Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
The ‘Turkish-Type’ Presidential System: an Imperial
Civilisational Restoration?
Nikos Moudouros
Lecturer, Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies,
University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
moudouros.nikos@ucy.ac.cy
Abstract
This article analyses the ideological background on which the Justice and Development
Party’s (akp) policy rested for the adoption of the presidential system in Turkey. It
examines the presidential system as an akp claim aiming at the resolution of Turkey’s
‘basic historical contradiction’ through the effort to restore the Ottoman imperial
legacy. In the same context, the analysis extends to the ideological content of ‘New
Turkey’, which focuses on the adoption of a ‘Turkish-type’ presidential system. At this
level the importance of the identification of a powerful state with the centralisation
of executive power is emphasised as a natural result of the restoration of the Ottoman
imperial legacy. Finally, the article presents specific problematic aspects arising from
the social and ideological polarisation accompanying the transition of Turkey to the
presidential system.
Keywords
imperial restoration – conservatism – presidential system – Ottomanism – civilisational
normalisation – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
With the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, the cycle of
Turkey’s transition to the presidential system was completed. In this way, these
elections mark a key turning point in the history of the country. The adoption
of the presidential system took place in circumstances of social and political
polarisation as well as an escalating economic crisis. At the same time, the timing was characterised by the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies among
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/18775462-bja10040
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
158
moudouros
many governments, in Turkey and internationally. It is true that the change
of political system in Turkey raised significant political, social and ideological
issues. However, this article chooses to focus on an attempt to comprehend
the ideological background against which the government of the Justice and
Development Party (akp) has in recent years aimed to legitimise and promote
the adoption of the presidential system.
First, this article examines the basic aspects of the perceptions of the
Islamic movement and the Turkish centre-right in general in relation to the
westernisation process and the dominance of Kemalism. In this context, it
underlines the historical reading of the Islamic movement in relation to the
fundamental contradiction of Turkey, in its view, as a Muslim nation on which
Western civilisation has been imposed, and its repercussions on society and
the political system. According to the Turkish Islamic movement and akp in
particular, the predominance of a tutelary regime, as well as the operation of a
parliamentary system that reproduced the basis for tutelage, formed the basic
parameters for the alienation of the state from the nation and were, therefore,
problems that needed to be overcome. Second, this article analyses one of
the basic formulas for overcoming the fundamental contradiction of Turkey,
which according to akp should be a political programme for the restoration of
the Ottoman-Islamic heritage and for the reform of the structures of power in
a way that would express the values of the ‘genuine nation’. In the epicentre of
this programme lie conservative restoration and a sense of regaining of power
by the representatives of the ‘genuine nation’. The realisation of this goal has
appeared as the way to re-strengthen the state through the adoption of a constitution and a political order that would secure and make visible Turkey’s
‘return’ to its imperial-civilisational basin.
The third part of the article analyses how the presidential system was promoted as a practical expression of establishing the ‘New Turkey’. Given the ideological background of the Islamic movement in general, and akp in particular,
it is clearly obvious that the adoption of the presidential system was seen as
a ‘natural development’ towards the normalisation of the country as, among
other things, the new political system was presented as legitimised by imperial historical traditions and the ‘genes’ of Turkish society. The presidential
system was promoted as a basic tool for the accomplishment of the historical
goal of ‘reunification of the state with its nation’ through the ‘customisation’
of authority to the true values of society. Finally, the article records certain
specific problematic aspects that the concept of the ‘Turkish-type’ presidential system reproduces. The tendency to cut off the presidential system from
widely accepted universal norms and standards has created the preconditions
for the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies and the weakening of the
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
159
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
separation of powers. At the same time, akp’s intense emphasis on the desired
‘native and national’ characteristics of the new power structures has reproduced polarisation around ideological and cultural axes. Therefore, the defining of ‘native and national’ criteria by the dominant power and the adoption
of the presidential system in this context have created the preconditions for
new destabilisation centres because of the ideological embodiment of a part
of society and the exclusion of another.
Turkey’s ‘Fundamental Contradiction’: Disintegration of the
Empire and Kemalism as an Alien Body
Every political thought and political regime should address the individual and be based on a specific time and space. The political regime that
does not address the individual and ignores the necessities of time and
space cannot be permanent. Moving towards the hundredth anniversary
of our Republic, the New Turkey will be the creation of reorganisation
that through regeneration and continuity comprehensively addresses the
individual, [as well as] time and space.1
This is an extract from ‘New Turkey Contract 2023’ (Yeni Türkiye Sözleşmesi
2023), the programme published by akp before the June 2015 general elections. This programme was important in terms of akp’s demand for adoption of the presidential system. However, from this particular extract one can
decode some important references concerning the ideological framework
through which akp, the Islamic movement in Turkey, and also a large part of
the Turkish centre-right promoted, over time, the need to adopt the presidential system. More specifically, the dialectical relationship between a historical
contradiction, a point of rupture and a dynamic restoration can be observed.
Historical contradiction is described in the tension that results if a political
regime ignores the ‘necessities of the individual, time and space’. The point
of rupture is described in the establishment of a New Turkey, while restoration refers to ‘reorganisation through reform and continuity’. To one degree or
another, the above relationship was historically expressed by almost all ideological components of the Turkish centre-right, but particularly by Turkish
Islamism.
A characteristic but not unique example is the theoretical endeavour of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. He argued that the basic contradiction
1 AK Parti, Yeni Türkiye Sözleşmesi 2023 (Istanbul, 2015), articles 1–2.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
160
moudouros
experienced by Turkey is the problematic adaptation of the political culture
of a society that was in the centre of a particular civilisation (medeniyet) to
a political system built by an elite imposing an alien civilisation on it. This
contradiction is, according to Davutoğlu, one of Turkey’s most important distinct characteristics.2 The most important point that arises from this argument
is what determines the nature of Turkish society as part of Ottoman-Islamic
civilisation, the civilisation, that is, which the akp leadership defines as ‘our
civilisation’.3 Therefore, the contradiction is that with the establishment of
the Republic and the dominance of Kemalism the aforementioned historicity was rejected and the Kemalist elite aimed at immersing society in Western
civilisation.4
This basic contradiction is considered problematic in the historical development of Turkey because of two important aspects. The first relates to the
procedure of westernisation. It should be noted that this procedure is viewed
critically by a large section of the Turkish right (nationalism, Islamism, conservatism)5 as one that cut off society from ‘its roots and traditions’.6 In general, the 200-year history of westernisation of the country, which began during
the late period of the Ottoman Empire, is presented as an ‘anomaly’ and as a
diversion from its authentic historical legacy.7 The process of westernisation is
presented as a period of ‘forced’ acceptance of western superiority, but also as
a historic defeat that put an end to the Ottoman golden era, evoking feelings
of inferiority.8 At the same time, however, the feeling of historic defeat created
the framework for the revival of the political programme of ‘revenge’ through
the restoration of Turkey’s imperial legacy, as the only way for the strengthening of the state.9 For Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, westernisation was more or less a
2 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul: Küre
Yayınları, 2001), p. 83.
3 Menderes, Çınar, “Turkey’s ‘Western’ or ‘Muslim’ identity and the akp’s civilizational
discourse”, Turkish Studies, 19 (2018), 176–97.
4 Yaşlı, Fatih, AKP, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus: Yeni Türkiye Üzerine Tezler (Istanbul: Yordam Kitap,
2014), p. 147.
5 Bora, Tanıl, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslamcılık (Istanbul: Birikim
Yayınları, 1998).
6 Taşkın, Yüksel, Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya: Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme
Karşıtlığına (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 135.
7 Arat-Koç, Sedef, “Culturalizing politics, hyper-politicizing ‘culture’: ‘White’ vs ‘Black Turks’
and the making of authoritarian populism in Turkey”, Dialectical Anthropology, 42 (2018),
391–408.
8 Yılmaz, İhsan, Kemalizm’den Erdoğanizm’e: Türkiye’de Din, Devlet ve Makbul Vatandaş
(Istanbul: Ufuk Yayınları, 2015), pp. 55–57.
9 Tokdoğan, Nagehan, Yeni Osmanlıcılık: Hınç, Nostalji, Narsisizm (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları,
2018), p. 155.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
161
stain and disorientated the nation in time and space.10 Furthermore, detecting
the historical disorientation caused by the westernisation process, Necmettin
Erbakan stressed: ‘We are not a random nation of the world. We should regain
our place in history’.11
The critical approach to the westernisation process and its treatment as
mimicking the West or forcing the ‘nation to follow foreign horizons’12 with
negative results for the historical development of Turkey is characteristic of
almost the entire spectrum of the Turkish right. For example, Intellectuals’
Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı)13 and its ideological endeavours were important
in the widening of the influence of the critical approach to westernisation.
Among the basic positions of İbrahim Kefesoğlu, protagonist of this organisation, was that the Turkish-Islamic cultural heritage resulted in the establishment of two great empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, but mimicking of the
West by eighteenth-century intellectuals finally brought about the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire. According to the same author, the consequences of this
mimicking went as far as bringing about instability in the 1970s resulting in
the loss of balance between family, mosque and army.14 As a matter of fact,
Western culture and the process of westernisation were seen as ‘the mother of
all evils’ for Turkey, through which local culture and the nature and identity of
society were threatened with total destruction.15 Eminent Islamist intellectual
Mustafa Özel stressed that Turkey could not retain its unity through an ideology imported from the West, but only through a real connection with Islam
‘which is the basic source of our perception of the world’.16
The second aspect of the problematic situation created by the historic contradiction, according to the Islamists, was that the authoritarian ‘transfer’ of
Turkey related to a completely alien and ontologically different civilisational
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Duran, Burhanettin, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslamcılığı: İdeolojik Konumları, Dönüşümü ve
Evleri”, in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, vol. 6, Yasın Aktay (ed.) (Istanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp. 129–56.
“Erbakan: Sultan Hamit’in Zihniyetini Korusaydık En İyi Tankları Yapardık”, Milliyet (23
March 1975).
Bora, Tanıl, Cereyanlar: Türkiye’de Siyasi İdeolojiler (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), pp.
406–7.
Bora, Tanıl, and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü Hareket
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), p. 170.
Eligür, Banu, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), p. 97.
Karasipahi, Sena, Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the
Islamic Intellectuals (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 58.
Özel, Mustafa, “Yirmibirinci Yüzyıla Girerken Dünya Sistemi ve Türkiye”, Çerçeve, 17 (1996),
54–61.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
162
moudouros
system.17 In this context the West is not considered in geographic terms, but
as a unitary monolithically defined cultural entity, identified at times with
Christianity, at times with secularism and at times with capitalism,18 but
always with certain attitudes, values and elements19 incompatible with the
Ottoman-Islamic civilisation. In fact, the existence of these very unbridgeable differences between the two worlds, the Islamic and the Western, is what
reveals the existence of two completely different entities. On one side stands
Homo Islamicus, who possesses special characteristics in relation to understanding God, man and nature. These particular characteristics stand as the
alternative to Homo occidentalis,20 the entity on the other side. According to
the same way of thinking, in the framework of the two different worlds, the different self-consciousnesses of the individual appear, which form the substance
of the identity of the people, i.e. members of a particular civilisation.21 This
self-consciousness (a difference in Islamic civilisation) is the most comprehensive proof of the ontological difference between the two worlds.22
Even if the clash between the two ontologically different civilisations is not
considered a causal development, nonetheless according to a great part of the
Turkish Islamic intelligentsia, the Islamic self-consciousness of the civilisation to which the country belongs cannot adapt to the crisis created by the
access of society to ‘another civilisation’. Since, on the basis of the aforementioned, the Turkish political body is identified with the Ottoman-Islamic past
and Ottoman geography,23 Kemalism is not accepted as a natural part of the
Turkish historical experience. On the contrary, Kemalism is understood in the
sense of a ‘diversion’ or a ‘parenthesis’ in the development of Turkish history
and politics, as an attempt for a complete civilisational transformation through
the replacement of native characteristics with Western standards and views.24
Among the negative effects created by the imposition of this ‘alien body’ on
Turkish history is a ‘schizophrenic situation’25 at the epicentre of which lies the
alienation of politics from its genuine history and geography.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Civilizational Transformations and the Muslim World (Kuala Lumpur:
Mahir Publications, 1994), pp. 65–66.
Karasipahi, Muslims in Modern Turkey, p. 67.
Özel, İsmet, Üç Mesele: Teknik – Medeniyet – Yabancılaşma (Istanbul: Şule Yayınları, 1998),
p. 149.
Davutoğlu, Civilizational Transformations, pp. 65–66.
Davutoğlu, Ahmet, “Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki”, Divan, 1 (1997), 1–53.
Adak, Sevgi, and Ömer Turan, “Restorasyon Hareketinin Başbakanı: Ahmet Davutoğlu”,
Birikim, 306 (2014), 33–41.
Bora, Tanıl, “Esat Arslan İle İslamcılık Üzerine Söyleşi: ‘Derinlerden Gelen “Aaah!”ı Pozitif
bir Projeye Çeviremezsek…’”, Birikim, 355 (2018), 62–83.
Karasipahi, Muslims in Modern Turkey, pp. 96–97.
Bora, “Esat Arslan İle İslamcılık”, p. 70.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
163
The process of westernisation becomes in this way a ‘hundred-year parenthesis’, which has however contributed to the marginalisation of the identity of
the genuine Turkish civilisation.26 As a result of the authoritarian imposition
of a vertical system of elitist values such as Kemalism,27 Turkishness was cut
off from Islam, stripped of the truth and weakened since it moved away from
its imperial achievements28 and from its Islamic imperial tradition. In this way,
for Kısakürek, the establishment of republican Turkey was the monumental
moment in the alienation of the Turkish people from their Ottoman past and
from their historical and moral roots.29 At the same level of historical understanding, many Islamists consider the Kemalist state as the result of defeat and
see its establishment as carrying the characteristics of the pressure exercised
by the victors of the First World War, in conflict with the values, history and
religion of the people.30 At the same time, that particular period marks for
them, too, the marginalisation and abolition of the memory of the Ottoman
imperial legacy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has characteristically
stressed that “[t]his nation has known unscrupulous officials who sold millions
of documents from the Ottoman archives for scrap paper for a few pennies
… Unfortunately, so many works, documents and events that will remind our
nation of its glorious past were deliberately marginalised”.31
In the same spirit, Cengiz Aydoğdu, mp of akp, used Edmund Burke’s critique of the French Revolution, which the British conservative theorist considered the ‘destruction of the sense of dignity in France’. Through Burke,
Aydoğdu indirectly underlined that Kemalist westernisation questioned the
native ‘imperial’ dignity of Turkey.32 akp, therefore, claims to undertake a
‘historic mission’ of restoration of the country’s lost dignity against the West
and the westernisation process, something to be achieved by the restoration
of the ‘Ottoman imperial self-confidence and pride’. As Erdoğan has stated,
‘[w]e have and continue to struggle to infuse self-confidence into the nation.
We struggle to infuse courage into the nation’.33
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Adak and Turan, “Restorasyon Hareketinin”, p. 41.
Bora, “Esat Arslan İle İslamcılık”, p. 70.
Yıldız, Ersin, “akp Devletinin İdeolojik Mekanizmasına Kavramsal bir Bakış”, Birikim, 336
(2017), 51–70.
Duran, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslamcılığı”, p. 133.
Abak, Şaban, “Türkiye Yeniden Kurulurken”, Yeni Şafak (6 December 2012).
“Hafıza 15 Temmuz Müzesi Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma” (15 July 2019), https://
tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/107088/hafiza-15-temmuz-muzesi-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklarikonusma.
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 4’üncü Toplantı (23 December 2016), p. 50.
Tokdoğan, Yeni Osmanlıcılık, p. 109.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
164
moudouros
Turkey’s fundamental contradiction, according to the Islamist intelligentsia, exercises a holistic influence on society and the political system because
the authoritarian inclusion of the country in an alien civilisational system also
meant the imposition of an alien rather than a native culture, constitution
and political system. It is characteristic that the ideological positions of the
Islamic National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) included the strong
statement that the Turkish state had been under ‘the occupation of foreign
powers’—that is, the western-type secular elite. This situation finally reproduced alienation of the ‘genuine nation’ from its own state.34 This rationale is
extended in such a way as to critically assess issues that concern the constitution and the system of government in Turkey. In particular, the constitutions
adopted after 1921 are considered texts of autocratic enforcement that drastically marginalised, overlooked and underestimated not only the local and
native peculiarities and culture, but also religious faith.35 As Erdoğan himself
has remarked, ‘[t]o this day the country has been ruled according to imported
constitutions instead of native ones. We have been ruled by imported products
and therefore imported rationales have been dominant. We should now return
to what is native and national’.36
The necessity for a ‘return to the native and national’ basically results from
the long-term non-adaptation of society to a ‘foreign’ constitution and government system like parliamentarism. Foreign constitutions resulted in the violation of national will,37 that is the will of the genuine nation, a nation resulting
from Eastern, not Western history. As Muhammet Emin Akbaşoğlu, mp of akp,
stated, the constitutions that resulted from the rise to power of the Committee
of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), and especially the 1908
Constitution, represent the epoch of ‘treacherous attempts’ at the shrinking
of the Ottoman Empire and its final breakup.38 According to other akp members, this particular period was also marked by the reproduction of problems
because the parliamentary system was alien to the local peculiarities of Turkey
and could not function on the basis of Turkish traditions and culture.39
34
35
36
37
38
39
Köseoğlu, Talha, “Islamists and the state: changing discourses on the state, civil society
and democracy in Turkey”, Turkish Studies, 20 (2018), 323–50.
“8 Maddede Neden Başkanlık Sistemi?”, Sabah (1 February 2016).
“T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Yeni Anayasa Hep Birlikte Temalı Programda Yaptıkları
Konuşma” (28 January 2016), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/38673/
yeni-anayasa-icin-hep-birlikte-temali-programda-yaptiklari-konusma.
Kuzu, Burhan, “Türkiye İçin Başkanlık Sistemi 1”, Liberal Düşünce Dergisi, 2 (1996), 13–43.
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 3’üncü Toplantı (22 December 2016), pp. 6–8.
Tozkoparan, Nursel, “AK Parti Başkanlık Sistemini 2001’de Açıklamıştı”, Haber 7 (28
November 2012).
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
165
The wider Islamic movement (as well as akp from a point onwards) promoted the fundamental political position that the Kemalist republican state
itself, and its power structures and constitutions, marginalised the Islamic
Ottoman past and at the same time presented themselves as the outcomes
of ‘salvation from the Ottomans’.40 In this way the whole experience of the
state-building procedure in contemporary Turkey constitutes an example of
creating power structures that reproduced a tutelary regime and prevented
the interaction between state and nation41—a state and a nation that would
originate from the East and Islam. In this particular framework, the main critique articulated against Kemalist republicanism focuses on the production
of a ‘regime question’ because state power was alienated from the nation.42 In
its turn the alienation of elitist authority from the nation enabled the tutelary
structures to obstruct the ‘unity between state and nation’. Therefore, the deep
rifts created by the marginalisation of society’s Islamic Ottoman past were
reflected on the political system in a way that a culturally alien and numerically small elite found itself dominating the ‘authentic nation’.43
The absence of the nation from the creation of the constitutions was a conscious attempt by the bureaucratic elite to retain control of power, but also to
prevent the reflection of the traditional and religious values of the nation in
the state structures.44 In fact, according to akp, this has been a perennial phenomenon. As stressed by Ahmet İyimaya, mp of akp, ‘the constitution problem
has always been present in Turkey’s history and unfortunately the architect of
the constitutions put into effect, even during the multi-party period, was not
the nation…’45 The basic tool of reproduction of the power monopoly by the
bureaucratic elite was the very parliamentary system imposed on the country.
‘Tutelary parliamentarism’, as Nebi Miş and Mehmet Zahid Sobacı call it,46 was
a mechanism reproducing the power of the elite that played a decisive role
in the establishment of the republican state and acquired privileges. Through
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 4’üncü Toplantı, p. 50.
Aslan, Ali, “Türkiye için Başkanlık Sistemi: Demokratikleşme, İstikrar, Kurumsallaşma”,
SETA Analiz, no. 122 (2015), p. 11.
Acet, Mehmet, “Genelkurmay Savunma Bakanlığı’na Bağlandı, Şimdi Ne Olacak?”, Yeni
Şafak (16 July 2018).
Aslan, Ali, “24 Haziran Seçimlerinin Siyasi Anlamı: Yerli-Milli Siyaset ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı
Hükümet Sistemi”, SETA Analiz, no. 240 (2018), pp. 12–13.
Köseoğlu, “Islamists and the state”, pp. 333–34.
tbmm, Tutanak Dergisi, 54’üncü Birleşim, 10 January 2017, p. 473.
Miş, Nebi, and Mehmet Zahid Sobacı, “AK Parti ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi”,
in AK Parti’nin 15 Yılı: Siyaset, Nebi Miş and Ali Aslan (eds) (Istanbul: seta Yayınları, 2018),
pp. 129–58.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
166
moudouros
this particular mechanism the bureaucratic elite did not allow for the emergence of opposition to the Republican People’s Party (chp) with the excuse
that it would constitute a danger to the secular state. At the same time, this
structure created the preconditions for the exclusion of the conservative
strata of the population from power or their control in case of strengthened
representation at the National Assembly.47 As Mücahit Bilici underlined, the
President of Turkey was in reality ‘a president without people and the people
remained without president’.48 In fact, the custodial orientation of the Turkish
constitutions ‘took the authority of the state and offered it to the bureaucratic
institutions’, a characteristic which, according to akp, contributed to the alienation of the people from the state, the law and the judicial system, while it also
weakened the democratic culture.49
According to political Islam in Turkey, a core aspect of the practical implementation of the tutelary regime and the exclusion of the nation from power
was the military coups and the constitutions which resulted from them.50 In
one of his speeches Erdoğan underlined: ‘The texts of the constitutions are
social contracts. Our constitutions, however, were prepared as orders by military coups’.51 akp’s critique focused on that the constitutions created after
every military coup strengthened ‘non-confidence towards the national will’,52
which was central to the custodial regime philosophy. A characteristic example is the 1960 coup, aimed against the Democratic Party’s attempt to open
up the state to the nation—a prospect which, according to akp circles, would
have created the preconditions for ‘authentic power of the nation’ (otantik iktidar).53 These characteristics of tutelary parliamentarianism also constituted
its historic pathology,54 since it was structured in such a way as to trap Turkey
in conditions of disempowerment. As Akbaşoğlu pointed out, the imposition
of that particular parliamentary system on Turkey was no different from the
way foreign tutelary centres had historically worked against Abdülhamid II,
aiming at the disempowerment of the Ottoman Empire.55
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Aslan, “Türkiye İçin Başkanlık Sistemi”, pp. 20–25.
Bilici, Mücahit, “İki Türkiye ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimi”, Yeni Şafak (21 March 2007).
AK Parti, “Yeni Türkiye Yolunda Daima Adalet, Daima Kalkınma. 7 Haziran 2015 Genel
Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi” (Istanbul, 2015), pp. 30–31.
Castaldo, Antonino, “Populism and competitive authoritarianism in Turkey”, Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, 18 (2018), 467–87.
“T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Yeni Anayasa Hep Birlikte Temalı Programda Yaptıkları
Konuşma” (28 January 2016), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/38673/
yeni-anayasa-icin-hep-birlikte-temali-programda-yaptiklari-konusma.
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 4’üncü Toplantı, p. 12.
Aslan, “Türkiye İçin Başkanlık Sistemi”, p. 26.
Miş and Sobacı, “AK Parti ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı”, p. 136.
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 3’üncü Toplantı, pp. 10–11.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
167
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
Imperial Restoration as the Remedy to Overcome Turkey’s
Historical Contradiction
In his work Reason and Virtue (Akıl ve Erdem), İbrahim Kalın, senior advisor to
President Erdoğan, argues that in order to overcome the ‘Kemalist diversion’
in the history and politics of Turkey, it is necessary to reconstruct its historical continuity through which society will reconnect with its Ottoman legacy.56
Nostalgia for the glorious era of the Ottoman Empire has always been part
of Turkish right-wing political rhetoric. However, it is also a fact that during
akp’s rule imperial nostalgia has influenced both internal developments and
foreign policy aspects, more than ever before. In this context, the republican
past has been demonised and denounced as nothing but a Western conspiracy
to weaken the nation’s Muslim identity as well as Turkey’s potential to lead the
Muslim world.57
For Turkey’s Islamic movement, the Ottoman Empire constitutes the
‘masterpiece’ of the nation’s historic mission. It is the symbol of absolute
consolidation of Turkish and Muslim capability to create empires.58 It is the
Ottoman legacy that safeguards the unique personality of Turkish society and
distinguishes it from all others. It is the legacy that rescues the nation from
mediocrity.59
The aforementioned selectivity with which akp deals with Ottoman history, promotes nostalgia for imperial restoration based on the grandeur of the
Ottomans. Key elements recognised in the Ottoman Empire are the strong
state, which was always victorious in wars, and its competent power to expand
its influence.60 However, the strong emphasis on victorious wars is selective
focusing only on those fought against non-Muslims, while systematically concealing confrontations and wars between Muslim states and populations.61
Furthermore, this attitude disregards the complexity of the historical development of the Ottoman Empire and more particularly of the process of its
weakening and collapse. For Erdoğan, history does not include any grey areas
56
57
58
59
60
61
Bora, “Esat Arslan İle İslamcılık”, p. 70.
Mert, Nuray, “The dream palaces of the Turks”, Hürriyet Daily News (5 March 2018), https://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/nuray-mert/the-dream-palaces-of-the-turks-128231.
Bora, Cereyanlar, p. 308.
Saraçoğlu, Cenk, “akp Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika: Bir Milliyetçilik Doktrini Olarak
Stratejik Derinlik”, Alternatif Politika, 5 (2013), 52–68.
Yilmaz, Ihsan, Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 138.
Ibid., p. 146.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
168
moudouros
and cannot be a thing of the past. On the contrary, it is the element that frames
the present political controversies and debates.62
For the Islamic movement and Turkish conservative thinkers in general, the
Ottoman period is the ‘golden age’ that has been lost, a ‘paradise’ retrieved to
point out the crisis of Kemalism.63 The ‘golden age’ of the Ottomans is the epoch
of consolidation of Turkish power and peaceful coexistence. It is the ultimate
symbol of multiculturalism and the righteous rule of Turkish-Muslims over all
ethno-religious identities. Imperial nostalgia is thus presented as a remedy for
national and ethnic division.64 This romanticisation of the Ottoman period
ignores the conflicts, authoritarianism, and even heterogeneity that existed
within the Empire in relation to the interpretation of Islam.65 In this way
Ottoman nostalgia selectively refers to an era of complete security, prosperity
and development under the high supervision and competence of the TurkishMuslim leadership.66
Many Islamist intellectuals and politicians propose ‘peace-making’ between
the nation and its Ottoman past and legacy as the only way to overcome the
alienation caused by the imposition of Kemalism. The specific political goal
expressed is the ‘reconnection of state and nation’,67 which presupposes the
adaptation of the state to the traditional values of society.68 Therefore, the
nation should conquer state authority and attribute ‘authentic characteristics’ to it. Former akp Vice President Numan Kurtulmuş described the aforementioned procedure as follows: ‘Turkey has, after 200 years, reunited with its
roots. This nation has brought its own children to power. The nation has taken
over power and will not surrender it’.69 The procedure described concerns the
akp’s assertion that it identifies with the Turkish nation, which means that by
being in power, the ‘genuine nation’ has reinstated its sovereignty and power
after a period of ‘artificial’ and foreign-influenced Kemalist authority over the
country.70
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Yavuz, M. Hakan, Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 146–47.
Fisher Onar, Nora, “Echoes of a universalism lost: rival representations of the Ottomans in
today’s Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, 45 (2009), p. 235.
Yaycıoğlu, Ali, “akp Türkiye’sinin Tarih Tezleri”, Gazete Oksijen (2 April 2021), https://
gazeteoksijen.com/yazarlar/akp-turkiyesinin-tarih-tezleri/.
Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, p. 162.
Ibid., p. 164.
Teazis, Christos, İkincilerin Cumhuriyeti: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Istanbul: Mızrak
Yayınları, 2010), pp. 59–60.
Karasipahi, Muslims in Modern Turkey, p. 104.
“Kurtulmuş Başkanlık Sistemi İçin Ne Dedi”, Haber 61 (27 April 2013).
Alaranta, Toni, National and State Identity in Turkey: The Transformation of the Republic’s
Status in the International System (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2015), p. 69.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
169
This political programme has to be expressed accordingly in Turkey’s
domestic and foreign policy.71 In other words, Turkey’s ‘return’ to the civilisational system to which it belongs necessitates redesigning the political, economic and social structure. It requires a kind of restoration aiming to overcome
the ‘historical abnormality’ caused by the Kemalist parenthesis. According to
Davutoğlu, akp is a restoration movement: ‘akp is a movement with members
who emerged from the traditions of a state with historical roots and who aim
to restore these very traditions’.72 The distinct role of akp as a political force of
imperial restoration has also been stressed by Erdoğan: ‘Our party is dedicated
to the construction of a sturdy bridge between the country’s glorious past and
its future’.73
At this point it should be noted that the idea of restoration of the state as
a platform for contestation of Kemalist republicanism is to be found in the
political programmes of both the Islamic parties in Turkey and those of the
wider Turkish right. It is important to mention that, for the Islamic movement,
the idea of restoration prevailed historically not as a rejection of progress, but
as a strong defence against the dogmas imposed from abroad. In this way, a
large part of the Islamic parties and the wider centre-right in Turkey adopted
the concept of ‘civilisational restoration’ against the foreign elements of the
process of westernisation.74 The revival of the genuine national culture (milli
kültür) was considered one of the principal ways for the revival of the nation75
and the resolution of crises in the country. Characteristically, Sezai Karakoç
underlined the necessity of conducting a ‘holy war’ at a civilisational level,
aiming to confront the negative consequences caused by the materialism and
profanity of contemporary western civilisation.76
In this sense akp’s restoration resembles contemporary conservatism,
which points to the renewal of tradition and the construction of a conservative
regime that nonetheless secures its continuity in a new context. This version of
conservatism does not lead to the complete rejection of the new.77 akp’s contemporary conservatism points more to the conservation of all those that are
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
Yaşlı, akp, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus, p. 147.
İnsel, Ahmet, “Köklü Devlet Geleneğinin Restorasyonu”, Radikal (26 August 2014).
“AK Parti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ni Yaşatmak İçin Gece Gündüz Çalışan Bir Partidir” (14
August 2017), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/80173/ak-parti-turkiye-cumhuriyetiniyasatmak-icin-gece-gunduz-calisan-bir-partidir.html.
Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali, p. 82.
Taşkın, Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya, p. 58.
Karasipahi, Muslims in Modern Turkey, pp. 27–29.
Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali, p. 54.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
170
moudouros
worth conserving78 and to the reinstatement of part of the old regime adapted
to current circumstances.79 As Islamist intellectual Yusuf Kaplan advocates,
the history of the Ottoman Empire proved that it was the only representative
of an ecumenical civilisation under which true peace and justice were established.80 These characteristics of an ‘ecumenical impact’ should be expressed
in a mighty Turkish state. This specific form of restoration asserts imperial tradition as a component of the nation in the current circumstances. Davutoğlu
remarks that the concept of restoration includes ‘the ability to comprehend
the spirit and dynamics of the times’.81
A few months after the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections,
Erdoğan stressed: ‘We are on the eve of a new era. The name of this new era
is revival. It will be a period when we realise our vision for a once again great
Turkey’.82 The phrase ‘once again great Turkey’ (yeniden büyük Türkiye) is of
pivotal importance. It has been intensively used by almost all the parties of the
Islamic National Outlook movement and indicates that Turkey had been great
in the past, but then a period of weakening intervened. Therefore, the restoration of the ‘once again great’ and powerful Turkey concerns not the reestablishment of the Ottoman monarchy as such, but the regaining by Turkey of its
imperial glory, importance and influence in the modern world.83 As Erdoğan
stated, ‘[w]e do not forget our nation’s grandeur. Thus, nor do we forget the
scale of the challenges we are asked to face. We stand strong with one foot in
Istanbul, in Ankara, in our 81 provinces, but with the other foot we stride from
Bosnia to Baku, from Samarkand to Khartoum and to the four corners of the
earth’.84
At this point it is worth noting the connection of the vision for the restoration of a strong Turkey as expressed by Erdoğan with other similar cases.
At the international level, the rise of authoritarian restoration has been most
characteristically recorded in and manifested by Donald Trump’s maga (Make
America Great Again), the ideological platform that provided the framework
for Brexit, as well as by the political programmes of leaders like Marine Le Pen,
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
Bora, Tanıl, Zamanın Kelimeleri: Yeni Türkiye’nin Siyasi Dili (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları,
2018), p. 65.
İnsel, Ahmet, “Büyük Restorasyon Dönemi”, Birikim (Haftalık Yazılar) (6 December 2014).
Kaplan, Yusuf, “Dünya Osmanlı’ya Gebe…”, Yeni Şafak (1 September 2014).
Yaşlı, akp, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus, p. 148.
“Başkan Erdoğan’dan TÜGVA Genel Merkezi Açılış Töreni’nde Önemli Açıklamalar”, Takvim
(21 October 2018), https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2018/10/21/baskan-erdogandantugva-genel-merkezi-acilis-toreninde-onemli-aciklamalar.
Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali, pp. 16–17.
Türkiye Bülteni, 16/123 (September 2018), p. 20.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
171
Narendra Modi or Jair Bolsonaro. A common component of this particular
restoration is the ideological construction of a glorious past which should be
‘reinstated’. This need is based on the arbitrary explanation of the causes of the
deep social and moral crisis of our time. What is sought is the restoration of
all those traditional elements and norms that were supposedly challenged by
extreme modernisation.85
In the Turkish case, too, the quest for adjustment of imperial grandeur to
twenty-first-century conditions and the intended ‘return’ of the country to its
own civilisational basin are components of an imperial programme. Through
the activation of concepts like restoration, akp claims the creation of a new
order in the country that can legitimise the reinstatement of hierarchical relations that had been disturbed with the dominance of Kemalism.86 Therefore,
it aims at the restoration of a conservative system of values (Islamic and
Ottoman) that can legitimise inequality within a new framework. It is to be
noted that akp’s conservative restoration contains a great leap into the past,
without eradicating the importance of transformation for the future of power
structures in Turkey. It attempts to combine return to a glorious OttomanIslamic system of values with building the framework of future power. It claims
to correct what it considers ‘Kemalist mistakes’ of the past, but it preserves the
goal of promoting its own political model for the future.87 Volatility between
the goal of marginalisation of the Kemalist system of values and the goal of
revival of an Ottoman-Islamic one is clearly apparent in everyday akp political
practice. On the one hand, the governing party is widely promoted as a force
for the restoration of the ‘lost’ state power of Turkey, and on the other hand as
a power for structural reform within the modern framework. In this context, it
is promoted as a power for the salvation of the state from a period of interregnum (fetret devri),88 while claiming monopoly on resolving the historic contradiction mentioned above through the revival of the glorious Ottoman-Islamic
(imperial) culture.
It is true that the position of the Ottoman Empire was a matter of ideological
conflict in the writing and narration of Turkey’s national history. The Islamist
85
86
87
88
Geiselberger, Heinrich (ed.), The Great Regression (Cambridge and Malden, Mass.: Polity
Press, 2017); Mondon, Aurelien, and Aaron Winter, Reactionary Democracy: How Racism
and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream (London and New York: Verso, 2020);
Mudde, Cas, The Far Right Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019).
Ongur, Hakan Ovunc, “Plus ça change… Re-articulating authoritarianism in the New
Turkey”, Critical Sociology, 44 (2018), 45–59.
Ibid., p. 54.
AK Parti, “Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun AK Parti 1. Olağanüstü Büyük Kurultayı Konuşması” (27
August 2014).
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
172
moudouros
movement in the country aimed to create a rift in the prevailing narration of
national history, converting the Ottoman past to a basis of alternative collective identity. In other words, it claimed the restoration of the Ottoman legacy
as a structural element of national memory.89 Even though the instrumentalisation of Ottoman history for the realisation of political goals had occurred in
the past as well, with the Erdoğan government it displays some new qualitative
characteristics. The selective use and politicisation of Ottoman history now
concerns all aspects of society. It has gradually become part of everyday life
practices.90 The reinstatement of the imperial past, promoted by akp, is carried out through symbols and concepts, through architecture, the mass media,
education, and also through public ceremonies. In this way the ‘ghost’ of the
Ottoman Empire is resurrected in the ‘body’ of the new national identity constructed by the authorities.91
The lavish shows celebrating the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans,92
the establishment of museums dedicated to the conquest of the city,93 the
modernisation of the archives of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the change
in the Presidential Palace protocol with guards dressed in ‘Turkish imperial’ uniforms,94 are all part of the effort for the inculcation of a new history
through which the Ottoman imperial legacy will be the core of national identity. However, for Erdoğan’s government, the instrumentalisation of Ottoman
history does not simply constitute a process of ‘culturalisation of memory’
with political aims. Rather, it is a complex process of selective definition of
the past, aiming to determine the future orientations of the state.95 Therefore,
akp ‘re-writes’ history and at the same time underlines the importance of
the current situation as proof of the necessity to strengthen state authority.96
Erdoğan himself has characteristically indicated the unifying thread between
the Ottoman Empire and his government, stating that “[j]ust like Mehmed the
Conqueror built Rumelihisari before conquering Istanbul, so we build the new
airport, the third bridge over the Bosporus, the metro and the Eurasia tunnel.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
Çinar, Alev, “National history as a contested site: the conquest of Istanbul and Islamist
negotiations of the nation”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43 (2001), 364–91.
Ongur, Hakan Ovunc, “Identifying Ottomanism: the discursive evolution of Ottoman pasts
in the Turkish presents”, Middle Eastern Studies, 51 (2015), p. 417.
Tokdoğan, Yeni Osmanlıcılık, p. 82.
Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanism”, p. 421.
Koyuncu, Büke, “Benim Milletim…”: AK Parti İktidarı, Din ve Ulusal Kimlik (Istanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 2014), pp. 99–100.
“Karşılama Sırasındaki 16 Asker Ne Anlama Geliyor?”, Yeni Akit (12 January 2015).
Çolak, Yılmaz, “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: collective memory and cultural pluralism in
1990s Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, 42 (2006), 587–602.
Tokdoğan, Yeni Osmanlıcılık, p. 83.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
173
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
Just like our forefather drove his navy from the land, so we construct railway
lines under the Bosporus with Marmaray’.97
The Presidential System: the ‘New Turkey’ Between Rupture and
Civilisational Normalisation
The coexistence of ‘reform-rupture’ and ‘restoration-normalisation’ has been
expressed relatively more clearly than the concept of ‘New Turkey’, which
has as its basic characteristic the presidential system. The vision of a New
Turkey demanded the adoption of a new political system that would be able
to strengthen the country and activate its historical experience. According to
akp’s official line, the presidential system, as a guarantee of a powerful and
effective executive authority and state governance, is the only one that can
respond to the needs of the New Turkey.98 On the one hand, the new constitution and the presidential system is the permanent solution to the tension
resulting from society’s non-conformity to the ‘alien civilisational system’
imposed on it by authoritarian Kemalism. On the other, the presidential system
can consolidate the social, economic and political transformation recorded
under akp governance.99
‘New Turkey’, a basic concept of the akp’s political programme, carries
within it the fundamental point: the overthrow of the old as evil, anachronistic and invalid. ‘New Turkey’ is a concept that carries with it the anguish
for revenge against the Kemalist past. It claims the creation of a state and
society that will not be characterised by Kemalism.100 Against the ideological background of ‘New Turkey’ are created political positions and rhetoric
on issues of authenticity and cultural nostalgia for the native, as well as the
boundaries of the sense of belonging to the nation.101 At the same time, the
notion of ‘New Turkey’ carries with it the ideological aspect of the founding
of the new.102 As such, it is an attempt to build a new political regime. The
97
98
99
100
101
102
“İstanbul’un Fethi’nin 562. Yıl Dönümü Kutlamalarında Yaptıkları
Konuşma” (30 May 2015), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32584/
istanbulun-fethinin-562-yil-donumu-kutlamalarinda-yaptiklari-konusma.
AK Parti, “Yeni Türkiye Yolunda Daima Adalet, Daima Kalkınma. 7 Haziran 2015 Genel
Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi” (Istanbul, 2015), pp. 30–31.
Miş, Nebi, and Ali Aslan, “Erdoğan Siyaseti ve Kurucu Cumhurbaşkanlığı Misyonu”,
SETA Analiz, no. 109 (2014), p. 18.
Bora, Zamanın Kelimeleri, p. 13.
Arat-Koç, “Culturalizing politics”, p. 405.
Bora, Zamanın Kelimeleri, p. 14.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
174
moudouros
qualitative characteristics are shaped through a new founding philosophy and
a new founding paradigm. This founding philosophy influences the content of
the construction of social, political and public life. It has an impact on statesociety relations.103
It is, therefore, not at all coincidental that the approval of a new constitution
and the adoption of the presidential system was the focus of ‘New Turkey’. The
constitution has, in one way or another, the status of a founding document.104
Such documents result from dramatic changes and symbolise the emergence
of a new regime through ruptures and reversals.105 The new constitution is
in itself a dynamic of the ‘new’ that overthrows what had existed previously.
Journalist Eyüp Can described this dynamic, saying ‘For some time now, the
system in Turkey is being re-established. And the problem is that whoever
is in power wants to be the “founding father”. Atatürk was the first founding
father of the Republic. Erdoğan wants to be the second founding father’.106
The more general attempt by akp and Erdoğan to adopt the presidential system has been based, to a great degree, on the mobilisation of that social basis
which felt marginalised by Turkey’s founding Kemalist ideology. On the way
to the presidential system, Erdoğan wanted to express the combination of
‘native and national’ values that Kemalism had ostracised. This combination
was the fundamental part of a new social contract.107 In this framework, the
2014 elections had the character of rejection, challenge or approval of Turkey’s
Kemalist founding ideology and Erdoğan’s advantage was that he managed to
represent that majority which sought reform or even overthrow of that founding ideology,108 enabling the dominance of a new founding ideology.
The basic framework in which Erdoğan’s presidential candidacy was presented and promoted in the 2014 elections was that of a ‘founding mission’.
The founding mission of the first president elected directly by the people
included the establishment of new institutions of power, a new political culture and a new national identity. Erdoğan himself, presenting his 2014 candidacy, stressed, ‘This very moment is not a farewell, it is not the end… It is a
fresh start… It is a fatiha, a new beginning’.109 The use of the term fatiha has a
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
Yaşlı, akp, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus, p. 25.
Denk, Erdem, “Yeni Anayasa Tartışmaları: Dünya Devlete Dönerken”, Birikim, 323 (2016),
7–15.
Sevinç, Murat, “Anayasa Sözcüğündeki Sihir: Devlet Modeli, Yerellik, Özerklik”, Birikim,
323 (2016), 16–23.
Can, Eyüp, “Türkiye’nin İkinci Kurucu Babası Kim?”, Hürriyet (13 May 2014).
Dalay, Galip, “Cumhuriyetin Kurucu İdeolojisi ve Cumhurun Seçimi”, Sabah (2 August
2014).
Ibid.
“İşte Erdoğan’ın Köşk Adaylığı Konuşması”, Aktif Haber (1 July 2014).
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
175
deeper historical connotation. Al-Fatiha is the first chapter of the Koran, but at
the same time it is considered the ‘key’ of Islam’s holy book that contains the
general message of Islam. Therefore, the political use of the term goes further
than the simple religious message. It indicates the turning of a new page in the
history of the country, towards the establishment of what came to be known
as the New Turkey.
At a more practical level, Erdoğan’s founding mission was mainly expressed
by his readiness to use all the executive powers secured by Turkey’s former constitution with no exception in a way that would push the country towards a de
facto presidential system110 or in a way that would create the preconditions for
the approval of a new constitution with the presidential system. For Erdoğan
himself the August 2014 presidential election was the start of a process for the
establishment of New Turkey and ‘the question of a new constitution was not
a matter of choice but mandatory’.111 Therefore, the direct election of the president by popular vote signified one of the pivotal stages in the closure of the
‘Old Turkey’ era.112 The assumption of the presidency by Erdoğan on 28 August
2014 marked ‘the first moments of the new beginning of the New Turkey’.113 But
the ‘first moments of the New Turkey’ went hand in hand with the construction of a glorious past, an imperial historic tradition, a historical reality from
which the government chose the civilisational framework for the legalisation
of the presidential system. On 28 August 2014 Erdoğan, as the newly elected
President of Turkey, wrote in the formal guest book at the Atatürk Mausoleum,
‘After your death on 10 November 1938, the distance between presidency and
nation widened. Today is the day that Turkey is reborn from its ashes. Today,
Turkey has embraced again its ancient (kadim) origins and reunited with its
spirit and essence’.114
Just like the Kemalist new Turkey, akp’s New Turkey has a selective past.
It does not choose to appropriate the immediate past, but the one before it,
i.e. not Kemalist Turkey, but the Ottoman and Seljuk periods. According to
Erdoğan, ‘the Turkish Republic is the continuation of the Ottoman Empire, just
like it is the continuation of the Seljuk and all our previous states. It is of course
110
111
112
113
114
Miş and Aslan, “Erdoğan Siyaseti”, p. 25.
“TC Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Altıncı Muhtarlar Toplantısı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma” (8 April
2015), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30100/altinci-muhtarlar-toplantisindayaptiklari-konusma.
“TC Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Devir Teslim Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma” (28 August
2014), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2931/devir-teslim-torenindeyaptiklari-konusma.
Ibid.
“Veda Gününün Ayrıntıları”, Time Türk (28 August 2014).
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
176
moudouros
understood that the borders have changed, that the forms of government have
changed, but the substance and soul remain the same’.115 Being selective, the
New Turkey is against the former ‘Kemalist ancien régime’ but promotes a new
‘Islamic-conservative ancien régime’.116 It retains peace-making and normalisation elements from the Ottoman past and insists on their modernisation so
as to adapt to the new context of modern times. More specifically, the identity of the New Turkey revolves around the values of conservatism, traditional
family, Sunni-Islamic traditions and imperial Ottoman history. At the same
time the New Turkey expresses a civilisational mission which will materialise
through a powerful state.117 The importance of the state for the restoration of
the national culture (milli kültür) is of strategic importance and supports the
ideological trend that claims that Turkey’s return to its civilisational basin is
possible through politics ‘from above’,118 i.e. through a powerful state authority
that will care for the restoration of traditional values. akp itself perceives its
mission not as a government formation process, but rather as the strengthening of the state towards the restoration of a whole civilisation.119
The idea of a powerful state that is wholly reflected in the powerful executive authority is a significant expression of the ideology of almost the entire
Turkish centre-right.120 In this ideological trend the state is the ultimate symbol of power and the sole agent that can exert it.121 The powerful state and the
powerful executive authority are actually presented as a structural characteristic of the history and civilisation of the Turkish people. They are ‘facts’ that the
Turkish people have carried within them from the depths of history and their
glorious past. In this way the state and its strengthening are presented as the
only means for the material as well as the spiritual development of the nation.
A nation without a powerful state is destined to lose its culture and civilisation
and is therefore doomed to extinction.122 According to the Turkish right, the
Ottoman Empire symbolises the glorious experience of transition from a small
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
“‘Vefatının 100. Yılında Sultan Abdülhamid’i Anlamak’ Konulu Konferansta Yaptıkları
Konuşma” (10 February 2018), https://tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/90385/vefatinin-100yilinda-sultan-abdulhamidi-anlamak-konulu-konferansta-yaptiklari-konusma.
Bora, Zamanın Kelimeleri, p. 14.
Seufert, Günter, “Erdoğan’s New Turkey”, SWP Comments, 44 (2014), p. 3.
Taşkın, Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya, p. 244.
tbmm, Tutanak Dergisi, 134’üncü Birleşim (Olağanüstü), 1 September 2014, p. 1233.
İnsel, Ahmet, “Başkanlık Sistemi ve Güç Fetişizmi”, Birikim, 288 (2013), 8–14.
Öztan, Güven Gürkan, “Türk Sağında Devlet Fetişizmine Dair”, in Türk Sağı: Mitler,
Fetişler, Düşman İmgeleri, İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu and Güven Gürkan Öztan (eds)
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), pp. 427–28.
Ibid., pp. 437–38.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
177
tribal state to an ecumenical empire. It symbolises at the same time the climax
of the Turco-Islamic civilisation.123
In this context, the Ottoman Empire constitutes one of the most important
examples that historically prove and convey to the present the ‘Turkish ability
and experience’ in the creation and administration of states. In this theoretical
framework, the Ottoman state evolves in a straight line; it is a homogeneous
whole, without ethnic, religious or social differentiations.124 Turkish nationalism and Islamism share the same view of an idealised Ottoman Empire—as a
world power, but also as the most important historical proof of a glorious and
victorious past of the Muslim Turks.125 Using this selective view of the imperial
past, a vision of a powerful Turkish state modelled on the Ottoman Empire has
been created—a state able to lead today’s world.126 Within this context, civilisational restoration through a strengthened state and the normalisation of
Turkey through return to its civilisational basin have concurrently legitimised
the presidential system both as a necessity and as something entirely normal.
In short, the adoption of the presidential system was presented by akp as a
civilisational necessity for the normalisation of Turkey. As Erdoğan has often
stressed, “[t]he presidential system is in our genes. The element of a powerful
leader is in our genes”.127
Of course, the construction of a direct relationship between Islamic
Ottoman civilisation and the presidential system is not a recent phenomenon as far as political confrontation is concerned. For example, many decades ago Ali Fuat Başgil used to stress that “[w]e are a nation that wants to
see over it one and only authority. To elect among us this authority… After the
abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate and supposedly with the aim of
Turkey never being caught again in the storm of one-man rule, they created
the National Assembly. That is, a ruler of a hundred heads and next to it they
wanted to leave a President of the state as a ceremonial clerk’.128 This argument exemplifies the shared ideology of quite a number of right-wing parties,
and was used in favour of the adoption of the presidential system. Both the
National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) and the National Salvation Party
(Milli Selamet Partisi) of Necmettin Erbakan promoted the presidential system
123
124
125
126
127
128
Ibid., p. 441.
Ibid., pp. 440–41.
Şen, Mustafa, “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the rise of the Justice and
Development Party”, Turkish Studies, 11 (2010), p. 62.
Ibid., pp. 62–63.
“Erdoğan: Başkanlık Sistemi Genlerimizde Var”, Yeni Şafak (21 February 2015).
Başgil, Ali Fuat, İlmin Işığında Günün Meseleleri (Istanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 1960), p. 39.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
178
moudouros
in their political programmes.129 The proposal submitted by Erbakan to the
competent National Assembly committee for reforms to the 1961 Constitution
stated that ‘[h]istory is full of examples showing that our nation is successful in making great leaps forward and overcoming hurdles under the rule of
leaders who have its full confidence. The abolition of all undemocratic laws
which inhibit the practical expression of the material and spiritual abilities of
our nation constitutes an obligation that historical truth puts on the table’.130
Alparslan Türkeş’ views belong to a similar value context. The leader of the
Turkish extreme right considered reform of the constitution and the adoption
of the presidential system necessary for the adaptation of the political system
to the Turkish national structure and for the removal of phenomena like class
society that he considered alien.131
Therefore, beside the arguments for government stability and economic
development that the abolition of the constitutional system would bring
about,132 akp insisted that its proposal concerning the presidential system was
authentically Turkish because it incorporated elements of the traditions of the
Turkic states, characterised by powerful executive authority.133 Responding to
opposition criticism that akp insisted on the presidential system in order to
reproduce Erdoğan’s domination, then Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım argued
‘Whose system is the presidential system? It is no one’s personally. It is the
result of 600 years of tradition in the governing of Turkey and the Turkish
nation’.134
In effect, the presidential system was presented as a way of setting right
a previous ‘anomaly’. According to this view, the multi-headed power structure the constitutional system represented did not fit the Turkish civilisational
and value system, because, as Burhan Kuzu noted, the view that had historically prevailed was that the state is responsible for everything.135 Support for
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
Milli Nizam Partisi, Program (Istanbul: Haktanır Basımevi, 1969), p. 10; Milli Selamet
Partisi, 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi (Istanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1973), p. 17; Milli Selamet
Partisi, 5 Haziran 1977 Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi (Istanbul, 1977), p. 89.
Sevinç, Murat, Türkiye’nin Anayasa İmtihanı: Cumhurbaşkanlığı - Başkanlık Tartışması
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), p. 128.
Türkeş, Alparslan, Temel Görüşler (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1975), pp. 156–57.
Esen, Berk, and Şebnem Gümüşçü, “A small yes for presidentialism: the Turkish
constitutional referendum of April 2017”, South European Society and Politics, 22 (2017),
303–26.
İyimaya, Ahmet, “Başkanlık Sistemini Tartışmak Yahut AK Parti Modeli”, Yeni Türkiye,
9/51 (2013), 52–63.
Akyol, Taha, “Osmanlı ve Başkanlık”, Hürriyet (9 January 2017).
Kuzu, Burhan, “Türkiye İçin Başkanlık Hükümeti”, Amme İdare Dergisi, 29/3 (1996),
57–84.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
179
the presidential system was necessary since the historical and cultural basis
of society was leading to the conclusion that a political system with all the
power vested in one person was the most suitable.136 At the same time, according to the ideological tradition of akp, the adoption of the presidential system was the basic means to resolve the problem of civilisational alienation
between the state and the authentic nation. Through this change the principle
that ‘sovereignty lies with the nation with no conditions or preconditions’137
would be expressed to an absolute degree. The presidential system symbolised
‘peace-making’ between state structures and the nation, since it would reflect
the civilisational values of the latter. As Mehmet Acet pointed out, ‘[t]he ideal
way for the army and other vital state institutions not to be in a “position to be
seized” passes through their reconstruction according to the average perception of Turkish society’.138
The direct election of the president by the people and the adoption of the
presidential system were thus transformed into mechanisms for the promotion of ‘reconciliation between state and nation’.139 The direct participation
of the nation in the choice of president was seen as the means to eradicate
the alienation of the office and bestow upon the head of the state the status
of ‘authentic national leader’.140 For example, according to akp circles, one of
the most important messages of the June 2018 presidential election was the
emergence of Erdoğan ‘as the most authentic part of Turkey’s sociopolitical
reality’.141 In this way the ‘genuine nation’ would have a decisive role in the
reconnection of state authority with the traditional values of society and in
overcoming the artificial alienation imposed by Kemalist republicanism in the
previous decades. As Erdoğan himself pointed out after his victory in the 2014
election, “[t]he state and the nation no longer have two separate directions.
As of today they both face the same direction. They walk as one in the same
direction”.142
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
Tozkoparan, “AK Parti Başkanlık Sistemini”.
tbmm, Tutanak Dergisi, 54’üncü Birleşim, 10 January 2017, p. 429.
Acet, Mehmet, “Genelkurmay Savunma Bakanlığı’na Bağlandı, Şimdi Ne Olacak?”, Yeni
Şafak (16 July 2018).
Teazis, İkincilerin Cumhuriyeti, p. 60.
Uslu, Hasan Faruk, “De facto presidentialization in Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2015), p. 127.
“24 Haziran Millet-Devlet Birlikteliğini Somutlaştırdı”, Kriter, 3/26 (July-August
2018), https://kriterdergi.com/acik-oturum/24-haziran-millet-devlet-birlikteliginisomutlastirdi.
Yaşlı, akp, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus, p. 241.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
180
moudouros
The concept of reunification of state and nation has as its starting point
akp’s understanding of a permanently suppressed Muslim conservative
majority and a permanently suppressive Kemalist minority.143 Thus, the new
constitution and the direct election of the president by the people are a form
of normalisation since they are based on the arbitrary view that the majority of
the ‘genuine nation’ will permanently ensure that the ‘problematic, alienated’
and in many cases ‘traitorous’144 opposition will never again rise to power.145
Therefore, the idea of Turkey’s normalisation through the presidential system
is the result of akp’s civilisational perception of Turkish society and its theory
that the ‘genuine majority’ can permanently shut the door to power on those
‘who do not identify with the culture, values and faith of the nation’.146
Conclusion: the Problem(s) of a ‘Turkish-Type’ Presidential System
‘The new constitution should in its spirit, word and method be a text which
reflects the experiences of our nation, its culture, its history and its aspirations. When our nation sees this constitution it should see itself, its traditions
and its history’.147 With these words, Erdoğan pointed to the necessity for a
new constitution with ‘native and national’ features, essential in the pursuit
of a resolution to the basic contradiction that reproduced Turkey’s alienation
from its civilisational basin, namely the East. This ideological approach was
particularly strong in the entire period leading up to the 2017 referendum,
which approved the adoption of the presidential system. Since the end of 2016,
akp mp s have strongly stressed the ‘native and national’ character of their
political aim at the National Assembly Constitutional Committee meetings,
examining the proposal for reform of the constitution and adoption of the
presidential system. The ‘native and national’ orientation of the proposal for
constitutional amendment was the basis for the emergence of a ‘Turkish-type’
presidential system, i.e. a system of government adapted to Turkey’s structure
and peculiarities.148 The presidential system was of a ‘Turkish type’ because,
143
144
145
146
147
148
Alaranta, National and State Identity in Turkey, pp. 72–73.
Esen and Gümüşçü, “A small yes for presidentialism”.
Mert, Nuray, “Presidential system as the majority’s aspiration of power in Turkey”,
Hürriyet Daily News (23 January 2017).
Tatlıcan, İsa, “İstemedikleri Başkanlık Değil Milli İrade”, Sabah (2 February 2016).
“T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı: Yeni Anayasa Hep Birlikte Temalı Programda Yaptıkları
Konuşma” (28 January 2016), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/38673/
yeni-anayasa-icin-hep-birlikte-temali-programda-yaptiklari-konusma.
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 1’inci Toplantı (20 December 2016), p. 61.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
THE ‘TURKISH-TYPE’ PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
181
according to akp, it incorporated both the distinct historic experience of the
country and the ‘native and national’ perceptions.149
On the basis of this ideological stance, the success of Turkey’s return to
its true history and geography was possible only if the spirit of the constitution and the presidential system embodied ‘native and national’ values. Only
through such a constitution could Turkey once again be embraced by the geography and civilisation from which it had been cut off.150 However, the concept
of ‘native and national’ as adapted to the new constitution and the presidential system causes, among others, two basic problems. At a primary level, the
problem is caused by the relation of the concept of ‘native and national’ to
ecumenical norms. According to Cihat Barış, ‘native’ and ‘national’ ‘have an
introvert orientation. An extrovert perception has no relation to native and
national’.151 The ‘Turkish-type’ presidential system strives not to be a copy or
imitation of Western models, but at the same time this creates the risk of divergence from universally accepted democratic standards.152 At a second level,
the aim of adopting a Turkish-type presidential system based on the necessity
for civilisational normalisation of the country undermines the need for a new
constitution as a true democratisation move.153
The ideological legitimisation of the presidential system through a civilisational framework, as well as the interpretation of the civilisational framework
through the ideological approach of the Islamic movement and the wider
Turkish right, created the prospect of a deepening polarisation in society. On
the one hand, the concept of democracy was further reduced to the election
process, putting in doubt the existence of other social and political checks and
balances and democratic action.154 On the other hand, the attempt to overcome the ‘multi-headed’ power structure regarded as civilisationally alien to
Turkey created the preconditions for the questioning of the concept of separation of powers,155 and steered the system towards unity and harmony of
powers under the exclusive control of the elected but sole leader.156
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 3’üncü Toplantı, p. 17.
Abak, Şaban, “Yeni Anayasanın Ruhu”, Yeni Şafak (24 January 2013).
Barış, Cihat, “Yerlilik ve Millilik Çimentosu”, Diriliş Postası (5 July 2017).
Çınar, Menderes, “akp’nin İkinci ‘Başkanlık Sistemi’ Hamlesi”, Birikim, 336 (2017), 12–17.
İnsel, “Başkanlık Sistemi”, p. 11.
Çınar, “akp’nin İkinci ‘Başkanlık Sistemi’”, p. 14.
Yabanci, Bilge, “Populism as the problem child of democracy: the akp’s enduring appeal
and the use of meso-level actors”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16 (2016),
591–617.
tbmm, Anayasa Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi. 3’üncü Toplantı, p. 63.
Turkish Historical Review 13 (2022) 157–182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus
182
moudouros
As Şule Özsoy Boyunsuz points out, presenting the strict separation of powers and the existence of constitutionally entrenched control mechanisms of
the executive as agents of destabilisation has created the preconditions for the
imposition of ‘hyper presidentialism’.157 Furthermore, the imposition of a civilisational framework with an absolutist interpretation of ‘native and national’
criteria as the basis of constitutional reform has created more centres of social
polarisation. The goal of ‘reconnection of state and nation’ through a ‘Turkishtype’ presidential system, defined as such by the dominant power, eventually meant the reconnection of a specific part of society and the exclusion of
another158—that which did not meet the ‘native and national’ criteria of the
pursued civilisational normalisation.
157
158
Boyunsuz, Şule Özsoy, “The akp’s proposal for a ‘Turkish type of presidentialism’ in
comparative context”, Turkish Studies, 17 (2016), 68–90.
Bora, “Esat Arslan İle İslamcılık”, p. 71.
Turkish Historical Downloaded
Review 13
(2022) 157–182
from Brill.com11/01/2022 08:33:48AM
via University of Cyprus