Explaining the Ammunition Shortage: The Show vs. Have Military Power Game

Damien Besancenot () and Radu Vranceanu
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Damien Besancenot: LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité, UPCité - Université Paris Cité

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Abstract: The return of high-intensity conflict at Europe's borders has exposed the massive underinvestment in ammunition by many Western states, relative to the normal availability of main weapons. This paper complements existing explanations for this relative imbalance with insights from a signaling game. In an environment of uncertain information, where neither military budgets nor investment in ammunition can be observed, low-budget states may imitate the procurement strategies of high-budget states to project an image of power. In this context, high-budget states have an incentive to over-invest in main weapons and neglect ammunition as a strategy to dissuade imitation by low-budget states. While this behavior may be rational in times of peace when perceptions may matter as much as capabilities, during wartime, the deficit in ammunition is extremely harmful, as it increases the likelihood of the opponent's victory.

Keywords: High-intensity warfare; Signaling game; Military power; Perceived power. JEL Classification -D82 F52 H56 H57; Perceived power. JEL Classification -D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08-05
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