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57 pages, 13541 KiB  
Article
A Credibility Monitoring Approach and Software Monitoring System for VHF Data Exchange System Data Link Based on a Combined Detection Method
by Xiaoye Wang, Leyun Fu, Weichen Wang and Qing Hu
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2024, 12(10), 1751; https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse12101751 - 3 Oct 2024
Viewed by 294
Abstract
Due to VDES’s higher data transmission speed and complex communication protocols, vulnerabilities within its data link infrastructure are more pronounced. To ensure the reliability of VDES data transmission, this manuscript proposes a credibility monitoring approach based on the combined detection method of radio [...] Read more.
Due to VDES’s higher data transmission speed and complex communication protocols, vulnerabilities within its data link infrastructure are more pronounced. To ensure the reliability of VDES data transmission, this manuscript proposes a credibility monitoring approach based on the combined detection method of radio interference detection and spoofing source identification and localization, focusing on key data link vulnerabilities outlined in the IALA G1181 VDES VDL Integrity Guide. Automated monitoring is achieved through VDES data link monitoring software (VDES(AIS 2.0)), which is based on a three-tier architecture and a Client/Server (C/S) model. The software validates monitoring techniques and software against various interference scenarios. Visualization of monitoring results, alarm notifications, and relevant data through the front-end interface enhances understanding of VDES data link credibility. This framework supports effective surveillance and detection of vulnerabilities, such as radio interference and spoofing sources. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Ocean Engineering)
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<p>Schematic illustration of the maritime wireless communication system.</p>
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<p>Two types of VDES data link interference scenarios mentioned in the IALA G1181 guidelines.</p>
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<p>Main structural diagram of VDES data link credibility monitoring approach based on a combined detection method.</p>
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<p>Flowchart of the MD5 algorithm computation.</p>
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<p>Results of failed message content integrity verification detection.</p>
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<p>Results of successful message content integrity verification detection.</p>
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<p>Comparison chart of computational speed of message digest algorithms.</p>
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<p>Diagram of the HMAC algorithm computation process.</p>
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<p>Results of failed verification of message consistency between VDES base stations.</p>
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<p>Results of successful verification of message consistency between VDES base stations.</p>
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<p>Positioning the vessel by using VDES shore station signals.</p>
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<p>The spoofing source broadcasting the spoofing VDES message.</p>
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<p>Positioning the spoofing source.</p>
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<p>The single monitoring station positioning scenario.</p>
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<p>The two monitoring stations positioning scenario.</p>
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<p>The three monitoring stations positioning scenario.</p>
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<p>Simulation results of testing for the absence of spoofing sources based on Visual Studio 2019.</p>
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<p>Simulation results of spoofing source detection based on Visual Studio 2019.</p>
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<p>Results of spoofing source localization by a single monitoring station.</p>
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<p>Results of spoofing source localization by a two monitoring stations.</p>
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<p>Results of spoofing source localization by a three monitoring stations.</p>
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<p>Results of spoofing source localization by a three monitoring stations.</p>
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<p>Algorithmic flowchart for a VDES data link credibility monitoring system based on a combined detection method.</p>
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<p>Architectural overview of the VDES data link monitoring system.</p>
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<p>User login interface for the software system.</p>
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<p>Structural block diagram of the VDES communication module.</p>
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<p>Functionality verification results of the VDES communication module.</p>
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<p>Flowchart for VDES message encapsulation.</p>
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<p>Functionality verification results for the VDES message encapsulation module.</p>
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<p>UML diagram for VDES message parsing.</p>
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<p>Functionality verification results for the VDES message parsing module.</p>
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<p>Functionality verification results for the VDES message integrity module.</p>
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<p>Verification results of the VDES communication consistency checking module.</p>
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<p>Functional verification results of the ship-to-shore distance and propagation distance matching analysis module.</p>
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<p>Results and figures of VDES message format compliance testing.</p>
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<p>Results and figures of VDES message parameter legitimacy verification testing.</p>
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<p>Results of VDES message content integrity verification testing.</p>
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<p>Results of VDES transmission and reception messages consistency check test.</p>
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<p>Results of radio interference vulnerability and threat testing.</p>
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<p>Results of testing for the absence of spoofing sources based on the Credibility Monitoring Software.</p>
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<p>Results of spoofing source detection based on the Credibility Monitoring Software.</p>
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<p>Results of spoofing source localization testing.</p>
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22 pages, 1367 KiB  
Article
Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks in UAVs Based on Adversarial Machine Learning Model
by Lamia Alhoraibi, Daniyal Alghazzawi and Reemah Alhebshi
Sensors 2024, 24(18), 6156; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24186156 - 23 Sep 2024
Viewed by 812
Abstract
Advancements in wireless communication and automation have revolutionized mobility systems, notably through autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAV spatial coordinates, determined via Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, are susceptible to cyberattacks due to unencrypted and unauthenticated transmissions with GPS spoofing being [...] Read more.
Advancements in wireless communication and automation have revolutionized mobility systems, notably through autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAV spatial coordinates, determined via Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, are susceptible to cyberattacks due to unencrypted and unauthenticated transmissions with GPS spoofing being a significant threat. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for UAVs have been developed and enhanced using machine learning (ML) algorithms. However, Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) has introduced new risks by exploiting ML models. This study presents a UAV-IDS employing AML methodology to enhance the detection and classification of GPS spoofing attacks. The key contribution is the development of an AML detection model that significantly improves UAV system robustness and security. Our findings indicate that the model achieves a detection accuracy of 98%, demonstrating its effectiveness in managing large-scale datasets and complex tasks. This study emphasizes the importance of physical layer security for enhancing IDSs in UAVs by introducing a novel detection model centered on an adversarial training defense method and advanced deep learning techniques. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Sensor Networks)
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<p>Overview of the offensive architecture.</p>
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<p>Overview of the defensive architecture.</p>
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<p>Proposed detection model.</p>
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<p>Proposed offensive model.</p>
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<p>Binary confusion matrix.</p>
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<p>K-fold cross-validation analysis with five iterations chosen as K-fold.</p>
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<p>Accuracy analysis.</p>
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<p>Precision analysis.</p>
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<p>Recall analysis.</p>
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<p>F1 score analysis.</p>
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<p>ROC curves of the AML detection model under different GPS spoofing attacks.</p>
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24 pages, 2984 KiB  
Article
SSRL-UAVs: A Self-Supervised Deep Representation Learning Approach for GPS Spoofing Attack Detection in Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
by Abed Alanazi
Drones 2024, 8(9), 515; https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8090515 - 23 Sep 2024
Viewed by 603
Abstract
Self-Supervised Representation Learning (SSRL) has become a potent strategy for addressing the growing threat of Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing to small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) by capturing more abstract and high-level contributing features. This study focuses on enhancing attack detection capabilities by [...] Read more.
Self-Supervised Representation Learning (SSRL) has become a potent strategy for addressing the growing threat of Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing to small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) by capturing more abstract and high-level contributing features. This study focuses on enhancing attack detection capabilities by incorporating SSRL techniques. An innovative hybrid architecture integrates Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) models to detect attacks on small UAVs alongside two additional architectures, LSTM-Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Deep Neural Network (DNN), for detecting GPS spoofing attacks. The proposed model leverages SSRL, autonomously extracting meaningful features without the need for many labelled instances. Key configurations include LSTM-GRU, with 64 neurons in the input and concatenate layers and 32 neurons in the second layer. Ablation analysis explores various parameter settings, with the model achieving an impressive 99.9% accuracy after 10 epoch iterations, effectively countering GPS spoofing attacks. To further enhance this approach, transfer learning techniques are also incorporated, which help to improve the adaptability and generalisation of the SSRL model. By saving and applying pre-trained weights to a new dataset, we leverage prior knowledge to improve performance. This integration of SSRL and transfer learning yields a validation accuracy of 79.0%, demonstrating enhanced generalisation to new data and reduced training time. The combined approach underscores the robustness and efficiency of GPS spoofing detection in UAVs. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Detection, Security, and Communication for UAV)
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<p>Small UAV’s GPS spoofing attacks scenario.</p>
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<p>Proposed methodology.</p>
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<p>Training and validation accuracy for LSTM-GRU.</p>
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<p>Training and validation accuracy for LSTM-RNN.</p>
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<p>Training and validation accuracy for DNN.</p>
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<p>Training and validation loss for LSTM-GRU.</p>
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<p>Training and validation loss for LSTM-RNN.</p>
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<p>Training and validation loss for DNN.</p>
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<p>Confusion matrix for LSTM-GRU.</p>
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<p>Confusion matrix for LSTM-RNN.</p>
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<p>Confusion matrix for DNN.</p>
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<p>Transfer learning model results.</p>
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19 pages, 1160 KiB  
Review
Detecting Denial of Service Attacks (DoS) over the Internet of Drones (IoD) Based on Machine Learning
by Albandari Alsumayt, Naya Nagy, Shatha Alsharyofi, Noor Al Ibrahim, Renad Al-Rabie, Resal Alahmadi, Roaa Ali Alesse and Amal A. Alahmadi
Sci 2024, 6(3), 56; https://doi.org/10.3390/sci6030056 - 20 Sep 2024
Viewed by 485
Abstract
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones has increased lately. This phenomenon is due to UAVs’ wide range of applications in fields such as agriculture, delivery, security and surveillance, and construction. In this context, the security and the continuity of UAV [...] Read more.
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones has increased lately. This phenomenon is due to UAVs’ wide range of applications in fields such as agriculture, delivery, security and surveillance, and construction. In this context, the security and the continuity of UAV operations becomes a crucial issue. Spoofing, jamming, hijacking, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are just a few categories of attacks that threaten drones. The present paper is focused on the security of UAVs against DoS attacks. It illustrates the pros and cons of existing methods and resulting challenges. From here, we develop a novel method to detect DoS attacks in UAV environments. DoS attacks themselves have many sub-categories and can be executed using many techniques. Consequently, there is a need for robust protection and mitigation systems to shield UAVs from DoS attacks. One promising security solution is intrusion detection systems (IDSs). IDs paired with machine learning (ML) techniques provide the ability to greatly reduce the risk, as attacks can be detected before they happen. ML plays an important part in improving the performance of IDSs. The many existing ML models that detect DoS attacks on UAVs each carry their own strengths and limitations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Topic Trends and Prospects in Security, Encryption and Encoding)
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<p>Paper sections.</p>
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<p>Malicious uses of drones.</p>
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<p>UAV attack classification.</p>
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20 pages, 5589 KiB  
Article
Advanced Control Strategies for Securing UAV Systems: A Cyber-Physical Approach
by Mohammad Sadeq Ale Isaac, Pablo Flores Peña, Daniela Gîfu and Ahmed Refaat Ragab
Appl. Syst. Innov. 2024, 7(5), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/asi7050083 - 6 Sep 2024
Viewed by 588
Abstract
This paper explores the application of sliding mode control (SMC) as a robust security enhancement strategy for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems. The study proposes integrating advanced SMC techniques with security protocols to develop a dual-purpose system that improves UAV control and fortifies [...] Read more.
This paper explores the application of sliding mode control (SMC) as a robust security enhancement strategy for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems. The study proposes integrating advanced SMC techniques with security protocols to develop a dual-purpose system that improves UAV control and fortifies against adversarial actions. The strategy includes dynamic reconfiguration capabilities within the SMC framework, allowing adaptive responses to threats by adjusting control laws and operational parameters. This is complemented by anomaly detection algorithms that monitor deviations in control signals and system states, providing early warnings of potential cyber-intrusions or physical tampering. Additionally, fault-tolerant SMC mechanisms are designed to maintain control and system stability even when parts of the UAV are compromised. The methodology involves simulation and real-world testing to validate the effectiveness of the SMC-based security enhancements. Simulations assess how the UAV handles attack scenarios, such as GPS spoofing and control signal jamming, with SMC adapting in real-time to mitigate these threats. Field tests further confirm the system’s capability to operate under varied conditions, proving the feasibility of SMC for enhancing UAV security. This integration of sliding mode control into UAV security protocols leverages control theory for security purposes, offering a significant advancement in the robust, adaptive control of UAVs in hostile environments. Full article
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<p>The inertial frame vs. body frame of the helicopter. Different colors are used for a clearer distinction between the components of each frame.</p>
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<p>Performance of the helicopter’s control system in the presence of the secured algorithm, highlighting various key parameters and their behavior over a 45-min flight. The subplots present altitude, throttle, flight trajectory, roll, pitch, yaw, and corresponding servo flap positions.</p>
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<p>Performance data of the Nuntius helicopter controlled by a secured SMC during a 45-min flight with random noise applied to the yaw angle between minutes 10 and 20. The subplots display critical flight parameters and corresponding control inputs.</p>
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<p>Performance data of the Nuntius helicopter controlled by a secured SMC during a 35-min flight. The pilot began sending assisted-manual commands at around minute 20, starting with a throttle reduction. The data highlight the controller’s compensation for these inputs, maintaining stability despite the manual interventions.</p>
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<p>Performance data of the Nuntius helicopter controlled by a secured SMC during a 45-min flight. At around minute 30, a changing direction was applied to the roll loop to test the attitude control performance. The figure showcases the helicopter’s response to this input across various flight parameters.</p>
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<p>Performance data of the Nuntius helicopter controlled by a secured SMC during a 50-min flight. The flight includes transitions between manual and automatic control modes, with significant altitude changes at around minute 12 and minute 35. The figure evaluates the controller’s performance in maintaining stability and handling these transitions.</p>
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23 pages, 2789 KiB  
Article
PSAU-Defender: A Lightweight and Low-Cost Comprehensive Framework for BeiDou Spoofing Mitigation in Vehicular Networks
by Usman Tariq
World Electr. Veh. J. 2024, 15(9), 407; https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj15090407 - 5 Sep 2024
Viewed by 460
Abstract
The increasing reliance of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) on the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) for precise positioning and timing information has raised significant concerns regarding their vulnerability to spoofing attacks. This research proposes a novel approach to mitigate BeiDou spoofing attacks in [...] Read more.
The increasing reliance of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) on the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) for precise positioning and timing information has raised significant concerns regarding their vulnerability to spoofing attacks. This research proposes a novel approach to mitigate BeiDou spoofing attacks in VANETs by leveraging a hybrid machine learning model that combines XGBoost and Random Forest with a Kalman Filter for real-time anomaly detection in BeiDou signals. It also introduces a geospatial message authentication mechanism to enhance vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication security. The research investigates low-cost and accessible countermeasures against spoofing attacks using COTS receivers and open-source SDRs. Spoofing attack scenarios are implemented in both software and hardware domains using an open-source BeiDou signal simulator to examine the effects of different spoofing attacks on victim receivers and identify detection methods for each type, focusing on pre-correlation techniques with power-related metrics and signal quality monitoring using correlator values. The emulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in detecting and mitigating BeiDou spoofing attacks in VANETs, ensuring the integrity and reliability of safety-critical information. This research contributes to the development of robust security mechanisms for VANETs and has practical implications for enhancing the resilience of transportation systems against spoofing threats. Future research will focus on extending the proposed approach to other GNSS constellations and exploring the integration of additional security measures to further strengthen VANET security. Full article
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<p>Differentiating legitimate and spoofed signals in navigation systems.</p>
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<p>PSAU-Defender framework to detect and mitigate BSD spoofing anomalies.</p>
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<p>Emulation assessment outcomes (selected sample extracted from data outcomes of fifty vehicles). (<b>a</b>) Link Establishment Requests between Source and Destination. (<b>b</b>) Network Connectivity Checks. (<b>c</b>) Session Connection Log. (<b>d</b>) Ad hoc Session Termination. (<b>e</b>) Critical System Event Alert. (<b>f</b>) Generation and Transmission of Localized Spoofing Signals. (<b>g</b>) Vehicle Disconnects from Ad Hoc Network. (<b>h</b>) Isolation of Malicious Nodes upon Detection.</p>
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<p>Performance evaluation of our proposed methodology in the context of current best practices [<a href="#B8-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">8</a>,<a href="#B9-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">9</a>,<a href="#B10-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">10</a>,<a href="#B11-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">11</a>,<a href="#B12-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">12</a>,<a href="#B13-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">13</a>].</p>
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<p>Performance outcome of PSAU-Defender at varying distances for enhanced VANET security [<a href="#B8-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">8</a>,<a href="#B9-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">9</a>,<a href="#B10-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">10</a>,<a href="#B11-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">11</a>,<a href="#B12-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">12</a>,<a href="#B13-wevj-15-00407" class="html-bibr">13</a>].</p>
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27 pages, 6859 KiB  
Article
AOHDL: Adversarial Optimized Hybrid Deep Learning Design for Preventing Attack in Radar Target Detection
by Muhammad Moin Akhtar, Yong Li, Wei Cheng, Limeng Dong, Yumei Tan and Langhuan Geng
Remote Sens. 2024, 16(16), 3109; https://doi.org/10.3390/rs16163109 - 22 Aug 2024
Viewed by 817
Abstract
In autonomous driving, Frequency-Modulated Continuous-Wave (FMCW) radar has gained widespread acceptance for target detection due to its resilience and dependability under diverse weather and illumination circumstances. Although deep learning radar target identification models have seen fast improvement, there is a lack of research [...] Read more.
In autonomous driving, Frequency-Modulated Continuous-Wave (FMCW) radar has gained widespread acceptance for target detection due to its resilience and dependability under diverse weather and illumination circumstances. Although deep learning radar target identification models have seen fast improvement, there is a lack of research on their susceptibility to adversarial attacks. Various spoofing attack techniques have been suggested to target radar sensors by deliberately sending certain signals through specialized devices. In this paper, we proposed a new adversarial deep learning network for spoofing attacks in radar target detection (RTD). Multi-level adversarial attack prevention using deep learning is designed for the coherence pulse deep feature map from DAALnet and Range-Doppler (RD) map from TDDLnet. After the discrimination of the attack, optimization of hybrid deep learning (OHDL) integrated with enhanced PSO is used to predict the range and velocity of the target. Simulations are performed to evaluate the sensitivity of AOHDL for different radar environment configurations. RMSE of AOHDL is almost the same as OHDL without attack conditions and it outperforms the earlier RTD implementations. Full article
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<p>FMCW chirp sequence.</p>
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<p>Range FFT from sampling.</p>
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<p>Range Doppler FFT from chirp sequence.</p>
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<p>Proposed workflow of the RTD.</p>
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<p>DAALnet architecture.</p>
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<p>FELLLnet architecture.</p>
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<p>TDDLnet layout.</p>
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<p>EPSO flowchart.</p>
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<p>Adversarial attack in radar system: (<b>a</b>) normal scenario; (<b>b</b>) adversarial attack scenario.</p>
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<p>RGAN architecture.</p>
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<p>Radar echo data cube database (row 1: bike target, row 2: car target, row 3: synthetic target).</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) Generated images of DAALnet; (<b>b</b>) DAALnet adversarial network learning progress, epoch: 50, iteration: 150, elapsed: 00:18:06.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) Generated images of TDDLnet; (<b>b</b>) TDDLnet adversarial network learning progress, epoch: 50, iteration: 150, elapsed: 00:10:54.</p>
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<p>RMSE comparison for range estimation.</p>
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<p>RMSE comparison for velocity estimation.</p>
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<p>Adversarial attack performance in range prediction.</p>
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<p>Adversarial attack performance in velocity prediction.</p>
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<p>The time complexity of the system.</p>
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<p>Prediction accuracy of the system.</p>
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<p>Impact of different interference in detection of radar target.</p>
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<p>Impact of dynamic environment on RMSE evaluation.</p>
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33 pages, 11324 KiB  
Article
An AIS Base Station Credibility Monitoring Method Based on Service Radius Detection Patterns in Complex Sea Surface Environments
by Xiaoye Wang, Yalan Wang, Leyun Fu and Qing Hu
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2024, 12(8), 1352; https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse12081352 - 8 Aug 2024
Viewed by 482
Abstract
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) utilizes base stations to manage vessel traffic and disseminate waterway information. These stations broadcast maritime safety data to vessels within their service radius using VHF signals. However, the emergence of “spoofing base stations” poses a significant threat to [...] Read more.
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) utilizes base stations to manage vessel traffic and disseminate waterway information. These stations broadcast maritime safety data to vessels within their service radius using VHF signals. However, the emergence of “spoofing base stations” poses a significant threat to maritime safety. These impostors mimic legitimate AIS base stations by appropriating their Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) information, interacting with vessels, potentially leading to erroneous decisions, or guiding vessels into hazardous areas. Therefore, ensuring the credibility of AIS base stations is critical for safe vessel navigation. It is essential to distinguish between genuine AIS base stations and “spoofing base stations” to achieve this goal. One criterion for identifying AIS spoofing involves detecting signals beyond the expected service radius of AIS base stations. This paper proposes a method to monitor the credibility of AIS base stations through a service radius detection pattern. Furthermore, the method analyzes the impact of hydrological and meteorological factors on AIS signal propagation in complex sea surface environments. By integrating empirical data, it accurately describes the mathematical relationship and calculates the service radius of AIS base station signals. Analyzing vessel position coordinates, decoding base station position messages, and computing distances between vessels and AIS base stations allows for matching with the AIS base station’s designated service radius and propagation distance. This approach enables precise identification of AIS spoofing base stations, thereby facilitating robust monitoring of AIS base station credibility. The research outcomes provide a foundational framework for developing high-credibility AIS base station services within integrated maritime navigation and information systems. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Ocean Engineering)
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<p>Wave modeling at different wind speeds. (<b>a</b>) Wind Speed = 0 m/s; (<b>b</b>) Wind Speed = 2 m/s; (<b>c</b>) Wind Speed = 15 m/s; (<b>d</b>) Wind Speed = 18 m/s.</p>
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<p>AIS Base Station Signal Transmission Loss under the Influence of Different Wind Speeds.</p>
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<p>AIS Base Station Signal Coverage under the Influence of Different Wind Speeds.</p>
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<p>Model the propagation of AIS base station signals under changing tidal water levels.</p>
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<p>Transmission Loss of AIS Base Station Signals under Different Tidal Water Level Variations.</p>
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<p>Service Radius of AIS Base Station Signals under Different Tidal Water Level Variations.</p>
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<p>Schematic of the AIS base station signal propagation in the presence of an evaporation duct.</p>
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<p>Illustrates the transmission loss of AIS base station signals under different effective duct heights.</p>
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<p>Depicts the service radius of AIS base station signals under different effective duct heights.</p>
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<p>Main architecture diagram of the AIS base station credibility monitoring pattern based on the service radius detection mode of AIS base stations.</p>
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<p>Map of the Ship’s Movement Route with Two Red Stars as the Starting and Ending Points.</p>
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<p>Service Radius of AIS Base Station Signals under Different Sea Surface Conditions. (<b>a</b>) Wind speed changes; (<b>b</b>)Tidal water level changes; (<b>c</b>) evaporation duct height.</p>
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<p>AIS Signal Field Strength Calculation Method based on the ITU-R P.1546 Model.</p>
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<p>Transmission Loss of AIS Base Station Signals Under Different Models.</p>
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<p>The flowchart of the AIS base station credibility monitoring method based on the service radius detection pattern.</p>
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<p>Login Interface of AIS Base Station Credibility Monitoring System.</p>
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<p>Results of the experimental system monitoring with illegal base station MMSIs set.</p>
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<p>AIS base station service credibility monitoring results for three distinct scenarios (* in this figure is the checksum field identifier).</p>
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<p>Results of the experimental system monitoring with “spoofing” base stations present outside the AIS base station service radius.</p>
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<p>Results of the experimental system monitoring with “spoofing” base stations present within the AIS base station service radius for the location mismatch with MMSI code scenario.</p>
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<p>Results of the experimental system monitoring with “spoofing” base stations present within the AIS base station service radius for the illegitimate message scenario.</p>
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<p>Results of the experimental system monitoring with “Spoofing” base stations present within the AIS base station service radius for the ship-to-shore distance beyond the expected range scenario.</p>
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<p>Results of the experimental system monitoring with scenarios devoid of “spoofing” base stations.</p>
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27 pages, 1525 KiB  
Article
Detection Strategies for COM, WMI, and ALPC-Based Multi-Process Malware
by Radu Marian Portase, Andrei Marius Muntea, Andrei Mermeze, Adrian Colesa and Gheorghe Sebestyen
Sensors 2024, 24(16), 5118; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24165118 - 7 Aug 2024
Viewed by 622
Abstract
Behavioral malware detection is based on attributing malicious actions to processes. Malicious processes may try to hide by changing the behavior of other benign processes to achieve their goals. We showcase how Component Object Model (COM) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be [...] Read more.
Behavioral malware detection is based on attributing malicious actions to processes. Malicious processes may try to hide by changing the behavior of other benign processes to achieve their goals. We showcase how Component Object Model (COM) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to create such spoofing attacks. We discuss the internals of COM and WMI and Asynchronous Local Procedure Call (ALPC). We present multiple functional monitoring techniques to identify the spoofing and discuss the strong and weak points of each technique. We create a robust process monitoring system that can correctly identify the source of malicious actions spoofed via COM, WMI and ALPC with a low performance impact. Finally, we discuss how malicious actors use COM, WMI and ALPC by examining real-world malware detected by our monitoring system. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Sensor Networks)
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<p>Procmon result for in-process execution using Win32 Api.</p>
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<p>Procmon result for out-of-process execution using COM.</p>
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<p>COM object anatomy.</p>
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<p>Local out-of-process server.</p>
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<p>RPCSS system activator flow.</p>
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<p>RPCSS object resolver flow.</p>
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<p>Monitoring COM through proxy objects.</p>
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<p>Monitoring COM through VTable patching.</p>
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<p>Monitoring COM using ETW and kernel mode filters.</p>
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<p>ALPC flow.</p>
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<p>Monitoring system architecture.</p>
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<p>COM and WMI monitoring architecture.</p>
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<p>Performance test results for user activity.</p>
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<p>Performance test results PCMark 10.</p>
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18 pages, 4287 KiB  
Article
Advanced GNSS Spoofing Detection: Aggregated Correlation Residue Likelihood Analysis
by Ning Ji, Yongnan Rao, Xue Wang and Decai Zou
Remote Sens. 2024, 16(15), 2868; https://doi.org/10.3390/rs16152868 - 5 Aug 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 924
Abstract
Compared to conventional spoofing, emerging spoofing attacks pose a heightened threat to security applications within the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) due to their subtly designed signal structures. In response, a novel spoofing detection method entitled aggregated correlation residue likelihood analysis (A-CoRLiAn) is [...] Read more.
Compared to conventional spoofing, emerging spoofing attacks pose a heightened threat to security applications within the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) due to their subtly designed signal structures. In response, a novel spoofing detection method entitled aggregated correlation residue likelihood analysis (A-CoRLiAn) is proposed in this study. Requiring only the addition of a pair of supplementary correlators, A-CoRLiAn harnesses correlation residues to formulate a likelihood metric, subsequently aggregating weighted decisions from all tracked satellites to ascertain the presence of spoofing. Evaluated under six diverse spoofing scenarios (including emerging challenges) in the Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT) via Monte Carlo simulations, A-CoRLiAn yields a detection rate of 99.71%, demonstrating sensitivity, robustness, autonomy, and a lightweight architecture conducive to real-time implementation against spoofing threats. Full article
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<p>Changing process of absolute correlation function under spoofing attack (<b>left</b>) and its top view (<b>right</b>).</p>
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<p>Scheme of A-CoRLiAn method.</p>
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<p>TDL system identification model.</p>
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<p>Impact of delay interval <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Δ</mi> </semantics></math> on <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>κ</mi> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi mathvariant="bold-italic">N</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>ϖ</mi> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>Detection rate <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>P</mi> <mi>d</mi> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math> under varied <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>δ</mi> <mrow> <mi>t</mi> <mi>r</mi> <mi>a</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>Aggregated CoRLiAn detection probability <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>P</mi> <mi>d</mi> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math> at various <span class="html-italic">p</span>.</p>
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<p>Comparison of critical variables for single CoRLiAn decision under spoofing (orange) and non-spoofing (blue) conditions: residual correlation values (<b>left</b>) and corresponding channel parameters (<b>right</b>) for ds7 SVN 13 (238–239 s).</p>
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<p>The 400 s CoRLiAn metrics <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>T</mi> </semantics></math> (blue) for eight tracked satellites in ds7, alongside threshold <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msup> <mi>γ</mi> <mo>′</mo> </msup> <mo>=</mo> <mn>0.32</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math> (orange), the probing effectiveness and the robustness.</p>
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<p>The 400 s CoRLiAn decisions <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi mathvariant="normal">d</mi> </semantics></math> for eight tracked satellites in ds7, illustrating its effectiveness and robustness.</p>
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<p>The 400 s aggregated test metrics <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>h</mi> </semantics></math> (<b>left</b>) and decisions <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>D</mi> </semantics></math> (<b>right</b>) of A-CoRLiAn for eight tracked satellites in ds7, illustrating the enhanced detection performance achieved through aggregation.</p>
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<p>Detection performance of A-CoRLiAn method under varied threshold scaling factors <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>β</mi> </semantics></math> across six non-repeated spoofing attack scenarios, aimed at investigating the sensitivity of the threshold scaling factor <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>β</mi> </semantics></math> to different attack scenarios.</p>
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<p>Monte Carlo (TEXBAT ds2-7) detection performance of the A-CoRLiAn method under varied threshold scaling factors <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>β</mi> </semantics></math>, aimed at investigating the recommended threshold scaling factors.</p>
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17 pages, 7953 KiB  
Article
GNSS Receiver Fingerprinting Based on Time Skew of Embedded CSAC Clock
by Sibo Gui, Li Dai, Meng Shi, Junchao Wang, Chuwen Tang, Haitao Wu and Jianye Zhao
Sensors 2024, 24(15), 4897; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24154897 - 28 Jul 2024
Viewed by 554
Abstract
GNSS spoofing has become a significant security vulnerability threatening remote sensing systems. Hardware fingerprint-based GNSS receiver identification is one of the solutions to address this security issue. However, existing research has not provided a solution for distinguishing GNSS receivers of the same specification. [...] Read more.
GNSS spoofing has become a significant security vulnerability threatening remote sensing systems. Hardware fingerprint-based GNSS receiver identification is one of the solutions to address this security issue. However, existing research has not provided a solution for distinguishing GNSS receivers of the same specification. This paper first theoretically proves that the CSACs (Chip-Scale Atomic Clocks) used in GNSS receivers have unique hardware noise and then proposes a fingerprinting scheme based on this hardware noise. Experiments based on the neural network method demonstrate that this fingerprint achieved an identification accuracy of 94.60% for commercial GNSS receivers of the same specification and performed excellently in anomaly detection, confirming the robustness of the fingerprinting method. This method shows a new real-time GNSS security monitoring method based on CSACs and can be easily used with any commercial GNSS receivers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Sensors for Real-Time Condition Monitoring and Fault Diagnosis)
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<p>GNSS Receiver Attacks. The lightning symbol represents RF signals transmission, arrows represent data transmission. Red represents the methods of initiating an attack.</p>
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<p>GNSS Receiver Fingerprint based on clock performance [<a href="#B22-sensors-24-04897" class="html-bibr">22</a>]. The application of statistical characteristics of the signal is a key aspect of this method. For example, Root Mean Square (RMS) and peak values, the relationship between Allan variance and Smoothing Time Interval (Tau), etc., are all taken into consideration.</p>
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<p>Chip-Scale Atomic Clock. Atoms in the vapor cell are trapped in a two-photon transition system due to CPT servo and can only absorb photons with specific energies. For more detailed information, please refer to [<a href="#B27-sensors-24-04897" class="html-bibr">27</a>].</p>
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<p>Temporal Block used in Temporal Convolutional Network. Dilated Convolution is used for extracting features in long term. For further information, please refer to [<a href="#B36-sensors-24-04897" class="html-bibr">36</a>,<a href="#B37-sensors-24-04897" class="html-bibr">37</a>].</p>
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<p>An example of the ZKQD-TF-CSAC embedded GNSS receiver, supplied by ZhongkeQidi Optoelectronic Technology (Beijing, China). Due to commercial secrets, we cannot show the newest version of this receiver. For more information, please see [<a href="#B38-sensors-24-04897" class="html-bibr">38</a>].</p>
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<p>The structure of TDC module, including Ring Oscillator, Counter and Dynamic Value Memory. The Start and Stop signal serve as the start and end of Ring Oscillator.</p>
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<p>Time Skew Analysis of ZKQD-TF-CSAC, several spectral lines around 0.06 Hz, 0.08 Hz, 0.11 Hz, and 0.19 Hz reappeared in four different experiments with different conditions.</p>
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<p>Time Skew Analysis of SA.45s, several spectral lines reappeared in four different experiments with different conditions, especially those around 0.25 Hz and 0.46 Hz, which S/N is more than 12 dB.</p>
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<p>Time Skew Analysis of four different CSACs.</p>
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<p>Fingerprinting Network. The number of input and output channels for each TemporalBlock Layer is given by the channel numbers specified between layers.</p>
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<p>Confusion Matrix of CSACs Classification.</p>
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<p>Relationship between Series Length and Classification Accuracy.</p>
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<p>Relationship between Anomaly Rate and Classification Accuracy.</p>
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<p>Relationship between Time and Alert Percentage.</p>
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19 pages, 3948 KiB  
Article
Design of New BLE GAP Roles for Vehicular Communications
by Antonio Perez-Yuste, Jordi Pitarch-Blasco, Felix Alejandro Falcon-Darias and Neftali Nuñez
Sensors 2024, 24(15), 4835; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24154835 - 25 Jul 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 515
Abstract
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a prominent short-range wireless communication protocol widely extended for communications and sensor systems in consumer electronics and industrial applications, ranging from manufacturing to retail and healthcare. The BLE protocol provides four generic access profile (GAP) roles when it [...] Read more.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a prominent short-range wireless communication protocol widely extended for communications and sensor systems in consumer electronics and industrial applications, ranging from manufacturing to retail and healthcare. The BLE protocol provides four generic access profile (GAP) roles when it is used in its low-energy version, i.e., ver. 4 and beyond. GAP roles control connections and allow BLE devices to interoperate each other. They are defined by the Bluetooth special interest group (SIG) and are primarily oriented to connect peripherals wirelessly to smartphones, laptops, and desktops. Consequently, the existing GAP roles have characteristics that do not fit well with vehicular communications in cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS), where low-latency communications in high-density environments with stringent security demands are required. This work addresses this gap by developing two new GAP roles, defined at the application layer to meet the specific requirements of vehicular communications, and by providing a service application programming interface (API) for developers of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) applications. We have named this new approach ITS-BLE. These GAP roles are intended to facilitate BLE-based solutions for real-world scenarios on roads, such as detecting road traffic signs or exchanging information at toll booths. We have developed a prototype able to work indistinctly as a unidirectional or bidirectional communication device, depending on the use case. To solve security risks in the exchange of personal data, BLE data packets, here called packet data units (PDU), are encrypted or signed to guarantee either privacy when sharing sensitive data or authenticity when avoiding spoofing, respectively. Measurements taken and their later evaluation demonstrated the feasibility of a V2X BLE network consisting of picocells with a radius of about 200 m. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Vehicular Sensing)
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<p>Schematic view about the coexistence of 5G, Wi-Fi, and BLE technologies for C-ITS.</p>
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<p>BLE protocol stack with our contributions in blue (ITS-BLE).</p>
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<p>Scenarios considered in this paper for BLE vehicular communications.</p>
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<p>Example of an ORT use case with one toll and two vehicles in a connectable setup.</p>
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<p>Example of an ORT use case with one toll and two vehicles in a non-connectable setup.</p>
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<p>Flowchart of ITS-BLE proposal with the packets exchange between advertiser–listener and scanner–responder.</p>
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<p>Security elements proposed for vehicular communication scenarios proposed in <a href="#sec3-sensors-24-04835" class="html-sec">Section 3</a>.</p>
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<p>Schematic model of an ISA system.</p>
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<p>Schematic model of an ORT system.</p>
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<p>Schematic model of a STL system.</p>
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<p>Altitude profile of the road where tests were conducted.</p>
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<p>Static packets received in both directions at both devices in the static scenario.</p>
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<p>Percentage of dynamic packets received in both directions at both devices in the dynamic scenario.</p>
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14 pages, 2793 KiB  
Article
A MobileFaceNet-Based Face Anti-Spoofing Algorithm for Low-Quality Images
by Jianyu Xiao, Wei Wang, Lei Zhang and Huanhua Liu
Electronics 2024, 13(14), 2801; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13142801 - 16 Jul 2024
Viewed by 592
Abstract
The Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS) methods plays a very important role in ensuring the security of face recognition systems. The existing FAS methods perform well in short-distance scenarios, e.g., phone unlocking, face payment, etc. However, it is still challenging to improve the generalization of [...] Read more.
The Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS) methods plays a very important role in ensuring the security of face recognition systems. The existing FAS methods perform well in short-distance scenarios, e.g., phone unlocking, face payment, etc. However, it is still challenging to improve the generalization of FAS in long-distance scenarios (e.g., surveillance) due to the varying image quality. In order to address the lack of low-quality images in real scenarios, we build a Low-Quality Face Anti-Spoofing Dataset (LQFA-D) by using Hikvision’s surveillance cameras. In order to deploy the model on an edge device with limited computation, we propose a lightweight FAS network based on MobileFaceNet, in which the Coordinate Attention (CA) attention model is introduced to capture the important spatial information. Then, we propose a multi-scale FAS framework for low-quality images to explore multi-scale features, which includes three multi-scale models. The experimental results of the LQFA-D show that the Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) and detection time of the proposed method are 1.39% and 45 ms per image for the low-quality images, respectively. It demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method in this paper. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Machine Vision in Robotics)
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<p>The overall architecture of LQFA-D collection system.</p>
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<p>The position between the camera and the subject.</p>
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<p>Part of the samples in LQFA-D.</p>
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<p>The data distribution of LQFA-D.</p>
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<p>The bottleneck of the proposed model.</p>
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<p>The framework of the proposed method.</p>
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<p>Detection accuracy of the FAS methods.</p>
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<p>The computation time of the FAS methods.</p>
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28 pages, 1250 KiB  
Review
Recent Advances on Jamming and Spoofing Detection in GNSS
by Katarina Radoš, Marta Brkić and Dinko Begušić
Sensors 2024, 24(13), 4210; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24134210 - 28 Jun 2024
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1941
Abstract
Increased interest in the development and integration of navigation and positioning services into a wide range of receivers makes them susceptible to a variety of security attacks such as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing attacks. The availability of low-cost devices [...] Read more.
Increased interest in the development and integration of navigation and positioning services into a wide range of receivers makes them susceptible to a variety of security attacks such as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing attacks. The availability of low-cost devices including software-defined radios (SDRs) provides a wide accessibility of affordable platforms that can be used to perform these attacks. Early detection of jamming and spoofing interferences is essential for mitigation and avoidance of service degradation. For these reasons, the development of efficient detection methods has become an important research topic and a number of effective methods has been reported in the literature. This survey offers the reader a comprehensive and systematic review of methods for detection of GNSS jamming and spoofing interferences. The categorization and classification of selected methods according to specific parameters and features is provided with a focus on recent advances in the field. Although many different detection methods have been reported, significant research efforts toward developing new and more efficient methods remain ongoing. These efforts are driven by the rapid development and increased number of attacks that pose high-security risks. The presented review of GNSS jamming and spoofing detection methods may be used for the selection of the most appropriate solution for specific purposes and constraints and also to provide a reference for future research. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Communications)
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<p>Main principle of spoofing and jamming attack.</p>
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<p>Types of spoofing attack: (<b>a</b>) simplistic, (<b>b</b>) intermediate, (<b>c</b>) sophisticated [<a href="#B37-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">37</a>].</p>
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<p>Real satellite signal in the capture phase [<a href="#B23-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">23</a>].</p>
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<p>A spoofed signal exists in the capture phase with a delay of 100 chips [<a href="#B23-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">23</a>].</p>
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<p>Comparison of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mo>/</mo> <msub> <mi>N</mi> <mn>0</mn> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math> for different satellites with and without spoofing attack [<a href="#B70-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">70</a>].</p>
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<p>Time of arrival of real and fake GNSS signal (* denotes that tm is modification time of the real GNSS signals in the spoofer).</p>
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<p>Block diagram for spoofing detection using ML methods [<a href="#B15-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">15</a>].</p>
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<p>(<b>A</b>,<b>B</b>) Confusion matrix for spoofing attack detection in TEXBAT dataset [<a href="#B14-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">14</a>].</p>
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<p>Expected trend for AGC and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> <mo>/</mo> <msub> <mi>N</mi> <mn>0</mn> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math> [<a href="#B77-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">77</a>].</p>
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<p>FOS DOA estimation for three jammers [<a href="#B96-sensors-24-04210" class="html-bibr">96</a>].</p>
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23 pages, 23785 KiB  
Article
Multiple Intrusion Detection Using Shapley Additive Explanations and a Heterogeneous Ensemble Model in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’s Controller Area Network
by Young-Woo Hong and Dong-Young Yoo
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(13), 5487; https://doi.org/10.3390/app14135487 - 25 Jun 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 457
Abstract
Recently, methods to detect DoS and spoofing attacks on In-Vehicle Networks via the CAN protocol have been studied using deep learning models, such as CNN, RNN, and LSTM. These studies have produced significant results in the field of In-Vehicle Network attack detection using [...] Read more.
Recently, methods to detect DoS and spoofing attacks on In-Vehicle Networks via the CAN protocol have been studied using deep learning models, such as CNN, RNN, and LSTM. These studies have produced significant results in the field of In-Vehicle Network attack detection using deep learning models. However, these studies have typically addressed studies on single-model intrusion detection verification in drone networks. This study developed an ensemble model that can detect multiple types of intrusion simultaneously. In preprocessing, the patterns within the payload using the measure of Feature Importance are distinguished from the attack and normal data. As a result, this improved the accuracy of the ensemble model. Through the experiment, both the accuracy score and the F1-score were verified for practical utility through 97% detection performance measurement. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Integrating Artificial Intelligence in Renewable Energy Systems)
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<p>UAVCAN payload framework [<a href="#B10-applsci-14-05487" class="html-bibr">10</a>].</p>
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<p>Diagram of attack through message injection in CAN protocol [<a href="#B38-applsci-14-05487" class="html-bibr">38</a>].</p>
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<p>Flowchart of Flooding Attack.</p>
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<p>Flowchart of Fuzzy attack.</p>
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<p>Flowchart of Replay attack.</p>
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<p>Structure of experiment model.</p>
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<p>SHAP force plot for 3 random rows of data.</p>
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<p>SHAP force plot for 4 random rows of data (type 02).</p>
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<p>SHAP force plot for 3 random rows of data (type 03).</p>
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<p>SHAP force plot for 3 random rows of data (type 04).</p>
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<p>SHAP force plot for 3 random rows of data (type 05).</p>
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<p>SHAP force plot for 3 random rows of data (type 06).</p>
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<p>Structure of relay attack model.</p>
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