Maidan Past and Present (comparing the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2013/14 EuroMaidan in Ukraine)

Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan Pre-publication version of chapter in: Marples, D., and Mills, F. (eds) (20015). Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution. Columbia University Press: New York, p. 27-56 Olga Onuch Please cite as: Onuch, O. (2015). “Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan”, in Marples, D., and Mills, F. (eds) (20015). Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution. Columbia University Press: New York, p. 27-56 Introduction Déjà Vu: a Ukrainian Revolution It happened again! On November 21, 2013, Ukrainians began protesting. The, at first, small protests, triggered by the government’s refusal to sign the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, assumed the name EuroMaidan . On November 24, the protests—organized by opposition political parties, student organizations, as well as, long-time activists1—grew in size to approximately 250,000 in Kyiv. Tens of thousands of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians2 joined in Lviv (and across western Ukraine), and a few hundred to a few thousand joined in eastern and southern cities like Odesa, Simferopol, Kharkiv, and Sumy. By December 1, it was estimated that up to 800,000 ordinary Ukrainians joined protest events in Kyiv, and even more when including those that protested in other cities across Ukraine, such as in Donetsk and Luhansk, both considered Yanukovych strongholds. At first, the EuroMaidan seemed like something we have seen before: the Orange Revolution. We returned to November 23, 2004, when observers of 1 Ukrainian politics were shocked to witness a sea of ordinary Ukrainians, joined by activists and opposition party members, in a moment of mass mobilization3. While Ukraine had previously experienced several smaller protest events, such as those surrounding the 1986 Chornobyl disaster, the 1991 Revolution on the Granite, and the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests, the sheer size of the 2004 protests, and the fact that the majority of the protestors were ordinary Ukrainians was unprecedented.4 The protests were first heralded as a democratic awakening and a step towards Europeanization. After the election of the villain of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych, as president in 2010, however, academics agreed that for a variety of reasons, including protest fatigue, Ukraine would not soon see another mass-mobilization.5 Thus, when the November 2013 protests grew to 800,000 strong, political scientists returned to the drawing board. Mass mobilization against an unrepresentative regime was happening again, and again scholars did not see it coming. While it seemed like déjà vu, the EuroMaidan was very different, not least because it was preceded by the events of 2004. This formidable moment of mass mobilization quickly descended into violence unprecedented in post-Soviet Ukraine. Like the prying open of Pandora’s box, the EuroMaidan protests divided the country, creating opportunities for radical voices—on both sides of the spectrum—to take center stage. As of summer 2014, the crisis included the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the rise of Russian-sponsored guerrilla-separatist conflicts in eastern Ukraine—which military experts interviewed6 defined as a low level war—and a Presidential Election plagued by violence and a record low7 turnout of 59.48% (national average excluding Donbas – Donbas estimated turnout is 20%). 8 Thus, when a moment of mass mobilization, like the EuroMaidan, surprises the academe, the regime, and even participants, we must first identify the temporal boundaries of the protest events, who participated in the protests, how, and why? Moreover, as the events and outcomes of the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations in Ukraine were so different, it is necessary to place EuroMaidan into comparative perspective and through process tracing 9 to identify how the two protest movements were similar and different. This chapter is the first attempt to tackle systematically the different aspects of mobilization for the case of the EuroMaidan, and compare it against a previous case of mobilization that ended peacefully and resulted in relative stability, the Orange Revolution. Outline 2 This chapter’s aim is to analyze and contextualize critically the EuroMaidan as a case of mass protest, by comparing it to the Orange Revolution. First, the chapter will briefly outline the data used. Second, it will highlight some key writing on mobilization and activism in Ukraine, and will identify potential contributions of this analysis to the literature. The majority of the text will assess the EuroMaidan mobilization. Employing interview and focus group data that I collected, we will be able to compare and contrast the parameters and trajectories of two protest waves, including their duration, location, and geographical diffusion. This study will also compare the central actors involved in the mobilization process, and their main claims. At each step, this chapter will explore the differences and similarities between the 2004 and 2013-14 mass mobilizations. Finally, once the main boundaries of the mobilization have been mapped out, the chapter will address the recent focus of the media and social scientists alike on the rise of the right, the use of violence, and the new role of social media in the EuroMaidan mobilizations. This initial analysis seeks to provide a schemata for larger studies of EuroMaidan mobilizations and in the conclusion will highlight key hypotheses for future testing. Methodology and data The empirical findings discussed below consist of data collected during two periods. The data were collected by the author and her team of research assistants between November 26, 2013, through to July 24, 2014, in Kyiv, Ukraine. This includes data from on-site surveys (n=1475), rapid on-site interviews with protest participants, digital photos of slogans and posters held by protesters in the first four weeks of the protests, and twenty-one interviews and correspondences with activists, journalists, and politicians, including both opposition and regime insiders. 10 Due to the on-going nature of the crisis, interviewees have been anonymized, and I use Chatham House rules to protect the informants’ identities. To provide the comparison, I rely on interview (n=98) and focus group (n=15) data collected between 2005 and 2010, covering the 2004 mass protests, past mobilizations, and activism in Ukraine. 11 Process tracing methodology was employed by the author to comparatively analyse the data.12 Contributing to the literature on Ukrainian activism and protest Ukrainian activism and mobilization is rarely examined until a mass protest occurs (be it in 2001, 2004, or 2013). Moreover, most analyses fail to provide 3 either historical context or a comparative perspective. That said, there are several valuable studies on mobilization in Ukraine. I should note that this is far from, and is not intended to be, a conclusive list. Key studies include research on the Ukrainian labour movement,13 women’s movements,14 and dissident activism.15 Still, the vast majority of studies focusing on activism and protest in Ukraine have been limited to the Orange Revolution. I have argued elsewhere16 that the three dominant types of studies of the Orange Revolution are those focusing on the role of intra-regional knowledge transfer,17 those arguing that foreign actors helped finance, train, and or coordinate the activists, their organizations, and the protests,18 and those that focus on the role of elites in both the formation of social movement organizations (SMOs) and in masterminding the protests.19 Several recent studies have also attempted to problematize micro-level participation in Ukrainian mobilizations, but these have relied on perception based rather then experiential data, and we have previously been unable at getting at the actual protesters when they are in the streets.20 Recent survey work by the Ukrainian Protest Project, the Kyiv Institute of Strategic Studies, and a National Science Foundation-sponsored research team headed by Henry Hale at George Washington University, will continue to fill this gap. This chapter combines and addresses the different above-noted perspectives on mobilization in Ukraine, and by doing so helps bridge empirical gaps. By comparing it to the Orange Revolution, this chapter will allow us to understand better not only the EuroMaidan, but will also further elucidate the patterns and politics of mobilization in Ukraine. Perhaps, this will help us better understand why the Orange Revolution ended peacefully and why the EuroMaidan resulted in a geopolitical crisis. First, we need to understand better the nature of the EuroMaidan, and then we can contrast and compare it to the Orange Revolution. What was the EuroMaidan? To facilitate a deep understanding of extra-institutional political behaviour, activism, social mobilization, and democratization more broadly in Ukraine, it is crucial to address briefly a question central to our puzzle: what was the EuroMaidan The 2013-14 EuroMaidan was both an instance of mass mobilization and a wave of protest. Thus, there are, as is the case with most moments of mass mobilization, two separate phenomena that require our attention. The first is a longer mobilization process pursued by and one in which activists and the political opposition participated. The second, a simultaneous event in the case of the EuroMaidan, was the phenomenon of a large protests, a moment of mass- 4 mobilization, in which ‘ordinary’ citizens joined the activists in the streets en masse. More similar than different, or visa-versa: the EuroMaidan and Orange Revolution Compared Several crucial points of similarity and difference exist between the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution. First, we can compare the duration, location, and size of the protests. This will provide us with clarity as to what wave of protest events21 the analysis refers. The chapter will pay specific attention to how the 2004 and 2013-14 protest waves differed geographically. We will explore how, from the first weekend, the mobilization spread to regions that previously did not see any serious protest events; contrary to some media reports, protests were not confined to the center and west of the country. Secondly, we will discuss the different actors involved in the mobilization process, and identify their roles. Here, we will highlight how the composition of the protesters shifted throughout the different phases of the protests. Through process-tracing, which includes survey and interview data, we will explore which actors are perceived to have spearheaded protests and compare that to the actors who actually took the lead in the events of 2004 and 2013-14. We will also investigate how the role of SMOs differed during the two protests. Next, we will query the central demands, claims, and repertoires22 employed by the protesters. While there has been much ado in the media about the role of Ukraine’s nationalist right in the EuroMaidan, this paper explores, using posters and signage from the protests, onsite rapid interviews, and focus group responses, whether “integral nationalists” received the same, more, or less support in 2013-14 than they did in 2004. Moreover, the dramatic and unprecedented use of violence will be clarified. Lastly, the use of new Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) and specifically the use of social media23 in the 2013/14 protests, will be problematized. Size, spatiality24 and geographic diffusion of protest events The EuroMaidan was reported in mainstream news to be a longer and significantly larger mobilization compared to the Orange Revolution. 25 Also reported was the claim that the EuroMaidan manifests the same east-west Ukrainian geographic divide. Thus, first we must address the length of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and assess if this greatly differed from the mobilizations in 2004. Second, we must assess the location, both spatially and 5 geographically, of participants. Lastly, we must attempt to account for the size of the mobilizations. When? And How long? As we know, the initial day of protest of the EuroMaidan was November 21, 2013. The following Sunday, November 24, was the first day the protests assumed a ‘mass’ quality. Yet, it was not until the weekend of November 30, and specifically December 1 that the EuroMaidan became a mass mobilization, in which we see a broad cross section of Ukrainian society take to the streets and squares of most large cities in Ukraine. While meetings of the EuroMaidan continued, we can consider the date Yanukovych fled the country, February 21, 2014, the final day of the EuroMaidan mobilization (even if the crisis continued, shifted and expanded thereafter). Thus, the multiple protest waves lasted three months. The EuroMaidan went through four distinct phases and at least four waves of protest and repressions. 26 The first phase, November 21-30, was sparked by the government’s volte-face on the EU Association Agreement. The second phase began after Berkut violently beat students and journalists, and cleared the Square. This also marked the first escalation of protest repertoires and an increase in militia violence—protests grew in size until mid-December. The third wave of protests began after the announcement of the anti-protest laws on January 16 by the Verhovniya Rada [Supreme Parliament] making it illegal to protest and lasted until 19 January. Some protesters, who were organized in smaller groups of Sotni (groups of 100), employed more violent tactics. The state escalated their use of repression—army and special forces militia used live ammunition, resulting in four deaths. The most violent encounters took place on Hrushevskyi Street approximately 600 meters from Independence Square. Other protest zones, however, remained relatively peaceful. This phase particularly saw the spread of protests, including regional direct action campaigns27, road blockades, and government building takeovers, to the east and south of the country.28 The fourth and final wave of mass repression began on February 18, 2014, when the regime attempted to clear the Square in a military operation that included snipers employing live ammunition. This final phase of protests and violence ended when Yanukovych fled to Crimea, and when protesters stormed the Presidential Administration Building in Kyiv. 6 In the case of the Orange Revolution, most analysts agree that while planning for the protest events took several months, activists and opposition mobilized around the time of the first round of presidential elections on October 21, 2004.29 Observers generally agree that the protests turned into a moment of mass mobilization approximately on November 23, 2004, after the official announcement of the fraudulent election results on November 21. This mobilization ended on or close to December 27 following a revote of the second round of the presidential elections and the election of Viktor Yushchenko as President. Thus, the Orange Revolution lasted approximately two months. While the length of the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan are similar, the events of October 2004 were neither a large protest nor a mass mobilization. It was only on November 23, 2004, a full month after initial protests, that ordinary Ukrainians joined en masse. This escalation and expansion of the protests happened at a much faster rate in 2013. Moreover, while the beginning of the longer mobilization process in 2004 can be traced back to at least January 2004, when SMO networks began to coordinate protest groups30 and to develop a plan of action for the fall election, there is little evidence that activists and the opposition anticipated the events of EuroMaidan. Thus, one could argue that while the mass mobilization component and the crisis resulting from the EuroMaidan lasted longer, the mobilization process was much more drawn out, and as we will see below, better coordinated in 2004 than in 2013-14.31 In the Cities When of Ukrainian politics first witnessed the crowds on Maidan Nezalezhnosty [Independence Square], it was assumed that the 2013 protest was a “mini” Orange Revolution A BBC World reporter stated that it was striking how it was “the same square, same time of year, [and] same city”.32 Within days, activists erected a stage at the base of the Statue of Independence along the southern section of the Maidan, and also set up tents with food and medical supplies. From the stage, activists and politicians spoke and musicians sang. Similar demonstrations happened in Lviv and several smaller western Ukrainian towns and cities. The space in which protest took place was symbolic and historically important, connecting the past struggles (be it, The Revolution on the Granite, The Ukraine Without Kuchma Protest, or The Orange Revolution) to the current one. Crucial differences, however, existed in the spatiality of the EuroMaidan protests compared to the Orange Revolution.. Namely, in most cities and towns, 7 including Kyiv, there were at least two different, though not oppositional, protest locations. Often, however, the same square hosted at least two different protest groups. One location was for the activists, journalists, students, and selforganized members of local communities, and the other was chosen and used by opposition parties and their immediate supporters. In Kyiv, the former was immediately established on Independence Square, while the latter was at first based in the Evropeiska Ploshcha [European Plaza], some 900 meters eastward. Even after protests united (in Kyiv this took place over several days from November 24 to 27), the Squares were still divided into different zones. Each group or stakeholder developed a distinct protest area. Thus, from the very beginning even the physical space of the protest zones showed divisions between different groups. For instance, the often referred to and rebranded as a political party Pravyi Sektor [Right Sector], was until mid-December simply a location in the Maidan protest zone. Its members were located in the right-hand corner of the Square. There, too, were a variety of SMOs, right-wing political parties and networks, and individuals who were willing to take part in frontline protests and provide security to other protesters (see image 1). The spatiality of the protest zones was important as it allowed for different groups, with different approaches and aims, to carve out their own version of the EuroMaidan. Image 1 Meeting Place of the Maidan Initially Called “The Right Sector” 8 (Picture taken on November 29, 2013: Ukrainian Protest Project ©, Olga Onuch and Tamara Martseniuk 2013) During the Orange Revolution, the Maidan was also divided between different groups, into what some would argue zones. However, from the beginning of the protests activists and party coordinators were united. In 2004, as explained by the coordinators themselves, the different networks of activists and political opposition forces cooperated, coordinated, and even signed a formal deal in 2004.33 By contrast, the coordination and cooperation between activists and organizers surrounding EuroMaidan was complicated and highly contested. This was specifically the case between activist networks and politicians; but, it was also a problem between different generations of activists.34 Thus, while the setting and stage design of the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution seemed similar, divisions were clearly visible in the architecture of the 2013-14 Maidan. The lack of coordination between the actors, as well as the prominence of selforganized ‘ordinary’ citizens, altered the boundaries of the contentious performance. In the Country Beyond this subtle shift in the spatiality of the protests at the local level, there was a more important expansion and extension of protests at the national level during the EuroMaidan. While we know that protest participation differed regionally, unlike the Orange Revolution, which was certainly a phenomenon of western and central Ukraine, the EuroMaidan was a national phenomenon, even though the largest protests took place in similar locations to 2004. From the very first weekend, small protests occurred in large cities in Simferopol, Odesa, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and even Donetsk, among other eastern and southern oblasts.35 These protests not only took place in central squares and outside of local government buildings, they occurred in cities and towns that have witnessed few protests since independence. Protests also occurred in places considered strongholds for the Party of Regions and Yanukovych supporters. Thus, protests spread to places wherein the risks associated with protesting were higher than in Kyiv because the level of support for the regime was higher. This geographic diffusion of protest events was one of the most interesting and novel aspects of the EuroMaidan protests. 9 Historically, Ukrainian activists hail from all parts of Ukraine. Elsewhere, I have described four “islands of contention,” regionally based activist tusovky [cliques or networks] in Lviv in the west, Kyiv in the center, Kharkiv in the east, and Odesa in the south. But, protests by ordinary Ukrainians in the east and the south were and are a rare occurrence. Instances of mobilization in these regions during the Orange Revolution were exceptional. In the case of the EuroMaidan, the national diffusion of the protests was instantaneous, and occurred in three waves. The first wave of protest event diffusion began around the weekend of November 24. These protests were quite small and were usually organized locally—only a handful coordinated with local political parties, typically Blok Yulii Tymoshenko (BYuT) [Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc], Ukrainskyi Demokratychnyi Alians za Reformy (UDAR) [Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform], and Svoboda [Freedom]. On November 29, 2013, I counted thirty-eight groups on the Russian-language social media site VKontakte related to EuroMaidan protests. The second wave of diffusion followed the violence of November 30, 2013, when Berkut forces attacked protestors. The state’s use of violence expanded the rhetoric of the protestors to include universal civil and human rights. The continued diffusion of protests throughout the country was even more pronounced, and they grew significantly in size. The third wave took place between January 17 and February 18, and saw the growth of radical and direct action tactics. These included the occupation of government buildings and the toppling of Lenin statues [Leninopads]. While activists and opposition parties coordinated some events, most were organized by local citizens. This development is evident in the images of shawl-wearing grannies who stumbled into local government buildings with their plastic carrier bags, alongside hoodieclad youth—both refusing to vacate in protest. One broadcast from Kryviy Rih, a large metallurgical center southwest of Dnipropetrovsk, showed an elderly woman who claimed, “I do not know how to protest. You can take your protest, I am not interested. I am a citizen and I am not leaving until Yanukovych resigns.”36 While a more thorough quantitative analysis focusing solely on the relationship between the identities and expectations of protesters and their geographic diffusion is necessary, it is clear that “ordinary” Ukrainians who had lived in places of relative calm since independence were key participants in the EuroMaidan. What is yet to be adequately documented, however, is the extent of the internal migration of protesters to Kyiv during the EuroMaidan.37 While it is assumed that most migrants came to Kyiv from western oblasts, survey data that I collected from protesters contends that a significant proportion came from central and eastern oblasts. Moreover, many of the most radical protesters, 10 including the leaders of the Pravyi Sektor, came from eastern oblasts. Dmytro Yarosh and many of his closest colleagues hail from Dnipropetrovsk. This departs from 2004, when the leaders of yellow Pora! [It’s Time!/The Time is Now] and black Pora!, came from western and central oblasts. Thus, the EuroMaidan is distinguished from the Orange Revolution by not only its trajectory and outcome, but to the extent that eastern based SMO networks and ordinary Ukrainians participated in protests. How many? The size and scale of protests in 2004 and 2013-14 are comparable. At their height approximately 800,000 people took part in the protests in Kyiv and close to 1.5 million across all of Ukraine. Depending on the time and location, the protest count varied considerably. Recent work from the Center for the Study of Society, located in Kyiv, Ukraine, which has counted protests and estimated sizes, is a good reference.38 As noted by the Center, it is not the size of the largest protests that distinguish the EuroMaidan from the Orange Revolution. Rather, it is the number of protests and incidents. The Center estimates that just under 4,000 protests took place during a three-month period of EuroMaidan. This high number is likely linked to the lack of coordination between different types of actors and protesters, and to the geographic diffusion and self-organized nature of the many of the protests. The next section will look at the roles and responsibilities of key actors during the mobilization process. Actors involved in EuroMaidan mobilization processes While identifying the dates, waves, boundaries, frequency, size, and location of protests helps us better understand the EuroMaidan, let us now turn our attention to how and when important actors influenced protest events. Elsewhere, I have identified four types of actors that are integral to the mass mobilization process: activists and SMOs, political elite, ‘ordinary’ citizens, and foreign actors. Each category of actor can be further divided. For instance, activists and SMOs can consist of diverse and even competing networks, while ‘ordinary’ citizens can represent a broad cross-section of society or it can be limited to a particular sub-group or electorate. Importantly, political elite should be divided between those strongly tied to the regime and those in opposition with few or no links. Foreign actors include supranational institutions, individual states, foreign leaders, politicians, bureaucrats, and foreign activists 11 and SMOs, journalists and citizens from neighbouring countries or expatriates, and the national diaspora. The analysis of Ukrainian and other Eastern European mobilizations has focused on foreign actors—politicians, activists, or financiers—and the ways in which they can enact, guide, and manipulate the mobilization process. Ultimately, the literature concludes that mobilization is most dependent on the actions of the political and economic elite. Since civil society is generally weaker in post-Soviet regimes, the trajectory and outcomes of mobilizations are elite dependent and ordinary citizens who mobilized tended to do so out of partisanship, emotional appeals, and ethno-linguistic nationalism. 39 The next section will engage with the above framework and briefly investigate the roles of the different actors in the 2004 and 2013-14 mobilizations. I will also identify key differences that can explain the different trajectories and outcomes of these two movements. Activists and SMOs While a detailed and quantitative process tracing of the different activists, SMOs, and networks involved in the mobilization process is not possible here, based on a small sample of interviews with activists I seek to identify trends and patterns in activist mobilization in 2013/14. In 2004, the SMOs Pora! (chorna) and Pora! (zhovta) became household names. During the EuroMaidan, no SMO was as ubiquitous. Nonetheless, activists stressed that several tusovky [cliques] involved in coordinating protests, and specifically the Maidan in 2013-14, were continuations or revivals of SMOs active in 2004 and 2001. They came together under umbrella groups like Hromadskyi Sektor [Civic Sector], Opora [Support], Molodyi Opir [Young Resistance], Chesno [Honestly], Coordinating Committee of the Maidan, Zhinocha Sotniya [Women’s 100 Squadron], Avto Maidan [Car Maidan], Samooborona [Self Defense], and Pravyi Sektor. Moreover, selforganization was not only a phenomenon among ‘ordinary’ citizens, it was also a trend among activists who broke off from pre-existing groups and launched their own activities. Unlike in 2004, when in order to be an activist you had to join a network, this time activists created new networks around their aims, strategies, and tactics for revolution. One such example is when individual activist, with long CVs of engagement joined or organized their own Sotni or SamoObora groups (author’s interview with unnamed former Yellow Pora activist, August 27, 2013). Much like in 2004, as well as in past mobilization like Ukraine without Kuchma, the boundaries between journalists, activist networks, and tusovky were 12 heavily blurred in the EuroMaidan. Mustafa Nayem, a well-known journalist and co-founder of Hromadske.TV, has been said to have in part initiated the events of EuroMaidan when he urged Ukrainians to gather in protest on Independence Square against Yanukovych’s decision to delay the implementation of the Association Agreement. Internet television and journalism strongly reflected activist rhetoric; former coordinators of Pora! (chorna) and Pora! (zhovta), for example, served as cinematographers stationed on the Square.40 For this reason, this discussion groups together these two actors.41 While it initially seemed as though activists did not play as key a role in the 2013-14 mobilization compared to 2004, most insiders highlight the role of activist-journalists in framing protest claims and sparking the initial mobilization, and then acting as connectors and intermediaries between selforganized ‘ordinary’ citizens, smaller activist groups, and politicians. Several small networks of activist-journalists, via social media, polemics, and an on-theground presence, enabled greater mobilization. In a Facebook post, Nayem and other journalists framed the non-singing of the EU association agreement as illegitimate and a violation of democratic rights.42 Yet, insiders explained as early as December 2013 that it was this willingness of certain politicians and journalistactivists to assume leadership roles without premeditation that divided the SMO networks.. Activists repeatedly point out that, “while in 2004 leaders found common ground, in 2013 SMO networks …[were] fragmented and lacked cooperation, making much of the coordination and mobilization… much more complicated” (author’s interview with unnamed Civic Network Activist, November 30, 2013). Activists stated that even though the majority of SMO leaders in 2013-14 were key figures from past mobilizations and played active leadership roles in 2004, they had to coordinate quickly not only with other activists, but with a new generation of university-student-activists and networks, too. The two processes of uniting activists and incorporating the activities of student networks into a coordinated and united front, which in 2004 took months of preparation, had to take less than a few days in 2013. Even though the use of social media permitted faster mobilization, schisms and differences among and between the activist leadership, SMOs, and politicians resulted in the slower than anticipated coalescence of anti-regime interests. This, in turn, created opportunities for the formation of alternative sub groups to form. Insiders have explained that though activist leaders relied on pre-existing diffuse networks, conflicts and disagreements appeared instantaneously on how the protests should proceed. Creating a united protest front was further complicated by egos and political differences. A former Pora! (zhovta) activist 13 who played an important role in the EuroMaidan Coordinating Committee explained that differences of “how to mobilize, were the outcome of disappointments after 2004”.43 She mentioned that, “some [activists] stressed that we should… prepare for a violent revolution, others did not want to cooperate with politicians… making it difficult to coordinate the protests and keep the peace”.44 She explained, contrary to some of the Ukrainian punditry, that these sentiments neither stemmed from nor were a reaction to the regime’s use of violence. The fragmentation of activists and the rise of violence “was not simply a cause and effect story. That is too simplistic.” Ideas of violent revolution “developed over several years.” Nonetheless, these tactics were, according to some activists, certainly “legitimized, when the regime repressed students and journalists on November 30, 2013.” Other experienced activists explained that the Coordinating Committee and old guard activist leaders could not prevent the formation of sub-groups that promoted the use of violence and destabilized the situation because there was no clear idea under what conditions this mobilization should end. Unlike in 2004 when the aim was to prevent further Kuchmizm45 and elect Viktor Yushchenko, the goals of the EuroMaidan were neither clear nor static. Thus, it was difficult for activists to coordinate both protests and messages, particularly as SMOs represented different constituencies with different long-term interests. Foreign actors In both 2004 and 2013-14, foreign actors played an important role in the mobilization process. In the two-year period leading up to 2004, Ukrainian activists relied on funds and training from various Intergovernmental and NonGovernmental Organizations (IGOs and NGOs). Foreign actors were important, though not essential, for the mobilization process. In 2013, protests were triggered by a foreign policy issue, the geopolitical direction of Ukraine, although with domestic implications, thus making the EU, its institutions and member states key actors in the mobilization process, specifically in its trajectory and outcome. Foreign NGOs and IGOs did indeed provide some small levels of support to several independent news groups and SMOs in 2013, but this was clearly ad hoc and initiated by Ukrainians. Moreover, as a Kyiv-based embassy worker explained, most foreign actors, diplomats or NGOs, focused on elite actors and attempted to help broker a deal (author’s correspondence February 14, 2014, NYC). Informally, Ukrainian political insiders have complained about Europe’s and America’s lack of initial interest and, then, later mismanagement of 14 the EuroMaidan crisis. Thus, it is difficult to discern the influence these actors had on the mobilization process. It is possible, as I have argued elsewhere, that a focus on foreign actors often exaggerates both their ability to mobilize and to influence actors and events. Yet, it is also possible, and more likely, that during the EuroMaidan, as opposed to the Orange Revolution, the Yanukovych regime was less concerned with the West. The EU and the USA lacked both carrots and sticks with which to influence the regime. Moreover, the regime was both heavily influenced by and arguably dependent on Russia and Putin by fall 2013. Unlike in 2004, in 2013 the Yanukovych regime was not composed of a broad coalition of interests. As such, it had greater freedom not to negotiate with western diplomats. Hesitant and furtive actions on the part of the West also reflect uncertainty as to the desirability of Ukraine’s potential future leadership. On February 7, 2014, a telephone conversation reportedly between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt was leaked to the press. In it, Nuland speaks frankly on the merits of the three main opposition leaders— Vitaly Klitschko, Oleh Tyahnybok, and Arseniy Yatseniuk. This brings us to the role political economic elite, both in power and in opposition, and their role in the mobilization process. Politico-economic elite By 2013, it was clear that the Yanukovych regime was very different from Kuchma’s. Yanukovych’s was composed of a small inner circle of family, friends, and business associates. The Party of Regions consisted of a clientelist network that heavily relied on patronage and nepotism, making it less susceptible to defections and lessened the likelihood of interlocutors.46 In fact the first signs of defection came when Serhii Tihipko left the Party of Regions, and when Serhii Lyovochkin, Chief of the Presidential Administration, resigned in January 2014. These actions provided cover for Yanukovych and enabled him to resist foreign pressure to resign. Insiders have suggested that because of differing worldviews Yanukovych was more able and willing to use repressive force than Kuchma.47 Thus, the regime was stronger and qualitatively different from Kuchma’s semiauthoritarian rule. Furthermore, political opposition was simply not as united and coherent as it was in 2004. The divisions, visible conflicts, and differing policy aims of key opposition leaders, Klitschko, Tiahnybok, and Yatseniuk, also made any 15 coordination difficult. As one Yanukovych administration insider explained, “they could not pose a legitimate political threat. They could not easily win an election. They were too different”.48 As a former SBU insider explained in 2012, the post-2010 opposition had few contacts within the regime, and thus had little influence on policy generally and specific actions, including the violent repressions of November 2013, particularly. Unlike the formal agreements made between the opposition in 2004, its initial lack of coordination and inability to prevent the use of violence resulted in a ‘coalition of inconvenience’. Moreover, opposition parties struggled to coordinate with activists and SMOs. Not only was the regime stronger and more willing to engage in violence, the opposition was disoriented, and for the most part incapable of coordinating with, let alone controlling, the Maidan. This is a sharp contrast to 2004, when, by December, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party, had near total control of the Maidan, and infact co-opted the mobilization of activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens into its own. “Ordinary”citizens: the median protester ‘Ordinary’ citizens are the most interesting category of actors involved in mass mobilization processes. Political scientists still debate why these generally disengaged individuals join activists and political opposition en masse. While in 2004 a clear partisan cleavage dominated the Maidan, the story of the EuroMaidan is much more complex. The shifting aims of the EuroMaidan reflect, in part, the diverse socio-economic and political affiliations of the protestors. The average age of EuroMaidan protest participants surveyed was 36 and men outnumbered women only slightly representing 59% of participants between November 26,, 2013 and January 10, 2014. Eighty-two percent of protestors were Ukrainophones while 12% were Russophones. 49 Sixty-nine percent identified Ukrainian as the language most used in private life, while 22% identified Russian.50 According to the 2001 Census, this is representative of the general population in central Ukraine.51 Also, the majority of protesters surveyed were employed and had at least secondary and some post-secondary education.52 According to our findings as part of the Ukrainian Protest Protect, the EuroMaidan protesters can be divided into three broad groups: students and youth; the employed middle-aged; and retirees and those over 50. The youth and students called themselves the initiators of the protest, and said they sought abstract goals such as “freedom” and “a ‘real’ democracy.” They reported frustration with their parents’ generation for permitting the failure of democracy in Ukraine. The middle aged group saw themselves as the “most important” 16 protesters as they were the “workers” and “voters” who were necessary to win elections and to keep the economy running. They explained that unlike the students, they could not be ignored because of their political and economic power. Their demands were more concrete than those of the younger cohort. Issues of economic security, travel to the EU, and the state’s illegitimate use of violence characterized their demands. ,The older group saw themselves as the “guardians of the Maidan.” This group of protesters, as they had no children and were retired, had “less to lose.” As such, they saw it as their responsibility to protest. A preliminary analysis of our protest participant study coincides with findings from surveys and focus groups conducted after the 2004 mass mobilization. EuroMaidan protesters, like the participants of the 2004 protests, eloquently employed a profound rhetoric of human rights to describe the central motivating factor behind their mobilization. Protesters identified the repression of November 30 and the official announcement of electoral fraud as the two moments when they “realized that this could happen to anyone and everyone.”53 In 2013, even previous supporters of the Party of Regions understood that repression and infringement of rights affected all citizens equally. In contrast, in 2004, the same realization escaped regime supporters. An interviewee explained, “anyone who had internet and saw the videos stopped being a BYuT or Party of Regions supporter, and became a citizen.”54 Furthermore, a comparison of focus group discussions I conducted with participants of the Orange Revolution shows differences in how grievances were framed. In 2004, the protesters focused on civil rights, whereas in 2013 the majority of protesters seemed to focus first on human rights, then socio-economic rights, and then civil rights. This makes sense as the Orange Revolution was motivated by fraudulent election results. The immediacy of the violence during EuroMaidan also explains different demands. As protesters described, their focus on human rights, combined with social media’s ability to rapidly inform and share information, and the legitimacy of self-organization, seems to have brought a wider mix of people to the protests than in 2004. An Expanding Protestorate? The Ukrainian Protest Survey found, that while the general participation and membership in civic organizations, unions, and political parties of those surveyed is quite low, surprisingly only 63% of protesters surveyed participated in the Orange Revolution.55 Even if we account for age, a significant portion of 17 our EuroMaidan survey respondents were first time protesters or “novices.” This, coupled with our knowledge that the protests were larger and more diffuse nationally than during the Orange Revolution, points to an expanded “protestorate.” Moreover, among protesters almost 10% had voted for the Party of Regions or for Yanukovych in past elections. As such, these protesters should not be understood as blind partisans. Rather, they represent a type of middle class, swing voter that we have observed in other countries, like the “Soccer Mom” in the United States. I argue that not only does the EuroMaidan median protester point to an expanding protestorate, but also to a less sectarian voter who will withdraw political support if they feel a leader or party has broken campaign promises or violated the social, democratic contract. The selforganizing ordinary Ukrainians, thus, are central to distinctions between the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution. The grassroots, self-organized protestorate came out en masse in 2013 compared to 2004. Now that we have a better understanding of the protest events and the actors involved, we can briefly address four themes central to informed observations and media reports: ethnolinguistic issues, the state’s use of violence, the rise of the right, and social media. Protest claims then and now: foreign policy, civic and ethno-linguistic claims Recent news coverage has focused heavily on the ethno-linguistic and ethnonationalist component of the EuroMaidan. 56 Statements like protesters were “mostly Ukrainian-speakers” frame the EuroMaidan as an ethno-linguistic issue. The reality is that most Ukrainians speak Ukrainian. The 2001 Census found that 65% of Ukrainians are Ukrainophones. The ethno-linguistic identities of Ukrainians are complex, fluid, and generally poor predictors of political behavior; rather, region has more predicative, explanatory power in this regard Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Role of Regionalism,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (2010): 99–106, doi:10.1353/jod.0.0177.. The analysis of Ukrainian activism through the prism of ethno-linguistic identity is not new and was best articulated by Mark Beissinger’s August 2013, article in American Political Science Review.57 When we compare past focus group discussions and recent interviews, it is clear that in 2004 ethno-linguistic identity had a greater influence on protest objectives and on protesters more generally than in 2013-14. Furthermore, if we compare the digitally documented protest posters as displayed on Independence Square in 2004 and 2013-14, we see fewer references to language and ethnic identity issues in the latter. We also observe more Russian language posters during the EuroMaidan than during the Orange Revolution. 18 Moreover, the fact that the mobilization initially occurred over a foreign policy issue was also somewhat novel in Ukraine. In the past we saw smaller protests with an anti-Russia and anti-Nato focus in 2005 and 2008 respectively. Protesters, however, did not actually discuss their demands in foreign policy or geopolitical terms. Rather, protesters spoke about socio-economic rights that would be protected by the Association Agreement and the illegitimacy and lack of accountability of the Yanukovych government by reneging on a promise of closer ties with the EU.58 Nonetheless, the media’s focus on an allegedly divided Ukraine overlooked the fact that in both 2004 and even more so in 2013-14, the majority of demonstration placards and posters focused on the regime’s corruption and on Yanukovych and his cronies’ criminal behavior. Pictures of the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan would be difficult to distinguish if not for the prevalence of “Yushchenko orange” in those from 2004 and “EU reflex blue,” the dominant color of the EU flag, in those from 2013.. Thus, while a minority of protesters were preoccupied with ethno-linguistic issues, my team and I actually observed an expansion of protest claims in 2013-14. However, the majority of protesters, as in 2004, demanded political protection of civil rights. Expansion of Protest Tactics: the Rise of Violence Although there is much continuity between 2004 and 2013-14, the use of extreme violence both by the regime and by protesters is a substantial departure from a long history of non-violence practiced by dissidents, activists, and opposition parties. I have previously mapped out the history of activism and SMO networks in Ukraine since the 1960s and found that dissidents and activists have purposefully eschewed violent tactics. From the Sixtiers (Shistdesiatnyky) to the People's Movement of Ukraine (Narodnyy Rukh Ukrainy), and from the Revolution on Granite to the Ukraine without Kuchma movement, protest in Ukraine has a distinct history of nonviolence. The majority of activists previously interviewed took seriously Ukraine’s tradition of non-violent protest. Former leaders of Pora! (chorna) and Pora! (zhovta), recounted how they taught tactics that would minimize protest violence and reduce the possibility of violent reappraisals from the regime. In focus groups it was remarkable how activists described their self-restraint and refusal to use violent tactics.59 As one activist noted “any act of vandalism, drunken disorder, whatever, can give the militia an excuse to put us all in jail”.60 Non-violent tactics, to which all activists during the Orange Revolution swore allegiance, were considered sacrosanct 19 Such experienced activists, as a result, were frustrated during the EuroMaidan by their collective inability “to control the activists, the crowds, and the provocateurs” and thus proved unable to stop the spread of violence (author’s interview with unnamed Civic Network Activist 2, November 30, 2013). Though only a minority of the more radical protesters used violence, they were unfortunately the most visible in the media. This does not mean to deny that the protests escalated to a “Molotov Revolution.” Rather, the images of fighters, walls of fire, and masked young men did not and do not represent the peaceful, larger groups that turned out well into February to join evening demonstrations in city squares. Still, this shift in the tactics of Ukrainian protest should be concerning, if only because previous protesters were generally peaceful. To many Ukrainian activists it was troubling to learn that Egyptian protesters used Ukrainian how-to videos to make Molotov cocktails.61 But as many have explained, it was their lack of coordination and control over protest events that allowed the spread of violence. This begs the question as to who sparked it and stood to gain from its use. The rise of the right and the divisive nature of the protests Recent Ukrainian focus groups reveal a belief that the EuroMaidan was divisive and, according to some, did more harm than good. The state’s violent tactics divided the country, they said. Yet, from mid-January onward, Russian and Western media focused increasingly on escalating violence and right wing groups, which unfortunately were branded as the dominant groups of the Maidan. 62 This focus on “Banderite Nationalists” provided an even greater opportunity for dividing the Ukrainian population. Dyczok’s recent scholarship has explained how the media manipulated these competing images to develop a fear of the enemy next door, be they violent “Banderites” or the repressive Berkut.63 The central focus has been on Pravyi Sektor. As noted above, and though currently an official political party, during the EuroMaidan it was a coalition of several ring-wing and nationalist groups. It also included individuals who wanted to assist security and frontline activities.64 Some participants, including its leaders, were long time members of pre-existing organizations, but others had and still have no organizational affiliation.65 While Keith Darden and Lucan Way highlighted these organizations’ western Ukrainian origins, Dmytro Yarosh, the 20 leader of Pravyi Sektor, and his coordinators were from Dnipropetrovsk, in the east. It was Pravyi Sektor, the party, and Dmytro Yarosh, the politician, who benefited the most from the use of violence as it resulted in increased media attention taking both from obscurity and turning them into a household brands. Yet, just how new was this “rise of the right”? Of course, right wing groups exist and have existed in post-independence Ukraine. A lack of evidence, however, exists as to whether or not participation in these groups has increased or decreased. Though anecdotal and observational, the results of right wing groups in recent elections inform that these groups have been unable to attract any substantial support. For instance in the May 2014, Presidential elections, right wing and conservative candidates Oleh Tyahnybok receive and Dmytro Yarosh received 1.6% and 0.7% of the national vote respectively. In the 2012 Parliamentary elections Svoboda, a party with ethnonationalist roots, received 10.4% of the vote. If we compare the role of right-wing organizations in past protest events, it was certain individuals who were participants in the organizations noted above who assumed top leadership positions in the SMOs active in 2004. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that right wing participation in protests is a new development. Insiders also disagree if the number of right wing protesters increased between 2004 and 2013.66 Yet, their visibility and their use of radical, direct, and violent tactics certainly has changed significantly. One activist explained that “there was more discipline among activists and party organizers in 2004, but with the rise of the internet, the ability of anyone to create their own group/protest event, the control of the situation by activists declined and so did their ability to stay disciplined”.67 He reminded me of a conversation we had in Kyiv in the summer of 2009, when activists were preparing for the 2010 Presidential Elections, “back then people were saying, we failed in 2004, we need to start a armed revolution… with the disarray of ‘self-organization’ they got their opportunity to do this.” Again, this reinforces the claim that disorganization among the opposition and activist networks created the conditions necessary for the rise of right-wing elements. These conditions were simply not present in 2004. New technologies, social media and samo-orhanizatsia (self-organization) Finally, we turn to social media and the ability of EuroMaidan protesters to selforganize. The relationship, however, between self-organization and social media 21 use is not clear. Was self-organization more prevalent because of social media or was social media use more prevalent because of a higher propensity for selforganization? What is clear, though, is that during the EuroMaidan the two were positively correlated. Though able to both facilitate the spread of information quickly and democratize protest, social media ‘selfies’ and ‘self-organization’ more broadly are not without concern. My research has revealed that social media was not in and of itself mobilizing. It is clear, though, from initial findings that social networks, specifically friendship networks, as participants attended the protest with close friends and family members, were integral to mobilizing individuals. This does not mean that social media was not influential—it certainly was and by all accounts, it aided significantly information dissemination and protest coordination. While Twitter was predominantly used by activists, organizers, politicians, and other policy practitioners, Facebook and VKontakte were used by ‘ordinary’ citizens, who often created their own pages, groups, and events related to the EuroMaidan. This was particularly important in the Regions, where people could not easily access information; social media enabled near instantaneous access. Moreover, social media work differently from internet media. With the former, you do not need to search for information per se since your newsfeed lets you know what your friends read and watch, and if they plan to attend certain events. Even so, social media still need people to create posters and events. It was also far too easy to simply like and share an item and feel as if one has already participated and made a difference, a development termed “slacktivism” or “armchair activism.” Changing a profile picture is a poor substitute for physical presence at a protest site. Social media activity was, for the most part, also seen as safe and free of risks. Yet, it exposed activists, real and imagined alike, to regime repression, by making them easily identifiable. Moreover, the spread of photoshopped and aggressive propaganda also created opportunities for the spread of violence. Thus, while social media may have had a democratizing effect, as noted by one activist, “there is a dark side to social media… you can safely voice radical views… you can spread misinformation… and just like it was a space to battle regime propaganda, it also allowed opponents of the EuroMaidan to demonize us” (author’s interview unnamed student activist, February 25, 2014). Several activists explained that they viewed the self-organization and the prevalence of social media during the EuroMaidan as concerns because they contributed to organizational chaos, loose discipline, and a reduced focus on the use of non-violence. Some explained in interviews that they believed that the rise 22 of Facebook activism contributed to the rise of the right, and to the escalation of violence. While further analysis is necessary and the causal relationship is still unknown, it is certain that we can at least see a correlation between the three variables previously mentioned.. This hypothesis can be tested for Ukraine and for mass mobilizations internationally. Conclusions: directions for further study While our initial impressions of the Orange Revolution and EuroMaidan lead us to believe that the two events were very similar, this chapter has identified key differences. First, while the mass mobilization and the crisis resulting from the EuroMaidan lasted longer, the general mobilization process was much longer, better coordinated, and better planned in 2004 than in 2013-14. In terms of space, the protest sites also differed in how they were managed. In 2013, each group or stakeholder developed their distinct protest areas. Even the physical space of the protest zones mirrored the divisions and lack of coordination among different groups of actors. It was argued that the spatiality of the protest zones was important as it allowed for diverse groups, with different approaches and aims, to carve out their own version of the EuroMaidan. Furthermore, in 2004 the protests mostly occurred in Kyiv and western Ukrainian cities. In 2013,—the protests quickly spread throughout the country. From the very beginning of the EuroMaidan we observed—albeit small—protest events in eastern and southern oblasts. It is hypothesized that social media platforms, specifically Facebook and VKontakte, facilitated the spread of protests through the dissemination of important, timely information. This merits further analysis by social media experts. Furthermore, the diffusion and geography of the protests can be better understood through the employment of Spatial Statistical Analysis. While the actors involved in the two mass mobilizations were generally the same, they were not adequately able to coordinate their activity in 2013/2014. While many observers and activists alike have applauded this democratization, the lack of clear boundaries and leadership offered radical voices the space to expand and even encouraged protesters to violence. This brings us to the last issue discussed in the chapter, the extremely violent nature of the protests. Unlike in 2004, the EuroMaidan witnessed violence from both the state and protesters. Unlike in 2004, the regime unleashed extreme force against the citizens of Ukraine. These were blatant violations of human rights and undoubtedly stoked a more aggressive and desperate response from protesters. Kuchma, unlike 23 Yanukovych, was unwilling to use agents of the state to silence protest—a deeper analysis into the inner-workings of the two presidential administrations will allow us to understand better this process. However, the use of violence was a significant shift among Ukrainian activists, who long employed a variety of nonviolent tactics. This is, in my opinion, one of the most significant differences between the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan., The repercussions of this move to violence need to be understood within the context of the further escalation of violence, and in the delegitimization of the movement according to some Ukrainians. Recent focus groups that I conducted show Ukrainians believe that not only has the violence of the Maidan traumatized a generation of Kyivans, it has provoked the division of Ukrainian society. The regime and a small group of protesters’ turn to and increasing use of violence will require study for many years to come. In order for Ukraine to move past these horrific events, we need to continue to offer evidence-based advice on how to unite Ukrainian society. This will achieve a more nuanced and sensitive understanding of the motivations of those who participated in the violence. Endnotes Activists are more engaged and more formalized members of Social Movement Organizations. They are connected to activist networks, and as I and other scholars have defined them – they are “in the business of protest”. An ‘ordinary’ citizen can become an activist – but this is rather infrequent Olga Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 39–46. 2 ‘Ordinary’ Ukrainians or ‘ordinary’ citizens is used by the author to denote the nonactivist, non-politicized citizens of a polity, who tend to be regularly disengaged from politics, other than when (and if) they vote in elections. Generally, they have not been active members of a Social Movement Organization, nor have they consistently participated in previous protests. Included are individuals of all socio-economic, employment and education levels. ‘ordinary’ citizens draws on Nancy Bermeo’s (2003) use of the term “ordinary people.” The term is used to avoid “the masses,” “average people/citizens” or even “median voter” as they depict a different concept of actors. 3 Mass Mobilization is 1-“ …proportionally larger than other protest events…”; 2- the balance of participation shifts away from activists…to a…majority made of ‘ordinary’ citizens.”; 3-“ ‘ordinary’ citizens…form cross-class and cross-cleavage coalition”.; 4“protests are more extemporaneous…undirected and lack a clear leadership…”Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina, 3–4. 1 24 Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina. 5 Adam Meirowitz and Joshua A. Tucker, “People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 2 (2013): 478–90, doi:10.1111/ajps.12017. 6 Due to the sensitive nature of the Euromaidan protests, the potential that some informants are under threat or can be under threat, and the fact that there is an ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the author has decided to anonymize all informants interviewed, and is instituting Chatham House Rules to protect the informants’ identities. 7 The average voter turnout for Presidential elections since independence is Turn in presidential elections since independence is 73.24% for first round average and 74.0% for first and second rounds. 1991 (first round only) 84.2%; 1994 (first round) 70.4% and (second round) 71.6%; 1999 (first round) 70.1% and (second round) 74.9% ; 2004 (first round) 74.54%, (second round) 81.12% and (re-run of second round) 77.28%; 2010 (first round) 67% and (second round) 69%. (all turnout data taken from Central Election Commission, Presidential Election Reports, 1991-2014. (Kyiv, Ukraine, 2014), http://www.cvk.gov.ua/. 8 Ibid.; Michel Chossudovsky, “Ukraine Presidential Elections. Low Turn-Out. Poroshenko Declares Victory,” Global Research, May 25, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-presidential-elections-low-turn-out-poroshenkodeclares-victory/5383777; Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Only Chance to Rebuild Ukraine,” Carnegie Europe, May 6, 2014, http://www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=55508. 9 The analysis of the data in this chapter process tracing methodology, influenced by Beissinger’s usage in his study of Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (2002), and by methodological insights presented by Ibid.; Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” 2010, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8872/; David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (2011): 823–30.. Process-tracing includes meticulously identifying, tracing, mapping and triangulating first-hand accounts, focus group materials and debates, and documentary evidence. The events and actors’ participation were first traced in reverse, simultaneously mapping a) the actors’ interaction and cooperation and b) the various stages of the mobilization process, until the origin of mass-mobilization was identified. 10 For more information about the survey, see: Olga Onuch, “Social Networks and Social Media in Ukrainian ‘Euromaidan’ Protests,” Washington Post, January 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/02/social-networksand-social-media-in-ukrainian-euromaidan-protests-2/; Olga Onuch, “The Puzzle of Mass Mobilization: Conducting Protest Research in Ukraine, 2004–2014,” Reviews & Critical Commentary: Council of Europe, May 22, 2014, http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/the-puzzle-of-mass-mobilizationconducting-protest-research-in-ukraine-2004-2014/; Olga Onuch, “‘Who Were the Protesters?,’” Journal of Democracy, 2014. 4 25 For more information about the data, see: Olga Onuch, “Why Did They Join En Masse? Understanding ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians’ Participation in Mass-Mobilisation in 2004,” New Ukraine/Nowa Ukraina, no. 11 (2011): 89 – 113; Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina. 12 For more on process tracing, see: Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference”; David Collier, “Process Tracing: Introduction and Exercises,” Beta Version, September 22 (2010): 2010. 13 Stephen Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel: Russian and Ukrainian Workers from the End of the Soviet Union to the Post-Communist Transformations (University of Michigan Press, 1997); David R. Marples, Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers’ Revolt (University of Alberta Press, 1991). 14 Alexandra Hrycak, “Foundation Feminism and the Articulation of Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine,” East European Politics & Societies 20, no. 1 (2006): 69–100; Tamara Martsenyuk, “What Is The Maidan Talking About,” 2005. 15 Yehven Zakharov, “History of Dissent in Ukraine,” Virtual Museum, Virtual Museum of the Dissident Movement in Ukraine, (2004), http://archive.khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1127288239. 16 Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina. 17 (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2007) 18 Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough (Brookings Inst Press, 2006); Michael McFaul, “Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution,” International Security 32, no. 2 (October 2007): 45–83, doi:10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.45; Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West∗,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2006): 21–32, doi:10.1080/09557570500501747. 19 Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange; Paul D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design, vol. aThe Strategy of Paired Comparison (M.E. Sharpe, 2006); Lucan Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 55–69, doi:10.1353/jod.0.0010. 20 Mark R. Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” American Political Science Review FirstView (2013): 1–19, doi:10.1017/S0003055413000294; David Lane, “The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary Coup?,” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10, no. 4 (2008): 525–49, doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2008.00343.x; Meirowitz and Tucker, “People Power or a One-Shot Deal?”; Olga Onuch and Gilles Serra, “The Protest Calculus: Why Ordinary People Join-in Post-Electoral Protests?” (presented at the Oxford workshop: Comparing Transitions, Nuffield College, Oxford, UK, 2010); Onuch, “Why Did They Join En Masse? Understanding ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians’ Participation in Mass-Mobilisation in 2004”; Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina; Onuch, “‘Who Were the Protesters?’”; Joshua A. Tucker, “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post11 26 Communist Colored Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (2007): 535–51, doi:10.1017/S1537592707071538. 21 There can be one protest event or a series of protest events connected in some fashion often referred to as a wave of protests. 22 Repertoire of contention refers to the set of protest-related tools and actions available activists Donatella Della Porta, “Repertoires of Contention,” The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm178/full; Charles Tilly, “Repertoires of Contention in America and Britian, 1750-1830,” 1977, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/50926; Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (University of Chicago Press, 2006).. 23 Vkontakte, Twitter, internet news streams and Facebook 24 Spatiality means: any property relating to or occupying space. Here I am referring to the spaces that the protests occupiedHelga Leitner, Eric Sheppard, and Kristin M. Sziarto, “The Spatialities of Contentious Politics,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33, no. 2 (2008): 157–72; Deborah G. Martin and Byron Miller, “Space and Contentious Politics,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 8, no. 2 (2003): 143–56; William H. Sewell Jr, “Space in Contentious Politics,” Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics 78 (2001): 18. 25 Author’s notes on BBC World News Report January 21, 2014, and CNN International Report February 19, 2014. 26 Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse, “What Does Ukraine’s #Euromaidan Teach Us about Protest?,” Washington Post, February 27, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/27/what-doesukraines-euromaidan-teach-us-about-protest/. 27 Direct action is political activity that bypasses normal political channels, by directly and even physically engaging with politic-economic elitesBarbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s (Univ of California Press, 1991), http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vYW67obBjSEC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=d irect+action+protest&ots=4FbF2HScoz&sig=vNjdo6jUeicP-mfweUY2RrfJN1Q; David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography (AK Press, 2009), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53189/; Tim Jordan, Activism!: Direct Action, Hacktivism and the Future of Society (Reaktion books, 2002), http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NrkcsMGPt9sC&oi=fnd&pg=PA7&dq=d irect+action+protest&ots=escxkr4T2e&sig=A3Dgod6LS6sJ8bPgskZkZ_13OH8.. 28 Onuch and Sasse, “What Does Ukraine’s #Euromaidan Teach Us about Protest?”. 29Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution”; Bunce and Wolchik, “Transnational Networks, Diffusion Dynamics, and Electoral Revolutions in the Postcommunist World”; Olena Nikolayenko, “The Revolt of the Post-Soviet Generation: Youth Movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine,” Comparative Politics 39, no. 2 27 (January 1, 2007): 169–88, doi:10.2307/20434032; Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina. 30 While social mobilization organizations are large entities – not all members are involved in the direct action. Many activists consider the SamoOboronas of Maidan as protest groups. An other example are Sotni. 31 While this chapter is unable to explore fully this longer mobilization process, for a more detailed analysis of the different waves and phases of mobilization in 2004, please see Onuch (2014a) and of the 2013-14 mobilization see Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse, “What Does Ukraine’s #Euromaidan Teach Us about Protest Waves?,” Nuffield College Politics Working Paper Series 2014, no. 1 (2014); Onuch and Sasse, “What Does Ukraine’s #Euromaidan Teach Us about Protest?”.. 32 Author’s Notes of a BBC World Reporter’s Commentary on December 1, 2013. 33 Vladyslav Kaskiv, yellow Pora activist and National Deputy Pora Party, 4/19/2008, Interview, Kyiv; Volodymyr Viatrovych, black Pora activist, 7/10/2007, Interview, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv; Yevhen Zolotariov, yellow Pora and human rights activist, 7/9/2008, Interview, Kyiv. 34 Author’s interview unnamed student activist, February 25, 2014. 35 Onuch and Sasse, “What Does Ukraine’s #Euromaidan Teach Us about Protest?”. 36 Author’s notes and recordings of broadcast. 37 Author’s interview with unnamed Maidan activist, Kyiv February 22, 2014 38 Roman Hankevych, “Khto Buv Na Maydani?,” ZAXID.NET, July 9, 2014, http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?hto_buv_na_maydani&objectId=1314409. 39 Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution”; Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Nicu Popescu, “The Strange Alliance of Democrats and Nationalists,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 (2012): 46–54. 40 The major online news websites are Spilno.TV, Hromadske.TV, Espreso.TV, and RadioSovoba.TV, 41 For a more detailed analysis of the media, see Dyczok’s analysis in this volume and elsewhere Marta Dyczok and O. V. Gaman-Golutvina, Media, Democracy and Freedom: The Post-Communist Experience (Peter Lang, 2009); Marta Dyczok, “Information Wars: Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, Propaganda, the Use of Force, and Resistance,” Russian Journal of Communication, no. ahead-of-print (2014): 1–4.. 42 Author’s interview with unnamed journalist/politician, December 17, 2013. 43 Author’s interview with unnamed activist, December 16, 2013. 44 Author’s interview with unnamed activist, December 16, 2013. 45 Kuchmizm is often used as shorthand, specifically by activists, for the system of corrupt (clientelistic and clan based) and semi-authoritarian (part-machine and repressive) rule experienced under President Kuchma. 46 Here I mean ndividuals who would communicate between the two camps with ease and frequency 28 Unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 2, 2/7/2010, Interview, Da Vinci, Kyiv. 48 Author’s telephone interview unnamed former Yanukovych administration insider, January 28, 2014. 49 Olga Onuch, EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey (Ukrainian Protest Project. Funded by British Academy Newton Fellowship and John Fell Fund, 2014). 50 Ibid. 51 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All-Ukrainian Population Census, 2001, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/. 52 Onuch, EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey. 53 Rapid interview conducted onsite December 1, 2013 Kyiv. 54 Rapid interview conducted onsite December 1, 2013 Kyiv. 55 Onuch, EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey. 56 Andrew Higgins, “A Battle in Ukraine Echoes Through the Decades,” The New York Times, June 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/europe/world-war-ibattle-in-ukraine-echoes-through-the-decades.html; “Pro-West Protesters Defy Riot Police, Shiver in Ukraine’s Snowy Capital,” NBC News, December 10, 2013, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/pro-west-protesters-defy-riot-police-shiverukraines-snowy-capital-f2D11720949; “The Eastern Wall,” The Economist, June 28, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21604685-polands-poorer-lessdeveloped-east-still-has-lot-catching-up-do-eastern-wall. 57 Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution.” 58 “Yanukovych Promises Reforms to EU,” The Moscow Times, March 2, 2010, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yanukovych-promises-reforms-toeu/400733.html?id=400733. 59 Activist focus group Ukraine #2, yellow Pora, (men only), 8/5/2007, FG Mykhailo (1981), Kyiv/Donetsk, YP Coordinator Head of Maidan Ostap (1979), Kyiv, YP Design Coordinator Pavlo (1982), Kyiv, YP Design Team Yaroslav (1980), Kyiv, YP Design Coordinator Yuri (1980), Kyiv, YP Coordinator, Lviv. 60 Ostap Kryvdyk, yellow Pora activist and journalist, 7/18/2007, Interview, Kyiv. 61 Neil Ketchley, “How Social Media Spreads Protest Tactics from Ukraine to Egypt,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/02/14/how-social-media-spreads-protest-tactics-from-ukraine-to-egypt/. 62 Keith Darden and Lucan Way, “Who Are the Protesters in Ukraine?,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/02/12/who-are-the-protesters-in-ukraine/. 63 Dyczok, “Information Wars.” 64 Author’s interview with unnamed Pravyi Sektor activist, February 10, 2014. 65 Such organizations include Tryzub (Trident), the Ukrainian National Assembly– Ukrainian National Self Defence (UNA–UNSO), Patriots of Ukraine, the Social-National Assembly, Karpatska Sich (Carpathian Sich), Volia (Freedom) and Bilyi Molot (White Hammer), among others. 47 29 66 67 Author’s interview with unnamed Pravyi Sektor activist, February 10, 2014. 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