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CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier |
Description This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one. Likelihood Of Attack Typical Severity Execution Flow Explore Determine Nature of Messages: Determine the nature of messages being transported as well as the identifiers to be used as part of the attack
Experiment Authenticate: If required, authenticate to the distribution channel Identify Known Client Identifiers: If any particular client's information is available through a control channel available to all users, the adversary will discover particular identifiers for targeted clients by observing this channel, or requesting client information through this channel. Change Message Identifier: Adversaries with client access connecting to output channels could change their channel identifier and see someone else's (perhaps more privileged) data.
Prerequisites
Information and client-sensitive (and client-specific) data must be present through a distribution channel available to all users. |
Distribution means must code (through channel, message identifiers, or convention) message destination in a manner visible within the distribution means itself (such as a control channel) or in the messages themselves. |
Skills Required
[Level: Low] All the adversary needs to discover is the format of the messages on the channel/distribution means and the particular identifier used within the messages. |
Resources Required
The adversary needs the ability to control source code or application configuration responsible for selecting which message/channel id is absorbed from the public distribution means. |
Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Confidentiality | Read Data | | Confidentiality Access Control Authorization | Gain Privileges | |
Mitigations
Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an authenticated user which they provide middleware. The middleware uses this token as part of its channel/message selection for that client, or part of a discerning authorization decision for privileged channels/messages. The purpose is to architect the system in a way that associates proper authentication/authorization with each channel/message. |
Re-architect system input/output channels as appropriate to distribute self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise protect) channels/messages so that only authorized readers can see them. |
Example Instances
A certain B2B interface on a large application codes for messages passed over an MQSeries queue, on a single "Partners" channel. Messages on that channel code for their client destination based on a partner_ID field, held by each message. That field is a simple integer. Adversaries having access to that channel, perhaps a particularly nosey partner, can simply choose to store messages of another partner's ID and read them as they desire. Note that authentication does not prevent a partner from leveraging this attack on other partners. It simply disallows adversaries without partner status from conducting this attack. |
Content History Submissions |
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Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
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2014-06-23 (Version 2.6) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Modifications |
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Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
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2015-12-07 (Version 2.8) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Description Summary | 2022-02-22 (Version 3.7) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Resources_Required, Skills_Required | Previous Entry Names |
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Change Date | Previous Entry Name |
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2015-12-07 (Version 2.8) | Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel | |
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