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Statement of Joan B. Rohlfing

Director

Office of Nonproliferation and National Security

Department of Energy

FY 1997 Budget Hearings

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to address youtoday as the Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security at the U.S.Department of Energy (DOE).

In recent years, the worldwide proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and theirmissile delivery systems has emerged as one of the most serious dangers confronting the UnitedStates. This is a continuing and evolving problem with broad consequences for internationalsecurity and stability. At least 20 countries -- some of them hostile to the United States --already have or may be developing WMD through the acquisition of dual-use technology,indigenous development and production, and/or support from rogue supplier states. Additionally,safety and security of existing nuclear weapons and materials are of increasing concern aseconomic and social pressures mount in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan andBelarus.

The President has made nonproliferation one of this nation's highest priorities. As the preeminentagency in nuclear materials and weapons technology and protection, the Department of Energy,through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, is uniquely suited to provideleadership in national and international efforts to reduce nuclear weapons worldwide; secure andprevent the spread of nuclear materials, technology and expertise; roll back nuclear weaponsdevelopment programs; avoid proliferation surprise; and respond to nonproliferation emergencies. We particularly draw upon 50 years of science and technology expertise resident throughout theDOE National Laboratory complex to help us achieve these goals.

To reduce the international proliferation threat, the Office of Nonproliferation and NationalSecurity is focusing its resources and expertise on the following near-term priorities: securingnuclear materials, technology and expertise in Russia and the Newly Independent States; maintaining effective protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials, technology andexpertise in the United States; limiting weapons-usable fissile materials worldwide; ensuringtransparent and irreversible reductions of global nuclear stockpiles; supporting the completion ofa Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996; developing and integrating a program for preventing,detecting and responding to nuclear terrorism and smuggling; controlling nuclear exports; and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Through the unique scientific, technical,analytical and operational capabilities of the Department and its National Laboratories, we areworking to effectively and efficiently accomplish these near-term priorities by marshaling andintegrating our resources and nonproliferation activities.

Some of our most important international activities include: conducting thegovernment-to-government and laboratory-to-laboratory programs of cooperation between U.S.nuclear experts and their counterparts at nuclear facilities and institutes in the former SovietUnion to improve the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials; assisting Russiaand the Newly Independent States in establishing and enhancing nuclear material export controlsystems; developing advanced technologies and systems to detect the indigenous proliferation ofWMD, to enable the verification of arms control treaties, and to facilitate the collection ofintelligence information in noncooperative environments; conducting critical operations incooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stabilize and safely store spentnuclear fuel thereby both freezing the North Korean nuclear weapons program and enabling theapplication of effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; working withthe private sector to engage WMD weapons scientists, engineers and technicians in the formerSoviet Union in activities which reduce the proliferation threat; and providing technical support oflong-term monitoring of Iraqi facilities and other nuclear safeguards and emergency programs ofthe IAEA. In addition, we are providing unique and in-depth technical, arms-control, intelligence,research and technology expertise as part of the U.S. Government's integrated efforts to concludenegotiations, prepare for entry into force, and implement a CTBT.

The Department's unique technical and analytical capabilities allow us to play a pivotal role in theweapons of mass destruction arenas of the U.S. Intelligence Community. For example, DOEcontinues to contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to support the IntelligenceCommunity's Non-Proliferation Center in assessing the activities of emerging nuclear weaponsstates and terrorist organizations, the activities of states that supply nuclear materials andexpertise, and theft and smuggling of nuclear material.

In concert with our international activities, we are responsible for conducting a wide range ofdomestic activities that support our nonproliferation and national security goals. These activitiesinclude: directing a rigorous safeguards and security program for the entire Department of Energycomplex, thereby ensuring the demonstrated security of our own nuclear materials, technologyand expertise; declassifying millions of DOE documents while protecting critical information thathas the potential to facilitate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and maintaining asecurity investigations and reinvestigations program for both Federal and contractor employees ofthe Department. We also provide technical, analytical, policy and implementation support to theefforts of the nation's policy community to deal with nonproliferation issues.

We also ensure the Department has a robust emergency management and response capability fornonproliferation, energy and nuclear emergencies. Through this program, we provide assistanceto other government agencies as well as state, tribal and local governments. Over the past year,we have been providing emergency response experts to assist other foreign governments inreviews of their emergency preparedness plans and capabilities. Through the Partnership forPeace, we have been working with the Departments of State and Defense to assist Russia and theNewly Independent States to plan for and manage energy and radiological emergencies. We alsohave been working with the International Atomic Energy Agency, International Energy Agencyand Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to develop procedures and support plans for anyradiological emergency.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Over the past year, we have demonstrated leadership and achieved significant accomplishments ineach of our near-term priorities:

• In 1995, our cooperative efforts with Russia and the Newly Independent States in securingnuclear materials, technology and expertise, has protected over 8 tons of direct-use nuclearmaterial with upgrades to 26 facilities' material protection, control and accounting programs. Before the end of 1996, we expect to broaden this effort to over 35 facilities and protecthundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Additionally, we have begundiscussions with the Russian Navy to begin upgrades on their nuclear facilities as well.

• We have engaged nearly two thousand weapons scientists, engineers and technicians on 219scientific projects at 77 institutes in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to prevent a"brain-drain" of these scientists to other countries that would employ them for their ownindigenous nuclear weapons programs.

• Our work in North Korea has effectively stopped their indigenous nuclear weaponsdevelopment program. We have a team currently in country canning the spent fuel to preventits reprocessing for use in nuclear weapons. Additionally, we have enabled the IAEA to applyinternational safeguards on the existing nuclear facilities remaining in North Korea.

• We are the sole agency responsible for developing technologies to monitor and verify aComprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 1995, we demonstrated significant progress in each of thesensor technologies required to support an international monitoring system: seismicmonitoring, radionuclide monitoring, hydroacoustic monitoring, on-site inspection,space-based monitoring, and automated data processing. One particular success is ourimprovement of the capability to more easily distinguish nuclear explosions from earthquakes-- a formidable step toward a greater verification capability.

• In 1994, the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security completed installation of sensorson all Global Positioning Satellites that allow the United States to continuously detectnear-earth and atmospheric nuclear explosions and verify treaty compliance worldwide. In1995 we began developing and deploying the next-generation of sensors to improve ourdetection capability.

• We have also completed the first comprehensive assessment of all the chemicals that might beused in a nuclear weapons life-cycle. This positions the United States to develop bettertechniques to detect an indigenous nuclear weapons program.

• Our declassification program has also played an instrumental role in furthering U.S.nonproliferation goals, especially in the initiative to achieve a bilateral agreement with Russiafor the exchange of classified information to facilitate confirmation of transparent andirreversible nuclear weapons reductions.

• The Department's safeguards and security functions that were previously spread across theDOE complex are now consolidated within the Office of Nonproliferation and NationalSecurity. This achievement is an important step toward creating a responsive and efficientfocal point for the Department's nuclear safeguards and security program and providing anational-level technical resource which is capable of fully supporting multilateral nuclearnonproliferation efforts.

LOOK TO THE FUTURE

With our many achievements, there is much work to be done in our long and short term priorityareas. We cannot rest on our laurels and expect the global nuclear danger to reduce on its own. The programs of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security seek to broaden theireffects whereever they are able.

In the coming year and a half, the Department will accelerate efforts to provide enhancedmaterials protection, control and accounting for fissile materials in Russia and the NewlyIndependent States. We hope to complete all MPC&A improvements in former Soviet Unionstates outside of Russia by the end of calendar year 1997 (with the majority of work beingcompleted by the end of the fiscal year). In Russia, we intend to expand cooperation to theremaining facilities in the civil nuclear complex while continuing work with facilities related to thenuclear weapon complex. Our efforts with Gosatomnadzor (the Russian agency equivalent to theU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to design and promote an indigenous MPC&A standardssystem will ensure that Russian weapons usable material will be protected after the U.S.involvement has been completed. The program as a whole anticipates upgrades at 50 locations inRussia and 13 locations in the Newly Independent States completed by the year 2002.

We are working to improve regional arms control and nonproliferation regimes through programssuch as the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At theCMC, we assist political and technical experts from around the world acquire thetechnology-based tools they need to assess, design, analyze and implement nonproliferation, armscontrol and other security measures in their own regions. This particularly fosters regionalsecurity and lessens the desire for nations to acquire or develop their own weapons of massdestruction. We plan to further expand this effort with states of the Middle East, South Asia, theKoreas, and China.

In 1996, we hope to conclude an Agreement for Cooperation and a Stockpile Data ExchangeAgreement with Russia that will allow us to gain insight into warhead dismantlement. Theseagreements will build confidence between our two nations that our mutual nuclear armsreductions are in fact occurring and irreversible.

These examples show that our activities are truly beneficial. Through our robust andcost-effective programs, we are able to provide leadership in the nonproliferation community,further the nonproliferation goals of the United States, and ensure the national security.

BUDGET REVIEW

The table below summarizes the fiscal year 1997 budget request for the Office of Nonproliferationand National Security from the Energy and Water Development Appropriation as compared withthe fiscal year 1996 adjusted appropriation (in thousands).

The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development budget request for fiscal year1997 reflects a savings of $15.3 million. This savings in part is a result of our effort to eliminateduplication between agencies and within DOE, improving coordination between sponsoringagencies, streamlining operations and generating a meaningful cost savings.

The Arms Control and Nonproliferation budget request includes a net increase of $36.1 millionconcentrated in the area of material protection, control and accounting. This increase is due tothe rapid pace of expansion of cooperation with Russian facilities and is important to ensure earlysafeguarding of weapons usable material at their source. We are also expanding our efforts in theReduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) and Industrial Partnering Programs. The increase will also allow us to ensure that the canned spent nuclear fuel in North Korea is notused in an indigenous nuclear development program. Finally, the increase will provide increasedanalysis and support to: U.S. nuclear arms control policies in the Middle East, Asia and SouthAsia, nuclear energy security issues in Asia, South Asia and Europe, and U.S. policies to deal withexcess civil plutonium.

The Intelligence budget request reflects a modest reduction from fiscal year 1996 resulting fromrealized efficiencies. The request will provide for timely, high-impact analysis and reporting onthe proliferation implications of selected nuclear weapons states' programs, emerging nuclearproliferants, nuclear suppliers, and global impacts to the U.S. energy security.

The Nuclear Safeguards and Security budget request for fiscal year 1997 includes a net increaseof slightly over $1 million. Through a requested increase and reprioritization of funding needs,we intend to increase the Classification and Declassification budget by approximately $2.3 million. This increase seeks to further develop advanced automation technology in support of theDeclassification Productivity Initiative program and implement Executive Order 12958 onClassified National Security Information.

Finally, the Emergency Management budget request for fiscal year 1997 is unchanged from thefiscal year 1996 appropriation. The change reflected in the summary table above is exclusively aresult of consolidation of Program Direction funds.

CONCLUSION

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial aspect of our national interest,and the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security is uniquely capable to serve this nationalinterest, especially through the efforts of our national laboratories. Our science and technologybase enables us to provide unique solutions to national and international nonproliferationproblems. The work we do benefits the nation's security across a broad spectrum: protectingnuclear material in the United States and worldwide; rolling back existing nuclear weaponsdevelopment programs internationally; ensuring the verifiability of nuclear treaties, especially aCTBT; and responding to energy and nonproliferation emergencies.

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