On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficien and On the Will in Nature
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Arthur Schopenhauer
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) entwickelte eine Philosophie, die zeitgenössische Annahmen der Erkenntnistheorie, Metaphysik, Ästhetik und Ethik richtungsweisend und vorgreifend mit empiristischen, hermeneutischen und phänomenologischen Elementen verbindet. Sein Denken wirkt weit über die Philosophie hinaus in Literatur, Musik und Bildender Kunst.
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On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficien and On the Will in Nature - Arthur Schopenhauer
LIBRARY.
TWO ESSAYS
BY
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
ON
THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
AND
ON THE WILL IN NATURE.
TWO ESSAYS BY
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
Translated by Mme. KARL HILLEBRAND.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
In venturing to lay the present translation[1] before the public, I am aware of the great difficulties of my task, and indeed can hardly hope to do justice to the Author. In fact, had it not been for the considerations I am about to state, I might probably never have published what had originally been undertaken in order to acquire a clearer comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to publicity.
The two treatises which form the contents of the present volume have so much importance for a profound and correct knowledge of Schopenhauer's philosophy, that it may even be doubted whether the translation of his chief work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,
can contribute much towards the appreciation of his system without the help at least of the Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde.
Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently insists upon a previous thorough knowledge of Kant's philosophy, as the basis, and of his own Fourfold Root,
as the key, to his own system, asserting that knowledge to be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension of his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the Fourfold Root
nor the Will in Nature
have as yet found a translator; therefore, considering the dawning interest which has begun to make itself felt for Schopenhauer's philosophy in England and in America, and the fact that no more competent scholar has come forward to do the work, it may not seem presumptuous to suppose that this version may be acceptable to those who wish to acquire a more than superficial knowledge of this remarkable thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not permit them to read his works in the original.
Now although some portions of both the Essays published in the present volume have of course become antiquated, owing to the subsequent development of the empirical sciences, while others—such as, for instance, Schopenhauer's denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of Brandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and Pathology[2]—can have no interest for the reader of the present day, I have nevertheless given them just as he left them and refrained from all suppression or alteration. And if, on the whole, the Will in Nature
may be less indispensable for a right understanding of our philosopher's views than the Fourfold Root,
being merely a record of the confirmations which had been contributed during his lifetime by the various branches of Natural Science to his doctrine, that the thing in itself is the will, the Second Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much importance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement. For they both throw light on Schopenhauer's view of the Universe in its double aspect as Will and as Representation, each being as it were a résumé of the exposition of one of those aspects. My plea for uniting them in one volume, in spite of the difference of their contents and the wide lapse of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be, that they complete each other, and that their great weight and intrinsic value seem to point them out as peculiarly fitted to be introduced to the English thinker.
In endeavouring to convey the Author's thoughts as he expresses them, I have necessarily encountered many and great difficulties. His meaning, though always clearly expressed, is not always easy to seize, even for his countrymen; as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have failed to grasp, let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this case besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot be shifted by the translator on to the Author; since the consummate perfection of Schopenhauer's prose is universally recognised, even by those who reject, or at least who do not share, his views. An eminent German writer of our time has not hesitated to rank him immediately after Lessing and Göthe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and only quite recently a German professor, in a speech delivered with the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer's philosophy, was reluctantly obliged to admit that his works would remain on account of their literary value. Göthe himself expressed admiration for the clearness of exposition in Schopenhauer's chief work and for the beauty of his style.
The chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these Essays, did not therefore consist in the obscurity of the Author's style, nor even in the difficulty of finding appropriate terms wherewith to convey his meaning; although at times certainly the want of complete precision in our philosophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selection was often far from easy: it lay rather in the great difference in the way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts which lies between the two nations. The regions of German and English thought are indeed separated by a gulf, which at first seems impassable, yet which must be bridged over by some means or other, if a right comprehension is to be achieved. The German writer loves to develop synthetically a single thought in a long period consisting of various members; he proceeds steadily to unravel the seemingly tangled skein, while he keeps the reader ever on the alert, making him assist actively in the process and never letting him lose sight of the main thread. The English author, on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, and ready for this end not only to sacrifice harmony of proportion in construction, but to submit to the necessity of occasional artificial joining, usually adopts the analytical method. He prefers to divide the thread of his discourse into several smaller skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting the convenience of the English thinker, to whom long periods are trying and bewildering, and who is not always willing to wait half a page or more for the point of a sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could be done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the original, I have broken up the longer periods in these essays into smaller sentences, in order to facilitate their comprehension. At times however Schopenhauer recapitulates a whole side of his view of the Universe in a single period of what seems intolerable length to the English reader: as, for instance, the résumé contained in the Introduction to his Will in Nature,
[3] which could not be divided without damage to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem advisable to sacrifice the unity and harmony of his design and to disturb both his form and his meaning, in order to minister to the reader's dislike for mental exertion; in keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to make it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in which the single parts are presented to the eye.
As regards the terms chosen to convey the German meaning, I can hardly hope to have succeeded in every case in adequately rendering it, still less can I expect to have satisfied my English readers. Several words of frequent occurrence and of considerable importance for the right understanding of the original, have been used at different times by different English philosophers in senses so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has by universal consent attained far greater precision than at present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator to convey to the reader's mind precisely the same thought that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly state those terms which give most latitude for misapprehension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and also the special meaning attached to some of them by Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers. They are as follows.
(a.) Anschauung (anschauen, literally 'to behold') I have rendered differently, according to its double meaning in German. When used to designate the mental act by which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation received, it is rendered by perception. When used to lay stress upon immediate, as opposed to abstract representation, it is rendered by intuition. This last occurs however more often in the adjective form.
(b.) Vorstellung (vorstellen, literally 'to place before') I render by representation in spite of its foreign, unwelcome sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest approaches the German meaning. The faculty of representation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as "an exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a picture there."
(c.) Auffassung (auffassen, literally 'to catch up') has so many shades of meaning in German that it has to be translated in many different ways according to the relation in which it stands in the context. It signifies apprehension, comprehension, perception, viewing and grasping.
(d.) Wahrnehmung (wahrnehmen, from wahr, true, and nehmen, to take), is translated by apprehension or perception, according to the degree of consciousness which accompanies it.
But the two words which have proved most difficult to translate, have been Vernehmen and Willkühr.
(e.) Vernehmen means, to distinguish by the sense of hearing. This word conveys a shade of thought which it is almost impossible to render in English, because we have no word by which to distinguish, from mere sensuous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than hearing and less than comprehension. The French entendre comes nearer to it than our hearing, but implies more comprehension than vernehmen.
(f.) As to Willkühr (arbitrium, literally 'will-choice'), after a great deal of consideration I have chosen (relative) free-will as the nearest approach to the German sense, or at any rate, to that in which Schopenhauer uses it. Willkühr means in fact what is commonly understood as free-will; i.e. will with power of choice, will determined by motives and unimpeded by outward obstacles: arbitrium as opposed to voluntas: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse. This relative free-will however is quite distinct from absolute free-will (liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ) in a metaphysical sense, i.e. will in its self-dependency. When its arbitrary character is specially emphasized, we call Willkühr, caprice, but this is not the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.
Besides the meaning of these German words, I have still to define the sense in which I have used the term idea in this translation; for this word has greatly changed its meaning at different times and with different authors, and is even now apt to confuse and mislead. Schopenhauer has himself contributed in one way to render its signification less clear; since, in spite of his declaration in the Fourfold Root
[4] to the effect, that he never uses the word idea in any other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself employed it to translate Vorstellung, in a specimen he gives of a rendering of a passage in Kant's Prolegomena
in a letter addressed to Haywood, published in Gwinner's Biography of Schopenhauer.
This he probably did because some eminent English and French philosophers had taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps that Kant's meaning would thus be more readily understood. As however he uses the word 'idea' everywhere else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense, I have preferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own declaration and definition. Besides, many English writers of note have protested against any other sense being given to it, and modern German philosophers have more and more returned to the original meaning of the term.
Some readers may take exception at such expressions as à priority, motivation, aseity; for they are not, strictly speaking, English words. These terms however belong to Schopenhauer's own characteristic terminology, and have a distinct and clearly defined meaning; therefore they had to be retained in all cases in which they could not be evaded, in order not to interfere with the Author's intention: a necessity which the scholar will not fail to recognise, especially when I plead in my defence that fidelity and accuracy have been my sole aim in this work.
If moreover Carlyle's words, He who imports into his own country any true delineation, any rationally spoken word on any subject, has done well,
are true, I may also be absolved from censure, if I lay before the public this version of some important utterances of a great thinker, in the hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement to, a deeper study of all Schopenhauer's works.
The Translator.
May, 1888.
ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT
OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE.
Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν.
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
This treatise on Elementary Philosophy, which first appeared in the year 1813, when it procured for me the degree of doctor, afterwards became the substructure for the whole of my system. It cannot, therefore, be allowed to remain out of print, as has been the case, without my knowledge, for the last four years.
On the other hand, to send a juvenile work like this once more into the world with all its faults and blemishes, seemed to me unjustifiable. For I am aware that the time cannot be very far off when all correction will be impossible; but with that time the period of my real influence will commence, and this period, I trust, will be a long one, for I firmly rely upon Seneca's promise: "Etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit; venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia judicent."[5] I have done what I could, therefore, to improve this work of my youth, and, considering the brevity and uncertainty of life, I must even regard it as an especially fortunate circumstance, to have been thus permitted to correct in my sixtieth year what I had written in my twenty-sixth.
Nevertheless, while doing this, I meant to deal leniently with my younger self, and to let him discourse, nay, even speak his mind freely, wherever it was possible. But wherever he had advanced what was incorrect or superfluous, or had even left out the best part, I have been obliged to interrupt the thread of his discourse. And this has happened often enough; so often, indeed, that some of my readers may perhaps think they hear an old man reading a young man's book aloud, while he frequently lets it drop, in order to indulge in digressions of his own on the same subject.
It is easy to see that a work thus corrected after so long an interval, could never acquire the unity and rounded completeness which only belong to such as are written in one breath. So great a difference will be found even in style and expression, that no reader of any tact can ever be in doubt whether it be the older or younger man who is speaking. For the contrast is indeed striking between the mild, unassuming tone in which the youth—who is still simple enough to believe quite seriously that for all whose pursuit is philosophy, truth, and truth alone, can have importance, and therefore that whoever promotes truth is sure of a welcome from them—propounds his arguments with confidence, and the firm, but also at times somewhat harsh voice of the old man, who in course of time has necessarily discovered the true character and real aims of the noble company of mercenary time-servers into which he has fallen. Nay, the just reader will hardly find fault with him should he occasionally give free vent to his indignation; since we see what comes of it when people who profess to have truth for their sole aim, are always occupied in studying the purposes of their powerful superiors, and when the e quovis ligno fit Mercurius is extended even to the greatest philosophers, and a clumsy charlatan, like Hegel, is calmly classed among them? Verily German Philosophy stands before us loaded with contempt, the laughing-stock of other nations, expelled from all honest science—like the prostitute who sells herself for sordid hire to-day to one, to-morrow to another; and the brains of the present generation of savants are disorganised by Hegelian nonsense: incapable of reflection, coarse and bewildered, they fall a prey to the low Materialism which has crept out of the basilisk's egg. Good speed to them. I return to my subject.
My readers will thus have to get over the difference of tone in this treatise; for I could not do here what I had done in my chief work, that is, give the later additions I had made in a separate appendix. Besides, it is of no consequence that people should know what I wrote in my twenty-sixth and what in my sixtieth year; the only matter of real importance is, that those who wish to find their way through the fundamental principles of all philosophizing, to gain a firm footing and a clear insight, should in these few sheets receive a little volume by which they may learn something substantial, solid, and true: and this, I hope, will be the case. From the expansion now given to some portions, it has even grown into a compendious theory of the entire faculty of knowing, and this theory, by limiting itself strictly to the research of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, shows the matter from a new and peculiar side; but then it finds its completion in the First Book of The World as Will and Representation,
together with those chapters of the Second Volume which refer to it, and also in my Critique of Kantian Philosophy.
Arthur Schopenhauer.
Frankfurt am Main,
September, 1847.
EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
In the present volume I lay before the public the Third Edition of the Fourfold Root,
including the emendations and additions left by Schopenhauer in his own interleaved copy. I have already had occasion elsewhere to relate that he left copies of all his works thus interleaved, and that he was wont to jot down on these fly-leaves any corrections and additions he might intend inserting in future editions.
Schopenhauer himself prepared for the press all that has been added in the present edition, for he has indicated, by signs in the original context corresponding to other similar signs in the MS. passages, the places where he wished his additions to be inserted. All that was left for me to do, was to give in extended form a few citations he had purposed adding.
No essential corrections and additions, such as might modify the fundamental thoughts of the work, will be found in this new edition, which simply contains corrections, amplifications, and corroborations, many of them interesting and important. Let me take only a single instance: § 21, on the Intellectual Nature of Empirical Perception.
As Schopenhauer attached great importance to his proof of the intellectual nature of perception, nay, believed he had made a new discovery by it, he also worked out with special predilection all that tended to support, confirm, and strengthen it. Thus we find him in this § 21 quoting an interesting fact he had himself observed in 1815; then the instances of Caspar Hauser and others (taken from Franz's book, The Eye,
&c. &c.); and again the case of Joseph Kleinhaus, the blind sculptor; and finally, the physiological confirmations he has found in Flourens' De la vie et de l'intelligence des Animaux.
An observation, too, concerning the value of Arithmetic for the comprehension of physical processes, which is inserted into this same paragraph, will be found very remarkable, and may be particularly recommended to those who are inclined to set too high a value on calculation.
Many interesting and important additions will be found in the other paragraphs also.
One thing I could have wished to see left out of this Third Edition: his effusions against the professors of philosophy.
In a conversation with Schopenhauer in the year 1847, when he told me how he intended to chastise the professors of philosophy,
[6] I expressed my dissent on this point; for even in the Second Edition these passages had interrupted the measured progress of objective inquiry. At that time, however, he was not to be persuaded to strike them out; so they were left to be again included in this Third Edition, where the reader will accordingly once more find them, although times have changed since then.
Upon another point, more nearly touching the real issue, I had a controversy with Schopenhauer in the year 1852. In arguing against Fichte's derivation of the Non-Ego from the Ego in his chief work,[7] he had said:—
"Just as if Kant had never existed, the Principle of Sufficient Reason still remains with Fichte what it was with all the Schoolmen, an œterna veritas: that is to say, just as the Gods of the ancients were still ruled over by eternal Destiny, so was the God of the Schoolmen still ruled over by these œterna veritates, i.e., by the metaphysical, mathematical, and metalogical truths, and even, according to some, by the validity of the moral law. These veritates alone were unconditioned by anything, and God, as well as the world, existed through their necessity. Thus with Fichte the Ego, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is the reason of the world or of the Non-Ego, of the Object, which is the product or result of the Ego itself. He took good care, therefore, neither to examine nor to check the Principle of Sufficient Reason any farther. But if I had to indicate the particular form of this principle by which Fichte was guided in making the Ego spin the Non-Ego out of itself, as the spider its web, I should point to the Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being in Space; for nothing but a reference to this principle gives any sort of sense or meaning to his laboured deductions of the way in which the Ego produces and manufactures the Non-Ego out of itself, which form the contents of the most senseless and—simply on this account—most tiresome book ever written. The only interest this Fichteian philosophy has for us at all—otherwise it would not be worth mentioning—lies in its being the tardy appearance of the real antithesis to ancient Materialism, which was the most consistent starting from the Object, just as Fichte's philosophy was the most consistent starting from the Subject. As Materialism overlooked the fact, that with the simplest Object it forthwith posited the Subject also; so Fichte not only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject (whatever name he might choose to give it) he had already posited the Object also, because no Subject can be thought without it; he likewise overlooked the fact, that all derivation à priori, nay, all demonstration whatsoever, rests upon a necessity, and that all necessity itself rests entirely and exclusively on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, because to be necessary, and to result from a given reason, are convertible terms; that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is still nothing but the common form of the Object as such: therefore that it always presupposes the Object and does not, as valid before and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in conformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting from the Object and the above-mentioned starting from the Subject have in common, that both presuppose what they pretend to derive: i.e., the necessary correlate of their starting-point."
This last assertion "that the Principle of Sufficient Reason already presupposes the Object, but does not, as valid before and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in conformity with its own legislation, seemed to me so far to clash with the proof given by Schopenhauer in § 21 of the
Fourfold Root," as, according to the latter, it is the function of the Subject's understanding which primarily creates the objective world out of the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; so that all that is Object, as such, after all comes into being only in conformity with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, consequently that this principle cannot, as Schopenhauer asserted in his polemic against Fichte, already presuppose the Object. In 1852, therefore, I wrote as follows to Schopenhauer:—
In your arguments against Fichte, where you say that the Principle of Sufficient Reason already presupposes the Object, and cannot, as valid before and independently of it, first introduce it, the objection occurred to me anew, that in your
Fourfold Root you had made the Object of perception first come into being through the application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and that you yourself, therefore, derive the Object from the Subject, as, for instance, p. 73 of the
Fourfold Root" (2nd edition). How then can you maintain against Fichte that the Object is always pre-supposed by the Subject? I know of no way of solving this difficulty but the following: The Subject only presupposes in the Object what belongs to the thing in itself, what is inscrutable; but it creates itself the representation of the Object, i.e. that by which the thing in itself becomes phenomenon. For instance, when I see a tree, my Subject assumes the thing in itself of that tree; whereas the representation of it conversely presupposes the operation of my Subject, the transition from the effect (in my eye) to its cause."
To this Schopenhauer replied as follows on the 12th of July, 1852:—
"Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the right ones. Here there cannot yet be a question of the thing in itself, and the distinction between representation and object is inadmissible: the world is representation. The matter stands rather as follows—Fichte's derivation of the Non-Ego from the Ego, is quite abstract:—A = A, ergo, I = I, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the Object is at once posited with the Subject. For to be Subject means, to know; and to know means, to have representations. Object and representation are one and the same thing. In the Fourfold Root,
therefore, I have divided all objects or representations into four classes, within which the Principle of Sufficient Reason always reigns, though in each class under a different form; nevertheless, the Principle of Sufficient Reason always presupposes the class itself, and indeed, properly speaking, they coincide.[8] Now, in reality, the existence of the Subject of knowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not exist for itself and independently, as if it had dropped from the sky; it appears as the instrument of some individual phenomenon of the Will (animal, human being), whose purposes it is destined to serve, and which thereby now receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself, on the other hand, of everything else. The question next arises, as to how or out of what elements the representation of the outer world is brought about within this consciousness. This I have already answered in my Theory of Colours
and also in my chief work,[9] but most thoroughly and exhaustively of all in the Second Edition of the Fourfold Root,
§ 21, where it is shown, that all those elements are of subjective origin; wherefore attention is especially drawn to the great difference between all this and Fichte's humbug. For the whole of my exposition is but the full carrying out of Kant's Transcendental Idealism."[10]
I have thought it advisable to give this passage of his letter, as being relevant to the matter in question. As to the division in chapters and paragraphs, it is the same in this new edition as in the last. By comparing each single paragraph of the second with the same paragraph of the present edition, it will be easy to find out what has been newly added. In conclusion, however, I will still add a short list of the principal passages which are new.
List of Additions to the Third Edition.
§ 8, p. 13, the passages from "Notandum, &c., to
Ex necessitate, and p. 14, from
Zunächst adoptirt down to the end of the page (English version, p. 14,
Not., &c., to
Ex nec.; p. 15, from
First he adopts down to the end of the paragraph, p. 16,
est causa sui"), in confirmation of his assertion that Spinoza had interchanged and confounded the relation between reason of knowledge and consequent, with that between cause and effect.
§ 9, p. 17, from "er proklamirt down to
gewusst haben wird. (E. v., § 9, p. 19, from
He proclaims it down to
by others before.")
§ 20, p. 42, in speaking of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung), from the words "Ja, wo einem Schreiber down to
ins Bodenlose gerathen sei. (E. v., § 20, p. 45, from
Nay, it is precisely down to
his depth.")
§ 21, p. 61, the words at the bottom, "und räumlich konstruirt, down to p. 62,
Data erhält, together with the quotation concerning the blind sculptor, J. Kleinhaus. (E. v., § 21, p. 67, the words
and constructs in Space down to
of the Understanding,") and the note.
§ 21, pp. 67-68, from "Ein specieller und interessanter Beleg down to
albernes Zeug dazu. (E. v., § 21, p. 73,
I will here add down to p. 74,
followed by twaddle.")
§ 21, p. 73, sq., the instances of Caspar Hauser, &c., from Franz, The Eye,
&c., and the physiological corroborations from Flourens, "De la vie et de l'intelligence," &c. (E. v., p. 80, and following.)
§ 21, p. 77, the parenthesis on the value of calculation. (E. v., p. 83, All comprehension,
&c.)
§ 21, p. 83, the words "da ferner Substanz down to
das Wirken in concreto. (E. v., § 21, p. 90,
Substance and Matter down to
in concreto.")
§ 29, p. 105, the words "im Lateinischen down to
erkannte. (E. v., § 29, p. 116, from
In Latin down to
κατ' ἐξοχήν.")
§ 34, p. 116, the words "Ueberall ist down to
Praxis und Theorie. (E. v., § 34, p. 128, the words
Reasonable or Rational down to
theory and practice.")
§ 34, p. 121, the verses from Göthe's West-Östlicher Divan.
§ 34, p. 125, Anmerkung, the words "Auch ist Brahma down to
die erstere, and p. 126, the quotation from I. J. Schmidt's
Forschungen. (E. v., § 34, p. 138, note,
Brahma is also down to
first of these.")
§ 34, p. 127, the words from "Aber der naive down to
judaisirten gouverneurs (E. v., § 34, p. 150, sentence beginning
But the artless down to
infancy," and the Greek quotation from Plutarch in the note.)
§ 34, p. 128, the words from "Ganz übereinstimmend down to
überflüssige sein soll. (E. v., p. 151, from
J. F. Davis down to
superfluous.")
§ 45, p. 147, the words "Eben daher kommt es down to
sich erhält. (E. v., § 45, p. 163,
It is just for this reason too down to
their possession.")
§ 45, p. 149, the words "Man suche Das, &c., down to
gelesen haben. (E. v., § 45, p. 164, from
We should down to
read in books.")
§ 49, p. 154, the words "Der bei den Philosophastern, down to
zu kontroliren sind. (E. v., § 49, p. 169, from the words
The conception of our, &c., down to
by perception.")
§ 50, p. 156, the words "Denn der Satz vom Grunde down to
nur sich selbst nicht. (E. v., § 50, p. 172, from
For the Principle of Sufficient Reason, &c., down to
everything else.")
§ 52, p. 158, the words "Der allgemeine Sinn des Satzes vom Grunde, down to
der Kosmologische Beweis ist. (E. v., § 52, p. 173, from
The general meaning down to
the Cosmological Proof.")
Julius Frauenstädt.
Berlin, August, 1864.
EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
The present Fourth Edition is of the same content as the Third; therefore it contains the same corrections and additions which I had already inserted in the Third Edition from Schopenhauer's own interleaved copy of this work.
Julius Frauenstädt.
Berlin, September, 1877.
ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT
OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
§ 1. The Method.
The divine Plato and the marvellous Kant unite their mighty voices in recommending a rule, to serve as the method of all philosophising as well as of all other science.[11] Two laws, they tell us: the law of homogeneity and the law of specification, should be equally observed, neither to the disadvantage of the other. The law of homogeneity directs us to collect things together into kinds by observing their resemblances and correspondences, to collect kinds again into species, species into genera, and so on, till at last we come to the highest all-comprehensive conception. Now this law, being transcendental, i.e. essential to our Reason, takes for granted that Nature conforms with it: an assumption which is expressed by the ancient formula, entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda. As for the law of specification, Kant expresses it thus: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas. It requires namely, that we should clearly distinguish one from another the different genera collected under one comprehensive conception; likewise that we should not confound the higher and lower species comprised in each genus; that we should be careful not to overleap any, and never to classify inferior species, let alone individuals, immediately under the generic conception: each conception being susceptible of subdivision, and none even coming down to mere intuition. Kant teaches that both laws are transcendental, fundamental principles of our Reason, which postulate conformity of things with them à priori; and Plato, when he tells us that these rules were flung down from the seat of the gods with the Promethean fire, seems to express the same thought in his own way.
§ 2. Application of the Method in the present case.
In spite of the weight of such recommendations, I find that the second of these two laws has been far too rarely applied to a fundamental principle of all knowledge: the Principle of Sufficient Reason. For although this principle has been often and long ago stated in a general way, still sufficient distinction has not been made between its extremely different applications, in each of which it acquires a new meaning; its origin in various mental faculties thus becoming evident. If we compare Kant's philosophy with all preceding systems, we perceive that, precisely in the observation of our mental faculties, many persistent errors have been caused by applying the principle of homogeneity, while the opposite principle of specification was neglected; whereas the law of specification has led to the greatest and most important results. I therefore crave permission to quote a passage from Kant, in which the application of the law of specification to the sources of our knowledge is especially recommended; for it gives countenance to my present endeavour:—
"It is of the highest importance to isolate various sorts of knowledge, which in kind and origin are different from others, and to take great care lest they be mixed up with those others with which, for practical purposes, they are generally united. What is done by the chemist in the analysis of substances, and by the mathematician in pure mathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher, in order to enable him to define clearly the part which, in the promiscuous employment of the understanding, belongs to a special kind of knowledge, as well as its peculiar value and influence."[12]
§ 3. Utility of this Inquiry.
Should I succeed in showing that the principle which forms the subject of the present inquiry does not issue directly from one primitive notion of our intellect, but rather in the first instance from various ones, it will then follow, that neither can the necessity it brings with it, as a firmly established à priori principle, be one and the same in all cases, but must, on the contrary, be as manifold as the sources of the principle itself. Whoever therefore bases a conclusion upon this principle, incurs the obligation of clearly specifying on which of its grounds of necessity he founds his conclusion and of designating that ground by a special name, such as I am about to suggest. I hope that this may be a step towards promoting greater lucidity and precision in philosophising; for I hold the extreme clearness to be attained by an accurate definition of each single expression to be indispensable to us, as a defence both against error and against intentional deception, and also as a means of securing to ourselves the permanent, unalienable possession of each newly acquired notion within the sphere of philosophy beyond the fear of losing it again on account of any misunderstanding or double meaning which might hereafter be detected. The true philosopher will indeed always seek after light and perspicuity, and will endeavour to resemble a Swiss lake—which through its peacefulness is enabled to unite great depth with great clearness, the depth revealing itself precisely by the clearness—rather than a turbid, impetuous mountain torrent. "La clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes," says Vauvenargues. Pseudo-philosophers, on the contrary, use speech, not indeed to conceal their thoughts, as M. de Talleyrand has it, but rather to conceal the absence of them, and are apt to make their readers responsible for the incomprehensibility of their systems, which really proceeds from their own confused thinking. This explains why in certain writers—Schelling, for instance—the tone of instruction so often passes into that of reproach, and frequently the reader is even taken to task beforehand for his assumed inability to understand.
§ 4. Importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Its importance is indeed very great, since it may truly be called the basis of all science. For by science we understand a system of notions, i.e. a totality of connected, as opposed to a mere aggregate of disconnected, notions. But what is it that binds together the members of a system, if not the Principle of Sufficient Reason? That which distinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is precisely, that its notions are derived one from another as from their reason. So it was long ago observed by Plato: καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις ἀυτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ (etiam opiniones veræ non multi pretii sunt, donec quis illas ratiocinatione a causis ducta liget).[13] Nearly every science, moreover, contains notions of causes from which the effects may be deduced, and likewise other notions of the necessity of conclusions from reasons, as will be seen during the course of this inquiry. Aristotle has expressed this as follows: πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητική, ἢ καὶ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας, περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστι (omnis intellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo intellectu participans, circa causas et principia est).[14] Now, as it is this very assumption à priori that all things must have their reason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the why, we may safely call this why the mother of all science.
§ 5. The Principle itself.
We purpose showing further on that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is an expression common to several à priori notions. Meanwhile, it must be stated under some formula or other. I choose Wolf's as being the most comprehensive: Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit. Nothing is without a reason for its being.[15]
CHAPTER II.
GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT VIEWS HITHERTO HELD CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
§ 6. First Statement of the Principle and Distinction between Two of its Meanings.
A more or less accurately defined, abstract expression for so fundamental a principle of all knowledge must have been found at a very early age; it would, therefore, be difficult, and besides of no great interest, to determine where it first appeared. Neither Plato nor Aristotle have formally stated it as a leading fundamental principle, although both often speak of it as a self-evident truth. Thus, with a naïveté which savours of the state of innocence as opposed to that of the knowledge of good and of evil, when compared with the critical researches of our own times, Plato says: ἀναγκαῖον, πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτων γίγνοιτο;[16] (necesse est, quæcunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri: quomodo enim absque ea fierent?) and then again: πᾶν δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν[17] (quidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa necessario gignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, impossibile est). At the end of his book De fato,
Plutarch cites the following among the chief propositions of the Stoics: μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε, τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας[18] (maxime id primum esse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis antegressis).
In the Analyt. post.
i. 2, Aristotle states the principle of sufficient reason to a certain degree when he says: ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν, δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστίν, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτο ἄλλως εἶναι. (Scire autem putamus unamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus causam cognoscere, propter quum res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nec posse eam aliter se habere.)[19] In his Metaphysics,
moreover, he already divides causes, or rather principles, ἀρχαί, into different kinds,[20] of which he admits eight; but this division is neither profound nor precise enough. He is, nevertheless, quite right in saying, πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὸ πρῶτον