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Search Results (712)

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Keywords = attackers’ knowledge

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18 pages, 9710 KiB  
Article
Exploring Synergy of Denoising and Distillation: Novel Method for Efficient Adversarial Defense
by Inpyo Hong and Sokjoon Lee
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(23), 10872; https://doi.org/10.3390/app142310872 - 24 Nov 2024
Viewed by 363
Abstract
Escalating advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) has prompted significant security concerns, especially with its increasing commercialization. This necessitates research on safety measures to securely utilize AI models. Existing AI models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are a specific form of assault methodology. [...] Read more.
Escalating advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) has prompted significant security concerns, especially with its increasing commercialization. This necessitates research on safety measures to securely utilize AI models. Existing AI models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are a specific form of assault methodology. Although various countermeasures have been explored, practical defense models are scarce. Current adversarial defense methods suffer from reduced accuracy, increased training time, and incomplete defense against adversarial attacks, indicating performance limitations and a lack of robustness. To address these limitations, we propose a composite defense model, the knowledge Distillation and deNoising Network (DiNo-Net), which integrates knowledge distillation and feature denoising techniques. Furthermore, we analyzed a correlation between the loss surface of adversarial perturbations and denoising techniques. Using DiNo-Net, we confirmed that increasing the temperature during the knowledge distillation process effectively amplifies the loss surface around the ground truth. Consequently, this enables more efficient denoising of the adversarial perturbations. It achieved a defense success rate of 72.7%, which is a remarkable improvement over the 41.0% success rate of models with only denoising defense mechanisms. Furthermore, DiNo-Net reduced the training time and maintained higher accuracy, confirming its efficient defense performance. We hope that this relationship will spur the development of fundamental defense strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Computing and Artificial Intelligence)
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<p>Illustration of the adversarial attack process on the decision boundary. The (<b>left</b>) plot shows the initial decision boundary separating two groups of data points. In the (<b>right</b>) plot, adversarial perturbations are applied to selected data points, shifting them across the decision boundary and causing misclassification.</p>
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<p>Examples of FGSM Attack.</p>
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<p>Structure of Proposed Model (DiNo-Net).</p>
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<p>Original input loss surface by defensive techniques.</p>
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<p>Adversarial example loss surface by defensive techniques.</p>
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<p>Ablation study of Hessian traces from second derivatives on training stability.</p>
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20 pages, 2069 KiB  
Article
Incidence, Level of Damage and Identification of Insect Pests of Fruits and Leaves of Ziziphus Tree Species in Ethiopia
by Tigabu R. Alle, Abdella Gure, Miriam F. Karlsson and Samora M. Andrew
Forests 2024, 15(12), 2063; https://doi.org/10.3390/f15122063 - 22 Nov 2024
Viewed by 251
Abstract
The Ziziphus tree species offer valuable socio-economic and ecological benefits but experience significant damage from insect pests. In Ethiopia, there is limited knowledge of the insects attacking Ziziphus fruits, and a study aimed to identify these pests, assess their impact and understand how [...] Read more.
The Ziziphus tree species offer valuable socio-economic and ecological benefits but experience significant damage from insect pests. In Ethiopia, there is limited knowledge of the insects attacking Ziziphus fruits, and a study aimed to identify these pests, assess their impact and understand how different land use types (LUTs) affect them was conducted. Sampling involved collecting fifty fruits and ten leaves from each of ten randomly chosen Ziziphus trees per LUT within each agroecological zone from August to December in 2022 and 2023. Samples were visually assessed for incidence and infestation levels, and the five morphotypes were identified using molecular techniques through phylogenetic analysis. Fruit pest incidence varied during the season, yet a positive correlation (r = 0.84) was observed among the months and years when assessment took place. Most fruits showed low to medium infestation levels (5%–50%), while severe infestations (>75%) were predominant in the lowland agroecological zone. The insects that had caused the damage were identified as Carpomya incompleta Becker, 1903; Drosophila hydei Sturtevant, 1921; D. simulans Sturtevant, 1919 and Zaprionus indianus Gupta, 1970. Fruits showed higher incidence and infestation levels than leaves, indicating significant yield and income losses. Thus, implementing effective management strategies is vital to minimize these losses and achieve sustainable production in Ethiopia. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Risk Assessment and Management of Forest Pest Outbreaks)
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<p>Location map of the study districts in Ethiopia.</p>
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<p>Mean ± SE incidence of insect pests on <span class="html-italic">Ziziphus</span> fruits across the assessment months during the 2022 and 2023 fruiting seasons in Ethiopia; a, b means marked with different letters to indicate statistically significant difference (means followed with the same letter within the same fruit production year are not significantly different at <span class="html-italic">p</span> &lt; 0.05).</p>
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<p>Phylogenetic tree drawn according to the neighbour-joining method based on barcode sequences from specimens of (<b>a</b>) <span class="html-italic">C. incompleta</span>, (<b>b</b>) <span class="html-italic">D. hydei</span>, (<b>c</b>) <span class="html-italic">D. simulans</span>, (<b>d</b>) <span class="html-italic">Z. indianus</span> and (<b>e</b>) <span class="html-italic">P. concolor</span> in Ethiopia.</p>
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<p>Phylogenetic tree drawn according to the neighbour-joining method based on barcode sequences from specimens of (<b>a</b>) <span class="html-italic">C. incompleta</span>, (<b>b</b>) <span class="html-italic">D. hydei</span>, (<b>c</b>) <span class="html-italic">D. simulans</span>, (<b>d</b>) <span class="html-italic">Z. indianus</span> and (<b>e</b>) <span class="html-italic">P. concolor</span> in Ethiopia.</p>
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25 pages, 2657 KiB  
Article
Domain-Specific Modeling Language for Security Analysis of EV Charging Infrastructure
by Anas Motii, Mahmoud El Hamlaoui and Robert Basmadjian
Energies 2024, 17(23), 5832; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235832 - 21 Nov 2024
Viewed by 339
Abstract
Electric vehicles (EVs) and their ecosystem have unquestionably made significant technological strides. Indeed, EVs have evolved into sophisticated computer systems with extensive internal and external communication capabilities. This interconnection raises concerns about security, privacy, and the expanding risk of cyber-attacks within the electric [...] Read more.
Electric vehicles (EVs) and their ecosystem have unquestionably made significant technological strides. Indeed, EVs have evolved into sophisticated computer systems with extensive internal and external communication capabilities. This interconnection raises concerns about security, privacy, and the expanding risk of cyber-attacks within the electric vehicle landscape. In particular, the charging infrastructure plays a crucial role in the electric mobility ecosystem. With the proliferation of charging points, new attack vectors are opened up for cybercriminals. The threat landscape targeting charging systems encompasses various types of attacks ranging from physical attacks to data breaches including customer information. In this paper, we aim to leverage the power of model-driven engineering to model and analyze EV charging systems at early stages. We employ domain-specific modeling language (DSML) techniques for the early security modeling and analysis of EV charging infrastructure. We accomplish this by integrating the established EMSA model for electric mobility, which encapsulates all key stakeholders in the ecosystem. To our knowledge, this represents the first instance in the literature of applying DSML within the electric mobility ecosystem, highlighting its innovative nature. Moreover, as our formalization based on DSML is an iterative, continuous, and evolving process, this approach guarantees that our proposed framework adeptly tackles the evolving cyber threats confronting the EV industry. Specifically, we use the Object Constraint Language (OCL) for precise specification and verification of security threats as properties of a modeled system. To validate our framework, we explore a set of representative threats targeting EV charging systems from real-world scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide a comprehensive security modeling framework for the electric mobility ecosystem. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section E: Electric Vehicles)
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<p>On the left side of the figure lies the component layer within the EMSA model, delineating the diverse zones and domains constituting the electric mobility ecosystem. Represented by blue boxes are the actors and stakeholders, interconnected by arrows to showcase the dynamic relationships among them. On the right side, the EMSA model unfolds its five interoperability layers, commencing from the uppermost tier, business, and cascading down to the lowermost tier, component. Each layer embodies distinct functionalities and interactions crucial for seamless operations within the electric mobility landscape.</p>
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<p>A methodology to analyze EV infrastructure.</p>
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<p>The considered extraction process based on a threat identified in [<a href="#B15-energies-17-05832" class="html-bibr">15</a>].</p>
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<p>E-mobility metamodel kernel.</p>
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<p>E-mobility metamodel—energy transfer element view.</p>
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<p>E-mobility metamodel—EV user element view.</p>
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<p>E-mobility metamodel—data view.</p>
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<p>EV charging infrastructure model instance and security analysis results.</p>
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<p>Excerpt of the grammar implemented with Xtext.</p>
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<p>Screenshot of our prototype showing the textual editor, the auto completion, and the result.</p>
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<p>Threats formalization with OCL in Obeo Designer.</p>
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<p>At the upper part of the figure, security needs for each component, communication and data are described. Threats, STRIDE category, risk level, and mitigations are shown at the lower part.</p>
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<p>Risk matrix showing the risks, their likelihood, severity, and risk level.</p>
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<p>ISO 21434 [<a href="#B36-energies-17-05832" class="html-bibr">36</a>] standard components highlighting in the red colored box the positioning of our approach.</p>
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14 pages, 2915 KiB  
Article
Missing Data Imputation Based on Causal Inference to Enhance Advanced Persistent Threat Attack Prediction
by Xiang Cheng, Miaomiao Kuang and Hongyu Yang
Symmetry 2024, 16(11), 1551; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16111551 - 19 Nov 2024
Viewed by 379
Abstract
With the continuous development of network security situations, the types of attacks increase sharply, but can be divided into symmetric attacks and asymmetric attacks. Symmetric attacks such as phishing and DDoS attacks exploit fixed patterns, resulting in system crashes and data breaches that [...] Read more.
With the continuous development of network security situations, the types of attacks increase sharply, but can be divided into symmetric attacks and asymmetric attacks. Symmetric attacks such as phishing and DDoS attacks exploit fixed patterns, resulting in system crashes and data breaches that cause losses to businesses. Asymmetric attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), a highly sophisticated and organized form of cyber attack, because of its concealment and complexity, realize data theft through long-term latency and pose a greater threat to organization security. In addition, there are challenges in the processing of missing data, especially in the application of symmetric and asymmetric data filling, the former is simple but not flexible, and the latter is complex and more suitable for highly complex attack scenarios. Since asymmetric attack research is particularly important, this paper proposes a method that combines causal discovery with graph autoencoder to solve missing data, classify potentially malicious nodes, and reveal causal relationships. The core is to use graphic autoencoders to learn the underlying causal structure of APT attacks, with a special focus on the complex causal relationships in asymmetric attacks. This causal knowledge is then applied to enhance the robustness of the model by compensating for data gaps. In the final phase, it also reveals causality, predicts and classifies potential APT attack nodes, and provides a comprehensive framework that not only predicts potential threats, but also provides insight into the logical sequence of the attacker’s actions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Symmetry and Asymmetry in Cybersecurity)
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<p>System architecture.</p>
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<p>This is a model figure.</p>
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<p>Causal diagram of partial variables.</p>
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<p>Multi-stage data interpolation graph.</p>
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<p>Error value of interpolation method under different missing rates.</p>
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<p>Evaluation.</p>
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34 pages, 459 KiB  
Article
Dynamic Bayesian Networks, Elicitation, and Data Embedding for Secure Environments
by Kieran Drury and Jim Q. Smith
Entropy 2024, 26(11), 985; https://doi.org/10.3390/e26110985 - 17 Nov 2024
Viewed by 366
Abstract
Serious crime modelling typically needs to be undertaken securely behind a firewall where police knowledge and capabilities remain undisclosed. Data informing an ongoing incident are often sparse; a large proportion of relevant data only come to light after the incident culminates or after [...] Read more.
Serious crime modelling typically needs to be undertaken securely behind a firewall where police knowledge and capabilities remain undisclosed. Data informing an ongoing incident are often sparse; a large proportion of relevant data only come to light after the incident culminates or after police intervene—by which point it is too late to make use of the data to aid real-time decision-making for the incident in question. Much of the data that are available to the police to support real-time decision-making are highly confidential and cannot be shared with academics, and are therefore missing to them. In this paper, we describe the development of a formal protocol where a graphical model is used as a framework for securely translating a base model designed by an academic team to a fully embellished model for use by a police team. We then show, for the first time, how libraries of these models can be built and used for real-time decision support to circumvent the challenges of data missingness seen in such a secure environment through the ability to match ongoing plots to existing models within the library.The parallel development described by this protocol ensures that any sensitive information collected by police and missing to academics remains secured behind a firewall. The protocol nevertheless guides police so that they are able to combine the typically incomplete data streams that are open source with their more sensitive information in a formal and justifiable way. We illustrate the application of this protocol by describing how a new entry—a suspected vehicle attack—can be embedded into such a police library of criminal plots. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bayesian Network Modelling in Data Sparse Environments)
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<p>Example 2TDBN for a plot model with four tasks with phases coloured blue, tasks coloured yellow, and intensities coloured orange.</p>
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18 pages, 1079 KiB  
Article
A Threefold Approach for Enhancing Fuzzy Interpolative Reasoning: Case Study on Phishing Attack Detection Using Sparse Rule Bases
by Mohammad Almseidin, Maen Alzubi, Jamil Al-Sawwa, Mouhammd Alkasassbeh and Mohammad Alfraheed
Computers 2024, 13(11), 291; https://doi.org/10.3390/computers13110291 - 8 Nov 2024
Viewed by 433
Abstract
Fuzzy systems are powerful modeling systems for uncertainty applications. In contrast to traditional crisp systems, fuzzy systems offer the opportunity to extend the binary decision to continuous space, which could offer benefits for various application areas such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs), because [...] Read more.
Fuzzy systems are powerful modeling systems for uncertainty applications. In contrast to traditional crisp systems, fuzzy systems offer the opportunity to extend the binary decision to continuous space, which could offer benefits for various application areas such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs), because of their ability to measure the degree of attacks instead of making a binary decision. Furthermore, fuzzy systems offer a suitable environment that is able to deal with uncertainty. However, fuzzy systems face a critical challenge represented by the sparse fuzzy rules. Typical fuzzy systems demand complete fuzzy rules in order to offer the required results. Additionally, generating complete fuzzy rules can be difficult due to many factors, such as a lack of knowledge base or limited data availability, such as in IDS applications. Fuzzy rule interpolation (FRI) was introduced to overcome this limitation by generating the required interpolation results in cases with sparse fuzzy rules. This work introduces a threefold approach designed to address the cases of missing fuzzy rules, which uses a few fuzzy rules to handle the limitations of missing fuzzy rules. This is achieved by finding the interpolation condition of neighboring fuzzy rules. This procedure was accomplished based on the concept of factors (which determine the degree to which each neighboring fuzzy rule contributes to the interpolated results, in cases of missing fuzzy rules). The evaluation procedure for the threefold approach was conducted using the following two steps: firstly, using the FRI benchmark numerical metrics, the results demonstrated the ability of the threefold approach to generate the required results for the various benchmark scenarios. Secondly, using a real-life dataset (phishing attacks dataset), the results demonstrated the effectiveness of the suggested approach to handle cases of missing fuzzy rules in the area of phishing attacks. Consequently, the suggested threefold approach offers an opportunity to reduce the number of fuzzy rules effectively and generate the required results using only a few fuzzy rules. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Multimedia Data and Network Security)
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<p>The triangular membership function.</p>
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<p>The interpolation conditions extraction procedure based on the factor parameters.</p>
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<p>The general architecture of the proposed threefold approach.</p>
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<p>The results of the threefold approach evaluation compared to other FRI methods [<a href="#B22-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">22</a>,<a href="#B25-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">25</a>], based on benchmark metric (1).</p>
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<p>The results of the threefold approach evaluation compared to other FRI methods [<a href="#B22-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">22</a>,<a href="#B25-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">25</a>], based on benchmark metric (2).</p>
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<p>The results of the threefold approach evaluation compared to other FRI methods [<a href="#B22-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">22</a>,<a href="#B25-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">25</a>], based on benchmark metric (3).</p>
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<p>The results of the threefold approach evaluation compared to other FRI methods [<a href="#B22-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">22</a>,<a href="#B25-computers-13-00291" class="html-bibr">25</a>], based on benchmark metric (4).</p>
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<p>The results of the threefold approach in the case of missing fuzzy rules (part 1).</p>
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<p>The results of the threefold approach in the case of missing fuzzy rules (part 2).</p>
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<p>The performance metrics of suggested threefold approach for the phishing attack dataset.</p>
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12 pages, 2453 KiB  
Article
Threshold Filtering for Detecting Label Inference Attacks in Vertical Federated Learning
by Liansheng Ding, Haibin Bao, Qingzhe Lv, Feng Zhang, Zhouyang Zhang, Jianliang Han and Shuang Ding
Electronics 2024, 13(22), 4376; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13224376 - 8 Nov 2024
Viewed by 513
Abstract
Federated learning, as an emerging machine-learning method, has received widespread attention because it allows users to train locally during the training process and uses relevant cryptographic knowledge to safeguard the privacy of data during model aggregation. However, existing federated learning is also susceptible [...] Read more.
Federated learning, as an emerging machine-learning method, has received widespread attention because it allows users to train locally during the training process and uses relevant cryptographic knowledge to safeguard the privacy of data during model aggregation. However, existing federated learning is also susceptible to privacy breaches, e.g., label inference attacks against vertical federated learning scenarios, where an adversary is able to reason about the labels of other participants based on the trained model, leading to serious privacy breaches. In this paper, we design a detection method for label inference attacks in vertical federated learning scenarios, which is able to detect the attacks based on the principles of the attacks. We design a threshold-filtering detection method based on the principle of attack to determine that the model is under attack when the threshold value is greater than a set parameter. Furthermore, we have created six threat model classifications based on different a priori conditions of the adversary to comprehensively analyze the adversary’s attacks. In addition to the detection method of attacks, the extent of attacks on the model and the effectiveness of the defense can also be evaluated. The evaluation module will experimentally measure the changes in the relevant metrics such as the accuracy of the attack, the F1 score, and the change in the accuracy after the defense method. For example, detection in the full connected neural network model assesses the attack and defense effectiveness of the model with an attack accuracy of 86.72% in the breast cancer Wisconsin dataset and an F1 score of 0.743, which is reduced to 36.36% after dispersed training. This ensures that users have an overall grasp of the extent to which the training model is under attack before deploying the model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Advances in Cybersecurity and Information Security)
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<p>Framework of the detection method.</p>
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<p>Steps to detect the model.</p>
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<p>Detection module output results.</p>
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<p>Attack accuracy of the two threat models for LIA.</p>
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<p>MIA accuracy assessment.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>–<b>d</b>) Evaluation of the MIA accuracy in the four models.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>–<b>d</b>) Evaluation of the MIA defense in the four models.</p>
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<p>MIA defense assessment.</p>
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27 pages, 2374 KiB  
Review
Cybersecurity at Sea: A Literature Review of Cyber-Attack Impacts and Defenses in Maritime Supply Chains
by Maria Valentina Clavijo Mesa, Carmen Elena Patino-Rodriguez and Fernando Jesus Guevara Carazas
Information 2024, 15(11), 710; https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110710 - 6 Nov 2024
Viewed by 1248
Abstract
The maritime industry is constantly evolving and posing new challenges, especially with increasing digitalization, which has raised concerns about cyber-attacks on maritime supply chain agents. Although scholars have proposed various methods and classification models to counter these cyber threats, a comprehensive cyber-attack taxonomy [...] Read more.
The maritime industry is constantly evolving and posing new challenges, especially with increasing digitalization, which has raised concerns about cyber-attacks on maritime supply chain agents. Although scholars have proposed various methods and classification models to counter these cyber threats, a comprehensive cyber-attack taxonomy for maritime supply chain actors based on a systematic literature review is still lacking. This review aims to provide a clear picture of common cyber-attacks and develop a taxonomy for their categorization. In addition, it outlines best practices derived from academic research in maritime cybersecurity using PRISMA principles for a systematic literature review, which identified 110 relevant journal papers. This study highlights that distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and malware are top concerns for all maritime supply chain stakeholders. In particular, shipping companies are urged to prioritize defenses against hijacking, spoofing, and jamming. The report identifies 18 practices to combat cyber-attacks, categorized into information security management solutions, information security policies, and cybersecurity awareness and training. Finally, this paper explores how emerging technologies can address cyber-attacks in the maritime supply chain network (MSCN). While Industry 4.0 technologies are highlighted as significant trends in the literature, this study aims to equip MSCN stakeholders with the knowledge to effectively leverage a broader range of emerging technologies. In doing so, it provides forward-looking solutions to prevent and mitigate cyber-attacks, emphasizing that Industry 4.0 is part of a larger landscape of technological innovation. Full article
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<p>MSCN links, adapted from [<a href="#B2-information-15-00710" class="html-bibr">2</a>].</p>
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<p>SLR Methodology.</p>
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<p>Bibliometric Overview: Geographical Distribution, Recurring Research Topics, and Publication Trends.</p>
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<p>Proportion of papers according to the MSCN actor.</p>
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<p>Historical evidence of cyber-attacks reported by year.</p>
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<p>Countries where the reported cyber-attacks occurred.</p>
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<p>Cyber-attack Taxonomy for the MSCN.</p>
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<p>Industry 4.0 technologies identified in the literature review.</p>
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16 pages, 1556 KiB  
Article
Maintaining Cyber Resilience in the Reconfigurable Networks with Immunization and Improved Network Game Methods
by Maxim Kalinin, Evgeny Pavlenko, Georgij Gavva and Maxim Pakhomov
Sensors 2024, 24(22), 7116; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24227116 - 5 Nov 2024
Viewed by 542
Abstract
The paper proposes a technique for protecting reconfigurable networks that implements topology rebuilding, which combines immunization and network gaming methods, as a solution for maintaining cyber resilience. Immunization presumes an adaptive set of protective reconfigurations destined to ensure the functioning of a network. [...] Read more.
The paper proposes a technique for protecting reconfigurable networks that implements topology rebuilding, which combines immunization and network gaming methods, as a solution for maintaining cyber resilience. Immunization presumes an adaptive set of protective reconfigurations destined to ensure the functioning of a network. It is a protective reconfiguration aimed to preserve/increase the functional quality of the system. Network nodes and edges are adaptively reorganized to counteract an invasion. This is a functional component of cyber resilience. It can be implemented as a global strategy, using knowledge of the whole network structure, or a local strategy that only works with a certain part of a network. A formal description of global and local immune strategies based on hierarchical and peer-to-peer network topologies is presented. A network game is a kind of the well-defined game model in which each situation generates a specific network, and the payoff function is calculated based on the constructed networks. A network game is proposed for analyzing a network topology. This model allows quickly identifying nodes that require disconnection or replacement when a cyber attack occurs, and understanding which network sectors might be affected by an attack. The gaming method keeps the network topology resistant to unnecessary connections. This is a structural component of cyber resilience. The basic network game method has been improved by using the criterion of maximum possible path length to reduce the number of reconfigurations. Network optimization works together with immunization to preserve the structural integrity of the network. In an experimental study, the proposed method demonstrated its effectiveness in maintaining system quality within given functional limits and reducing the cost of system protective restructuring. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue IoT Cybersecurity)
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<p>Sample of a hierarchical infrastructure: (<b>a</b>) a smart grid network; (<b>b</b>) result of the network immunization.</p>
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<p>Demonstration of the immunization effectiveness.</p>
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<p>Experiments with the network game method: (<b>a</b>–<b>c</b>) original network game; (<b>d</b>–<b>f</b>) modified network game.</p>
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<p>Results for direct connections: (<b>a</b>) broadcast; (<b>b</b>) sequential; (<b>c</b>) mixed requests.</p>
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<p>Results for direct disconnections: (<b>a</b>) broadcast; (<b>b</b>) sequential; (<b>c</b>) mixed requests.</p>
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<p>Results for spectral radius of the graph: (<b>a</b>) broadcast; (<b>b</b>) sequential; (<b>c</b>) mixed requests.</p>
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21 pages, 2469 KiB  
Article
Fortify the Guardian, Not the Treasure: Resilient Adversarial Detectors
by Raz Lapid, Almog Dubin and Moshe Sipper
Mathematics 2024, 12(22), 3451; https://doi.org/10.3390/math12223451 - 5 Nov 2024
Viewed by 641
Abstract
Adaptive adversarial attacks, where adversaries tailor their strategies with full knowledge of defense mechanisms, pose significant challenges to the robustness of adversarial detectors. In this paper, we introduce RADAR (Robust Adversarial Detection via Adversarial Retraining), an approach designed to fortify adversarial detectors against [...] Read more.
Adaptive adversarial attacks, where adversaries tailor their strategies with full knowledge of defense mechanisms, pose significant challenges to the robustness of adversarial detectors. In this paper, we introduce RADAR (Robust Adversarial Detection via Adversarial Retraining), an approach designed to fortify adversarial detectors against such adaptive attacks while preserving the classifier’s accuracy. RADAR employs adversarial training by incorporating adversarial examples—crafted to deceive both the classifier and the detector—into the training process. This dual optimization enables the detector to learn and adapt to sophisticated attack scenarios. Comprehensive experiments on CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet datasets demonstrate that RADAR substantially enhances the detector’s ability to accurately identify adaptive adversarial attacks without degrading classifier performance. Full article
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<p>General scheme of adversarial attacks. <span class="html-italic">x</span>: original image. <math display="inline"><semantics> <msubsup> <mi>x</mi> <mi mathvariant="monospace">adv</mi> <mo>′</mo> </msubsup> </semantics></math>: standard adversarial attack. <math display="inline"><semantics> <msubsup> <mi>x</mi> <mi mathvariant="monospace">adv</mi> <mrow> <mo>″</mo> </mrow> </msubsup> </semantics></math>: adaptive adversarial attack, targeting both <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>f</mi> <mi>θ</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> (classifier) and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>g</mi> <mi>ϕ</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> (detector). The attacker’s goal is to fool the classifier into misclassifying the image and simultaneously deceive the detector into reporting the attack as benign (i.e., failing to detect the adversarial manipulation). The classifier <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>f</mi> <mi>θ</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> and the detector <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>g</mi> <mi>ϕ</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> share the same input but operate independently, with separate parameters and architectures. The classifier is trained to perform standard classification, while the detector is explicitly trained to identify adversarial instances.</p>
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<p>Overview of <b>RADAR</b>. (1) The process begins with the generation of adaptive adversarial instances, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>X</mi> <mi>adv</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>. (2) After completing the batch attack, we train the detector <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>g</mi> <mi>ϕ</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> using both benign instances <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>X</mi> <mi>ben</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> and adversarial instances <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>X</mi> <mi>adv</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>. The <span class="html-fig-inline" id="mathematics-12-03451-i003"><img alt="Mathematics 12 03451 i003" src="/mathematics/mathematics-12-03451/article_deploy/html/images/mathematics-12-03451-i003.png"/></span> symbol refers to the models being frozen.</p>
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<p>Generalization performance of adversarially trained detectors trained on CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet. Each adversarial detector was trained using each corresponding classifier; e.g., ResNet-50 adversarial detector was trained using ResNet-50 image classifier. This table shows the generalization of each detector to other classifiers, which it did not train with. A value represents the ROC-AUC of the respective detector–classifier pair for OPGD (top row) and SPGD (bottom row) with <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>ϵ</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mstyle scriptlevel="0" displaystyle="true"> <mfrac> <mn>16</mn> <mn>255</mn> </mfrac> </mstyle> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>Comparison of perturbations generated by PGD and OPGD across adversarial detectors. The red box contains the manipulated images and the corresponding perturbation over the adversarially trained detectors. Each row represents one model architecture, while the columns show the adversarial image generated by PGD, the corresponding perturbation from PGD, the adversarial image generated by OPGD, and the corresponding perturbation from OPGD. The original image is shown on the right for reference. Note: PGD only attacks a classifier, while OPGD attacks both a classifier and a detector.</p>
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<p>CIFAR-10. Binary cross-entropy loss metrics, from the point of view of an attacker, are presented here in the context of crafting an adversarial instance from the test set. These plots illustrate the progression of loss over 20 different images of orthogonal projected gradient descent (OPGD) with the main goal being to minimize the loss. The progression for each image is represented in a distinct color. Top: Prior to adversarial training, the loss converges to zero after a small number of iterations. Bottom: After adversarial training, the incurred losses are significantly higher by orders of magnitude (note the difference in scales) compared with those observed in their standard counterparts. This shows that the detector is now resilient, i.e., far harder to fool.</p>
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<p>SVHN. Binary cross-entropy loss metrics, from the point of view of an attacker, are presented here in the context of crafting an adversarial instance from the test set. The progression for each image is represented in a distinct color.</p>
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<p>ImageNet. Binary cross-entropy loss metrics, from the point of view of an attacker, are presented here in the context of crafting an adversarial instance from the test set using OPGD. The progression for each image is represented in a distinct color.</p>
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<p>AUC and SR@5 scores across different epsilon values for CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet datasets using OPGD. The performance of the adversarial detectors is illustrated, highlighting how AUC and SR@5 vary across different perturbation magnitudes.</p>
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<p>AUC and SR@5 scores across different epsilon values for CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet datasets using SPGD.</p>
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<p>Ablation studies were conducted using VGG-11, varying the (1) number of steps, (2) step size <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>α</mi> </semantics></math>, (3) batch size, (4) learning rate, and (5) whether the model was pretrained through standard training, presented sequentially from left to right.</p>
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<p>Comparison of classification accuracies of models utilizing adversarial detectors trained with standard pretraining followed by adversarial training (solid lines) versus detectors trained exclusively with adversarial training (dashed lines) across CIFAR-10, SVHN, and ImageNet datasets. The plot demonstrates the impact of increasing <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>ϵ</mi> </semantics></math> values on the accuracy of the classification models when using the respective adversarial detectors.</p>
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19 pages, 2223 KiB  
Article
Performance Analysis of Wireless Sensor Networks Using Damped Oscillation Functions for the Packet Transmission Probability
by Izlian Y. Orea-Flores, Mario E. Rivero-Angeles, Sergio-Jesus Gonzalez-Ambriz, Eleazar Aguirre Anaya and Sumera Saleem
Computers 2024, 13(11), 285; https://doi.org/10.3390/computers13110285 - 4 Nov 2024
Viewed by 368
Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are composed of many nodes distributed in a region of interest to monitor different environments and physical variables. In many cases, access to nodes is not easy or feasible. As such, the system lifetime is a primary design parameter to [...] Read more.
Wireless sensor networks are composed of many nodes distributed in a region of interest to monitor different environments and physical variables. In many cases, access to nodes is not easy or feasible. As such, the system lifetime is a primary design parameter to consider in the design of these networks. In this regard, for some applications, it is preferable to extend the system lifetime by actively reducing the number of packet transmissions and, thus, the number of reports. The system administrator can be aware of such reporting reduction to distinguish this final phase from a malfunction of the system or even an attack. Given this, we explore different mathematical functions that drastically reduce the number of packet transmissions when the residual energy in the system is low but still allow for an adequate number of transmissions. Indeed, in previous works, where the negative exponential distribution is used, the system reaches the point of zero transmissions extremely fast. Hence, we propose different dampening functions with different decreasing rates that present oscillations to allow for packet transmissions even at the end of the system lifetime. We compare the system performance under these mathematical functions, which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been used before, to find the most adequate transmission scheme for packet transmissions and system lifetime. We develop an analytical model based on a discrete-time Markov chain to show that a moderately decreasing function provides the best results. We also develop a discrete event simulator to validate the analytical results. Full article
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<p>Linear damped cosine function for selecting the packet transmission probability.</p>
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<p>Sawtooth function for the selection of the packet transmission probability.</p>
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<p>Arctangent damped cosine function for selecting the packet transmission probability.</p>
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<p>Natural logarithmic damped cosine function for selecting the packet transmission probability.</p>
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<p>Exponential damped cosine function for selecting the packet transmission probability.</p>
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<p>Logarithmic damped sine function for selecting the packet transmission probability.</p>
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<p>Numerical solutions of the DTMC for the system’s lifetime using the fixed and F5 schemes.</p>
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<p>System simulation for the system’s lifetime using the fixed and F5 schemes.</p>
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<p>Successful packet transmission probability for the fixed scheme for different values of the packet transmission probability and number of nodes.</p>
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<p>System lifetime for the fixed scheme for different values of the packet transmission probability and number of nodes.</p>
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<p>The ratio of success packet transmission and system lifetime for the fixed scheme.</p>
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<p>Successful packet transmission probability for the dampening oscillating functions (<math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>f</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, for <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo>,</mo> <mn>2</mn> <mo>,</mo> <mo>…</mo> <mo>,</mo> <mn>6</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and the exponential and sine functions.</p>
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<p>System lifetime for the dampening oscillating functions (<math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>f</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, for <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo>,</mo> <mn>2</mn> <mo>,</mo> <mo>…</mo> <mo>,</mo> <mn>6</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and the exponential and sine functions.</p>
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<p>The ratio of successful packet transmission probability and system lifetime for the dampening oscillating functions (<math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>f</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, for <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo>,</mo> <mn>2</mn> <mo>,</mo> <mo>…</mo> <mo>,</mo> <mn>6</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and the exponential and sine functions.</p>
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24 pages, 2294 KiB  
Article
Fast Algorithm for Cyber-Attack Estimation and Attack Path Extraction Using Attack Graphs with AND/OR Nodes
by Eugene Levner and Dmitry Tsadikovich
Algorithms 2024, 17(11), 504; https://doi.org/10.3390/a17110504 - 4 Nov 2024
Viewed by 547
Abstract
This paper studies the security issues for cyber–physical systems, aimed at countering potential malicious cyber-attacks. The main focus is on solving the problem of extracting the most vulnerable attack path in a known attack graph, where an attack path is a sequence of [...] Read more.
This paper studies the security issues for cyber–physical systems, aimed at countering potential malicious cyber-attacks. The main focus is on solving the problem of extracting the most vulnerable attack path in a known attack graph, where an attack path is a sequence of steps that an attacker can take to compromise the underlying network. Determining an attacker’s possible attack path is critical to cyber defenders as it helps identify threats, harden the network, and thwart attacker’s intentions. We formulate this problem as a path-finding optimization problem with logical constraints represented by AND and OR nodes. We propose a new Dijkstra-type algorithm that combines elements from Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm and the critical path method. Although the path extraction problem is generally NP-hard, for the studied special case, the proposed algorithm determines the optimal attack path in polynomial time, O(nm), where n is the number of nodes and m is the number of edges in the attack graph. To our knowledge this is the first exact polynomial algorithm that can solve the path extraction problem for different attack graphs, both cycle-containing and cycle-free. Computational experiments with real and synthetic data have shown that the proposed algorithm consistently and quickly finds optimal solutions to the problem. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Algorithms for Multidisciplinary Applications)
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<p>The flow chart of the proposed algorithm.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) Example 1 adapted from [<a href="#B41-algorithms-17-00504" class="html-bibr">41</a>]. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) Acyclic attack graph equipped with the node times. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path for Example 2.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) Attack graph with cycles. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) The unweighted attack graph with cycles. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path.</p>
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<p>Attack graph with cycles without an attack path.</p>
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<p>The extended attack graph with the start node (adapted from [<a href="#B20-algorithms-17-00504" class="html-bibr">20</a>]).</p>
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<p>Extracted minimum-length attack path for the attack graph in <a href="#algorithms-17-00504-f007" class="html-fig">Figure 7</a>.</p>
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<p>A scheme of defenders’ response to a malicious attack.</p>
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20 pages, 6184 KiB  
Article
Kinetic Modeling of Brilliant Blue Discoloration by Ozonation
by Adrian Victor Crisciu, Ligia Stoica, Carolina Constantin, Maria (Tiron) Marcvart, Anamaria Hanganu and Maria Gratiela (Craioveanu) Ianos
Sustainability 2024, 16(21), 9591; https://doi.org/10.3390/su16219591 - 4 Nov 2024
Viewed by 515
Abstract
This paper presents the results of investigations on the kinetic modeling of Brilliant Blue FCF (BB) discoloration reactions in aqueous solutions with different ozone concentrations and pH conditions. Kinetic studies involve knowledge of the structure and properties of dye and ozone, as well [...] Read more.
This paper presents the results of investigations on the kinetic modeling of Brilliant Blue FCF (BB) discoloration reactions in aqueous solutions with different ozone concentrations and pH conditions. Kinetic studies involve knowledge of the structure and properties of dye and ozone, as well as of the experimental conditions. In general, scientists admit that the predominant oxidation pathway is direct (by free oxygen atoms) or indirect (by free hydroxyl radicals); this will depend on influencing factors such as the physicochemical properties of the dye, the pH of the aqueous solution, ozone concentration, reaction time, and the contact mode with/without stirring. In this experimental research, two pathways were chosen following CBB = f(t)—1. a constant dye concentration and different ozone concentrations, in the concentration range of 100–250 mg/L, in three pH media (acidic, neutral, and basic), with and without stirring; 2. a constant concentration of ozone and different dyes in the concentration range of 2.5–10 mg/L, under the conditions of point 1. With the obtained experimental data, the curves CBB = f(t) were drawn and processed according to the integral method of classical kinetics, based on first- and second-order equations. Unfortunately, this simple procedure did not give any results for the pH values studied. The rate constants were negative, and/or the reaction order depended on the initial conditions. Due to its structure, the BB dye has several chromophore groups, and thus multiple attack centers, resulting in several oxidation by-products, which is why the 1H-NMR spectrum was recorded for the discoloration of BB with ozone. Since the stoichiometry of the overall oxidation reaction, as well as the relationship between the rate constant and the reaction conditions mentioned above, is not known, a kinetic model based on mass transfer coupled with a chain reaction in the bulk liquid phase was proposed and successfully tested at pH = 7. This research approach also involves the consolidation of the theoretical bases of the ozonation process through the kinetic study carried out, as well as the proposal of a kinetic model. These systematics lead to results that are applicable to other aqueous systems that are impure with dyes, allowing for generalizations and the development of the field, ensuring the sustainability of the research. Full article
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<p>Chemical structure of BB molecule.</p>
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<p>Variation of C<sub>tBB</sub> = f(t) during the BB-O<sub>3</sub> interaction at pH = 4.0, in a time interval of 0–1.5 min, C<sub>0BB</sub> = 5 mg/L. (<b>a</b>) with stirring (200 rpm), (<b>b</b>) without stirring.</p>
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<p>Variation of C<sub>tBB</sub> = f(t) during the BB-O<sub>3</sub> interaction at pH = 4.0, in a time interval of 0–1.5 min, C<sub>0BB</sub> = 5 mg/L. (<b>a</b>) with stirring (200 rpm), (<b>b</b>) without stirring.</p>
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<p>Variation of C<sub>tBB</sub> = f(t) during the BB-O<sub>3</sub> interaction at pH = 7.0, in a time interval of 0–10 min, C<sub>0BB</sub> = 5 mg/L. (<b>a</b>) with stirring (200 rpm), (<b>b</b>) without stirring.</p>
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<p>Variation of C<sub>tBB</sub> = f(t) during the BB-O<sub>3</sub> interaction at pH = 7.0, in a time interval of 0–10 min, C<sub>0BB</sub> = 5 mg/L. (<b>a</b>) with stirring (200 rpm), (<b>b</b>) without stirring.</p>
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<p>Variation of C<sub>tBB</sub> = f(t) during the BB-O<sub>3</sub> interaction at pH = 10.0, in a time interval of 0–1 min, C<sub>0BB</sub> = 5 mg/L. (<b>a</b>) with stirring (200 rpm), (<b>b</b>) without stirring.</p>
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<p>Variation of C<sub>tBB</sub> = f(t) during the BB-O<sub>3</sub> interaction at pH = 10.0, in a time interval of 0–1 min, C<sub>0BB</sub> = 5 mg/L. (<b>a</b>) with stirring (200 rpm), (<b>b</b>) without stirring.</p>
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<p><sup>1</sup>H-NMR spectrum of Brilliant Blue.</p>
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<p>Experimental and calculated kinetic curve for BB decay at pH = 7, initial chromophore concentration 2.5 mg/L, and gas-phase ozone concentration 100 mg/L; full time range.</p>
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<p>Experimental and calculated kinetic curve for BB decay at pH = 7, initial chromophore concentration 2.5 mg/L, and gas-phase ozone concentration 100 mg/L. Time range [15 s, 600 s].</p>
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<p>Experimental and calculated kinetic curve for BB decay at pH = 7, initial chromophore concentration 5 mg/L, and gas-phase ozone concentration 100 mg/L; full time range.</p>
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<p>Experimental and calculated kinetic curve for BB decay at pH = 7, initial chromophore concentration 7.5 mg/L, and gas-phase ozone concentration 100 mg/L; full time range.</p>
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<p>Experimental and calculated kinetic curve for BB decay at pH = 7, initial chromophore concentration 10 mg/L, and gas-phase ozone concentration 100 mg/L; full time range.</p>
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<p>Experimental and calculated kinetic curve for BB decay at pH = 7, initial chromophore concentration 5 mg/L, and gas-phase ozone concentration 150 mg/L; full time range.</p>
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<p>Proposed pathway of BB degradation from aqueous solutions by ozonation.</p>
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22 pages, 3454 KiB  
Article
An Applied Analysis of Securing 5G/6G Core Networks with Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Methods
by Paul Scalise, Robert Garcia, Matthew Boeding, Michael Hempel and Hamid Sharif
Electronics 2024, 13(21), 4258; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13214258 - 30 Oct 2024
Viewed by 885
Abstract
Fifth Generation (5G) cellular networks have been adopted worldwide since the rollout began around 2019. It brought with it many innovations and new services, such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra Reliable and Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and Massive Internet of Things (mIoT). Furthermore, [...] Read more.
Fifth Generation (5G) cellular networks have been adopted worldwide since the rollout began around 2019. It brought with it many innovations and new services, such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra Reliable and Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and Massive Internet of Things (mIoT). Furthermore, 5G introduced a more scalable approach to network operations using fully software-based Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) in Core Networks (CN) rather than the prior hardware-based approach. However, while this shift towards a fully software-based system design provides numerous significant benefits, such as increased interoperability, scalability, and cost-effectiveness, it also brings with it an increased cybersecurity risk. Security is crucial to maintaining trust between vendors, operators, and consumers. Cyberattacks are rapidly increasing in number and sophistication, and we are seeing a shift towards zero-trust approaches. This means that even communications between VNFs inside a 5G core must be scrutinized and hardened against attacks, especially with the advent of quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), over the past 10 years, has led efforts to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to protect against quantum attacks. This paper covers a custom implementation of the open-source free5GC CN, to expand its HTTPS capabilities for VNFs by introducing PQC Key Encapsulation Methods (KEM) for Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.3. This paper provides the details of this integration with a focus on the latency of different PQC KEMs in initial handshakes between VNFs, on packet size, and the implications in a 5G environment. This work also conducts a security comparison between the PQC-equipped free5GC and other open-source 5G CNs. The presented results indicate a negligible increase in UE connection setup duration and a small increase in connection setup data requirements, strongly indicating that PQC KEM’s benefits far outweigh any downsides when integrated into 5G and 6G core services. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work incorporating PQC into an open-source 5G core. Furthermore, the results from this effort demonstrate that employing PQC ciphers for securing VNF communications results in only a negligible impact on latency and bandwidth usage, thus demonstrating significant benefits to 5G cybersecurity. Full article
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<p>A 5G system overview and the inclusion of post-quantum cryptography for secure end-to-end and control communications.</p>
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<p>Addition and analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography in a 5G Core Network.</p>
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<p>Steps taken in the discovery, integration, validation, and analysis of PQC in 5G core networks.</p>
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<p>Openssl.cnf with the edited files highlighted to enable OQS.</p>
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<p>Essential PQC free5GC CN VNFs up during runtime.</p>
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<p>UE Connection times measured with no encryption, X25519, PQC and Hybrid PQC KEMs in the CN.</p>
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<p>Measurement of Megabytes of data transmitted in the CN during a UE connection while varying the KEM used in TLS 1.3 within the CN.</p>
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<p>Difference in unit time of the KEM latency compared to no encryption.</p>
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<p>Difference in unit time of the KEM latency compared to X25519.</p>
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<p>Example packet captures with relative timestamps of TLS handshakes using p521_kyber1024 (<b>top</b>) and plain kyber1024 (<b>bottom</b>).</p>
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<p>All stages of a typical UE connection with a total of 129 TLSv1.3 handshakes.</p>
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12 pages, 886 KiB  
Article
Effect of Helicobacter pylori Eradication on Serum Level of Valproic Acid in Children with Idiopathic Generalized Epilepsy
by Abobakr Abdelgalil, Doaa Ismail, Ayman Eskander, Marian Girgis, Ahmed Farouk, Fajr Saeedi, Mohamed Shazly and Amera Hasnoon
Children 2024, 11(10), 1259; https://doi.org/10.3390/children11101259 - 18 Oct 2024
Viewed by 576
Abstract
Background/Objectives: The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of H. pylori eradication on the serum level of the orally administered valproic acid (VPA) in children with idiopathic generalized epilepsy; Methods: This prospective cohort observational study included 100 children with idiopathic [...] Read more.
Background/Objectives: The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of H. pylori eradication on the serum level of the orally administered valproic acid (VPA) in children with idiopathic generalized epilepsy; Methods: This prospective cohort observational study included 100 children with idiopathic generalized epilepsy, recruited from a neurology clinic from May 2021 to December 2021. The patients were divided into two groups, each containing 50 children. The first group had a positive H. pylori stool antigen and H. pylori-related symptoms, while the second group had a negative antigen. H. pylori Eradication therapy was given to the positive H. pylori group. The serum level of VPA was obtained at baseline and 4 weeks after eradication therapy. Results: Despite there being no significant difference between the H. pylori-positive and H. pylori-negative groups regarding the baseline VPA serum level (79.9 ± 13.9 and 77.9 ± 13.1 mcg/mL), respectively, the serum VPA level had significantly increased after H. pylori eradication therapy (99.4 ± 11 mcg/mL) (p value = 0.000), as opposed to the H. pylori-negative group (85.3 ± 10.9 mcg/mL) (p value = 0.142). Furthermore, there was a statistically significant association with a negative correlation between the VPA serum level after eradication and the number of epileptic attacks per month (p value = 0.033, R value = −0.301) and the dose of VPA (p value = 0.046, R value = −0.284). Conclusions: The eradication of H. pylori resulted in a highly significant improvement in the serum level of the orally given VPA in children with idiopathic generalized epilepsy, as well as an indirect decrease in the frequency of epileptic events per month, allowing for dose reduction. Eradication therapy may have anticonvulsant properties and might indirectly aid in the management of epileptic activity. H. pylori screening for children with idiopathic generalized epilepsy can optimize serum VPA levels, potentially leading to better seizure control. To our knowledge, this is the first study in the literature to describe the effect of H. pylori eradication on the serum level of the orally administered VPA in children with idiopathic generalized epilepsy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Pediatric Gastroenterology and Nutrition)
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<p>VPA serum level after eradication and change in number of epileptic attacks/month.</p>
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<p>VPA serum level after eradication and change in dose of VPA.</p>
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