Targeted killing by Israel

"}"> Targeted killing (Hebrew: סיכול ממוקד, romanized: sikul memukad, lit. 'focused foiling'),^[1][2] or assassination^[3] is a tactic that the government of Israel has used during the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Iran–Israel proxy conflict, and other conflicts.^[3]

There is no clear definition of "targeted killing" under international law. Academic Nils Melzer writes that "The term 'targeted killing' denotes the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons not in the physical custody of those targeting them".^[4][5]

The term gained widespread use in 2000 during the Second Intifada, when Israel became the first state to publicly outline a policy of "liquidation" and "preemptive targeted killing" in November 2000.^[6][7][8]

Before 2001, Israel denied it practiced or has a policy of conducting extrajudicial executions.^[7] Israel first publicly acknowledged its use of the tactic at Beit Sahour near Bethlehem in November 2000, when four laser-guided missiles from an Apache helicopter were used to kill a Tanzim leader, Hussein Abayat, in his Mitsubishi pickup truck, with collateral damage killing two 50 year-old housewives waiting for a taxi nearby, and wounding six other Palestinians in the vicinity.^[9][10] The public admission was due to the fact an attack helicopter had been used, which meant the execution could not be denied, something that remains possible when assassinations of targets by snipers takes place.^[11][9][10]

B'tselem has calculated that between 2002 and May 2008, at least 387 Palestinians died as a result of Israeli targeted killings, of which 234 were the targets, and the rest collateral casualties.^[12][13] The majority of Israeli targeted killings have taken place in Area A of the West Bank lying within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority.^[12] Some of the killings listed below have been denied by Israel. Most^{[citation needed]} fall within a series of campaigns, including Operation Wrath of God (launched in response to the 1972 Munich massacre), Israeli actions in the wake of the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–), and strikes during the 2008–09 Gaza War. According to reports, as part of the long-term cease-fire terms negotiated between Israel, Hamas and other Palestinian groups to end the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, Israel pledged it would desist from its targeted killings against Palestinian terrorists and faction leaders.^[14]

At the outset of the Second Intifada, it was reported that Ariel Sharon obtained an understanding from the administration of George W. Bush that the American government would provide support for Israel while it undertook a campaign of targeted assassinations against Palestinians, in exchange for Israel desisting from building Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.^[15]

Killings in the past were often premised on revenge for earlier crimes and required a quasi-judicial commission to convict the target of culpability before action was taken. The policy, re-introduced by Ariel Sharon in the face of suicide bombings, no longer took evidence of potential involvement by the target in future attacks on Israel as decisive, and the decision was left to the discretion of the Prime Minister and Shin Bet.^[16]

The Supreme Court of Israel, in response to a suit on the practice, mainly regarded actions in the Palestinian Territories, ruled on 14 December 2006 that such actions took place in an 'international armed conflict' but that the "terrorists", as civilians, lacked combatant status under international law. Yet they were, in the court's view, civilians participating directly in hostilities, which would mean they lose their immunity. It also ruled, following a precedent set forth by the European Court of Human Rights in its McCann and Others v United Kingdom judgement, that a 'law of proportionality', balancing military necessity with humanity, must apply.^[17] Assassinations were permitted if "strong and persuasive information" concerning the target's identity existed; if the mission served to curtail terror; and if other techniques, such as attempting to arrest the target, would gravely endanger soldiers' lives.

According to the former Legal Advisor to the State Department Judge Abraham Sofaer:

...killings in self-defense are no more "assassinations" in international affairs than they are murders when undertaken by our police forces against domestic killers. Targeted killings in self-defense have been authoritatively determined by the federal government to fall outside the assassination prohibition.^[18]

A state engaged in such activities must, however, Sofaer concluded, openly acknowledge its responsibility and accept accountability for mistakes made.

This characterization is criticized by many, including Amnesty International.^[19]

The Israeli army maintains that it pursues such military operations to prevent imminent attacks when it has no discernible means of making an arrest or foiling such attacks by other methods. On 14 December 2006, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that targeted killing is a legitimate form of self-defense against terrorists, and outlined several conditions for its use.^[20][21] The practice of targeted killing developed in the post-World War II period, throughout which Israel has exercised the option more than any other Western democracy, according to Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman.^[15]

Since then, Israeli Air Force has often used attack helicopters, mainly the Apache, to fire guided missiles toward the target. The Shin Bet supplies intelligence for the target. Sometimes, when heavier bombs are needed, the strike is carried out by F-16 warplanes. Other strategies employ strike teams of Israeli intelligence or military operatives. These operatives infiltrate areas known to harbor targeted individuals, and eliminate their assigned targets with small arms fire or use of explosives. Snipers have also been utilized, as was in the case of Dr. Thabet Thabet in 2001.^[22]

Unmanned combat aerial vehicles have also been used for strikes.^[23]

Notable targeted killings by the Israeli military were Hamas leaders Jamil Jadallah (October 2001),^[24] Mahmoud Abu Hanoud (November 2001),^[25] Salah Shahade (July 2002), Ibrahim al-Makadmeh (March 2003), Ismail Abu Shanab (August 2003), Ahmed Yassin (March 2004), Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi (April 2004) and Adnan al-Ghoul (October 2004), all targeted during the Second Intifada.^[26]

While the term "targeted killing" usually describes airborne attacks, Israeli security forces have killed top Palestinian militants in the past by other means, although this has never been confirmed officially.^[27] Other notable targeted killing involving multiple targets include Operation Wrath of God against Black September Organization and PLO personnel alleged to have been directly or indirectly involved in the 1972 Munich massacre, which led to the Lillehammer affair; and then Operation Spring of Youth against top PLO leaders in Beirut in 1973, namely Muhammad Najjar, Kamal Adwan, and Kamal Nasser.^[28]

According to the Israeli Human Rights organization B'Tselem, which uses data independent of the Israeli military, Israeli targeted killings claimed 425 Palestinian lives between September 2000 and August 2011. Of these, 251 persons (59.1 percent) were the targeted individuals and 174 (40.9 percent) were civilian bystanders. This implies a ratio of civilians to targets of 1:1.44 during the whole period.^[29]

The civilian casualty ratio of the targeted killings was surveyed by Haaretz military journalist Amos Harel. In 2002 and 2003, the ratio was 1:1, meaning one civilian killed for every target killed. Harel called this period "the dark days" because of the relatively high civilian death toll as compared to later years.^[when?] He attributed this to an Israeli Air Force (IAF) practice of attacking targets even when they were located in densely populated areas. While there were always safety rules, argued Harel, these were "bent" at times in view of the target's importance.^[30]

According to Harel, the civilian casualty ratio dropped steeply to 1:28 in late 2005, meaning one civilian killed for every 28 targets killed. Harel credited this drop to the new IAF chief Eliezer Shkedi's policies. The ratio rose again in 2006 to 1:10, a fact that Harel blamed on "several IAF mishaps". However, in 2007 and 2008 the ratio dropped to a level of less than 1:30, or 2–3 percent of the total casualties being civilian.^[30] Figures showing an improvement from 1:1 in 2002 to 1:30 in 2008 were also cited by Jerusalem Post journalist Yaakov Katz.^[31] Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School stated that the 2008 figure of 1:30 represents the lowest civilian to combatant casualty ratio in history in the setting of combating terrorism. Dershowitz criticized the international media and human rights organizations for not taking sufficient note of it. He also argued that even this figure may be misleading because not all civilians are innocent bystanders.^[32] In October 2009, Dershowitz stated that the ratio for Israel's campaign of targeted killings of terrorists stood at 1 civilian for every 28 targets. Dershowitz stated "the ratio was the best ratio of any country in the world that is fighting asymmetrical warfare against terrorists who hide behind civilians. It is far better than the ratio achieved by Great Britain and the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan, where both nations employ targeted killings of terrorist leaders."^{[citation needed]}

However, in a July 2011 article published in the Michigan War Studies Review, "Targeted Killings: A Modern Strategy of the State", A.E. Stahl and William F. Owen wrote that casualty ratios and death counts in general should be considered skeptically. Stahl and Owen state: "A caveat: reported death counts and casualty ratios should be approached with skepticism. Statistics are too easy to manipulate for political purposes, vitiating arguments based on them."^[33]

According to Neve Gordon, Israel’s approach to proportionally has undergone a significant change since 2008. In 2002 an outcry occurred when 14 other people were killed when Israel targeted and killed Salah Shehade. Since 7 October 2024, he adds, the IDF has authorised the killing up to and over 100 civilians whenever a single senior Hamas commander is targeted. The purpose of this strategy would be to effect a change in international law by repeatedly establishing a new precedent. In support of his view, Gordon cites a former head of the IDF's International Law Department, Colonel Daniel Reisner, who stated that the aim was:

’a revision of international law. If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries.’ ^[34]

The exact nature of the proof required by the Israelis for the killings is classified, as it involves clandestine military intelligence-oriented means and operational decisions. All Mossad targeted killings must have the approval of the Prime Minister,^[35] rather than being a part of a published justice system executed by lawyers and judges. International law provides two distinct normative paradigms which govern targeted killings in situations of law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities. As a form of individualized or surgical warfare, the method of targeted killing requires a "microscopic" interpretation of the law regulating the conduct of hostilities which leads nuanced results reflecting the fundamental principles underlying international humanitarian law. Any targeted killing not directed against a legitimate military target remains subject to the law enforcement paradigm, which imposes extensive restraints on the practice and even under the paradigm of hostilities, no person can be lawfully liquidated without further considerations.^[36]

Proponents of targeted killings

Proponents of the strategy argue that targeted killings are within the rules of war. They contend they are a measured response to terrorism, that focuses on actual perpetrators of militant attacks, while largely avoiding innocent casualties. They point out that targeted killings prevented some attacks against Israeli targets, weakened the effectiveness of militant groups, kept potential bomb makers on the run, and served as deterrence against militant operations. They also argue that targeted killings are less harmful toward Palestinian non-combatants than full-scale military incursion into Palestinian cities.^[37] The IDF claims that targeted killings are only pursued to prevent future terrorist acts, not as revenge for past activities as such they are not extrajudicial. The IDF also claims that this practice is only used when there is absolutely no practical way of foiling the future acts by other means (e.g., arrest) with minimal risk to its soldiers or civilians. The IDF also claims that the practice is only used when there is a certainty in the identification of the target, in order to minimize harm to innocent bystanders.^[26] They argue that because many of the Palestinians who have targeted Israel over the years have enjoyed the protection of Arab governments, extraditing them for trial in Israel has often proved impossible. They argue that Israeli governments have long used targeted killings as a last resort, when there were no peaceful options for bringing suspected terrorists to account.^[38] In a 2010 article in Infinity Journal, it was argued that targeted killings are a strategy that entails "limited, force in support of policy" and that the strategy has proven to work, albeit within specific contexts.^[39] The context of the Infinity Journal article related specifically to Hamas' calls for ceasefires and "calms" in 2004 after the majority of their leadership had been successfully targeted by Israeli forces. According to the article, "Targeted Killings Work", Israeli targeted killings throughout "the 2000–2005 armed rebellion represented a successful strategy" because "the tactics never undermined Israeli policy enough to alter Israel's overall political objectives" and because Hamas' will to continue with armed violence was temporarily broken.^[39]

Rule of law

This section contains weasel words: vague phrasing that often accompanies biased or unverifiable information. (August 2010)

In 2006, Israel's Supreme Court rejected a petition to declare targeted killings illegal. The court recognized that some killings violated international law, but the legality of individual operations must be assessed on a "case by case basis".^[20][21][42] It also said its decision that caution was needed to prevent civilian casualties. "Innocent civilians should not be targeted," it said. "Intelligence on the (targeted) person's identity must be carefully verified." The court also allowed for the possibility of compensation claims from civilians.^[42]

Defenders of this practice argue that the Palestinian National Authority has not lived up to its treaty agreements to crack down on militants and has even aided them in escaping Israeli authorities.^[43] As such in a legal opinion, Israeli attorney general Elyakim Rubinstein wrote: "The laws of combat which are part of international law, permit injuring, during a period of warlike operations, someone who has been positively identified as a person who is working to carry out fatal attacks against Israeli targets, those people are enemies who are fighting against Israel, with all that implies, while committing fatal terror attacks and intending to commit additional attacks—all without any countermeasures by the PA."^[44]

Gal Luft of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security has argued that because the Palestinian National Authority is not a state, and because few governments recognize Hamas' control in Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not bound by the set of norms, rules, and treaties regulating other state conflicts.^[11] John Podhoretz has written for the New York Post that if the conflict were between states, targeted killing would be in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention (Part 3, Article 1, Section 28) which reads: "The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations." Podhoretz therefore argues that international law explicitly gives Israel the right to conduct military operations against military targets under these circumstances.^[45][46]

Opponents of Israeli targeted killings, among them human rights groups and members of the international community including Britain, the European Union,^[42] Russia, France, India, China, Brazil, South Africa and all Arab States, have stated that targeted killings violate international laws and create an obstruction to the peace process.^[47]

Authors Howard Friel, Richard Falk, and Palestinian representatives to the United Nations Security Council regard targeted killings as extrajudicial killing, and argue that it is a rejection of the rule of law and due process.^[48][49] They defend that in international law assassination was outlawed in both the 1937 convention of for the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism and the 1973 New York convention.^[37][50]

IDF reports show that from the start of the Second Intifada (in 2000) to the year 2005, Palestinians killed 1,074 Israelis and wounded 7,520. Such losses generated immense public pressure from the Israeli public for a forceful response, and the Israeli increase in targeted killings was one such outcome.^[40] Targeted killings are largely supported by Israeli society.^[11][51] A poll published by Maariv newspaper in July 2001 found that 90 percent of Israeli public support the practice.^[37]

• Anat Kamm-Uri Blau affair
• Counter-terrorism
• Extrajudicial execution
• Manhunt (military)
• Operation Damocles
• Targeted killing
• Targeted Killing in International Law
• Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World
• Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations
• List of Mossad operations
• Human rights violations against Palestinians by Israel
• Dariush Rezaeinejad