The Origins of Hizbollah: Lebanon’s Islamic Resistance to Israeli Occupation

The Origins of Hizbollah: Lebanon’s Islamic Resistance to Israeli Occupation Nicholas Blair Munhofen III History Honors Thesis Academic Year 2009-2010 10 May 2010 Advisor: Prof. Yvonne Haddad Munhofen 1 Table of Contents Historical Timeline………………………………………………………………………………..2 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations…………………………………………………………….4 Maps………………………………………………………………………………………………7 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………....14 Chapter 1- From Imam Musa al-Sadr to Ayatollah Khomeini: The Development of the Theology of Revolutionary Islam and Its Vanguard………………………………………………………..26 Chapter 2- The Palestinian Presence in South Lebanon…………………………………............53 Chapter 3- The Israeli Occupations of South Lebanon: Comparing 1978 with 1982……….......72 Conclusion………………………………………....……………………………...…………....104 Works Cited………………………………………....……………………………...…………..108 Munhofen 2 Historical Timeline 24 September 1902 Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini is born in Khomeyn, Iran 1930s Khomeini lectures at the Qom Feyziyya School 1943 Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh publishes The Secrets of a Thousand Years and Khomeini responds with his first publication—Kashf al-asrar, or Revelation of the Secrets 14 May 1948 Israel declares itself an independent Jewish state, Arab-Israeli War ensues causing more than 100000 Palestinian refugees to flee to south Lebanon 1958 Revolt of the Pashas in Lebanon ends with the deployment of US Marines on Lebanese soil 1963 Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi institutes a series of reforms later dubbed the White Revolution, which ultimately faced strong condemnation on behalf of the Iranian religious scholars, including Khomeini August 1963—May 1964 Iranian authorities arrest and imprison Khomeini on grounds of his political dissent November 1964 Iranian government exiles Khomeini to Turkey October 1965 Khomeini arrives in Najaf, Iraq 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and Arab states results in the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Sinai Peninsula September 1970 The Jordanian Army expels PLO fedayeen from Jordan, thereby forcing thousands of Palestinian militiamen to flee to south Lebanon 15 October 1972 Israel announces policy of preemptively attacking PLO strongholds in south Lebanon 1974 Imam Musa al-Sadr founds Amal, a secular though predominantly Shiite militia in Lebanon 1975-1977 First phase of the Lebanese Civil War 6 January 1978 Khomeini returns to Iran 15 March 1978 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invade south Lebanon during Operation Litani 22 March 1978 United Nation deploys a multinational force to south Lebanon in order to secure the area and ensure an Israeli withdrawal August 1978 Imam Musa al-Sadr mysteriously disappears and his whereabouts remain unknown 16 January 1979 Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi is evacuated from Iran Munhofen 3 March 1979 Referendum calling for the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran passes Late 1979 Constitution creating the Islamic Republic of Iran is ratified 6 June 1982 Israeli troops cross into south Lebanon during Operation Peace for Galilee, thus beginning an occupation of south Lebanon that does not end until 2000 Early 1980s Ayatollah Khomeini sends Iranian Revolutionary Guards to south Lebanon Late 1982 Israel institutes harsh occupation policies and Shiite resistance against the occupation ensues November 1982 Hizbollah announces its existence as an Islamic militia devoted to Ayatollah Khomeini 16 February 1985 HIzbollah issues a public proclamation spelling out its ideological views, religious pedigree, and goals 3 June 1989 At age 86, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, dies Munhofen 4 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations Words in bold are featured in this glossary. Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniyya (Amal)- This military arm of Harakat al-Mahruumin was established in 1975 by Imam Musa al-Sadr in order to protect the Shiite community from the escalating sectarian violence preceding the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)- The force deployed by the League of Arab States, though primarily consisting of Syrian troops, to Lebanon to end the first phase of the Civil War in 1977. Ashura- On 10 [ashura in Arabic] Muharram, Shia remember the Battle of Karbala (680), where al-Husayn and his followers were killed by the much larger forces of Ibn S’ad. Many Shiite men, especially those in Lebanon, observe Ashura by cutting their foreheads in an act of ritual bloodletting. Ayatollah- This high ranking title is granted to only the most learned Twelver Shiite mujtahids. Faqih- The faqih is the leading Shiite jurisprudent, or Islamic legal scholar. By way of his understanding of the faqih, Supreme Leader of Iran and architect of the Islamic revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini, considered himself the faqih. Fatwa- A fatwa is a religious edict relating to Islamic law. Presently, fatwas are oftentimes used by Islamic scholars to clarify the application of sharia’ to modern society. Fedayeen- Meaning ‘freedom fighters’ in Arabic, fedayeen were Palestinian militants who violently opposed the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories [i.e., the West Bank and Gaza Strip]. Harakat al-Mahruumin- Begun as a national Lebanese socio-political movement by Imam Musa al-Sadr and a Greek Catholic archbishop in 1974, the Movement of the Deprived (the English translation) sought to improve the economic situation of the poor, especially the Shia living in the south and slums around Beirut. Imam- This Arabic word means ‘leader of the community’ as it derives from umma, the Arabic term for community. Imams oftentimes lead prayer or serve as the head of a mosque. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)- The Israeli Defense Forces comprise the entirety of the Israeli armed forces. Within the IDF are the air force, navy, ground combat forces, and ground support (telecommunications, signals, and logistics). Jaafari Legal School- Jafar as-Sadiq (d. 765), the Sixth Imam, established this Shiite legal school, which emphasizes the use of ijtihad, or individual reason, to interpret sharia’. Lebanese Arab Army (LAA)- The Lebanese Arab Army was established by Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib, who was formerly an officer in the Maronite-dominated Lebanese Armed Forces, as a predominantly Sunni Muslim force during the first phase of the Lebanese Civil War (1975- Munhofen 5 1977). The LAA joined the Lebanese National Movement in opposing the government led by President Elias Sarkis. Lebanese Front (LF)- Maronite militias, such as the Phalangists, and their supporters formed the Lebanese Front, the pro-government forces that fought against the leftist Lebanese National Movement during the Lebanese Civil War. Lebanese National Movement (LNM)- At the outset of the first phase of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the Lebanese National Movement was composed of leftist Lebanese and Palestinian militias. After on attacks on Palestinian refugee camps, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) joined the LNM. During the early portion of the first phase al-Sadr’s Amal fought alongside the LNM, but the Shiite leader later rescinded his support left the coalition. Mujahidin- Derived from the same word as jihad, or struggle in Arabic, the mujahidin are those who struggle. In today’s usage, mujahidin usually fight against an external foe, such as another country’s armed forces. Mujtahid- A mujtahid is an Islamic scholar capable of interpreting sharia’ using ijtihad. Mullah- A mullah is Muslim cleric, oftentimes the leader of a mosque. Mustakberin- According to Ruhollah Khomeini and the founders of Hizbollah, the mustakberin, translated to English as the oppressors, included Israel and its Western supporters—especially the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Mustazafin- The mustakberin subjugated the mustazafin, or oppressed, to poverty, discrimination, and humiliation. Because of their experience of centuries of such treatment, the Shia considered themselves the prime example of the mustazafin. Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA)- Created by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser prior to the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day War, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) ostensibly represented the regular army of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO never exercised full control over the PLA, however, and in many instances other Arab states used the PLA as a proxy force for their own aims. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)- Considered a terrorist organization by Israel until 1991, the Palestinian Liberation Organization is political and military organization that regards itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Pasdaran- The Pasdaran are the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. They have been given the role of ensuring the security of the Islamic Revolution, and in Lebanon, this meant the training of Shiite militias who sought to usher an Islamic revolution in Lebanon. Phalangists- The Lebanese Phalangists are right-wing Christian militiamen who are members of the Social Democratic Party of Lebanon, or the Kataeb Pary. Most Phalangists are Maronite Christians. The Phalangists played a critical role in the Lebanese Forces (LF) during the Lebanese Civil War. Munhofen 6 Al-Quds Day- In 1979, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini deemed the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan to be Al-Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day. On Al-Quds Day, Muslims around the world hold anti-Zionist demonstrations where they decry the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and other areas of historic Palestine. Sazman-i Amniyyat Va Ettele’at-i Keshvar (SAVAK)- SAVAK was Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s domestic intelligence service, operating from 1957 until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. SAVAK was infamous for torturing political opponents of the Shah. Sharia’- Sharia’ is Islamic law, the body of which is derived from many sources, including the Quran and the practices and sayings of the Prophet and his inner circle of early followers. Taqiyya- Meaning fear or caution, taqiyya is a Shiite practice whereby a follower of Shiism may hide his religious beliefs in order to avoid persecution or bodily injury. Ulema- The ulema are Muslim religious scholars. Umma- The umma is the Muslim community. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)- Created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was deployed to south Lebanon in 1978 to quell sectarian violence while also providing enhanced security in order to prevent fedayeen attacks on Christian militias and their Israeli supporters. Velayet-e Faqih- Translated from Persian as rule by the faqih, or leading jurisprudent, this theological tenet affirms the authority of the faqih over all matters of life, whether religious, social, political, etc. Zuama- The zuama were powerful land-owning families in Lebanon. During Ottoman rule, the zuama served as the de facto administrators of the Shia living in the Biqa’ valley and south Lebanon areas. The rise of Imam Musa al-Sadr coincided with the demise of the power and influence of the zuama. Munhofen Maps Political Map of Lebanon 1 1 “Lebanon Maps,” Perry-Castañeda Library: Map Collection (University of Texas: Austin, 2000) <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_pol_2000.jpg> 7 Munhofen 8 2 2 “Lebanon Maps: Distribution of Religious Groups,” Perry-Castañeda Library: Map Collection (University of Texas: Austin, 1983) < http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_religions_83.jpg> Munhofen Location of Palestinian Refugee Camps 3 3 Itagaki Yuzo, Oda Makoto, and Shiboh Mitsukazu, eds., The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Inquiry by the International People’s Tribunal, Tokyo (Tokyo: Sanyusha, 1983) xiii. 9 Munhofen 10 Map of Beirut 4 4 Itagaki Yuzo, Oda Makoto, and Shiboh Mitsukazu, eds., The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Inquiry by the Intenational People’s Tribunal, Tokyo (Tokyo: Sanyusha, 1983) xv. Munhofen 11 Invasion of south Lebanon: Litani Operation, 1978 5 5 Lebanese Ministry of Information, South Lebanon: 1948-1986 Facts and Figures (Beirut: Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Information Department of Lebanese Studies and Publications, 1986) 9. Munhofen 12 Deployment of UNIFIL, 1978 6 6 Beate Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt: Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978 (New York: Praeger, 1988) 174. Munhofen 13 The Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, 1982-1986 7 7 Lebanese Ministry of Information, South Lebanon: 1948-1986 Facts and Figures (Beirut: Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Information Department of Lebanese Studies and Publications, 1986). Munhofen 14 Introduction In the summer of 2005, the Party of God in Lebanon, Hizbollah, garnered the fourth-most seats in the first parliamentary elections held since the Syrian withdrawal of troops from Lebanese territory in April of that year. Widely considered a victory for Hizbollah but a cause for concern for Israel and its allies, the results of the 2005 elections made one thing clear: Hizbollah had become a political power player in Lebanon. Only two decades prior to the parliamentary elections, Hizbollah had formally announced its existence, ideology, and goals when its leaders issued the Open Letter to All the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World.1 In that document, Hizbollah declared itself as a Shiite organization loyal to the faqih or leading Shiite jurisprudent, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, with social, political, and religious aims. The founding of Hizbollah and its later political success was the consequence of a culmination of developments that altered the Lebanese Shiite community in the 20th century. This paper will argue that Hizbollah, owed its Islamic character to Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology and its emergence to the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) 1982 invasion and subsequent implementation of occupation policies. Although the Israelis undertook a similar invasion in 1978, the lack of a harsh and comprehensive occupation policy did not elicit such a violent response. I will also examine the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in encouraging these multiple Israeli forays into Lebanese territory. In this introductory section, I will provide a brief synopsis of Shiism’s origins and the experience of Shia in Lebanon. In addition, I will address the current scholarship covering Hizbollah, while also elaborating on the specific structure and goals of this particular thesis. 1 Naim Qassem and Dalia Khalil, trans., Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books, 2005) 98. Munhofen 15 The Supporters of ‘Ali, the Martyr of Islam Before approaching the Shiite community in Lebanon, a brief summation of the development of Shiism is necessary in order to better understand the history of oppression and persecution experienced by Shia. According to Shiite tradition, on 16 March 632, the Prophet Muhammad asked his followers, “Am I not more appropriate for authority over you than yourselves?” to which the early Muslim community responded with a resounding affirmation. Muhammad then declared, “Whomsoever I am the authority over, ‘Ali is also the authority over.”2 Recounted for centuries as the Shia’s justification of the Prophet’s supposed anointing of ‘Ali (656-661) as his successor, this story served as a major point of contention after the Prophet’s death later that year. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib was the son of Muhammad’s uncle, making the Prophet and him cousins. When ‘Ali’s father was no longer able to provide for his son, the Prophet took the young ‘Ali into his own household and raised him. For the Shia, ‘Ali was the second person to accept the Muhammad’s prophetic message. While Muhammad established the Muslim community, the umma, in Medina from 622-632, ‘Ali married Muhammad’s beloved daughter Fatima, thus making ‘Ali the son-in-law of the Prophet. After Muhammad’s death, however, ‘Ali did not become the imam or leader of the umma; instead, Abu Bakr, a companion of the Prophet much older than ‘Ali became the khalifa or successor to the Prophet. Although only Caliph for two years—he died in 634—Abu Bakr sought to consolidate and prevent further fragmentation of the umma, since many of the Prophet’s followers fell away after his death. Shortly before his death, Abu Bakr named ‘Umar his successor. ‘Umar led a tenyear campaign of expansion beginning in 634 whereby the Arab-Muslim armies conquered Palestine, Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. Because ‘Umar neglected to name his successor, a council or shura met to choose the next Caliph, and they decided upon ‘Uthman who was a 2 Heinz Halm, The Shiites: A Short History, trans. (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007) 3-5. Munhofen 16 member of the Umayyad clan, which long opposed the prophetic message of Muhammad. At the time, many Muslims believed ‘Ali, who represented the first followers of Islam and was a close friend of the Prophet, should have been selected as the Caliph. Muslims opposed to ‘Uthman assassinated the Caliph during prayer in 656, and on 17 June, this opposition group deemed ‘Ali the Caliph. According to Shia, ‘Ali was the true successor of the Prophet, and with his ascension to the caliphate, order was restored in the umma. Most Muslims at the time, however, considered ‘Ali’s path to caliphate illegitimate and as such, they rejected his authority.3 Because most Muslims opposed ‘Ali, he left Medina for Kufa, Iraq, where ‘Ali faced off against Mu’awiya, an Umayyad whose supporters deemed the legitimate successor to ‘Uthman. Those who supported ‘Ali considered themselves of the party of ‘Ali, Shi’at ‘Ali in Arabic, and from here came the name Shia, referring those who believe ‘Ali was the only legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammad. In 661 a Muslim who once supported ‘Ali allegedly assassinated the Caliph because he thought ‘Ali acquiesced to the apostasy of Mu’awiya by permitting Mu’awiya to live. Thus, ‘Ali was the first martyred Shiite imam. After his death, the eldest son al-Hasan announced himself as Caliph to the approval of the Shia. However, Mu’awiya and his army entered Iraq with the aim of suppressing the Shia, and after forced negotiations with al-Hasan, ‘Ali’s son relented and renounced his claim to the caliphate. alHasan quietly returned to Medina. 4 In 680, Mu’awiya died and named his son Yazid his successor, thus laying the precedent of a dynastic caliphate headquartered in Damascus. The Shiite community encouraged al-Husayn to lay claim to the position of Caliph, and in September 680 he, his family, and some supporters departed from Mecca in the hopes of reaching Kufa, where he planned to announce himself as 3 4 Heinz Halm 5-8. Heinz Halm 7. Munhofen 17 the true legitimate Caliph. Before reaching Kufa, al-Husayn camped at Karbala, and simultaneously, the Iraqi governor dispatched thousands of his troops—probably around 4000— under the command of Ibn Sa’d in order to demand al-Husayn pay tribute to Yazid. Since alHusayn refused to acquiesce, the army prevented the caravan from getting water for three days. On 10 October 680, or 10 Muharram 61 of the Hijra or Muslim calendar, a battle broke out between al-Husayn’s supporters and the army loyal to Yazid. By nightfall, the large army had killed all of al-Husayn’s men, which Shia believed included 40 foot soldiers and 32 horsemen. The victorious troops brought al-Husayn’s severed head and his surviving family members to the Caliph in Damascus.5 From this point in history, Shiism began to develop independently as a community of ‘Ali’s followers devoted to expressing penance for not coming to the aid of martyred imams. The Battle of Karbala came to symbolize the persecution Shia expected to face during their lifetimes. Later, Shia developed their own traditions and practices, and the Sixth Imam, Jafar as-Sadiq, even established the Jaafari legal school of Shiism in the 8th century.6 Fantastical stories concerning the Battle of Karbala emerged in the 13th century, and with the mass conversion of Persians to Shiism in the 16th century, elements of Persian mysticism influenced Shia tradition as well. However, disputes often arose within Shia communities concerning the correct line of succession, and as a result, different forms of Shiism developed centered around the imamate of different Shia leaders. The Shia in Lebanon and the Confessional System of Government In pre-Ottoman times, Lebanon served as a refuge and home to people of diverse religious persuasions, including an array of Muslim and Christian sects. According to Shiite 5 6 Heinz Halm 8-16. Heinz Halm 24. Munhofen 18 tradition in Lebanon, a companion of the Prophet and supporter of ‘Ali, Abu Dharr, brought the faith to Lebanon after his exile from Damascus.7 Because the historical authenticity of such a claim faced opposition—the dubious claim that a contemporary of the Prophet established the Shia community provided significant legitimacy to the historical legacy of the Shia in Lebanon—some scholars have instead suggested that Yemeni tribesmen brought Shiism to Lebanon.8 The Lebanese Shia follow the Twelver form of Shiism, whereby they believe that the twelfth imam resides in occultation, but as the Hidden Imam or Mahdi, he will someday return in the future and usher in the period of Allah’s divine judgment.9 Over the course of several centuries, conquest of Bilad ash-Shams, or Greater Syria, by Christian crusading armies and later the Mamluks resulted in the formation of tight-knit Shiite enclaves in Lebanon.10 By the Ottoman conquest of Lebanon in the 16th century, the Shia of Lebanon traditionally represented the poorest and least powerful of the numerous sects in Lebanon, and they predominantly lived in Jabal ‘Amil and the northern area of the Biqa’ valley. While under the rule of the Porte, the status of Shia did not improve. For instance, the Sunni Ottoman administration did not recognize the Jaafari legal school. The few land owning Shia families, the zuama, served as the de facto heads of the Lebanese Shiite community, largely because these Shia represented the select few with economic power.11 A glimmer of a brighter future appeared when the French granted the Lebanese Shia community an independent and autonomous justice system whereby the Shia implemented their interpretation of Islamic law.12 7 Rodger Shanahan, The Shia of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 13. See Rula Abisaab, ‘Shi’ite Beginnings and Scholastic Tradition in Jabal ‘Amil in Lebanon’, The Muslim World, Vol. 89, No. 1, January 1999, p. 4. 9 For more information on Twelver Shiism, see Heinz Halm 28-30. 10 The Mamluks were former slaves who came to power and established a dynasty in Egypt lasting from the 13-16th centuries. 11 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987) 15. 12 Yusri Hazran, “The Shiite Community in Lebanon,” Middle East Brief, No. 7, June 2009, 2. 8 Munhofen 19 Nevertheless, the declaration of Lebanese independence from the Free French Government on 26 November 1941 and formation of the 1943 National Pact were accomplished amidst much fanfare and optimism but with little Shia involvement.13 While discrimination against Shia had become a centuries old tradition in Lebanon, the National Pact legislated, codified, and made this oppression de jure. The National Pact outlined the sectarian structure of the Lebanese government, but it used a controversial census14 from the 1930s to justify its granting of the Presidency to the Christians; the office of the Prime Minister to the Sunnis; and the position of Speaker of the Parliament—the weakest of the three positions—to the Shia.15 Developments occurring in Lebanon at mid-century coincided with the political ‘awakening’ of the Shia. Demographic shifts and internal migration (e.g. Shia moving to Beirut), spurred by lack of economic opportunities at home and the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees into Lebanese territory because of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, eroded the power of the zuama.16, 17 The Palestinian refugees brought a leftist and secular political ideology—PanArabism—that appealed to the disaffected Lebanese Shia. In spite of its egalitarian goals, PanArabism achieved little in Lebanon, leaving the Shia, the fastest growing religious community in Lebanon, just as politically bereft as before. Lebanon avoided a potentially devastating civil war during the 1958 Revolt of the Pashas, which brought Lebanese Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, who supported Nasser’s notion of a Pan-Arab state into conflict with Lebanese Christians, who 13 According to Salim Nasr, a scholar of Lebanese demographics, “In 1948, the Shi’a numbered 225,000 of 18.2 percent of the population. They were the third largest community after the Maronites and the Sunni.” From “Roots of the Shi’i Movement,” MERIP Reports, No. 133, June 1985, 12. 14 This census awarded Christians a slim 6:5 majority status over the combined populations of the Druze, Sunni, and Shia. 15 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, 17. 16 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, 17. 17 By 1975, more than 40 percent of Lebanon’s rural population had migrated to metropolitan areas, and in the Shiadominated south, the number reached higher than 60 percent. From Salim Nasr, “Roots of the Shi’i Movement,” MERIP Reports, No. 133, June 1985, 11. Munhofen 20 wanted to keep Lebanon allied with Western powers. The deployment of American Marines on Lebanese soil prevented the outbreak of a civil war—or at least delayed it until 1975. The uneasy peace between the Christians and the Muslims persisted into the 1960s and early 70s but the Shia remained relatively uninvolved in the affairs of state because of Christian-Sunni domination. Imam Musa al-Sadr (1928-1978?), a Shiite cleric from Iran but with ancestral ties to Lebanon, brought new hope to the Lebanese Shia. The first chapter of this work will briefly examine the role played by Imam Musa in the political awakening of the Lebanese Shia. In mid-1978, Imam Musa mysteriously disappeared after traveling to a conference in Libya. The Connection with Iran In the first chapter this essay will argue that the void left in Imam Musa’s absence was no sooner opened than filled by the rising star in the world of Shia politics—Ayatollah Khomeini. Like al-Sadr, Khomeini advocated Shiite political activism, but unlike the Lebanese imam, Khomeini insisted upon the necessity of armed rebellion against apostate governments, such as his own in Iran. Khomeini also asserted himself as the faqih, or leading jurist of the Muslim world. While some Lebanese considered Khomeini their spiritual guide, his vociferous attacks assailing the US and Israel, were not however, wholly accepted by those same followers. In 1978, when thousands of Israeli forces invaded south Lebanon and executed Operation Litani, few Shia actually resisted the ensuing occupation that lasted for nearly 100 days. Following the 1982 invasion of south Lebanon, however, Khomeini’s anti-Israeli rhetoric later garnered new meaning. Israel’s handling of the occupation provided real instances of what Khomeini deemed Zionist aggression against Islam. As a result of the occupation beginning in 1982, the Lebanese Shia developed an appreciation for Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology, especially his conception Munhofen 21 of velayet-e faqih [rule by the faqih, the leading Shiite jurisprudent], the oppressors versus the oppressed, and anti-Zionism. The Palestinian Presence and Israeli Military Occupation of South Lebanon In the second chapter, I will illustrate how the presence of Palestinian refugees and militiamen led to the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War and eventually, to the 1978 Israeli invasion of south Lebanon. In this way, I will construct a historical context that provides the reader with a familiarity of the situation in Lebanon, and particularly in the south, prior to extensive Israeli intervention. Following the 1948 War with Israel more than 100000 Palestinian refugees entered Lebanese territory.18 Thousands of more Palestinians came to Lebanon because of other Arab-Israeli conflicts, most notably the 1967 Six-Day War. With the heavy-handed defeat of the Arab coalition, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) continued the struggle against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories by way of attacks originating from the territories of other Arab states, such as Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. After developments in Jordan in 1970, the Palestinian fedayeen, or freedom fighters, migrated en masse to south Lebanon, where their resistance efforts resumed in full. Putting a strain on the Lebanese population by upsetting the delicate and fragile sectarian balance, the PLO clashed with Christian militias, and in 1975, these skirmishes led to the outbreak of a country-wide civil war. Although Syrian and Israeli intervention led to the cessation of hostilities, the underlying cause of the war, the PLO’s presence in and activities originating from south Lebanon, remained unresolved. As such, the PLO continued carrying out its resistance operations against Israel. 18 “The Palestinian Element,” A Country Study: Lebanon, Library of Congress Country Studies, 10 April 2010 <http://countrystudies.us/Lebanon/37.htm>. Munhofen 22 The Litani and Peace for Galilee Operations In the third and final chapter of this thesis, I will compare the 1978 Litani Operation with the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee and its subsequent occupation in order to explain how Israel’s occupation policies of the latter led to the emergence of Hizbollah. The IDF launched Operation Litani, which aimed to push the PLO northward and out of striking distance from Israel, because of the frequency of fedayeen attacks on Lebanese Christian enclaves and northern Israeli towns. With the exception of the PLO’s resistance to the invasion and short occupation, few Lebanese actually decried the Israeli intervention since many had grown wearisome of the ‘PLO attack and devastating Israeli reprisal’-trend. In spite of this operation and the subsequent deployment of the United Nations’ Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978, fedayeen attacks against Israel resumed once more. On 6 June 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee in an attempt to completely expel the PLO from south Lebanon. Although the IDF accomplished the stated goal of the operation, Israeli leadership determined that the prospect of a PLO renewal seemed possible and likely, and as a result, the IDF braced itself for a long-term occupation. The occupational policies of Israel indicated to the Lebanese, especially the Shia living in the south, that Israel had no intention of leaving Lebanese territory. In fact, Israel implemented practices more indicative of an annexation than a temporary occupation. In addition, the harsh tactics employed by the Israeli soldiers vilified their presence further in the eyes of the Lebanese. Hizbollah, the Islamic resistance to the occupatioin formed after the arrival of Persian Revolutionary Guardsmen who brought weapons and a radical Shiite ideology. Munhofen 23 The Current Scholarship on Hizbollah Well before Hizbollah’s infamous summer 2006 bout with Israel, scholars studying the Middle East have sought to better understand the Shiite demographic of Lebanon. As such, the ideas that Khomeini provided the ideological backbone to Hizbollah, the PLO’s presence in south Lebanon led to the Israeli invasions, and the harsh occupation policies of the IDF encouraged the emergence of a popular resistance are hardly new. In Joseph Alagha’s The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, he affirmed Khomeini’s ideological influence on Hizbollah, paying special attention to his conception of velayet-e faqih.19 In addition, Frederic C. Hof analyzed the Israel-Lebanon border in his Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984, and in doing so, he provided a history of the PLO in Lebanon. Finally, Augustus Richard Norton, who I have already cited in this introduction alone, has also researched Hizbollah and the Lebanese Shia extensively. In his seminal Hezbollah: A Short History, Norton acknowledged the critical role the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982 played in Hizbollah’s foundation and resistance activities.20 Clearly, I agree with Norton that the policies of the IDF prompted many Shia to take up arms and violently oppose the occupying force. Recently, in 2009, Israeli historian Eitan Azani authored an extensive account of Hizbollah’s history and ideology that included a discussion of both the influence of Khomeini and the 1982 Israeli occupation.21 In spite of the dearth of secondary sources on this subject, I did find areas where I may offer new analysis, and thus contribute to the scholarly community. 19 Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2006) 88-95. 20 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007) 79-82. 21 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, From Revolution to Institutionalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Munhofen 24 The Goals of this Thesis and My Original Contribution This thesis will answer three questions: 1. What specific tenets of Khomeini’s ideology did Hizbollah incorporate into its identity?; 2. How were the Shia affected by the presence of the PLO in Lebanon?; and 3. Why did a resistance movement against Israeli intervention in Lebanon develop after the 1982 occupation but not the 1978 Litani Operation? Within these three questions, I hope to provide my original contribution to the body of literature concerning Hizbollah’s origins. As mentioned previously, in the first chapter of this essay I will examine how Hizbollah fully incorporated Khomeini’s ideals into its character, giving the organization its distinctly Khoemini-Islamic leanings. Unlike the secondary sources I examined, I intend to delve deeper into Khomeini’s writings and compare them with statements made by actual Hizbollah officials, such as Naim Qassem (a founding member) and Hassan Nasrallah (the current Secretary-General of Hizbollah). In the second chapter, I intend to explain the importance of the Palestinian presence in south Lebanon in the lead up to the 1978 Litani Operation. According the Shia in Lebanon, the real blame for their substandard quality of life in the late 1970s was the PLO and its fedayeen forces, and the subsequent Israeli military forays into south Lebanon substantiated their growing disdain for the PLO. In addition, the PLO presence served as the single most important factor into the eventual Israeli occupation, and therefore, we must familiarize ourselves with situation in south Lebanon prior to 1978. For this chapter, I will contribute to existing scholarship by showing how Shia attitudes towards the PLO, which were once favorable, deteriorated even before the Litani Operation. In the third and final chapter, I will focus my attention on comparing the 1978 Litani Operation and 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee. Very little of the secondary literature approached a direct comparison of these two Israeli military campaigns. Furthermore, my emphasis on the specific occupation policies will Munhofen 25 offer a new perspective on how the 1982 occupation led to Hizbollah’s inception. Ultimately, this thesis will argue that a combination of influences, namely, Khomeini’s radical ideology, the PLO presence in south Lebanon, and the subjugation of the Lebanese Shia to the IDF’s harsh occupation policies, led to the formation of Hizbollah as a distinctly Shiite Islamic resistance movement. Munhofen 26 Chapter 1- From Imam Musa al-Sadr to Ayatollah Khomeini: The Development of the Theology of Revolutionary Islam and Its Vanguard I will begin this chapter with an introduction to the work of Imam Musa al-Sadr in south Lebanon during the 1960-70s. Imam Musa, as his followers knew him, promoted Shiite activism and inspired the Lebanese Shia to take charge of their own affairs. Unlike Arabists who sought drastic Lebanese regime change, Imam Musa aimed to work within the framework of the Lebanese government by establishing autonomous Shiite institutions that cooperated with the state but retained a Shiite distinctiveness. al-Sadr did not promote armed rebellion against the government but rather supported inter-community development with or without state resources. With a lack of state funds reaching the south,1 Imam Musa proved critical in establishing a network of charitable organizations that helped build the infrastructural needs of Shia-dominated towns. In addition, in terms of making concerted efforts to cooperate with the Lebanese government, Imam Musa created the Higher Shiite Islamic Council in 1969, which held the responsibility of administering to the religious affairs of the Shia community.2 The importance of the founding of this Council, especially in the context of a tradition of Shiite exclusion from Lebanese politics, cannot be overstated, since it provided the link between the weak Lebanese government and a significant portion of its citizenry that it had neglected for so long. Imam Musa continued to usher in a new era in sectarian Lebanese politics through further efforts, which attested to the increased activism within the Shiite community. In 1974, he 1 Augustus Richard Norton, “Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 482, November 1985, 111-112. 2 Augustus Richard Norton, “Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon,” 113. Munhofen 27 founded Harakat al-Mahruumin or the Movement of the Deprived in conjunction with a Greek Catholic archbishop. This political movement, though not a party, sought to bring greater socioeconomic prosperity to the poorest and underrepresented Lebanese citizens. 3 In 1975, Shia numbered nearly 750,000 or approximately 30 percent of the Lebanese population, arguably making it the largest sectarian group in Lebanon.4 Imam Musa furthered his efforts at improving the lot of the Shia by establishing a militia to supplement the Movement of the Deprived. This militia, called Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniyya or Amal, meaning hope in Arabic, defended the Shia areas of Lebanon. Shortly after Amal’s founding, civil war broke out in Lebanon pitting the Christian militias against the PLO and its contingent of supporters, which included a number of leftist-leaning militias. The experience of the Shia and Amal during the initial portion of the Lebanese Civil War will be described in greater detail in the second chapter of this work. In 1978, as the introduction mentioned, Imam Musa disappeared; nevertheless, his impact on the Lebanese Shia community was tantamount to the sect’s growing political activism. Furthermore, his establishment of a Shiite militia set a precedent from which Hizbollah later emerged: In order to defend themselves, their territory, and their religion, the Shia of Lebanon needed to take up arms. The strange disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr left a gaping void in the leadership of the Lebanese Shiite community. The timing of his disappearance, however, played well into the hands of the emerging leader of the global Shiite population—Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. This chapter will primarily focus on the ideology of Khomeini. In many ways, Khomeini put forth a new revolutionary ideology, with which, instead of encouraging cooperation with the Lebanese government, as al-Sadr did, he advocated armed revolution to 3 4 Salim Nasr 12. Salim Nasr 12. Munhofen 28 usher in a new Islamic form of governance. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini declared himself the Supreme Leader, thereby placing himself at the helm of his conception of Islamic government rooted in strict observance to sharia’, or Islamic law. His ideas concerning revolutionary Shiism served as the guiding light of the Islamic revolution in Iran; later, these ideas formed the backbone of Hizbollah’s political and religious ideology. According to future Secretary General of Hizbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, “It [Hizbollah] is the outcome of the will and decision of a group of Lebanese people who were inspired by Khomeini’s ideology, and who took advantage of the climate created by the Islamic Revolution.”5 As such, the Islamic Revolution in Iran represented a rare instance in the history of Shiism where the oppressed overthrew the yoke of the oppressors, and for many, it symbolized the triumph of Islam over the West.6 With Khomeini as its proclaimed faqih, Hizbollah ultimately sought replicate the revolutionary model of achievement in Iran by expelling the Israeli invaders and thereby ushering in an Islamic revolution in Lebanon. The Impact of Khoemini’s Ideology on Hizbollah Khomeini’s leadership and ideas resonated with the Lebanese Shia in particular because of their experience of multiple devastating Israeli invasions coupled with the inefficacy of the Lebanese government in providing security for its citizens. Because of Khomeini’s emphasis on ‘exporting the revolution,’ Iran sought to disseminate Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology in other centers of Shiism, Lebanon being one of these places.7 The Supreme Leader’s handicraft was obvious in Hizbollah’s 1985 Open Letter. This pronouncement cited various components of Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology, including: velayet-e faqih [rule by the leading jurisprudent], 5 Nicholas Noe, Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (London: Verso, 2007) 96. Eitan Azani 56. 7 Eitan Azani 41. 6 Munhofen 29 oppressors versus the oppressed, and anti-Zionism. An examination of these ideological principles demonstrates the extent to which Khomeini influenced Hizbollah. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the leadership of Khomeini, provided weapons and training to Shia militants prior to the official proclamation of Hizbollah’s existence. In this chapter, I will provide a biography of Khomeini in the context of the historical events of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In doing so, I intend to shed light upon the development of Khomeini’s theological and political ideology and the factors that influenced his thought. I will follow with an explanation of his ideas that featured prominently in Hizbollah’s early ideology and practice. At the conclusion of the chapter, the reader should have a clear understanding of the main tenets of Khomeini’s ideas that contributed to the emergence of Hizbollah, as well as Iran’s particular role in founding Hizbollah. Khomeini’s Early Life and Education Khomeini’s early life and religious studies played a critical role in the later development of his religious and political ideology. A descendent of the Prophet Muhammad by way of the seventh imam, Musa al-Kazim, Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was born in Khomeyn, Iran in 1902. As a child, Khomeini entered a maktab, or Shiite elementary school, where he began his Quranic education. Khomeini’s early education left an indelible mark upon the student: for instance, Baqer Moin noted the importance of the ‘black and white’ style of education Khomeini experienced while a youngster. Khomeini’s instructors taught him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, but with little emphasis on the areas of gray that cloud and complicate such a binary understanding of the world. In addition, a fundamentally Shiite version of history permeated the young boy’s lessons, and as such, Khomeini’s teachers made him well aware of Munhofen 30 the injustices endured by Shia for centuries, from the martyrdom of ‘Ali to the present state of affairs in Iran where Shia lived in destitution.8 As a result, Khomeini’s theological treatises that he wrote much later in life reflected an emphasis on identifying the perpetrators of the wrongs [the oppressors or mustakberin, which include the Western world and Israel] and those that have been victimized [the oppressed or mustazafin, which include Iran, Palestine, and Lebanon]. In addition to his prognosis of the ills ailing the Muslim world, Khomeini also prescribed a method by which these illnesses may be cured: Only by complete adherence to the principles of Islam. As maestro orchestrating the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini implemented this desgin. Prior to these ideological and historical developments, however, Khomeini sought to further his religious education by leaving Khomeyn to study under Sheikh Abdulkarim Haeri-Yazdi, an Ayatollah who left Najaf, Iraq for Arak, Iran following British colonization of Iraq.9 Formerly, Najaf, Iraq served as the center of Shiite learning in the Middle East, but the British mandate in Iraq forced many of Najaf’s leading clerics, who vociferously opposed Britain’s colonial ambitions, to flee to neighboring Iran. Ayatollah Haeri first settled in Arak, where Khomeini joined him in 1918. Years later Haeri, along with his pupil Khomeini, moved to Qom. While studying in Qom, Khomeini saw the small town grow to prominence as a center of rigorous learning filled with prominent Shia lecturers. Under Haeri’s guidance, Khomeini studied the Dars-e Kharej, or “studies beyond the text,” meaning that Khomeini reached a level of instruction where he no longer needed to read a set group of books in succession, but rather, he began to articulate his own legal opinions.10 In spite of his traditional focus on law and jurisprudence, Khomeini also devoted himself to Shiite mysticism. Khomeini noted that one of 8 Baqer Moin, et al., Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books Limited, 1988) 65-66. Ayatollah: “Derived from the terms ayat (sign, testimony, miracle, verses of the Qur’an) and Allah (God), ayatollah (Ar., ayatullah, sign of God) is an honorific title with hierarchical value in Twelver Shiism, bestowed by popular usage on outstanding mujtahids.” From Jean Calmard, et. al., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008) 257. 10 Baqer Moin 68. 9 Munhofen 31 his mystic instructors, Shahabadi, who disapproved of quietism—often termed taqiyya in some circles—and even joined the ranks of a small group of mullahs opposed to Reza Shah, held a strong influence on his own ideological development.11 At this point, Khomeini grew to develop his anti-secular tendencies, which may be due to his interactions with Shahabadi and others like him. During the 1930s Khomeini became a noted mujtahid teaching at the Qom Feyziyya School, located near the Shrine of Fatima, a popular point of pilgrimage. 12, 13 As a lecturer on the popular Thursdays and Fridays, Khomeini’s speeches on ethics and sharia’ law spread far beyond Qom and its environs. Khomeini attacked the reinstalled Shah of Iran and the mullahs who supported him by deeming both responsible for what he considered to be the moral degradation of his homeland.14 Khomeini’s assaults on the Shah and religious establishment brought him unwanted attention from the governmental authorities, forcing him to relocate to a more remote school until the Allies forced a temporary abdication of the Shah during World War II.15 In the midst of the Second World War and with the Shah deposed, Khomeini authored his first political and theological treatise—Revelation of the Secrets. The Revelation of the Secrets In response to growing secularism and anti-clerical sentiment as expressed by Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh’s The Secrets of a Thousand Years in 1943, Khomeini authored his first 11 For a thorough explanation on Khomeini’s mystic tendencies, see Moin 46-51. Heinz Halm 142. 13 A mujtahid is a Muslim scholar who uses analytical reasoning, or ijtahid, to interpret the Quran, Sunna of the Prophet, or Hadith. 14 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was reinstalled as the Shah of Iran in 1941. 15 Baqer Moin 77. 12 Munhofen 32 publication that same year under the title Kashf al-asrar, or Revelation of the Secrets.16 In The Secrets of a Thousand Years Hakamizadeh assailed the Iranian ulema, or religious scholars, for encouraging Iranians to believe in fantastical superstitions and in doing so, the religious scholars ensured their retention of influence and power.17 In Revelation, responded to Hakamizadeh’s criticism and defended the necessity of the ulema in preserving Iran’s distinct religious character. Khomeini did not focus on criticizing or lampooning the Shah; rather, he attacked the West, who he deemed responsible for Iran’s irreligiousness. Khomeini denounced calls for the constitutional system of governance in Iran as a means through which the West may strengthen its hold on the East. His condemnation of the West as the source of society’s ills became a hallmark of his later pronouncements, and as will be explained later, composed a critical component of Hizbollah’s ideology as well. Furthermore, Khomeini argued against Western-style constitutionalism by claiming Western legislative assemblies produce defective law, largely due to the absence of an Islamic influence on the law-making process. As a result, he reasoned that in the West, “the government acts against the interests of the people, and the country, bypassing laws according to their own flawed judgment.”18 With this in mind, Khomeini followed with a spirited defense of Islamic governance, or government: “Government can only be legitimate when it accepts the rule of God and the rule of God means the implementation of the Sharia.”19 He continued to construct what an Islamic government would look like: The establishment of a council [majlis] to set up a government or change a regime. The council would consist of the exalted and just fuqaha [jurists] and mullahs, who, with fairness and cooperation and piety and without motives of personal interest and appetite, would deliberate on the election of a sultan for the benefit of the country and the people, and then will choose a just sultan who will 16 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000) 104. 17 Vanessa Martin 104. 18 Ruhollah Khomeini in Vanessa Martin 106. 19 Ruhollah Khomieni in Baqer Moin 80. Munhofen 33 respect the laws of Islam, the laws of the land, which are based on the divine law.20 Khomeini also added that a strong central state, bolstered by a large and capable military, undoubtedly enhanced the effectiveness of the state in preserving adherence to Islamic law. His most vociferous attacks against the Shah’s regime came later, as did a more developed political and theological ideology. Following publication of the Revelation of the Secrets, Khomeini returned to Qom, where he became a popular lecturer, drawing hundreds of students from Iran and abroad to his lessons. By the end of the 1950s, most considered Khomeini an influential cleric with a large and loyal following, although he remained largely apolitical at this time. It was not until 1963 that Khomeini revisited a politicized interpretation of Islam. Khomeini’s Response to the White Revolution In 1963 the Shah of Iran, introduced a series of reforms, which included the creation of the Literacy Corps and drastic land redistribution, in an effort intended to modernize Iran. When grouped together, the Shah officially dubbed these reforms the ‘Revolution of the People and the Shah,’ but because few Iranians actually supported the Shah’s efforts, the name never stuck. Instead these changes became known as the ‘White Revolution’ since the Shah intended these ‘improvements’ to be implemented without bloodshed. To the Shah’s disappointment, his opponents decried the autocratic method of the Shah in forcing these reforms on his people, who already held disdain for the man.21 Iran’s clergy led the opposition to the Shah’s ‘White Revolution,’ and Khomeini vociferously denounced the reforms as another example of the 20 Ruhollah Khomeini in Vanessa Martin 108. Peter Avery, ed., et al., The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic (New York: Cambridge UP, 1991) 279. 21 Munhofen 34 Shah’s disregard for the condition of Iranian citizens.22 In a sermon on 3 June 1963, Khomeini derided the Shah by comparing him to a parasite when the cleric said: And those who have filled foreign banks with the wealth produced by the toil of our poverty-stricken people, who have erected towering palaces but still will not leave the people in peace, wishing to fill their own pockets and those of Israel with our resources – they are not parasites? Let the world judge, let the nation judge who the parasites are!23 A day later, the Shah’s authorities arrested Khomeini and took him to Tehran. The Shah’s opponents, further emboldened by his detainment of Khomeini and disparaging attacks against the ulema, took to the streets and protested against the Shah’s government on the Shiite holiday of Ashura.24 Iranian authorities released Khomeini in August 1963, only to imprison him again in October of that same year. After his second release in May 1964—at which time his name was known throughout Iran—Khomeini continued his attacks against the Shah and the government’s plans to strengthen ties to the United States via an arms sales agreement. As an unabashed opponent of the Shah and his strong ties to the West, Khomeini became the spiritual guide of a Muslim community growing increasingly hostile to the West’s continued involvement in the domestic politics of the Muslim world. Seeking to prevent further sedition against the Shah and his Western allies, the Iranian government exiled Khomeini from Iran. After a short stay in Turkey, Khomeini eventually settled in neighboring Iraq in the holy Shiite city of Najaf, where a shrine to ‘Ali is located.25 22 Peter Avery 281. Peter Avery 281. 24 “the Shah went to Qum, where he denounced the religious authorities as ‘Black reactionaries’ and as Sodomites and agents of the British.” From The Cambridge History of Iran, 281. 25 Heinz Halm 7. 23 Munhofen 35 The Imam in Exile Ultimately, the Shah’s attempt to silence Khomeini or restrict his influence failed. While in Najaf, Khomeini’s students compiled a collection of their lecture notes and wrote his second major piece on the intersection of Islam and politics. This treatise, Hokumat-e eslami or Islamic Government, consisted of a series of lectures that Khomeini gave in January and February 1970. While in exile, Khomeini’s views on the make-up of a government in accordance with sharia’ law developed and matured significantly, since at this juncture, Khomeini demanded that the powers of the government belong in the hands of the ulema.26 In his defense of Islamic government, Khomeini introduces his conception of velayet-e faqih, or rule by the leading jurisprudent, a topic that will be covered shortly. Furthermore, Khomeini devoted a portion of his polemic to assail what he considered Western imperialism and oppressive involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. According to Khomeini, the West and its puppet the Shah actively sought to curb the influence of the Muslim religious leaders by way of promoting secularism in the form of a separation of religion from government. For instance, Khomeini wrote: This slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists…These slogans and claims have been advanced by the imperialists and their political agents in order to prevent religion from ordering the affairs of this world and shaping Muslim society, and at the same time to create a rift between the scholars of Islam, on the one hand, and the masses and those struggling for freedom and independence, on the other.27 In the opinion of Khomeini, the West’s conception of secularism ultimately held the blame for the exclusion of Islamic principles from the Shah’s government. Therefore, the problems in Iran resulted not just from the Shah’s policies of reform but also the West’s influence on the Shah and ability to manipulate domestic politics within Iran for its own benefit. Khomeini implored the 26 Cheryl Bernard and Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Government of God”: Iran’s Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia UP, 1984) 39. 27 Heinz Halm 145. Munhofen 36 Iranian government to reject or at the very least curb the influence of the West and embrace Islam as the only path to righteousness. Khomeini’s attacks against the Shah, the West, and secularism did not cease in the wake of the publication of Islamic Government, which few people outside of Khomeini’s close circle of followers actually read. Rather Khomeini continued his offensive against the Shah via fatwas, or religious edicts, denouncing what he considered to be the Shah’s most egregious policies. For instance, Khomeini continued to assail the Shah’s close relationship with the West, who provided Iran’s SAVAK intelligence service with the weapons used for espionage and torture, and also the Shah’s heretical worship of himself.28, 29 Perhaps the Shah’s claim of receiving “messages and visions from the prophets, from Imam Ali and from God Himself” were a veiled attempt at legitimizing the Shah’s own claim to religious authority.30 In addition, the Shah declared all political parties other than his own Resurgence Party illegal in 1975. With each of the Shah’s encroachments, Khomeini led the charge in condemning such acts and declarations. Khomeini issued a fatwa effectively banning all Muslims from joining the Shah’s political party because, according to Khomeini, the Resurgence Party represented a dangerous threat aimed at eradicating Islam in Iran.31 As the Shah sought to enact his sweeping reforms more fully, Khomeini’s pronouncements against him became more pointed and aggressive. He demanded the Shah hand the government over to the mullahs, since they possessed the religious understanding and authority that the Shah so clearly lacked. Furthermore, Khomeini’s students began to notice a change in their leader: His focus shifted from religious to political aspirations, and as a result of 28 Note: Sazman-i Amniyyat Va Ettele’at-i Keshvar (SAVAK) was the Shah’s secret police agency notorious for its actions in suppressing political dissidence, domestic espionage, and cooperation with the US Central Intelligence Agency and Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency. 29 A.J. Langguth, “Torture’s Teachers,” New York Times, 11 June 1979, p. A19. 30 Con Coughlin, Khomeini’s Ghost: The Iranian Revolution and the Rise of Militant Islam (New York: Harper Collins, 2009) 131. 31 Con Coughlin 130-133. Munhofen 37 his vociferous edicts decrying the Shah, he became the Shah’s most feared opponent and political rival.32 Khomeini’s Ties to Lebanon In addition to his political ambitions, Khomeini developed a personal relationship with Lebanese Shia during his tenure in Najaf, where a large contingent of Lebanese Shia studied sharia’, the lasting consequence of which was Khomeini sending Revolutionary Guardsmen— who trained Hizbollah’s first militants—to south Lebanon in June 1982.33 Khomeini fostered a friendship with Imam Musa after al-Sadr’s niece married the Ayatollah’s youngest son, Ahmad. Khomeini even once said of Imam Musa, who was decades younger than the Ayatollah, “I can say that I nearly raised him.”34 Additionally, one of al-Sadr’s most trusted assistants, Mustafa Chamran, also befriended Khomeini and became a founding member of the Revolutionary Guards at the conclusion of the Islamic Revolution.35 As the friendship between Khomeini and al-Sadr strengthened, the Imam took up the cause of Khomeini, and in effect, became another vehement clerical critic of the Shah.36 As a highly influential Shiite in Lebanon, al-Sadr’s support for Khomeini ensured that other Lebanese Shia followed his lead even after al-Sadr’s disappearance. South Lebanon’s ties to Iran and Khomeini in particular deepened as it became a haven for Iranian dissidents opposed to the Shah, and young Iranians even trained with the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) while there. The sincere friendship between Khomeini and Imam Musa was evident after al-Sadr’s disappearance: When Imam Musa’s luggage arrived in Rome 32 Con Coughlin 118-120. Joseph Alagha 34. 34 Ruhollah Khomeini in Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986) 196. 35 Con Coughlin 135. 36 Fouad Ajami 194-195. 33 Munhofen 38 following his supposed departure from Libya, investigators found an unmailed letter addressed to Khomeini.37 In addition, a Kuwaiti newspaper dubiously reported that al-Sadr left Libya only to arrive in Iran. Furthermore, “The newspaper said As-Sadr had sneaked into Iran because the shah had withdrawn his Iranian passport because of his hostile attitude toward the regime in Tehran and his overt sympathy with religious leaders and Shi’ite sect there.”38 Whether or not Imam Musa actually arrived in Iran remains mere speculation today; however, Imam Musa’s solidarity with Khomeini rang loud and clear, and as a result, such a story was plausible because of the strength of the al-Sadr and Khomeini friendship. In addition, the entrance of popularly respected Imam Musa into the struggle against the Shah represented a critical victory for Khomeini and the Shah’s opponents who needed resources from outside Iran to fuel an uprising. Later on, the bedrock of this friendship made it possible for Khomeini to export his revolutionary ideology to Lebanon following his rise to the position of Supreme Leader. Furthermore, the budding friendship, though cut short by al-Sadr’s disappearance, left a lasting impact on Lebanese Shia: “Side by side in the Shia parts of Lebanon were posters of Ayatollah Khomeini and of the younger cleric [Imam Musa].”39 As a charismatic Shiite leader, Khomeini filled the void left by Imam Musa’s disappearance as evidenced by the acceptance and implementation of the Ayatollah’s revolutionary ideology by the Shiite community of Lebanon. The 1979 Revolution in Iran According to most scholars of the Islamic Revolution, the accepted starting date for the events that culminated in the return of Khomeini to Iran was 6 January 1978.40 On this date, an 37 Fouad Ajami 196. “Kuwaiti Paper Reports Imam As-Sadr in Iran,” translated from Arabic, Sana, 13 September 1978. 39 “Kuwaiti Paper Reports Imam As-Sadr in Iran” 196. 40 Peter Avery 292. 38 Munhofen 39 article appeared in the daily Persian newspaper Ettela’at disputing Khomeini’s pedigree and true intentions by claiming him “as being the son of a trader of Indian origin and an agent of colonialism.”41 The article incited violent protests in Qom, where Khomeini’s supporters clashed with the Shah’s army, leaving six dead.42 After Qom, the protests, which began as a reaction to a xenophobic article, “quickly snowballed into a nationwide popular revolt against the regime” leaving dozens of dead in its wake.43 Each protest was followed by a mourning ceremony every 40 days, effectively ensuring constant anti-Shah activities.44 At a demonstration in Jaleh Square, Tehran on 8 September, the Iranian military shot into a crowd killing hundreds of protestors. In an effort to curb the influence of Khomeini, the Shah’s regime pressured the Iraqi government to force Khomeini’s departure from Iran. Khomeini’s exile to France was short-lived—he stayed only a couple of months—but he still managed to continue assailing the Shah and demanding his abdication. On 16 January 1979, Khomeini received his wish when Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fled the country. Shortly thereafter, on 1 February, the Ayatollah returned to Tehran, determined to establish his particular version of Islamic government.45 Upon his return to Iran, Khomeini set about the task of constructing the Islamic Republic under the authority of his concept of velayet-e faqih, or governmental rule by the leading jurisprudent—and in the Iranian case, this leading jurisprudent was Khomeini. A March 1979 referendum calling for the establishment of an Islamic regime passed with a vote of 98.2 percent in favor.46 Although the referendum likely did not actually garner support from such a high percentage of Iranians, Khomeini lauded the passage of the referendum when he announced: 41 Vanessa Martin 149. Baqer Moin 89. 43 Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006) 215. 44 Vanessa Martin 149. 45 Heinz Halm 150. 46 According to the New York Times, 14 million minorities lived in Iran, and therefore, composed more than a third of the total population of 38 million. At the time of the referendum, minorities in Iran protested and called for 42 Munhofen 40 I declare the Islamic republic of Iran on this auspicious day, the day of the nation’s leadership and the day of the triumph and victory for the nation. I declare to the world that a referendum such as this is unprecedented in the history of Iran, which witnessed the entire nation rushing to the ballot box with enthusiasm and fervor, casting its (affirmative vote?), and burying the satanic regime in the annals of history forever. I admire this peerless solidarity which comprised all but a handful of adventure-seeking individuals who are unmindful of God and [words indistinct], and cast affirmative votes nearly unanimously for the Islamic republic, and thus proved their political and social maturity to the East and West.47 In the same month, supporters of clerical leadership of the Iranian government created the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). With nearly unanimous support for Islamic government, a draft constitution was submitted for review of the Assembly of Experts, a body dominated by clerics, in June.48 At the same time, the concept of rule of the leading jurisprudent gained supporters. As a result, the Experts transformed the document, which “failed to mention the implementation of Islamic law and granted no specific role to the jurists,” so as to include Khomeini’s conception of velayet-e faqih and increased clerical oversight of all government activities.49 In early December, a referendum approved the new constitution, which referred to Khomeini as the Grand Ayatollah, thus deeming him the leading jurisprudent or faqih. Velayet-e Faqih Perhaps the most lasting of Ayatollah Khomeini’s theological interpretations of Islamic leadership, his understanding velayet-e faqih laid the groundwork from which all of his later ideas drew their justification. Without his assertion that that the leading jurisprudent is Allah’s representative on Earth, Khomeini’s other edicts would lack the necessary legitimacy for their dissemination and implementation. Therefore, as the faqih, Khomeini possessed sweeping greater autonomy than what was stipulated by the government. With these sentiments in mind, the 98.2 percent support for the Islamic government was unlikely. From Gregory Jaynes, “Khomeini Declares Victory in Vote for a ‘Government of God’ in Iran,” New York Times, 2 April 1979, p.6. 47 “Khomeyni Proclaims Islamic Republic,” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa, 2 April 1979, p. R7. 48 Again, the notion of unanimous support was dubious because of uprisings occurring in minority areas of Iran. 49 Vanessa Martin 158. Munhofen 41 powers making him capable of fully integrating his interpretation of sharia’ within Iranian law. In a sense, velayet-e faqih is the necessary starting point for an explanation of Khomeini’s views as it forms the basis of his own authority. For the purposes of this paper, Khomeini’s conception of velayet-e faqih was particularly important because it permitted him to claim guardianship over the worldwide Shiite community. Therefore, in order to consolidate his own authority in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini ensured the inclusion of his rendering of velayet-e faqih in the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this document, The 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran read: In keeping with the principles of governance and the permanent necessity of leadership, the Constitution provides for the establishment of leadership by a faqih possessing the necessary qualifications and recognized as leader by the people…Such leadership will prevent any deviation by the various organs of government from their essential Islamic duties.50 Clearly, as the spiritual and political guide of his people and country, the faqih possessed sweeping powers, capabilities, and influence. However, one must ask, who is the faqih, and what are his characteristics and responsibilities? Finally, what is the faqih’s relationship with Hizbollah? According to Khomeini’s lectures on Islam and Revolution, the faqih is an individual possessing knowledge of Islamic law and justice. As mentioned in the introduction, Twelver Shia believe the twelfth imam lives in occultation until his return with Jesus to usher in the final judgment. Before his return, however, representatives of Allah must lead the community. For Khomeini, this leader is the faqih. As a just man with exceptional knowledge and understanding of sharia’, he may establish and serve as the chief administrator of a government. In a sense, the faqih has authority over all affairs, whether religious, social, economic, etc. Khomeini’s understanding of the role of the faqih stemmed from the writings of Mulla Ahmad Naraqi who 50 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hamid Algar, trans. (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1980) 20-21. Munhofen 42 considered the faqih to possess nearly the same powers as the Prophet and first eleven Imams.51 Under his rendering of Islamic government, the faqih “will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger… in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him.”52 As the most learned jurist of the umma, the faqih becomes the guardian of the entire Muslim community. In this case Khomeini, asserted himself as the most learned and educated Shiite imam, and as the spiritual guide of the Islamic Revolution, a capable one at that. The ability of Khomeini to rally millions of Iranians to forcibly overthrow the Shah only added to his popularity and legitimacy. Unlike Shiite leaders of the past who practiced taqiyya and promoted quietist political programs, Khomeini urged drastic action.53 In his interpretation of velayet-e faqih, Khomeini did not envision a limited jurisdiction of the faqih; rather, he understood the faqih to be God’s representative on earth, with authority over all Muslims. This conception, coupled with his own legitimacy, proved critical in his efforts to establish ties to Shia political movements elsewhere. As a result, his rulings and pronouncements should, theoretically, not only apply to Iranians, but also Shia Muslims living in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. The leaders of Hizbollah understood their role under the faqih, and declared “The Jurist-Theologian’s native land has no relation to the scope of his dominion.”54 In the specific example of Hizbollah, to be examined below, Khomeini’s influence was clear in statements and documents made by Hizbollah officials. Members of Hizbollah mentioned Khomeini’s conception of velayet-e faqih on numerous occasions and affirmed his spiritual and political authority over them. In this way, Hizbollah was and remains a distinct Shiite Islamic group because of its proclaimed allegiance to Khomeini. 51 Vanessa Martin 117. Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, Hamid Algar, trans. (Tehran: Mizan Press, 1981) 62. 53 Taqqiya is a Shiite principle whereby one may conceal one’s faith if the revelation of such information would put that person in danger of injury or death. 54 Naim Qassem 55. 52 Munhofen 43 Sunni fundamentalist groups, such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad in Palestine, opposed to Israeli occupation do not consider Khomeini their spiritual leader. Hizbollah’s devotion to Khomeini was obvious in its 1985 Open Letter to All the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World. In the document, the author refers to the leading jurisprudent or Khomeini’s velayet-e faqih on four occasions within the first section entitled “Who are we, and what is our identity?” In the first instance, the letter refers to Khomeini specifically as it reads, “We…abide by the orders of a single wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent, currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah Ruhallah al-Musawi al-Khumayni…who has detonated the Muslim’s revolution, and who is brining about the glorious Islamic renaissance!”55 From here, the letter reaffirms the legitimate claim of the faqih to the legal guardianship the Muslim community, and as a result, his edicts constituted a source of emulation from which Hizbollah sought to carry out its objectives. The leaders of Hizbollah, however, did not blindly follow the direction of a Persian imam. Naim Qassem, an early founder of Hizbollah, explained that guardianship of the leading jurist was essential for the continuation of Islam, since “It is not possible to achieve Islam’s large-scale project through individual initiatives or detached programmes.”56 For Hizbollah, the guardianship of Khomeini was absolutely necessary for carrying out its stated goals of ending the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon. Khomeini sent approximately 1000 Revolutionary Guards to south Lebanon for the purpose of establishing a Shiite resistance militia.57 Not only did Khomeini provide leadership for the world’s Shia, but he also supplied the resources necessary for achieving the stated objectives of revolutionary Shia groups. Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the 55 “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world,” trans. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2006) 224. 56 Naim Qassem 52. 57 Nicholas Noe 26. Munhofen 44 current Secretary-General of Hizbollah described the influence of Khomeini on the creation of Party of God: Iranian revolutionary guards arrived in the Bekaa upon the orders of Imam alKhomeini, and the faithful were to adequately confront the new challenge facing Lebanon. This current was to have a clear Islamist political vision, and operate through a consistent ideology based on the principles and political line of Imam al-Khomeini, and according to the principle of wilayat al-faqih [the Arabic rendering of the concept] in which we believe. This is how Hezbollah [sic] came to be.58 That interview, taken in 1985, differs little from an interview granted by Nasrallah in 1996 with the newspaper Nida Al-Watan. In this interview, Nasrallah reaffirmed Khomeini’s interpretation of velayet-e faqih when he explained, “From the very beginning, we believed in the wilayat alfaqih, the guiding supreme leader as someone who can lead the Islamic nation towards regaining its identity, its existence as an entity, and its self-esteem.”59 Clearly, Khomeini’s leadership, as defined by velayet-e faqih, constituted an integral component of Hizbollah’s ideology and practice. With his guardianship firmly in place, Khomeini’s other ideological positions penetrated the core of Hizbollah’s initial program of resistance. The Oppressors versus The Oppressed Like the Shia of Lebanon, the majority of the Shia of Iran at the mid-twentieth century was impoverished, uneducated, and pious. Similarly, a large sector of the Iranian population lived in rural areas and relied on unprofitable subsistence farming. The Shah enacted land reform policies in the 1960s that detrimentally affected these small-scale farmers. In an effort to introduce capitalist style agribusiness in the countryside, the Iranian state evicted peasant 58 59 Nicholas Noe 26. Nicholas Noe 133. Munhofen 45 landowners and consolidated their former holdings under large agricultural corporations.60 The consequences incurred by the Shah’s land reforms pushed the landless and jobless Iranian peasantry out of the countryside and into cities, in similar fashion to the way Lebanese Shia flocked to Beirut as mentioned in the introduction. This addition of unneeded labor to the nation’s capital in Tehran made matters worse in the already burgeoning slums of the urban unemployed. Panah noted the pervasive poverty afflicting Iran: “By the mid-1970s Tehran contained around 50 slums and squatter communities, and by 1979 an estimated total of almost 1.5 million lived under such conditions.”61 The New York Times ran a piece on the deplorable conditions of slums by describing the home of Hussein, a day laborer: He cannot afford private medical care, so he spends his days in his hut, visibly fading away. On a recent morning, the frail, slight Hussein sat on a filthy mattress pressed into a corner, looking, at 43 years of age, at least 65. He watched his wife brew tea in the 10-by-12-foot room, one of the two they share with a son aged 22, two daughters aged 9 and 7, and his mother-in-law. The mud hut is roofed with straw and has no electricity, windows, running water or sewers.62 The government’s efforts to displace the urban slums inflamed and embittered the destitute citizens, and violent clashes between state authorities and residents became commonplace in the 1970s. Under the tutelage of Khomeini, this sector of society, which Khomeini deemed the oppressed or mustazafin, became his most devoted followers and most violent opponents of the Shah. The experience of the mustazafin forms the historical backdrop from which Khomeini’s conception of the oppressors, the mustakberin, versus the mustazafin. According to Khomeini, the world is divided into two warring groups, the mustakberin and the mustazafin, oftentimes translated as the downtrodden. The mustakberin, represented by 60 Maryam Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution (New York: Pluto, 2007) 27. 61 Ruhollah Khomeini in Maryam Panan 29. 62 Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Reporter’s Notebook: Iran as Viewed From Bazaar, Campus, Slum, and Prison,” New York Times, 4 December 1978, p. A3. Munhofen 46 the western imperial powers and their non-western cohorts, such as the Shah, exploited the resources, both human and material, of the non-western world in order to assert and maintain dominance. The Shah’s policies alienated large sectors of the Iranian population, and Khomeini used the Shah’s unpopular reform programs as a basis for criticizing the Shah and his western supporters. Khomeini explained the work of the mustakberin: The agents and servants of imperialism know that if the people of the world, particularly the young and educated generation, become acquainted with the sacred principles of Islam, the downfall and annihilation of the imperialists will be inevitable and also the liberation of the resources of exploited nations and peoples from their control.63 Essentially, Khomeini claimed the ills affecting the Muslim world and Iran in particular were not necessarily the fault of Muslims; instead, the destitution and poverty characteristic of Tehran’s slums resulted from the Shah’s close relationship with and reliance on the west. Khomeini termed the unnecessary and ultimately cancerous influence of the west Westoxication, or Gharbzadegi.64 In his portrayal of the oppressors versus the oppressed model, Khomeini identified the causes of discontent in the Muslim world- the West. As a result, the revolution in Iran did not merely represent a coup d'état removing the Shah from power, but a complete rejection of the west and all its influence. For many pious Muslims, the Islamic Revolution marked a fulfillment of the Quranic verse, which reads, “And we wish to show favor to those who have been oppressed upon earth, and to make them leaders and inheritors.”65 Khomeini’s worldview, as expressed in his concept of the mustazafin versus the mustakberin, takes a prominent role in Hizbollah’s ideological framework and justification for its 63 Maryam Panah 39-40. This is a term borrowed from one of Khomeini’s peers, Al-e Ahmad, authored a book entitled Gharbzadegi in 1962. In the opening of the book, he wrote: “I say that Gharbzadegi is like cholera. It this seems distasteful, I could say it’s like heatstroke or frostbite….In any case, we’re talking about a disease. A disease that comes from without, fostered in an environment made for breeding diseases.” From: Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi [Weststruckness], trans. John Green (Lexington: Mazdâ, 1982) 11. 65 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 20. 64 Munhofen 47 actions. Like Khomeini, Hizbollah’s founders viewed the world as a battleground pitting the oppressors against the oppressed. Naim Qassem described the mustakberin and their intentions when he wrote, “Their basic vision is confined to personal interests and aspirations from life, even where such ambitions may lead to corruption, individual or community diversion from the correct path, oppression, killing or violation of other individuals’ rights.”66 The oppressors, the most powerful of which included the US, Soviet Union, and Israel, used their economic, political, and military capabilities to extenuate their domination over the weak. In terms of economic exploitation, the Open Letter, which was addressed to the mustazafin, read, “We reject both the USSR and the US, both Capitalism and Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations of a just society.”67 Hizbollah attacks the US in particular, claiming the US is the primary origin of oppression. Citing Khomeini as Hizbollah’s inspirational leader, the Letter continued, “Imam Khumayni has stressed time and again that America is behind all our catastrophes, and it is the mother of all vice…When we fight it, we only exercise our legitimate right of defending our Islam and the dignity of our umma.”68 Khomeini’s imprint on Hizbollah’s ideology was unmistakable. As the militia representing and protecting the oppressed in Lebanon, Hizbollah defended against what they deemed the imperialist forces attacking the Shiite community in south Lebanon. Whereas the mustakberin were idolatrous and self-serving, the mustazafin were “The believers in God who go through life as a trail leading to the hereafter…suffer loss as a result of adhering to their obligations and being indifferent to whims. There is therefore no need for oppression, tyranny and aggression, for these only bear temporary results.”69 However, as the 66 Naim Qassem 35. “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world” 230. 68 “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world” 225. 69 Naim Qassem 36. 67 Munhofen 48 Islamic Revolutionary in Iran showed, the mustazafin no longer needed to accept the oppression levied by the apostate governments of the world. Rather, the mustazafin must “refuse and confront oppression, and to struggle with their inner selves towards the victory of virtue, justice, human rights and uprightness.”70 In this way, Hizbollah became the party of the Lebanese mustazafin in that it sought to eliminate Western influence in and the Israeli occupation. Anti-Zionism In the same vein of his explanation of a world divided between the oppressors and the oppressed, Khomeini deemed Israel a bastion of tyranny and apostasy because of its occupation of predominantly Muslim countries like Palestine, Syria, and Egypt. For Khomeini, Israel represented a prime example of the abusive power of the mustakberin. In spite of those countries’ Arab and Sunni majority population, Khomeini took the side of Palestine and railed against Israel, who he saw as a creation of the US manifestation of the West within the Muslim world.71 Similar to his worldview, Khomeini’s opposition to Zionism and Israel stemmed from real world events occurring inside Iran. Under Shah Muhammad Reza, Iran and Israel developed close ties as non-Arab nations in the Middle East. Nixon’s foreign policy in the Middle East, in fact, stressed the strategic importance of the Twin Pillars, Israel and Iran, both of which stood at opposite ends of the region.72 In 1950, the Shah granted Israel de facto recognition by allowing Israel to establish a consulate in the country. Although Iran did not issue Israel the de jure recognition for which David Ben Gurion yearned, Iran-Israeli relations deepened in other areas; namely, Israel’s reported involvement in setting up the Shah’s notorious security apparatus, 70 Naim Qassem 36. A history of conflict pervaded the interactions between Persians and Arabs. 72 Trita Parsi, “Israel and the Origins of Iran’s Arab Option: Dissection of a Strategy Misunderstood,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 2006: 495. 71 Munhofen 49 SAVAK, and the sale of Iranian oil to Israel.73 Iran’s public dealings with Israel infuriated Arab leaders, even causing the severance of relations between Iran and Egypt prior to the 1967 ArabIsraeli War. In spite of the Shah’s efforts to ameliorate Persian-Arab relations following the end of the 1967 war, his unwillingness to denounce Israel and fully support the Arab and specifically Palestinian side provoked attacks by the ulema, including Khomeini. Khomeini’s constant charge that Israel sought to eliminate Islam formed the basis of his criticism of the Shah’s relations with Israel. As early as 1962, prior to Khomeini’s exile from Iran and publication of Hokumat-e eslami, Khomeini remarked, “It should be realized that many sensitive positions are in the hands of Israeli agents. The danger of Israel to Islam and Iran is very real; a pact with Israel in opposition to the Islamic governments has either been made or will be made.”74 Though his remarks seem clouded by paranoia of an Israeli conspiracy to infiltrate the Shah’s regime, Khomeini maintained his determined skepticism of Israeli-Persian relations well before the Islamic Revolution. In another speech, he warned governments, especially those whose dominion extended over Muslims of the Israeli threat: I have repeatedly cautioned governments, and especially the Iranian government, against Israel and its dangerous agents This source of corruption which has settled in the heart of the Islamic countries under the protection of the great powers, and whose tentacles of corruption threaten the Islamic countries every day, should be uprooted through the efforts of Islamic countries and the great nations of Islam. Israel is engaged in armed aggression against the Islamic countries and it is incumbent upon the governments and nations of Islam to eradicate it.75 Before the Revolution, Khomeini’s statements urged action on the behalf of Muslims to eliminate the Zionist threat. However, in a position of exile, with little resources at his disposal to activity resist Israel, Khomeini’s arsenal was limited to statements and exhortations. However, 73 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) 156-157. 74 The Imam Versus Zionism (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1983) 17. 75 The Imam Versus Zionism 21. Munhofen 50 with his authority drastically enhanced after the passage of the Constitution at the end of 1979, Khomeini placed further emphasis on opposing Israel, but this time, however, Khomeini possessed personal army in the form of the Revolutionary Guards, or Pasdaran. After the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini took a number of steps to actively oppose Israel and Zionism. He replaced the Israeli consulate with an outpost of the PLO. In order to further his opposition to Zionism and Israel, he founded Al-Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, to be celebrated by Muslims the world over on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan. According to Khomeini, Al-Quds Day is an opportunity for the mustazafin to “rise up and defeat the oppressors as Iran did, and will continue to do. They (the oppressed nations) must rise up and dispose of this source of corruption (Israel).”76 Of critical importance in the pre-revolution statements of Khomeini was his unabashed support of armed aggression against Israel. In the wake of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini began a concerted effort to lead in the fight against Israel. After a 1979 meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister, Khomeini called for the creation of a Hizb Al-Mustazafin, or Party of the Oppressed, which he also referred to as the Hizb Allah, or Party of God.77 He urged Muslims to resist the Israeli occupation of Muslim lands, and upon Israel’s invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, and Khomeini saw Lebanon as a nation in direct conflict with Israel, reeling from its own battle with Zionism and in dire need of assistance and security. Because of Israel’s occupational policies and practices—which will be examined in the third chapter—Lebanese Shia grew antagonistic towards the IDF in the south. Their articulation of their disdain for the IDF was markedly similar to the language Khomeini uses, even referring to Israel as an oppressor. For instance, the Open Letter declared Israel to be the “vanguard of the 76 77 The Imam Versus Zionism 39. The Imam Versus Zionism 40. Munhofen 51 United States in our Islamic world” after having already deemed the US as the most powerful and oppressive regime in the world. 78 In the Open Letter, one can clearly see the influence of Khomeini as it reads, “It [Israel] is the hated enemy that must be fought until the hated ones get what they deserve. This enemy is the greatest danger to our future generations and to the destiny of our lands.”79 Hizbollah’s founders considered Israel the greatest threat posed against Muslims, much in the same way Khomeini characterized Israel. Similarly, Hizbollah implored, as did Khomeini, “all the Muslims in the world to share, with their brothers in Lebanon, the honour of fighting against the occupying Zionists, either directly by supporting the mujahidin (Hizbullah’s freedom fighters) because it is the direct responsibility of all the Muslims to do so.”80 In a sense, Hizbollah represented the manifestation of Khomeini’s anti-Zionist principles in that the group not only espoused his ideology but it undertook armed resistance in a way that Iran could not. Conclusion The future Supreme Leader of Iran grew up and studied during a period of increased activity between followers of divergent religious and political persuasions. Through his experience as a scholar of Islamic law and citizen under the government of Shah Muhammad Reza, Khomeini developed an ideology that sought to marry Islam with politics. He eventually concluded in the necessity of rule by mullahs as the only appropriate form of governance. In his articulation of this ideal, he became convinced of the necessity of purifying Islam from all foreign influences. He considered the nature of Persian-Western relations one-sided and even colonial in nature with the Western powers benefiting from Iran’s resources and markets. In addition, the infiltration of Western idea of secularism represented a particularly potent threat to 78 “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world” 231. “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world” 231. 80 “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world” 232. 79 Munhofen 52 the religious establishment. As a result, his writings and statements railed against the West and its promotion of secularism. Undoubtedly, the Shah’s policy and relationship with the West played an indelible role on the formation of Khomeini’s political and religious ideology. While in exile, Khomeini argued for his conception of velayet-e faqih by reasoning that only Allah’s representative on earth could truly judge justly in full adherence to sharia law. By establishing himself as the faqih, Khomeini became the leader of the world’s Shia community. In need of a charismatic leader, the Lebanese Shia accepted Khomeini as their guardian, and during the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, Khomeini assisted the Lebanese Shia in establishing a resistance movement. The faqih not only provided to the ideology of his resistance movement, deemed the Party of God or Hizbollah, but he also he equipped it with the weapons and training this militia needed. Munhofen 53 Chapter 2: The Palestinian Presence in South Lebanon After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War—waged after Zionist leaders declared the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel on 14 May 1948—more than a hundred thousand Palestinians entered south Lebanon as refugees unable to return to their homes, which fell into the hands of the new Israeli state. Their new home in Lebanon was not a huge improvement in terms of stability and security. The 1943 National Pact, Lebanon’s unwritten constitution that ensured the political domination of the minority Christians, was less than a decade old, and tensions between the various religious sects flared from time to time. The issue of Israel also divided the Lebanese: While the Maronites considered the establishment of Israel a positive development in the region, the Muslim majority viewed the 1948 war as evidence of the destructive power of this new state. The presence of Palestinian refugees upset the delicate balance established by the Pact. By 1958, Lebanon found itself at the brink of a civil war pitting the Muslim majority against the politically and economically powerful Christian minority. The primary focus of this chapter will be the issue of the large Palestinian presence around Beirut and in south Lebanon. This chapter will begin with a description of the 1958 Crisis, and later, provide details on the activities of the Palestinian ‘freedom fighters’ prior to the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. Then I will examine the Civil War with particular emphasis on the Shiite experience during the war, and I will argue that the Shia developed an aversion to the presence of the Palestinian refugees and militiamen in south Lebanon. Ideally, after reading this chapter, one will have a solid understanding of the Shiite experience during the two decades leading up to the Litani Operation of 1978, when Israel invaded Lebanese territory to curb attacks on its citizens. Munhofen 54 The 1958 Crisis: The Revolt of the Pashas With the political ideology of Pan-Arabism touted by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser gathering support throughout the Arab world, Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, a Maronite, feared such the formation of the UAR since many Lebanese Muslims supported Nasser and his socialist leanings. These Lebanese, who felt drawn to the Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, also held a favorable opinion of the potential inclusion of Lebanon into the UAR. For the Christians in Lebanon, inclusion in the UAR meant a potentially deepening of their minority status, since earlier Chamoun admitted that Lebanese Muslims held a 60 percent majority.1, 2 The assassination of a journalist in May 1958 set off a series of events now known as the 1958 Crisis, or in Lebanon, as the Revolt of the Pashas. Leftist political leaders representing the Sunnis, Druze, Shia, and even some Christians joined forces in opposition to the Chamoun regime. The tenuous Pact deteriorated quickly, and sporadic fighting erupted around Lebanon with the opposition nearly achieving a decisive victory when its forces approached Beirut in June. With defeat looming, Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine.3 In 1957 President Eisenhower had announced his foreign policy, which stipulated that any state could request American economic or military assistance if it was threatened or attacked by another state. Knowing that Eisenhower intended to implement this foreign policy as an aggressive defense against the spread of communism, Chamoun invoked the Doctrine in 1958 by claiming that the opposition forces received support from the UAR, which had benefited from Soviet economic assistance.4 Eisenhower heeded Chamoun’s request, and in June 1958, Marines landed in Beirut to quell the uprising, thus 1 Tabitha Petran, Struggle Over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987) 50. Sam Pope Brewers, “Nasser Influence Worries Lebanon,” The New York Times, 27 February 1958, p. 5. 3 Tabitha Petran 51-52. 4 “Soviet Is Pushing Its Cause in Syria,” New York Times, 19 March 1956, p. 11. 2 Munhofen 55 preventing Lebanon’s inclusion into the UAR. The 1958 Crisis revealed the utter weakness of Lebanon’s sectarian form of government in balancing the interests of its diverse population. At this juncture, with a large Palestinian population beginning to make Lebanon their permanent home, the balance to which Lebanon returned after 1958 was precarious. Ultimately, the initiation of anti-Israeli operations by the Palestinians fractured the precarious system and led to the 1975 Civil War. The Fedayeen Situation Before 1975 On 1 June 1965, Palestinian fedayeen forces launched their first attack from Lebanese soil when a small force crossed the border, entered Israeli territory, and destroyed a house in the village of Yiftah.5 Attacks like these, mostly originating from Jordan and Syria, precipitated the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day War. This conflict pit Israel against and an alliance of Arab countries, and it resulted in the Israeli occupation of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Syria’s Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The psychological damage wrought by this war on the Arab world was catastrophic as it seemed the Arab states—under the banner of Nasser’s PanArabism—presented no match for the Western-backed Israeli state. Nevertheless, Palestinians continued their resistance efforts against Israeli occupation by launching attacks from the neighboring Arab states. By 1968, fedayeen fighters migrated to south Lebanon in earnest and joined the 100,000 to 170,000 Palestinian refugees who had already settled in Lebanon following the 1948 war against Israel.6 In large part, the lack of Lebanese governmental oversight in a territory populated by poor Shiite farmers and Palestinian refugees permitted such an added influx of Palestinian militiamen. In addition, the small Lebanese army, a mere force of 13,200 5 Fedayeen were Palestinian guerilla fighters who organized following the 1948 war. “The Palestinian Element,” A Country Study: Lebanon (Library of Congress Country Studies) 10 April 2010 <http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/37.htm>. 6 Munhofen 56 men, could do little to halt the flow of Palestinians into the south.7 The fedayeen fought under the direction of the PLO, which operated from its headquarters in Jordanian administered Palestine.8 In spite of King Husayn’s (1935-1999) assurances to his Western allies concerning Jordan’s ability to ensure security in the West Bank and prevent fedayeen attacks against the IDF and Israeli civilians, the PLO continued to launch raids against Israeli forces inside Palestinian and Israeli territory. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, an upsurge of PLO-led attacks on Israeli territory originating from Jordan and other Arab states led to a deterioration of already embattled relations between the forces of the PLO and King Husayn’s Jordanian Army.9 Seeking to move the ‘Palestinian problem’ elsewhere, King Husayn vigorously supported the 1969 Cairo Agreement that permitted fedayeen to operate out of south Lebanon.10 In spite of the Cairo Agreement, Palestinians continued to primarily resist the Israeli occupation from Jordan rather than Lebanon. By 1970 Palestinians in Jordan outnumbered Jordanians and in Palestiniandominated areas effectively established a “state-within-a-state” by collecting taxes and running schools and hospitals, thus providing further evidence to King Husayn’s utter lack of control over a majority living under his supposed authority.11 At the time, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir even remarked, “By his adventurous policy, King Hussein [sic] has with his own hands brought about the creation of a State within his kingdom and undermined his country’s integrity 7 Frederic C. Hof, Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984 (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1985) 71. 8 Following the 1948 war with Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan annexed the territory of the West Bank in 1950. 9 “Concurrently, there has been an aggravation in aggression from the territories of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and in the activities of the terrorist organizations.” Statement by Golda Meir on 15 December 1969. 10 According to the Historical Dictionary of Lebanon, the Cairo Agreement was a secret agreement between the command of the Lebanese army and the PLO that permitted the PLO to continue to plan and execute military operations originating in Lebanon under the condition that these actions included coordination with the Lebanese Army. 47-48. 11 Mehmood Hussain, “PLO-Jordan Relations,” Economic Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 37, 13 September 1986, 1632-1633. Munhofen 57 and regime.”12 Clearly, the Israeli government likened King Husayn’s inability to reign in the activities of the PLO as proof of his ineffectiveness. The strained relationship between the PLO and King Husayn reached critical mass during the events of Black September in 1970, when the Jordanian Army expelled thousands of fedayeen. The aftermath of this conflict held drastic consequences for south Lebanon, the area which received the vast majority of these militiamen.13 Ultimately, the events of Black September in 1970 nearly doubled the Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon, which reached approximately 300,000 refugees by late 1970.14, 15 Following the 1970 Black September terrorist attacks in Jordan and the expulsion of the PLO by the Jordanian army, the PLO moved its base of operations to southern Lebanon. As in Jordan, the PLO set up a “state-within-a-state” by administering large swaths of territory in south Lebanon, particularly in the foothills of Mount Hermon. Later, this area came to be known as “Fatahland” because of the significant presence of Palestinians and the administrative autonomy they possessed.16 The strategic importance of this location was due to its proximity to LebaneseSyrian trade routes that allowed a flow of weapons from Syria to the PLO in Lebanon. From its headquarters in south Lebanon, an area traditionally populated by Shiite Muslims, the PLO launched deadly attacks against Israeli towns to the chagrin of Tel Aviv. Even before Black 12 Meron Medzini, ed., Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1947-1974, Vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979) 886. 13 Black September refers to a series of events occurring in Jordan and the greater Arab world in 1970. On 6 September 1970 fedayeen forces loyal to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked multiple airplanes. One of the hijackings ended in Cairo, where the plane exploded just seconds after the passengers, crew, and hijackers had left the plane. Seeing these hijackings as further proof of the need to bring the guerilla forces under control, King Husayn embarked on a military campaign against the regular military arm of the PLO , the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). In spite of Syrian troops who were stationed in Jordan but sided with the PLA, the Jordanian Army quickly put the PLA on the defensive. Under pressure from other Arab regimes to end the infighting, Yassir Arafat, the head of the reigning Fatah party of the PLO and commander of the PLA, signed a cease-fire with King Husayn on 25 September. From the Library of Congress Country Studies <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jo0022>. 14 Robert G. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, & Lebanon (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) 47. 15 The total Lebanese population in 1975 (five years later) was 2,550,000. It is unknown whether or not this number includes the refugee population. Source: Yusri Hazran, “The Shiite Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendancy,” Middle East Brief, No. 37, June 2009, 3. 16 Frederic C. Hof 72. Munhofen 58 September, the Israeli government issued statements decrying the insecurity of south Lebanon and ineffectiveness of the Lebanese army in preventing attacks. On 31 December 1968, after a group of Palestinians, who resided in Lebanon, hijacked an airliner, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol condemned the inaction of the Lebanese government in curbing the violence by fedayeen living in Lebanon: “We have not only averted any blow at civilians, women and children, we have not even touched a hair on the heads of the armed forces of the Lebanese Government, which never bothered to uproot the nests of terrorists in Beirut and other places in Lebanon [emphasis added].”17 Additionally, when Golda Meir became Prime Minster in March 1969, she commented on “The recent incidents on the Lebanese border…point to a worsening of terrorist activity along our entire border with Lebanon.”18 As in Jordan, the PLO’s attacks originating in south Lebanon posed a threat to the weak Lebanese government because further strikes could— and in most cases did—instigate direct military confrontation with Israel, thereby putting defenseless Lebanese citizens in the line of fire. Just as the attacks originating from Jordan eroded the once friendly relations between King Husayn and the Palestinians, the operations planned and executed from south Lebanon became a thorn in the side of the Lebanese government. Prime Minister Meir even grouped the Jordanian and Lebanese governments together as sponsors of terrorist attacks against Israelis because of their shared failure in stopping fedayeen operations: In Jordan and Lebanon, terrorist domination has so expanded as to become a threat to the existence and authority of the Governments. In both countries, the Governments have vainly sought to reconcile opposites: their own authority and the presence of and activity of terrorist organizations. Such attempts could meet with no more than a semblance of success. More than once, the Governments seemed about to confront the organizations but each time recoiled from the encounter.19 17 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol. 2, 868. Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol, 2, 886. 19 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol. 2, 902. 18 Munhofen 59 Israel, clearly frustrated with its much weaker and less stable northern neighbor, launched retaliatory attacks against the fedayeen. Likely due to the Palestinian refugees upending the balance of interests in the state, the developing situation was further complicated and sectarian antagonism returned to Lebanon. While Lebanese Muslims felt more inclined to support the Palestinian cause, Lebanese Christians considered the PLO presence a threat to national security and their tenuous hold on political power; as a result, the Christians feared another crisis similar to 1958. As such, the Christian militias that fought during the clashes that eruptied in 1958 reasserted themselves as protectors of the Lebanese Christians. Clashes between these militias and fedayeen escalated in late 1971. Violence during elections between supporters of candidates who had varying views on how to address the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon became pronounced during the Chamber of Deputies elections in April 1972. Making matters worse for the already tense situation in Lebanon were the attacks on the Israeli Olympic athletes at the 1972 Munich games, since Israeli forces retaliated by way of an incursion into south Lebanon. In addition, on 15 October 1972 the Israeli government declared that its intention to strike fedayeen strongholds preemptive of more attacks on Israeli citizens.20 Another Israeli raid, though targeted on Beirut, on 10 April 1973 resulted in the assassination of three prominent Palestinian leaders, two of which were militia leaders.21 Seeing this an example of the Lebanese Army’s unwillingness to protect Palestinian freedom fighters, the fedayeen attacked Lebanese forces. With clashes erupting throughout Lebanese territory in May 1973 and more guerilla fighters entering Lebanon via Syria, the Lebanese government declared martial law and reached an agreement with the PLO that 20 21 Frederic C. Hof 73-74. “Major Events of the Day,” New York Times, 10 April 1973, p. 45. Munhofen 60 restricted but continued to allow fedayeen activities.22 In the spring and summer of 1974, fedayeen fighters launched attacks on the Israeli towns of Qiryat Shemona, killing 16 civilians and two soliders; Maalot, leaving 25 dead; Shamir, leaving three women dead; and a seaborne operation on Nahariya, killing four Israelis.23 For each of these attacks, Israel responded in similar fashion, producing numerous Palestinian and Lebanese casualties. According to a Lebanese government record, “Attacks on Palestinian bases in border villages [occurred] almost daily,” and even forced the Lebanese diplomatic corps to appeal to the UN Security Council.24 A Lebanese account of the Israeli attacks occurring on Lebanese soil read, “On January 6 the Lebanese government complained to the UN Security Council about repeated violations of Lebanon’s airspace (44 times) and territorial waters (10 times), naval and land incursions (10 and eight) and bombardments (347), during the period 12 December 1974 to 4 January 1975.”25 For many Lebanese, especially Shia in the south who lived in the crossfire and the politically powerful Christian elite who felt their power waning, their patience wore thin and tensions ran high. First Phase of the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1977 By 1975, Lebanon represented a powder-keg ready to explode. The paramilitary activities of thousands of fedayeen forces, the ascendancy of sectarian militias, which by 1975 included Amal, and an increasingly politically volatile atmosphere contributed to the outbreak of the first 22 Thomas Collelo, ed., Lebanon: A Country Study (Washington: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1989) 28-29. 23 Frederic C. Hof 75. 24 Lebanese Ministry of Information, South Lebanon: 1948-1986 Facts and Figures (Beirut: Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Information, Department of Lebanese Studies and Publications, 1986) 5. 25 Meron Medzini, ed., Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1947-1974, Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976) 6. Munhofen 61 phase of the Lebanese Civil War lasting from 1975 until 1977.26 The initial event that led to the outbreak of the war occurred on 13 April 1975 when a group of gunmen, presumed to be Palestinians, killed four Christian Phalangists—a particularly powerful Christian militia—in a botched assassination attempt on Pierre Jumayyil, a powerful Christian Lebanese politician. The Phalangists retaliated on the same day with an attack on a bus carrying Palestinians, resulting in 26 deaths. On 14 April the fighting escalated and rendered the Lebanese government unable to protect the Beirut citizenry. Although initially confined to street fights in Beirut, clashes spread to the countryside and eventually divided Lebanon between the Lebanese Front and Lebanese National Movement. As fighting spread outward from Beirut and into the Lebanese environs, the burgeoning violence forced other militias to choose sides. The Lebanese Front (LF) included the Phalangists and other Maronite militias oftentimes headed by the descendents of the Christian zuama who hoped to retain the status quo whereby the minority Christians held the most critical positions within the Lebanese government. The opposition, led by Kamal Jumblatt and dubbed the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), included an array of militias representing leftist groups, non-mainstream Palestinian militias, and the Druze. Although more organized than the LNM, the militias of the LF fared slightly worse by the end of 1975. Syria, which watched the events unfold with great interest and concern, since it feared a potential spillover into its territory. As a result, Syria attempted, though with little success, to bring both sides to a sustained cease-fire in the first half of 1976. Since the beginning of the conflict, the PLO had not officially participated in the Civil War, and going into January, the PLO remained neutral of what it considered a domestic conflict occurring within Lebanon. However, after notorious LF attacks on Palestinian civilians living in the East Beirut refugee camp Tall Zatar and the Karantina Muslim quarter in 26 Author’s note: The Lebanese Civil War officially ended in 1990 with the signing of the Taif Accord. Munhofen 62 Beirut, the PLA (Palestinian Liberation Army, the official military of the PLO) joined the fray on the side of the LNM.27 Palestinian leader Izz ad-Din Qalaq explained the change in the PLO position: The Palestinians have made it a point to avoid the civil war in Lebanon for the past 9 months in order not to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs. The Palestinians have always favored a dialog with the Lebanese authorities. But the isolationist forces and foreign interventionists…wanted to involve the Palestinians in the conflict. Thus, the isolationist forces began to attack the Palestinian refugee camps as a prelude to a massacre to liquidate the Palestinians, similar to the one that took place in Jordan in 1970. Therefore, it was no longer possible for us to ignore what was being planned against us.28 With the official entrance of the PLA into the Civil War, thereby bringing thousands of additional troops into the fray, an end to hostilities became even more crucial as the potential for a decades-long conflict putting millions at risk loomed ominously. In spite of continued Syrian efforts at stabilizing the volatile situation, matters only worsened as the Lebanese Army disintegrated in March. As a result, the Lebanese government possessed no real military capabilities, making foreign intervention that much more necessary before Lebanon literally tore itself apart. Not longer after the crumbling of the Lebanese Army, Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib formed a predominantly Muslim force called the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) and joined the LNM. With an augmentation of troops, the LNM laid siege to areas of Beirut, including the presidential palace.29 As the LMN neared victory, the Syrian government reassessed its commitment to ensuring a lasting stability in Lebanon. With Lebanon in shambles, Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad feared the ascent of a radical Lebanese government supported by the LNM and the possible secession of a Christian majority state along the Mediterranean coast. President al-Assad considered a leftist Lebanese government 27 Thomas Collelo 30-31. “PLO Envoy’s Warning,” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa, 12 January 1976, p. A7. 29 Thomas Collelo 30-31. 28 Munhofen 63 dangerous because it may seek to influence domestic politics in Syria by supporting antigovernment politicians. As such, in May 1976 Syria’s military advanced into Lebanese territory and engaged the LNM, though to the dismay of other Arab leaders who considered such a move beneficial to Israeli rather than Arab interests in Lebanon. Despite incurring losses early, the Syrian military prevailed and brought the LNM to near submission by early fall 1976. Later that year, the LNM, LF, and Syria convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and Cairo, Egypt to draw a conclusion to the conflict. Although the underlying causes of the war—the Palestinian presence, persistence of fedayeen activities, and the confessional sectarian political system in Lebanon— remained unsolved, the parties agreed to a feeble peace pact. This agreement, which held the backing of the League of Arab States, established the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) and charged this 30,000-man multi-national force with the assignment of maintaining the peace in Lebanon.30 In the ensuing year, Lebanese President Elias Sarkis renewed the ADF’s mandate.31 By the close of the first phase of the Civil War in 1977, more than 40,000 had died and 180,000 were injured due to the fighting, which oftentimes occurred in heavily populated areas like Beirut. The clashes and raids uprooted entire towns and sectarian quarters of cities, leaving an indelible mark on human geography of the Lebanese state by further segregating sectarian populations. In Beirut, for example, a “Green Line” separated Muslim and Christian quarters. Because of the ADF’s effectiveness in its mandated areas of Lebanon, fedayeen operating out of the center and north migrated to the south, where the ADF held no presence.32 30 According to Collelo, “the ADF consisted of 30,000 men, of whom 27,000 were Syrian. The remainder were token contingents from Saudi Arabia, the small Persian Gulf states, and Sudan; Libya had withdrawn its small force in late 1976.” 31 Thomas Collelo 31-32. 32 Thomas Collelo 32. Munhofen 64 Israeli Operations Against Fedayeen in Lebanon during the Civil War, 1975-1977 During the first year of the Lebanese Civil War, the IDF stepped up its preemptive incursions and raids into Lebanese territory significantly. In large part, the lack of any governmental or military oversight in the PLO camps and fedayeen stronghold seemed reason enough for further Israeli reprisals, like the “air raids against the Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi Palestinian camps on December 2 [1975], in which 75 were killed and nearly 150 wounded.”33 In a radio address on 6 September 1975, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin succinctly explained Israel’s view of the situation unraveling in Lebanon: Lebanon: the problem is clear. There is no stable government in Lebanon with which negotiations can be conducted. There is no territorial problem between Lebanon and Israel. And because of the Lebanese Government’s weakness, because of the existence of the terrorist organizations in Lebanon, the problem as regards Lebanon will be the fight against the intensified efforts to act against Israel.34 The worsening state of affairs in Lebanon led Rabin and his cohorts to believe that Israel needed to preempt and counteract PLO attacks with increased vigor and force. However, knowing that prior sustained Israeli attacks have scarred Israeli-Lebanese relations, Rabin’s government articulated a three-pronged approach to Lebanon in July 1976 called the “good fence policy.” With the good fence policy in force, Israel hoped to endear itself to the Lebanese adversely affected by the PLO presence in Lebanon, while also strategically protect its citizens from deadly fedayeen attacks on Jewish territory.35 The good fence policy’s three major tenets included: humanitarian aid for Lebanese citizens living near high-risk zones in the south, the barring of all non-Lebanese military forces from the furthest southern areas of Lebanon, and the strengthening of ties between the IDF and 33 Lebanese Ministry of Information 6. Meron Medzini, ed., Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1974-1977, Vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982) 295. 35 Frederic C. Hof 82. 34 Munhofen 65 southern Christian militias.36 In late 1975 the Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog implored member nations of the UN to take action because “An entire Christian community of one million people in Lebanon is in danger” by claiming “A terrifying human tragedy is unraveling before our eyes.”37 Ambassador Herzog’s emphasis on the humanitarian toll of the Civil War served as the Israeli public relations scheme of shrouding its ulterior motives, such as the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, by parading a moral tragedy like the plight of the Christians living in the south. Nevertheless, his language did highlight actual Israeli attempts at endearing itself to a portion of the Lebanese population negatively affected by the conflict. Israel implemented this portion of the good fence policy by opening up two locations, at Metulla and Dovev, of the security fence, which had divided Lebanon and Israel since 1974. Israel also offered the south Lebanese, though predominantly Christian, necessary goods and services like food, water, and medical care.38 From May 1976 to mid-1977, Israeli aid to south Lebanon amounted to more than $100 million.39 With these gestures of goodwill, Israel hoped to contrast itself with the PLO in terms of its interactions with the Lebanese: Whereas the PLO fought against Christian militias of the LF, Israel provided much needed humanitarian aid, peace and security. By identifying itself as the “good guy,” Israel ultimately envisioned a Lebanese population, which supported the Israeli goal of ousting the PLO from Lebanon. The second tenet of the good fence policy stipulated that Israel opposed the existence of any non-Lebanese militias operating in southern Lebanon, thereby including the PLO as a nonnative force with fedayeen in the south. PM Rabin explained that Israel did not accept the stationing of non-Lebanese forces south of the Red Line, a demarcation following parallel and 36 Frederic C. Hof 82. Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1974-1977, Vol. 3, 343. 38 Frederic C. Hof 80. 39 Lebanese Ministry of Information 7. 37 Munhofen 66 north of the East-West axis of the Litani River, a natural barrier between central and south Lebanon. With this in effect, Israel hoped to disallow any Syrian troop advancements that might have brought this Israeli foe closer to the Lebanese border and Israeli territory.40 After the creation of the ADF, Israel maintained its stipulation and prohibited the ADF from crossing below the Red Line since the vast majority—approximately 90 percent—of ADF troops were Syrian.41 Israel formed strong ties with their natural allies, such as the Christian militias along the southern border, as the third component of the good fence policy. Israel did not seek to occupy the territory of south Lebanon, but with no real national Lebanese army at operational readiness, Israel needed to cooperate with militias. These former-LF militias, led by majors Saad Haddad and Sami Chidiac, held some of the same goals as Israel: Suppress all military activities engineered and executed by the PLO in order to protect Lebanese Christians living in south Lebanon. An indirect consequence of the militias’ behavior included the protection of Israeli towns and Lebanese territory from Israeli retaliatory attacks. Israel forged a particularly close relationship with Maj. Haddad and went so far as to arm and train troops in his militia.42 With the election of Prime Minister Menachem Begin in June 1977, Israel’s intent to act as a protective force fighting alongside the militias became more pronounced. In a statement, Begin compared Lebanese Christians with Israeli Jews—religious minorities surrounded by fundamentalist Muslims determined to eliminate them. With this in mind, Begin declared, “So my friends we shall go on helping the Christians in Lebanon, it’s our moral duty.”43 Israel’s brief occupation of the Lebanese territory around Al-Khayim in September 1977 served as a prime example of its 40 Author’s note: Syria and Israel continued to fight over the disputed Golan Heights, which Israel had occupied following the 1967 war. 41 Thomas Collelo 32. 42 Frederic C. Hof 80. 43 Meron Medzini, ed., Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4 (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981) 78. Munhofen 67 defense of the Lebanese Christians. In spite of the efforts to arrive at a US-brokered ceasefire signed in fall 1977, Palestinian fedayeen forces continued attacking Maj. Haddad’s militias and Israeli towns.44 As a result, Israel carried out multiple operations in south Lebanon in November 1977, including an air attack on the village of Azzieh leaving 65 killed and 68 wounded.45 Clearly, Israel’s alliance with Maj. Haddad did not produce the intended cessation of fedayeen attacks originating from Lebanese territory. Therefore, Israel sought to include the Shia, who comprised the majority of south Lebanon, in the good fence policy in late 1977 and into 1978. The Shiite Experience in the Midst of the Civil War, 1975-1977 As noted in the introduction, Imam Musa al-Sadr founded the predominantly—though officially secular—Shia militia Amal in 1974 as the military arm of his popular Harakat alMahruumin. As the spiritual guide and founder of Amal, al-Sadr developed a nuanced policy during the Civil War that aimed to preserve and protect the Shia. Playing on the popularity and early successes of the LNM, Amal entered the Civil War on the side of the LNM in 1975. In 1976, with the Civil War in full swing, Phalangists embarked on a campaign of ridding Beirut’s Muslim quarters of its inhabitants, and according to some accounts, the Phalangists expelled somewhere between 100,000 to 200,000 Shia from the Armenian-Shia squatter area of the city. This particular enclave had provided Imam Musa with spirited support during his ascendancy to such an influential status within the Shia community.46 Perhaps in an effort to save face for Amal’s inability to prevent the expulsion of Shia from areas of Beirut or out of a principled opposition to the forward trajectory of the war, al-Sadr criticized Kamal Jumblatt for singlehandedly prolonging the conflict: “Without him, the war in Lebanon would have been terminated 44 Frederic C. Hof 82. Lebanese Ministry of Information 8. 46 Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986) 172. 45 Munhofen 68 in two months. Because of him, it has been prolonged two years and only God knows how long the encore will last.”47 As an ardent anti-Communist, al-Sadr also accused the leftist elements of the LNM of exploiting sectarian divisions within Lebanon. Imam Musa’s displeasure with the LNM led to Amal’s departure from the leftist alliance at the time of Syrian intervention in 1976. Amal’s short tenure as a member of the LNM clearly indicated its rather half-hearted support of the leftists. Imam Musa developed nuanced policy towards the PLO: Although he expressed support for the ultimate aims of the PLO, he did not resist levying criticism at the actions of the fedayeen, which put the Shia in harm’s way, i.e., in the line of Israeli retaliatory attacks. Because of consistent Israeli reprisals, al-Sadr commented, “The problem was not one of fida’iyin [fedayeen] infiltration but of launching rockets and grenades against Israel across the South. This is something that is totally impermissible.”48 For al-Sadr, the recklessness of the PLO put innocent and defenseless Shia at the helm of a conflict from which they were likely to benefit little. At one point, al-Sadr even declared, “the PLO is a factor of anarchy in the South. The Shia are conquering their inferiority complex with respect to the Palestinian organizations. We have had enough!”49 The radical and oftentimes revolutionary tendency of the PLO and its supporters, including the Marxist Popular Liberation Front of Palestine (PFLP), further embedded the growing divide separating al-Sadr from the Palestinians. The PLO emphasized its goal of ushering in a new era of secular politics in Lebanon whereby the sectarian system no longer defined representation in the government. Imam Musa, though frustrated with Christian hegemony, still agreed in principle to the idea of a sectarian Lebanese government. His commitment to a blend of religion and politics led PLO to strongly chastise al-Sadr, who they 47 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: U of Texas Pr., 1987) 42. Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia 43. 49 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia 43. 48 Munhofen 69 claimed was in the pocket of the American intelligence services.50 By the conclusion of the Civil War, al-Sadr and the PLO had a falling out due to their opposing positions and rhetoric. Shortly before his 1978 disappearance, al-Sadr condemned the PLO saying, “The Palestinian resistance is not a revolution. It does not seek martyrdom. It is a military machine that terrorizes the Arab world.”51 Whereas the Shia rarely benefited from Israeli overtures, Israel’s good fence policy obviously favored the Christians living in south Lebanon. For instance, Israeli retaliatory attacks oftentimes left Shia worse off than before. Because of the devastation left by the initial phase of the Civil War, the Shia found themselves in a new position: Although many supported the cause of the fedayeen in principle, the deteriorating situation in the south forced a reconsideration of allegiances. However, any alliance with the Christians or Israelis was tainted by the tradition of Maronite oppression of the Lebanese Muslims or disregard for the collateral damage in the south caused by Christian-Israeli collaboration. Nevertheless, the intense fighting in the south led 20 Shia leaders to “study the problems in southern Lebanon, which they consider to be the result of the Palestinian presence and absence of any Lebanese authority.”52 Knowing the Shia’s growing aversion to the PLO activities in south Lebanon, Israel aimed to include the Shia in its good fence policy. A group of Israeli soldiers approached a Shiite village less than two miles away from the border seeking to buy their favor in the fight against the fedayeen. Reportedly, the soldiers “offered the people factory jobs in Israel and said they would protect their town against the Palestinians.”53 In return, the soldiers asked to “establish road and telephone links with Israel 50 Fouad Ajami 175. Karim Pakradouni, Al Salam al Mafqud, trans. (Beirut, 1984) 118. 52 Marvine Howe, “Israelis Said to Be Seeking Use of Lebanese Villages,” New York Times, 26 February 1978, p. 11. 53 Marvine Howe, “Israelis Said to Be Seeking Use of Lebanese Villages” p. 11. 51 Munhofen 70 and move the border fence to the other side of town.”54 Obviously, Israel thought it needed the support of the Shia in order to make significant inroads in its south Lebanon policy goals. In this particular situation the Shia “politely” declined the offer, pledging their allegiance to the Lebanese government then led by President Sarkis.55 In spite of this setback to the Israeli aims, Israel did achieve a small victory, albeit indirectly: The scourge and devastation wrought by the Civil War cost the PLO dearly in the fight for public opinion. In 1969, just two years after the Six-Day War, a majority of the Lebanese had supported the efforts of the fedayeen in resisting Israeli occupation of Arab lands. By the end of 1977, however, Lebanese support waned and opposition to the fedayeen increased as Israeli retaliatory attacks became more commonplace and destructive. Conclusion By the close of 1977, south Lebanon remained embroiled in conflict as the fedayeen continued attacking Israel and its allies, most notably the Christian militias under the command of Maj. Haddad headquartered in. These fedayeen forces executed operations originating in Lebanon against Israeli targets since the late 1960s. As more PLO militiamen entered southern Lebanese territory during the 1970s because of their deteriorating relations with King Husayn of Jordan, the attacks against Israel coincidentally increased as well. The creation of a “statewithin-in-a-state” in Lebanon led to the outbreak of a traumatic Civil War lasting two years and leaving tens of thousands of dead in its wake. The Lebanese Shia, though rather neutral during the conflict, lived in the midst of the combat for years—longer than most Lebanese who lived in the central and northern areas. Even though the Civil War officially ended in the 1977, clashes 54 55 Marvine Howe, “Israelis Said to Be Seeking Use of Lebanese Villages” p. 11. Marvine Howe, “Israelis Said to Be Seeking Use of Lebanese Villages” p. 11. Munhofen 71 between the PLO and Christian militias persisted. In addition, the PLO continued to carry out attacks against Israeli forces and towns. The Israeli preemptive and retaliatory attacks wrecked havoc on the Lebanese landscape, but the Shia considered the PLO ultimately responsible for plunging south Lebanon into such a dismal situation. Little improved by 1978, and seeing no alternative to an outright heavy invasion of south Lebanon, Israel undertook the Litani Operation. Munhofen 72 Chapter 3: The Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon: Comparing 1978 with 1982 The Israeli invasion and occupation of south Lebanon that began in 1982 represented the culmination of a decades worth of developments. In fact, a similar invasion in 1978—the Litani Operation—held much of the same aims as the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee. However, the 1978 invasion did not result in an oppressively length and mismanaged occupation. Instead, the 1978 occupation lasted less than 100 days, and as a result of its relative brevity and nonoppressive occupation policies, no Lebanese resistance movement emerged. As alluded to earlier, Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon beginning in 1982 produced drastically different results—within three years of the launching of Operation Peace for Galilee, Hizbollah emerged as a well-organized, effective, and ultimately deadly resistance movement. What made Hizbollah particularly fascinating to this author, was its Shiite Islamic character, discussed in the first chapter. This chapter will examine the Litani Operation and its impact on the Lebanese Shia living in the south, paying particular attention to the lack of resistance the Israelis faced during their short occupation, while also citing examples of the Shiite community’s changing attitude towards the Palestinian presence. The first section will provide a brief history of the events that followed the deployment of the United Nations’ Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the summer of 1978 until the launching of Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982. After a recounting the military operation, I will delve into the specific occupational practices of Israel, showing how these oppressive practices encouraged the emergence of Hizbollah. Munhofen 73 Leading up to the Litani Operation in March 1978 As indicated in the prior chapter, Palestinian fedayeen continued to conduct cross-border and domestic raids against Israel and Maj. Saad Haddad’s Christian militia, respectively. A brief lull in November 1977 ended with a “resumption of sporadic fighting between the Israeli-backed Christian militias in the Marjeyoun and Qoleyaa areas, led by Saad Haddad, and the Joint Forces (JF, Palestinian-leftist)” in early 1978.12 With the Lebanese Army just barely reasserting its presence in central Lebanon and President Sarkis unwilling to deploy such a limited force, Israel’s patience with the Lebanese government’s ineffectiveness wore out. In addition, Maj. Haddad’s forces lost ground at the outset of March, and a recapture of Palestinian held positions seemed unlikely. Without a significant outpouring of armed Israeli support, defeat of the embattled Christian militias appeared within reach for the fedayeen—for whom success meant unfettered entrance into Israeli territory. However, a PLO attack on Israeli buses near Tel Aviv brought the full force of the IDF upon south Lebanon and prevented the destruction of the Christian militias in the area. The Spark On 11 March 1978 eleven Palestinian fedayeen crossed Israel’s coastal border at Eretz, and upon landing, hijacked two buses outside Tel Aviv. At a road-block, the Palestinians opened fire on civilians in the buses and other cars at the scene. By the time Israeli authorities forcibly stopped the fedayeen, the Palestinians had killed 37 Israelis and wounded 76 more.3 An anonymous PLO leader responded with pride to the operation when he said, “I couldn’t help 1 Lebanese Ministry of Information 8. The Joint Forces is a collective term referring the greater leftist militia that included the Lebanese National Movement, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Army of Arab Lebanon. Although Kamal Jumblatt appeared as the public leader of the JF, Yasir Arafat, the head of the Fatah party and hence the PLO at-large, oftentimes made the most critical decisions. In many cases, the policies and actions of Arafat angered Jumblatt. 3 Meroni Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4, 356. 2 Munhofen 74 thinking with admiration for those young people who were ready to sacrifice their lives for the liberation of Palestine.”4 Even a member of the Lebanese Parliament expressed his support saying that the raid “was a symbol of the sound guerilla action of which all are proud.”5 The Israeli response, on the other hand was markedly stern, accusatory, and foreboding. In a statement after the attack, Prime Minister Begin railed against the PLO, even comparing them to the Nazis, saying: For years, we tried to explain to free public opinion in the world that his organization called “Fatah” or PLO is one of the meanest, the basest armed organizations ever in the annals of mankind since the days of the Nazis. Their purpose is to kill the Jews: Man, woman, and child. They never attack a military installation—they come to kill our civilians. The original purpose of the design, or order was to take hostages, to put out certain demands to the Government of Israel, and to threaten killing all of the hostages if we do not surrender to their demands. That they didn’t achieve—but instead they started killing. But now we know the blood that was shed of innocent people: 37 Jews who were massacred again in our time.6 For the Israeli government under the leadership of Prime Minister Begin, this catastrophe represented the disastrous culmination of a decade’s worth of fedayeen attacks against Israel along the Lebanese border. In his speech to the Knesset on 13 March, Begin alluded to a forceful Israeli retaliatory operation as he announced: Gone forever are the days when Jewish blood could be shed with impunity. Let it be known: The shedders of innocent blood shall not go unpunished. We shall defend our citizens, our women, our children. We shall sever the arm of iniquity. Under no circumstances, under no conditions will acquiesce criminal’s hand being raised against a Jewish child, a Jewish woman. We shall do what has to be done to defend our people and to eradicate the inhumanity which is today the lot of peoples around us. But the countries that tolerate, and even encourage the murderers organization on their soil are accountable before God and man.7 4 Marvine Howe, “Some Palestinians are Proud of Attack,” New York Times, 14 March 1978, p. 17. Marvine Howe, “Some Palestinians are Proud of Attack,” p. 17. 6 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4, 357. 7 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4, 362. 5 Munhofen 75 With these sentiments in mind, Israel’s next move came as no surprise. Determined to put an end to the PLO presence in south Lebanon or at least push the fedayeen out of striking distance from the border, the IDF launched the Litani Operation—a full-scale invasion of south Lebanon that included a 20,000 troop expeditionary force supported by heavy artillery bombardment and naval units beginning at 1:40 AM on 15 March 1978.8 The name “Litani Operation” was a referencet to the Israeli goal of pushing the fedayeen north of the Litani River, thereby rendering the PLO unable to launch attacks from south Lebanon. However, Palestinians had already begun to travel en masse as far away from the southern border days before the Litani Operation. The number of fedayeen in south Lebanon may have reached as high as 5000, but because of heavy rains that permitted thousands of fedayeen to evacuate the area before a delayed Israeli invasion, only 1000 remained south of the Litani River on 15 March.9 Fanning the Flames: The Litani Operation When unleashing its full repertoire of capabilities, the IDF made an intensive effort to emphasize the goal of such a grandiose invasion: “The purpose of the operation is to root out the terrorist bases near the border and to strike at their special bases from which terrorists set out on missions deep inside Israeli territory.”10 Additionally, the IDF stressed the limited scope—to root out PLO strongholds in south Lebanon and push the fedayeen further north—of the operation when it added, “It is not the IDF’s intention to harm the population, the Lebanese army or the inter-Arab force, but only the terrorists and their helpers, in order to safeguard the life and 8 Frederic C. Hof 87. Beate Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt: Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978 (New York: Praeger, 1988) 164. 10 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4, 363. 9 Munhofen 76 security of the population of Israel.”11 The IDF expected to encounter Lebanese resistance to the operation, so it made sure to point out that its enemy was just the PLO and its fedayeen fighters. Even though the Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman stated that the IDF “will continue to clear the area for as long as we find it necessary,” he also added, “I didn’t say we were staying there. Nobody wants to stay there.”12 Furthermore, Weizman told reporters that IDF troops were instructed to “avoid striking at civilians.”13 Clearly, Israel intended the Litani Operation to efficiently and effectively uproot fedayeen stationed in south Lebanon without causing significant collateral damage adversely impacting the civilian Lebanese population. By 15 March, the day after the operation began, the IDF completed its most strategic goal—destroying fedayeen strongholds. At this point, Israel affirmed its operational effectiveness in Lebanon and its demands for a withdrawal. Israeli General Mordechai Gur alluded to the establishment of a south Lebanon security belt extending approximately four to six miles inland along the 60-mile long border. However, Prime Minister Begin emphasized the temporary nature of such a buffer zone when he said, “Our army was not sent into southern Lebanon to stay there. We want an arrangement in which all those places from which the murderers will not return there. Southern Lebanon will not serve as a base for future attacks against Israel.”14 In spite of this statement stressing the limited scope of the Litani Operation and others like it, Israeli leaders faced mounting pressure from the international community to withdrawal.15 On 19 March, the UNSC adopted Resolution 425, which called for “strict respect for the territorial integrity” of Lebanon, the immediate cessation of all Israeli “military action against Lebanese territorial integrity,” and the establishment of “a United Nations interim force 11 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4, 363. William E. Farrell, “A ‘Limited Action’,” New York Times, 15 March 1978, p. 1. 13 William E. Farrell, “Major Fighting Ends,” New York Times, 16 March 1978, p. 25. 14 William E. Farrell, “Major Fighting Ends,” New York Times, 16 March 1978, p. 25. 15 Bernard Gwertzman, “Israelis Seize 4- to 6- Mile ‘Security Belt’ in Lebanon and Say Troops Will Remain; Washington Sees ‘Impediments to Peace’,” New York Times, 16 March 1978, p. 1. 12 Munhofen 77 for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces.”16 On the same day, the UNSC clarified the role of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Resolution 426. Two days after the adoption of Resolution 425, on 21 March Israel imposed a cease-fire upon its forces. At this point, IDF troops had occupied approximately 1,100 square kilometers.17 Before UNIFIL troops entered Lebanese territory, Major General Emmanuel Erskine met with Defense Minister Weizman, who demanded that certain conditions be met prior to Israel’s acceptance of Resolution 425: UNIFIL must patrol the buffer zone from Ras al Biyada to Ibil as Saqy, while Maj. Haddad’s militia controlled a “peace zone” along the Israeli-Lebanese border south of UNIFIL’s area of operations. After accepting these terms, the first UNIFIL troops entered Lebanon via Israel on 22 March 1978. Over the two months, Israeli troops ceded more than half of the occupied zone, but because of sporadic fedayeen attacks on UNIFIL slowed the withdrawal significantly. Israeli leaders refused to comply with a complete withdrawal without the assurance of a strong force in place protecting and patrolling the border. Finally, with heavy international prodding, on 21 May, Israel set a date for a complete withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon by 13 June. On that day, all Israeli troops exited Lebanese territory, though leaving their goal of halting fedayeen attacks incomplete.18 leaving the security belt in the hands of Maj. Haddad’s militias by claiming, “they [the Israelis] were honoring their pledge to protect the Christian minority in southern Lebanon.”19 Although President Sarkis attempted to deploy a 650man battalion of the Lebanese Army to the border on 31 July, Maj. Haddad’s forces rejected the 16 Resolution 425, United Nations’ Security Council, 19 March 1978. Lebanese Ministry of Information 10. 18 “Israelis Quitting Lebanon, Yielding Posts to Christians,” New York Times, 13 June 1978, p. 3. 19 William E. Farrell, “Israelis Withdraw Last Invasion Units in Southern Lebanon,” New York Times, 13 June 1978, p. 1. 17 Munhofen 78 stationing of these men, even going so far as to fire artillery upon them.20 The inability of the Lebanese government to bring south Lebanon under its control, and the increasingly volatile and rogue actions of Maj. Haddad will be examined in a later section. Before then, the next section will examine the impact of the invasion on the southern population, and also, postulate an answer as to why this operation elicited very little resistance on behalf of the Lebanese Shia community. Assessment of Impact of the Litani Operation and the Lack of Armed Lebanese Resistance Though the actual execution of the Litani Operation lasted less than a week before Israel imposed a cease-fire, the ordeal left a bloody path in its wake. According to estimates made by the Lebanese government, the Israeli invasion caused 1,168 Lebanese and Palestinian casualties, half of which were civilians. While Israeli figures suggested between 250-400 Joint Forces (includes PLO fedayeen) deaths, Lebanese reports put the number at 150-200. In addition to the more than 1000 casualties suffered, the Litani Operation destroyed thousands of homes, rendering some 285,000 people homeless. This figure represents more than half of the estimated 445,000 population of the area. The International Committee of the Red Cross conducted an investigation into south Lebanon and determined that “80% of the villages and towns in the South were damaged, while the HRC [Lebanese Higher Relief Committee] reported seven villages or towns, including Khiyam, Ghandouriyeh and Abbassiyeh, almost entirely destroyed.”21 With this data in mind, the reactions of indignation of the south Lebanese were to be expected. However, reports of Shia upset with the PLO presence in Lebanon and approval of the Israeli operation were rather unforeseen. 20 21 Frederic C Hof 89-92. Lebanese Ministry of Information 11. Munhofen 79 A survey of reports of the reactions of the Shia living in south Lebanon offer conflicting accounts concerning their thoughts and reflections on Israel’s role in the three-month long occupation. A brief vignette reflected the sentiments of the Lebanese Shia: “A group of [Lebanese] residents gathered in Scafi’s pastry shop on the main street of Saida expressed rage over Israeli attacks. Some blamed the Palestinians, others didn’t but all apparently felt that the Israelis had used the Palestinian raid as a pretext to clear the Palestinians out of southern Lebanon and occupy it.”22 Obviously, some Shia ultimately held Israel responsible for the collateral damage brought by Operation Litani, and expressed their discontent with the IDF’s handling of it. The same journalist noted, “While some Lebanese are critical of the Palestinian guerilla…there is general outrage at the extent of Israel’s reprisals.”23 Imam Musa al-Sadr, however, voiced his concern about the physical damage wrought by the IDF but on what he considered an absolute disregard for Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. For al-Sadr, the power vacuum left in the wake of the Israeli occupation—the Lebanese state authority in the region continued to be sparse in some areas and non-existent in others—presented a dangerous prospect for those living in the south: If we try to look at the situation in the south separately from the question of Israeli occupation, it is a matter that calls for close examination because the question of Lebanese sovereignty in the south has become a crucial question. The lack of security and the absence of the state whets the ambitions of other people. Nobody today would leave an area in a vacuum, even if it were in the deep seas, let alone an area in the eastern Mediterranean, the heart of the world. Therefore, it is necessary that no vacuum should be left in the south, in the north and south of [the] Litani River.24 22 Marvine Howe, “Palestinians Fleeing the Israelis Crowd into Saida; Lebanese Port City Fears It Will Be Next Target,” New York Times, 17 March 1978, p.10. 23 Marvine Howe, “Palestinians Fleeing the Israelis Crowd into Saida; Lebanese Port City Fears It Will Be Next Target,” p.10. 24 Shi’ite Leader Interviewed on Israeli Withdrawal”, trans. from Arabic, Ad-Dustur, 26 June 1978, p. 9. Munhofen 80 According to al-Sadr’s reasoning, responsibility for the Litani Operation fell not just on the shoulders of the fedayeen but also on the Lebanese state for not asserting its own authority in the area and preventing the emergence of ‘Fatahland’. Although the Lebanese disapproved of the force used by the IDF in accomplishing its stated goals, they did not actively and violently oppose the Israeli occupation, and if they did, it was to little avail. The changing attitudes of the Lebanese Shia towards the PLO ultimately precluded any grand resistance effort since many Shia became increasingly critical of the PLO’s presence in south Lebanon. Like many Arabs, the Lebanese Shia viewed the plight of the Palestinians with empathy, having themselves experienced generations of governmental neglect. However, life with such a large Palestinian presence in the south grew tiresome, difficult, and eventually dangerous. Since the beginning of fedayeen operations originating in Lebanon in the late 1960s and the commensurate Israeli retaliatory attacks, the ire of the Lebanese towards the PLO grew significantly. Although the Shia did not take up arms against the PLO in the same way the Christian militias did, they surely did not seek to accommodate PLO forces. After the Litani Operation, the Lebanese Shia voiced their disdain for the Palestinian presence, and some even joined sides with Maj. Haddad’s militia. As Imam Musa al-Sadr explained the development of his position concerning the PLO in south Lebanon: During the past years we have seen different situations and attitudes. There is no doubt that in the beginning Palestinian presence in the south was quite in harmony with the feelings of the southern inhabitant who looked at Israel as their common enemy…The withdrawal of the state from the south led to Palestinians taking over the powers of the state. When they became the authority in the south, they became responsible for internal security as well as for defending the borders. My opinion, which I have often declared, is that it is not in the interest of the Palestinian resistance to replace the authority because in case of any internal or external problem—caused by Israel—the resistance will be practically responsible since such a problem will have happened because of its presence…all this led to the strained relations between the resistance and the sons of the south.25 25 “Shi’ite Leader Interviewed on Israeli Withdrawal”, p. 9. Munhofen 81 Imam Musa’s measured explanation of his growing opposition to the emerging Palestinian state mirrored the sentiments of other Lebanese Shia. For instance, a doctor from Saida said, “People generally feel that if the Palestinians were not here, the Israelis wouldn’t be raiding Lebanon.”26 Other Shia, however, took up arms against the fedayeen by joining the ranks of a Christian, Major Samir Shidyaq, who had established ties with Maj. Haddad’s militia. During Israel’s short occupation of south Lebanon, Israeli newspapers stressed the need to form close ties with Shia of south Lebanon. An editorial appearing in Ha’arez emphasized that this relationship must not impede the already cozy Israeli-Haddad relations: [The] IDF presence in southern Lebanon must now be used to build a friendly infrastructure with these Shi’ite Moslems. Without forsaking its alliance with the Christians and without leaving the Christian militias to their fate, Israel must now show initiative and imagination and pave a way to the heart of the Moslem population residing right next to [the Christians]…Obviously there is no security that the Shi’ites will want to lean on Israel….The extent of the destruction caused in the hostilities of the ‘Litani operation’ has opened the eyes of the Moslem inhabitants to see how heavy is the damage caused them by the terrorists [PLO]. The Shi’ite population in southern Lebanon is now becoming ‘a natural ally’ of Israel—both in the efforts for rehabilitation and in the efforts to prevent the return of the terrorists to their bases.27 With this in mind, Israel’s overtures towards the Shiite community via Maj. Shidyaq, a Maronite Phalangist who fought with the Lebanese Forces during the Civil War, were not surprising. Israel had a close relationship with Maj. Shidyaq, who worked with the IDF in setting up roadblocks in south Lebanon to curb the rise in looting occurring in the south.28 According to an article, whose optimistic tone was likely due to its Israeli origins, reported that Shi’ite leaders agreed to collaborate with Maj. Shidyaq when it read, “Shi’ite notables in the Bint Jubayl region have 26 Marvine Howe, “Palestinians Fleeing the Israelis Crowd…”, p.10. “Closer Links with Shi’ites in S. Lebanon Urged,” DAILY REPORT; Middle East & North Africa, 13 April 1978, p. N5. 28 “Shi’ite Notables to Help Recruit for S. Lebanese Army,” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa, 5 April 1978, p. N9. 27 Munhofen 82 agreed to cooperate with the initiative to recruit Shi’ite youths within the framework of a southern Lebanese army.”29 Although Imam Musa al-Sadr deemed Maj. Shidyaq another “Israeli agent” like Maj. Haddad, some Shia did in fact seek protection on behalf of the Israeli supported Christian militias.30 While the IDF met little to no Lebanese resistance, the PLO’s presence and deemed responsibility in the instigation of the Israeli campaign actually led some Lebanese Shia to join forces with Maj. Haddad’s Christian Israeli supported militia. From 1978 to 1982 In the period separating the Litani and Peace for Galilee Operations, Israel attempted to secure the border using the Christian militias it supported. However, in 1979 the Lebanese government made a renewed effort to increase its presence in the south with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 444, which: Calls upon the Secretary-General and the Force [UNIFIL] to continue to take all effective measures deemed necessary in accordance with the approved guidelines and terms of reference of the Force as adopted by the Security Council and invites the Government of Lebanon to draw up, in consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, a phased programme of activities to be carried out over the next three months to promote the restoration of its authority [emphasis added].31 In spite of Resolution 444 and another deployment of Lebanese Army troops sent to south Lebanon, Maj. Haddad deemed the territory under his control the State of Free Lebanon on April 18. While reaction to his declaration split across sectarian lines within Lebanon, Haddad’s actions met the near unanimous chagrin of the Arab world.32 In the meantime, Israel launched multiple operations aimed at expelling the PLO from south Lebanon or at the very least, making life in Lebanon nearly untenable. In April alone, Israeli land and sea bombardments coordinated 29 “Shi’ite Leader Interviewed on Israeli Withdrawal”, p. 9. “Shi’ite Leader Interviewed on Israeli Withdrawal”, p. 9. 31 Resolution 444, United Nations’ Security Council, 19 March 1979. 32 Lebanese Ministry of Information 13. 30 Munhofen 83 with attacks by Maj. Haddad’s forces led to 87 dead and 162 wounded.33 Under the pretext of rooting out ‘terrorist’ bases, the IDF initiated raids into Lebanese territory, and by January 1980, these operations “acquired a new dimension with the establishment of fixed Israeli positions in the border strip controlled by [Maj. Haddad’s] Free Lebanon Army [FLA].”34 In addition, The reports added that the Israeli forces stationed in Al-Khiyam are continuing to demolish houses and are establishing military installations there. The UN command says that the Israeli soldiers are preventing the UN observers from carrying out their tasks in Marun Ar-ra’s, Al-Khiyam, and Markabah. Despite the Israeli denial of these reports on Israeli movements, which are designed to prevent the Palestinians from infiltrating into Israel, it has been learned that in addition to the earlier excavation of large areas in ‘Alma ash-Sha’b and ‘Ayta Al-Jabal, Ramya and Az-Zuhariyya, Israel has also constructed paved roads in Shab’a, Kafr Shuba, Al-Mari, Rashayya al-Fukhkhar, and Al-Khuraybah and placed under its control 12 farms belonging to Shab’ah village owned by about 2,000 southerners.35 Because the PLO-led Joint Forces continued shelling Israeli towns, Israel and the Christian militias justified the increasing intensity of their bombing campaigns in south Lebanon throughout 1980. In 1981, clashes in south Lebanon reached a point at which the US deemed it necessary to intercede diplomatically. This point of ‘critical mass’ occurred when Maj. Haddad’s forces shelled troops of the Lebanese Army stationed in Qantara, an area ceded to the Lebanese troops by UNIFIL, on 16 March. According to the Lebanese government, it deployed forces to Qantara “In order to stop the cycle of violence in South Lebanon and to deprive Israel of its pretexts for intervention in Lebanon” on March 14.36 Maj. Haddad considered such a troop movement indicative of the pro-Syrian aims of the Lebanese Army, which ultimately sought the expulsion of all pro-Israeli militias from Lebanon. On March 16 the Christian militias unleashed a barrage 33 Lebanese Ministry of Information 14. Lebanese Ministry of Information 16. 35 “Israel Establishes Positions in South,” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa, 26 June 1980, p. G1. 36 Lebanese Ministry of Information 18. 34 Munhofen 84 of artillery bombardments on which killed three Nigerian UNIFIL soldiers and left 20 others wounded.37 In light of this attack, even Israeli Prime Minister Begin attempted to distance himself from the actions of Maj. Haddad when he said, “We have some influence [over Haddad] (and) if we use it, it is to prevent an attack on a U.N. force, on U.N.F.I.L., which must be respected and must truly restore peace… U.N.F.I.L. must not be attacked, and if there is any danger, and the possibility of preventing it, we prevent it. These are the orders that were given to all army commanders on duty in the north, and they know it.”38 Israel’s continued attacks on other areas in south Lebanon, however, did little to dissuade the international community from holding Israel at least partially responsible for the developing crisis. President Ronald Reagan urged Israel to “show restraint,” and he even called former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib out of retirement in order to assert US pressure to quell the situation.39 With Israel unwilling to budge in terms of enacting a cease-fire, President Reagan delayed the shipment of American fighter jets to Israel.40 In addition, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada issued a statement on behalf of the leaders of Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany saying: We are deeply distressed by the scale of destruction, particularly in Lebanon, and the heavy civilian loss of life on both sides…We call on all states and parties to exercise restraint and in particular to avoid retaliation which only results in escalation and to forgo acts which could lead in the current tense situation in the area to further bloodshed and war. We are particularly concerned in this respect by the tragic fate of the Lebanese people. We support the efforts now in progress to permit Lebanon to achieve a genuine national reconciliation, internal security and peace with its neighbors.41 37 “Christian Officer Vows Lebanon Curb,” New York Times, 24 April 1981, p. 3. Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1981-1982, Vol. 7 (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988) 21. 39 “A Special U.S. Envoy Will Go to Mideast,” New York Times, 6 May 1981, p. 1. 40 “Reagan Delays Jets to Israel; U.S. and 6 Allies Urge All Sides in Mideast to Cease Reprisals,” New York Times, 21 July 1981, p. A1. 41 “Reagan Delays Jets to Israel; U.S. and 6 Allies Urge All Sides in Mideast to Cease Reprisals,” p. 1. 38 Munhofen 85 With such international pressure to agree to a cease-fire, the Israeli government and PLO announced a bilateral cessation of hostilities on 24 July 1981.42 The south Lebanese, who bore the brunt of Israeli reprisals, welcomed this cease-fire with open arms. Nevertheless, within hours of its implementation, fedayeen “mistakenly” launched rockets at Israeli targets and the then traditional attack-retaliation-attack-retaliation model of engagement resumed.43 Operation Peace for Galilee Nearly a year later, in mid-1982, little changed along the south Lebanon border with Israel, but an attack on an Israeli diplomat in June brought the conflict to new heights. On 3 June 1982, three allegedly Palestinian terrorists attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, who in spite of three shots to the head, survived. Prime Minister Begin wrote in a letter to President Reagan, “The purpose of the enemy [the PLO] is to kill – to kill Jews; men, women, and children. Is there a nation in the world that would tolerate such a situation which, after the cessation of hostilities agreement, has repeated itself time and again?”44 Even before he wrote this letter, Begin answered his question with a resounding NO. On 4 June, Israel used air raids to destroy Palestinian targets in Beirut, to which the Palestinians responded with a shelling barrage of their own. In spite of UN Security Council Resolution 508, which called for a renewed cease-fire, clashes escalated. On 6 June, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee so as to “push back the terrorists to a distance of forty kilometers to the north, 42 “Cease-Fire in Border Fighting Declared by Israel and P.L.O.; U.S. Sees Hope for Wider Peace,” New York Times, 25 July 1981, p. A1. 43 “Cease-Fire in Border Fighting Declared by Israel and P.L.O.; U.S. Sees Hope for Wider Peace,” p. A1. 44 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8 (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990) 5. Munhofen 86 thereby effectively removing the PLO from striking against Israeli civilians living in the Galilee region.45 When Israel initiated Operation for Peace for Galilee in early June, Prime Minister Begin clearly stated the goals of the Israeli invasion as he explained, “I hereby announce – with the concurrence of all the Zionist factions – that we do not want even one square millimeter of Lebanese territory. We ask for only one thing: That our border be renewed – peaceful, green, quiet and beautiful – between Lebanon and Israel.”46 The border range, as defined by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, extended 40 kilometers into Lebanese territory.47 Israel used a large force to achieve its stated objective: “two armored brigades and a motorized infantry battalion,” which brought troop totals up to 20,000. 48 Although the IDF achieved its stated objective of pushing the fedayeen out of the 40 kilometer security belt within 55 hours of fighting, clashes between the Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force and Israeli soldiers served as the impetus for further advances into Lebanese territory.49 By 12 June, the IDF reached the outskirts of Beirut, and in two weeks, a siege of the port city began. During the siege, the IDF launched air and naval bombardments against West Beirut, the predominantly Muslim quarter of the city, and Syrian military targets in Lebanon. Finally, by 19 August, with nearly half of Lebanese territory occupied by the IDF, both Israel and Lebanon agreed to a US-brokered cease-fire, thus ending Operation Peace for Galilee. Over the next two months, as a Multi-national Force including US Marines took control of areas of Beirut, a total of 10,876 (2,631 PLO and 8,245 PLA) Palestinian regulars in the Palestinian Liberation Army and fedayeen of the PLO evacuated from Lebanon.50 Operation Peace for Galilee not only pushed the PLO 40 kilometers from the border, but the IDF 45 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 5. Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 13. 47 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 16. 48 Lebanese Ministry of Information 22. 49 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 17. 50 Lebanese Ministry of Information 22-26. 46 Munhofen 87 successfully dismantled Palestinian resistance in Lebanon and forced thousands of fedayeen to flee. Nevertheless, the last remaining fedayeen held out in West Beirut, but another assassination attempt—this time successful—triggered the final Israeli purge of Palestinian forces. Events took a turn for the worse when Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, a former Phalangist militia commander, was assassinated on 14 September. Accusing the Palestinian resistance of culpability, “the I.D.F. took positions in west Beirut in order to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed and anarchy, while about 2,000 terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons remained in west Beirut, thus blatantly violating the departure agreement.”51 By 16 September, Israeli troops occupied West Beirut and in cooperation with Phalangist militia forces, encircled the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila. Perhaps the most gruesome and inhumane actions of the conflict occurred when Israeli troops allowed Phalangists to enter the camps and slaughter hundreds of civilians. This portion of the operation will be covered later, as it pertains to one of Israel’s occupation policies, that being its use of auxiliary forces. The carnage wrought during 16-18 September forever etched images of murder in minds around the world. Facing international pressure because of its assumed role in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Israeli troops left West Beirut on 26 September, thus ending its 13-day occupation of that portion of the city.52 From this point, I will approach Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon, where its army maintained a large presence and carried out Israel’s controversial occupation policies, by paying particular emphasis on the period of late 1982 until 1985.53 51 Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 205. Lebanese Ministry of Information 26. 53 The ratification of the May 17 Accord (1983), which outlined Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, did not result in a significant Israeli withdrawal until 1985, as which point Israeli troops continued to occupy an area reaching 12 miles into Lebanon. Israeli forces held much of this territory until 2000. 52 Munhofen 88 Overview of Israeli Occupation and Initial Reception of Israeli Troops by the Lebanese States use their military might to invade and occupy foreign territories temporarily in order to accomplish strategic economic, political, and security goals. To establish control in the occupied territory, the occupying power must overrun the enemy by force. Because the occupying force must use its military to meet its tactical aims, the environment of an occupation is usually hostile. In spite of the hostile nature of occupation, the occupier still has the freedom to choose how it will treat the occupied population. In the same way, the occupied citizenry have the option of cooperating with, fleeing from, or resisting the occupation forces. My examination of the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon beginning in 1982 suggests that the occupier’s treatment of the occupied people, the majority of which were Shia, played a role in the emergence of Hizbollah, an Islamic resistance movement devoted to expelling foreign and especially Zionist influence from Lebanon. When the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) occupied south Lebanon in 1982, it enforced harsh occupation policies that inspired violent opposition to the IDF. In stark contrast, Israel’s 1978 Litani Operation elicited little native Lebanese opposition largely because IDF targeted the PLO fedayeen forces specifically. A comparison of the tactics of the Litani Operation of 1978 and occupation beginning in 1982, indicated that the IDF played a direct role in the formation of a native Lebanese resistance movement. At the outset of Operation Peace for Galilee, the local population of south Lebanon— both Shia and Christian—greeted the incoming Israeli troops as liberators freeing the south of its Palestinian problem. As aforementioned, the Shia living in south Lebanon detested the fedayeen whose attacks on brought undue destruction to the region via Israeli retaliations. As a result, most Lebanese in the south welcomed the IDF invasion as the necessary means, albeit potentially destructive, to achieve a PLO-free Lebanon. Therefore, Israel’s stated objective, “the destruction Munhofen 89 of the terrorist [PLO] infrastructure,” matched perfectly with the desire of the Shia living in south Lebanon.54 Due to this convergence of goals, the IDF met a welcoming Lebanese population. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak described the Lebanese reception of the IDF when he said, “We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south.”55 Within a week of invading Lebanon, the IDF reached the outskirts and began its siege of Beirut. By this point, the IDF controlled nearly “4,500 square kilometers of Lebanese territory and had all but liquidated the PLO military presence in southern Lebanon.”56 By 6 September 1982, the IDF finally achieved its goal of expelling the PLO from Lebanon when the last Palestinian forces left Lebanese territory.57 According to the Shiites in south Lebanon, Israel had finished its job, and finally, life could return to normal. Yet, within a few months after the forced evacuation of fedayeen from Lebanon, a Lebanese resistance movement emerged and attacked the Israeli troops and its allies occupying areas of Lebanon.58 The IDF began to face Lebanese resistance when the goals of the IDF and Lebanese began to differ, and this divergence of aims centered on the IDF policies while it occupied Lebanese territory. As previously mentioned in the first chapter, the resistance to Israeli occupation was distinct because of its Islamic character and devotion to the principles and ideology of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Although the IDF had achieved its goals, it enforced policies more indicative of a longterm occupation, or even annexation, than a short-term invasion and withdrawal. For instance, the IDF occupied private and public buildings, imposed “strict controls” over the south Lebanon 54 Meron Medzini, ed., Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 49. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 33. 56 Frederic C Hof 101. 57 Frederic C Hof 102. 58 Chris Mowles, “The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4, Oct. 1986, 1352. 55 Munhofen 90 population, and maintained “a massive and obvious presence of the Israeli armed forces.”59 During the siege of Beirut, “leaflets were dropped in Tyre and Sidon asking residents to report to the local Israeli administrative centers for new identification papers.”60 In addition, the IDF distributed a detailed 27-page questionnaire to village heads in the south, which if answered, gave Israeli officials more information about the demographics of the south than the Lebanese government likely had ever known.61 Obviously, these administrative strategies were not humanitarian activities for helping the Lebanese government reassert its own rule in the area; instead, the IDF collected this data to prepare for its imminent occupation in south Lebanon. For these reasons, the International Commission, a body composed of lawyers, concluded, “such facts constitute, by their nature acts of occupation under international law.”62 The Shia living in south Lebanon, had never desired or planned for a long-term occupation. Nevertheless, the continued presence of the IDF in Lebanon following the evacuation of PLO forces confirmed that the IDF had no intention of leaving Lebanon in the near future. The specific policies enforced by the IDF during the occupation ultimately led to the rise of anti-Israeli resistance in south Lebanon. These policies showed the people in south Lebanon that they and Israel held vastly differing interests. Examples of Israel’s specific occupational policies and practices follow. Economic Damage and Israeli Attempts at Recovery Operation Peace for Galilee severely hurt the economy of south Lebanon, with damages costing as much as 7.5 billion Lebanese pounds (1.9 billion USD), or nearly one-third of the 59 International Commission, Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1983) 115-116. 60 Chris Mowles 1352. 61 Chris Mowles 1352. 62 International Commission 116. Munhofen 91 entire Lebanese gross national product (24.3 billion LP). Most of this economic carnage affected the Lebanese living in Beirut and south Lebanon, particularly in the agricultural, industrial, and housing sectors.63 The invasion devastated the agricultural sector of south Lebanon, which before the invasion, “agriculture provided 40% of South-Lebanon’s revenues and employed 25% of the manpower there.”64 After the invasion, however, production decreased by 35-40 percent and exports fell by 50 percent. In addition, the number of agricultural workers dropped from 12,000 to 8,000. The production of factories operating in the south hovered at 70 percent of their functioning capacity. Manpower in these factories decreased from 12,000 to 7,000 and exports fell by 30 percent. To add to these already disconcerting figures, the Lebanese Ministry of Industry and Petroleum estimated that production costs increased by 25 to 40 percent. The housing sector of the south also incurred significant damages with 10-15,000 housing units either partially or totally destroyed by the invasion.65 In an effort to integrate the now-feeble economy of the south with Israel’s, the IDF enacted occupation policies indicative of an outright annexation. On aspect of Israel’s economic occupation policies included destroying what was left of the agricultural sector, followed by flooding the Lebanese market with Israeli goods.66 During the early portion of the occupation, Israeli troops demolished farms by way of burning and bulldozing, and in the district of Sidon, the IDF destroyed nearly 1000 acres.67 Joseph Schechla reported other damages when he wrote: On September 3, 1984, Israeli forces burned down entire plantations adjacent to Dwair village; and 10 days later, the IDF staged maneuvers in the Rafid Plain and Mdouka Hills, causing destruction of the vineyards there. On September 17, Israel 63 Lebanese Ministry of Information 30. Lebanese Ministry of Information 31. 65 All data taken from the Lebanese Ministry of Information 30-32. 66 Chris Mowles 1352. 67 Joseph Schechla, The Iron Fist: Israel’s Occupation of South Lebanon, 1982-1985 (Washington: Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1985) 36. 64 Munhofen 92 troops looted several houses and stet vineyards and an olive grove ablaze at Anqoun village, devastating a wide area. Using flares, IDF soldiers set the hills around the village of Houmine ablaze on October 13, 1984. Olive groves were destroyed and the soldiers prevented villagers from attempting to extinguish the fire. Plantations along the Ghaziyah-Zahrani road belonging to the al-Masri family were razed by IDF bulldozers.68 Compounding this sort of agricultural destruction was the introduction of cheap Israeli foodstuffs meant to replace the indigenous produce. As aforementioned, the economy of south Lebanon relied heavily on agriculture, and the introduction of cheap Israeli products wrecked the core of the south Lebanon economy. For instance, Israel exported bananas, usually considered a surplus item since many Lebanese farmers grew bananas, to south Lebanon so that during the occupation, nearly 60 percent of all bananas were of Israeli origin.69 The Report of the International Commission surmised that Israeli intended to “make the Lebanese consumer dependent on Israeli agriculture which would thus acquire an important market.”70 Israeli occupation policies caused Lebanese farmers to protest “against the dumping of Israeli produce in their market” by claiming “the Israeli competition forced them to leave their crops to rot in the fields or sell” at a loss.71 Additionally, because of the domination of the Lebanese market by Israeli produce, other Arab countries “started imposing bans on Lebanese produce for fear of importing Israeli goods,” further eroding the economy of south Lebanon.72 In an effort to solidify the economic relationship between Israel and the south, Israel took steps to reach an agreement with the National Bank of Lebanon that allowed branches of Israeli banks to open in the occupied south.73 The implementation of Israeli economic policies in south Lebanon clearly indicated that Israel’s aim “was both to disrupt the economy and to turn it into a satellite of the 68 Joseph Schechla 36. Joseph Schechla 37. 70 International Commission 137. 71 Joseph Schechla 36.s 72 Chris Mowles 1353. 73 International Commission 137. 69 Munhofen 93 Israeli economy.”74 Israel’s economic policy in occupied Lebanon helped establish an atmosphere of financial insecurity, which Israel’s use of auxiliary forces and the IDF’s inhumane treatment of Lebanese civilians only made worse. The Auxiliary Forces Prior to the Israeli invasion, the IDF held close ties to various Lebanese militias, most of which had strong connections to Maronite or Orthodox Christians.75 During the invasion, the IDF strengthened its ties to the Phalangists, who helped Israel occupy Beirut and root out fedayeen in the city. These militias helped the IDF carry out “harassing operations against the civilian population and in particular against the inhabitants of the refugee camps.”76 The massacres at the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps showed the disastrous impact of the IDF’s reliance on these sectarian militias: In 1982 the IDF allowed its Phalangist auxiliary force to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and within hours, the Phalange had murdered more than 1,000 Lebanese and Palestinians.77 Palestinians reported indirect Israeli involvement: Residents of the Shatila camp said no Israeli soldiers were directly involved in the killings. The residents said the Israelis sealed off the area surrounding the Shatila camp and the nearby Sabra camp Friday and then permitted Christian militiamen from the army of Maj. Saad Haddad, which is armed an trained by Israel, and the Phalangist militia of the late President-elect Bashir Gemayel to move into the camp. Major Haddad’s forces had been brought to the area by the Israeli army.78 Later reports concerning the massacres horrified readers worldwide and especially those in Lebanon. One reporter recollected, “Israeli troops and armour were standing around the perimeter of the camp and made no attempt to stop the gunmen—who have been their allies 74 International Commission 135. International Commission 118. 76 International Commission 119. 77 Augustus R. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2000, 23. 78 Thomas L. Friedman, “2 Factions Blamed,” New York Times, 19 September 1982, p.A2. 75 Munhofen 94 since their invasion of Lebanon—going in.”79 Another reporter wrote, “The bodies were everywhere, lying in the streets of both camps, curled up in the houses left standing and heaped at the base of walls where some obviously had been lined up for execution.”80 One observer described the clean-up effort saying: Sunday morning [19 September] the bodies of victims were still scattered throughout the streets and under the rubble of Sabra and Shatila. The noxious stench of decomposed bodies filed the air for hundreds of meters around the camps. Some of the corpses had been lying under the gazing sun since Thursday. Red Cross rescue teams and Lebanese soldiers continued their search, uncovering bodies of men, women, elderly people and children from the rubble. They wore black gas masks and rubber glove to protect themselves. The recovered bodies were carried to an empty lot by the entrance to Shatila. The corpses were gathered near a huge grave. Some were wrapped in blankets, others were bare. Many were disfigured beyond recognition. At the feet of one body lay the rope used to tie the victim. Now and then, A Red Cross ambulance would appear, bringing another load of corpses. A young Palestinian woman in the late stages of pregnancy moved from one body to another, hoping to locate her husband or other members of her family. Everyone looked as if they had rest returned from hell. Some cried—some trembled uncontrollably. Others still dazed, moved around like robots. Before long, the screaming began—the hysterical shrieks of mothers who identified their children’s corpses, of women who recognized their husbands, and children collapsing on top of the bodies of their parents.81 Noting the destruction and significant loss of civilian lives, the Israeli government sought to distance itself from Sabra and Shatila, and the Israeli Cabinet responded to accusations that it played a direct role in the massacres when it claimed, “All the direct or implicit accusations that the I.D.F. bear any blame whatsoever for this human tragedy in the Shatila Camp are entirely baseless and without any foundation. The Government of Israel rejects them with the contempt 79 Claud Morris, et al., Eyewitness Lebanon (London: Morris International Ltd., 1983) 32. Claud Morris 34. 81 Amnon Kapeliok, Sabra & Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre, trans. Khalil Jahshan (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1984) 61. 80 Munhofen 95 which they deserve.”82 The same communiqué even explained, “without the intervention of the I.D.F., there would have been much greater loss of life.”83 The Israeli government’s attempts at evading international criticism or its role in the massacre at Sabra and Shatila did nothing to assuage Lebanese fears that another disaster, possibly even worse than this, could happen again. The Kahan Commission confirmed Israel’s indirect involvement and even called for Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon, to resign, which he later did.84 Reports like the aforementioned served as fuel for anti-occupation sentiment in Lebanon and abroad. The Israeli Cabinet responded to accusations that it played a direct role in the massacres when it claimed, “All the direct or implicit accusations that the I.D.F. bear any blame whatsoever for this human tragedy in the Shatila Camp are entirely baseless and without any foundation. The Government of Israel rejects them with the contempt which they deserve.”85 Such a statement contrasted with reports indicating Israeli involvement, and as a result, the Lebanese believed such an Israeli response reaffirmed Israel’s lack of concern for the safety and security of the people under Israeli occupation. During the occupation, Israel sought to establish more militias, and in this writer’s opinion, Israel aimed to divert its responsibility of the occupation to these Lebanese militias. According to the International Commission, “This process of creating militias is still continuing [in late 1982]. Recent newspaper reports revealed that the Israelis are forming Druze militias in 82 Meron Medzini Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 207. Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 207. 84 According to the Kahan commission, “We have found, as has been detailed in this report, that the Minister of Defense [Ariel Sharon] bears personal responsibility. In our opinion, it is fitting that the Minister of Defense draw the appropriate personal conclusions arising out of the defects revealed with regard to the manner in which he discharged the duties of his office—and if necessary, that the Prime Minister consider whether he should exercise his authority under Section 21-A(a) of the Basic Law of the Government, according to which “the Prime Minister may, after informing the Cabinet of his intention to do so, remove a minister from office.” 85 Meron Medzini Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8, 207. 83 Munhofen 96 the south-east of the country and the Shi’ite militias in the south.”86 The IDF charged these militias with many of the unpopular occupation policies, such as the maintenance of order, manning checkpoints, and investigating villages and homes of suspected PLO sympathizers. For instance, “they carry out, apparently independently [according to Israeli claims], harassing operations against the civilian population and in particular against the inhabitants of refugee camps. Harassment consists of seizure of property, physical maltreatment, kidnappings, assassinations, and actual massacres [likely referring to Sabra and Shatila].”87 In many ways, the militias performed the ‘dirty’ work that the IDF sought to outsource. Clearly, the militias played an integral role in Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon, but their involvement in the harsh treatment of civilians led to the emergence of a resistance movement aimed at eliminating Israel—the patron of these militias. Treatment of Civilians in Occupied South Lebanon The harsh treatment of Lebanese civilians by the IDF also played a critical role in the emergence of a Shiite resistance movement beginning in late 1982. When the IDF entered Lebanese territory, the Palestinians and their few supporters put up armed resistance against the IDF. As aforementioned, many Lebanese actually welcomed the invasion as a necessary means to the end of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Although it defeated the weak Palestinian resistance with astounding efficiency, as evidenced by the September 1982 evacuation of PLO militiamen, the IDF treated the entirety of the south Lebanon populace as PLO collaborators. Spontaneous raids conducted by the IDF “among the civilian population were sometimes 86 87 International Commission 119. International Commission 119. Munhofen 97 executed without undue brutality.”88 According to the International Commission, “the evidence shows that the great majority of people were taken into custody during organized raids aimed indiscriminately at all men between 14 and 60 no matter what their nationality or situation.”89 Sometimes, the men captured during these raids “were kept [by the Israeli troops] for many hours before being paraded one by one before masked men.”90 The Israeli forces freed the fortunate men but took others to detention centers and prison camps. Perhaps the most egregious occupation policy of the IDF was the establishment of these prisons in south Lebanon and northern Israel where local civilians faced horrible conditions, an uncertain future, and sometimes death. The Centre of Information on Prisoners compiled a list of nine detention centers which included “Naharya, Hadera (under tents), Djebel el Joura (under tents), near Tiberias (under tents), Djalami (prison near Haifa – place for interrogation and torture.”91 However, the most notorious prisons, Ansar and Megiddo, served “as the driving force behind the resistance in the South” because of the number of prisoners they held and the treatment they faced.92 According to Palestinian and Lebanese sources, Israeli prisons in south Lebanon held approximately 1415,000 prisoners, but Israeli officials estimated a lower figure at about 9000 people. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported that just the Ansar prison kept 7,000 men— half of which were Lebanese—within its walls.93 At the International People’s Tribunal in Tokyo, Japan, Lebanese sociologist Ghassan Safi al-Din briefly mentioned the Ansar camp when he testified, saying: 88 International Commission 123. International Commission 120. 90 International Commission 121. 91 International Commission 125. 92 Chris Mowles 1355. 93 All data taken from International Commission 125. 89 Munhofen 98 Between 6,000 and 9,000 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners are kept in this camp where they have been held since the beginning of the Israeli invasion. These prisoners have been tortured. They do not have the right to defend themselves against specific charges. The Israelis have not even declared them prisoners. They are neither prisoners of war nor prisoners under civil or criminal law; they simply have no status. We are not told what crimes they have committed. We cannot visit them. They are deprived of all rights.94 At the Ansar detention center, prisoners faced awful conditions that caused Israeli Knesset member Amnom Rubenstein to describe “the conditions in Ansar as intolerable” and “a stain on Israel’s reputation.”95 What were the conditions at these detention centers? Accounts from released inmates painted a picture of despair and suffering. A Bangladeshi doctor working in Sidon recounted his arrest and transport to the Megiddo prison: It was Friday 11 June when myself and a Canadian doctor, Dr Giannou, a Lebanese doctor, and another Bangladeshi doctor, Dr Khalid, began with an operation of a Palestinian boy aged 12 who had sustained internal shrapnel injuries. We could not even complete our operation because suddenly we were told to stop [by Israel Defense Forces]…[on the bus transporting them to Megiddo] We heard someone fire and then the sound of someone falling on the floor of the bus. Later on the bus stopped somewhere, maybe it was Nahariya or a little bit before, and a man was dragged out; most probably it was that man who died inside the bus and who was shot by the Israeli soldier. Every five minutes we were all beaten with a stick, we were told not to move, and if there was a movement that the beating would increase. During this the Israeli soldiers searched all our pockets, took all our valuables, our money and other things.96 At the Megiddo prison, Israeli soldiers continued to treat Dr. Shafique Islam with little regard to his health or human dignity. After an interrogation occurring shortly after his arrival to the camp, Dr. Islam told about soldiers beating him when he said, “after the interrogation they told me to go outside and they started beating me, beating me thoroughly and properly. Except for the head, 94 Itagaki Yuzo, Oda Makoto, and Shiboh Mitsukazu, eds., The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Inquiry by the International People’s Tribunal, Tokyo (Tokyo: Sanyusha, 1983) 108. 95 Chris Mowles 1356. 96 The International Organization for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, Witness of War Crimes in Lebanon: Testimony given to the Nordic Commission, Oslo, October 1982 (London: Ithaca Press, 1983) 135-136. Munhofen 99 they beat me everywhere.”97 These beatings were widespread and a common practice at these centers. Another arrested doctor witnessed a beating where an Israeli guard “drove his knee as hard as he could up into the groin of the first prisoner. He then hit him behind his neck with his hand and the prisoner fell down to the ground. He then kicked him in the face, then in the stomach with his boots; this he did with small variations to all of those prisoners.”98 In addition to the multiple beatings the prisoners experienced on a daily basis, the hygienic conditions within the camps created an environment of filth. According to the International Commission’s assessment, “Hygiene is deplorable. Toilets are primitive and adjacent to the tents when not located on the inside these tents; often they overflow and then filthy water and feces flood the tents, the smell being intolerable, even to the sentries standing outside the fences…Scabies is rampant.”99 For the Lebanese, the detention centers operated by the occupying Israeli troops became a symbol of terror. Resistance to the Occupation For the average Shiite Lebanese civilian, “The environment of everyday life became one of fear and uncertainty,” but this sense of fear did not prevent many Lebanese, especially Shiite Muslims from resisting the occupation towards the end of 1983.100 The shift to violent resistance accelerated after a 16 October 1983 altercation between Israeli troops and Lebanese Shia in Nabatiyah as the Shia celebrated the holy day of Ashura with a reenactment of al-Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala. Israeli troops opened up fire on a crowd that defended itself with mere rocks. After the IDF gained the upper hand, it “sealed off the town and imposed a curfew on the 97 The International Organization for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 136. The International Organization for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 139. 99 International Commission 128. 100 Chris Mowles 1360. 98 Munhofen100 Nabatiyah area, searching homes and rounding up townspeople in the central square. More than 300 were abducted by the Israelis, including 60 women.”101 The Israeli occupation policies served as the impetus for armed resistance, as the occupation appeared to have no real end in sight. The Shia considered the Israeli occupation worse than the Palestinian presence because “The Israelis have given no indication to leave and many people say they have become even more abusive than the Palestinians.”102 The resistance movement that materialized found its strongest support among the Shiite population in the south, “many of whom had welcomed the Israeli invaders (expecting, incorrectly, that the IDF would expel the PLO and then leave).”103 According to Naim Qassem’s account of Hizbollah’s founding, Ahmad Kassir undertook Hizbollah’s first suicide bombing attack against Israeli forces when on 11 November 1982, the Shiite man drove a bomb-laden truck into the headquarters of the occupation forces in Tyre, Lebanon.104 Not long after this operation occurred, the Lebanese newspaper An-Nahar announced the formation of Hizbollah, a separatist movement “working for the establishment of an Islamic republic and Lebanon and spreading the Iranian revolution to all Arab states.”105 The influence of Iran was undeniable. Initially led by Husayn al-Musawi and Sheikh Subhi alTufayli, this militia split from Amal, of which the former and latter were once members. As Hizbollah-scholar Augustus Richard Norton noted, Hizbollah did not exist as a well-oiled resistance machine until the mid-1980s.106 In 1983 Hizbollah carried out attacks against US Marines stationed in Beirut and Israeli troops involved in the occupation.107 Following the 1983 Ashura incident, attacks against the Israelis increased significantly. By November 1983, the New 101 Joseph Schechla 53. Joseph B. Treaster, “Israelis Face Growing Shiite Hostility,” New York Times, 7 December 1983, p. 18. 103 Augustus Richard Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” 24. 104 Naim Qassem 89. 105 “Al-Musawi Forms Separatist Movement in Ba’labakk,” An-Nahar, 27 November 1982, 5. 106 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 34. 107 In this writer’s opinion, Hizbollah was ostensibly the “fourth party” mentioned in Thomas L. Friedman, “Snipers in Beirut Kill a U.S. Marine and Hit 3 Others,” New York Times, 17 October 1983, p. 1. 102 Munhofen101 York Times reported a surge of anti-occupation attacks by Shia loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini in an article that read, “Statistics issued by the Israeli Defense Forces show a sharp increase in recent weeks in attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon…Western analysts said that attacks were becoming more sophisticated and that Moslem fundamentalists, especially those influenced by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, were behind them.”108 In the same article, Shiite leaders “expressed bitterness about Israel and its occupation.”109 One of the leaders of this unnamed organization was Sheikh Rhageb Harb, who Nicholas Noe considered a founding member of Hizbollah.110 It came as no surprise to this writer to learn that in spring 1983, before the increase in Shiite attacks against Israeli troops, the IDF detained Sheikh Harb for 17 days.111 The experience of the Shia in occupied Lebanon led many to believe the only way to end the occupation was armed resistance. Although Western reporters oftentimes left this fundamentalist Shiite resistance group unnamed, this writer believes Hizbollah organized much of the Shiite resistance to the Israeli occupation, since the articles identified the early leaders of the militia and its ideological allegiance to Khomeini. Hizbollah attacked both the physical presence of Israeli troops on Lebanese soil and those who collaborated with Israel’s specific occupation policies. By December 1983, Hizbollah executed so many attacks against the Israeli troops that the “Guerillas have made it impossible for Israelis to walk the streets alone.”112 In July 1984, Shia attacked Israeli troops in the south several times each day.113 In response to such attacks, the IDF expelled Shiite leaders suspected of resistance activities, such as Shiekh Muhammad Husayn al-Amin, who was told, “Go and 108 Judith Miller, “Israeli Assumes Driver of Truck Was a Shiite,” New York Times, 5 November 1983, p. 9. Judith Miller, “Israeli Assumes Driver of Truck Was a Shiite,” p. 9. 110 In Nicholas Noe’s Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, footnote 8, p. 53. 111 Judith Miller, “Israeli Assumes Driver of Truck Was a Shiite,” p. 9. 112 Joseph B. Treaster, “Israelis Face Growing Shiite Hostility,” New York Times, 7 December 1983, p. 18. 113 John Kifner, “Southern Lebanon: Occupation by Israel Trauma for All Sides,” New York Times, 22 July 1984, p. 1. 109 Munhofen102 never return.”114 In response to such forced deportations, Shia took to the streets and protested the unending occupation. Hizbollah also attacked Lebanese civilians whom it considered collaborators with Israel. For instance, Hizbollah sought to curb the influx of Israeli goods at Lebanese markets, and “Many of those who were cooperating with Israeli security forces were threatened, Shiite Moslems said and Western officials confirmed. Six shops in Natabiye that had openly stocked Israeli fruits and vegetables were bombed, analysts said.”115 In August 1984, Hizbollah expanded its operations by attacking the Saudi Arabian and British embassies in Beirut in an effort to rid Lebanon of all foreign influence, especially what Hizbollah considered foreign pro-Zionist influence.116 According to Hizbollah, “the only dialogue with Israel…should be through the muzzle of a gun.”117 As such, Hizbollah’s attack against Israeli troops persisted, so that by the end of 1984, the IDF incurred such “heavy losses” because of “resistance attacks in the South” that it withdrew an occupation zone covering 10 percent of Lebanese territory.118 119 The Shia welcomed Israel’s withdrawal, as the resistance tactics seemed to accomplish the goals of the people. That said, the continued occupation of Lebanese territory served as the impetus for further resistance operations aimed at fully expelling the IDF from south Lebanon. Conclusion As explained in this chapter, the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of south Lebanon differed greatly, most notably in the sense that the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee initiated an 18-year occupation of Lebanese territory. The 1978 Litani Operation did not succeed in removing the threat the PLO posed to northern Israeli towns and the Christian populated areas of 114 John Kifner, “Southern Lebanon: Occupation by Israel Trauma for All Sides,” p. 1. Judith Miller, “Israeli Assumes Driver of Truck Was a Shiite,” p. 9. 116 Ihsan A. Hijazi, “2 Embassies Attacked in West Beirut,” New York Times, 25 August 1984, p. 4. 117 John Kifner, “Lebanon Threats Are Stepped Up,” New York Times, 8 November 1984, p. 3. 118 Chris Mowles 1361. 119 Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996) 33. 115 Munhofen103 south Lebanon. However, Israel did not follow its invasion with a long-term occupation during which it treated the south Lebanese civilians as collaborators with the PLO. Instead, Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon with their primary goal unaccomplished and the south insecure. Israeli officials were determined to avoid failure during the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, and within months of the invasion, the IDF watched as the last fedayeen departed from Beirut. Because the PLO presence in south Lebanon made life so difficult for the Lebanese Shia, they welcomed the 1982 invasion as a solution to a worsening problem. However, the subsequent occupation proved otherwise as the IDF implemented occupation policies designed to annex the Lebanese territory under Israeli authority. Due to the IDF’s harsh treatment of Lebanese Shia, a resistance movement emerged. In addition, the influence of Iran was obvious as Hizbollah’s early leaders pledged their spiritual allegiance to Khoemini. Hizbollah’s attacks against the Israeli troops occupying south Lebanon clearly exposed the Shia’s disgust with the harsh occupational policies. Munhofen104 Conclusion The final section of this thesis will summarize the major arguments explicated in the substantive chapters, and also reflect upon the limited scope of this particular essay with an intention of augmenting it at a later date. As stated in the introduction, this thesis sought to answer three questions: 1. What specific tenets of Khomeini’s ideology did Hizbollah incorporate into its identity?; 2. How were the Shia affected by the presence of the PLO in Lebanon?; and 3. Why did a resistance movement against Israeli intervention in Lebanon develop after the 1982 occupation but not the 1978 Litani Operation? I hope to revisit the answers to these questions, identify the weak aspects of my specific responses, and how I can better substantiate my claims if I decide to revisit this topic in the future. As for the first question, What specific tenets of Khomeini’s ideology did Hizbollah incorporate into its identity, I identified three components of Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology, though articulated and developed well before the inception of Hizbollah, that featured prominently into the DNA of Hizbollah. These tenets included Khomeini’s understanding of velayet-e faqih, oppressors versus the oppressed, and anti-Zionism. By declaring himself the leading jurisprudent, or faqih, Khomeini sought to extend his authority outside of Iran. Because of his close ties to Lebanon via Imam Musa al-Sadr, coupled with his increased legitimacy due to the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Khomeini became the preeminent Shiite leader in the world. As such, the devastating Israeli occupation beginning in 1982 allowed his radical ideology to penetrate into Lebanon because the harsh tactics employed by the IDF substantiated Khomeini’s criticism against Israel. Hizbollah’s early leaders considered Khomeini their spiritual guide, as evidenced in the statements made by these men. In particular, the 1985 Open Letter made numerous references to Khomeini and his legitimate authority, while also alluding to his Munhofen105 ideological tenets by using a similar language to his. Although my essay provided a unique comparison of writings and statements of Hizbollah’s members with Khomeini’s literature and speeches, I certainly could have delved deeper into such an analysis. With more time, I could have examined the dearth of statements made by Hizbollah’s members and Khomeini. Clearly, as shown in the first chapter, a strong correlation between the two existed, and I am sure there are other areas where their ideologies overlap. If I possessed a stronger command of Arabic or Persian, I may have found documents from Hizbollah’s early history that today remain untranslated, and with such data, my original contribution would have been that more distinctive and powerful. Nevertheless, I stand by my earlier claim that I did in fact provide an original contribution in the sense that no secondary sources provide a direct comparison of Khomeini and Hizbollah statements. Like the existing literature, I answered the second question, How were the Shia affected by the presence of the PLO in Lebanon, by arguing that the PLO presence in Lebanon adversely affected the lives of Lebanese Shia. More than 100,000 Palestinians entered Lebanese territory in the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and two decades later, fedayeen began launching attacks against Israeli outposts from south Lebanon The forced expulsion of thousands of PLO militiamen from Jordan in late 1970 led to an increase in fedayeen operations against Israel originating from south Lebanon. The establishment of a Palestinian state-within-a-state in Lebanon served as the impetus for Israel to preemptively attack fedayeen strongholds, thus putting the Lebanese Shia in the crossfire. The outbreak of the first phase of the Lebanese Civil War further exasperated the growing divide between the PLO, who formerly held strong ties to the Shiite community, and the Shia. Even Imam Musa realized how the quality of life for Shia deteriorated because of the actions of the PLO. Munhofen106 In my opinion, although this chapter sufficiently answered the question posed, it was the weakest portion of this essay. Because this chapter relied too heavily on secondary source material, it was less argumentative and more “historically” driven. For instance, in my first chapter, I compare two secondary source bases, the statements of Khomeini and Hizbollah’s members. In this chapter, however, I construct an argument, that the PLO presence aversely affected the Lebanese Shia, but I substantiate my claims via historical developments described in the secondary literature. While the last pages make more use of primary sources, I definitely could have defended my argument with more primary material earlier. As with the first chapter’s weaknesses, with more time and a better grasp of Arabic, I might have written a more compelling second chapter. The third chapter of this essay posed an answer to the question Why did a resistance movement against Israeli intervention in Lebanon develop after the 1982 occupation but not the 1978 Litani Operation? After Israel invaded south Lebanon in 1978, the IDF occupied the south for less than 100 days, and during that time, it did not enforce the harsh occupation policies characteristic of its later occupation begun in 1982. Perhaps, Israel did not have the enough time to implement the controversial and ultimately deadly practices that made 1982 such an infamous year for the Lebanese Shia. Regardless, the occupation begun in 1982 differed significantly from 1978 its scope and impact: Clearly, Israel intended to annex Lebanese territory, or at the very least, put the south Lebanese through such a terrible experience that they would never allow the PLO to attack Israeli territory ever again—Israel, of course, assumed the Shia collaborated with fedayeen. Israel’s economic policy in the south, use of auxiliary forces, and treatment of south Lebanese civilians contributed to overall atmosphere of terror and deadly insecurity. With Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen training Shiite men and indoctrinating them with Khomeini’s Munhofen107 revolutionary ideology, is it really surprising that such a resistance movement as Hizbollah emerged? Obviously, the answer is a resounding NO. For me, this chapter was the most enjoyable to write because it was truly distinctive in that none of the secondary literature compared the occupations of 1978 and 1982. Instead, they focused on the 1982 occupation alone. I truly felt as though I had broken some new ground in the scholarship on Hizbollah even though I ultimately arrived at the same conclusion as other historians who also reasoned that the 1982 occupation played a direct role in the formation of Hizbollah in 1982. I provided copious details, which strengthened my method in examining how the 1982 occupation led to the establishment of the Islamic resistance. For some readers, there may have been so many figures that they proved distracting. I thought the details substantiated my claims, while also legitimizing the research that went into such a time- and labor-intensive project. Nevertheless, I believe this chapter could have been augmented significantly. In fact, I earnestly insist that this chapter could become grounds for a book. If I knew in September 2009 what I know now, I would have focused this essay on the 1978 and 1982 occupations. As a senior undergraduate, I am proud of the work I put into this project and its final outcome. Although I am cognizant of its many weaknesses, I realize that I possessed a short time to complete such an expansive work. Perhaps, as a graduate student, I may have the time, academic resources, understanding of Arabic, and sheer grit to turn this mere senior thesis into a dissertation. I believe this paper is a start and has the potential to be something spectacular. Munhofen108 Works Cited Primary Sources Ahmad, Jalal Al-e. Gharbzadegi [Weststruckness]. John Green, trans. Lexington: Mazdâ, 1982. “Al-Musawi Forms Separatist Movement in Ba’labakk.” An-Nahar. Trans. 27 November 1982. The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report. Princeton: Karz-Cohl, 1983. Brewers, Sam Pope. “Nasser Influence Worries Lebanon.” New York Times. 27 February 1958. “Cease-Fire in Border Fighting Declared by Israel and P.L.O.; U.S. Sees Hope for Wider Peace.” New York Times. 25 July 1981. “Christian Officer Vows Lebanon Curb.” New York Times. 24 April 1981. Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996. “Closer Links with Shi’ites in S. Lebanon Urged.” DAILY REPORT; Middle East & North Africa. 13 April 1978. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hamid Algar, trans. Tehran: Mizan Press, 1980. Farrell, William E. “A ‘Limited Action’.” New York Times. 15 March 1978. ______________. “Israelis Withdraw Last Invasion Units in Southern Lebanon.” New York Times. 13 June 1978. ______________. “Major Fighting Ends.” New York Times. 16 March 1978. Friedman, Thomas L. “2 Factions Blamed.” New York Times. 19 September 1982. ______________. “Snipers in Beirut Kill a U.S. Marine and Hit 3 Others.” New York Times. 17 October 1983. Gwertzman, Bernard. “Israelis Seize 4- to 6- Mile ‘Security Belt’ in Lebanon and Say Troops Will Remain; Washington Sees ‘Impediments to Peace’.” New York Times. 16 March 1978. Hijazi, Ihsan A. “2 Embassies Attacked in West Beirut.” New York Times. 25 August 1984. Howe, Marvine. “Israelis Said to Be Seeking Use of Lebanese Villages.” New York Times. 26 February 1978. Munhofen109 ______________. “Palestinians Fleeing the Israelis Crowd into Saida; Lebanese Port City Fears It Will Be Next Target.” New York Times. 17 March 1978. ______________. “Some Palestinians are Proud of Attack.” New York Times. 14 March 1978. Ibrahim, Youssef M. “Reporter’s Notebook: Iran as Viewed From Bazaar, Campus, Slum, and Prison.” New York Times. 4 December 1978. The Imam Versus Zionism. Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1983. The International Commission. Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. London: Ithaca Press, 1983. The International Organization for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. Witness of War Crimes in Lebanon: Testimony given to the Nordic Commission, Oslo, October 1982. London: Ithaca Press, 1983. “Israel Establishes Positions in South.” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa. 26 June 1980. “Israelis Quitting Lebanon, Yielding Posts to Christians.” New York Times. 13 June 1978. Jaynes, Gregory. “Khomeini Declares Victory in Vote for a ‘Government of God’ in Iran.” New York Times. 2 April 1979. Kapeliok, Amnon. Sabra & Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre. Khalil Jahshan, trans. Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1984. Khomeini, Ruhollah. Islam and Revolution. Hamid Algar, trans.Tehran: Mizan Press, 1981. “Khomeyni Proclaims Islamic Republic.” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa. 2 April 1979. Kifner, John. “Lebanon Threats Are Stepped Up.” New York Times. 8 November 1984. ______________. “Southern Lebanon: Occupation by Israel Trauma for All Sides.” New York Times. 22 July 1984. “Kuwaiti Paper Reports Imam As-Sadr in Iran.” Sana. Trans. 13 September 1978. Langguth, A.J. “Torture’s Teachers.” New York Times. 11 June 1979. Lebanese Ministry of Information. South Lebanon: 1948-1986 Facts and Figures. Beirut: Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Information Department of Lebanese Studies and Publications, 1986. Munhofen110 “Lebanon Maps.” Perry-Castañeda Library: Map Collection. 2000. University of Texas, Austin. 9 May 2010. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_pol_2000.jpg> “Lebanon Maps: Distribution of Religious Groups.” Perry-Castañeda Library: Map Collection. 1983. University of Texas- Austin. 9 May 2010. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_religions_83.jpg> “Major Events of the Day.” New York Times. 10 April 1973. Medzini, Meron, ed. Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1947-1974, Vol. 1. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976. ______________. Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1947-1974, Vol. 2. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979. ______________. Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1974-1977, Vol. 3. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982. ______________, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1977-1979, Vol. 4. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981. ______________. Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1981-1982, Vol. 7. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988. ______________, Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents 1982-1984, Vol. 8. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990. Miller, Judith. “Israeli Assumes Driver of Truck Was a Shiite.” New York Times. 5 November 1983. Morris, Claud, et al. Eyewitness Lebanon. London: Morris International Ltd., 1983. Noe, Nicholas. Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. London: Verso, 2007. “PLO Envoy’s Warning.” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa. 12 January 1976. Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within. Dalia Khalil, trans. London: Saqi Books, 2005. “Reagan Delays Jets to Israel; U.S. and 6 Allies Urge All Sides in Mideast to Cease Reprisals.” New York Times. 21 July 1981. Resolution 425. United Nations Security Council. 19 March 1978. Resolution 444. United Nations Security Council. 19 March 1979. “Shi’ite Leader Interviewed on Israeli Withdrawal.” Ad-Dustur. Trans. 26 June 1978. Munhofen111 “Shi’ite Notables to Help Recruit for S. Lebanese Army.” DAILY REPORT: Middle East & North Africa. 5 April 1978. “Soviet Is Pushing Its Cause in Syria.” New York Times. 19 March 1956. “A Special U.S. Envoy Will Go to Mideast.” New York Times. 6 May 1981. “The text of the Open Letter addressed by Hizbullah to the oppressed in Lebanon and the world.” The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political. Joseph Alagha, trans. Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2006. Treaster, Joseph B. “Israelis Face Growing Shiite Hostility.” New York Times. 7 December 1983. Yuzo, Itagaki et. al. The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Inquiry by the International People’s Tribunal, Tokyo. Tokyo: Sanyusha, 1983. Secondary Sources Abisaab, Rula. “Shi’ite Beginnings and Scholastic Tradition in Jabal ‘Amil in Lebanon.” The Muslim World 89.1 (January 1999). 1-21. AbuKhalil, As‘ad. Historical Dictionary of Lebanon. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 1998. Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986. Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2006. Avery, Peter, ed., et al. The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. New York: Cambridge UP, 1991. Azani, Eitan. Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, From Revolution to Institutionalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Bernard, Cheryl and Zalmay Khalilzad. “The Government of God”: Iran’s Islamic Republic. New York: Columbia UP, 1984. Calmard, Jean, et. al. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Vol. 1. Ed. John Esposito. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. Chubin, Shahram and Sepehr Zabih. The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Collelo, Thomas, ed. Lebanon: A Country Study. Washington: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1989. Munhofen112 Coughlin, Con. Khomeini’s Ghost: The Iranian Revolution and the Rise of Militant Islam. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. Halm, Heinz. The Shiites: A Short History. Allison Brown, trans. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007. Hamizrachi, Beate. The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt: Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978. New York: Praeger, 1988. Hazran, Yusri. “The Shiite Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendancy.” Middle East Brief 37 (June 2009). 1-8. Hof, Frederic C. Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1985. Hussain, Mehmood. “PLO-Jordan Relations.” Economic Political Weekly 21.37 (13 September 1986). 1632-1633. Karsh, Efraim. Islamic Imperialism: A History. New Haven: Yale UP, 2006. Martin, Vanessa. Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000. Moin, Baqer. Pioneers of Islamic Revival. Ed. Ali Rahnema. London: Zed Books Limited, 1988. Mowles, Chris. “The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon.” Third World Quarterly 8.4 (October 1986). 1351-1366 Nasr, Salim. “Roots of the Shi’i Movement.” MERIP Reports 133 (June 1985). 10-16. Norton, Augustus Richard. “Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 482 (November 1985). 109-121. ______________. Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987. ______________. Hezbollah: A Short Story. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. ______________. “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon.” Journal of Palestine Studies 30.1 (2000). 22-35. Pakradouni, Karim. Al Salam al Mafqud. Trans. Beirut: 1984. “The Palestinian Element.” A Country Study: Lebanon, Library of Congress Country Studies. 10 April 2010. <http://countrystudies.us/Lebanon/37.htm> Panah, Maryam. The Islamic Republic and the World Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. New York: Pluto, 2007. Munhofen113 Parsi, Trita, “Israel and the Origins of Iran’s Arab Option: Dissection of a Strategy Misunderstood.” Middle East Journal 40.3 (Summer 2006). 493-512. Petran, Tabitha. Struggle Over Lebanon. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. Rabil, Robert G. Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, & Lebanon. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Schechla, Joseph. The Iron Fist: Israel’s Occupation of South Lebanon, 1982-1985. Washington: Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1985. Shanahan, Rodger. The Shia of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.