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WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY
Jakarta
August Z1 - Z4, 1984
SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
E.MUnch and D.Renn
Kernforschungsanlage JUlich GmbH
Session I
Energy Planning
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SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
E. Munch, O. Renn
Nuclear Research Centre, JUlich. Germany
1.
INTRODUCTION
Since its discovery in 1938 by Otto Hahn nuclear fission has proven to be
a reliable source of energy for a large number of countries round the world.
More than 300 nuclear power plants representing a capacity of more than
200,000 MWe are in operation to date and nearly the same number of plants
is in the phase of planning or under construction. Besides the majority of
industrialized countries nearly 20 developing countries are using nuclear
energy and have the intention to cover a major portion of their energy demand
by this energy source.
On the other hand the introduction of nuclear energy and its expansion in
numerous democracies of the western world have been accompanied by an, at
times, vehement controversy. This controversy has taken various forms in the
different countries, is based on ideological, polittcal and ecological arguments and has led in almost all of the countries to profound effects on the
utilization of nuclear energy . It caused considerable delays in the completion
of power plants and increased the cost of this energy source in a remarkable
degree. The controversy came up just at a moment, when nuclear energy had
proven its competitiveness and even economic superiority to conventional
sources of energy, reaching an extremely high level of safety. The risk of
nuclear energy is by many orders of magnitude smaller for the population than
that of other major technical installations of the civilized world.
It is in some way difficult to determine the reasons for this opposition
to nuclear energy but it seems obvious that the possibility of military use
of nuclear power, the complexity and advanced nature of nuclear technology,
and the risk associated with the radioactivity of fission products produced
in the fission process, as well as more emotional arguments concerning risk,
safety and radioactivity have contributed to the controversy. All this has
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occured at a time when
particon~
qualitative growth, .environmental
protection and soft technologies are key words in a socia-political discussion
about values and goals of human development.
The utilization of nuclear energy offers an excellent chance to increase the
level of development of a country and to raise the standard of living of the
individual. To introduce nuclear energy to cover the needs of developing
countries it nevertheless seems to be necessary to take into cons1deration
socio-political aspects of this energy source, also. In this short presentation
it is obviously not possible to deal with the whole scope of questions in
this field . So it is necessary to concentrate on those results based on
experience gained through past investigations.
Since the technical risk and the perception of risk towards nuclear energy
in particular is an important factor for the acceptance of nuclear energy
we try to elaborate this topic in some detail. Further it is necessary to
evaluate values associated with energy production 1n order to concentrate
on essentials when introducing nuclear energy into to energy system of a
country. It is, moreover, helpful to show the differences in attitudes towards
nuclear energy in industrialized and developing countries, and finally to
present a review of public attitudes towards nuclear energy in German'y since
the end of World War II. It may be possible to take advantage of the experience
gained in our country .
As a result of these investigations we present a proposal for a special
programme for information and education to facilitate the introduction of
nuclear energy in developing countries and to create a level of acceptance
which is necessary for this step of development in the field of energy
production.
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2.
RISK PERCEPTION AND NUCLEAR ENERGY
In the 19th century, technological progress in the industrialized countries
was synonymous with overcoming inflexible hierarchies and postfeudal power
structures. Until ten years ago, the development of science and technology
was considered to be one of society's most urgent tasks, connected with a
highly positive and progressive image. However, within a short time, the problems
of large-scale technological plants, an increasing awareness of research and
technology in major fields, such as cancer research and unemployment problems,
have set in motion a process of re-interpretation which has placed the
ambivalence of technology squarely In the forefront of perception. This new
attitude has played a large part In fuelling the increasingly critical debate
as to the consequences of technology and its specific effects on the environment
and on society.
It Is for this re.son that risk estimation by the general public and by specific
groups of the public Is investigated with more than merely academic significance.
The general value concepts and the specific risk assessment criteria among
the public provide Important reference points for rational polltlc.l action
in a democratic SOCiety, reference points which ensure both legitimacy and
expertise in decision making. So far, a paradoxical situation seems to be
arising In the political and SOcial debate on energy systems (in particular
In the case of nuclear power), in that probabilistic risk analysis assigns
a particularly low risk status to those technologies which are Intuitively
perceived .s being of especially high risk by the general public. Here, we
.re forced to consider the question as to which criteria .re .ctually used
by man to assess risks.
Since the general public assesses. risk in • different manner form the risk
assessment of experts who work on the basis of scientific risk definition,
any of the three causes below may apply:
- People .re unaw.re of the results of risk analysis and construct their own
intuitive risk .ssessments.
-
1~9
-
- People are aware of the results of risk analysis but do not believe them.
preferring to trust their own intuitive convictions.
- People are aware of the results and believe the expert estimations; however,
they do not evaluate this information as providing decisive criteria for
their own risk assessment process.
So which of the three explanations Is correct? Figs. 1 and 2 help to answer
this question. The graphs show the results of an American and a German survey.
A random sample of several people were asked to estimate the risks involved
in various hazard sources, from smoking to nuclear power stations, in terms
of losses per year. The estimated values are plotted on the y-axis and the
actual statistical figures on the x-axis. Apparently the estimated loss figures
and the statistically determined "actual values" are relatively close together.
There Is a general trend, both in the USA and in the Federal Republic of Germany,
to underestimate risks InvolVing very high losses slightly, and to overestimate
risks Involving very low losses slightly. Nonetheless, the extent of agreement
between estimated and actual values is surprisingly high. Therefore, the first
premise, that people are merely misguided in their assessment, cannot apply .
It Is, however, interesting to note that the Intuitive ability to determine
the order of magnitude of risks disappears as soon as questions are asked
relating to the number of lives lost during the span of a lifetime. Either
all risk sources are graded almost uniformly (all disaster losses being
approximately 3.000), or exorbitant estimates are made. for example, an average
of 22,000 deaths for narcotics, 4,000 deaths in skiing accidents and as many
as 600,000 deaths caused by nuclear power.
When making estimates, experience and common sense can bring about a relatively
good approximation of the statistical values. However, when questions are
related to catastrophic situations, these intuitive evaluation processes
will not function, sfnce the extent of catastrophies cannot be drawn directly
from a person's own experience. Could it be, that fear of disasters is the
decisive motive behind the evaluatfon of risks1
Thfs natural hypotheses does not apply either. People do take account of the
perceived loss rate when making risk assessment, but this rate can only explain
a very small part of this assessment. Therefore, there must be more important
factors which people apply In the evaluation of risks.
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But what are the factors according to which risk sources are evaluated? Up
to a few years ago one could only answer this question speculatively . Today
. thanks also to the antinuclear movement - a whole scientific branch has
thrown i tself into these problems and is attempting with the aid of experiments
and surveys to investigate the mechanisms Of intuitive risk perception. In
most investigations of the institutions and individuals involved the following
factors in risk perception have been empirically determined.
~ Qualitative risk features (voluntariness, opportunfties for personal control)
Catastrophe potentials
- Beliefs about the type of consequences
- Social values
- Personal characteristics.
In order to give some insights into the methods of scientific research with
respect to this complex, we would first of all like to deal with the area
of "Qualitative Risk Features" in more detail and to describe an exper1ment
which was carried out in our department about 2 years ago.
In this experiment, 37 people, who had responded to a newspaper advertisment
asking for volunteers to take. part in an experiment to test pharmaceuticals,
were randomly distributed into two groups of 18 and 19 people.
The experfmenter, wearing a doctor1s white coat and pretending to be a physician,
explained to both groups in identical words that his pharmaceutical company
had developed three new capsule coatings, all of which dissolved in the stomach
twice as fast as in conventional capsules. In order to achieve this, he explained,
one capsule had been given weakly radioactive coating one a coating containing
bacteria, while the third included a ring of heavy metal which was toxic
if taken in large quantities. The experimenter emphasized that the quantity
of the materials contained in the coating was so small that a health hazard
was completely ruled out. The capsules, he said, were filled with natural
vitamin preparations so that the test subjects would be dOing something beneficial for their health. In order to demonstrate the harmless nature of the
capsules the experimenter swallowed all three, one after the other, in the
presence of the test subjects. In fact they were commercially available vitamin
capsules.
-
151 -
Subsequently he requested the members of group I to select anyone of the
three capsules and swallow it. In group II the experimenter directed that
the first six test subjects should take the first capsule. the second six
the second capsule, and the remaining subjects the third capsule. After 15
minutes the respondents were requested to state whether they felt any ill-effects,
and which of the three capsules they would prefer to purchase, provided that
all three were absolutely identical with respect to the amount of r1sk 1nvolved
and their medical effectiveness.
Figure 3 provides an idea of the different behaviour patterns between the
members of group I (VOluntary risk-taking) and group II (involuntary risk-taking).
Two basic insights can be obtained from the data:
(a)
when compared to group I, there were more than twice as many test
subjects in group II who stated that they felt some kind of ill-effect
after taking the capsule; this significant relationship supports the
assumption that voluntary risk-taking causes less aversion than
involuntary risk.taking;
(b)
although the stated risk was the same in each case, the results show
that in both selection of capsules and the distribution of specific
complaints, opinions about the source of risk init1ated preferences
(probably via association of affected ideas) independent of any apparent
danger.
That freedom of choice represents a significant parameter 1n risk perception
has long been an important component of psychological risk and decision theory.
The former d1rector of the Electric Power Research Institute (USA) Chauncey
Starr has underlined the significance of these variables in quite a different
way. A comparison of statistical loss rates caused by various risk sources
provided the result that socially accepted risks, which are entered into
voluntarily. may show a thousand times higher loss rate than risks which can
be regarded as imposed by society.
Voluntariness is just one example of a whole chain of variables which are
independent of 1055 rates, and which are described
as
IIqualitative risk/bene·
fit features". Other features of this nature are 'personal control possible",
-
152 -
"external consequences conce1Vaole l'. Udanger not subject to sensory perception!!,
etc. Surveys make it possible to estimate roughly the position occupied by
these characteristics in the perception and evaluation of a risk source.
Qualitative risk and/or benefit properties and to a smaller extent expected
losses constitute two important categories of factors according to which
people evaluate risk. However, even the capsule coating experiment revealed
that not only the abstract risk indication (the experimenter confirmed equal
riskiness for all capsules) is regarded as a criterion for decision making
but rather the ideas and attitudes about the risk source. The "radioactive"
capsule thus triggered the most negative associations and therefore caused
the most frequent psychosomatic complaints. With respect to risk perception
people do not distinguish between the risk level and the object causing the
risk. It is not immaterial to the observer whether the identical risk stems
from a nuclear power station or from swimming: on the contrary. the risk
cannot be fully apprehended until the individual is able to establish a
relationship with his ideas and attitudes towards the object causing the
risK.
A different approach has been tried in the research of risk perception which
adopts the risk source as such as the key factor of risk perception and draws
conclusions about the formation of risk assessment on the basis of associations
and 1deas about the r1sk source.
In order to investigate these particular variables, a random group of 100
people were asked to rate their beliefs about 12 different sources of risk.
A set of comparable factors was developed which could be grouped under the
following five headings:
(a)
effects on the person himself or on his social environment (health,
security etc.):
(b)
extent to which a person is directly affected (personal benefits, or
injuries, comfort, well-being, freedom, etc . );
(c)
effects on economic and social welfare (employment security, social
status, general standard of living, quality of life, etc.);
(d)
socia-political and social values (social justice, democratic rights,
equality of distribution of benefits, etc.);
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(e)
effects on future conditions (maintenance of economic levels, defence,
security of supplies, etc.)
In order to obtain an overall view of the importance and relationship of the
five criteria the average values for the individual factors have been compiled
for six sources of risk (Figure 4). The bars extending below the zero line
in this figure show negative estimations with respect to the risk under consideration, while those above show a corresponding positive evaluation. A comparison
of the bar diagrams for coal and nuclear energy clearly reveals why nuclear
energy suffers from more serious acceptance problems than coal. The public,
on average, associates the utilization of nuclear energy with a negative
effect on the social welfare and on the realization of social values. The
direct and indirect advantages of nuclear power on one's life, however, are
less frequently perceived. The preponderance of the negative aspects can only
be compensated by the belief in the future role of nuclear energy for solving
the outstanding energy problems. The expectation of the future necessity of
nuclear energy prevents a continuously negative attitude to nuclear power.
In contrast to this, mainly positive beliefs are associated with coal and
it is precisely the criterion public welfare which achieves the highest value.
In other wordS, major acceptance problems are not to be expected for the
energy source coal, even considering tpe problems with acid rain and its
effects on forests.
This intuitive preference for non-nuclear alternatives can also be seen by
comparing the desire of the respondents to devise their own future energy
option with their perceptions of reality. If the beliefs held by individuals
what the energy future should be like and their expectations what the future
will actually be like are investigated an inversion of the order between
personal preferences and expected development is found. More than half of
the interview subjects were convinced that by the year 2000 nuclear energy
will have become the most important source of energy, but only 20 %would
desire this development (Figure 5).
Thus the opponents of nuclear energy believe that it is possible to live
without nuclear energy power stations, but feel that this opinion is politically
unrealistic. Intuitively the adherents of nuclear energy also prefer alternative
energy production systems, but compensate for the negative aspects by three
mechanisms:
-
(a)
154 -
Ass i gnment of symbo 1ic va 1ueS to nuclear energy (such as IIprogress i ve" ,
"modern", "prestigious", "scientific", and "adapted to an industrialized
a predom; nant feature of the
soc i ety" ): Th i s symbo 1i c eva 1uat; on ~as
euphoric pro-nulcear attitudes of the 1960s; today predominantly older
and technically inclined people associate nuclear energy with positive
values.
(b)
Belief that nuclear energy may be hazardous, but 1s absolutely essential
to the economy and future standards of living: The perception of economic
necessity was one of the central dividing lines between opponents and
adherents of nuclear energy. In particular, when people developed a
favourable view towards general economic values such as raising the
standard of living, they rated nuclear energy as an economically essential
precondition In achieving these alms. If people were more Inclined towards
qualitative values such as pollution control or harmony with the environment, they regarded nuclear energy not only as opposed to these values
but also as incompatible with economic values.
(c)
Confidence in groups of professional proponents: Even If people have
doubts about the safety of nuclear power stations, they can develop
a positive attitude towards nuclear energy, provided that they still
have confidence in legal and scientific institutions. People with negative
attitudes towards science in general or to the problem-solving capacity
of political Institutions, are usually opposed to nuclear energy or
at least ambivalent.
These three findings of our survey can be well-documented by statistical
results. In Figure 6 five general attitude scales (confidence In science,
politics and technology; conservatism; participation; political apathy; and
environmental awareness) are shown as functions of the risk estmation of nuclear
energy.
Especially these three mechanisms are amplified substantially In developing
countries and can create a higher level of acceptance for nuclear energy.
The use of nuclear power plants Is looked at to lead the way to Industrlalzlatlon
and progress and to • solution of economic problems by the fact that nuclear
energy is one of the cheapest ways of electriCity production. An extreme
need of environmental protection i. not present. To undergo personal financial
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sacrifices for the preservation of the environment is completely unintelligible
for the public at large. The construction of each industrial plant and also
that of a nuclear power station means the creation of additional jobs, the
improvement Of the standard of living in the related region and a possible
improvement in the social position of the country.
In order to investigate further the role of scientific institutions and
various social and political factors, we included a scale designed to measure
the credibility assigned to these institutions. The numerical data are given
in Table 1, which provides some interesting results:
(a)
Where credibility on questions of nuclear energy is attributed to
anyone at all, it is most likely to be to the representatives of
science and technology or of technically responsible political bodies
(such as the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology).
(b)
In their assessments of the credibility of scientific institutions
there are only minor differences between the opponents and proponents
of nuclear energy. Both groups assign the highest rating to these
institutions.
(c)
Central political institutions and technically competent business
institutions generally occupy intermediate positions on the scale,
while social institutions such as trade unions and churches, and people
in certain individual social groups such as journalists, managers or
local politicians, are located at the bottom end of the scale.
(d)
On the basic tripartite scale of ratings, opponents and proponents
differ very little: science comes first, followed by politics in
general and finally the institutions of society. On the whole, however,
opponents aSSigned lower ratings to almost all institutions than did
proponents.
(e)
In judging the credibility of scientific experts, opponents attributed
the greatest credibility to members of universities and nuclear research
centres. This is surprising because the opponents are convinced that
the overwhelming majority of the staffs of these two types of institutions
are in favour of nuclear energy. Competent scientists engaged in a
citizens' action group are given only the third place by opponents
(and eighth place by proponents).
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What is there to be learnt from these survey results? The artifical1y constructed
contrast between the rational assessment of the experts and the supposedly
irrational assessment of the layman has not only disguised the true relationship
in the current discussion about risk, but has at the same time put considerable
difficulties in the way of the dialogue between the two sides. The technological
calculation of risk dimensions must doubtless be regarded as an important
component of any decision concerning risk sources and is also an ideal instrument
for constantly improving the safety measures for protecting the public. However,
the public is not disputing the fact! To make calculations of this kind the
sole criteria for "acceptability" and/or "desirabilityU of technologies or
of other civilizing riSK sources, however, contradicts the intuitive view
of risk acceptance and 1s also unreasonable from political and social standpoints. What is necessary is an analYSis of the concomitant circumstances
and an assessment of the consequences for man and for society. so that
people's fears and attitudes with respect to the effects of the risk sources
they can see can be compared to the actual situation. any aberrations can
be corrected or diverted in advance, and. finally, reproducible deciSions.
reflecting all levels of intuitive perception, can be made. Only when we have
learnt to taKe a serious view of the structure and development of the layman'S
view of risk and to treat and approach the factors governing intuitive perception
purposefully. will it be possible to initiate a fruitful discussion between
SCientists, decision-makers and the public.
3.
THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR ENERGY IN INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPING
SOCIETIES
There are distinct differences in the public perception of nuclear energy
of people from industrial societies compared to those stemming from developing
countries.
First, most citizens in developing countries are preoccupied with fulfilling
their basis economic and cultural needs and are more indifferent towards
production technologies. Industrialized countries, like Germany and the
United States, have reached a standard of living and a level of affluence
that make people highly concerned about noneconomic considerations.
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Second. in developing countries nuclear power is regarded as a rather remote
point of concern, since it is not directly related to consumption.
Third, environmental and health aspects are not In the focus of public interest
or can at least be displaced by economic consideration .
fourth. modernization and national prestige are still national goals in
developing countries which shape the overall attitude towards modern technologies.
In spite of the preponderance of indifferent or even slightly positive
attitudes of the general public In developing countries it is important to
investigate more throughly the opinions and pOints of view of important
societal groups, in particular those groups with well educated, socially
relevant leaders who have the ability to influence the media as well as
the public opinion.
In this respect, parties, unions. religious groups, the technical elite.
students, village chiefs and other fractions within society are of special
interest . For initiating a nuclear programme it Is more essential to reveal
the attitudes of relevant opinion leaders rather than Interviewing samples
of the general public.
For this purpose the Social Science Research Centre of los Angeles and the
Nuclear Research Centre of Jijllch have developed a methodological approach,
called IIValue Tree AnalysisM.
The value tree analysis is an Interactive, iterative and Integral method.
Individuals Or representatives of Important societal groups are Interviewed
in order to determine their relevant values and concerns about the domain
of investigation. The values Identified as statements about desired states,
positive intentions or preferred directions with respect to possible decision
options are organized in a value tree representing the hierarchy of values
of the particular group. Each group has to approve to its value tree.
The value tree represents a hierarchical structure with the general values
and concerns on top, and the specific criteria and value dimensions at the
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The main objective of constructing individual value trees is the formation
of a combined value tree for all groups. Such a joint tree can be understood
as the presentation of major concerns in society without focusing on the
differences in weighting and importance for each value item. But the combined
tree represents more than just a list of concerns which have been mentioned
during group interviews. It 1s an attempt to structure various, even conflicting values and criteria in a logically consistent, generally acceptable
scheme which is meant to be the first step of a meta-semantic framework 1n
farming a societal consensus on conflict resolution.
The value tree approach has been used to reveal the underlying values,
criteria and attitudes towards different energy systems by interviewing
relevant groups in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Unitied States.
A small part of the combined value tree of the German society is illustrated
in Figure 7.
At present, we have not applied the value tree approach in developing countries.
But we believe it would be a rewarding effort to interview the representatives
of leadfng groups in developing countries in order to analyse their values
and concerns and to predict their involvement in the nuclear debate . In
particular, the policies of the government could be shaped in such a way that
legitimate concerns can be encorporated into the policy making process and
more fears and emotions can be met by an intelligent information campaign.
In addition to value tree analysis traditional survey methods can be used
to investigate the beliefs and attitudes of special social groups in developing
countries . In cooperation with the IAEA our research team has been engaged
in a large comparative study on attitudes towards energy systems in four
industrial and five developing countries. Within the framework of this paper
we would like to refer to a study of attitudes towards nuclear power comparing
German, Japanese and Philippine students of technical SUbjects.
The three student samples were taken from Technical Universities. The German
students are enrolled in Aachen and Cologne (N = 150), the Philippine students
in Manila (N = 174). The data of the Japanese students have been obtained
from Tokyo (N = 36) and Osaka (N = 84).
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The sample from Germany consisted of 63 %males and 37 % females. Among the
Philippine students there Were 26 %males and 69 % females (5 %of the sample
did not indicate their sex in the Questionnaire) and in Japan 96 %males and
4 %females responded to the questionnaire.
The students were asked to fill in a questionnaire asking for their general
beliefs in relation to nuclear energy and for their evaluations of each belief .
Adding up these weighted beliefs the direction of the overall attitude can
be determined. In addition to this sophisticated method, all students were
asked to rate themselves on a seven point scale ronging from -3 (totally
opposed to nuclear energy) to +3 (totally in favour of nuclear energy). The
distribution of values according to this pro/con scale is depleted in Fugure 8.
of Fig. 8 where the respondent frequencies are given in percentages
Ex~inato
for each response category for each sample shows that the Japanese students
were predominontly for the use of nuclear energy (categories 2 and 3 account
for 68 %Of the sample), the Philippine student sample includes two groups
one very opposed (category -3 accounts for 25 %) and one slightly in favour
(category 1 represents 20 %). The German (FRG) students are also composed
of two groups, with 45 %of the sample being for the use of nuclear' power
(categories 2 and 3) an a smaller group of 25 % ((c.tegorles -3 and -2) being
against.
As a general remark it could be concluded that except for the Japanese
students who are predominantly in favour of the use of nuclear power, the
other two student samples from Germany and the Philippines appear to include
both interest groups, proponents and opponents.
In order to detect the main differences between the three samples, discriminant
analysis was applied. Depending on the par.meter that is used for the statistical calculation, all variables can be ordered according to the degree to which
their variance discriminates between the samples. Table 2 shows the results
obtained with the scores of weighted beliefs . In the first line the most
discriminative item is listed followed by the second most discriminative and
so on. In total, 15 items out of 30 proved to be significantly different .
This rather large number of significant .differences is a good indication for
the importance of national peculiarities.
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Inspection of Table 2 demonstrates that there are distinct differences with
regard to the expected benefits of nuclear energy_ Whereas German students
emphasize the advantages of cheap energy supply and of conserving natural
resources, the Philippine students apparently disregard these two benefits,
but are convinced that nuclear energy can increase the industrial development
of the1r country and the national prestige. Those two benefits aTe of no
importance for the German students, though. The Japanese respondents lie in
between. Similar to the Germans they regard nuclear energy as in inexpensive
way of generating electricity. in agreement with the Philippines they believe
in the stimulating role of nuclear energy for the development of the national
industry.
Regarding the question of conserving natural resources and increasing national
prestige the Japanese respondents relate both issues to the utilisation of
nuclear energy, but not as strong as the Germans or the Philippines. In contrast
to the German and Philippine sample the Japanese regard nuclear power as a
long-term solution to their energy problems. All three samples react more
homogeneously on the risk side. But there are still some distinct patterns
which are worthwhile mentioning. The Japanese respondents perceive hardly
any risk in connection with radioactive wastes; the Germans show medium concern,
whereas the Philippines have a rather negative view on the waste problem.
This negative evaluation is also predominant in the question of environmental
pollution and - rather unexpectedly - in the restriction of personal freedom.
German and Japanese students are less concerned about environmental pollution
as a consequence of nuclear power and do not believe that personal freedom
might be endangered by the implementation of nuclear power. According to this
response pattern German and Japanese students have just a little fear of the
potential threat to society's freedom. This threat. however. has a large
impact on the Philippine sample. Only the international threats seem to be
more decisive for the German and Japanese negative view of nucelar power.
Proliferation 1s seen as highly probable risk factor by these two samples,
whereas the Philippines are not or at least not as much concerned with this
possible ~enac
to world peace.
Two
not
but
the
more differences should be mentioned. First the Japanese students do
perceive nuclear energy as a competitor for alternative energy sources
as a compliment to them. But both Germans and Philippines believe that
use of nuclear power will restrain the development of alternative energy
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sources. Second, while the Germans feel that nuclear energy has the potential
to increase scientific research, the Philippines reject this possibility.
and Japanese respondents are somewhat undecided on that matter.
Most of the results fit into a consistent mosaic characteristic for each
country. German and Japanese students reflect their industrial heritage by
ascribing the role of a promoter to nuclear energy which helps to provide
inexpensive electricity, encourage economic progress and to increase national
independency. The Philippine sample perceives nuclear energy as an imported
technology with rather doubtful economic advantages and high risks. But they
do link nuclear energy with some positive symbolic attributes: increase of
prestige as well as encouragement for modernization and industrial development .
The motivation to go nuclear is more functional on the German side, more symbolic
on the Philippine side. The Japanese respondents react more like the German
students, however. in some aspects concerning national prestige and economic
development they agree with the Philippine statements. Functional attitudes
are typical for highJy industrialised western cultures; the Japanese are still
partly influenced by traditional value systems, but at the same time highly
motivated by modern functional evaluations. If the risk aspects hat not such
a strong impact on the Japanese attitudes, their overall judgement combining
functional and symbolic aspects, tends to a rather we1l·ba1anced and stable
attitude towards nuclear energy.
Thus the main lesson to be learnt from the analysis of different attitudes
in various countries is the fact that nuclear energy is a controversial topic
in each country. but for different reasons. Whereas in industrial countries,
like Germany, environmental and political aspects playa major role in the
perception procedure, the educated public in developing countries perceives
on one hand the dependence on Industrial nations and the technical complexity
which is felt to be hardly managable. On the other hand nuclear energy Is
seen as a energy source which facilitates economic progress and increases
national prestige. Before looking Into information and education policies
In order to cope with the perceptions of relevant groups in society, one has
to con$1der the time component in the reaction of the public towards nuclear
energy. The protest movement in ~estrn
countries has to be regarded as a
steady process of governmental action and public reaction. The aggravation
of conflict which we observe today, is partly due to the handling of the
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sceptical oPPosition by the responsible actors in business and government.
This point can be made clearer if we look into the recent history of public
opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany.
4.
A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR POWER IN
GERMANY
A brief historic.l description of the different phases of attitude formation
towards nuclear energy is useful for following the trend of public opinionforming over time.
Until approximately 1950/51, there was an ambivalent attitude toward nuclear
energy. There was the fear of the horrors of nuclear warfare, and at the same
time the acknowledgement that nuclear weapons were significant to ensure the
military superiority of one's own political block. During this period, the
peaceful use of nuclear energy plays no role at all and is not perceived.
During the fifties, there was a clear reversal of public opinion against
nuclear weapons which found an expression in the Easter demonstrations. A
nuclear weapons stop was demanded world-wide. and nuclear fall-out was
considered as a general threat in the United States. The Atoms for Peace Program, initiated by President Eisenhower, created a counter-movement to
the military threat and hopes for a reversal of man's destructive intellectual
potential into a harnessing of natural resources for human purposes. This
metaphysical embellishment of nuclear energy, promoted for political reasons,
prepared the first step toward a symbolic role of nuclear energy as a paragon
of technology and .innovation.
When in 1963 the test stop agreement was signed between the United States
and the USSR, the spearhead of protest against nuclear weapons was brokeni
nuclear weapons took second place after the problems of substitute wars (such
as Vietnam). The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy still had little
relevance. While there was still protest against the construction of research
reactors tn the fifties, where the typical characteristics of traditional
technological innovation protest eXisted, the first commercial nuclear power
stations could be commissioned in the late sixties without any appreciable
protest or resistance.
- '163 -
In the late 60s and early 70s, the criticism of peaceful nuclear energy uses
which started in the United States was seized upon in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The problems were first discussed among scientists and then
presented to the public by professional critics. At the same time, local
resistance to the construction of nuclear facilities developed.
None of this would have had the result that nuclear energy grew into a major
political problem if the symbolic nature of nuclear energy which had developed
in the 50s had not been seized again and reinterpreted. The developing awareness
of the limits of growth, the greater sensitivity of the population for the
natural environment, the change of social values, the distrust in central
institutions, and the disappointed hopes regarding the effects of technological
and scientific progress (such as space flight or cancer research) were the
decisive factors that the symbolic attributes of nuclear energy. such as
IIprogressive, clean, centr~l;zd
and complex", aqu1red a negative connotation.
In spite of the first opposition, opinion polls confirmed that the number
of strong and moderate advocates of nuclear energy still reached approximately
70 %, while less than one tenth of the population considered themselves
opponents of the new technology.
The characteristiC feature of the second half of the 70s which started
approximately with the protest activities in the German town of Wyhl (1975)
was the increasing consolidation of nuclear energy opponents. Support by
persons engaged in science and technology. the popular protest in the neighbourhood of planned nuclear power stations, the ,organziation of citizens'
initiatives and the overreactions on the part of politicians had the result
that more and more citizens questioned the motives of nuclear policy and
adopted sceptical standpoints. Also, doubts as to the relevance of the nuclear
program were increasingly reported in the media.
The discussion of the hazards of nuclear energy and some apocalyptic scenarios
published by sceptics created a high potential of active resistance in the
local environment of planned nuclear energy facilities which was vented in
massive demonstrations and sometimes even militant activities (Brokdorf,
Stade, Kalkar). Among the public this resulted in an increased perception
of nuclear energy opponents who were regarded as being a majority.
During this phase. a structurized attitude formed in most individuals;
approximately 25 %were clear-cut opponents, approximately 30 % adherents,
and the remaining 45 i were ambivalent between the two extremes depending
on the issues of the day and the political mood. Only a small proportion of
not more than 10 %were really indifferent.
While the years from 1975 to 1978 were characterized by confrontation between
opponents and proponents and the resulting polarization of views, the Iran
crisis and the Three Mile Island accident in the following years marked a
trend toward less denunciation in the conflict and more attempts to find
solutions that would allOW political compromises. The conflicts had lost in
virulence, and both camps were undergoing an internal consolidation process
to develop new arguments and new ideas for future conflicts.
In the gener,l public, the opinion structures which had developed in the
mid-70s were more or less retained. An increasingly positive basic attitude
in the question as to the necessity of nuclear energy developed again among
the population. An interesting feature in this connection was the increasingly
critical evaluation of the safety of nuclear facilities and their engineerin9
maturity and
th~
increasingly positive evaluation of their economic necessity.
The latest development since 1982 is characterized by a growing awarenesS
of the military uses of nuclear power. in particular the question as to the
installation of American missiles in Western Europe. The renaissance of a
new peace movement has absorbed a large number of protesters and hence calmed
down the movement against nuclear power stations. At the same time the economic
recession in the fRG and the good performance of nuclear power plants in
Genmany supported a more favourable view towards nuclear energy within ·the
public. According to the most recent opinion polls a large majority of appro •.
60 % is in faVOUr of a modest growth of nuclear energy provided that the waste
disposal problem can be solved. A complete shut down, or a fast expansion
of nuclear power - the two possible extremes - are both options which are
supported only by a small minority of the German population.
- 165 -
5.
PROPOSAL FOR A COMBINED INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAMME
What can we learn from history and from the description of socio-political
aspects and what lessons can be drawn for developing countries which are at
present in the first or second stage of utilizing nuclear energy? We will
try to draw some conclusions for the effective management of educational and
information programmes to compensate for opposition and protest.
In order to achieve any acceptance it will be necessary to inform the people
about the complex correlations of nuclear energy, the future development
of energy reqUirements and the possibility of covering them, the methods
of operation of nuclear power plants, their safety, their risk, the problems
of environmental protection, the effects of radiation and the excellent
experience gained in industrialized countries which nuclear power plants.
It must be shown clearly and understandably that the peaceful use of nuclear
energy grants security of supply and the advantages ' of independence in covering
the energy demand of a country, and that nuclear energy is an inexpensive
and safe way of electricity production. The use of that energy so~rce
leads
to more employment and to an industrial development in the case when cheap
energy is combined with a functioning technology transfer. Finally it must
be explained that the use of nuclear energy creates a real relief of the
balance of trade either by less imports of fossil fuel like coal and oil or
by giving the opportunity to export indigenous conventional energy resources
or in addition by exporting the products of a growing industry.
But especially in developing countries this information is to be channelled
through the technical elite of a country, the religious groups, politicians,
political parties, students, educated persons, village chiefs and other groups
highly est1mated by the people .
In addition the positive basic attitude towards nuclear energy can be supported
and maintained when training and education in the relevant scientific and
technical disciplines takes place in combination with information about benefit
and risk of nuclear energy.
_ 166 -
Information should thus be imparted along with the knowledge required for
industrialization. This knowledge must be presented to the relevant groups
of persons in a ~aner
which can be easily received in a sufficiently
illustrative form, particularly if visible symptoms of nuclear energy
development such as research reactors or similar installations do not exist.
Especially groups which are in the position to follow the international discussion on nuclear energy should be interested in gaining knowledge and should
be actively involved in an information campaign in order to avoid importing
the nuclear controversy from abroad. Universities. scientific institutes.
teachers and professional organizations should also be involved in such
measures and should be motivated to form the basis for a public information
team to travel round the country. Public information teams are necessary to
go into the villages equipped with the relevant information material to inform
the village leaders and, together with them, the public at large. Special
emphasis should be placed on information at schools and universities in order
to inform the growi ng generation in the best manner. Besides a good training for
teachers, information experts have to go into the schools to report about
the new energy source, to answer questions and to discuss problems associated
with nuclear power with the young boys and girls. It is necessary even in
the young generation to create a solid basis of knowledge which helps to diminish
the fear of hitherto unknown technologies and to increase acceptance .
Informing the media, particularly the press, as early as possible offers the
chance for a broad discussion and creates the prerequisites for qualified
and unbiased reporting. The electronic media should introduce information
about nuclear energy into their educational programme.
Special and timely information should be given to politicians since it is
up to them to make binding and responsible decisions on energy programms.
They should be furnished with .11 information available on the possibilities
offered by nuclear energy for the development of their country and on the
alternative available to them beyond nuclear energy.
Along this 11ne it is not necessary to duplicate the difficulties in the field
of public acceptaAce in developing countries which some industrialized countries
have been confronted with in the near past.
- 167 -
100000
Motor Vah.
Ace..
~ . .rtOiM'U
/
Homlclde?foe eStrnk.
10000
Botulism
Pregnancy
1 000
~od
TOIm~.
~.:",;'-I
•
•
•
"
..,.
; ,. . .
eP-'...
..,...-.
• Stomech
~nce,
Dlabet ••
• • Asthma
Electrocution
100
10
o ~'-r,
10
1000
100
100000
10000
1000000
Aetull Numta;r of C•• ths pI' Vear
Risk estimation and statistical data (USA survey)
Fig. 1
,
220000
81000
30000
t
...
J
~
.
i
Inx
10
•
Motor
•
e
Acclden13 It Hom."
• Heroin
11 000
7
4000
•
1500
5
350
4
.01
3
74
2
27
1
,
Accidents V.t1ldes
.t Work
• Home
•
•
• A1eol\ol
Smoking
•
Apli.n~es
Aircraft
Pesticides
•
Nudler Energy
•
ex· Ray
•
SkIIng
0
In,
x
1
27
2
74
34561&910
201
350
1500 4000 ',000 30000 81000 220000
A.. I Fltlilltln
Risk estimation and statistical data (German survey)
I
J
f
50
.0
30
1;
!';
10
o •
Heavy U.tal
Cepaul.
liD
D
Fig. 3
Bacteria
1
CapSUla
Group II (InVDIontary Risk.Taklng)
Group I (VoSontary R[sk
~ T.ldng)
Results of the capsula experiment
2
Radlo.cttve
Capsula
3
Variance of Experimental Design
-
l OY -
100-r-----------------.-----------------.----------------,
90
80
70
30
20
10
o
-10
-20
-~
10-r=~_
Nuclear Power
eoll
Home Appllances
Motor Vehk:l.
90
80
-20
X· Ray
• S 1El S 2 mID S 3 BS4S 5-
m
Fig. 4
Personal Direct and Indir.a Advantages and OlsadYMtages
Effec:tI for the Public and the SocIety
Sodolond Toc:hnoIoglcoi Prog,... (Rotrograslon)
SoGiopolltlcal V.lues
Personel Convenlenc. and PI_au,.
The importance of five belief factors with respect to the
risk estimation of various technologies
~
f
~
,
!
~
Mud..,
EM""
Coo.
fill As Realistic Perc:.lved En.rgy Option
lID Dulrod ....... Option
Fig. 5
......
So ..,
Energy
S.vlng
The discrepancy between desired energy future and perceived
reality
~
~
o
30
28 -
-<!>...
• -~-
26 2.
2.
20
1
t
J!
3
'"
®-.~
18
,.
16
'lit,....,
12 -
..:------.-:--.- -----.. . ._i'.s<
.--.
....
.....•
......"...__ ,,_............
--
...
~
.~-
10
.....' - '
8
6-
®"''''''''"
~.
/ , . _ . _ . __
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.-=............."
-~
.....
-~
.• -......
,-.~
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'
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.~!-
....-.....
--'''''''""
4
2
0
I
-3
-2
I
-1
I
o
1
I
2
Rlsk-Benefit.£stlmatJon of Nudear Energy
G> Confidence lI'I aclenu and technology
.------- ® Nonfatalistic: vieW 01 IIf.
u _ , _ , . CD ConsltlYatiY. attitude In Uf. styt.
"" " " " . @ environmental consciousness
. _ - - (i) Deslr••Of' more participation
Fig. 6
Risk-benefit-estimation of nuclear energy .s • function
of socio-polltical attitudes
3
"
- 172 -
• Social impacts
* Quality of life
.. Cultural and mo~al
quality of life
.. Preservation of cultural goods
*
Threats to cultural values
.. Loss of fantasy
* Aqression
.. Apathy
.. Uniformity
.. Wastefulness
.. Induced increase in consumption
.. Threats to the human identity
.. Anonymity
.. Restriction of individual development options
.. Fears
.. Disturbance of the relation between humans and nature
.. Social quality of life
.. social justice.
.. Social peace
* social security
.. Stable living
.. EconoNic quality of life
.. Employment
.. Wealth
I
II
.. Energy services
* Heat
* Lights
III Comfort
.. Improvement of working conditions
.. Keeping societal options open . ability to change
.. ~epin9
options open for future ~enratios
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
* Enabling alternative lifestyles
• For individu«ls
- For groups (e.g. religious, rural)
Fig. 7
Part of combined value tree structure nSocial impacts
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
ll
-
TaWoL
173 _
Cr.Iamtr altriMttailo IasdftIUou 011 quesrioM 01 MtCIHr taerU
IDSLitutioa
TouJ tMdiaD
Median nlucs
Adheren'" HtSe (pI
vaJue
Opponents
Profc:saor a, a
lI.udcat rcsc.arch centre
Scicatilt at a
1.44
1.18
1.47
0.00
1.71
1.88
1.71
0.0)
univcnity
Reactor safd)'
US
2~.
I.SO
0.00
2.09
:u.
1."
0.00
Scientist i.a •
citiuAs' adion &roup
2.]2
2.18
2.'0
0.00
Rtpreseftutiyc of
2.)9
2.42
2.38
0.60
commission
Federal Mirais&er of
Rc:sc&R"b and Tcthnoloc)'
the medial profession
Fcdcr.t Chancellor
HO
2.68
2.36
Speaker for a
citiuaa' Idton 810UP
2.60
2.39
2.73
0.00
0.00
Cb.a.innan of •
\u ilily company
2.69
2.91
2.43
0.00
TV tommentator
2.70
2.71
2.61
0. 18
Speaker for Social
2.9'
3."
2.14
0.01
1.96
1.03
1.86
0."
2."
3.00
J .07
3.00
2.9S
3.01
0.09
3.03
2.97
2.96
0.87
1.10
Ul
3. 17
] .24
U7
3.84
2.89
0.00
0.15
Democntic Piny (SPD)
Speaker (or Christian
Democntic: Pany (CDU)
PoIillNn
SpukCf for Libcnrol
Dnloc:n.tic Pany (FOP)
Joumaliat
Manal" of aa
iDd",uial COmpal11
Local politician
Trade ucion chainnln
Priet
Chaimwl of the
3.12
3.20
.U 6
1.87
3] ."
, 12
3."
3.68
0.93
0.10
0."
0.01
Genua FootbaU M5ociltion
A veRse VAlue
Coniden" intctval
Medians;
1.SO
;to.64
2.7'
:to.2l
"tile: I - hilh Credibility ,,- uro
c~
i bil
i ty
2."
;to.lS
O.oJ
50 ....
JAPAN
~
•
••
I
•
40;
-
I
•
•
~
•
~
>-
LJ
•
••
30
Z
'f~
UJ
a
a::
UJ
u..
....
z
"-
a
CJ
0VI
__/,'
.o
~
20
UJ
z
10
UJ
-,
a:
I
-3
"-
"-.-~)j
-. ..
-~
I
-2
...
---"--0"'-""
~
'W.
-
••
"~
FRG
"i( PHILIPPINES
I
-1
0
1
2
SCORES
Flg . 8
•••
,•
Pro/Con scale frequencies in different countries
3
.."-
Table 2
Discriminant coefficients and mean differences between
three samples
EB
Mean
Mean
Students
Students
German
Japanese
Mean
Phil ippine
Students
1
Conserve natural resources (7)
4.42
2.09
-0.37
2
Increase nation's prestige (22)
0.09
1.34
2.64
3
Assuring economic independence (12)
1.92
1.33
-2.16
4
Technology as tool in intern.tional politics (15)
-1.28
-1. 78
0.29
5
Management of dangerous wastes (6)
-0.08
1.73
-2.71
6
Leads ·to equal income distribution among nations (30)
-2.45
-1.14
-0.94
7
Promotes industrial development (3)
1.93
3.14
3.58
+0.92
+0.31
B
Restricts options for future societal development (21)
+2.27
9
Postpones the development of alternative energy sources (14)
-0.22
2.04
-1.15
10
Provides cheap energy (17)
2.45
2.59
-1.38
11
Long-term solution to energy needs (19)
0.35
2.21
-0.13
12
Restricts personal freedom (2)
1.9
1.3
-2.16
13
leads to environmental pollution (20)
-1.95
-2.37
-4.84
14
leads to proliferation (2B)
-1.46
-1.35
-0.89
15
Uses up valuable land (9)
-1.2B
-1.77
0.29
"
c,