German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army
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The overall purpose of the series is threefold: 1) To provide the United States Air Force with a comprehensive and, insofar as possible, authoritative history of a major air force which suffered defeat in World War II; 2) to provide a history of that air force as prepared by many of its principal and responsible leaders; 3) to provide a firsthand account of that air force’s unique combat in a major war with the forces of the Soviet Union.
This series of studies therefore covers in large part virtually all phases of the Luftwaffe’s operations and organization, from its camouflaged origin in the Reichswehr, during the period of secret German rearmament following World War I, through its participation in the Spanish Civil War and its massive operations and final defeat in World War II.
Generalleutnant Paul Deichmann
PAUL DEICHMANN (27 August 1898 - 10 January 1981) was a German World War II Luftwaffe general and recipient of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron in recognition of successful military leadership. Born in Fulda in 1898, he entered the Imperial Army in 1916 as a cadet in the 86th Regiment of Fusiliers. He was commissioned a lieutenant a week before his 18th birthday. In August 1917 he began service with flying units as an observer and continued this duty to the end of WWI. At the end of 1920 he was transferred to the 3rd Prussian Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) in 1925. Having been temporarily released from the Army in 1928, he returned to active duty in 1931 with the 1st Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Captain in 1933. With the official establishment of the German Air Force in 1934 he entered the Reich Air Ministry. In 1935 he was posted to the Luftwaffe General Staff and received his majority that August. In 1937 he became unit commander of the II Gruppe of the 253rd Bomber Wing and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1938. By August 1940 he was Chief of Staff of II Air Corps and two years later Generalmajor (Brigadier General) as Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Kesselring. By February 1943 he was Chief of Staff of Second Air Fleet, and June found him commanding the 1st Air Division. He was promoted to Generalleutnant (Major-General) on 1 January 1944. After the end of WWII he assumed charge of Luftwaffe Command 4. He died in 1981 aged 82.
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German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army - Generalleutnant Paul Deichmann
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Text originally published in 1968 under the same title.
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USAF HISTORICAL STUDIES: NO. 163
GERMAN AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY
by
General der Flieger a. D. Paul Deichmann
Edited by Dr. Littleton B. Atkinson of the USAF Historical Division of Research Studies Institute, Air University, United States Air Force
Brig.-Gen. Noel F. Parrish, USAF Director, Research Studies Institute
Dr. Albert F. Simpson, Air Force Historian
With an Introduction by Telford Taylor
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES 5
FOREWORD 12
PREFACE 15
PART I — THE BASES FOR ARMY SUPPORT OPERATIONS 17
Chapter 1 — THE RECORD OF GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH AIR SUPPORT BEFORE WORLD WAR II 17
Operational Experience in World War I 17
Provisions in the New Army for Future Establishment of an Air Component 22
Chapter 2 — PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING THEORY 25
An Independent Luftwaffe and Its Relations with the Army 25
Development of the Command Organization 27
Luftwaffe Forces Allocated Permanently to the Army 29
Units for Temporary Assignment in Army Support Missions. 36
Development and Procurement of Munitions for Ground Support 45
Training of Luftwaffe Personnel for Army Support 52
PART II — ARMY SUPPORT OPERATIONS 56
Chapter 3 — AIR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS 56
Types of Reconnaissance Operations 56
Planning for Air Reconnaissance 58
Operational Air Reconnaissance 60
Tactical, Battle, and Artillery Air Reconnaissance 64
The Execution of Air Reconnaissance Missions 65
Reporting Equipment and Techniques 70
Processing and Interpretation of Air Photos 71
Exchange and Dissemination of Results 72
Return to Luftwaffe Control of Units Formerly Allocated to the Army, 1942 73
Chapter 4 — OPERATIONS OF COMBAT AIR FORCES 116
Air Defense of the Army: Supply System and Power Resources 116
Types and Scope of Air Support 141
Interdiction of the Battlefield 144
Direct Air Support for the Army 162
Chapter 5 — THE RATIO OF ARMY SUPPORT TO OVERALL AIR OPERATIONS 184
The Polish Campaign, 1939 184
The Campaign in the West, 1940 185
The Balkan Campaign 186
The Russian Campaign 187
Chapter 6 — SUMMARY 194
APPENDICES 198
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 246
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
The publication of this series of official historical studies is at once a most significant contribution to our knowledge of the Second World War and a landmark in the development of commercial publishing.
So much is published nowadays—far beyond the capacity of any individual even to screen—and so much is printed that ought never to see the light of day, that one tends to forget the considerable amount of writing well worth reading which rarely or never gets published at all. These volumes are an excellent example. Military monographs by foreign officers whose names are unknown to the public are not attractive items to most commercial publishing houses. But sometimes, as in the present case, they are unique sources of information which should be available in public if not in private libraries. Less often, and again as in the case of these volumes, they are surprisingly well written, and in many parts fascinating to the general reader as well as to the historian or military specialist.
The foreword of the Air Force Historical Division describes the inception and purposes of its German Air Force Historical Project and the circumstances under which these studies were written. Together with others to be published or made available for research in the future, the fruits of the Project are an analytic survey, at once comprehensive and intensive, of the Luftwaffe’s structure and operations.
Not the least remarkable feature of the series is its authorship. With the single exception of Dr. Richard Suchenwirth—a one-time Austrian Army Officer and more recently a historian and educator in Munich—they are all former Luftwaffe generals, of low to middling seniority, who were intimately and responsibly involved with the events and problems of which they write. All seven were born within the decade 1891–1901, and thus in their forties or early fifties during most of the war years. Lieutenant-colonels or colonels when the war began, they filled a wide variety of staff and administrative assignments. Only two (Deichmann and Drum) attained three-star rank (General der Flieger), and only one (Deichmann) was ever given a major field command.
In military parlance, accordingly, they are all staff
rather than command
types, and for present purposes that is a good thing. Staff officers are responsible for the smooth functioning of the military machine; they must anticipate and provide for contingencies, and are expected to possess good powers of analysis and imagination. They spend much time drafting orders, which requires the ability to write with clarity and brevity. All these qualities are reflected in their product; our seven generals must have been good staff officers.
Banned by the Treaty of Versailles, the German air arm was condemned to a clandestine and embryonic life until 1933, and the Luftwaffe’s existence was not publicly acknowledged until 1935. Hermann Göring and his colleagues in its command thus had only six years prior to the war in which to assemble and organize an officer corps. Its younger members—those who were lieutenants and captains when the war came—were recruited and trained during those years (1933–39), but the upper reaches of the corps had to be manned in other ways.
The need for experienced staff officers was especially acute, and this was met largely by transferring army (and a few navy) officers to the newly established air arm. Thus it is not surprising to find that all but one (Morzik) of our generals were professional soldiers who made their careers in the Reichsheer of the Weimar Republic, and received general staff training at the time Adolf Hitler was coming to power. So far as possible, the officers to be transferred were selected from those who had served in the air arm during the First World War, as had Deichmann and Drum.
Morzik alone represents the other principal type of senior Luftwaffe officer. He was not of the officer class
; he had been a non-commissioned officer in the air arm during the First World War. Between the wars he led an adventurous and varied life as a commercial pilot, a successful competitor in aviation contests, a Junkers test pilot, and a flying instructor. Like his more famous superiors—Udet, Loerzer, von Greim, and Göring himself—Morzik was a freelance knight of the air, and one of a considerable company commissioned from civil life in the 1933–35 period.
These generals are writing about events of which they were a part, in the course of a war in which Germany was catastrophically, and the Luftwaffe even ignominiously, defeated. What they have written is certainly not objective in the sense that it is detached; they see with the eyes and speak the language of the air arm, and readily find explanations for their own failures in the mistakes of the Army leadership—often with good reason, to be sure. But their work is objective in the sense that it is dispassionate. Their studies bespeak a deep curiosity about their conduct of the war and the causes of their defeat, and they have, on the whole, endeavored to put the record straight by the lines they are able to perceive.
There is, however, a great deal that they did not perceive. Few, if any, are those who can write at length about other men without revealing a great deal about themselves, and our authors are not in this respect exceptional. At least during this century, the German military profession has been rightly celebrated for its technical and tactical competence, but its record in the field of grand strategy has been abysmal. By and large these studies do not often venture into the rarefied atmosphere of the highest levels of command, and when they do, the results are unimpressive. Plocher’s account of the reasons for the German attack against the Soviet Union,{1} for example, is superficial and diffuse. Of course he was not party or privy to the decision, but in telling us what he has heard there is little effort to winnow fact from fable, or to assess the considerations and alternatives.
In other respects, these volumes are not to be faulted so much for what is said as for what is left unspoken. Describing the Russian soldier, Uebe tells us that it is his inherent character
to be ruthless
and to place a relatively lower value on human life
than Western
peoples do.{2} For myself, I am inclined to discount popular stereotypes about national characteristics, and to judge rather upon a record of behavior. Beyond question the Russian soldier was often ruthless and worse, but what of the German soldier in Russia? Neither Uebe nor any of his colleagues carries the story in that direction. To be sure the Luftwaffe, by the nature of its operations, was not much involved in the exterminations, forced labor impressments, and other atrocities in which the Army was extensively implicated. But this hardly justifies Plocher’s chest-thumping conclusion that: ...the incomparable performances of the individual German soldier in combat in the East are above criticism. This applies to all ranks, from the lowest private to general officers, on the land, in the air, and on the seas.
{3} Unhappily, the German military records tell quite a different story.
Fortunately such departures from the factual dimension are rare, and the authors have given us a unique and invaluable fund of information. Two of these studies concern the high command of the Luftwaffe, and two more cover particular Luftwaffe functions—air lift and ground support. The remaining six all concern the fighting on the eastern front between the German and Russian forces—a ferocious conflict on a scale greater than any other in human history.
Three of the eastern front studies, all by Plocher, constitute a chronological account of Luftwaffe operations on the eastern front in 1941, 1942, and 1943, one year to each volume. It is a mammoth undertaking of nearly 1,200 pages, well-organized, and abundantly supported and illustrated with maps, charts, and photographs.
Plocher was chief of staff of an air corps on the southern part of the front, and remained in the east until the middle of 1943. Thus he witnessed at first hand the Luftwaffe’s highly successful operations during the first few days of the campaign in July 1941, in the course of which the entire Russian air force was virtually annihilated, as well as the great encirclements at Minsk, Kiev, Bryansk, and elsewhere, which netted over two and a quarter million Russian prisoners and drove the Soviet forces back to the gates of Leningrad and Moscow and the banks of the Don. No doubt the Wehrmacht’s failure to achieve decisive success was more the fault of the Army leadership than of the Luftwaffe, but the air generals made serious mistakes of their own, of which Plocher stresses two of major strategic proportions: (1) failure to carry out strategic bombing attacks on Russian armaments industries, and (2) dispersion of the slender air strength at the extreme northern end of the front, so that Murmansk and Archangel remained in Russian hands, as ports through which the western Allies could help the Russians to recover, following their nearly disastrous losses in the opening months of the campaign.
With the Russian air arm largely destroyed and strategic operations neglected, the Luftwaffe became, in practical terms, part of the German army—flying artillery,
supplemental transportation, additional ground forces. There were few Russian aircraft for the German Flak to shoot at, so the anti-aircraft units became frontline artillery.
Later on, as the Army got into even deeper trouble, the Luftwaffe was pulled in after it. Bombers were misused on ground-attack and airlift assignments; efforts to supply encircled German armies by air caused the Luftwaffe catastrophic losses. New Russian aircraft began to appear on the scene, and the balance gradually shifted so that by the end of 1943 the Germans no longer enjoyed air superiority, and the Luftwaffe became, as Plocher puts it, a fire brigade,
constantly on emergency call to plug up holes or salvage hard-pressed Army units.
How the Russians responded to the Luftwaffe’s operations is the subject of Uebe’s report. Except for the first few days, when the Soviet planes were destroyed in close array on their own airfields, like our own aircraft on Clark Field in the Philippines in December 1941, the Russians reacted to the overwhelming German superiority with great adaptability, and skill in the arts of camouflage and deception. Rails laid on ice did not sink with the thaw, for supports had been built under the ice; ships that appeared half-sunk and useless were under repair, with the bow flooded to elevate the stern. As events show,
writes Uebe, Russian reaction to German Air Force operations, however primitive and makeshift in character, and however crude they might have first appeared to be to their more enlightened Western opponents, proved throughout the course of the war to be highly efficient, effective, and ultimately an important factor in the defeat of Germany.
A lesson for the American military command in Vietnam?
These same qualities were strikingly manifest in the Russian partisan operations behind the German lines, as described in a short but vivid study by General Karl Drum. The partisan units depended on air transportation for reinforcements, leadership, supplies, evacuation of wounded, and other necessary assistance, and all this was accomplished with obsolete aircraft and improvised equipment, utilizing air-drop or well-concealed air strips. Upon occasion, men were delivered
to the partisans by parachuteless air-drop, wrapped in straw and dropped from low-flying planes into deep snow. The Germans, counting on a blitzkrieg victory, had made no preparations for anti-partisan warfare. No aircraft were earmarked to deal with the Russian air-supply, no single anti-partisan command was established to deal with the problem as a whole. Brutal occupation policies boomeranged by driving the population into the arms of the partisans. The German failure to take effective countermeasures is a striking demonstration that overwhelming superiority in heavy weapons and a sophisticated military tradition are no guarantee of success against surprise and deception.
Perhaps the most interesting and valuable of the eastern front volumes is Schwabedissen’s extensive and perceptive study of the Russian air force as it appeared to the Germans. Through interchange of equipment and manufacturing and training facilities during the Weimar period, the antagonists were well known to each other. The Russian air performance in Spain and Finland had not been impressive, and in 1941, just prior to their attack, the Luftwaffe had a pretty accurate picture of the opposing force: it was far larger than the Luftwaffe, but much inferior in equipment, leadership, and training. The Germans expected to smash it to bits, and they succeeded.
What the Germans failed to reckon with was the Russians’ recuperative powers. Most of their aircraft were destroyed on the ground rather than in the air, so that personnel losses were not high. The armament industries were rapidly moved eastward, and an early winter hampered Luftwaffe operations and gave the Russians a badly needed respite. By the winter of 1941–42 new Russian air units, better equipped, were beginning to appear at the front.
Still vastly superior in operational capacity, the Luftwaffe remained dominant in 1942, but in 1943 Russian numerical superiority, and techniques improved by experience, began to tell. During the last two years of the war, general air superiority passed to the Russian side of the front. But superior German technique enabled them to operate and achieve local successes right up to the end of the war; the Russians never achieved the total superiority enjoyed by the Allies on the western front.
German military air transport operations were opened by spectacular successes in the West. By parachute, glider, and landed aircraft, German airborne units descended on the major airfields of Norway and Denmark, on the airfields and tactically crucial bridges in Holland, and on the famous fort Eben Emael in Belgium. Morzik’s fine account covers these operations in detail, as well as the later successful but costly assault on Crete, and the planned but never executed airborne operations in England, Gibraltar, Malta, and elsewhere.
The transport workhorse of the Luftwaffe was the three-engined Junkers 52, opposite number to our C-47s (otherwise known as DC-3s, Dakotas, gooney birds,
and now in Vietnam as dragonships
), and well-known to all European travelers of ancient enough vintage to have flown Lufthansa during the thirties. A sturdy and versatile airplane, it was turned out by the thousands, but by the end of the war there were less than two hundred left. Most of the rest lay shattered and scrapped in Russia, near Demyansk and Stalingrad.
Morzik’s account of the Demyansk and Stalingrad airlifts is gripping and enlightening. Retreating from the Moscow sector, the German Second Corps (roughly 100,000 men) was encircled at Demyansk in February 1942. Hitler forbade a breakout to the rear, and decided to supply the Corps by air. This was accomplished, but at a cost of 160 railway trains of gasoline, 265 Ju-52s, and consequent loss of trained crews and disruption of the pilot-training program. The psychological cost was even higher, for the apparent success of the operation made spuriously credible Göring’s promise, ten months later, to supply Paulus’ Sixth Army of over 300,000 men, encircled at Stalingrad. By then the Luftwaffe had only 750 Ju-52s left; half of them, and many bombers pressed into service as transports, were lost in the futile effort.
Airlift operations were the product of special circumstances, and strategic bombing the Luftwaffe neglected from birth to death. Day in and day out, its basic role was direct support of Army operations: attacking enemy troop columns, strong points, and tanks; impeding the flow of enemy reinforcements or cutting off their avenues of retreat; general intelligence reconnaissance. After 1941, Army support comprised over 75% of the Luftwaffe’s operational activity—too large a proportion, as General Deichmann points out in his treatise German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army.
Deichmann traces the development of German air theory from its beginnings in the First World War, and explores the manner in which those theories shaped the Luftwaffe and governed its operational potential. The military air specialist will find this an exceptionally informative study.
In The German Air Force General Staff,
Nielsen takes us into the weird world of the Luftwaffe high command, well stocked with colorful characters, many of them adequately unattractive. Hitler was not much interested in air power and left Göring a free hand as long as things went well. After the period of spectacular initial successes, Göring suffered a sharp decline in influence, and the Führer interjected himself into the Luftwaffe’s management. He was not helpful; his decisions were the product of ignorance and favoritism and simply completed the process of demoralization.
Nielsen’s study is focused on the general staff—i.e. the group of specially trained officers who held staff assignments—but its perspective is much broader, and includes the interplay of personality and rivalry at the top. Until his fall from grace, Göring’s domination was complete, with one exception—Erhard Milch, his second-in-command, who had his own contacts and standing with Hitler and the Nazi Party. A former director of Lufthansa and a man of great energy and administrative ability, Milch was ambitious to the point that his attitude on proposed measures was governed less by the merits than by his estimate of their probable effect on his personal situation. Thus he initially opposed the creation of a general staff, and, when overruled, bent his energies to ensuring that the chief