The term populism has become a pejorative. In the United States, supporters of Donald Trump are often referred to as populists. Those same supporters labeled Bernie Sanders a populist. It is clear that neither use is intended to be a compliment. It is less clear what is meant by this now derogatory epithet.
The negative connotation tied to the word populism predates contemporary American politics. Although not the first such use, populism appears as the antagonist of William Riker’s influential work Liberalism against Populism ([1982] 1988). Riker leaves no doubt that populism is the enemy of liberalism, but there is doubt about precisely who or, better yet, what this enemy is. The first task of this paper is to perform a conceptual analysis of populism. To know whether populism is antithetical to liberalism requires knowing what populism is.1
After gaining additional conceptual clarity, the second task of the paper is to assess Riker’s contention that liberalism and populism are at odds. Riker’s project was not one of conceptual analysis but one of investigating the implications social choice theory has for democratic theory. Although not the first to arrive at this conclusion, I contend that Riker’s criticism of populism is not as damning as he suggests.
The final task of the paper is to discuss how James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s (1962) consensus model of justification is actually a promising possibility for a “populist” means of satisfying the justificatory conditions defended by Riker. What we might call ideal populism—which employs a unanimity rule—circumvents criticisms raised by Riker. But is ideal populism actually populism? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, depends on what conception of populism one employs. If one employs the account put forth at the outset of the paper, then the answer seems to be no.
What Is Populism?
A Google search for the definition of the term populism produces the following result: “a political approach that strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elites.” Although vague, this preliminary definition is helpful in that it emphasizes an important aspect of populism: antielitism. Jan-Werner Müller suggests in a book that shares its name with the title of this section that the heterogenous uses of the term populism actually have a common core, which can be more precisely stated as two necessary conditions—one of which is antielitism.
Antielitism: X is populist only if X is critical of elites. (Müller 2016, 2)
: X is populist only if X identifies an out-group or set of out-groups that are not part of “the people,” properly
