Playing with Fire: The Strange Case of Marine Shale Processors

Preface

I first became aware of Marine Shale Processors when I was a graduate student at the University of New Orleans. I was in the political science program but was taking courses in as many environmentally related areas as I could: urban policy, sociology, geography, law, etc. . . . I had heard Marvin Gaye ask, What’s going on? and had watched Koyaanisqatsi too many times to simply ignore the demands of the planet. Somehow, I had gotten the idea that I had the ability to take an advanced hazardous waste management course taught by the environmental engineering department. The engineering professor was courteous, very knowledgeable but candid: as a political science student I was not qualified to be in such a course. I really should stick to polling and leave the heavy lifting to those that could. I thanked him and said that I would stick to learning the material if he stuck to teaching the material. A deal he was all too willing to accept. The engineering students picked up on his distain and treated me accordingly. There seemed to be a giant chasm cutting through the classroom separating the engineers from me. But, things would change. After setting the curve on the mid-term, I discovered that I had many new engineering graduate student friends and at least one professor that would tolerate me.

A great political lesson.

As part of that course, we travelled to St. Mary Parish (Amelia) to tour the Marine Shale Processors (MSP) facility. We would be able to see a state-of-the-art incinerator that was taking hazardous waste and making black rocks, or glass-like aggregate. By the early 1990s, MSP was in the news as the controversy was boiling over. Locals, especially women’s organizations, were protesting and politicians were looking for anyway to unshackle themselves from the sham-recycler and their president Jack Kent. I had become fascinated about this debacle through the political and regulatory process that Kent had influenced.

Gradually, I was concerned about a corporation and a single person wielding so much power; especially since that power was over poor, disenfranchised peopled. The stakes were very high. This was not a compost center with leaves, yard waste and other organics. Marine Shale was taking tons of hazardous waste every day and, in their view, creating a value-added product. Or, according to those in opposition, slithering through loopholes and endangering vulnerable people to public health nightmares. Was this really a ‘state-of-the-art facility? Was it advanced technology? Or was this just another scam to maximize profits at the expense of others?

Why is this strange case of MSP still so controversial?

It is important to note despite decades since MSP dominated the news cycle, not a single former Governor would consent to an interview. All were contacted through multiple and personal channels and not even one (for various reasons) would answer a single question. In fact, few that were close to this case would comment after more than two decades.

All the women that participated in the MSP protests who demanded an end to the importation of hazardous wastes agreed to be interviewed.

Is this case still too hot for political and regulatory people alike?

On a personal note, graduate students Daniel Elliot Gonzalez (History) and Laralee Herron (Public Administration) were invaluable to this process. Gonzalez showed remarkable discipline and contributed as an equal. He took the initiative and stayed focused. When people are dismissive of Millennials, I will mention him as why such stereotypes are flat wrong. Gonzalez will move on to law school after completing a graduate degree. I hope that he will work with me on the next project.

Also, my family is always supportive and remain the foundation from which I build. Chris, Alex, and Ian have listened to me for years about Jack Kent, Marine Shale and ‘glass-like aggregate.’

Maybe now this project makes more sense. I know that they will be glad that I can stop talking about it.

A special thanks to the courageous women of Louisiana.

We all breathe easier and cleaner because of them.

John W. Sutherlin, PhD

University of Louisiana Monroe

Introduction

Sound and Fury, Signifying Everything

Louisiana is different from other states. While most people are familiar with the state’s French influence through Creole or Cajun culture—predominately through music and food—many are not acquainted with the influence of the Spanish.¹ In fact, the famous Cabildo building in Jackson Square (New Orleans) was the old colonial seat of the Spanish government. A large swath of Southeast Louisiana is known as the Florida Parishes because of their tie to the adjacent Spanish colony located southeast of the state.² In addition, coupled with cheap or enslaved labor, the Louisiana river system and accompanying deltas have forged an agricultural history that has produced fortunes in cotton, rice and sugar.³ Further, Louisiana has an amazing hodge-podge of other ethnic and racial groups that set it apart politically, socially, culturally and religiously from other states. Besides the French, Spanish, African, and various other Europeans, Louisiana has always had a resilient Native American population.⁴ Nevertheless, Louisiana’s gumbo culture—characterized by its elite political system and the scattered, disenfranchised peoples of Louisiana—has, according to some, led to a belief that the Pelican state is more exploitative and corrupt than others.⁵ But this is not a work attempting to right historical wrongs or revisit generations of poverty and inequalities or even the vast elements of corruption.

This is a strange, often contradictory story about Marine Shale Processors (MSP), a hazardous waste management (that started out processing oil field waste, but found a more lucrative sector) and processing company in the Town of Amelia (St. Mary Parish), Louisiana (See map 1 on the following page).⁶ MSP was a major corporation with business interests across the nation while Amelia was a small, poor Louisiana community. Conflict was inevitable. While the result was not quite as magnificent or grandiose as David versus Goliath, the conflict entangled Louisiana politicians and regulators, a corporation, and simple, local families alike. Everybody seemed to be just doing their jobs, trying to make a living and attempting to prosper as best as they could under less than ideal circumstances. Environmental regulations and enforcement were still (and maybe still are) emerging concepts in Louisiana. On the other hand, MSP offered a revolutionary recycling technology for a major waste stream; thus, solving a national problem (while making a tidy profit). Its competitors and other opponents, including a group of Amelia mothers (almost all the expert women were from nearby Morgan City), called it sham-recycling.⁷ In their minds, MSP was not recycling but incinerating hazardous waste and emitting dangerous toxins into the air and water. And MSP did all this without any appropriate permits.⁸ Still, MSP had political connections and a steady source of waste from around the country

Figure I.1. Topographical Map of Louisiana. Source: U.S. Geological Survey.

that ensured staggeringly high profits. On the surface, MSP had everything they needed.

What they lacked was local support. More importantly and specifically, they lacked support from an otherwise silent group of women who, until this point, had been more concerned with raising a family and going to church than regulatory enforcement and environmental policy. In many ways, MSP had depended on poor, disenfranchised people to simply keep quiet, go to work, cash their paychecks, and go home.

They needed fewer questions and more gratitude for their sizeable investment in such a massive facility. However, that did not happen.

And when the local support vanished, so too did the political and regulatory cover Marine Shale required to operate. Some would argue that Louisiana missed an opportunity to be on the cutting edge of hazardous waste management. MSP’s founder Jack Kent would certainly make that claim. MSP could have accessed more than twelve billion tons of industrial waste per year.⁹ This could have put Amelia on the international hazardous waste processing map. Even capturing a fraction of that, Kent’s profits were staggering. On the other hand, many would claim that a public health nightmare was stalking this small town as their air and water was being contaminated.¹⁰ Even with decades of hindsight this remains unclear. Still, those that play with fire often get burned.

As stated earlier, Louisiana politics is different than in other places. To be sure, everyone claims that their state or local political scene is unique and esoteric to those not within the system. Yet, from the election process to the weak-legislature-strong-governor model to dozens of constitutions to the Napoleonic Code to divisions religiously, culturally, racially . . . the Pelican State appears more similar to a banana republic than one of the fifty states.¹¹ More importantly to the points being argued here, coalitions across economic, social and political sectors are important, but hard to forge.¹²

The tale of Marine Shale Processors (MSP) began more than three and a half decades ago. At that time, Louisiana was show-casing what made and still makes the state unique. In 1984, Louisiana hosted the World’s Fair, bringing its people, culture, food, and music onto the global stage. The spectacle generated an inundation of tourists (and their money) into the impoverished state.¹³ Expectations were high and hopes that this event would spark redevelopment and renewal were pervasive. But instead of facilitating a discussion of the urban poor or crumbling roads and levees in New Orleans or developing a process to examine other mega-projects, i.e., the Olympic Games, the Louisiana World’s Fair exposed the weaknesses of the state’s infrastructure.¹⁴ Louisiana was not prepared or equipped to accommodate such an influx of people. Maybe Louisiana was destined to fail like so many other world cities staging societal spectacles in order to expose the rougher side of a poor state.¹⁵ Regardless, the World’s Fair was a missed opportunity, and perhaps a harbinger of future opportunities yet to be lost.

On the political side, the World’s Fair followed a very important election year in 1983 for Louisiana. Due to the provisions in Article IV, §3 of the Louisiana State Constitution,¹⁶ Governors are not allowed to run for more than two consecutive terms. It is because of this fact that Governor Edwin Edwards—who had served from 1972 to 1980—had to wait until the 1983 Gubernatorial Election to run for office again. Like his previous two terms in office, Edwards’ campaign proved to be both popular and controversial. Despite winning that November by a wide margin over Republican Incumbent David Treen, the integrity of Edwards’ administration was immediately called into question by way of numerous scandals arising at the beginning of his third term. One issue that seemed to hang around Edwards was his affinity for gambling, which bothered many Protestant voters north of Alexandria and in the center of the state.¹⁷

But his biggest controversy may not have been focused on the roulette wheel or the dice table.¹⁸ One week before his inauguration, Shreveport Journal editor Stanley Tiner reported on a conversation that he had previously had with Edwards in which the Governor admitted that he did not believe in the Death, Burial, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ.¹⁹ This angered a large number of Conservative Christians in the state, who had voted for Edwards due to his status as a former Nazarene Preacher.²⁰ This did little to boost his ratings in Catholic south Louisiana, too, which had long been his political base. The Cajun and Creole cultures had strong traditions that were founded in religious practices and customs, but always included a central Christian focus.²¹ Edwards may have garnered support because of his flamboyant demeanor, but his ‘silver tongue’ was becoming his worst enemy.

Then, on a more relevant political issue, a week after his inauguration, Edwards threatened to cut state spending if the State House of Representatives did not approve of a $1.1 billion tax package.²² While this passed, the decision only served to further cripple Edwards’ popularity. Edwards was struggling early and needed some type of victory, particularly a job-creator to off-set the impacts of budget cuts (due in part to prices of oil being so low) and a national recession. Louisiana was and is a hard economic sell for most investors. Every governor, regardless of party, seems unwavering in supporting a new economic model that may last until they leave office and then is replaced by another. Edwards was not that different from previous governors in that he was trying to establish Louisiana’s economy on a more sustainable basis.²³ However, he was willing to sell out the environment to do so.

Economically, Louisiana was still aching from the boom and bust of cyclical oil prices. Disruptions across a multitude of industries, including chemical processing and refineries, as well as academic, political, and social institutions, plagued the Pelican State.²⁴ Most industries in Louisiana relied directly or indirectly on the energy sector. Thus, a downturn in oil and gas prices had the potential to impact social matters as well. In the coastal region, Louisiana’s crime rate indices almost doubled over the end of the 1970s and early 1980s following a drop in oil prices.²⁵ The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that Louisiana had one of the highest unemployment rates in the country, with minorities suffering disproportionately.²⁶ It would take years for Louisiana to get back to 1983 numbers.

Those social matters are especially troubling and remain a hurdle for any workforce development. For example, in 1990, only 68 percent of adult Louisianans had a high school diploma, tied for sixth lowest graduation rate in the nation.²⁷ Thirty percent of Louisiana children lived below the poverty line.²⁸ Isolated populations were even worse off. The illiteracy rate of the whole of Louisiana in 1992 was 21 percent. Illiteracy rates in the parishes of Assumption, Iberia, St. James, and St. Mary reached well above 30 percent.²⁹ This exacerbated the issues of abject poverty in these regions. Industries coming into these areas were looking for highly skilled workers but could not find any. Many companies then and now outsource higher wage manufacturing and engineering jobs from out of state sources or to larger, more prosperous parishes nearby.³⁰ Lafayette Parish, for example, remains a growth hub for Cajun Louisiana (and the state).

Still, beyond the negative social impacts of an inevitable bust, Louisiana has always had to account for the effects of exploration and development on the environment.³¹ In the eighty-five mile stretch down the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New Orleans there are roughly one hundred refineries and petrochemical processors looming over a landscape characterized by high poverty rates, unemployment, and illiteracy.³² Seldom, though, has the environment or conservation been a top priority for policy makers. Job development through recruitment of extraction industries appeared more pressing. This logic still haunts economy-versus-ecology arguments throughout the U.S., not just in Louisiana. Such a false debate is odd because the maintenance of coastal and inland pollution should be a preoccupation of public officials considering the importance of recreational fishing and commercial shrimping. Even today, reports of heavy metal contamination along these precious waters are all too common.³³ Despite the fact that Louisiana contributes more than one-quarter of the nation’s seafood, pollutants such as metals still plague local fisheries.³⁴ Protecting the environment is not a luxury but a necessity for anyone but more importantly for those living so close to the land and water.

Louisiana’s vestiges of politically crooked leaders (i.e., the Kingfish) linger and place the state side-by-side with neighboring Mississippi as leaders in corruption.³⁵ Further, a legacy of environmental injustice may appear to indicate that its citizens would take no action to fight back.³⁶ After all, a state lacking protection of civil rights could hardly be expected to be an example of environmental sustainability. A lack of information and awareness of ecological issues in Louisiana and lack of social organization persist today even after disasters like Deepwater Horizon.³⁷ Lessons based on adverse or crises do not always seem to be learned. But a raising of awareness began about a decade after America’s first Earth Day. And, by the early 1980s, the Sierra Club was doing toxic tours that highlighted both the level of pollution and an emerging activism in the state.³⁸ In South Louisiana, the grassroots activism of environmental justice and civil rights was generating the potential for more engagement.³⁹

Historically, though, Louisiana lags behind other, more progressive, states in mobilization and confrontation of powerful interests versus poor people of color.⁴⁰ But, that is not to suggest that Louisiana residents will simply give up. While many in the U.S. are familiar with Susan B. Anthony, few have heard of suffragist Kate M. Gordon, a native of New Orleans.⁴¹ Even further back, Louisiana’s Creole women often were at the center of protests for equal rights long before the Civil War.⁴² Women of color had a major role in the struggle for civil rights in Louisiana.⁴³ Louisiana has a tradition of women organizing to oppose political, social and economic matters, especially when there is an environmental or public health issue at stake. The response to Shintech in the 1990s, a proposed Taiwanese PVC production plant to be built in a poor river parish, by a group of racially diverse women is evidence of this point.⁴⁴ Yet, upon closer examination, that event was almost a decade after the 1982 Warren County Protests (North Carolina) that really kicked off such environmentally and racially charged demonstrations.⁴⁵ Here, ‘scientific’ evidence had pointed towards an ‘ideal’ location that ‘just happened’ to adversely impact African-Americans.⁴⁶

The same may be said for the women in St. Mary Parish. Here, women across economics and color lines held their ground against what they saw as a politically rotten deal for a polluting company. Additionally, the methods implored by these women in the wake of regional public health crises further exemplify the success of their organizations. Their ability to ally themselves with local citizens, regional experts, and both local and national organizations across racial and economic divides,⁴⁷ proved exceptionally effective in repelling that which they sought to oppose. Women-led organizations such as Protecting the Environment and Ecological Resources (PEER), led by Ann Williams, and Alliance against Waste and Action to Restore the Environment (AWARE), led by Liz Avants and Les Ann Kirkland, began going toe-to-toe with industrial giants in the late-1980s.⁴⁸

However, industry was not the only entity that these organizations took to task. Whether government agencies, companies, or non-profits, all were potential targets. During the 1970s and early 1980s, filing lawsuits was a strategic and important tool.⁴⁹ Many environmental non-profits found this useful in their struggle against the political and economic system. In Louisiana, one such organization, Save Ourselves, Inc., sued the Louisiana Environmental Control Commission in 1984 in a landmark Louisiana Supreme Court case.⁵⁰ This case led not only to the denial of the Industrial Tank Corporation’s waste incineration permit application, but also to the heightened importance of environmental consideration regarding industrial permit approval in the state. Here, the seeds of local control over a state agency were sown. It is a major issue: should a municipality or parish government have veto power over a state agency authorized by federal regulations and a federal agency to issue permits? The long-term implications here are staggering.

Perhaps, the ill-fated MSP plant was predestined to fail. Initially, the town of Amelia was part of Assumption Parish, but fell under the reorganization of St. Mary Parish in 1938. Most of the town folks looked to the larger Morgan City to the south for commerce and leadership. Amelia lies in the Atchafalaya River basin south of Lake Palourde and near Bayou Boeuf. Highway 90 splits the town of about 2,500 people.⁵¹ The largest regional newspaper, the Daily Review (Morgan City) is privately owned and has a circulation of less than 6,000 in a fragmented community of shrimpers, industrial-plant workers and Cajuns.⁵² Amelia, incidentally, was named by Clay Thibodeaux, a distinguished citizen of Assumption Parish in 1936. Amelia Dupuis was a belle engaged to marry Clay but died a few days before the wedding. Thibodeaux petitioned the government to rename the area in memory of his lost love.⁵³

It seems that the origins of Amelia foreshadowed the greater environmental tragedies decades later. Locals would say this put a madichon (or curse) on the Town of Amelia. Or, as some might say, Amelia had bad ‘mojo.’⁵⁴

It was in this cultural, social, historical, and political climate that MSP was founded in 1984 by Jack Kent who was in his early 40s. Kent’s plan (after oil processing did not make enough money) was to recycle hazardous waste from counties and municipalities outside of Louisiana and private chemical, oil and gas companies or state and city sources to create a glass-like aggregate that was a usable product with a substance left over—ash—from super-heating toxic garbage in a kiln. It was a hard sell for some. Was there liability under new federal laws for reusing (and repurposing) once hazardous waste now rendered inert? Was the product inert? If so, Kent would revolutionize the hazardous waste management industry and Louisiana would be at the center of this. Many interpreted the recently passed Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) very strictly; thus, offering no exemptions for any reuse.⁵⁵

But was MSP the exception to these new rules?

After all, the technology was state of the art. A rotating kiln, resembling a cement mixer, was used to bake the trash and reduce it to a glass-like aggregate (looked like black gravel) which could be used on roads and other construction projects. MSP claimed that this product was environmentally benign and studies appeared to back this statement.⁵⁶ Yet studies have been found to be incomplete and those impacted may be different than those in the study. Do all ethnic or racial groups have the same level of exposure? Economics play a role in the level of exposure and the response of groups. Health inequalities exist among populations exposed to any pollutant.⁵⁷ Again, the MSP aggregate was found safe and was even placed in fish tanks as part of an experiment which found that the fish were completely unaffected.

A process which takes hazardous waste and renders it into a non-toxic, useful product should be the type of technological advancement that environmentalists and politicians alike come together to celebrate. However, heightened awareness of environmental issues from the 1970s brought the company under immediate and intense scrutiny. Fear-mongering and political theatrics guaranteed conflict and its eventual demise. Amelia and MSP received national and international attention for many reasons. Greenpeace considered this situation an example of playing with fire.⁵⁸ A great metaphor for a hazardous waste incinerator. Not a description, though, that MSP and Jack Kent were particularly fond of discussing.

Still, the mounting evidence from around the world was overwhelming. The scientific community is often ahead of the regulatory community. Questions loom large in attempting to make sound policy. Should public trust, the precautionary principle, or a polluter pay governance structure be relied upon?⁵⁹ How should one govern in a world of uncertainty? When presented with the (false) dichotomy of jobs versus nature, what should be the norm? Hazardous waste management is sufficiently complex for the scientific community.⁶⁰ How can a typical citizen comprehend the multifarious and indefinite variability of toxic wastes and ecological circumstances?

So, in the early 1980s there was limited and confusing (sometimes contradictory) data for policymakers or environmental regulatory agencies to rely upon. Basic information was still being developed: levels of toxicity, connections to health concerns, and possible pathways of exposure.⁶¹ Cancer reports, pregnancy and birth defects, and a host of other epidemiological concerns were being alleged, reported and investigated in a more systematic way resulting in a growing body of literature raising awareness and fears about MSP-like facilities.⁶² Optimal sites, according to some research, could be found to limit exposure and improve cost-benefit analysis for hazardous waste facilities.⁶³ Others would point towards potential groundwater contamination regardless of the ‘optimal’ locations.⁶⁴ And, air-borne pollution did impact communities down-wind from disposal sites; resulting in a host of breathing issues and lung ailments.⁶⁵

Yet, this story is also about public health, especially perceived issues for children, but is full of examples of how federal and state bureaucracies treated MSP like a political football (or hot potato) and drug their feet at every possible chance and, perhaps, missed an economic and technological opportunity. After all this time, it is unclear if Marine Shale’s technology was as impressive as Jack Kent purported. Detractors would argue that he was relying on politics and not sound science. Kent stayed faithful to his process throughout. He always and probably still believes that he was right.

Further, this book is meant to be a cautionary tale about what happens when regulators, public officials and private companies ignore the details, and move forward without obtaining air or water permits. Process is important. Regulations exist to protect everyone. Ignoring those causes suffering for everyone in the community. But what happens when the regulators provide incorrect or misleading information? And, industry, believing it is doing the right thing, follows bad advice?

This is also a story about what can happen when citizens fight back. Citizens, particularly women’s organizations, were angry and armed with knowledge and supported sympathetically. MSP simply depended on their technology being an example of environmental entrepreneurship. Politicians believed they would be unopposed because they were part of a process to create new jobs for Amelia and the rest of St Mary Parish.⁶⁶ As a note, the author assumes that the jobs versus the environment to be a false controversy.⁶⁷

Regardless, Marine Shale and Jack Kent were in a largely unsympathetic position. It is hard to imagine overwhelming public support for a hazardous waste incinerator. Would any mom want their child wearing a jersey sponsored by Marine Shale?

Kindling was being gathered. Soon, a raging fire would consume MSP. But we are not there yet. This is a strange and twisted tale that remains hard to fully grasp.

NOTES

1. Gayabre, C. (1866). History of Louisiana.

2. Hyde, S. C. (1996). Pistols and Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy in Louisiana’s Florida Parishes, 1810–1899. LSU Press. Today, this area is known as Northshore.

3. Russell, R. J. (1940). Quaternary history of Louisiana. Bulletin of the Geological Society of America, 51(8), 1199–1233.

4. Kniffen, F. B., Gregory, H. F., & Stokes, G. A. (1994). The Historic Indian Tribes of Louisiana: From 1542 to the Present Louisiana. LSU Press.

5. Williams, T. H. (1960). The gentleman from Louisiana: Demagogue or democrat. The Journal of Southern History, 26(1), 3–21.

6. U.S. Geological Survey. The National Map. Powered by Esri. Generated at https://viewer.nationalmap.gov/advanced-viewer/.

7. Comella, P. L. (1993). Understanding a sham: When is recycling, treatment? BC Environmental Affairs Law Review, 20, 415.

8. Allen, D. T. (1993). Using wastes as raw materials: Opportunities to create an industrial ecology. Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materials, 10(3), 273–277.

9. Allen, D. T., & Jain, R. (1992). Special issue on industrial waste generation and management. Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materials, 9(1), 1–111.

10. Toman, B., & Gastwirth, J. L. (1997). The US versus marine shale processors: Statistical issues. Environmetrics: The official journal of the International Environ-metrics Society, 8(5), 533–540.

11. Parent, W. (2006). Inside the carnival: Unmasking Louisiana politics. LSU Press.

12. Estabrook, T., Levenstein, C., & Wooding, J. (2018). Labor-environmental coalitions: Lessons from a Louisiana petrochemical region. Routledge.

13. Buel, J. W. (Ed.). (1904). Louisiana and the fair: An exposition of the world, its people and their achievements (Vol. 3). World’s Progress Pub. Co.

14. Gotham, K. F. (2011). Resisting urban spectacle: The 1984 Louisiana World Exposition and the contradictions of mega events. Urban Studies, 48(1), 197–214.

15. Gotham, K. F. (2011). Resisting urban spectacle: The 1984 Louisiana World Exposition and the contradictions of mega events. Urban Studies, 48(1), 197–214.

16. Louisiana State Senate. (1998). State Constitution. Accessed at http://senate.legis.state.la.us/Documents/Archives/1999/Constitution/Constitution.pdf.

17. Dean, L. N. (2003). Losing in Louisiana: The Legal Problems of Gambling and Edwin Edwards.

18. Within a few years, Edwards would convince Louisiana voters to embrace gambling (or gaming as it was called since gambling was such a dirty word) in a manner that few outside of Las Vegas or Atlantic City could have imagined. An excellent source for this includes: Stooksbury, C. (2002). Bad Bet on the Bayou: The Rise of Gambling in Louisiana and the Fall of Governor Edwin Edwards. (Booktalk: the big sleazy). The American Enterprise, 13(3), 54–55. This would ultimately be the downfall of Edwards that landed him in federal prison. See Dean, L. N. (2003). Losing in Louisiana: The Legal Problems of Gambling and Edwin Edwards.

19. The Independent Weekly Newspaper. Accessed at https://web.archive.org/web/20071014065349/http://www.theind.com/politics2.asp?CID=1033172192.

20. McGill, K. (13 Nov. 1991). Edwin Edwards: High Times and Hard Times of a Self-Styled Cajun King. Associate Press.

21. Landry, C. (2016). A Creole melting pot: the politics of language, race, and Identity in southwest Louisiana, 1918–45 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sussex).

22. Minden Press-Herald Staff. (23 Mar. 1984). Legislators buckle under EWE threat. Minden Press-Herald, 18(188), 1.

23. Boeckelman, K. (1997). Issue definition in state economic development policy. Policy Studies Journal, 25(2), 286–298.

24. Forsyth, C. J., Luthra, A. D., & Bankston, W. B. (2007). Framing perceptions of oil development and social disruption. The Social Science Journal, 44(2), 287–299.

25. Louisiana Crime Rates, 1960–2015. Accessed at http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/lacrime.htm.

26. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Accessed at https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.la.htm.

27. National Center for Education Statistics. Accessed at https://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/98018.pdf.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. Accessed at https://nces.ed.gov/naal/estimates/StateEstimates.aspx.

30. Allen, B. L. (2003). Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana’s Chemical Corridor Disputes. MIT Press.

31. Davis, D. W., & Place, J. L. (1983). The oil and gas industry of coastal Louisiana and its effects on land use and other socioeconomic patterns (No. 83–118). Geological Survey (US).

32. Allen, B. L. (2003).

33. Sneddon, J., Rode, P. W., Hamilton, M. A., Pingeli, S., & Hagen, J. P. (2007). Determination of metals in seafood and fish in Southwest Louisiana. Applied Spectroscopy Reviews, 42(1), 23–42.

34. Lowry, P. W., Pavia, A. T., McFarland, L. M., Peltier, B. H., Barrett, T. J., Bradford, H. B., . . .& Blake, P. A. (1989). Cholera in Louisiana: widening spectrum of seafood vehicles. Archives of internal medicine, 149(9), 2079–2084.

35. Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006). Corruption in America. Journal of public Economics, 90(6-7), 1053–1072.

36. Babich, A. (2003). Environmental Justice in Louisiana. Louisiana Bar Journal, 51(2), 91.

37. Simon-Friedt, B. R., Howard, J. L., Wilson, M. J., Gauthe, D., Bogen, D., Nguyen, D., & Wickliffe, J. K. (2016). Louisiana residents’ self-reported lack of information following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill: Effects on seafood consumption and risk perception. Journal of environmental management, 180, 526–537.

38. Pezzullo, P. C. (2003). Touring Cancer Alley, Louisiana: Performances of community and memory for environmental justice. Text and Performance Quarterly, 23(3), 226–252.

39. Willard, W. (1992). Environmental Racism: The Merging of Civil Rights and Environmental Activism. SUL Rev., 19, 77.

40. Bullard, R. D., Warren, R. C., & Johnson, G. S. (2001). The quest for environmental justice. Reprinted from RL Braithwaite & SE Taylor. Health Issues in the Black Community, 2, 471–485.

41. Gilley, B. H. (1983). Kate Gordon and Louisiana Woman Suffrage. Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 24(3), 289–306.

42. Bell, C. C. (1997). Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718–1868. LSU Press.

43. Sartain, L. (2007). Invisible Activists: Women of the Louisiana NAACP and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 1915–1945. LSU Press.

44. Kurtz, H. E. (2007). Gender and environmental justice in Louisiana: Blurring the boundaries of public and private spheres. Gender, Place & Culture, 14(4), 409–426.

45. Mank, B. (2007). Title VI and the Warren County Protests. Golden Gate U. Environmental Law Journal, 1, 73.

46. Murphy-Greene, C., & Leip, L. A. (2002). Assessing the effectiveness of executive order 12898: Environmental justice for all?. Public Administration Review, 62(6), 679–687.

47. Allen, B. L. (2003).

48. Frankland, P. and Tucker, S. (2013). Women Pioneers of the Louisiana Environmental Movement. University of Mississippi Press.

49. Breen, B. (1989). Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law. Wake Forest L. Rev., 24, 851.

50. 452 So. 2d 1152. (1984). Save Ourselves, Inc. v. The Louisiana Environmental Control Commission and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources.

51. U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk.

52. Taylor, C. E., Lee, J. S., & Davie, W. R. (2000). Local press coverage of environmental conflict. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 77(1), 175–192.

53. Leeper, C. D. A. (2012). Louisiana place names: Popular, unusual, and forgotten stories of towns, cities, plantations, bayous, and even some cemeteries. LSU Press. p.16.

54. Sexton, R. (Oct 1992). Cajun and Creole Treaters: Magico-Religious Folk Healing in French Louisiana. Western Folklore. Western States Folklore Society. 51 (3/4): 240–243.

55. Oswald, L. J. (1993). Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis. BC Environmental Affairs Law Review, 20, 579.

56. Weisskopf, M. (1998). Trash-to-Cash Company Called ‘Sham’ by Rivals. The Washington Post.

57. Mitchell, R., & Popham, F. (2008). Effect of exposure to natural environment on health inequalities: an observational population study. The Lancet, 372(9650), 1655–1660.

58. Pleus, R. C., & Kelly, K. E. (1996). Health effects from hazardous waste incineration facilities: five case studies. Toxicology and industrial health, 12(2), 277–287.

59. Bodansky, D. (1991). Law: scientific uncertainty and the precautionary principle. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 33(7), 4–44.

60. LaGrega, M. D., Buckingham, P. L., & Evans, J. C. (2010). Hazardous waste management. Waveland Press.

61. Houk, V. N. (1982). Determining the impacts on human health attributable to hazardous waste sites. Risk Assessments at Hazardous Waste Sites. FA Long and GE Schweitzer, eds, 21–32.

62. Geschwind, S. A. (1992). Should pregnant women move? Linking risks for birth defects with proximity to toxic waste sites. Chance, 5(3-4), 40–86.

63. Anderson, R. F., & Greenberg, M. R. (1982). Hazardous Waste Facility Siting A Role for Planners. Journal of the American Planning Association, 48(2), 204–218.

64. Page, G. W. (1986). Municipal Characteristics Associated with Toxic Contaminants in Groundwater. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 5(2), 86–93.

65. Harkov, R. (1982). Toxic air pollutants—assessing their importance. Science of the Total Environment, 26(1), 67–85.

66. Morgenstern, R. D., Pizer, W. A., & Shih, J. S. (2002). Jobs versus the environment: an industry-level perspective. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43(3), 412–436. The researchers here provide support that protecting the environment IS good for business.

The possibility that workers could be adversely affected by increasingly stringent environmental policies has led to claims of a jobs versus the environment trade-off by both business and labor leaders. The present research examines this claim at the industry level for four heavily polluting industries: pulp and paper mills, plastic manufacturers, petroleum refiners, and iron and steel mills. Combining a unique plant-level data set with industry-level demand information, we find that increased environmental spending generally does not cause a significant change in employment.

All sectors reported increased, not lost jobs, per dollar spent. In a slightly varied study, researchers suggest that jobs are always being created and eliminated. But environmental regulations create new, better educated and well-trained jobs. See Goodstein, E. (1999). The trade-off myth: Fact and fiction about jobs and the environment. Island Press.

67. Jaffe, A. B., Peterson, S. R., Portney, P. R., & Stavins, R. N. (1995). Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of US manufacturing: what does the evidence tell us? Journal of Economic literature, 33(1), 132–163.

Chapter One

Something about Saint Mary

From the nefarious reign of the pirate Jean Lafitte to the debauched and corrupt tenures of Huey P. Long, Louisianans are known for the resiliency for survival but also for their unscrupulous tenacity.¹ They tend to forge ahead, disregarding the constraints of law and morality when they become too cumbersome or threaten their culture or quality of life for what they hold dear. Their attitude is tough, but merciful and understanding . . . sometimes to a fault. As such, they have produced a long list of tainted characters whose misadventures and misgivings become legend when their time on stage is up.² One such character was Jack Kent—a pirate of sorts himself, of the hazardous waste industry—and his deeds in St Mary Parish (See map 2 below)³ were destined to go down in environmental history. There will be some that still claim he was a visionary, a man who gave Louisiana an opportunity to develop a cutting-edge technology to solve a global problem. Others will assert that he was an environmental robber-baron without concern for those poor, uneducated who were the most impacted by his facility.

The Kingfish shaped a political environment that Kent would exploit.⁴

After the ‘purchase,’ but before Louisiana was a state, St. Mary Parish was carved from St. Martin Parish and the Attakapas (Louisiana Native Americans) District. Surrounded by French-Catholic Acadiana, St. Mary Parish was primarily an Anglo-Protestant settlement with some remaining Chitimacha Native Americans.⁵ Further, as the parish was always a sugar producer (not large-scale cotton), the entry of large numbers of African Slaves was significantly lower than surrounding parishes.⁶ And, this meant that a small number of wealthy landowners generated the largest per capita production