Philosophy of Law Chapter 8
Philosophy of Law Chapter 8
Philosophy of Law Chapter 8
INTRODUCTION
Nomenclatural Distinction
At the outset, a cursory distinction must be made between “Philosophy of Law” and “Legal
Philosophy.”
1. While they both deal with Philosophy and Law, their field of emphasis is different. Philosophy of law is a
branch of philosophy, and therefore deals primarily with philosophy. Legal Philosophy is a discipline in
law, and therefore deals primarily with law. In other words, their operational base is different – Philosophy
of law is within philosophy, whereas Legal Philosophy is within the legal academy.[1]
2. Consequently, because of the difference in their field of emphasis, it seems that philosophy of law is
broader than legal philosophy. Philosophy is an all-encompassing subject that may have as its subject
matter anything under the sun; thus the so-called philosophy of X, and philosophy of “law” is just one of
the many possible subjects. The philosophical approach is highly abstract and seeks for the ultimate
“whys” and “wherefores.” Legal theory deals specifically with how institutions and legal processes are
legitimized or justified.
3. The distinction, however, is never clear. They overlap in terms of subject and themes. And in pursuit of a
more academic discussion in a post graduate course, it is becomes unimportant to distinguish philosophy
of law and legal philosophy.
Schools of Thought
There are two major contending schools of thought in philosophy of law: Natural Law Theory and Legal
Positivism.
1. From the time of the ancient Greeks until the seventeenth century, natural law was the only legal theory.
In brief, natural law understands law as an “ordinance of reason” and “intimately connected to morality;”
hence law must be “reasonable” and “just” otherwise it is not law.
2. Legal positivism came after, generally contending that the law is only a kind of “social technology” which
does not necessarily have a moral character. Under this theory, what the law does is regulate the
behavior of its subjects and resolves conflict between them.[2] A law exists not for its moral or rational
underpinnings but because of the social mechanisms that promulgate it.
3. Roughly speaking, the two schools of thought differ in their understanding of philosophy of law, in that
natural law almost makes philosophy of law as a “branch of moral or ethical philosophy,” while legal
positivism takes philosophy of law as the “philosophy of a particular social institution.”[3]
Law and morality are intimately connected. Law and morality are different.
All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which is that there is a necessary relation
between the concepts of law and morality. According to this view, then, the concept of law cannot be fully
articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may seem unambiguous,
there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted.
The strongest form of the Overlap Thesis underlies the classical naturalism of St. Thomas Aquinas and
William Blackstone. As Blackstone describes the thesis:
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in
obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are
of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original (1979, p. 41).
In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of classical
naturalism: 1) there can be no legally valid standards that conflict with the natural law; and 2) all valid laws
derive what force and authority they have from the natural law. On this view, to paraphrase Augustine, an
unjust law is no law at all.
Related to Blackstone's classical naturalism is the neo-naturalism of John Finnis (1980). Finnis believes
that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the
existence conditions for law. According to Finnis (see also Bix, 1996), the classical naturalists were not
concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining
the moral force of law: "the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of
"obligation") of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles" (Finnis 1980,
pp. 23-24). On Finnis's view of the Overlap Thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a justification
for state coercion. Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but cannot provide an adequate
justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an
unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally
binding, but is not fully law.
Lon Fuller (1964) rejects the idea that there are necessary moral constraints on the content of law. On
Fuller's view, law is necessarily subject to a procedural morality consisting of eight principles:
P1: the rules must be expressed in general terms;
P2: the rules must be publicly promulgated;
P3: the rules must be prospective in effect;
P4: the rules must be expressed in understandable terms;
P5: the rules must be consistent with one another;
P6: the rules must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties;
P7: the rules must not be changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and
P8: the rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their wording.
On Fuller's view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles of legality can achieve
law's essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide behavior. A system of
rules that fails to satisfy (P2) or (P4), for example, cannot guide behavior because people will not be able
to determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller concludes that his eight principles are "internal" to
law in the sense that they are built into the existence conditions for law: "A total failure in any one of these
eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly
called a legal system at all" (1964, p. 39).
b. Legal Positivism
Opposed to all forms of naturalism is legal positivism, which is roughly constituted by three theoretical
commitments: (i) the Social Fact Thesis, (ii) the Conventionality Thesis, and (iii) the Separability Thesis.
The Social Fact Thesis (which is also known as the Pedigree Thesis) asserts that it is a necessary truth
that legal validity is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social facts. The Conventionality
Thesis emphasizes law's conventional nature, claiming that the social facts giving rise to legal validity are
authoritative in virtue of some kind of social convention. The Separability Thesis, at the most general level,
simply denies naturalism's Overlap Thesis; according to the Separability Thesis, there is no conceptual
overlap between the notions of law and morality.
Positivism is from the Latin root positus, which means to posit, postulate, or firmly affix the existence of
something. Legal positivism is a school of jurisprudence whose advocates believe that the only legitimate
sources of law are those written rules, regulations, and principles that have been expressly enacted,
adopted, or recognized by a governmental entity or political institution, including administrative, executive,
legislative, and judicial bodies. The basic question to be asked when talking about this theory is “What is
law?” Is it written? Where does it come from? Legal positivism is a theory which answers these questions.
Legal positivism is the legal philosophy which argues that any and all laws are nothing more and nothing
less than simply the expression of the will of whatever authority created them. Thus, no laws can be
regarded as expressions of higher morality or higher principles to which people can appeal when they
disagree with the laws. It is a view that law is a social construction. The creation of laws is simply an
exercise in brute force and an expression of power, not an attempt to realize any loftier moral or social
goals. Therefore, from a positivist perspective, it can be said that “legal rules or laws are valid not
because they are rooted in moral or natural law, but because they are enacted by legitimate authority and
are accepted by the society as such”.