The Relationship between Vice and Malice According to Thomas Aquinas

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICE AND MALICE ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS René Ardell Fehr M01060738 October 25, 2022 Dominican University College Ph.D. in Philosophy Program Dissertation Directed by: Prof. Maxime Allard, O.P. Defense Date: October 24, 2022 ABSTRACT This project aims to examine the relationship between vice and malice according to Thomas Aquinas. The first chapter begins with a consideration of the categories before moving on to disposition and habitus. Habitus, it is argued, is a disposition that resides in certain powers of the soul that is difficult to change; they make action prompt, easy, and pleasurable, and their objects connatural to their subjects. The second chapter takes up unsuitable habitus: vices. The features of habitus are applied to vice, and the relationship of vice to virtue and to the mean, the connection of the vices, and the generation, strengthening, weakening, and corruption of vices are examined. The third chapter focuses upon that to which vicious habitus are directed: sinful actions. Here, sin is examined as a philosophical concept as well as as an act. The fourth chapter considers malice, which is an interior cause of sinful actions, consisting as they do in a disordered will that loves some temporal good more than a spiritual good, and which, when the temporal and spiritual good are perceived to be incompatible with each other, result in an agent who knowingly chooses a spiritual evil so that the temporal good may be obtained. Malice is contrasted with the exterior causes of sinful action, as well as with the other interior causes of sinful action: ignorance and passion. Special emphasis is placed upon the roles of intention and choice in the malicious action, as well as upon the role i of evil in the choice that characterizes malice. The groundwork being laid, the fifth and final chapter considers the relationship between vice and malice, which consists in large part of an examination of Thomas's two claims that, first, all sins arising from one's vicious habitus are malicious, and, second, that not all malicious sins are from a vicious habitus. In the former case, this is in part because a vicious habitus makes its object connatural to the sinning agent. In the latter case, this is because malicious sins need not be committed in the manner which vicious sins are: promptly, easily, and pleasurably. Thus, for Thomas, the relationship between vice and malice is characterized differently whether one approaches malice from the side of vice, or vice from the side of malice. I argue that the result is a progression of vice and malice in the sinning agent, according as one's appetites are more or less inclined to their respective objects. ii CONTENTS ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . i CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . v ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . vii . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7 16 28 51 52 71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 83 105 116 128 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS PART ONE CHAPTER I: HABITUS . . i. The Categories . . a. Quality . . b. Disposition and Habitus ii. Habitus Itself . . . a. The Features of Habitus b. Translating Habitus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER II: VICE . . . . . i. Vice Itself . . . . . ii. The Relationship of Vice to Virtue and to the Mean iii. The Connection of the Vices . . . iv. The Generation and Corruption of Vice . iii PART TWO CHAPTER III: SIN . . . i. Sin as a Philosophical Concept ii. Sin as an Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 138 147 CHAPTER IV: MALICE . . i. The Exterior Causes of Sinful Acts ii. The Interior Causes of Sinful Acts a. Ignorance . . b. Passion . . iii. Malice . . . a. Malice Itself . . b. Intention and Choice . c. The Choice of Evil . d. Translating Malitia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 182 187 188 193 203 204 219 232 242 CHAPTER V: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICE AND MALICE i. The Relationship Itself . . . . . a. Vicious Acts Are Malicious Acts . . . b. Malice without Vice . . . . . ii. Generating Vice, Becoming Malicious . . . iii. Towards Virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 249 250 260 273 287 CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . 292 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . 296 PART THREE . . iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have the pleasure of thanking a number of people who have not only made this project possible, but who have made it all the richer for their direct or indirect involvement. My director, Prof. Maxime Allard, O.P., has been invaluable in my own formation and in the direction of this work. Thank you for the support and guidance you have given me throughout these years. I thank as well the members of the defense committee, which in addition to Prof. Allard included Prof. Jean-Franҫois Méthot and Prof. Pierre Métivier, O.P., both of Dominican University College, and Prof. Colleen McCluskey of Saint Louis University. Additionally, I would like to thank Prof. Mark Nyvlt of Dominican University College for organizing the defense, as well as Prof. Francis K. Peddle of Dominican University College, who chaired the defense. Fr. Andrew Handrahan of Immaculate Conception Parish in Richmond, PE, has been a wonderful office-mate. Thank you for use of the office, and for appeasing my intellectual side while I have been away from the College. Dr. Ruth Padmore has provided generous assistance throughout the duration of this project, which has resulted in a significantly easier and quicker process. Thank you, Ruth. Additionally, I wish to thank Ruth and Dr. Ann Michael together, who brightened the Fehr v home and who shared in making many happy memories with Emilie, Marilla, and I that will not soon be forgotten. Thanks to my parents Ike and Benita, as well as to my sister Vanessa, who have taught me innumerable lessons and skills that have allowed me to complete this project. To my best friend and wife, Emilie, and to our daughters, Marilla and Eleanor, I give unending thanks. Emilie, for your care of me and the household, and Marilla and Eleanor, for the joy you bring me every day, I will be forever grateful. I dedicate this work to the three of you. I also wish to thank St. Joseph, St. Anne, St. Thomas Aquinas, and our Blessed Mother for their intercession and Christian examples. Finally, I wish to give my most heartfelt thanksgiving, meager though it is, to our Lord, without whom I can do nothing. vi ABBREVIATIONS Throughout this dissertation I will use abbreviations for the texts of Thomas Aquinas of which I make use. Full bibliographical information can be found in the bibliography. I have taken the Latin titles of Thomas's works from < www.corpusthomisticum.org >. Commonly used titles (usually in English, but not always) are given immediately below the Latin. Other works that are sometimes abbreviated in scholarly literature, for example, those of Aristotle, will not be abbreviated in this project. CT Compendium theologiae Compendium of Theology De Causis Super librum De causis expositio Commentary on the Book of Causes De Ente De ente et essentia On Being and Essence De Malo Quaestiones disputatae de malo De Malo De Princ. De principiis naturae On the Principles of Nature De Spir. Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis On Spiritual Creatures vii De Veritate Quaestiones disputatae de veritate On Truth De Virt. Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus On the Virtues In Col. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to the Colossians In II Cor. Super II Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura Comm. on the Second Letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians In De Anima Sentencia libri De anima Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima In Eph. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios lectura Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to the Ephesians In Ethic. Sententia libri Ethicorum Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics In Gal. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Galatas lectura Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to the Galatians In Heb. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Hebraeos lectura Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to the Hebrews In Ioan. Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John In Iob Expositio super Iob ad litteram Commentary on the Book of Job In Matt. Super Evangelium S. Matthaei lectura Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew In Metaph. Sententia libri Metaphysicae Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics In Phys. Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Commentary on Aristotle's Physics In Post. Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics viii In Rom. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos lectura Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans In Sent. Scriptum super Sententiis Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences In Titus Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Titum lectura Commentary on the Letter of St. Paul to Titus Q. De Anima Quaestio disputata de anima Disputed Questions on the Soul SCG Summa contra Gentiles Summa Contra Gentiles ST Summa Theologiae Summa Theologiae ix INTRODUCTORY REMARKS In comparison with virtue and moral action, relatively little research has been undertaken with respect to vice and sinful action in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. This trend is not only indicative of Thomistic scholarship, but of modern ethical scholarship as a whole. In the field that is usually called "virtue theory", the focus is almost exclusively on virtue to the exclusion of vice and sinful action.1 This approach has the unfortunate effect of ignoring sinful action, which is a phenomenon vast in its scope, and which is an essential component of any competent ethical theory. Any ethical theory that seeks to explain morality in terms of virtue and of morally upright action is incomplete to the extent that vice and sinful action are set aside. This project aims at contributing to the body of scholarly work that is dedicated to the study, understanding, and teaching of the ethical thought of Thomas in an attempt to address the above-mentioned poverty in Thomistic scholarship. Specifically, it is my aim in these 1 See, for example, David Carr, James Arthur, and Kristján Kristjánsson, eds., Varieties of Virtue Ethics (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016); and Justin Oakley, "Varieties of Virtue Ethics," Ratio 9, no. 2 (1996): 128-152. The name "virtue theory" should not give one the impression that it is concerned exclusively with virtue. "Virtue theory" comprises a group of theories that purport to give an account of ethics as a whole, not just of virtue. What is supposed to distinguish "virtue theory" from other theories of morality is its emphasis on the virtues. Below, I will argue that Thomas ought not to be understood as a "virtue theorist". See page 82, note 13. 1 pages to examine and expound the relationship between vice and malice in the way that Thomas understands it. For the most part, this relationship will be examined in the form of two claims made by Thomas: first, that all vicious actions are malicious, and second, that not all malicious actions are vicious. I have chosen the topics of vice and malice in large part because they remain relatively untouched by Thomistic scholarship, and because, frankly, I find them terribly interesting. The very fact that a human agent is able to develop a vice – something that is unsuitable to his very nature – implies a host of philosophically tantalizing questions. What is it about human nature that allows a human agent to develop vice? How does a vice develop? What is the role of knowledge, ignorance, and passion in this development? How exactly is a vice unsuitable given human nature? The list goes on. Perhaps even more interesting than vice is the topic of malice. What is it that accounts for the human will, whose object is goodness, to desire something that the agent knows to be evil? Is such a phenomenon even possible? When it comes to virtue and virtuous action, the processes going on behind the scenes are somewhat straightforward: things are going well, and everything is happening according to the nature of the acting agent. Comparatively, in vice, vicious action, and in malice, things are going very wrong. Something is happening in the vicious agent that is against his nature – he is not acting as he should given the kind of thing that he is. What's more, there are ways to identify whether the vicious agent is acting more or less against his nature. Such a reality finds particular nuance in the relationship between vice and malice. Necessary for this project will be the situation of each of vice and malice within their proper philosophical contexts. Thus, much of this dissertation will be dedicated to building 2 the foundation upon which to examine the relationship which vice and malice share. The explanation surrounding each of vice and malice will be comparative, so that vice will be explained in contrast to virtue, and malice will be explained in contrast to ignorance and passion. As a result, most of what is said with respect to vice, for example, will reappear and be relevant when discussing the relationship between vice and malice, although some aspects of vice will be more prominently featured in the discussion of the relationship between vice and malice than will others, the latter being necessary to understand vice itself, but not vice as it relates to malice in particular.2 This dissertation will proceed as follows. Part One will consist of Chapters I and II, the first being concerned with habitus, the second being concerned with a particular type of habitus: vice. Habitus, we will see, is a disposition in certain powers of the soul that is difficult to change, and is divided into suitable (virtuous) and unsuitable (vicious) habitus. Chapters III and IV will comprise Part Two, which will examine sin and malice respectively. Habitus are directed to act, so that vices are directed to sinful actions in particular, of which malice is one kind of cause. Finally, Part Three will consist of Chapter V, wherein we will explore the relationship between vice and malice. The structure of this dissertation is laid out so as to begin broadly, narrowing in scope with each successive chapter. The five chapters are grouped into the three parts to reflect the narrowing scope, and to indicate that certain chapters are more alike in scope than others, as well as to indicate that transitioning between chapters in some cases involves a greater 2 An example is the relationship of vice to virtue and to the mean. See pages 105-116 below. Such an explanation is necessary for understanding what vice is, but it has little relevance for the discussion of the relationship of vice to malice, and so it does not appear in that discussion. 3 narrowing of scope than does the transition between others. For example, Chapters I and II, comprising Part One, are more similar in scope with each other than they are with Chapters III and IV or V, comprising Parts Two and Three respectively, while between Chapters I and II, Chapter I is more broad in scope than is Chapter II. Much of the work in the following pages will be exegetical, although at many points I will have to go beyond the immediate primary texts in order to aid the process of exegesis, to address a dispute among scholars, to offer a new interpretation of Thomas's texts, or to offer potential solutions to problems that are not in the primary texts. The main text that I will draw from is the Summa Theologiae,3 specifically the Shapcote translation, as this is arguably the English translation that is most widely used and cited. 4 The Latin that I will use is taken from Corpus Thomisticum.5 The abbreviations for each Thomistic work that I will cite can be found above, on pages vii-ix. We begin, then, with Part One, and with habitus. 3 At various points, I will refer to the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae. These are parts of the Summa Theologiae – the first part of the second part, and the second part of the second part respectively. I also use the term Secunda Pars at one point, which simply refers to the Prima Secundae and Secunda Secundae together. 4 Another major source that I will draw from is the De Malo. Full bibliographic information for these and all other works cited in this dissertation can be found in the bibliography: pages 296-302 below. 5 See < https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ >. 4 PART ONE I HABITUS Our examination of the relationship between vice and malice must begin with habitus. Habitus, most often translated into English as "habit", although some have preferred "disposition",1 is the concept upon which a proper understanding of vice is hinged. Thus, we will begin with an exploration of Thomas's interpretation of habitus, being careful to identify all of the relevant features that will pertain to our later discussions of vice and malice. With the goal of explaining habitus as Thomas understands it, this chapter will begin with a discussion of the Aristotelian categories, which Thomas adopts, and specifically the category of quality, of which, according to Aristotle and Thomas, disposition and habitus are a species. By examining the species of quality, we will be better able to place our object in its proper setting. Following this, we will consider disposition and habitus together, before moving on to habitus in particular. We will consider the relevant features of habitus, including their relationship to their subjects, their order to act, their status as a mean between potency and act, and the role that desire and pleasure play in their use, among other topics. By 1 See, for example, Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 189. Below, on pages 72-73, I will argue that the translation of habitus as "disposition" is inappropriate. Also below, on pages 73-77, I will consider the common translation of habitus as "habit", noting that this translation must be carefully nuanced. For a review of the various meanings of habitus according to Thomas, see Roy J. Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Fitzwilliam: Loreto Publications, 2004), s.v. "habitus". 6 starting our investigation with a wider scope and narrowing in on habitus as we proceed, I hope to properly situate habitus within the overall structure of Thomas's metaphysical and ethical thought. Throughout this chapter I will continue to leave habitus untranslated, as I wish to avoid any confusion between the meaning of habitus and the meaning of the modern English word "habit". However, in the course of discussing habitus we will have developed a solid enough foundation to speak to the differences between habitus and "habit", at which point it will become prudent to consider translating habitus. We proceed with the categories. I.i. The Categories Thomas follows Aristotle in placing habitus among a set of related concepts that have come to be called the "categories" or "predicaments". These are so-named because they are intended to exhaust the various categories by which something might be predicated of something else (or in which the predicate might signify the very thing itself). 2 Indeed, for Thomas, the categories are derived from the very notion of predication, owing to the diverse modes of being.3 The point is that each of the categories point to some unique form of 2 See John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 212. I will follow Wippel's analysis of the Aristotelian and Thomistic categories closely. The relevant pages are 208-228 of the work cited in this footnote. Additionally, I will also refer to Gaven Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), who likewise follows Wippel, but who provides a much more succinct interpretation of Thomas, in particular at pages 141-148. 3 In Metaph. V.9, §890. See also Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 210-211; and Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation, 143, who sums up this point particularly well: "it should be kept in mind that for Thomas there is a correlation between our predicating something of some subject and the mode of existence of that subject, since every mode of predication for him signifies a mode of being for some existing thing." 7 predication, each of which corresponds to some unique way or mode of being, so that, for example, the predicate "is red" is a unique way of being for the subject in which it adheres, 4 different from the predicate "is large". And so the sentence "Socrates is red" signifies a way that Socrates is (in this case, red) that is different from the way that the sentence "Socrates is large" signifies that Socrates is (in this case, large). 5 In simplest terms, "being red" is a different way of being than is "being large", and these two predicates are predicated of their subject or subjects in different ways. John F. Wippel has identified five texts in which Aristotle presents his doctrine of the categories:6 the Categories, the Topics, the Posterior Analytics (each of these three composing a part of Aristotle's Organon), the Physics, and the Metaphysics.7 Notably, in the former two texts Aristotle identifies ten categories, while in the latter three he identifies only eight. Thomas himself was surely aware of this discrepancy, but we will not trouble ourselves here with the reasons which might have produced the two different numbers. It is sufficient to note 4 When speaking of an accident "adhering" in a subject, Thomas will often use some form of the Latin verb inhaereo. See, for example, SCG IV.63; ST I.39.3, co.; ST III.63.5, obj. 1; In De Anima III.8, §707; In Phys. I.6, §42; and In Metaph. VII.1, §1255. This term is often used by Thomas in the context of truth or goodness (usually, the intellect adhering to the truth, or the will adhering to the good), which fact gives us some indication of how Thomas intends for us to understand the relationship between an accident and its subject. Deferrari defines inhaereo thus: "to cling to, cleave to, adhere to, used both [literally] and [figuratively]." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "inhaereo". This clinging and cleaving is, in the case of an accident, a matter of its very being – the accident positively depends on the substance to which it adheres for its own continued existence. The manner of adhering is different in the case of truth and goodness, however, as these are the proper objects of the intellect and will respectively. 5 The emphasis on predication and the modes of being imply that the derivation of the categories is a matter that is proper to the metaphysician, as opposed to, say, the natural philosopher. See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 211. 6 Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 216, n. 67. 7 Aristotle, Categories IV, 1b25-27; Topics I.9, 103b21-23; Posterior Analytics I.22, 83b15-19; Physics V.1, 225b5-9; and Metaphysics V.7, 1017a25-27. The textual references in this footnote refer only to Aristotle's listing of the categories, and not to his subsequent discussion of them. All references to Aristotle's writings throughout this dissertation are taken from Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941). 8 that Thomas himself appears to be committed to the reality of ten categories,8 as his commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, Physics, and Metaphysics indicate.9 Moreover, except for a few minor differences in the ordering of the categories, Thomas appears to remain consistent as to the content of the categories throughout his career.10 Of the three commentaries mentioned immediately above, Thomas offers a derivation of the categories in the latter two. In this chapter, we will limit ourselves to the Metaphysics and to Thomas's commentary thereupon in order to explore Thomas's thought on the categories and the relationship that they have with habitus. The Metaphysics would appear to be the most appropriate text to work from, as the Physics limits its scope to being as mobile, 11 while the Metaphysics is concerned with being as such.12 Before following Thomas's derivation of the categories, it will be helpful to briefly highlight the main division of the categories, that being of substance and accident. Substance is itself the first and primary category, and as such it enjoys a unique status, as it is divided against the remaining nine categories which together constitute that side of the division of the 8 One might ask: In the commentaries on Aristotle, is Thomas committing himself to the reality of ten categories, or is he merely presenting Aristotle's view? This issue is side-stepped by pointing to texts in which Thomas affirms the reality of ten categories outside of the context of Aristotle's texts. For one instance, see ST I.5.6, ad 1. Moreover, Thomas approvingly cites Aristotle's list of ten categories at ST I.48.2, ad 2; and De Ente I. Finally, Thomas will often cite Aristotle's Categories approvingly when writing about the categories, a text which, the reader will recall, contains a list of ten. See ST I-II.49.1 for an example. Indeed, nowhere does Thomas claim that there are eight categories, or any number other than ten. 9 In Post. I.33; In Phys. III.1, §280; In Phys. III.5, §322; In Phys. V.3, §661; In Metaph., just for Book V: §§885, 889, 897, 930, 954, and 977. 10 See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 222-223. 11 See Aristotle, Physics III.1, 200b12: "Nature has been defined as a 'principle of motion and change', and it is the subject of our inquiry." See also In Phys. III.1, §275. 12 See In Metaph., Prologue. See also page 8, note 5 above. Additionally, Wippel argues convincingly that "Thomas's derivation of the predicaments in his Commentary on the Metaphysics expresses his [Thomas's] most mature thought on the issue", and Wippel also calls the approach that Thomas takes in his commentary on the Metaphysics "more precise" than the approach he takes in his commentary on the Physics. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 224 and 223. 9 categories known as accidents.13 Substance is primary because it is the category or mode of being which exists in its own right; Thomas writes that substance "has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself."14 Accidents are so-named because they constitute the nine modes of being which do not have such a "firm and solid being". Rather, accidents adhere in substances, and so are said to exist insofar as they are in a subject, a substance. 15 To return to an earlier example, "being red" and "being large" are two different modes of accidental being, and as such are only said to be insofar as they adhere in some subject or substance which exists of itself, in this case, Socrates.16 And while it makes sense to say that the substance Socrates exists of itself, it would be incongruous to claim that red or large existed of themselves. We recognize that these things red and large only signify some mode of being insofar as there is some thing which is red or which is large.17 Substance, then, is the primary mode of being, while accidents are those modes of being which adhere in substances and modify them in some way or another. Let us turn now to Thomas's derivation of the ten categories – in Thomas's commentary on the Metaphysics, this occurs in Book V.9, §§890-892. And as the categories 13 See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 197-237, especially 199-200; and Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation, 141-148, especially 141-143. 14 In Metaph. IV.1, §543. 15 See ibid. 16 Recall that "Socrates is red" signifies a special a way that Socrates is (red). 17 As Kerr notes, "an accident happens (accidit) to some substance." Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation, 142. Emphasis my own. According to Deferrari, the Latin accido, from which the English word "accident" is derived, means "to come to pass, happen, occur, befall", and likewise the Latin word accidens, which is translated here as "accident", means "a happening, occurrence, incident, event". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "accido" and "accidens". See also Bernard Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy (Fitzwilliam: Loreto Publications, 2012), s.v. "substance, n." and "accident, n.", who defines substance as "a being that has existence in itself and by virtue of itself as an ultimate distinct subject of being", and (metaphysical) accident as "something whose essence requires naturally that it exist in another being; a being of a being; a mere modification or attribute of another being; being in a qualified sense; being inhering in another being as in a subject of existence; one of the nine modes in which substance is determined in its being". 10 are derived on the basis of predication, Thomas begins with the different ways in which something may be predicated of something else: For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways. This occurs in one way when the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.18 There are three ways of predicating something of something else, then, and the first of these is the first category, substance; this is when the predicate refers to the thing itself, the subject. Thomas's example is "Socrates is an animal", although he clarifies that he is referring to the substance of Socrates itself – "a particular substance". Thus, our example of a substance is "Socrates", as Socrates exists of himself. Thomas's remaining two ways of predication refer to when the predicate is "taken as being in the subject" on the one hand, and when the predicate is "taken from something extrinsic to the subject" on the other hand. 19 The first of these is divided into two different types of predicates, namely, when the predicate is in the subject essentially, and when the predicate is in the subject with reference to something else. When the predicate is in the subject essentially, it is either a result [consequens] of the subject's matter, in which case we have the second category of quantity, or it is a result of the subject's form, in which case we have the third category of quality. Our example of a quantity is "large", as this is something intrinsic to Socrates and is the result of his matter (literally, the "quantity" of Socrates; "how much" Socrates there is), while our example of quality is "red", as this too is something 18 19 In Metaph. V.9, §891. Ibid., §892. See also In Phys. III.5, §322. 11 intrinsic to Socrates, although it is the result of Socrates's form (that is, it follows from the what it is of Socrates, in this case, a body).20 When the predicate is in the subject not essentially, but with reference to something else, we have the fourth category of relation, as when Socrates is said to be the teacher of Plato. Socrates's being a teacher is something intrinsic to him, but this mode of being only adheres in him in reference to something extrinsic to him, namely, a pupil. Socrates is thus said to be in a relationship with something else – in this case, Socrates is the teacher of the pupil Plato.21 The third and final way of predication refers to when the predicate is "taken from something extrinsic to the subject". Thomas writes that this occurs in two ways: either the thing from which the predicate is taken is completely extrinsic to the subject, or the thing from which the predicate is taken, "though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which it is predicated." 22 According to the first of these, when the thing from which the predicate is taken is not a measure of the subject, we have the fifth category of habit [habitus],23 for example, when we predicate clothing of Socrates, we say that "Socrates is clothed" (thereby indicated a mode of being), and we are referring to the category of habit. Continuing, when that from which the predicate is taken is external to the subject and is a measure of the subject, then if the predicament is taken in reference to time, it is of 20 Thomas will argue elsewhere that qualities are founded upon quantity, "as color is in a surface, and figure is in lines or in surfaces". In Phys. III.5, §322. Thus, Socrates must have some quantity (surface) in order to have the quality of redness. Consider too the fact that, as Wippel rightly notes, "In his remark about quality's being based on quantity, Thomas is restricting himself to qualities as realized in material entities." Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 219, n. 77. 21 See In Metaph. V.9, §892. 22 Ibid. 23 The category of habit [habitus] is not to be confused with the habitus with which this chapter is concerned. 12 the sixth category when, and if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts is not considered, then it is of the seventh category where, and if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts is considered, then it is of the eighth category position. Thus, by the category of when we might say that Socrates is in the present; by the category of where we might say that Socrates is in Athens; and by the category of position we might say that Socrates is seated. Notice, again, that each of these denote some unique mode of being for Socrates. When that from which the predicate is taken is extrinsic to the subject, but is "from a certain point of view" in the subject,24 if this is on the basis of some principle in the subject, we have the ninth category of action, as when we say that Socrates is walking; but if this is because the subject is the terminus of some action of someone or something else, then we have the tenth category of passion,25 as when we say that Socrates is being poked. In each of these two cases, action and passion, what is predicated of Socrates is so predicated because of something extrinsic to him (walking or being poked), yet in one case (walking) this something proceeds from a principle in Socrates himself (the power to walk), and in the other case (being poked) this something proceeds from the potential for Socrates to receive, in this case, a poking (and indeed, the action of poking terminates in Socrates). 24 Kerr provides a more helpful summary of these types of predicates: "what is predicated is other than the subject but predicated because of something in the subject". Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation, 144. 25 It might appear strange to label this category as passion, but consider the following definition from Wuellner: "any kind of reception of a perfection or of a privation; being, considered as acted on by another; the reception of change in the being acted upon; any passing from potency to act." Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "passion, n.", and consider too that the Latin for "passive", patior, and for "passion", passio, are related. See ST I-II.22.1, co. 13 We have, then, multiple different ways of dividing the categories, as there is the division of substance and accident, the threefold division of predication (when the predicate states what the subject is, when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject), and the ten categories themselves (substance, quantity, quality, relation, habit, when, where, position, action, and passion). We may represent these divisions with the following structure (note that the two major divisions appear in bold): I. Substance. i. The predicate states what the subject is.26 A. The predicate signifies a particular substance: (1) substance. II. Accident. ii. The predicate is taken as being in the subject. A. The predicate is in the subject essentially. a. The predicate is the result of the subject's matter: (2) quantity. b. The predicate is a result of the subject's form: (3) quality. B. The predicate is in the subject with reference to something else: (4) relation. 26 Recall that for Thomas, "this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance". In Metaph. V.9, §891. 14 iii. The predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject. A. The thing from which the predicate is taken is completely extrinsic to the subject. a. The thing from which the predicate is taken is not a measure of the subject: (5) habit. b. The thing from which the predicate is taken is a measure of the subject. 1. In reference to time: (6) when. 2. In reference to place. x. The order of parts is not considered: (7) where. y. The order of parts is considered: (8) position. B. What is predicated is other than the subject but is predicated because of something in the subject. a. Because of a principle in the subject: (9) action. b. Because the subject is the terminus of some action of someone or something else: (10) passion.27 Aside from highlighting the unique and primary place of the category of substance among the others, the above structure has the benefit of illuminating the process by which the categories are derived. Wippel rightly notes that in this derivation one finds "Thomas's answer 27 I am indebted to Kerr for providing a similar structuring of the categories, which I referred to in making the structure I present here. Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation, 145. 15 in advance to a criticism raised centuries later by Kant against Aristotle's list of ten categories or predicaments."28 Writes Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason: "Aristotle's search for these fundamental concepts was an effort worthy of an acute man. But since he had no principle, he rounded them up as he stumbled on them, and first got up a list of ten of them, which he called categories (predicaments)."29 Wippel retorts: "Whatever the merits of this criticism when leveled against Aristotle, it does not seem to apply fully to Aquinas. As he [Thomas] sees things, there is a kind of principle to account for the fact that there are ten and only ten categories or predicaments."30 As we have seen, according to his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Thomas thinks that this principle is taken from the three different ways in which a predicate may be related to a subject. I.i.a. Quality Having painted in broad stokes a picture of the ten categories, and of the primary role of substance among the categories, it remains to situate habitus within its proper context. Thomas, following Aristotle, argues that habitus is within one species of the category quality.31 Before examining Thomas's reasoning for thinking that this is so, it would be helpful to explore each of the senses of quality that Thomas, again following Aristotle, distinguishes, as well as the various species of quality of which habitus is a part. 28 Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 215. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A81 / B107. 30 Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 215-216. 31 See ST I-II.49.1 and 2. For Aristotle, see his Categories VIII, 8b27-34. 29 16 In commenting on Book Delta of the Metaphysics, Thomas expounds on the four senses of the term quality32 – note that we are not here restricting our view to the category of quality, but simply to our use of the term. The first of these is "substantial difference" [differentia substantiae], and it highlights the relationship between the Latin word qualis and the concept of quality. According to Roy J. Deferrari, qualis means "how constituted, of what sort, kind" or "nature, what kind of",33 and so when we ask "What sort of thing is this?", we are asking about its quality, in the first sense of the word. Recall that, for Thomas, the category quality is a predicate that is in the subject essentially and is a result of its form (as opposed to its matter).34 Likewise, to ask how a thing is constituted, of what sort or kind it is, or about its nature, is to inquire about something that is not exterior to it, but a part of it essentially: its form; for these questions – how a thing is constituted, of what sort or kind a thing is, its nature – all correspond to or are getting at the form of some subject, the thing that makes it to be the kind of thing that it is. The "substantial difference" sense of quality directly touches upon this aspect of quality, as it means "the difference by which one thing is distinguished substantially from another and which is included in the definition of the substance."35 Thomas utilizes Aristotle's examples in order to better illustrate this point: "For example, if one were to ask what sort of [quale] animal man is, we would answer that he is two-footed… and if one were to ask what sort of [qualis] figure a circle is, we would answer that it is 'non-angular', i.e., without angles; as if a substantial difference were quality." 36 In this 32 In Metaph. V.16, §§987-1000. For the text of Aristotle, see Aristotle, Metaphysics V.14, 1020a34- b25. 33 Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "quālis". See pages 11-12 above. 35 In Metaph. V.16, §987. 36 Ibid. 34 17 sense, quality is very evidently a qualification, as it qualifies, for example, man, as the twofooted sort of animal.37 The second sense of quality applies the concept of qualification to immobile things and to the objects of mathematics, but we will not concern ourselves with it here. Suffice it to note that in this second sense, "numbers and continuous quantities" use the term quality, as when, Thomas writes, "we say that surfaces are qualified as being square or triangular… similarly numbers are said to be qualified as being compound."38 The third sense of quality means "the modifications of mobile substances according to which bodies are changed through alteration, as heat and cold and accidents of this kind." 39 Thus, certain alterations of substances are qualities, such that, in our earlier example of "Socrates is red", if Socrates's redness came about by alteration,40 we would say that he has the quality of redness according to this third sense of the term quality. The fourth sense of quality is used "insofar as something is disposed by virtue or vice, or in whatever way it is well or badly disposed, as by knowledge or ignorance, health or sickness, and the like."41 This is the sense of quality upon which we will focus our efforts during the course of this dissertation, as it corresponds to our attempt to examine vice and its 37 With respect to quality and form, notice that qualifying is a kind of limiting, which, in Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics, is exactly what form does to matter. 38 In Metaph. V.16, §989. Thomas's discussion of this sense of quality is dominated by the concept of number. See ibid., §§989-992. 39 Ibid., §993. 40 The English word "alteration" is used to translate the Latin word alteratio, which Deferrari defines as having the following primary meaning: "making different, change, alteration of the sensible quality, physical agitation or excitement, a synonym of passio." Deferrari's secondary meaning includes "alteration of quality in the general sense of the word." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "alteratio". Wuellner defines "alteration" as "1. change in regard to the quality or qualities of a thing; otherness in quality. 2. especially, qualitative change in sensible things." Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "alteration, n.". Thomas discusses alteratio in depth throughout In Phys. VII. 41 In Metaph. V.16, §994. 18 relationship to malice. Thus, according to this fourth sense, a virtue or vice qualifies its subject, making it to be well or badly disposed towards some particular object; this also helps to make sense of the fact that we understand that we are referring to the quality of someone when speaking about their virtues or vices. These are the four senses of the term quality, then: (1) substantial difference, (2) the qualifications of immobile things and the objects of mathematics, (3) the modifications of mobile substances, and (4) the dispositions of virtue and vice and other dispositions. Yet Thomas reads Aristotle as reducing these fours senses of quality to two. Specifically, according to Thomas, sense (2) is reduced to sense (1), and sense (4) is reduced to sense (3). 42 This results in two basic senses of the term quality: the primary sense (I) substantial difference, and (II) the modifications of mobile substances. That sense (2) is reduced to sense (1) is, it seems to me, especially apparent, as the sorts of qualities and qualifications which concern numbers and continuous quantities constitute substantial differences. For example, the quality (sense 2) "square" of a surface indicates a substantial difference (sense 1) from the quality (sense 2) "triangle" of some other surface, and there appears to be no significant difference between this sort of quality (sense 2) and the quality (sense 1) of a circle's being a "non-angular figure". That sense (4) of quality is reduced to sense (3) is less evident, but can be shown regardless. This is because, as will be shown during the course of this dissertation, a virtue or a vice (habitus) just is a certain type of modification of a substance. Thomas mentions that not just the modifications of substances that are moved are called qualities, but also their 42 Ibid., §§996-999. 19 differences: "They [qualities of basic sense II] are called differences of motions because alterations differ in terms of such qualities, as becoming hot and becoming cold differ in terms of heat and cold."43 Thomas continues: The sense in which virtue and vice are called qualities is reduced to this last sense [(3)], for it is in a way a part of this sense. For virtue and vice indicate certain differences of motion and activity based on good or bad performance. For virtue is that by which a thing is well disposed to act or be acted upon, and vice is that by which a thing is badly disposed. The same is true of other [habitus], whether they are intellectual, as science, or corporal, as health.44 We will leave aside a fuller discussion of habitus and vice for later sections of this dissertation. For now, note that for Thomas there are four senses of the use of the term quality, which are reduced to two, of which our use of the term quality with respect to virtue and vice belongs to the second of the two, being a part of it. That sense is ultimately in view to some modification or alteration of a substance, and it is here that one may see the interplay of substance and accident rather clearly, for the modification or alteration in question is always of some substance, and does not subsist on its own apart from said substance. Nevertheless, the accident really does qualify the substance in which it adheres. We are now in a position to examine the species of the category of quality, of which Thomas holds that there are four: (1) disposition and habitus, (2) natural power and impotence, (3) passion and sensible qualities, and (4) figure and form. 45 Interestingly, when 43 Ibid., §998. Ibid., §999. 45 In large part I have taken this particular enumeration of the four species of quality from ST I-II.110.3, obj. 3. The same basic list is provided by Aristotle in his Categories VIII, 8b25-10a16, which Thomas cites approvingly at ST I-II.49.2, s.c. and co. The latter source considers the four species of quality in very great detail; it is my main source for the discussion of the species of quality. Note also that the habitus of the first species is the same habitus that is the subject of this chapter. 44 20 deriving these species of quality, Thomas appeals to the senses of the term quality mentioned above: just as that in accordance with which the potency of matter is determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics V.46 The first half of Thomas's "just as / so" conjunction refers to the first sense of the term quality, where that term refers to substantial difference.47 The second half of the "just as / so" conjunction refers to the category of quality, as is clear from Thomas's usage of the term "accidental quality" in this text; Thomas is referring to the accident of quality, or, the category of quality. This category of quality, Thomas writes, is also a kind of difference. I should note that by "accidental being" in this text, Thomas is not referring to any accident at all, but only to those accidents which fall under the category of quality. The key to understanding this is the relationship between the first sense of quality and the potency of matter which it determines to substantial being. That is, the first sense of quality does not determine some substance to substantial being in all of its aspects, but only according to its substantial difference. For example, that a particular man is a two-footed animal is owing to the determination to substantial being of the quality two-footed, but that he is also large and red cannot be reduced to this first sense of quality. Likewise, the category of quality is that whereby a particular man is qualified as being, say, temperate, but this same category of quality cannot explain his being seated. The category of quality, then, in some way 46 47 ST I-II.49.2, co. I have altered the translation somewhat. Thomas is referring to Metaphysics V.14. Matter is determined to substantial being by its marriage to form, hence quality's correspondence to form. 21 determines a subject to accidental being (corresponding to form). And like the first sense of the term quality, the category of quality is a kind of difference (albeit an accidental kind); it qualifies the subject in which it adheres. As the accidental being with which the category of quality is concerned corresponds to form, it actualizes a subject's potency for some accidental form that is connected with what a thing is, and indeed in this way are qualities a result of form.48 In the words of Nicholas Kahm: "quality comes from the mode of predicating in which the predicate is taken from something in the subject, namely, form; quality follows (consequens) form."49 In his early De Ente et Essentia, Thomas writes that while in accidents the primary genus is derived from their mode of existence (hence quality is taken from the form of the subject), the differences or species into which a genus is divided are taken from "the diversity of principles by which they are caused."50 Later in his Summa Theologiae, during the course of his most extended treatment on the species of quality, Thomas indirectly confirms what he had earlier written in the De Ente et Essentia and further clarifies the diversity of principles which cause the diversity of species of the category of quality. 51 There, Thomas writes that the division of the species of quality must be according to some measure, and that this 48 This aspect of quality – that of being a result of form – is the key to explaining Thomas's ordering of the species of quality. See ST I-II.49.2, co. 49 Nicholas Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2016): 27. Note that Kahm is here speaking of the category of quality. 50 Thomas Aquinas, De Ente VI. Jean-Pierre Torrell, who is the foremost expert on the dating of Thomas's life and works, dates De Ente et Essentia to 1252-1256 in Paris, making Thomas roughly 27-31 years of age at the time of its composition. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume I: The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 47-48, 348349. Any and all dating of Thomas's life and works in this dissertation will be derived from Torrell's work referenced in this footnote. 51 ST I-II.49.2, co. Torrell dates the Prima Secunda to around 1271. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume I, 146-147, 333. 22 measure can also be known as a principle from which the various species of quality are derived.52 For example, quantity (the category) is both the principle and measure of Socrates's figure (of the fourth species of quality),53 as will be explained below. In the case of the category of quality, when the determination to accidental being has as its principle and measure nature, we have the first species of quality (1) disposition and habitus.54 When this determination has as its principle and measure action and passion resulting from the natural principles of the subject, we have the second species of quality (2) natural power and impotence, and the third species of quality (3) passion and sensible quality. And when the determination has as its principle and measure quantity, we have the fourth species of quality (4) figure and form. 55 We will now turn to a more detailed examination of the four species of quality, including their sub-species, in the order that Thomas considers them in ST I-II.49.2, co., proceeding from the fourth to the first, 56 wherein habitus will finally be located. The fourth species of quality has as its principle and measure quantity, and is divided into the sub-species of figure and form.57 Figure, according to Thomas, consists in "fixing the bounds of magnitude",58 and as such can be understood as the "termination" or "shape" of a 52 See Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 28. Recall that, for Thomas, some qualities are founded upon quantity. See page 12, note 20 above, and In Phys. III.5, §322. This is especially evident in the fourth species of quality. 54 In Thomas's words: "the mode or determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject… the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is [habitus] and disposition". ST I-II.49.2, co. 55 See Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 28. 56 Kahm, following Thomas, likewise considers the species of quality in reverse order. See ibid., 28-38. Thomas does this, surely, according to their order of knowability to us and not according to their order of knowability by nature. See In Phys. I.1, §6. 57 See In Phys. VII.5, §914; Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 28; and Aristotle, Categories VIII, 10a11-16. 58 ST I.78.3, ad 2. 53 23 subject's quantity.59 Socrates's round shape, therefore, is consequent upon how much (quantity) of Socrates there is, that is, Socrates's figure is the limit or termination of his quantity.60 The other sub-species of the fourth species of quality is form, which differs from figure in that it is concerned with the accidental forms of artifacts: "a form [of the category of quality] is said to be that which gives specific being to an artifact. For the forms of artifacts are accidents."61 These forms are like figures in that they express the figure or image of some artifact, but they are unlike figures in that they are not properly the result of their subject's matter; Thomas writes that the matter of artifacts is predicated "denominatively", as when we say that "a triangle is 'of bronze' or 'waxen' or 'wooden'." 62 In figure and form, then, we have two sub-species of the fourth species of quality, which have as their principle and measure quantity; their principle in that they are derived from quantity, and their measure in that they receive their particular characteristics from the measure of quantity. What divides figure from 59 See Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 28. Moreover, note that the Latin figura is sometimes translated as "shape", as is the case in the Shapcote translation of the Summa Theologiae. See ST I.78.3, ad 2. See also ST III.45.1, ad 2: "Figure is seen in the outline of a body, for it is that which is enclosed by one or more boundaries. Therefore whatever has to do with the outline of a body seems to pertain to the figure." 60 Kahm points to an interesting aspect of figure that I can only highlight in passing: "Aquinas says that of all the qualities, figure most follows and demonstrates the species of material things. In fact, he says that there is no more certain judgement of the diversity of species of plants and animals than that which is taken from the diversity of figures." Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 28-29. See In Phys. VII.5, §917. 61 In Phys. VII.5, §915. For a brief discussion of the differences between substances and artifacts, see René Ardell Fehr, "Thomas Aquinas and the Teleological Argument: Understanding the Fifth Way," (M.A. thesis, Dominican University College, 2018), 33-37. See also Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Piscataway: Transaction Books, 2014), 164-171. Perhaps the most notable explanation of this distinction in Thomas's corpus occurs in In De Anima II.1, §218. I will not go into the distinction between substances and artifacts in this dissertation, as it is not relevant to my current project. 62 In Phys. VII.5, §915. This point gets at the distinction between substance and artifacts; see note 61 immediately above. Contrast Thomas's triangle example with a substance, such as a man, wherein we woul d predicate matter of him principally. 24 form "is the cause of that particular dimensive quantity, whether it follows the quantity of a natural substantial form or the quantity of an [artifact]."63 The third species of quality has as its principle and measure passion, and is divided into the sub-species of passion and sensible quality. The concepts at play here are complicated, and a proper explanation of them would take us much too far afield; suffice it to note the following three points. First, as Kahm notes, the division of the third species of quality into passion and sensible quality "is… difficult to tease from Aquinas's texts because Aquinas, following Aristotle, sometimes uses these terms synonymously, but sometimes he does not."64 This problem is compounded by the triple-use of the term passion [passio] in the relevant texts: there is the passio that is the principle and measure of the third species of quality, the passio that is a sub-species of this species, and the passio that is a category of its own.65 In fact, at one point Thomas explicitly indicates to his reader that he is writing of the species of passion, and not the category, presumably to avoid any potential and understandable confusion.66 Second, at many places Thomas connects the third species of quality with alteration,67 a theme that Kahm picks up on and runs with. 68 Third and finally, the third species of quality is fundamentally wrapped up in issues of sense, whether they 63 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 29. Note that I have replaced part of Kahm's original quotation with "artifact" in square brackets. The replaced segment read: "artificially made thing", but this is not entirely accurate, as artificially made things are not necessarily artifacts; they can be substances. Think, for example, of fire, or water synthesized in a laboratory. See note 61 immediately above, especially Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 167-168. See also In Sent. II.7.3.1, ad 5. 64 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 29. See also ST III.63.2, ad 2. 65 See In Metaph. V.20, §§1065-1066. 66 In Phys. V.4, §679. 67 For example, In Phys. V.4, §679; In Phys. VII.4, §910; In Metaph. V.12, §918; and especially In Metaph. V.20, §1065. 68 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 29-32. 25 concern the sense appetites or the external senses themselves. 69 In his own study on the species of quality in Thomas's thought, Kahm ultimately concludes that "the cause of the third species [of quality]" – or in our terms, the principle and measure – "is a passive receiving or material principle of alteration… The difference that subdivides this third species… is the particular power of the soul (and its organ) that receives the quality by way of alteration and in which the accidental quality inheres, namely, the external senses or the sense appetites."70 In short, the principle and measure of the third species of quality is passion, or more specifically, we might say, the ability to undergo sensible alteration. 71 This species is divided into the sub-species of passion, wherein the alteration adheres in the sensitive appetite, and sensible quality, wherein the alteration adheres in the external senses, that is, in the sensible qualities affecting the external senses. 72 The former just are the passions of the sensitive appetite (both the concupiscible and irascible appetites), and as examples of the latter we might give hot and cold.73 The second species of quality has as its principle and measure action, and is divided into the sub-species of natural power and natural impotence.74 These pertain to what a 69 See In Metaph. V.20, §1065; and especially ST III.63.2, ad 2: "The third species of quality contains only sensible passions or sensible qualities." 70 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 32. I am inclined to agree with Kahm's treatment of the third species of quality, although I must note that the third species of quality presents such a complicated web of issues, and Thomas's discussion of it is so unclear, that I can only offer my own tentative agreement. Surely the issue deserves its own detailed and sustained study, which I am unable to provide here. 71 Recall that passion [passio] has connotations of passivity, reception, being acted upon, and the like. See page 13, note 25 above. See also Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "passion, n.": "2. [A] type of quality. [A] transitory sensible quality which moves or is moved by the sensitive appetite." Emphasis in the original. 72 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 31. 73 Thomas gives the examples of hot, cold, black, and white at one point in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics. In Phys. V.4, §679. Later in the same work, Thomas gives the examples of heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, sweet and bitter, wet and dry, and density and rarity. See ibid., §910. 74 See De Spir. XI, co., where the Latin is "potential vel impotentia naturalis". 26 certain substance can or cannot do according to its nature, and thus is that substance qualified. It is by means of this second species of quality that a substance can or cannot act. For example, owing to Socrates's rational nature, he has the power to will, which would be considered a quality of Socrates under the second species. However, if Socrates has broken his leg, he is qualified as being unable to walk, which is something that, normally according to his nature, he is able to do. This impotence of his natural power is likewise a qualification of him under the second species of quality. 75 Kahm identifies the second species of quality with the powers of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls. 76 This begs the question, however, as to whether or not we might identify the second species of quality in those substances which are not living. If so, we would have to locate a natural power or natural impotence in some substance – something that a non-living substance, according to its nature, is able to do or should be able to do but cannot. For example, might it not make sense to identify in the downward tendency of a stone a natural power? Likewise, if the stone is prevented from coming to rest, might this not be seen as a natural impotence? It is difficult to say; perhaps only insofar as one might attribute action to a non-living substance could one also attribute a second species of quality. Indeed, writes Kahm, "Aquinas does not take the difference of quality from the power's cause (the soul), but rather from the power's effect – namely, action."77 And thus is action the principle and measure of the second species of 75 Here the term natural is key. We would not qualify Socrates as being unable to fly, as this is not something that is proper to him according to his nature. We would, however, so qualify a sparrow which was likewise unable to fly. 76 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 33. 77 Ibid. 27 quality, for action is that by which natural power and natural impotence are manifested and by which they receive their character. The first species of quality has as its principle and measure nature, and is divided into the sub-species of disposition and habitus.78 This habitus which is a sub-species of the first species of quality is the object of our current investigation. A deeper analysis of habitus, and of disposition, than we have provided for the other three species of quality is required. Thus, at present we will shift our attention to consider disposition and habitus in some detail. Their place among the species of quality, and the role that nature plays as their principle and measure, will be made manifest. I.i.b. Disposition and Habitus The term disposition is, in Thomas's body of work, somewhat ambiguous. This fact is owing in part to no fewer than two apparently conflicting analyses of disposition and its senses. Both of these analyses are based upon Aristotle's definition of disposition in Metaphysics V: "'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind".79 In his Summa Theologiae, Thomas asks whether habitus is a quality, to which an objector replies to Thomas's affirmative position: "every [habitus] is a disposition, as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments. Now disposition is the order of that which has parts, as stated in Metaph. V. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore [habitus] is not a quality."80 In his response to this objection, Thomas fills in the remainder of 78 ST I-II.49.2, co. Aristotle, Metaphysics V.19, 1022b1-2. 80 ST I-II.49.1, obj. 3. 79 28 Aristotle's definition of disposition that the objector left out, and, by all appearances, cites the authority of Simplicius approvingly: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say: namely, either as to place, or as to power, or as to species. In saying this, as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says "as to place," and this belongs to the predicament Position, which is the order of parts in a place: when he says "as to power," he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness, such as inchoate science and virtue: and when he says, "as to species," he includes perfect dispositions, which are called [habitus], such as perfected science and virtue.81 The italicized text in the above block quote is a quotation that Thomas has lifted from Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's Categories, which, in another English translation, runs thus: "Therefore he includes all the different positions within a single term; bodily ones because they get this condition in terms of place, others receiving their position in their predisposition and propensity because of potential, others determining their position as complete states in terms of the form."82 Whatever the differences between these two texts and their representations of Simplicius's thought, the Summa Theologiae quotation represents Thomas's own interpretation of Simplicius on this matter. Thomas sees Simplicius as reducing the term disposition to three senses: (1) bodily dispositions, which are of the category position, 83 (2) 81 ST I-II.49.1, ad 3. Vivian Boland, O.P. has written an interesting article on Thomas's use of Simplicius during the course of his treatment of habitus. Boland points to this Summa Theologiae I-II.49.1, ad 3 text, but only mentions that Simplicius helps Thomas to reconcile an apparent discrepancy between Categories VIII and Metaphysics V.19-20, without indicating what this help consists in. Vivian Boland, O.P., "Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions – A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory," New Blackfriars 82, no. 968 (2001): 471. 82 Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 7-8, trans. Barrie Fleet (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 240.29-33. 83 Recall that the category of position is an accident in which the predicate is taken from something completely extrinsic to the subject in reference to place, and the order of parts is considered. See pages 12-13 above. Elsewhere, Thomas calls this sense of disposition posture. See In Metaph. V.20, §1058. 29 what might be called "imperfect" dispositions – namely, those that are "in course of formation" and are not yet perfectly "useful", and (3) perfect dispositions, which, in contrast to the second sense above, are fully formed and are perfectly "useful" – these are called habitus. In his commentary on the Metaphysics, Thomas gives a decidedly different interpretation of the three senses of the term disposition. Recall that Aristotle's definition was: "'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind".84 In commenting, Thomas writes: He [Aristotle] gives the common meaning of the term [disposition], saying that a disposition is nothing else than the order of parts in a thing which has parts. He also gives the senses in which the term disposition is used; and there are three of these. The first designates the order of parts in place, and in this sense disposition or posture is a special category.85 What Thomas writes here corresponds to his interpretation of Simplicius given in the Summa Theologiae. The first sense of the term disposition considers the order of parts in place, and refers to the category of position. However, Thomas's reading of the second sense of disposition in the Metaphysics constitutes a departure from his reading of Simplicius: Disposition is used in a second sense inasmuch as the order of parts is considered in reference to potency or active power, and then disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For a thing is said to be disposed in this sense, for example, according to health or sickness, by reason of the fact that its parts have an order in its active or passive power.86 Here, the concepts of formation and usefulness are notably absent; what is emphasized is the order of parts with reference to power, which, perhaps, makes more sense given Aristotle's 84 Aristotle, Metaphysics V.19, 1022b1-2. In Metaph. V.20, §1058. 86 Ibid., §1059. 85 30 own text. Here, also, Thomas places the second sense of disposition squarely in the first species of quality [et sic dispositio ponitur in prima specie qualitatis], which might indicate that Thomas will place the third sense of disposition, habitus, in the first species of quality as well. However, one finds an even more radical departure from the Summa Theologiae text instead: "Disposition is used in a third sense according as the order of parts is considered in reference to the form and figure of the whole; and then disposition or position is held to be a difference in the genus of quantity. For it is said that one kind of quantity has position, as line, surface, body and place, but that another has not, as number and time."87 This third sense of disposition is placed in the category of quantity, although it may also be related to the fourth species of quality, that is, figure and form. Regardless, it is evident that, according to this text, the third sense of disposition is not at all related to habitus, as it is in the Summa Theologiae text. What might explain these two divergent readings of Aristotle's definition of disposition? Unfortunately, we cannot point to the dates of the composition of the texts. Torrell dates both the Prima Secundae (wherein one finds the Summa Theologiae text above) as well as Thomas's commentary on the Metaphysics to around the year 1271,88 leaving us no clear indication as to which text predates the other. In any case, the texts are too close together in time to explain away their differences by an appeal to the development of Thomas's thought. 87 88 Ibid., §1060. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume I, 333 and 344. 31 Unfortunately, the secondary literature does not appear to be of much help either. For example, Vernon J. Bourke, in noting the three senses of the term disposition in the Summa Theologiae, writes the following of the second sense: "Those [dispositions] which dispose their subjects in regard to potency are dispositions belonging to the first species of quality, but since their end is the imperfection of potency, rather than the perfection of act or form, they are not habitus."89 Let us leave aside the question of whether it is accurate to say that dispositions (in any sense) terminate in potency, and continue with Bourke, who writes the following of the third sense: "The third kind of disposition, orders its subject in regard to form and it is a perfect disposition, i.e., a habitus."90 Here, by perfect, Bourke may be referring to the formation of dispositions and habitus, following Thomas's use of Simplicius – that is, as Thomas interprets him, a disposition is imperfect because it is not fully formed, while a habitus is perfect because it is so fully formed. Likewise the concept of usefulness can so follow. Or we might interpret Bourke as applying imperfection and perfection to dispositions and habitus simply on account of their ends – potency for one and form or act for another. The first interpretation of Bourke has against it the fact that dispositions cannot become habitus,91 something that Bourke's text, when interpreted in this manner, seems to imply is possible. The second interpretation of Bourke, while having the advantage of being indicated by the plain meaning of his text, unfortunately will not do, as Bourke would have to admit that no disposition has as its end act or form. 89 Vernon J. Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," in Essays in Thomism, ed. Robert E. Brennan, O.P. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), 105. 90 Ibid. 91 We will return to this point below. See pages 44-50. 32 What is even more damning of Bourke's text, however, is Thomas's own division of disposition and habitus, by which he indicates that dispositions are directed towards form (as opposed to Bourke's claim that they are directed towards potency) and that habitus are directed towards operation (as opposed to Bourke's claim that they are directed towards form or act). Here we must make use of Thomas's distinction between power in reference to being and power in reference to act:92 "power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts insofar as it is in act." 93 Thomas goes on to integrate his hylomorphic ontology: "man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form."94 Thus, the body is associated with matter, while the soul is associated with form and action or operation. The thrust of this is that the dispositions of the body are related to the thing itself directly, that is, to its being (even if only potential being), while the dispositions of the soul are "operative", and so are related to actions or operations. I suggest, then, that those dispositions that imply an order of something's parts to itself are dispositions of the body, while those dispositions that imply an order of something's parts to something else are dispositions of the soul, and that the "something else" is action. By its soul, a subject is disposed to operation. By its body, a subject is disposed to its very being (or more specifically, to its form – to its soul). This is confirmed by Thomas himself: [habitus] implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take [habitus] as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul—that is, if we 92 This is a distinction that Thomas makes use of in the course of his discussion of the essence of virtue. There, the point of the use of the distinction is that virtues are directed towards action or operation. ST III.55.2, co. 93 ST I-II.55.2, co. 94 Ibid. 33 speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, [habitus] or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body…. On the other hand, if we take [habitus] in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that [habitus] are found in the soul: insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a [habitus]…. And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, [habitus] are in the soul in respect of its powers.95 The emphasis on the body and on action or operation is again stressed by Thomas elsewhere: "a thing is well or badly disposed in two ways: in itself or in relation to something else. Thus a healthy thing is one that is well disposed in itself, and a robust thing is one that is well disposed for doing something."96 Tellingly, Thomas also writes that those dispositions that are directed to the body are directed to form: If… we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of [habitus] perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.97 95 ST I-II.50.2, co. As they are seated in the body and the soul, disposition and habitus can only be in living beings in a primary sense. And, more specifically, habitus can only be in living beings endowed with intelligence. See In Metaph. I.1, §28: "nor, indeed, is it possible to cause [habitus] in things that lack knowledge." Thomas's reasons for this fact have to do with the role of instinct in the operations of brute animals. Thomas does allow, however, for bodily dispositions to exist in brute animals, and habitus, he writes, exist in them in a secondary and incomplete sense, insofar as they may be trained and habituated by man. ST I-II.50.3, ad 2. See also Robert C. Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," in A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu, eds. Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 72, who emphasizes custom (consuetudo) in animals; and Bonnie Kent, "Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49-70)," The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 118. 96 In Metaph. V.20, §1064. 97 ST I-II.50.1, co. We will see below that only those dispositions of the soul can properly be called habitus. See pages 44-50. Thus, habitus, properly speaking, cannot be in the body. 34 Dispositions, then, can either be in the body (and then they are dispositions of a certain subject to itself, or more specifically, to its form), or they can be in the soul (and then they are dispositions of a certain subject to action or operation).98 In view of these texts, we simply cannot endorse Bourke's reading of the Summa Theologiae's three senses of the term disposition, as Thomas, contra Bourke, is clear that those dispositions that are in the body are directed to form. In the end, Bourke does not appear to be aware of the Metaphysics text wherein Thomas assigns the senses of disposition differently. With both the Summa Theologiae and the Metaphysics texts in view, we must explain the matter another way. I would like to suggest the following reading of the above two texts. The Metaphysics text is the primary reading of Aristotle's definition, while the Summa Theologiae text, along with Thomas's reading of Simplicius, constitutes a secondary reading of the same definition. Allow me to explain. In the Summa Theologiae, during the course of his treatise on habitus, Thomas gives his account of the ways in which disposition and habitus may be divided against each other, beginning with a way in which they are not so divided: "disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of [habitus], for disposition is included in the definition of 98 The exception to this rule would appear to be divine grace, which indeed may be in the soul in respect to its nature (and not in respect of its operation). In this way Thomas has gone considerably beyond Aristotle, for whom the various habitus belong to the various powers of the soul, as Thomas himself was aware. See ST I-II.50.2, co.; and ST I-II.110.4. See also Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 72; and Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," 108. These writers also consider the role of infused habitus, which I will not explore in this dissertation. For Aristotle's view on the subject of habitus, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.13, 1103a4-10. For Thomas's awareness of Aristotle's view on this, see ST I-II.50.2, s.c.; and In Ethic. I.20, §§243-244. See also Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 72. 35 [habitus] (Metaph. V): in another way, according as it is divided against [habitus]."99 In this first sense, disposition may be taken as being the genus of habitus, which would mean that all habitus are dispositions. However, Thomas continues, noting that disposition can also be divided against habitus: disposition, properly so called, can be divided against [habitus] in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a [habitus], when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a [habitus], just as a boy becomes a man.100 This division of disposition and habitus corresponds to Simplicius's second and third senses of the term disposition referred to by Thomas in the Summa Theologiae. Disposition is in formation and imperfect, and when it becomes fully formed and perfect, it is a habitus. The second division is as follows: Second, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g., sickness and health: whereas we call [habitus] those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g., sciences and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become [habitus].101 By "diverse species of the one subaltern genus", Thomas simply means that disposition and habitus may be distinguished as two sub-species of the first species of the accident quality. What distinguishes them on this view is not their formation or perfection, but their causes, resulting in their relative impermanence or permanence. Of these two ways of distinguishing 99 ST I-II.49.2, ad 3. This text will also help to establish Thomas's view that all habitus are dispositions, but not all dispositions are habitus. See also In Ethic. III.12, §509: "On this account the Philosopher, having passed over the dispositions or qualities of the body, treats only the dispositions of [habitus]." Emphasis my own. 100 ST I-II.49.2, ad 3. 101 Ibid. 36 disposition and habitus (by their degree of formation and by their permanence), Thomas writes that "The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle". 102 When it comes to the first species of quality, we might distinguish, then, between three senses of the term disposition: (1) the genus of habitus, by which we understand that habitus is a disposition of a certain kind, (2) as divided against habitus as the imperfect to the perfect, by which we understand that dispositions are not habitus, and habitus are not dispositions, although they may become each other, and (3) as divided against habitus in reference to their respective causes and permanence, by which we understand that dispositions are not habitus, and habitus are not dispositions, and that they may not become each other. Thomas claims that of these three senses, the third appears to be the closest to Aristotle's intention in Metaphysics V, wherein one finds Aristotle's definition of disposition. This fact, combined with what we have said above about dispositions of the body (for form) and of the soul (for operation), would seem to imply that in his commentary on the Metaphysics Thomas is giving the primary division of the term disposition, 103 while in the Summa Theologiae text above he is expounding on two senses of disposition, the in-formation and imperfect sense, and the formed and perfect sense. 102 Ibid. Thomas is referring to a definition of habitus given at Metaphysics V.20, 1022b10-12: "'Having' or '[habitus]' means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, and either in itself or with reference to something else". 103 Recall that, in the commentary, he writes: "Disposition is used in a second sense inasmuch as the order of parts is considered in reference to potency or active power, and then disposition is placed in the first species of quality." Here, we might see "potency" as a reference to the body, that is, to the potency of matter, and "active power" as a reference to the soul, that is, to operation. Thus, this second sense of the term disposition (as opposed to the second sense of the term disposition in ST I-II.49.2, ad 3) includes both dispositions (understood as the third sense of the term disposition in ST I-II.49.2, ad 3) and habitus (as divided against disposition in the same third sense). 37 We might also note that the Summa Theologiae text and the commentary on the Metaphysics text may be reconciled in another way. That is, one possible interpretation is that dispositions of the body, which are imperfect in formation, just are impermanent and transient. What makes dispositions of the body both imperfect and impermanent are their causes, so that, in principle, were the causes to be perfected, so would said dispositions become perfect and permanent – they would become habitus (albeit of the body). However, the nature of the body, which is corporeal and corresponds to the material cause, demands that the causes of dispositions of the body be themselves such as to cause imperfect and transient dispositions, while the nature of the soul, which is immaterial and corresponds to the formal cause, allows for more perfect, stable, and permanent causes and, therefore, habitus. While I am sympathetic to this interpretation of the apparently conflicting texts, it does allow for, in theory, dispositions of the body to become as permanent and fully formed as habitus of the soul – if only their causes were stable and strong enough – and Thomas himself indicates that he does not believe that this sort of view is in keeping with Aristotle's intention (and Thomas's by implication).104 Another possible interpretation, and one that I am more sympathetic to, is proposed by Robert C. Miner. Miner suggests that the development of the concepts of habitus and disposition in the Summa Theologiae represents Thomas's dialectical strategy. As Thomas moves through the articles in question, he narrows the parameters surrounding these objects: "Question 49's unfolding of the [habitus]/disposition contrast is itself an instance of the 104 See ST I-II.49.2, ad 3. 38 Summa's dialectical pedagogy."105 This interpretation is certainly consistent with my own, although it may have one minor drawback (at least, in the way that Miner presents it). That is, Miner sees Thomas as ultimately coming to the conclusion that habitus are not dispositions.106 While this is true, it is nevertheless the case that Thomas does see habitus as dispositions in one sense, the first sense given immediately above. So long as Miner does not exclude this possibility, his interpretation is compatible with Thomas's texts. One of the key points to take away from the lack of clarity surrounding the definition of disposition by Aristotle is that disposition and habitus can be understood in many ways. The thrust of these various interpretations is that there are many ways of understanding the term disposition, some of these senses implying others, some being contrary to others, and some having various or dubious degrees of reconcilability to others. All told, nuance and care are required when discussing these matters. 107 According to Kahm, "there is a tremendous amount of flexibility in Aquinas's usage of the terms '[habitus]' and 'disposition', and it can sometimes be difficult to know which way he is using the terms." 108 Indeed, we have proposed that the term disposition has no fewer than seven unique senses across three divisions, while habitus, as we have seen, could refer to the category or to the second sub-species of the first species of quality.109 The three divisions (marked with uppercase Roman Numerals) and the 105 Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 68-69. Ibid., 69. 107 Thomas provides yet another analysis of the term disposition elsewhere: "It should be said that disposition is said in three ways. First, as heat is the disposition for the form of fire. Second, as that by which an agent is disposed to act, as speed is the disposition to run. Third, disposition means the ordering of things to one another, and Augustine takes disposition in this sense. Disposition in the first sense is contrasted with [ habitus], whereas in the second sense, virtue itself is a disposition." De Virt. I.1, ad 9. 108 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 38. 109 For the category of habitus, see page 12 above. 106 39 seven unique senses (marked with lowercase Roman Numerals) of disposition are: (I) the commentary on Metaphysics V.20, §§1058-1060 division, (i) the category of position sense, (ii) the first species of quality sense, (iii) the part of quantity sense, (II) the ST I-II.49.1, ad 3 division, (i) the category of position sense, (iv) the in-formation and imperfect sense, (v) the formed and perfect sense, (III) the ST I-II.49.2, ad 3 division, (vi) the genus of habitus sense, (iv) the in-formation and imperfect sense, and (vii) the impermanent sense. Of these, I have argued that, at least when it comes to Thomas's thought on habitus, sense (vii) is the primary sense of the term disposition. Let us return to our analysis of disposition and habitus proper. Above we saw that, for Thomas, the first species of quality has as its principle and measure nature: "the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is [habitus] and disposition".110 Here, Thomas approvingly cites the authority of Aristotle: "for the Philosopher says, when speaking of [habitus] of the soul and of the body, that they are dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature."111 In commenting on this text, which is in the Physics, Thomas writes: "A thing is most perfect in respect to nature when it possesses the virtue of nature, for the virtue of nature is an indication of the completion of nature." 112 Here Thomas is using virtue in a broad sense, but the point to be gleaned from this text is that dispositions and habitus (signified in general by the term virtue) have to do with the nature of 110 ST I-II.49.2, co. Ibid. Thomas appears to be referring to Aristotle, Physics VII.3, 246a10-b3, although no English translation that I can find quite approximates the sense in which Thomas is using Aristotle's text. Nevertheless, the main thrust of Thomas's point is found in Aristotle here. 112 In Phys. VII.6, §920. 111 40 the subject in which they adhere. That is, a disposition is not for something that is besides the nature of the subject, but always something that is for or against that very nature. For this reason, Thomas writes, we are able to consider "both evil and good" in the first species of quality, that is, we are able to speak of good dispositions (those that are in accordance with the subject's nature) and evil dispositions (those that are not in accordance with the subject's nature): "For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the aspect of good, and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil." 113 Kahm notes that the first species of quality is, in this respect, "inherently teleological and is ordered to the end of nature". 114 At bottom, a disposition's being good or evil boils down to its suitability to the nature of the subject in which it adheres. It is in this sense that nature is the measure of any disposition: How does the disposition measure up against the nature of its subject? This, of course, implies that dispositions might arise in various ways, or at least that a subject, with respect to a single aspect, might be disposed suitably or unsuitably. There is, then, behind dispositions a kind of indeterminacy, in the sense that the conditions that give rise to the possibility of dispositions are not determined to just one sort of disposition (suitable or unsuitable) or another. This aspect of indeterminacy Thomas calls one of the conditions of disposition, such that no disposition, properly speaking, can arise without it. 115 Another condition is, as Thomas states it, "that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to 113 ST I-II.49.2, co. Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 35. See ST I-II.49.2, ad 1: "Disposition implies a certain order… And if we add well or ill… we must consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end." 115 ST I-II.49.4, co. 114 41 that only, there we find no room for disposition and [habitus]".116 This condition for dispositions is also a kind of indeterminacy, although instead of being an indeterminacy of a disposition that is suitable or unsuitable to a subject's nature, this indeterminacy is rooted in the various potentialities and objects that a subject might have a relationship towards. For example, a man does not have a disposition towards his intellectual nature, as he is not in potentiality to anything else in that respect – the man is not in potentiality to becoming a dog, or a tree, or a stone. However, that same man is in potentiality to various arts – he may become a painter, a sculptor, or a pianist. Here, we can say that the man may develop a disposition for one of these things; he may become ordered to being a pianist. Dispositions, then, are only ever towards things that a subject may or may not achieve, and which a subject might realize or achieve by powers that are, of themselves, capable of realizing or achieving various ends. At bottom, dispositions are about focusing a subject's potencies or powers, so to speak, upon one potential end. A subject might be in potentiality to many ends of the same kind (painter, sculptor, pianist) – a disposition will help him to focus his "artistic" powers upon one of these. A disposition will, in a word, dispose him. The "focusing" aspect of disposition and habitus helps us to understand the first part of the definition of disposition given above:117 "'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts…." This is admittedly rather vague and seems under-developed. However, there is a text which helps to shed light on this curious definition. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas considers whether habitus are in angels. An objector to his affirmative position 116 117 Ibid. See page 28. 42 writes: "[habitus] is a disposition (Metaph. V). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is the order of that which has parts. Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and [habitus] in them."118 Since, as Thomas understands them, angels are wholly incorporeal, they would appear to have no parts, and so, according to the definition of disposition given in Metaphysics V (which Thomas accepts), there cannot be dispositions or habitus in them. Thomas responds: "In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, insofar as their intellect is perfected by several species, and insofar as their will has a relation to several things." 119 The parts in angels, then, are metaphysical parts, not physical, and they are able to be ordered in the manner necessary for dispositions and habitus insofar as they have relations "to several things". This, I argue, is key to understanding the definition of disposition given in Metaphysics V. When a subject has parts that are able to be ordered, or arranged, to many and various objects, whatever order they actually take on will be a disposition.120 That is all well and fine, but it does not tell us the role of the concept of parts in the Metaphysics V definition. Why must a subject have parts at all in order to be disposed? In order to answer this, we must turn once again to the Summa Theologiae, wherein Thomas gives three conditions for dispositions to arise; we have already seen two of them. 121 The first condition, which we have not yet considered, runs thus: 118 ST I-II.50.6, obj. 3. ST I-II.50.6, ad 3. 120 Compare Deferrari, who defines ordo (which is the word that Thomas uses when discussing Aristotle's definition of disposition; see In Metaph. V.20, §1058) in part as "direction, relation, relating, referring". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "ordo". 121 See pages 41-42 above. 119 43 that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for [habitus] and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.122 Thomas connects the fact of God's pure actuality (that is, God's lack of potentiality, which entails in God a lack of parts either physical or metaphysical) with his complete absence of dispositions and habitus. In a subject, parts imply potentiality (even if only of the parts to the whole), and indeed one cannot have potentiality without parts, as even the angels require (metaphysical) parts in order to have potentiality to many and various things. As Bourke writes: "Thomas understands [parts] in reference to the multiplicity of acts towards which [potencies] are naturally ordered… Thus, these potencies have parts in the sense that they are not determined to act in one way only, but can act in a variety of ways." 123 In order to be disposed, then, a subject must have parts, and those parts must be capable of being ordered variously.124 On this point, Miner correctly notes that complexity is the theme that runs through each of the three conditions for disposition.125 We are ready to distinguish between disposition and habitus. Thomas divides disposition against habitus by taking disposition in its seventh sense above; writes Thomas: "This difference, difficult to change, does not distinguish [habitus] from the other species of quality, but from disposition."126 That is, dispositions are distinguished from habitus by their 122 ST I-II.49.4, co. Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," 105-106. 124 For a more detailed analysis of the three conditions for disposition, see Blaise Edward Blain, "Thomas Aquinas on How Habits Affect Human Powers and Acts," (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 2017), 57-62. 125 Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 71. 126 ST I-II.49.2, ad 3. Thomas is replying to an objector against his position that habitus is a distinct species of quality. The objector writes: "difficult to change is not a difference belonging to the predicament of 123 44 relative impermanence, and habitus are distinguished from dispositions by their relative permanence. The more or less difficult a particular disposition or habitus is to change, the more or less permanent is it, the more or less does it incline its subject towards its proper object. Yet we should not be quick to interpret Thomas as claiming that the more ingrained a disposition becomes, the more does it approach the status of habitus. As Miner writes, A person can be "disposed" to a particular way of knowing, but this implies nothing more than a shaky grip on the science, one that can be easily lost. Displaying a casual interest in a science, or even knowing some of its facts and theorems, is not to "have" the science in any profound sense. To acquire the science as habitus, one must grasp it from the inside, possessing it at the deepest level. The move from casual disposition to internal possession is not a small step, a difference of degree. It is more nearly a quantum leap, a difference in kind.127 Miner's reference to "have" in the above quotation points to the oft-repeated derivation of the Latin habitus from habere, which means "to have". 128 As "to have" indicates possession and the ability to make use of, the connotation is that when one has a habitus, that is, when one has a fixed and permanent disposition, one truly possesses one's habitus; one is able to make use of it.129 In the example given above by Miner, this having is related to the virtue of science, which, when it is truly had, is a habitus. And as Miner points out rather well, the difference between being disposed to science and having science is not merely one of degree, but one of kind; dispositions imply an arrangement, a (non-possessive) relationship, an quality, but rather to movement or passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but differences should be proper to a genus, as the Philosopher says in Metaph. VII. Therefore, since [habitus] is a quality difficult to change, it seems not to be a distinct species of quality." ST I-II.49.2, obj. 3. 127 Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 69. 128 See ST I-II.49.1, co.: "This word [habitus] is derived from to have [habendo]." See also ST I-II.49.1, obj. 1, where the objector points to Augustine's own derivation to the same effect. See also Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "habitus" and "habeo"; and Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 68, n. 1. 129 Note how the concept of possession dominates the Oxford English Dictionary's many definitions of "have, v.". Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., "have, v.". 45 inclination towards an object – habitus implies possession, an actually having the object in question. Miner's example is, however, imperfect, as the distinction between being disposed to science and having science is not merely one of having a grasp of a few basic essentials and getting to the core of the science, so to speak. For Thomas, the distinction has more to do with the body and the soul, as we saw above. 130 Someone who is disposed to science might have excellent eyesight, for example, or stable hands, or any number of prerequisites of the body that we might say would be good for someone in some scientific field to have. In contrast, by having an intellectual grasp of the basics of that science, however tenuous, one has already begun to form the habitus of that science, however weak that grasp may be. Indeed, while we would not call the habitus strong until certain features are realized, nevertheless, so long as the disposition (in the wide sense) to an object is in the soul of a subject, we call that disposition habitus. As to their permanence, dispositions are much more easily changeable than are habitus, as dispositions of the body are notoriously fickle things, while something like the knowledge of a science takes much more time and effort to uproot. It is clear, then, how dispositions (in the seventh sense above) and habitus differ not in degree, but in kind: dispositions are seated in the body primarily, and refer to the body's relationship to the soul, while habitus are seated in the soul primarily, and refer to the soul's relationship to operation.131 No matter how ingrained a particular disposition may be, it can never "make 130 131 See pages 33-35. It is true, however, that in speech we tend to call a weaker habitus a disposition. See ST I-II.49.2, ad 3. 46 the jump", so to speak, to the soul and become a habitus; they are simply of different orders.132 It follows, then, that only habitus of the soul are habitus simply.133 Dispositions of the body are not habitus in the proper sense, although they may become habitus in a certain secondary and extended sense. An example which illustrates this principle well is health. Health qualifies a subject in relation to itself, and thus is a disposition of the body. To be sure, health is relatively unstable, and so lacks the permanence that characterizes habitus proper – and yet there is a certain stability present in health (usually), so much so that Thomas prefers to call it a habitual disposition [habitualis dispositio]: If… we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of [habitus] perfectly: because their causes, of they very nature, are easily changeable.134 Following Thomas, Bonnie Kent, Miner, and Kahm all stress the point that only habitus of the soul are habitus simply. Kent focuses on the fact that the operations of the soul can be adapted to various ends: "[Habitus] arise from actions of a power capable of exercise in one way or another, not determined by its very nature to operate as it does." 135 Miner, similarly to Kent, points to the single-ended operations of the body, while also highlighting 132 See Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 37. Wuellner is mistaken on this aspect of disposition and habitus. See Bernard J. Wuellner, Summary of Scholastic Principles (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), §202: "A disposition becomes or grows into a [habitus]." 133 See ST I-II.50.1, ad 2. 134 ST I-II.50.1, co. See also ST I-II.49.3, ad 3. 135 Kent, "Habits and Virtues," 118. Kent continues: "When the body digests food, it does so strictly as a matter of nature; hence, it neither needs nor acquires some digestive [habitus]. In contrast, when the body is moved by the soul – in pitching a baseball, for example – it can indeed acquire a [habitus], albeit merely a [habitus] in the secondary sense." 47 the relationship of habitual dispositions to the soul: "The body cannot be directly habituated, since the natural qualities of the body are determined to a single mode of operation, rather than in potency ad multa. Nevertheless, bodily qualities like health and beauty which have some connection to the soul can be called 'habitual dispositions,' without being [habitus] in the full sense."136 Kahm focuses on the causes of habitus of the soul and of the body: "Because one of the distinguishing marks of [habitus] is that they have immutable or permanent causes and these [bodily] dispositions have changeable causes, they are not truly [habitus]".137 Kent and Miner, on the one hand, and Kahm, on the other, are getting at two different reasons why habitus cannot be in the body primarily. Kent and Miner stress that habitus cannot be in the body primarily because of the body's natural potency to operations of one sort. Kahm notes that the causes of bodily dispositions are too changeable to result in true habitus. In these respects, Kent, Miner, and Kahm are all following the example of Thomas himself: as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a [habitus]: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required…. If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of [habitus] perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.138 136 Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 71. Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 36. Kahm notes that Thomas does still call bodily dispositions habitus at certain points. As examples, he gives ST I-II.49.1; In Ethic. VI.10; and In Sent. III.23.1.1. See Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 36, n. 40. 138 ST I-II.50.1, co. 137 48 Thomas, ever nuanced, sees that Kent and Miner's line of thought considers habitus on the side of the operations that proceed from the very nature of the body, in which case, habitus cannot be in the body primarily, as these operations are ordered to a single end (for example, nutrition, growth, reproduction, etc.). Kahm's line of thinking, however, considers habitus on the side of the subject's relationship to form – the soul – and here too habitus cannot be in the body primarily, because of their changeable causes. Of course, the preceding remarks assume that we are not speaking of dispositions in senses (iv) and (v) above. If we were, the distinction between the body and the soul would no longer apply, since a disposition just is a weak habitus, and a habitus just is a strong disposition – it would not matter where the disposition or habitus is seated.139 Thomas argues that what accounts for the difference difficult to change is the causes of the disposition or habitus. We have already indicated this above,140 although there are other supporting texts. For example, when speaking to the distinction between dispositions (in the seventh sense above) and habitus, Thomas writes: "we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g., sickness and health: whereas we call [habitus] those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g., sciences and virtues."141 What makes something a habitus, then, or more specifically, what makes something to have the nature of habitus perfectly, are the causes that inform it – the stable and permanent causes of a habitus mean that the habitus itself is more stable and 139 Thomas does sometimes speak of dispositions and habitus in this manner. See, for example, De Malo VII.2, ad 4. 140 See page 47. The text in question is ST I-II.50.1, co. 141 ST I-II.49.2, ad 3. Emphases my own. 49 permanent.142 Kahm goes so far as to argue that the dispositions of the body "have changeable and corruptible material causes",143 which is, perhaps, in agreement with Thomas's claim that bodily dispositions have bodily causes.144 The point is that health, for example, is a relatively unstable quality of an individual. There are many (bodily) causes that go into one's bodily health, such that good health comes and goes, sometimes seemingly arbitrarily – Miner calls health and sickness "essentially transient".145 By habitus, Thomas has something much more stable and permanent in mind, as the causes of habitus are themselves stable things – for example, what causes the habitus of courage in a subject is courageous acts, whose essential features are identical in each act (the use of reason and will, the presence of perceived danger, the engagement of the irascible appetite, etc.), although the accidental features may look different owing to the various circumstances (when, where, with what, etc.).146 Let us summarize the above treatment of disposition and habitus. There are many senses of the term disposition; we have taken it in its seventh sense indicated above. 147 Both disposition and habitus are related to the nature of the subject in which they adhere, and thus the aspects of suitable and unsuitable arise with reference to said nature. A disposition or habitus is said to be suitable to a subject when it is in accordance with that subject's nature, and it is said to be unsuitable to a subject when it is not so in accordance. This, then, implies 142 We should also note that the causes under consideration here are unchangeable or changeable by their natures, and not merely accidentally. 143 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 36. Emphasis my own. See Kahm's brief analysis of "health" in the writings of Thomas: ibid. 144 See ST I-II.50.1, ad 2. 145 Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 69. 146 Below we will analyze the causes of habitus in more detail, specifically as they apply to vice. See pages 128-131. 147 See page 40. 50 a sort of indeterminacy of suitability on the part of the subject of disposition and habitus, but it also implies an additional indeterminacy in the form of the subject's potency to many and varied objects. We saw that a subject cannot have a disposition or habitus towards something which it is fixed towards (or towards something which is impossible for it to obtain). Disposition and habitus are distinguished from each other by the difference difficult to change, which arises from their respective causes. Ultimately, dispositions are, properly speaking, seated in the body as it is related to the soul, while habitus are, properly speaking, seated in the soul as it is related to operation. Kahm summarizes the above information in the formula: "Dispositions are dispositions of the body as it is related to the soul and have mutable causes; [habitus] are dispositions of the soul, inhering in the powers of the soul as it is ordered to operation, and have immutable causes."148 Having examined the categories, quality, and disposition and habitus as far as our present purposes require, let us now turn our attention to habitus itself. Exploring habitus will allow us to properly identify and define vice, which is a type of habitus. Our project, which has as its object the relationship between vice and malice, cannot proceed without a proper understanding of habitus itself. I.ii. Habitus Itself We are narrowing our scope of investigation to the second sub-species of the first species of quality, which is an accident adhering in a subject, where the predicate is taken as being in 148 Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 37. The manner in which habitus, or more specifically for our purposes, vices, inhere in the powers of the soul will be explained below. See pages 88-97. 51 the subject and as being a result of the subject's form. Habitus, then, is a certain kind of qualification of a subject (relating to its nature) that is intrinsic to it. This being so, there are certain features of habitus which we would do well to examine, as they will aid us in our analysis of vice. These features are the status of habitus as another nature, its order to act, its being a mean between potency and act, its necessity for certain types of actions (that is, "perfect" actions), the role that desire and pleasure play in habitus, and the question of its necessity in producing actions. Following this, having formed an adequate concept of our object, we will consider translating habitus. Other aspects of habitus will be discussed later during the analysis of a certain type of habitus, namely, vice.149 I.ii.a. The Features of Habitus Above I indicated that habitus involve the focusing of one's powers;150 this focusing is of the soul's powers in particular. Below we will see how this works with respect to the vices, 151 but suffice it to note for now that some of the soul's powers (some of what the soul is capable of doing) are able to be directed to many and varied objects, and that habitus help to focus said powers upon one object or one type of object in particular.152 Thus, by focusing the powers of a subject's soul, habitus becomes like another nature for the subject. In explaining this concept, Thomas prefers to point to the permanence of habitus: "the reason why [habitus] are 149 See Chapter II. See page 42 above. 151 See pages 88-97. 152 ST I-II.49.4, co. and ad 1: "By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of [habitus]." 150 52 hard to remove is that they turn into nature: whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not forever, because they are in their subject as a way to nature",153 and elsewhere: "He [Aristotle] says that those who are incontinent by [habitus] are more easily cured than the incontinent by nature, i.e., bodily temperament inclining to it, because a [habitus] can be changed more easily than a nature…. But a [habitus] is difficult to change because of this, that it is like nature." 154 This latter quotation highlights well the aspect of habitus as another nature; it does not modify the nature of the subject itself, although, in some respect, habitus are permanent and strong enough to be called "nature" in a secondary sense. However, a habitus does not constitute another nature in a literal sense; Thomas usually prefers to write that they are like [quasi] another nature,155 or that they are after the manner [modum] of nature.156 Many English commentators on habitus in the writings of Thomas refer to habitus as "second" natures, but this translation simply does not find adequate support in the texts. In 153 SCG III.65. I have altered the translation somewhat; the Latin reads: "Et similiter habitus sunt difficile mobiles, quia vertuntur in naturam: dispositiones autem et passiones, sive corporales sive animales, manent aliquantum post actionem agentis, sed non semper, quia insunt ut in via ad naturam." Shapcote translates vertuntur [verto] in naturam as "merge into the nature". Deferrari defines verto as "(1) [literally], to turn round or about, (2) in [particular], (a) to change or turn into something else". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "verto". Here Thomas is evidently taking disposition in its fourth sense (and habitus in the fifth sense of disposition), although this does not affect our discussion of habitus as another nature. For the senses of disposition, see pages 39-40 above. 154 In Ethic. VII.10, §1467. 155 See ST I-II.29.3, co.; and ST I-II.82.1, co. Ezra Sullivan, O.P. makes this same point. Ezra Sullivan, O.P., "Taking Nature Graciously: A Thomistic Perspective on Habits," The Thomist 101, no. 1094 (2020): 391. 156 See ST I-II.56.5, co.; ST II-II.18.4, co.; and De Malo III.12, ad 6. Thomas uses both quasi and modum at ST I.18.2, ad 2: "ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum genera quasi per modum naturae". Elsewhere, Thomas writes that "the position of a [habitus] in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing." ST I-II.71.4, co. The way in which habitus is both like and unlike nature is characterized thusly by Thomas during his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics: "while [habitus] is practically the same as nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one definite effect, still [habitus] differs from nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites by reason of human knowledge." In Metaph. I.1, §28. 53 fact, where Thomas uses the phrase altera natura, which is the closest plausible Latin equivalent to "second nature",157 he uses it to refer to consuetudo, and never to habitus.158 Thus, we shall refrain from using the term "second nature", and instead will use the term "another nature". The phrase another nature implies a host of concepts and ideas. For our purposes, a full explanation of habitus as another nature is realized only in explaining all of the relevant features of habitus.159 Fundamentally, as habitus focus the powers of the soul, habitus are ordered to the soul's operations – or, to put it simply, habitus are ordered to act. In explaining this, Thomas refers to habitus itself and to human nature: To have relation to an act may belong to [habitus], both in regard to the nature of [habitus], and in regard to the subject in which the [habitus] is. In regard to the nature of [habitus], it belongs to every [habitus] to have relation to an act. For it is essential to [habitus] to imply some relation to a thing's nature, insofar as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto.160 Here we see the aspect of suitability come through, again with regard to the nature of the subject. Next, Thomas ties the subject's nature to operation: But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore [habitus] implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end.161 157 Deferrari defines alter as, in part, "the other of two, another". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "alter". 158 See ST I.63.4, ad 2; ST I-II.32.2, ad 3; De Veritate XXIV.10, co.; De Virt. I.8, ad 16; and De Virt. I.9, co. 159 In De Virt. I.1, co., Thomas lists three reasons that habitus are needed: (1) ease of operation, (2) promptness of operation, and (3) pleasure in operation. I will touch upon each of these and expand where necessary. 160 ST I-II.49.3, co. 161 Ibid. 54 Thus, all habitus, properly considered, involve some sort of relationship to operation – that is, habitus are ordered towards action. Some habitus, however, are so ordered simply: But there are some [habitus], which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For, as we have said, [habitus] primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the [habitus] is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the [habitus] principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every [habitus] [that] is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.162 Here, Thomas is speaking of habitus generally – in the fifth sense of disposition163 – as opposed to habitus of the soul in particular, in which case all habitus are seated in a power of the soul. Speaking more generally, however, habitus (in the fifth sense of disposition, and indeed the fourth sense as well) can be seated in the body, and even here are they related to act, albeit indirectly, insofar as a thing's nature is "ordained to another end, which is either operation, or the product of an operation". Here we would do well to remember that the dispositions of the body are ordered to the subject's form, that is, the soul, which is itself ordered to operation.164 The habitus that are seated in the powers of the soul are ordered to act of themselves, just as the powers in which they are seated are ordered to act of themselves. One finds the most textual support for the idea of habitus being ordered to act in Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. There, Thomas writes that habitus terminates in act,165 that act is the use of a habitus,166 that habitus are directed to act,167 and 162 Ibid. See pages 39-40 above. 164 See pages 33-35 above. 165 In Ethic. VIII.8, §1646. 166 In Ethic. VII.12, §1493: "activity is the use of a natural form or [habitus]." 167 In Ethic. II.3, §271: "Every [habitus], [Aristotle] writes, has a disposition to do and to be busied with the things by which it is made worse and better". Thomas goes on to speak of particular actions. 163 55 that habitus are known168 and defined169 by their proper acts. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas writes that "[habitus] are for the sake of actions", 170 that "all our [habitus] are revealed by their acts",171 and that "power and [habitus] are perfected by operation".172 The connection between habitus and their proper acts is, according to Thomas, what allows for habitus to be knowable at all: "so far as a [habitus] fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a [habitus] from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that [habitus]".173 The ordering of habitus to operations is likewise attested to in the secondary literature on Thomas.174 Acts, indeed, are the manner by which habitus are formed and strengthened, and by disuse and the performance of acts that are contrary to the habitus in question, they weaken and are eventually corrupted.175 Acts, then, are the means by which one focuses the powers of one's soul (or more specifically, those powers of the soul that are able to be focused). By acts, one focuses the power of the soul from which that action proceeds, and by disuse or the performance of contrary acts, that focus weakens and eventually is lost. 176 The relationship 168 In Ethic. V.10, §992: "since [habitus] are known by acts…." See also ST I.87.2, co. In Ethic. II.7, §§322 and 327: "[habitus] must be defined by the act", and "the species of a [habitus] is taken from the object to which the [habitus] tends." 170 SCG III.48. 171 SCG IV.12. 172 SCG I.100. 173 ST I.87.2, co. The status of habitus as "imperfect act" will be discussed immediately below. See pages 57-61. 174 For example, see Kahm, "Aquinas on Quality," 37: "[Habitus] proper… concern the manner in which the soul is ordered to operation or action"; and Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 70: "For any quality to be a [habitus], it must be the enabling condition for some operation." 175 ST I-II.51-53. See also ST I-II.56.5, co.: "a [habitus] of use is nothing else than a [habitus] acquired by use". 176 Miner argues that the corruption of habitus by disuse appears to be the primary way by which they are corrupted. Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 79. To this end, Miner points to the preamble of Question 53 of the Summa Theologiae, which characterizes Article 3 in this way: "How are [habitus] corrupted or diminished?" [de 169 56 between the performance of actions and the development of habitus is so strong that Thomas writes: "We may then universally sum up in one sentence: like actions produce like [habitus]",177 and likewise, "As [habitus] are acquired by practice, they must be preserved by practice, for everything is preserved by its cause." 178 The relationship between act and habitus is twofold, then. On the one hand, (1) habitus are formed and strengthened by their respective acts, while they are also weakened and corrupted by disuse or the performance of contrary acts. On the other hand, (2) habitus are themselves directed to act, specifically, to those kinds of acts by which they were developed in the first place.179 In the following chapter, we will see in greater detail how the processes of the generation, strengthening, weakening, and corruption of habitus takes place in the context of vice.180 The direction of habitus to act is implied in Thomas's statement that "[habitus] is imperfect act, a mean, as it were, between potency and act."181 Subsequent commenters on Thomas have identified this maxim and have attempted to explain it to varying degrees of success.182 On the side of Thomas himself, one finds its most succinct explanation in the modo corruptionis et diminutionis]. The article itself opens with the objection: "It would seem that a [habitus] is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act." ST I-II.53, Preamble and 3, obj. 1. However, we cannot accept Miner's interpretation. See pages 132-134, especially note 224, below. 177 In Ethic. II.1, §253. 178 In Ethic. VIII.5, §1597. 179 See In Ethic. II.3, §271. Also, consider that Thomas argues that some habitus can be directly infused into a subject by God (and, indeed, a subject can only have certain habitus if they are infused by God). I will not consider these sorts of habitus here. See ST I-II.51.4. 180 See pages 128-134 below. 181 SCG I.92. The same statement appears in ST I.14.1, obj. 1: "[habitus] does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act". It is likewise assumed, implicitly or explicitly, throughout Thomas's corpus, especially in his commentaries on Aristotle. See, for example, In Metaph. V.14, §960; In Phys. VII.6, §925; In Phys. VIII.8, §1031; In Ethic. VII.3, §§1338 and 1340; In De Anima II.1, §216; In De Anima II.11, §§359-361; and In De Anima III.8, §701. At SCG II.73, Thomas indicates that he approves of Aristotle's treatment of habitus in this way. Bourke has helpfully compiled a list of places wherein Thomas mentions this doctrine. See Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," 107, n. 21. 182 See, for example, Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 70; Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 57 Summa Theologiae: "[Habitus] is an act, insofar as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore [habitus] is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained [by Aristotle] in De Anima II."183 Thomas's commentary on the text of Aristotle cited in the quote above sheds much light on the status of habitus as a mean between potency and act. There, Thomas follows Aristotle in distinguishing between two different senses of act and potency in the intellect based upon three different cases: "We speak, [Aristotle] says, in one sense of potency when we say that a man is a knower, referring to his natural capacity for knowledge. Man, we say is one of the class of beings that know or have knowledge, meaning that his nature can know and form [habitus] of knowing."184 This sense of potency refers to the most basic sense of able to: man is able to know. Thomas continues: "In another sense, however, we say of someone that he knows, meaning that he knows certain definite things; thus we say of one who has the [habitus] of some science – e.g., Grammar – that he is now one who knows."185 This second sense of potency, as we will soon see, is also the first sense of act. Thus, in the potency sense, it also refers to able to, although in a different, fuller sense: Now, obviously, in both cases the man's capacities are implied by calling him a knower; but not in the same way in both cases. In the first case man is said to be "able" through belonging to a certain genus or matter, i.e., his nature has a certain capacity that puts him in this genus, and he is in potency to knowledge as matter to its University of America Press, 2005), 32; and Austin Fagothey, S.J., Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, 2nd edition (Charlotte: Tan Books, 2000), 225. Bourke has, to my mind, gone the farthest in attempting to explain this curious doctrine. See Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," 104 and 107, n. 22. 183 ST I-II.49.3, ad 1. The reference is to Aristotle, De Anima II.5, 417a22-b2. 184 In De Anima II.11, §359. 185 Ibid. 58 form. But the second man, with his acquired [habitus] of knowing, is called "able" because when he wishes he can reflect on his knowledge….186 We have, then, a man who is able to know according to what he is, and a man who is able to know, not just according to what he is, but also according to his acquired habitus. These two senses of potency find their fullest intelligibility in the case of a third man who is in the act of knowing: "A third case would be that of a man who was actually thinking about something here and now. He it is who most properly and perfectly is a knower in any field". 187 The third man, Thomas writes, is most properly said to know, as it is he who is actually considering his object of knowledge; he is to the second man what the second man is to the first. Thomas writes: "Of the three [men], then, the third is simply in act; the first is simply in potency; while the second is in act as compared with the first and in potency as compared with the third. Clearly, then, potentiality is taken in two senses (the first and the second); and actuality also in two senses (the second and third man)." 188 The first sense of potency can be called primary potency as it is the principle of the second sense, which can be called secondary potency.189 Secondary potency can also be called first act, as it is the first principle of an act that proceeds from a habitus.190 Thus, the third case, that of the act of operation, can be called second act, as it is more actualized than is habitus, being actualized in operation (which is what habitus are directed towards).191 Depending on how one divides these two senses of 186 Ibid., §360. Ibid., §361. 188 Ibid. 189 See In De Anima II.11, §362. 190 See ST I-II.49.3, ad 1. 191 See ibid. 187 59 potency and act,192 there are three or four ways of understanding potency and act with respect to habitus and their proper acts: (1) primary potency, which is potency simply, (2a) secondary potency, which is potency with respect to (3), or (2b) first act, which is act with respect to (1), and (3) second act, which is act simply.193 We might better understand the status of habitus as a mean between potency and act by means of an example. Consider a man who is learning to play the piano. 194 First, we recognize that a man is able to play the piano owing to the kind of thing that he is: a human being. Second, we say that a man is able to play the piano when he has developed the art of playing the piano. Notice that able to is now taken in a different sense than in the first case. In the first case, able to means "he can play the piano" simply. In the latter, able to means "he can play the piano" well.195 Third, we understand that a man is most properly a piano player when is actually playing, and here we rightly distinguish between the playing of a beginner (as in the first case) and the playing of one who has developed the habitus (as in the second case). The latter is what we mean when we ask "Is he playing the piano?", where "playing" is taken in its more perfect expression. Thus, while a beginner and a master may hit the same keys in the same sequence for a time, only the latter is considered to be playing the piano in 192 That is, if one views habitus under a particular aspect (be it secondary potency or first act), there will be three ways of understanding potency and act with respect to habitus and their acts. If one views habitus generally (as both secondary potency and first act), there will be four ways of understanding potency and act with respect to habitus and their acts. 193 See De Virt. I.1, ad 4, where Thomas speaks of habitus (virtue in particular) as "habitual perfection" [perfectio habitualis] and the operations that proceed therefrom as "actual perfection" [perfectio actualis]. 194 I owe this example to Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 354-355. I will return to it below. See pages 74-76. 195 We will return to the aspect well immediately below. See pages 61-66. On this point, Fagothey writes that "[habitus] is a sort of midway stage between undeveloped ability and expert operation." Fagothey, Right and Reason, 225. 60 the perfect sense of the word "playing", as he does it from his habitus. All of this implies that the pianist does not need to re-learn how to play the piano every time he wishes to play (in the perfect sense),196 as he is able to use his underlying habitus at will.197 He is, assuming that he has already developed the habitus, already partially actualized towards playing the piano before he even sits down to play. The result of all of this is that Thomas has gone beyond the traditional act / potency distinction in explaining habitus and their role with respect to human nature and operation. Bourke writes that the kind of operative potency that habitus requires is a kind of "metaphysical scandal" that goes "beyond the limits of the simply theory of potency and act."198 Habitus, and the acts that they are directed towards, are much too layered and subtle for clear cut either / or descriptions, and so nuance is required in interpreting these matters.199 Beyond the necessity of habitus to focus various powers of the soul, habitus are necessary for acting truly well or truly badly.200 Thomas writes of the habitus of science and of the virtues: "when [habitus] has been acquired [one] acts perfectly, whereas at first [one 196 See Q. De Anima XV, ad 17: "Sometimes [intelligible species] exist in [the intellect] in a mode midway between potency and act, that is to say, as a [habitus]; and when that is the case the intellect can understand actually whenever it wishes. Moreover, thanks to this mode of existing, acquired intelligible species exist in the possible intellect even when it is not performing acts of understanding." 197 As will be argued below. See pages 66-71. 198 Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," 104. 199 In the In De Anima text that we have considered, Thomas is following Aristotle in considering the habitus of knowing, although what he discusses there can be applied to the moral virtues and vices, as the distinction between primary potency and secondary potency / first act and second act applies also to the moral habitus. For example, a man is able to be just according to his natural capacity, and he is able to be just according to the habitus that he has, and he is just according as he makes use of his habitus. 200 For a detailed account of the necessity of habitus according to Thomas, see Blain, "Thomas Aquinas on How Habits Affect Human Powers and Acts," 49-64. Blain sees the necessity of habitus in Thomas's thought as twofold: (1) habitus are necessary for perfecting the powers for operation (what I have called focusing), and (2) habitus are necessary for perfecting the acts which proceed from said powers (what I have here called acting truly well or truly badly). See page 50. 61 acts] imperfectly."201 And while discussing the possibility of wicked ministers administering the sacraments, Thomas writes: Now [habitus] differs from power in that power makes it possible for us to do a certain thing, whereas [habitus] does not make it possible for us to do a thing, but confers a certain ability or inability for doing well or ill that which it is possible for us to do. Consequently, [habitus] neither gives nor removes the possibility of doing, but gives the facility of doing a certain thing well or ill.202 Elsewhere, Thomas connects the perfection of virtue (which is a habitus, as we shall see below)203 to the perfection of operation and, by extension, to the virtuous agent: "It belongs to the virtue of every thing… to render an excellent performance. Because a perfect operation proceeds only from a perfect agent, it follows that everything is both good and operates well according to its own virtue."204 Elsewhere still Thomas writes that "the perfect activity required for happiness can come only from a power perfected by a [habitus] that is the power's virtue making the activity good."205 For our purposes, there are two texts that highlight habitus in the light we desire. First, in his commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas is concerned to refute a particular error: many people are of the opinion that they are ready to do even injustice immediately. Hence they think that it is easy to be habitually unjust. Certainly it is easy, and immediately in a man's power, to do unjust things: to have sexual intercourse with his neighbor's wife, to strike his neighbor, to take money from the hand of another, or to hand over money to have murder or some crime done. But that men should do actions of this kind in such a way that they act promptly and with pleasure is not easily nor 201 In Metaph. IX.7, §1855. See also ST I.62.9, ad 1: "the operation from an acquired [habitus] is both perfect and enjoyable." 202 SCG IV.77. 203 See pages 80-81. 204 In Ethic. II.6, §308. While Thomas is using "virtue" in an extended sense here, he indicates immediately that what he is saying applies to the human virtues. 205 In Ethic. X.10, §2085. Emphasis my own. See also In Ethic. II.5, §302. 62 immediately in a man's power, but they come to this point through persistent [habitus].206 Here, Thomas indicates that promptness and pleasure accompany actions which proceed from habitus in a way in which they do not accompany those actions which do not so proceed – or to be more specific, acting promptly and with pleasure is easy to the man who is using his habitus. Consider also a second text: "for the perfection of his operations, [man] needs certain perfections and [habitus] besides his natural powers to enable him to do the good well, connaturally (as it were), and with both ease and pleasure." 207 In this text, Thomas has in mind the theological concept of grace (hence the reference to "certain perfections and [habitus] besides his natural powers"), yet the point remains that habitus are required to "do the good well", that is, connaturally: easily, promptly, and with pleasure. And we have seen above that the same applies to those actions which are truly bad: in order to "do the bad well" (so to speak), one requires habitus. Here, one ought not to interpret "doing the bad well" in terms of doing some bad thing in a manner which decreases its gravity. To use the example of lust, one is truly good at being lustful when one does it from one's lustful habitus: one commits208 lustful acts connaturally: easily, promptly, and with pleasure; the lustful agent 206 In Ethic. V.15, §1074. See also ST I.89.6, ad 3: "The acts which produce a [habitus] are like the acts caused by that [habitus], in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the [habitus] of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably." 207 SCG III.150. Michał Głowala has gone so far as to argue that "Most scholastic authors think that… becoming easy is the foundation of the whole metaphysics of [habitus]", and he includes Thomas in this group. Michał Głowala, "What Kind of Power is Virtue? John of St. Thomas OP on Causality of Virtues and Vices," Studia Neoaristotelica 9, no. 1 (2012): 28, n. 11. Emphasis in the original. 208 Thomas will sometimes use the word committo to describe the performance of a sinful action. See, for example, ST I-II.71-89 throughout. Committo is usually translated as "commit", although it can also mean "perpetrate", and is the opposite of omitto: "to disregard, lay aside.... to omit, neglect.... of an action, to leave off, give over, cease doing anything." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "committo" and "omitto". 63 finds committing lustful acts easy to do, he does them without hesitation, and he enjoys doing them apart from any pleasure he might obtain from the lustful acts themselves. The attendant role that pleasure plays in habitus is well attested to by Thomas. We will briefly review it here. Thomas writes that "Actions indeed are pleasurable to an agent when they are agreeable to him by reason of a proper [habitus]",209 and he applies this line of thinking to both good and evil habitus.210 The role of pleasure in acts of habitus is so strong, Thomas thinks, that it can be a sign that one has actually formed a habitus.211 The pleasure that accompanies the acts of a habitus is strong enough for the habitus to be utilized for its own sake: "anyone who has a [habitus] finds the operation relating to that [habitus] to be pleasurable and readily performed; and thus one who has a [habitus] acts in accordance with that [habitus] and not for the sake of anything extrinsic." 212 Thus, we might describe pleasure as being connatural to habitus.213 This aspect of connaturality rings of the "another nature" aspect of habitus discussed above.214 Indeed, Thomas explicitly ties these themes together: when virtue produces actions similar to the actions that formed it… the performance of this action differs before and after [the formation of] virtue. Before virtue man does a kind of violence to himself in operating this way. Such actions, therefore, have some admixture of sorrow. But after the [habitus] of virtue has been formed, these actions 209 In Ethic. I.13, §159. Much of this lecture is concerned to show that pleasure attends the acts of both good and bad habitus. It is especially worth reading in this regard. 210 See In Ethic. I.13, §§156 and 158. 211 In Ethic. II.3, §266. Thomas is expounding on Aristotle: "[Aristotle] says that an indication that [habitus], good or bad, have already been formed is given by the pleasure or sorrow that follows the operations…. The man who is glad that he has avoided bodily pleasures is temperate because he performs the action in keeping with the [habitus]." See also De Virt. I.1, co. 212 In Metaph. V.22, §1135. 213 See In Ethic. VII.12, §1492, where Thomas calls perfect pleasure "the connatural activity of a [habitus] already existing." Elsewhere, with respect to virtue in particular, Thomas writes that "there is no virtue without love of virtue." ST I.93.9, co. 214 See pages 52-54. 64 are done with pleasure. The explanation is that a [habitus] exists as a sort of nature, and that is pleasurable which agrees with a thing according to nature.215 If pleasure attends the operations of habitus, and if habitus are strengthened by their proper operations, it would seem to follow that the pleasure attendant upon the operations of habitus indirectly helps in strengthening them.216 These pleasures, Thomas thinks, are so connected with human nature (as connected with habitus) that they are pleasures in the most proper sense: "the pleasures connected with activities proceeding from [habitus]… are pleasures in the true and proper sense. But those [pleasures] producing [habitus] and natures are not pleasures in the true and perfect sense but only in an imperfect manner."217 The preceding remarks have assumed a certain view of actions and of their character of being performed well or not. For Thomas, according to the above, an act is done well (whether that action be good or evil) when it has certain attendant features which accompany that act's being performed by means of the agent's habitus, these being features such as connaturality, ease, promptness, pleasure, and the like. This point is made clearer when one considers the pianist example from above: the pianist who plays a piece of music from his habitus is truly acting well (as far as the action "playing the piano" is concerned), while another man may play the piano in a way that is physically identical to the pianist without thereby acting truly well, for the reasons given above. To use another example, it is the difference between a professional athlete using his skills in making an extremely difficult shot 215 In Ethic. II.3, §265. See also ST I.18.2, ad 2: "[habitus] [incline men] like [another] nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure." See also ST I-II.78.2, co.; and De Virt. I.1, co. 216 See In Ethic. VII.12, §1492. Thomas writes in the same place, following Aristotle, that a habitus is "impeded… by pleasure alien to it." 217 In Ethic. VII.12, §1488. 65 and another man who makes the same shot by chance. The acts are of the same kind, but one is more perfect than another by reason of habitus: "Acts proceeding from [habitus] are of like species as the acts from which those [habitus] were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect."218 If habitus are necessary for actions to be done well, they are not likewise necessary in their respective acts. This simply means that habitus do not necessitate their acts. In fact, one is not even constricted, on Thomas's view, to use one's habitus at all when acting. Thomas develops these points in the context of vice and sin: There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the [habitus], and a sin committed by [habitus]: for it is not necessary to use a [habitus], since it is subject to the will of the person who has that [habitus]. Hence [habitus] is defined as being something we use when we will, as stated above. And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious [habitus] may break forth into a virtuous act… so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious [habitus], acts, not from that [habitus], but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance.219 Consider as well the following text: Now the position of a [habitus] in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the [habitus] that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a [habitus], may either fail to use the [habitus], or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin.220 And finally: 218 ST I-II.78.2, ad 2. ST I-II.78.2, co. We will discuss passion and ignorance in more detail below. See pages 188-202. 220 ST I-II.71.4, co. 219 66 The [habitus] of virtue or vice is a form in the rational soul, and every form is in a thing according to the mode of the recipient. But it is of the nature of the rational creature that it is free in its judgment and choice, and therefore the [habitus] of virtue or vice does not incline the will of necessity in such a way that a person cannot act contrary to the nature of the [habitus]; but it is difficult to act contrary to that to which the [habitus] inclines.221 The idea that habitus are subject to the will may strike the modern ear as strange. One must bear in mind, however, that habitus proper are seated in certain powers of the human soul, such that the acts that proceed therefrom are acts that arise from certain of the soul's powers which, if not the will itself, are subject to the will. 222 Thomas therefore includes the notion of the will in the definition of habitus, something that he refers to during the course of the quotations above.223 The will always retains its proper function with respect to willing the acts of the habitus, or, on the contrary, not willing to use the habitus, and this is so no matter how strong the habitus becomes: "A man can choose by reason and deliberation (even contrary to the inclination of [habitus] and passion) the things that are foreseen. In no case is the inclination of [habitus] or passion so vehement that reason is unable to resist provided that the use of reason… remains with man."224 What is true of reason and choice here is also true of the act of willing. No matter how strong the inclination of a habitus becomes, one is free to will to use it or not to use it, provided the use of reason remains. Thus, Steven J. 221 De Malo III.13, ad 6. See pages 88-97 below. 223 The reference "as stated above" in the first of the three quotations is to potentially a number of places in the Summa Theologiae. The editor of my edition refers the reader to I-II.50.1, although, in that article, such a definition occurs only in objection 1. A more likely candidate is I-II.49.3, s.c.: "Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that [habitus] is that whereby something is done when necessary. And the Commentator [Averroes] says (De Anima iii) that [habitus] is that whereby we act when we will", although this quotation uses "act" [agit] in place of "use" [utitur]. Another possibility is I.107.1, co., although this seems too far removed from the discussion of habitus. See also ST II-II.137.4, ad 1: "a [habitus] is a thing one uses at will"; De Malo VI, co.; and De Malo XVI.8, co. 224 In Ethic. III.17, §579. 222 67 Jensen stresses that "A [habitus] does not mean we are determined to behave in a certain way, but acting in that manner is certainly easier", 225 a sentiment which Kent echoes,226 while Blaise Edward Blain argues that Thomas held this position throughout his career. 227 Michał Głowala uses the example of a spiteful man to illustrate the fact that one need not use one's habitus in acting: "[the spiteful man's] action may be prompted by an immense fear (he may have been blackmailed into it); in this case it is not true that he did it because he is spiteful, although it was nasty and he actually is spiteful."228 And so it seems clear that, for Thomas, habitus do not necessitate their acts. There is, however, a curious text wherein Thomas appears to contradict himself. It occurs during the course of Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. In Book III, Thomas reads Aristotle as defending two views of habitus. First, that "[habitus] of the soul are voluntary with respect to their formation", and second, that "they are not voluntary after their formation has already been completed."229 The first point is shown by noting that the sorts of acts that tend to develop habitus of the soul are voluntary acts, that is, they are acts that are willed by the subject of the habitus.230 To the second point, Thomas notes that Aristotle makes a comparison with bodily dispositions: [Aristotle] says that because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he ceases to be unjust and becomes just whenever he may will. He proves this by means of a likeness in the dispositions of the body. A man who in good health willingly falls into sickness by living incontinently… had it in his power in the 225 Steven J. Jensen, Living the Good Life: A Beginner's Thomistic Ethics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 69. 226 Kent, "Habits and Virtues," 118-119. 227 Blain, "Thomas Aquinas on How Habits Affect Human Powers and Acts," 62-63. 228 Głowala, "What Kind of Power is Virtue?" 27-28. Emphases in the original. 229 In Ethic. III.12, §509. 230 Ibid., §510. 68 beginning not to become sick. But after he has performed the act, having eaten unnecessary or harmful food, it is no longer in his power not to be sick.231 Thus, it would appear that habitus are involuntary once they are formed, in that one may not cease being such-and-such (whatever one's habitus qualifies one as) once one has formed the relevant habitus. However, Thomas continues: "Hence we say that men are voluntarily unjust and incontinent, although, after they have become such, it is no longer within their power to cease being unjust or incontinent immediately, but great effort and practice are required."232 Thomas qualifies his earlier remarks on the involuntariness of habitus by arguing that they can, indeed, be uprooted, albeit with "great effort and practice". This hearkens to the difference difficult to change that divides disposition from habitus. We are to understand, then, that habitus are strong enough to be called involuntary (in themselves and in their acts), but not so strong as to be involuntary simply. In fact, the sort of involuntariness that is involved with habitus does not diminish merit or blame, but rather increases it: necessity is twofold. There is a necessity of compulsion; this lessens the praise due to virtue, since it is opposed to what is voluntary, for compulsion is contrary to the will. But there is another necessity resulting from an interior inclination. This does not diminish but increases the praise due to a virtuous act, because it makes the will tend to the act of virtue more tensely. For it is clear that the more perfect is a [ habitus] of virtue, the more strongly does it make the will tend to the virtuous good, and the less liable to deflect from it. And when virtue has attained its perfect end, it brings with it a kind of necessity for good action…. Yet the will is not any the less free for that reason, or the act less good.233 231 Ibid., §513. Ibid. Emphasis my own. Thomas similarly highlights the difficulty with which habitus are resisted in the De Malo III.13, ad 6 text cited above on page 67. 233 SCG III.138. Thomas is referring to those habitus that are seated in the appetitive faculties, the socalled moral virtues (and by extension, moral vices). We know this because he explicitly says that the virtue tends to the good, which is a feature of the moral habitus in particular, as they alone – as opposed to the intellectual habitus – perfect man's appetitive faculties, thereby inclining them to their proper objects. See ST III.58.2; and ST I-II.57.1. We can thus conclude that the non-strict necessity by which habitus are directed towards their acts is present in the moral habitus alone, and not also in the intellectual habitus. 232 69 What allows Thomas to reason in this way is the connection between habitus and the nature of the subject. Since habitus of the soul are nothing but the focusing of certain powers of the soul, they do not impose necessity upon said powers or upon the will in consenting to the acts of habitus. Indeed, as Thomas writes, the will, if anything, is more free to tend to the actions that it ultimately consents to, being unburdened by competing desires and inclinations. The result, in the subject, is "a kind of necessity" for choosing the actions of the habitus, although, as we have seen, we must be careful to nuance and qualify exactly what sort of necessity this entails. On the one hand, then, it is correct to say that for Thomas habitus do not impose necessity upon the will, such that the acts that are chosen by the subject are freely chosen. On the other hand, it is correct to say that for Thomas habitus do impose a certain kind of necessity upon the will, but one which, paradoxically, does not negate the freedom of the subject, but rather increases, supports, and bolsters it, along with the attendant merit or blame. In his treatment on habitus and freedom of choice, when writing on these issues, Lawrence Dewan refers to the role of deliberation and to the fact that a man may "get rid of" a disposition or habitus that one does not want, although this process is, of course, easier with dispositions than it is with habitus.234 When it comes to habitus and actions, "there is no necessitation since one can eliminate the [habitus] or passion before acting."235 Again, the key 234 Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St. Thomas and the Causes of Free Choice," Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 182-183. Thomas argues explicitly for something very much like this at ST I.83.1, ad 5: "The adventitious qualities are [habitus] and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will." 235 Dewan, "St. Thomas and the Causes of Free Choice," 183. We must qualify Dewan's use of necessitation as strict necessitation. 70 to understanding this is another nature – both another and nature. By "nature", habitus is indicated to be difficult to change, imposing a sort of necessity on one's actions that is compatible with and magnifies moral agency. By "another", habitus is indicated to be changeable (that is, not a part of one's nature properly speaking), imposing no strict necessity on one's actions. I.ii.b. Translating Habitus Having formed a sufficient concept of our object, we are now in a position to consider translating habitus – although here we must proceed with caution, as numerous scholars have argued convincingly that habitus has no English equivalent.236 In light of this fact, we would do well to briefly summarize what we have said about habitus thus far. Recall the discussion of substance and accident above. 237 Accidents are ways of being that adhere in a subject – a substance – that exists in its own right. By calling habitus an accident, we simply mean that habitus do not exist of themselves, but rather do they exist as adhering in and related to a subject. Moreover, habitus is taken as being in the subject essentially, and as being a result of its form, thereby indicating that habitus is a quality – it qualifies its subject in some way. Habitus has its principle and measure the subject's nature, thereby placing it in the first species of quality, and it is divided against disposition by the difference difficult to change. What makes habitus difficult to change is their permanent 236 See, for example, Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 364, who claims that there is no modern equivalent to habitus in any modern language; and Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., "Thomistic Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 394, who notes the "myriad" of translations that have resulted from this fact. 237 See pages 9-10. 71 causes. Habitus, in the most proper sense of the word, is the order of that which has parts to something else: in this case, operation. They imply a sort of indeterminacy in their subjects, in that they may be either suitable or unsuitable to the subjects in which they adhere, according to that subject's nature. Thus, habitus constitute another nature for their subjects, as they are intimately related to the souls of their subjects, focusing various of their powers. They imply an order to act, and act is how they are generated, strengthened, weakened, and corrupted. Relatedly, habitus is a mean between potency and act, holding the curious status of secondary potency / first act. They are, moreover, necessary for acting truly well (whether that be truly good or truly bad), and their use is accompanied by desire and pleasure. Strict necessity does not follow the acts of habitus, although a certain weaker sort of necessity does so follow, one that does not negate from, but instead amplifies, one's responsibility for one's actions. Related as they are, habitus and the English word "disposition" are perhaps too different for the latter to be offered as a translation of the former. "Disposition" does not imply the sort of permanence or the force with which a habitus inclines its subject to its proper act. Moreover, the Latin dispositio is often translated into English as "disposition" (as it has been during the course of this dissertation), and it would be wise to avoid any unnecessary confusion.238 Thus, we cannot follow the advice of Brian Davies and Gregory M. 238 We have seen above that dispositio and habitus ought not to be conflated. See pages 28-51. 72 Reichberg in translating habitus as "disposition",239 although Davies is following the advice of Anthony Kenny,240 as is Vivian Boland,241 who similarly translates habitus. A few exceptions aside, habitus is almost universally translated into English in the form of the word "habit".242 Short of inventing a new word or leaving habitus untranslated, I can think of no better translation. If habitus is to be translated into English, "habit" appears to be the best candidate. Both habitus and "habit" imply a disposition to a certain operation, permanence and difficulty in changing, and their formation, strengthening, weakening, and corruption occur by actions. However, the differences between habitus and the modern "habit" are many and significant. Whereas "habit" is often viewed as something restricting, mechanical, and negative, habitus is about focusing the powers of one's soul (not restricting them), being able to will acts consistently and easily (not mechanical acts), and, depending on the relation of the habitus to the nature of the subject, they can be good or bad. "Habits" are often used to describe quirks, twitches, annoyances, dependencies on drugs, and the like. Habitus refer to very specific realities that adhere in specific powers of the soul. "Habits" are besides nature, 239 Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 189. In this same place, Davies also comments that there is no modern English equivalent to habitus. Gregory M. Reichberg, "The Intellectual Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 57-58)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 142. 240 Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 189, n. 4. For Anthony Kenny, see the 22nd volume of the Blackfriars edition of the Summa Theologiae (London: Blackfriars, 1964), 5, n. b. Kenny translates dispositio as "state", which does nothing to capture the inclination aspect of dispositio. 241 Boland, "Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions" 468. 242 Habitus has a long and varied history, as does the English word "habit". For an overview of the notion of "habit" in the history of philosophy, see Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson, eds., A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013); and Clare Carlisle, On Habit (New York: Routledge, 2014). 73 or very often against it. Habitus are fundamentally rooted in and expressive of nature, even when they are unsuitable to it. For these and other reasons, modern Thomistic scholarship, regardless of whether habitus is translated as "habit" or not, is at pains to argue that Thomas's habitus is not to be understood as "habit" in our modern sense of the word. 243 For example, Kent, Clifford G. Kossel, Pinckaers, and Torrell all emphasize the mechanical aspect of "habit", a feature which, they note, does not attend habitus,244 while Bourke, Stephen J. Pope, and Jean Porter refer to the thoughtlessness or automation that attends our notion of "habit".245 On the other hand, Kossel, Pinckaers, and Torrell emphasize the freedom in operation which habitus affords their subjects,246 with Pinckaers in particular stressing the "moral commitment" to action that "habit" diminishes but that habitus allows for of the fullest expression. 247 And where Davies notes that "habit" is often associated with addiction, 248 Torrell points to the inventiveness of habitus.249 This final point – the inventiveness of habitus – is particularly 243 Miner argues that "The warnings [that habitus is not to be understood in the modern sense of 'habit'] have by now become commonplace." Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 85, n. 7. 244 Kent, "Habits and Virtues," 116. Kossel, "Thomistic Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," 394. Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 225. Torrell, Aquinas's Summa, 32. 245 Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," 106. Stephen J. Pope, "Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas," The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 34. Jean Porter, "Virtues and Vices," The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 265, n. 2. 246 Kossel, "Thomistic Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," 394. Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 225. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume II: Spiritual Master, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 264. Torrell, Aquinas's Summa, 32. 247 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 225. Pinckaers writes, additionally, that habitus affords us "mastery" over our actions. Davies similarly writes that habitus allows us more "control" of our actions. Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 189. See also Servais Pinckaers, "Virtue Is Not a Habit," CrossCurrents 12, no. 1 (1962): 67. 248 Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 189. 249 Torrell, Aquinas's Summa, 32. 74 well developed in an example of Pinckaers's which I have already made use of above, and which is worth quoting at length: We all know how music is taught to a child – piano, for instance. In the first place, the child must have certain predispositions. Without some attraction to music and an ear for it, lessons are a waste of time. But if the child is gifted, it is well worth the effort to find a music teacher who will explain the rules of the art and develop the talent by dint of regular exercises. In the beginning the child, despite a desire to learn, will often feel that the lessons and exercises [act] as a constraint imposed on freedom and the attractions of the moment. There are times when practice has to be insisted upon. But with effort and perseverance, the gifted child will soon make notable progress and will come to play with accuracy and good rhythm, and with a certain ease – even the more difficult pieces. Taste and talent are developing. Soon the child is no longer satisfied with the assigned exercises but will delight in improvising. In this way, playing becomes more personal. The child who is truly gifted and able to keep up these musical studies may become an artist, capable of executing with mastery whatever may be suggested, playing with precision and originality, delighting all who hear. Further, this artist will compose new works, whose quality will manifest the full flowering of talent and musical personality.250 This example brings together all of the various aspects of habitus that we have insisted upon until this point, while introducing some that were not explicit until now: habitus are creative, inventive, and flexible. A subject with a habitus is able to adapt to any situation and any circumstance, finding new and creative ways to exercise his habitus. Pinckaers continues: In this very example, we can see clearly a new kind of freedom. Of course anyone is free to bang out notes haphazardly on the piano, as the fancy strikes him. But this is a rudimentary, savage sort of freedom. It cloaks an incapacity to play even the simplest pieces accurately and well. On the other hand, the person who really possesses the art of playing the piano has acquired a new freedom. He can play whatever he chooses, and also compose new pieces. His musical freedom could be described as the gradually acquired ability to execute works of his choice with perfection. It is based on natural dispositions and a talent developed and stabilized by means of regular, progressive exercises, or properly speaking, a habitus.251 250 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 354-355. For my previous uses of this example, see pages 60-61 and 65 above. 251 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 355. The aspect of invention is again stressed by Pinckaers in "Virtue Is Not a Habit," 81. 75 Pinckaers is right to emphasize the freedom that habitus implies, so long as this freedom is understood as the freedom to do one's acts well, and that said acts are the acts of their proper habitus. Moreover, we must caution against seeing in this example an illustration of good or suitable habitus only. Bad or unsuitable habitus imply the same sort of freedom in the same manner, which is what makes them so dangerous. If the piano player in our example can play the piano so well, so creatively, so freely, so beautifully, owing to his habitus, what then does that imply of the cowardly, or of the lustful, or of the hateful? Although the tendency to view habitus and their acts in their virtuous light is understandable, we must be careful to appreciate the vicious side of habitus as well. It is clear that the modern English word "habit" has numerous connotations that are contrary to Thomas's notion of habitus, and yet, for the prospect of translating habitus, no other English word appears as suitable. While I am sympathetic to the practice of translating habitus as "habit" while being careful to explain away the contrary connotations, seeing as I have thus far left habitus untranslated, and considering my purposes in this dissertation – I am not here writing a popular level work or an introductory text – it does not seem appropriate to translate habitus at all. Indeed, Torrell and Porter advocate against translating habitus.252 Pinckaers notes that "it might seem preferable simply to retain the original word, habitus," to which he adds: "The tendency still remains, even then, however, to understand habitus… as a habit."253 I agree. That is why we must be careful, in leaving habitus 252 253 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume II, 264. Porter, "Virtues and Vices," 265, n. 2. Pinckaers, "Virtue Is Not a Habit," 66. 76 untranslated, not to allow ourselves to slip into the understanding of habitus as the modern "habit". Having identified habitus and explored its relevant features, the next step in our project is to examine unsuitable habitus, namely, vices. It is vice, and its relationship to malice, that is the focus of this dissertation. 77 II VICE Many of the interpretive problems surrounding habitus and the dubious translation of "habit" are extended to the concept of vice. In particular, the modern notion of vice inherits the mechanical, automatic view of habitus as "habit". Often, when one speaks of vice, one has in mind a compulsive behavior that the subject has little to no control over. This is sometimes reflected in how one speaks of the subject's personal attitude towards his vice: "I know I eat too much, but I just can't help it. It's my vice." Vices, in this context, are in their subjects in spite of and contrary to their express desires. Moreover, vices are often thought to be distinct from bad habits. The former are often thought to be related to food, drink, drugs, and sexual activity, while the latter are usually identified with idle and so-called automatic behaviors that annoy those nearby: tapping, knuckle cracking, leaving the lights on when one leaves the room, and the like.1 The very idea that an unsuitable habitus just is a vice might appear to 1 Representative of this line of thought is Ann M. Graybiel and Kyle S. Smith, "Good Habits, Bad Habits," Scientific American 310, no. 6 (2014): 38-43, of which the abstract reads: "Every day we all engage in a surprising number of habitual behaviours. Many of them, from brushing our teeth to driving a familiar route, simply allow us to do certain things on autopilot so that our brains are not overtaxed by concentrating on each brushstroke and countless tiny adjustments of the steering wheel. Other habits, such as jogging, may help keep us healthy. Regularly popping treats from the candy dish may not. And habits that wander into the territory of compulsions or addictions, such as overeating or smoking, can threaten our existence." Sometimes the terms "vice" and "bad habit" are used interchangeably; see John C. Burnham, Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehaviour, and Swearing in American History (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 2. 78 some people to be strange and novel. The idea that there might be something like a suitable habitus, one that is perfective of human nature (and not just something like turning out the lights when one leaves the room), might appear even stranger. These hurdles to properly understanding habitus and vice are little addressed by the secondary literature. Broadly speaking, the concept of vice in the writings of Thomas has been left relatively untouched in modern philosophy. Surprisingly, this is often even the case when a scholar has set out to examine and explain vice. For example, Porter's chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas entitled "Virtue and Vice" contains only two explicit mentions of vicious actions, and only one brief paragraph on vices themselves.2 Similarly, Eileen Sweeney's chapter in The Ethics of Aquinas entitled "Vice and Sin" contains very little direct treatment of vice.3 Exceptions exist, of course,4 but the fact remains that the secondary literature on vice proper is woefully lacking, and I am by no means the first scholar to notice 2 Porter, "Virtue and Vice." For the references to vicious actions, see 270 and 272. For the paragraph on vice, see 271. 3 Eileen Sweeney, "Vice and Sin (Ia IIae, qq. 71-89)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 151-168. To be fair to Sweeney, her project affords her more excuse to treat of sin directly at the expense of vice. Much of Thomas's discussion in the section of the Summa Theologiae that she is working from is dedicated to sin and its effects, and Thomas himself, in that section, often treats sin and vice as interchangeable. This latter fact, however, can be explained in terms of the direction of habitus to its proper act, and in terms of the potentiality side of habitus (according to which a habitus is only known by its proper act). In my view, Sweeney's (or her editor's) use of "Vice" in the title of her chapter merits some significant direct discussion on that subject. 4 See, for example, Gavin T. Colvert, "Aquinas on Raising Cain: Vice, Incontinence and Responsibility," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 (1997): 203-220; Jonathan J. Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," in Aquinas and Maritain on Evil: Mystery and Metaphysics, ed. James G. Hanink (Washington, D.C.: American Maritain Association Publications, 2013), 72-87; Steven J. Jensen, Sin: A Thomistic Psychology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), who, despite the title, does offer some direct and insightful treatments of vice; Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and Their Remedies, 2nd edition (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2020), who offers an analysis of the capital vices in particular; and Colleen McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 148-178. DeYoung has also published a number of works on particular capital vices, such as "Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on the Vice of Acedia," The Thomist 68, no. 2 (2004): 173-204; "Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth: Three Interpretive Issues," The Thomist 75, no. 1 (2011): 43-64; and Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2014). 79 this fact.5 In large part, then, we will have to rely upon Thomas's own discussions of vice within his corpus, and for any interpretive issues that may arise we will have relatively little recourse to secondary literature. Thankfully, Thomas's treatments of vice are not insignificant in their size and scope, and, for our purposes, they do not pose any major exegetical problems.6 During the course of his discussion of habitus in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas asks whether habitus are divided into good and bad habitus.7 Thomas affirms that they are, and in proof of this he points to their relationship to the nature of their subjects, and their suitability or unsuitability thereto. Writes Thomas: In this way a good [habitus] is specifically distinct from a bad [habitus]: since a good [habitus] is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil [habitus] is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that [habitus] are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.8 5 See, for example, Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 72: "More still needs to be done, not just in clarifying the nature, role, and purpose of the virtues, but in bringing greater clarity to that murkier and too often unexplored dimension of virtue theory, that of vice." Other scholars, such as Colvert, have pointed out that "a theory of the virtues is lacking without an adequate account of vice and incontinence." Colvert, "Aquinas on Raising Cain," 203. Certainly Colvert is correct here, and the implication is that, if we add Sanford's point, Thomistic accounts of ethics tend to be lacking. Below I will argue that Thomas's own philosophy of ethics is not best described as a "virtue theory". See page 82, note 13. 6 McCluskey has argued that "Vicious habits in general are not the subject of very much discussion in Aquinas's corpus. He has a fair amount to say about individual vices, although not anywhere near the extent to which he discusses individual virtues." McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 154. While McCluskey is correct, it should be pointed out that when one considers together Thomas's discussion of habitus in ST I-II.49-54, the discussion of vice and sin in ST I-II.71-89 (although here it can be difficult to untangle vice from sin), and the discussion of the capital vices in De Malo VIII-XV (not to mention the discussion of sin, IIVII), one begins to form a rather substantial body of work from which a Thomistic concept of vice can be fruitfully mined. 7 ST I-II.54.3. 8 Ibid., co. In the sed contra, Thomas writes that "A good [habitus] is contrary to a bad [habitus], as virtue to vice." 80 Here the relationship between a habitus, its act, and the nature of the subject in which the habitus adheres is made explicit. A habitus that disposes one towards an act that is suitable to one's nature is suitable to that agent – such a habitus is called a virtue. A habitus that disposes one towards an act that is unsuitable to one's nature is unsuitable to that agent – such a habitus is called a vice. There are two important points to note. First, notice that habitus and their acts have different (immediate) measures as to their suitability or unsuitability for the subjects in which they adhere, in the case of habitus, or for the agents who perform them, in the case of acts. Whereas acts are measured according to reason,9 habitus are measured according to the acts which they produce, which are in turn measured according to reason. Thus, McCluskey's claim that "Just as action is specified as good, bad, or indifferent for Aquinas on the basis of its accordance with reason, so too habits are specified as good or bad on the same basis"10 is incorrect. Habitus are not measured according to reason, but according to the acts which they produce: "a good [habitus] is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil [habitus] is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature."11 Ultimately, the acts of a habitus are measured according to reason, which in turn provides the measurement of suitability or unsuitability that characterizes the habitus, but the immediate measurement of a habitus is its act, not its relationship to reason. The reason why this point is important has to do with the direction to act that characterizes habitus. As we saw above, 12 this relationship is so strong that a habitus 9 We will return to this point below. See pages 173-175. McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 152. 11 ST I-II.54.3, co. Thomas makes the same point again at ST I-II.71.3, co.: "a [habitus] is not called good or bad, save insofar as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a [habitus] is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act". 12 See pages 55-56. 10 81 (being in potency with reference to act) cannot even be known without its proper act; a habitus is only intelligible insofar as it is productive of an act. 13 Thus, if we want to know whether a certain habitus is suitable or unsuitable for its subject, we must look to its act and determine that act's relation to reason. It should be noted, however, that while the measurement of reason is most properly applied to the acts to which a habitus disposes its subject, so long as this fact is kept in mind, nothing prevents us from speaking shorthand of vices being against the order of reason. Thus, while Thomas argues that it is acts which are against the order of reason, he does also speak of vices being against this same order as well.14 Second, unsuitable habitus, that is, vices, are directed towards actions which are unsuitable for their subject: "the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature".15 This notion of vice allows Thomas to suggest a secondary meaning for the word "vice" which is likewise related to nature: "Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious."16 The thrust of these notions of vice is that whatever may be called a vice is in some way contrary to nature.17 Thomas goes so far as to quote Augustine approvingly to the effect that "every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." 18 Vice is not accidentally against nature, then, but essentially so, as even its extended meaning shows. The vicious habitus is always directed to the evil of the one who possesses it.19 13 This is why Thomas's philosophy of ethics is not best described as a "virtue theory". This label incorrectly places the emphasis on virtue, when in fact virtue derives all of its moral worth from the acts to which it is directed. A more accurate label of Thomas's philosophy of ethics is something like: "virtuous act ethics", or better yet, "habitual act ethics". 14 See, for example, ST I-II.71.2, co. 15 ST I-II.71.1, co. See also ST I-II.71.2, co. 16 ST II-II.142.1, co. 17 See ST I-II.71.2. 18 ST I-II.71.2, s.c. The quotation is from Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio III.13.38.132. 19 See ST I-II.55.4, co.: "some operative [habitus] are always referred to evil, as vicious [habitus]". See also SCG III.8: "vice is an evil [habitus] according to its species". 82 II.i. Vice Itself Our object is in view. Recall that the purpose of this project is to examine the relationship between vice and malice; here we will set down the nature of vice as it is in the thought of Thomas. We will begin our investigation of unsuitable habitus with an examination of vice itself, before moving on to the relationship of vice to virtue and to the mean, the order of the vices, and finally to the generation, strengthening, weakening, and corruption of vice. As to vice itself, we will apply what I have called the "features" of habitus to the vices.20 To begin, we will examine the nature of vice and its status as another nature in the subjects in which they adhere, before moving on to briefly explore the other features of habitus as they apply to vice. The discussion of the status of vice as another nature will take on a fuller and more detailed character than it did with habitus, as our narrower focus will allow us to speak more definitely on this matter. As a type of habitus, vices constitute another nature for the subjects in which they adhere. This implies all of the same features of vice that it does of habitus. Thus, vices focus the powers of the soul to perform certain types of actions (that is, vicious actions) in a certain way. The specific actions and the manner in which those actions are performed are, we have seen, unsuitable to the natures of the subjects of the vices. But this immediately raises a troubling question: If vice constitutes another nature for its subject, how can it also be against the nature of its subject? Would not vice then be both another nature and against nature? Does it make sense to speak of "another unsuitable nature"? To answer these 20 See pages 52-71 above. 83 questions, it will be necessary to examine Thomas's treatment of vice with respect to human nature, reason, and the powers of the soul in which the vices adhere. Let us begin with human nature. As we have already indicated, Thomas argues that vices are contrary to nature. The concepts "contrary to nature" and "vice" are so connected in Thomas's writings, that, as we have seen, Thomas feels justified in arguing that "Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious."21 In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas devotes an article to showing that vices are contrary to nature,22 where "nature" is understood as the nature of the subject in which the vice adheres: "the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature".23 Moreover, the contrariety of vice to nature can be understood in terms of the corruption of nature,24 although this corruption must be understood not in terms of destroying the nature of the subject, but in wounding it.25 The eudiamonistic character of Thomas's thought on vice is on full display. 26 If we are to understand vices as unsuitable because they lead to acts that are contrary to our human nature, then it would seem to follow that vicious men are evil and unhappy; they are not flourishing qua human as are their virtuous counterparts. Indeed, Thomas argues that vicious 21 ST II-II.142.1, co. ST I-II.71.2. 23 ST I-II.71.2, co. In this article, Thomas goes on to tie the nature of a thing to its form. 24 See In Ethic. X.2, §1977, where Thomas uses the term corruptio in this context. Another interesting text in this regard is ST II-II.34.5, co., wherein Thomas ties the corruption that vice occasions to "what is natural" to the vicious subject. 25 See ST I-II.85.1-2. For the concept of "wound" [vulnus], which can only be mentioned in passing, see ST I-II.85.3. See also Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "vulnus". 26 Ultimately, Thomas will locate man's happiness in the immediate vision of God in the next life ( ST III.3.8), so that he can write: "the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God"(ST II-II.154.12, ad 1), and again, tying in vices explicitly: "Vices against nature are also against God" (ST II-II.154.12, ad 2). Below we will discuss the appropriateness of utilizing the concept of sin in philosophy. See pages 138-147. 22 84 men are both evil and miserable. He writes that "A man is good or bad [malus] in reference to virtue and vice",27 and that "We are called good according to virtues and evil [malitias] according to the opposite vices."28 Stronger still, Thomas argues that "a man who, being despoiled of virtue, is subjected to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense (namely, as a being and as a man), but not absolutely; in fact, he should rather be called evil [malus]."29 The vicious man, being evil, is miserable: "virtuous actions are the principal and predominant factor in a man's happiness so that he can be called happy principally because he acts virtuously. On the contrary, vicious actions are powerful and dominant in the opposite state, which is misery [miseria], so that he is truly miserable who is occupied with evil deeds."30 Elsewhere, Thomas argues that vice leads to misery,31 and he contrasts the misery that follows the vices to the beatitude that follows the virtues.32 Thus far, we seem to have made the case against our interpretation of vice as another nature stronger, as we have now added to the unsuitability of vice the notions of evil and misery: vices (another unsuitable nature) not only are contrary to the nature of their subjects, but they also (as a result of this contrariety) make their subjects evil and miserable. It is hard to see how anything that does this to its subject might be labelled "nature" in any sense of the 27 SCG IV.77. In Ethic. II.5, §299. 29 SCG III.20. I have altered the translation. Where Shapcote translates "vitiis est subiectus" as "is addicted to vice", I have used "is subjected to vice" instead, as this is more accurate. See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "subiectum". 30 In Ethic. I.16, §187. 31 CT I.173. 32 In Matt. V.2, §430. The virtues and vices, as habitus, are directed to act (see pages 54-61 above), and as such they lead to misery or beatitude, inasmuch as they incline their subjects to vicious or virtuous action, wherein misery and beatitude consist. 28 85 word. An understanding of how vices are contrary to human nature will help us to resolve this tension. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas writes the following: it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, insofar as it is contrary to the order of reason.33 Thomas's Aristotelianism allows him to connect human nature to rationality and reason via the soul, the form of the human person. The rational aspect of man – his specific difference within the genus of animal – informs his nature and is the measure against which vice is judged.34 And as vice is contrary to the order of reason, so is it contrary to the nature of man. The connection between vice and contrariety to the order of reason is reiterated later in the Summa Theologiae: "whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful", 35 and later still: "the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason."36 33 ST I-II.71.2, co. Notice the implication – if human virtue (1) makes a man good, (2) makes a man's work good, and (3) is in accord with man's nature, then human vice (which is contrary to human virtue) must (1) make a man evil, (2) make a man's work evil, and (3) is contrary to man's nature. 34 As mentioned above, properly speaking it is acts which are against nature as being contrary to the order of reason, while vicious habitus are against nature as inclining their subjects towards vicious acts. See pages 80-82. However, nothing prevents us from speaking shorthand of vicious habitus being contrary to the order of reason. 35 ST II-II.130.1, co. 36 ST II-II.135.1, co. 86 If the vicious man, in exercising his vice, fails to act in accordance with reason, according to what rule does he act? Thomas argues that the vicious man acts according to his sensitive nature – or what we might call his animal nature. Writes Thomas: "There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature…. the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason."37 Elsewhere, using the example of an intemperate man, Thomas writes that "The overflow of passion that causes vice does not depend on its quantitative intensity, but its relation to reason."38 The precise relationship between vice, the order of reason, and the sensitive appetite is a point that Thomas takes care to make in another context, where he rejects the idea that the unsuitableness of vice consists solely or primarily in the lack of the due measure of reason: "the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason."39 Thus, we might best describe the relationship between vice, the order of reason, and the sensitive appetite in the following way: vice is primarily directed to the good of the sensitive appetite, and this at the expense of the order of reason. Where vice gets its unsuitable character is from its lack of the order of reason, but this is not its modus operandi, so to speak. Vice is directed towards some (sensible) good, but against the order of reason. We might say that in the vicious act, the order of the sensitive appetite has replaced 37 ST I-II.71.2, ad 3. See also In Ethic. III.2, §404: "it is necessary that as reason operating according to itself is the cause of virtuous action so also in following the passions it should be the cause of vicious action." 38 In Sent. IV.31.2.1, ad 3. Thomas is writing in the context of the pleasure that a man and his wife experience in the act of sexual intercourse. Even here, Thomas thinks, where pleasure is extremely intense, its moral value depends strictly on its relation to reason, and not at all on its intensity. 39 ST I.48.1, ad 2. 87 the order of reason, contrary to our human nature. That vice is primarily directed towards the good of the sensitive appetite (and not just to an act that is against the order of reason, although this is necessarily involved in vicious action as well) is a point made forcefully by Thomas in the following text: "Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite."40 Thomas is clear: vice is made perfect qua vice according to the inclination of the sensitive appetite, which inclination is directed towards sensible goods.41 We must now turn to the powers of the soul in which the vices adhere. Above we saw that part of what makes habitus distinct from dispositions is that the former adhere in the soul and are directed to operation, while the latter adhere in the body and are directed to the form of their subject42 – additionally, I have already indicated that habitus act as a sort of focuser for the powers of the soul in particular.43 However, we can say something more specific still. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas considers where habitus reside. He asks whether habitus are in the soul as to its essence or as to its power, that is, are habitus in the soul in respect of what the soul is or in respect of what the soul can do? Thomas affirms the latter: "it is chiefly thus that [habitus] are found in the soul: insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a [habitus]…. And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, [habitus] are in the soul in respect of its powers." 44 The human soul, Thomas thinks, is 40 ST II-II.118.7, ad 1. Emphasis my own. See ST II-II.24.1, co. 42 See pages 47-49. 43 See page 42 above. 44 ST I-II.50.2, co. See also ST I.83.2, s.c.: "Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a [habitus]." For a parallel text, see De Virt. I.3. 41 88 capable of operations, of doing certain things, and habitus reside in certain powers of the soul that make these operations possible, habituating 45 these powers by inclining them to certain types of acts. But what are these powers of the soul, exactly? For our purposes, we may divide the powers of the soul into the sensitive and the intellectual powers, and we may ask whether habitus reside in each of these.46 Thus, Thomas considers the sensitive powers47 of the soul, which are the powers of the soul that incline a subject towards (or away from) particular sensible goods:48 The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: second, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is. And therefore since there are no [habitus] in the natural powers, so neither are there in the sensitive powers, according as they operate from natural instinct. But according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be [habitus] in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.49 We see that Thomas has remained consistent in the role that he gives reason viz. habitus. The sensitive powers of the soul, in some respects, act from natural instinct towards a single end, and in this respect they are unable to be habituated. In other respects, however, the sensitive powers of the soul obey reason,50 and in this way they are able to be habituated, as reason is able to direct them to many and various objects. For example, the concupiscible appetite (the 45 I hesitantly use the word "habituate"; in this dissertation, it is to be understood in reference to habitus, and not in reference to the English word "habit". See pages 71-77 above. 46 We are using ST I-II.50 as our guide. For a parallel text, see De Virt. I.4-8. 47 "Sensitive powers" is a broad term that covers many different aspects of human sensuality. For instance, they might be divided according as they are interior or exterior, or apprehensive or appetitive. Here we are speaking of the appetitive sensitive powers of the soul, which are interior to the human person. See ST III.50.3, ad 3. 48 See ST I.81. 49 ST I-II.50.3, co. 50 See ST I.81.3. 89 appetite that regards particular sensible things as desirable or repugnant simply), 51 is able to be directed by reason to this or that particular bar of chocolate or away from this or that particular angry and aggressive man. And besides the concupiscible appetite, the sensitive powers of the soul include the irascible appetite (the appetite that regards particular sensible things as difficult to obtain or avoid / overcome), which likewise is able to be directed by reason to, for example, this particular bar of chocolate as difficult to obtain or this particular angry man as difficult to avoid / overcome.52 Whether the power of the soul known as the intellect is a seat of habitus is a much more complicated issue. One would think that, if the sensitive appetite is a seat of certain habitus because it is able to be directed by reason to many and various objects, the intellect is all the more suited for habitus for the same reasons. After all, are we not able to direct our intellects to many and various objects? Can I not consider now one thing, and now another? For these reasons, Thomas grants that the intellect is indeed a seat of habitus, however, he is careful to nuance his position. Thomas writes the following about the possibility of virtues, in particular, being seated in the intellect: a virtue is a [habitus] by which we work well. Now a [habitus] may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, insofar as by the [habitus] a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the [habitus] of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Second, a [habitus] may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.53 51 See ST I.81.2, co. See ibid. 53 ST I-II.56.3, co. 52 90 The two ways that habitus are directed to act, namely, by conferring "aptness" to an act and, besides conferring this aptness, by conferring the right use of this aptness, might be otherwise described as, first, the ability to perform an act well, and, second, besides conferring the ability to perform an act well, as inclining its subject to said act. Thomas continues: from having [habitus] of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise, these latter [habitus] are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of [habitus] are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).54 Elsewhere, Thomas writes similarly: When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue… is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done.55 For Thomas, then, there are habitus in the intellectual power of the human soul, for this power is able to be directed to many and various objects. However, these habitus have not the nature of virtue and vice simply, as they do not also incline their subject to their proper acts (for example, the grammarian is not inclined to consider grammatical truths simply from his 54 Ibid. I have removed a dubious emphasis which occurs in the English text that I am using. The words emphasized were: "which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise". Later in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas will reiterate that "the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue". ST I-II.66.3, co. 55 ST I-II.61.1, co. 91 grammatical habitus; his will is, of itself, decidedly neutral to considering grammatical truths at any given time). The clear implication is that it is essential to the simple notion of virtue and vice that they incline their subjects to their proper acts. Before we examine this concept in greater detail, let us consider one final power of the human soul, that one which is directly related to the intellect: the will. The will is nothing else than the intellectual appetite.56 Unlike the sensitive appetite, which regards particular sensible things, the will's object is the good in general, not any particular good. 57 Thomas's reasoning for why we must admit that there are habitus in the will is by now familiar: "Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a [habitus] whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a [habitus] whereby it is well disposed to its act."58 To the objection that the will cannot be the subject of habitus because it is ordered to a single thing, namely, the good as apprehended by reason, Thomas replies that "The will from the very nature of the power is inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a [habitus], to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more promptly." 59 Thus, there are habitus in the will. We have, then, four powers of the human soul that are the seats of habitus: (1) the concupiscible appetite and (2) the irascible appetite, which make up the sensitive appetitive 56 See ST I-II.26.1, co.: "there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the will." 57 See ST I-II.2.8, co.; and ST I-II.9.1, co. The good that is the object of the will is the (intellectually) apprehended good, specifically. See ST I-II.19.3, co.; and ST I-II.19.5, co. 58 ST I-II.50.5, co. 59 ST I-II.50.5, ad 3. 92 powers, (3) the intellect, and (4) the intellectual appetite, called the will. Of these, three are distinctively appetitive powers. The virtues that perfect the appetitive powers are called the moral virtues.60 Appetitive powers, Thomas argues, incline their subjects to their proper acts: "the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination". 61 To use an analogy, when one's ability to feel hungry is actualized, one is for that very reason inclined towards the proper object of one's hunger: food. This does not mean that one is necessitated to seek out food, but only that one is inclined towards it. The concupiscible, irascible, and intellectual appetites, then, incline the subjects in which they adhere, and thus are able to be habituated by virtues and vices simply. What about the intellect? By itself the intellect is not an appetitive power. However, there is a sense in which it participates in appetitive functions (besides the act of the intellectual appetite). As it will turn out that prudence is the moral virtue that perfects the intellect, Thomas develops this line of thought in the context of the virtue of prudence: Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a [habitus] in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; 60 See ST I-II.59.4, co.: "Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason." See also ST I-II.66.3, co. Traditionally, these virtues have also been called the cardinal virtues. See ST I-II.61.1; and De Virt. V.1. Today, the identification of the moral virtues as cardinal virtues is maintained primarily by Catholic and other Christian groups. See, for example, Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd edition (New York: Double Day, 1995), §1805. 61 ST I-II.50.5, ad 1. See also ST I-II.6.4, co.; and ST I-II.22.2, co. 93 and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.62 Here Thomas is beginning to develop the idea that prudence is, we might say, appetitive by participation. Although it is strictly speaking an intellectual virtue, prudence nevertheless is intimately related to the appetites. Later in the Summa Theologiae during his treatise on prudence itself, Thomas returns to the question of prudence and its status as a virtue. His thought process is revealing and is worth quoting at length. As stated above when we were treating of virtues in general, virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise. Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, second, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any [habitus] rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good.63 These are the intellectual virtues (besides prudence). Thomas continues: On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good. Now it belongs to prudence… to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.64 And thus prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, has something of the nature of the moral virtues, as it considers "the rectitude of the appetite". The topic of prudence and its relationship to the other virtues is vast and deserves an extended treatment of its own – here we can only examine what is relevant for our own 62 ST I-II.57.5, co. ST II-II.47.4, co. See also In Ethic. VI.4, §1172. 64 ST II-II.47.4, co. 63 94 project. When one considers the relationship between vice and malice, the moral vices are by far more relevant than the intellectual vices. This is because of the fact that malice (of the type with which this dissertation is concerned) is an interior cause of sinful acts,65 and as such malice is directly related to the appetites, as are the vices from which malicious sins result. 66 Thus, the vices that we must consider are moral vices. This project, then, will be concerned with the moral vices to the exclusion of the intellectual vices.67 As for prudence, note that, in the above quotation, Thomas explicitly writes that it is counted among the moral virtues – it is what I have called appetitive by participation.68 Indeed, when discussing the moral virtues earlier in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas argues for the status of prudence as a principal or cardinal virtue:69 "those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue", 70 and in the next article Thomas argues that these principal moral virtues are four, and, as one way of enumerating them, he points to the powers of the soul as his justification: "For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz., the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by Prudence; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of Justice, the concupiscible 65 For the idea that (moral) vices and sins are related to the appetites, see pages 87-88 above. See pages 250-260 below. Malicious actions which do not proceed from a vicious habitus are also related to the appetites, although less obviously. See pages 260-272 below. At the very least, malice is related to the appetites as a defect consisting in a disorder of the intellectual appetite. See ST I-II.78.1, co. 67 We will return to malice in greater detail in Chapter IV of this dissertation. 68 At one place Thomas writes that prudence "regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof." ST I-II.57.4, co. 69 See my note on the label "cardinal" virtues above: page 93, note 60. The principal virtues are also called cardinal. 70 ST I-II.61.1, co. 66 95 faculty, subject of Temperance, and the irascible faculty, subject of Fortitude."71 All of the other moral virtues are reducible to these four principal or cardinal virtues.72 What is true of the moral virtues here (the suitable habitus) is also true of the moral vices (the unsuitable habitus). Each vice is seated in a certain power of the soul, and focuses that power upon some object. Specifically, as moral vices, the vices each have a relationship to appetite in some way, inclining certain appetites to their objects. Thus, a vice is not something over and above the power of a soul, but is rather the very disordering of the power itself, much like the focusing of a beam of light by a lens is not something over and above the lens itself, but just is the order of the lens towards a certain type of focus. Jonathan J. Sanford makes this point in the following way: "A vicious [habitus] is the corruption of a power; yet that corruption is not itself an additional something deposited upon some combination of human powers, but rather the very disordering of those powers to evils." 73 Sanford should not be taken as to say that a vicious habitus corrupts the power in which it resides so that the agent is less able to act or to use that power; a vice does not corrupt its power in this manner. In the case of a vicious habitus, what is corrupted is the power's order to acts that are in accord with right reason. Thus, when a vice is called the corruption of a power, it should be taken to mean that a vice is a disorder of a power of the soul.74 Additionally, we must nuance Sanford's claim that a vice is a disordering of a power to evil. It is more accurate to claim that a vice is an ordering of a power of the soul to some perceived good against the order of 71 ST I-II.61.2, co. The other way of enumerating the four moral virtues has to do with the formal principle of each virtue. The virtues enumerated are the same. 72 See ST I-II.61.2, ad 3. 73 Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 86. 74 See ST I-II.78.1, co.: "Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man". 96 reason. Vice is not directed primarily to privation, but to some good at the expense of or against the order of reason. Such orders are rightly called disordered given human nature and the manner in which the powers ought to be ordered (to acts that are in accord with right reason). The point is merely that, fundamentally, a vice is ordered to some perceived good, albeit in a manner unsuitable to the nature of the subject, which ordering is disordered given human nature. Above we saw Thomas make this very point.75 We are now in a position to resolve the problem posed at the beginning of this section: How can a vice be at the same time another nature and against nature? The answer to this question ties together the three major themes with which we have occupied ourselves throughout this section: nature, reason, and the soul's powers. In the Summa Theologiae, while responding to an objection, Thomas clarifies the manner in which a vice is said to be against nature: "Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that virtue is a [habitus] in accord with reason, like [another] nature [modum naturae]: and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature." 76 Human nature is such that our actions are measured against the rule of reason, and vices are against this nature to the extent that they incline their subjects to acts which are contrary to this rule. On the other hand, vices constitute another nature insofar as they are seated in the powers of the human soul and incline their subjects to certain types of acts. Such habitus (and vices are no exception) become difficult to remove owing to their causes, 77 and it is under this difficult to change aspect that they are considered to be another nature. So, vices are both against nature, 75 See ST I.48.1, ad 2, referred to on page 87. ST I-II.71.2, ad 1. 77 See pages 49-50 above. For greater detail, see pages 128-131 below. 76 97 in the sense that they are contrary to the order of reason, and another nature, in the sense that they adhere in the powers of the soul – being the very orders of those powers to some perceived goods without the order of reason – and are more or less stable and permanent. These two aspects of vice are by no means mutually exclusive. We have discussed the status of vice as another nature; what of the other features of habitus which have been identified above?78 Specifically, what can we say about the role of desire and pleasure in vice, the fact that vices do not necessitate their acts, the direction of vice to the vicious act, and the necessity of vice for perfect actions? In all, there is little to add to the "features" of vice that has not already been said about habitus, but what there is to add is important for our project. As to the role of desire and pleasure in vice, vices, as habitus, result in their subjects desiring and taking pleasure in the acts of their vices. This is because of the status of vice as another nature, for what is natural to an agent is pleasing to him.79 Vice in particular, however, implies a specific relationship to pleasure, one that habitus in general does not. The reason for this has to do with the vicious agent's neglect of the rule of reason, and the fact that he instead follows his passions: "the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason."80 Jensen develops this point: "A person might take two different approaches… when determining which goods are better to be pursued. On the one hand, he might consult what really is better; on the other hand, he might consult his desires. The vicious person, it seems, uses the second approach, which approach becomes 78 See pages 52-71. See In Ethic. II.3, §265; ST I.18.2, ad 2; and ST I-II.27.1, co. 80 ST I-II.71.2, ad 3. 79 98 faulty because his desires are themselves disordered."81 The vicious person's desires are disordered precisely because they are not ordered by reason – Thomas writes that he pursues whatever object attracts him: "for the wicked or vicious man that thing is the object of willing which attracts him, i.e., whatever seems pleasing to himself." 82 The vicious agent, according to Joseph Caulfield, "follows [the] inclination of the appetite thinking that its good is his best end."83 While the object of the appetite is always a perceived good, it is nevertheless not man's true good unless it is in accord with his human (rational) nature. The vicious agent is deceived, then, and this deception is the result of him consulting his desires without the order of right reason.84 Writes Thomas: for many, the vicious, deception in the distinction between good and evil occurs especially because of pleasure. As a consequence of this it happens that they desire as good the pleasurable, which is not good, and seek to avoid as evil what is for them painful but in itself good. The explanation is that they do not follow reason but the senses.85 One's vices are not only generated in this way, but are similarly expressed in their direction to act: on the influence of one's vice one's reason follows the passions and a vicious act is 81 Jensen, Sin, 171. In Ethic. III.10, §493. Thomas is expounding on Aristotle, contrasting the vicious man with the virtuous man, whose object of attraction is "truly worthy of being willed". 83 Joseph Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," Laval théologique et philosophique 7, no. 1 (1951): 113. 84 This is not to say that the vicious agent does not consult his reason at all – one of the features of habitus that I argued for above was creativity. See page 75. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas speaks of false prudence: "There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, [insofar] as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called a good robber, and in this way [we] may speak of a prudent robber, by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery." ST II-II.47.13, co. Emphases in the original. (Where I quote an emphasis in the English translation of Thomas, this is not to be understood as though that emphasis occurs in the original Latin.) Later, Thomas discusses vices that are opposed to prudence by way of resemblance, among which is craftiness. ST II-II.55.3. 85 In Ethic. III.10, §495. Thomas may use the qualifier "especially" because of certain vices that arise because of sorrow, such as envy. For envy as a kind of sorrow, see ST II-II.36.1. 82 99 performed.86 Above we have seen that "vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite."87 A number of scholars have pointed out the fact that the vicious agent, as Bonnie Kent describes him, "rejoices in his sins."88 Caulfield writes that the man who sins from his vice "is not sorry for what he has done, but on the contrary is pleased with his evil actions." 89 Thomas himself writes that the intemperate man "rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural [connaturalis] to him by reason of his [habitus]."90 Just as one's vice becomes another nature, so the acts to which those vices are directed become connatural to the vicious agent. There are two important points to make here. First, it is sometimes claimed by scholars of Thomas that those with vices sin dispassionately (at least when they sin by using their vices). For example, Kent has argued that "To sin from choice is to sin from [habitus] – deliberately, dispassionately, and in ignorance of what is good in general." 91 If Kent is implying that to sin from vice is not to sin from passion as a first principle of one's act, she is certainly correct.92 However, if she is implying that one who sins from vice sins dispassionately simply, she is mistaken. We saw above that habitus imply passion in the 86 See In Ethic. III.2, §404. Below we will examine the generation of vice in more detail. See pages 128-131. 87 See page 88. The quotation is from ST II-II.118.7, ad 1. Emphasis my own. Bonnie Kent, "Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence," Journal of the History of Philosophy 27, no. 2 (1989): 216. 89 Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 119. 90 ST II-II.156.3, co. 91 Kent, "Transitory Vice," 209. 92 See the discussion of the interior causes of sinful acts (pages 187-246), and particularly what it means to sin from something (pages 187-188) below. 88 100 performance of their proper acts,93 and this is true of both virtue and vice. 94 We have seen in this very section how the vicious man follows the inclination of his appetite in acting, and in so acting he desires some perceived good. As Jensen rightly argues, "both virtue and vice have no internal conflict between reason and the emotions. In the virtuous person, reason judges and the emotions follow. In the vicious person, the emotions desire and reason follows."95 It can hardly follow that the vicious person sins dispassionately.96 Second, although a vicious agent comes to desire and take pleasure in his sins, he does not thereby become immune to regret. "He that sins through [habitus] is always glad for what he does through [habitus], as long as he uses the [habitus]. But since he is able not to use the [habitus], and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the [habitus] he is sorry for what he has done through the [habitus]."97 Thomas ties the regret that a vicious agent may experience for his sins to the fact that he may use his habitus when he wills.98 So long as he sins through 93 This point is made specifically with respect to pleasure. See pages 64-66. For virtue, see ST I-II.59.5, co.: "if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts." The virtue of justice is a partial exception to this rule, as Thomas goes on to point out. One might also point to the fact that virtue, as a habitus, makes virtuous acts connatural to the virtuous agent, thereby also making them pleasurable to him. 95 Jensen, Living the Good Life, 83. 96 Other scholars argue in ways that seem at least to suggest that they are leaning towards Kent's line of thought. For example, Ashley Dressel calls the person who sins from malice "clear-eyed" and writes that they sin "calmly", implying a similar dispassion in acting. Ashley Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 2014), 1-2, 14. The relationship of vice to malice is the subject of my own dissertation, and will be explored in-depth in Chapter V. It will turn out that all vicious actions are malicious actions as well. See pages 250-260 below. 97 ST I-II.78.2, ad 3. For more on remorse, especially is it pertains to malice and the relationship between vice and malice, see page 212, note 149; and pages 257-259 below. 98 See pages 66-71 above. 94 101 his vicious habitus, he will not regret his actions, as said actions have become connatural to him. However, should he not use his habitus in sinning, he may come to feel sorrow for his sins. How does this happen? When a man sins in a manner in which he does not use his vicious habitus, in what way does he sin? Writes Thomas: "it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious [habitus], acts, not from that [habitus], but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance."99 Above we saw Głowala's illustration of this very concept: "[the spiteful man's] action may be prompted by an immense fear (he may have been blackmailed into it); in this case it is not true that he did it because he is spiteful, although it was nasty and he actually is spiteful."100 This is a point made by numerous scholars of Thomas, such as, for example, Kent and Dressel, McCluskey, and Sanford.101 Additionally, Kent and Dressel have pointed to Thomas's claim that "man, while possessing a [habitus], may either fail to use the [habitus], or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin"102 as an indication that a vicious man may be able to perform a morally good act.103 The broader point is that, as a type of habitus, vices do not necessitate their acts – Thomas makes this point explicitly with reference to virtue and vice: "as long as 99 ST I-II.78.2, co. Thomas is touching upon the three interior causes of sin, which we will consider below. See pages 187-246. 100 Głowala, "What Kind of Power is Virtue?" 27-28. Emphases in the original. For my earlier use of this quotation, see page 68 above. 101 Bonnie Kent and Ashley Dressel, "Weakness and Willful Wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," Aquinas's Disputed Questions on Evil: A Critical Guide, ed. M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 49. McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 126. Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 81-82. 102 ST I-II.71.4, co. 103 Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and Willful Wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 49. Colvert also points to this text. Colvert, "Aquinas on Raising Cain," 209. 102 we live here below, the will is changeable as to vice and virtue", 104 although it is difficult to so change: "the [habitus] of virtue or vice does not incline the will of necessity in such a way that a person cannot act contrary to the nature of the [habitus]; but it is difficult to act contrary to that to which the [habitus] inclines."105 Even if vices do not necessitate their acts, they do incline their subjects to the vicious actions that are proper to each vice. Recall that, for Thomas, the connection between a habitus and its act is such that the former derives its moral character from the latter. 106 We might point to a number of other texts as well – for example, where Thomas argues that vices incline the will to sin,107 or where he writes of habitus causing their acts.108 And as vice corresponds to secondary potency / first act and the vicious act to second act, 109 Thomas is able to argue that vicious acts are worse than the vices from which they arise: "it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil".110 More than just being directed to their proper vicious acts, vices are necessary for those vicious acts to be truly bad. Recall that here, "truly bad" simply refers to the manner in which the acts in question are performed: easily, promptly, with pleasure, etc. 111 Thomas 104 SCG IV.71. De Malo III.13, ad 6. 106 See ST I-II.71.3, co.: "a [habitus] is not called good or bad, save insofar as it induces to a good or bad act". See also pages 80-82 above. 107 De Malo III.13, ad 5: "[habitus] makes the movement of the will [to sin] more vehement". 108 ST I-II.71.3, ad 3: "[Habitus] causes act by way of efficient causality" [habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis]. See also ST I.79.13, ad 3: "Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause [causa], which is power and [habitus]"; and ST I.89.6, ad 3: "The acts which produce a [habitus] are like the acts caused [causant] by that [habitus]". 109 See pages 57-61 above. 110 ST I-II.71.3, co. 111 See pages 61-65 above. 105 103 addresses this point most explicitly during his discussion of the vice of injustice in the Summa Theologiae. There, he asks whether a man is unjust by performing an unjust act. He answers in the negative, arguing the following: it may happen… that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust… on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the [habitus]. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a [habitus], because whenever a man has a [habitus], whatever befits that [habitus] is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the [habitus] of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the [habitus] of injustice.112 Jensen comments on this text: Someone is unjust not simply if he performs an unjust action, but only if he acts unjustly from the [habitus] of injustice. If I [decide to steal], then I have committed an unjust action. Am I thereby unjust? Not necessarily. My action might have arisen from the passion of the moment rather than from a steady [habitus] of choosing injustice. Injustice is a vice; it is not a mere wrongdoing. If virtue is the ideal of spontaneously and joyfully doing what is just, then vice is the anti-ideal of someone who spontaneously does injustice and relishes it.113 The text of the Summa Theologiae and Jensen's commentary neatly wraps up much of what we've examined in this section on vice itself. When someone has a vicious habitus, the object of that habitus seems pleasant to the agent in which the habitus adheres. The habitus has become another nature for him, and its object has similarly become connatural to him and his appetites. What makes vicious habitus so dangerous is the contempt for the rule of reason that it manifests, which rule is in conformity with our human nature and foundational to our flourishing as humans. Vicious habitus are what allow us to perform vicious acts readily and 112 113 ST II-II.59.2, co. See also In Ethic. V.15, §1074, which I referred to above on pages 62-63. Jensen, Living the Good Life, 179. 104 easily, and, as Jensen notes, what allow us to relish them. The lustful, the rash, and the unjust are, if they act from their habitus, capable of truly vicious actions in this sense, and they are only turned away from their objects with great difficulty. The extent of the evil of vicious habitus will only be apparent after we have examined malice, 114 but already something of the gravity of vice is evident. We move on now to the relationship of vice to virtue and to the mean, as the nature of vice is only fully appreciated when it is understood in comparison with the mean of virtue. II.ii. The Relationship of Vice to Virtue and to the Mean Virtues and vices are opposed as suitable and unsuitable habitus. And as we are speaking of the moral habitus – those habitus that perfect an agent's appetites and incline him to operation – the two categories of suitable and unsuitable habitus exhaust the division into which habitus can be categorized. There is no such thing as a neutral habitus; a habitus either inclines its subject towards acts which are in accord with right reason, or it inclines its subject towards acts which are not in accord with right reason. In the former case, those habitus will be suitable to the subject, and will be called virtues. In the latter case, those habitus will be unsuitable to the subject, and will be called vices. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas argues 114 See Chapter IV. 105 that vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.115 This means that while other things may be opposed to virtue in one way or another,116 vice is opposed to virtue qua virtue.117 The exact nature of the opposition of virtue and vice consists in part in terms of excess and deficiency: "In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency."118 Virtue represents the measure against which a vice is judged as being in excess or deficiency, and between two vicious extremes a virtue is said to observe the mean: Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good [of] things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.119 The virtue of temperance provides us with an excellent example of these concepts. Temperance, for Thomas, regulates the concupiscible appetite in accordance with reason, 120 and as such it is concerned with moderating our desire for sensible pleasure. 121 Thus, someone is excessive in these desires when they do not moderate them enough, so to speak – 115 ST I-II.71.1, co. and ad 1. Thomas mentions sin (which is opposed to virtue "in respect of that to which virtue is ordained") and malice (which is opposed to virtue "in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz., that it is a kind of goodness"). See ST I-II.71.1, co. In Chapter IV, we will see that malice [malitia] has a number of different meanings. See pages 203-204 below. 117 Thus, Thomas's claim that "Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue" should be read with the following qualification: "as such". ST II-II.142.1, s.c. 118 ST II-II.119.1, co. 119 ST I-II.64.1, co. 120 ST I-II.61.2, co. 121 ST II-II.141.3, co. 116 106 right reason demands that they be more moderate in their desires. This is the vice of intemperance, and as the very word suggests, it is opposed to temperance as vice to virtue. 122 On the other hand, when someone does not desire sensible pleasure enough, when he has moderated his desires too much, he is said to be deficient in these desires, and is guilty of the sin of insensibility.123 Insensibility, like intemperance, is opposed to the mean of temperance, and indeed these two vices are opposed to each other as well: "To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice." 124 Thus, to any one virtue there are two vices opposed, one in excess and one in deficiency, and these vices are likewise opposed to each other. Regarding the opposition of virtue to vice, an interesting text is ST II-II.10.5, co., wherein Thomas argues that, in one sense, each virtue has two vices opposed to it, and in another sense, there are infinite vices opposed to each virtue. According to the first sense, we consider vices and their relations to virtue, so that there can only be two vices opposed to each virtue: one in excess and one in deficiency. According to the second sense, we consider the various conditions or circumstances that are necessary for virtue, such that whatever corrupts one of these conditions is considered to be a vice. In this way, as there are potentially infinite ways to corrupt a condition for virtue, there are potentially infinite vices opposed to each virtue, each of which implies a greater or lesser deviation from the mean of virtue. Throughout his corpus, when Thomas writes about the relationship of virtues and vices, he refers to the first sense above, as the first sense touches upon the species of actions, while the 122 In English, the prefix in is commonly used to denote opposition or negation, as in justice and injustice, sufficient and insufficient, opportune and inopportune, etc. 123 See ST II-II.142.1. 124 ST II-II.135.2, ad 2. 107 second touches upon the circumstances of actions. Additionally, one might point to certain texts where Thomas admits that there is more than one vice opposed to a single virtue (in the first sense given above). Thus, while discussing the virtue of magnanimity, Thomas claims that there are three vices opposed to it in excess: presumption, ambition, and vainglory. 125 When Thomas asks whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess, he has an objector reply: "It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above. Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess." 126 Thomas's reply is revealing: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, insofar as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.127 For Thomas, then, there is indeed one vice opposed to each virtue in both excess and in deficiency, although this must be qualified according to what each respective virtue regards – a virtue may regard different things, which may result in multiple vices being opposed to it in either excess or deficiency. In the case of an excess of magnanimity, the virtue might regard a great deed, in which case the vice that opposes it is presumption, or it might regard honor, in 125 ST II-II.130, Preamble. ST II-II.131.2, obj. 1. 127 ST II-II.131.2, ad 1. Thomas's reasoning for vainglory being opposed to magnanimity in excess is similar. See ST II-II.132.2, co. and ad 2. 126 108 which case the vice that opposes it is ambition. And as glory is an effect of honor, Thomas includes vainglory as a vice opposed to magnanimity by excess.128 The result of these different senses of virtue and vice is that there are more vices than virtues,129 as there are many ways to miss the mean, and only one way to hit it. As an illustration of this point, consider Thomas's approving quotation of Aristotle: "it is as difficult to behave virtuously as to find the center of a circle". 130 While commenting on this quotation, Thomas writes the following: it is difficult to be good or virtuous because we see that in every case it is difficult to discover the mean but easy to deviate from the mean. Thus, not everyone—only an informed person who is a geometrician—can find the center of a circle. On the other hand, anyone can easily deviate from the center. Likewise, anyone can hand out money and waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right person, the right amount, at the right time, for the right purpose, in the right manner—all of which belongs to virtuous giving. Indeed, because of the difficulty it is a rare and difficult thing, but praiseworthy and virtuous precisely as conforming to reason.131 These ideas speak to the two senses of vice and virtue above: there are either two vices opposed to each virtue (according as a vice denotes an excessive or deficient relationship to its virtue), or there are potentially infinite vices opposed to each virtue (according as a vice denotes a more-or-less excessive or deficient relationship to its virtue, owing to various circumstances). Either way we look at things, there is only one way to be virtuous: hitting the mean. 128 ST II-II.132.2, co. See In Gal. V.6, §335, where Thomas states this explicitly. 130 SCG III.5. Thomas is quoting from Nicomachean Ethics II.9, 1109a24-25. 131 In Ethic. II.11, §370. 129 109 Hitting the mean is achieved through conforming the relevant appetite to right reason.132 This involves all of the features of the act in question, including and especially the circumstances of the act, a point which Thomas makes forcefully in a number of places, for example: "the act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice", 133 and: "the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances."134 An act that is otherwise virtuous may become vicious if the due circumstances are not observed: "An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances."135 And likewise, one must take into account the various moral agents and their unique persons, relationships, and situations in determining, through reason, which acts might be virtuous and which acts might be vicious: "it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them."136 Thus, in order to hit the mean of virtue, one must ensure that the various circumstances surrounding one's act are in conformity with right reason – one's act must be done at the right time, at the right place, by / with the right person, and so on for the other circumstances.137 Each of these circumstances plays a crucial role in determining the rightness 132 See ST I-II.64.2, co.: "moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason." 133 ST II-II.101.4, co. ST I-II.18.3, co. See also ST I-II.7.2. 135 ST II-II.147.1, ad 1. 136 ST I-II.94.3, ad 3. 137 Thomas adopts Aristotle's enumeration of the circumstances of an act: who, what, about what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when. See ST I-II.7.3, co. An exposition of these circumstances, not to mention addressing the issue of their number and order, is beyond the scope of this project. For the text of Aristotle, see Nicomachean Ethics III.1, 1111a3-7. 134 110 of any particular act. Should one or more of these not conform to right reason (for example, if one were to engage in sexual intercourse with the wrong person, say, one's neighbor's wife), the act itself is rendered evil.138 Although virtue is a mean, a "middle course" between two vicious extremes, 139 it is not to be understood as being equidistant from each of these extremes. Of any two vicious extremes, one of them is closer to or more similar to its virtue than is the other: "a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the contrary vices than with the other". 140 Thomas provides a number of examples to illustrate this point: the virtue of fortitude is more like its excess rashness than it is like its defect cowardice, while the virtue of temperance is more like its defect insensibility than it is like its excess intemperance. 141 Thus, we are more likely to call a rash person courageous than we are a coward, and we are more likely to call an insensible person temperate than we are an intemperate person. This relates to the seats of fortitude and temperance – the irascible (which is the appetite that regards particular sensible things as difficult to obtain or avoid) and concupiscible (which is the appetite that regards particular sensible things as pleasurable or repugnant) appetites respectively – as the vice that is closer to the virtue in question will look more like the function of the virtue, given the appetite in which it is seated, than will its opposite vice.142 138 Not all circumstances will have the same bearing upon the gravity of a sinful act, so that some circumstances render an action more evil (that is, contrary to right reason) than others, all else being equal – for example, it matters very much to the gravity of an act whether one steals a pear or a sacred object. The result is a nuanced view of sinful action that allows for an impressive degree of gradation. 139 See In Ethic. II.7, §324. 140 ST II-II.21.3, co. Thomas is paraphrasing parts of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.8, 1108b111109a19. 141 In Ethic. II.10, §365. 142 Thomas, following Aristotle, argues that if we want to hit the mean, sometimes we must aim for one or another of the extremes of vice, owing to the nature of the mean (which extreme is the mean closer to?) or to our own natural inclinations (to which vice are we naturally more inclined?). By doing this, hitting the mean will 111 While vices may be contrary to other vices and to virtues, no virtue may be contrary to another virtue.143 In fact, according to Thomas, the virtues are connected in an intimate way, so that should one possess a single virtue, one must also possess the other virtues. 144 In defending this position, Thomas sees himself as agreeing with tradition and the current opinion on the virtues.145 Thomas sees the tradition on the virtues as following two different threads on this issue, both of which conclude that the virtues are connected. The first of which proceeds from what Thomas calls the "general properties of the virtues", which are explained thusly: "discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude". 146 The connection between the virtues, in this case, has to do with these general properties and their association with one another: "the reason for the connection [of the virtues] is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth." 147 According to Thomas, then, the virtues are accompanied by certain "general properties", which properties (when connected with the virtues) imply the others, and so the other virtues as well. In support of this position, Thomas cites the authority of Gregory and Augustine, and his quotation of the former helps to shed light on this curious argument: "a virtue cannot be perfect… if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, become easier. See In Ethic. II.11, §§369-381; and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.9, 1109a20-b27. 143 See ST I-II.31.8, ad 1. 144 Recall that we are here restricting our view to the moral virtues. See pages 94-96 above. 145 See ST I-II.65.1, co.: "we must say that [the moral virtues] are connected, as nearly all are agreed in saying." Besides Gregory, Augustine, and Aristotle, who I will refer to below, Thomas also sees himself as agreeing with Ambrose. See De Virt. V.2, s.c. 1. 146 ST I-II.65.1, co. 147 Ibid. 112 justice and fortitude".148 A number of questions prior to this quotation, Thomas had considered this very quotation and provided a fuller explanation of the "general properties" of virtue: some take [the moral virtues] as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous [habitus]: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a [habitus], should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude.149 It is clear, then, that Thomas considers this first way of connecting the virtues as not considering the virtues as distinct virtues, but simply as sharing "general properties" which are found in each virtue. Let us consider the second way of connecting the virtues, which, contrary to the first, considers the virtues as distinct from one another. Writes Thomas: Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection. Because… no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective [habitus]. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is right reason about things to be done, and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have 148 Ibid. For the text of Gregory, see Moralia XXII.1, §2. For the text of Augustine, see De Trinitate 149 ST I-II.61.4, co. See obj. 1 and ad 1 as well. VI.4. 113 speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.150 Here, Thomas ties the connection of the virtues to "right choice". Right choice, Thomas argues, requires that an agent be inclined to a suitable end, and the appropriate choice of the means to the end. The former of these is proper to the three appetitive moral virtues, while the latter is proper to the intellectual virtue that is appetitive by participation: prudence. What one needs in order to make right choices, then, are the moral virtues (that aren't prudence) on the one hand, and prudence on the other. Thus, Thomas argues that an agent cannot have the moral virtues without prudence, and one cannot have prudence without the moral virtues.151 Essentially, the connection of the virtues revolves around the use of right reason. Thomas explains this aspect of the connection of the virtues while discussing why the vices are not connected as the virtues are. In ST I-II.73.1, Thomas asks whether all sins are connected with one another. There are two objections to his negative position that point to the connection of the virtues and which conclude that the vices must be likewise connected. 152 In response, besides noting that some vices are contrary to one another,153 Thomas writes the following: The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the 150 ST I-II.65.1, co. Thomas is referring to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.13, 1144b1-1145a12. A fuller treatment of these claims is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The point that I wish to make here is merely that, for Thomas, the virtues are connected in such a way that the possession of one implies the possession of all, and that the vices are not so connected (as I will argue immediately below). For Thomas's defense of these two claims, see ST I-II.65.1; ST I-II.57.5; ST I-II.58.4; and De Virt. V.2. Moreover, it should be noted that, in arguing that the virtues are connected, Thomas appears to prefer the second of the two formulations given immediately above. See, for example, ST I-II.58.4-5. 152 ST I-II.73.1, obj. 2 and 3. 153 ST I-II.73.1, s.c. 151 114 intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz., prudence…. But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.154 The connection among the virtues and the lack of a similar connection among the vices is due to their respective ends. In acting, the virtuous agent intends to act in accordance with right reason, whereas the vicious agent intends, not to act against right reason, but to obtain some particular sensible good against the due measure of reason. 155 But sensible goods are many and varied, and are often mutually exclusive and contrary to each other. 156 The result is that sin and vice are not connected as the virtues are – a fact that we tend to recognize in our everyday speech: When we say "He is a good man", we have, in a sense, captured a man's goodness in a single statement. We mean that he is good all around, so to speak. We do not mean that he is morally good in one way only, but that he is good simply.157 On the other hand, when we say "He is a bad man", we have under-specified his badness. We do not know in what ways he is bad. Is he prideful? Is he cowardly? Is he prodigal? We do not have enough 154 ST I-II.73.1, co. The notion of vice being directed towards a perceived good is particularly relevant here. See pages 87-88 above. 156 For example, a man who is pursuing his neighbor's wife may be compelled to shun the sin of gluttony on account of the woman's distaste for gluttonous men. 157 See ST I.93.9, co.: "we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue." 155 115 information. We do not mean that he is bad all around, so to speak, as though he has acquired every vice and performs every kind of sin.158 If the vices are not connected as the virtues are, the issue remains as to the way in which the vices are in fact connected, if in fact they are in any meaningful way. It is to this question that we now turn. II.iii. The Connection of the Vices While Thomas groups and treats the virtues according to the powers of the soul, he prefers an entirely different method when it comes to the vices. Certainly, in the Summa Theologiae, it appears as though he adopts the powers method when discussing the vices, but this is a consequence of his intention to analyze the vices according to the particular virtues that they oppose, and not of anything inherent in the vices themselves. However, his discussion of the vices in the Summa Theologiae allows us to extract his preferred method of grouping and analyzing the vices, a method which is identical in another work that is deeply concerned with the vices: the De Malo. Examining Thomas's grouping and treatment of the vices will allow us to understand what he views to be the connection among the vices, as it is this very connection that informs his grouping. When discussing the grouping and connection of the vices, Thomas uses the term capital vices.159 Thomas explains the meaning of this term by referencing the etymological connection between the Latin words capitale and caput: 158 See ST I-II.56.3, co. The history and development of the capital vices is rich. For a brief overview of this history, see DeYoung, Glittering Vices, 21-38; and Morton Bloomfield, The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967). 159 116 The word capital [capitale] is derived from caput [head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called [when the term caput is] taken metaphorically for a principle or director of [other vices]. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal…. Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or [habitus], to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means.160 Capital vices, then, are those vices that are the origin of further vices, as their principle and director. The directing that capital vices are responsible for is primarily a matter of final causation: "the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause," and this happens "on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another". 161 In other words, what allows a capital vice to originate and direct another vice is its desirable end, an end which, of itself, has "certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite." 162 It is the desire for the object of the capital vice that inclines an agent to further vicious acts (that is, acts of a different species of vice) in pursuit thereof. An enumeration of the capital vices will illustrate this point. Thomas writes that there are seven: vainglory, envy, anger, acedia, covetousness, gluttony, and lust.163 For some capital vices, such as gluttony and lust, it is rather obvious that their objects have "certain 160 ST I-II.84.3, co. ST I-II.84.4, co. 162 Ibid. Thomas returns to this point many times, for example, at ST II-II.148.5, co.; and ST II-II.158.6, 161 ad 2. 163 See ST I-II.84.4; and De Malo VIII.1. I have left acedia untranslated, as the usual translation "sloth" is quite problematic and leads to grave misinterpretations. DeYoung has done much to attempt to uncover Thomas's concept of acedia. See Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, "Resistance to the Demands of Love"; "Sloth: Some Historical Reflections on Laziness, Effort, and Resistance to the Demands of Love," in Virtues and Their Vices, eds. Kevin Timpe and Craig Boyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 177-198; and Glittering Vices, 87-109. Some vices and passions share names with each other (anger, for example). Thomas is careful to explain how these differ in a number of places, such as ST I-II.45.1, ad 1. Also relevant is ST I-II.59.1, ad 2. 117 fundamental reasons for moving the appetite". Gluttony regards the pleasure that accompanies food and drink, while lust regards the pleasure that accompanies sexual intercourse. Thomas reasons similarly for each capital vice, deriving the above list from various goods to which the human person is naturally inclined, or from various evils which the human person might seek to avoid. 164 Part of what makes lust, for example, a specifically capital vice is that its appetible object is so connected with human nature – its pull on the appetite is so strong – that one is often ready and willing to commit further sins and develop further vices in the pursuit of inordinate sexual pleasure. DeYoung puts the point in the following way: "[the capital vices have] greatly desirable, happiness-like ends [which] spur us on to a range of other vices", 165 and McCluskey writes similarly: "The capital vices operate as final causes in the sense that each of them is directed toward a particular object that functions like an ultimate end."166 A reader who is somewhat familiar with the tradition of the capital vices might have wondered at the exclusion of the vice of pride from the enumeration given above, or perhaps he will have assumed that the vice of vainglory has taken its place or is practically equivalent to it. Far from ignoring or diminishing the role of pride among the vices, Thomas actually gives it a unique and preeminent status. And while covetousness is numbered among the seven capital vices, Thomas similarly argues for its special importance. 164 See ST I-II.84.4, co. Thomas's derivation of the seven capital vices is thus anything but arbitrary. DeYoung, "Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth," 59-60. 166 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 162. 165 118 Let us begin with covetousness. Thomas, again in line with the traditional interpretation of covetousness, argues that covetousness is the root of all sins.167 Here, Thomas wishes to avoid interpretations of covetousness which would denote it as a general sin or as an inclination only. Thus, he does not want to interpret covetousness as "denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good", or as "denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately".168 Rather, Thomas wants to interpret covetousness as a special sin with a particular object: covetousness is the root of all sins insofar as covetousness refers to "inordinate desire for riches". 169 With covetousness as a special sin in mind, Thomas explains his reasoning behind calling it the root of all sins: Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods… so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins.170 The key to understanding the root aspect of covetousness is the analogy of the tree. The roots of a tree nourish the tree and allow it to grow. Likewise, covetousness is the root of all sins in the sense that the inordinate desire for riches, and the satisfaction thereof, is what allows an agent to nourish his other sinful desires. By obtaining wealth an agent may pursue whatever other objects of his inordinate appetite: "The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are 167 ST I-II.84.1, co. In the sed contra, Thomas takes as his authority 1 Tim. 6:10, which in part reads in the Vulgate translation: "Radix enim omnium malorum est cupiditas". 168 ST I-II.84.1, co. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 119 much sought after as useful for any temporal end." 171 This is not to say that any and every individual sin is nourished by riches, but only that this is the case in most instances: "in moral matters, we consider what happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given."172 Pride is given a similar status as an origin sin by Thomas. As with covetousness, Thomas wishes to avoid interpreting pride as a general sin or as an inclination. Thus, he does not want to interpret pride as "denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment", or as "denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature".173 Rather, Thomas wishes to interpret pride as a special sin with its own object: pride is the "inordinate desire to excel", 174 and in this sense pride is the beginning of every sin.175 In the course of explaining this aspect of pride, Thomas refers back to his discussion of covetousness as the root of all sins: we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end…. Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the beginning of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, 171 ST I-II.84.1, ad 2. ST I-II.84.1, ad 3. 173 ST I-II.84.2, co. 174 Ibid. Later in the Summa Theologiae Thomas will define pride more precisely as the "inordinate desire of one's own excellence." ST II-II.162.2, co. 175 ST I-II.84.2, co. Thomas's authority in the sed contra is Sir. 10:13, which in the Vulgate (Eccl. 10:15) reads in part: "quoniam initium omnis peccati est superbia." 172 120 from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the root of all evils, as stated above.176 Pride is the beginning of all sin according to the order of intention, which intention is formed when an agent decides to purse his own excellence inordinately. 177 Because an agent has this desire and has formed this intention, he proceeds to act on this intention in view of the object which he desires inordinately, which, as we have seen, is most often nourished by riches. Pride and covetousness are therefore like two sides of the same coin. They are both vices that originate other vices in a special way, and whether one considers the order of intention or the order of execution, one will consider either pride, as the beginning of sin, or covetousness, as the root of sin, as the originative vice. An agent intends some illicit object, and he begins the pursuit of said object by desiring riches so as to obtain his goal. It should be clear that the labels "beginning" and "root" are not necessarily interchangeable between pride and covetousness. Specifically, the label "root", given its connotation of nourishment, growth, and association with the means to an end, is especially suitable to covetousness. However, some scholars have confused these labels, which, as far as I can tell, almost always consists in applying the label "root" to pride. For example, in her book on the capital vices, DeYoung provides a chart of the seven vices, at the top of which is found: "Pride = root",178 and she writes: "we can think of pride as the root and trunk of a tree, 176 ST I-II.84.2, co. The Latin word that is translated as "beginning" is initium, which means "a beginning, commencement", and has connotations of movement, that is, of something already begun or already commenced. Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v., "initium". Pride as the beginning of sin, therefore, is not a static beginning devoid of movement, but implies that one is already moving towards one's object. The English word "initiate" captures well this aspect of initium; pride would therefore be the initiator of all sin. 178 DeYoung, Glittering Vices, 25. 177 121 which extends upward into seven main branches, each of which represents one capital vice…. The capital vices name the set of vices that grow out of pride and tend to proliferate additional sin."179 Here, DeYoung is attempting to summarize the traditional medieval thought on pride and the capital vices, and so we cannot fault her as an exegetic of Thomas. However, it is clear that this analogy is not appropriate when applied to Thomas in particular. As pride is the beginning of sin when one considers the order of intention, pride is more akin to the final cause of the tree, the end of the growth of the tree, 180 the reason why the tree is growing in the first place – pride is like the adult tree into which the fledgling tree will eventually grow. It is covetousness that is like the roots of the tree and which nourish it. Even considered as an interpretation of Thomas, however, DeYoung and those who argue similarly cannot be entirely faulted. In the De Malo, Thomas uses the term "root", which in Latin is radix, for both pride and covetousness indiscriminately. 181 The De Malo probably predates the Summa Theologiae, however; Torrell has dated the relevant De Malo texts to around 1270 (publication date) and the Prima Secundae to around 1271 (composition date).182 We might say, then, that between the De Malo and the Summa Theologiae Thomas developed his thought on pride, covetousness, and radix.183 We may say something further about pride, beyond its unique status as the beginning of all sin, as this status does not explain its absence from the list of the seven capital vices 179 Ibid., 31. At ST I-II.84.4, ad 4, Thomas calls the order of intention "the order of the end". 181 See De Malo VIII.1, ad 1, 16, 17, 19, 23; De Malo VIII.2, co. and ad 14; and De Malo XIII.1, s.c. 3 and ad 5. See also In II Cor. XII.3, §472. 182 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. I, 333 and 336. 183 It must be pointed out that Thomas explicitly applies radix to pride twice in the Summa Theologiae, although these are far removed from the discussion of pride as the beginning of sin and are not particularly relevant to our discussion here. See ST II-II.53.3, ad 2; and ST II-II.148.3, co. 180 122 given above – after all, covetousness too enjoys a special status as the root of all sin, and yet it is enumerated among the capital vices. Thomas argues that pride is the beginning of all sin in the order of intention or end, which is the same aspect under which the capital vices are considered.184 That is, both the capital vices and pride are considered as principles and directors after the manner of final causes. The difference is that pride holds a preeminent place in this scheme, as it is the principle or director (or beginner / initiator) of all sins. For this reason, Thomas argues, "pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the [other capital vices], but is reckoned as the queen of them all".185 Thomas develops these issues when discussing vainglory: The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however, reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride… denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices.186 Thus, as all vices (including the capital vices) are directed towards the satisfying of one's inordinate desires for one's own excellence, pride enjoys as special status over and above the capital vices. For this reason, Thomas calls pride the "queen and mother" of the other vices, being their principle and director.187 Just as a queen directs her subjects to the ends of her kingdom, and a mother is an originative principle of her children, so does pride originate and direct the other vices. 184 ST I-II.84.4, ad 4. Ibid. The text in italics is Thomas's quotation of Gregory, Moralia XXXI.45, §87. 186 ST II-II.132.4, co. The reference to Gregory is from Moralia XXXI.45. 187 ST II-II.132.4, ad 1; and ST II-II.162.8, co. 185 123 Before we move on to examine the concept of "mother" further, as well as the feminine language behind these concepts (queen, mother), it is important to complete Thomas's picture of the order of the vices using another feminine label: the daughter vices. These are vices that may be considered to be the offspring of the capital vices, and which are directed to the ends of their respective mother vices: "the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters." 188 The concept of daughter vices is given a less technical expression using the example of vainglory in the De Malo: "since the special end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, those vices by which a man strives for the manifestation of his own excellence will be called daughters of vainglory."189 As such, Thomas identifies certain vices as daughters of vainglory, as these are concerned to "manifest" one's own excellence: boasting, obstinacy, and the like.190 Thomas lists daughters for each of the seven capital vices, which we will not examine here.191 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the daughter vices are those that the capital vices give rise to, and that these daughter vices do not have any necessary connection to their mothers besides the ends to which they are directed. In fact, the daughter vices are not even necessarily seated in the same power of the soul as their mother vices.192 Thomas makes this point explicit while discussing covetousness: "There is no need 188 ST II-II.132.5, co. This is not to say that the mother vices are necessarily more grave than their daughters. See ST II-II.132.4, ad 3. See also Bruce Williams, "The Capital Vices in Contemporary Discourse," Angelicum 84, no. 1 (2007): 42. 189 De Malo IX.3, co. 190 See ibid.; and ST II-II.132.5, co. 191 Vainglory: ST II-II.132.5, co.; and De Malo IX.3, co. Envy: ST II-II.36.4, ad 3; and De Malo X.3, co. Anger: ST II-II.158.7, co.; and De Malo XII.5, co. Acedia: ST II-II.35.4, ad 2; and De Malo XI.4, co. Covetousness: ST II-II.118.8, co.; and De Malo XIII.3, co. Gluttony: ST II-II.148.6, co.; and De Malo XIV.4, co. Lust: ST II-II.153.5, co.; and De Malo XV.4, co. 192 For example, lust is seated in the concupiscible appetite, while its daughter rashness is opposed to prudence, seated in the intellect. See ST II-II.135.5, obj. 1 and ad 1. 124 for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species."193 There is the additional matter of the final cause relationship between a mother vice and its daughters. Thomas writes that "the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause."194 The Latin for the word that is translated here as "especially" is praecipue, which indicates that some other possibility may exist. 195 That is, it may be possible that some capital vices give rise to their daughters (or others) by some other form of causation. In fact, while discussing the vice of gluttony, Thomas writes that "those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of [consequuntur] eating and drinking immoderately."196 Such daughters include, for example, uncleanness [immunditia] and scurrility (buffoonery) [scurrilitas], which are difficult to imagine as being directed towards the end of satisfying one's desire for taking inordinate pleasure in food and drink – they seem more likely to be the direct effects of gluttony. 197 Generally speaking, however, the capital vices enjoy a final causal relationship with their daughters, such that the daughter vices are directed towards the ends of their mother capital vices.198 This final causal relationship is one of tendency and not of a necessary production, a point that Bruce Williams 193 ST II-II.118.8, ad 1. ST I-II.84.4, co. Emphasis my own. 195 See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "praecipue" which directs one to s.v. "praecipuus", the adverb version of which is defined as "chiefly, principally, eminently, especially, particularly". 196 ST II-II.148.6, co. 197 See also Thomas's explanation for "dullness of sense" being placed among the daughters of gluttony, which has to do with the fumes of the food affecting the brain. Ibid. 198 DeYoung and McCluskey note this aspect of the capital vices as well. See Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Glory: Aquinas on the Forgotten Vice of Vainglory," in Aquinas's Disputed Questions on Evil: A Critical Guide, ed. M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 118-119; and McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 162. 194 125 makes: "Thomas is not positing a necessary causal relationship between [a capital vice] and its several offspring sins; what he asserts is a general tendency or aptitude for each of the vices to motivate people toward one or several of the respective offspring."199 The above quotation of Williams subtly highlights another issue in this area. Some scholars have noted, questioned, or objected to the feminine language in which Thomas clothes these vices.200 For example, McCluskey calls "daughter vices" a "gender-loaded term",201 while DeYoung speculates that "the designation 'daughter' may simply be because the names of the vices (as well as the virtues) are feminine nouns in the Latin." 202 What are we to make of this? Is there some advantage to using the term "daughter vices" – and "mother" and "queen" as well – that would justify our using them? Was Thomas simply deferring to tradition, or did he have more fundamental reasons for using the feminine nouns? In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas makes some remarks about the virtue of charity that echo what we have seen about pride. There, he explains why charity is called the mother of the virtues: "Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end." 203 Here we see that the 199 Williams, "The Capital Vices in Contemporary Discourse," 43. Not that Williams explicitly questions or objects to such usage. He simply acknowledges that the Latin filiae is normally translated as "daughters", before proceeding to use the term "offspring" exclusively. Ibid., 42. See also DeYoung, Glittering Vices, 148; and DeYoung, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Glory," 118, who similarly uses the term "offspring vices". 201 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 162, n. 30. 202 DeYoung, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Glory," 118, n. 47. 203 ST II-II.23.8, ad 3. In the De Malo, Thomas makes a similar point: "a mother is one who conceives within herself. Hence that vice is said to be the mother of others, which proceed from the conception of that vice's special end." De Malo IX.3, co. DeYoung points to this text as a possible explanation of Thomas's use of the term "daughter vices". DeYoung, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Glory," 118, n. 47. 200 126 order of intention is connected directly to a distinctively female function: conception. In some way, a mother vice is receptive in such a manner as to "conceive" the acts of vices which are its daughters,204 specifically for its own ends. Now, there are a number of ways to interpret the active principle of this conception, as well as the subsequent "birthing" of the acts themselves. However, the important point is that the mother vices receive something – a seed – that causes them to conceive the acts of the daughter vices. This active principle is, I think, most likely a perceived good that is in agreement with the end of the mother vice as a means thereto. According to this interpretation, the reason why the daughter vices are not called "offspring vices" is to allow for them to conceive further sinful acts in pursuit of their ends and the ends their mothers, as well as the fact that, for Thomas, it is the intellect and the will which are the active principles of the human act.205 Thus, the mother vices conceive the acts of the daughter vices, while the will consents to them and reason commands them. 206 Whatever one thinks about Thomas's explanation of the use of the term "mother", it is clear that he attaches significant conceptual content to this feminine term, and that, within Thomas's own philosophical body of work, it is suitable to the capital vices. Similar reasoning applies to the daughter vices and to pride as the queen of the vices. The connection of the vices, therefore, is primarily teleological. Unlike the virtues, they are not grouped according to the powers of the soul in which they are seated. Rather, they are arranged in a structure that sees certain vices originating and directing others. At the 204 See ST I.98.2, co.: "wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female". See also ST II-II.26.10, co. 205 ST I-II.10.4, co. See also SCG III.10: "the first active principle in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive power; the third is the will; and the fourth is the motive force, which carries out the command of reason." 206 See ST I-II.15.1; and ST I-II.17.1. 127 pinnacle of this structure sits pride, the queen and mother of all of the vices, which directs all of the vices to its own end. Directly below pride are the capital vices, which in turn originate and direct the lower daughter vices to their own ends. And so while the vices may not be connected in such an intimate way as the virtues, they are nevertheless connected in a teleological and ordered manner. For Thomas, then, sin inclines to sin, and vice inclines to vice. II.iv. The Generation and Corruption of Vice Thomas devotes three questions of the Summa Theologiae to the topics of the generation, strengthening, weakening, and corruption of habitus.207 These subjects are much richer than the secondary literature would incline us to believe. On the generation and strengthening of habitus there is relatively little discussion that goes significantly beyond Thomas's claim that like acts produce like habitus, and there is even less on the weakening and corruption of habitus.208 Here we will only concern ourselves with what pertains to aims of this dissertation: the relationship between vice and malice. Thomas is clear that habitus are generated by acts which proceed them and which are of the same kind as the habitus they generate.209 How exactly this happens is a complicated 207 ST I-II.51-53. A parallel text is De Virt. I.9, where Thomas addresses the generation of virtue. In all of these cases Miner is a significant exception. Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 75-80. For examples of scholars devoting relatively little attention to the generation and corruption of habitus, see Kent, "Habits and Virtues," 116-130; and Porter, "Virtues and Vices," 265-275. 209 See ST I-II.56.5, co.; and ST I-II.51.2, s.c.: "[habitus] of virtue and vice are caused by acts." For the notion that the habitus are of the same kind as the acts which generate them, see ST I-II.75.4, co.: "acts cause dispositions and [habitus] inclining to like acts." Thomas applies the first line of thought to vice specifically at ST I-II.63.2, s.c. See also De Virt. I.9. 208 128 matter that involves the various powers of the soul, active and passive principles, and the Thomistic principle that every agent produces its like:210 In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent a [habitus] cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed…. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object…. Wherefore by such acts [habitus] can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a [habitus]: just as the [habitus] of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason….211 Human beings have active and passive principles of their moral acts, which is what accounts for the generation of habitus. The active principle – the principle that does something – is the apprehensive power presenting an object to the appetitive powers. We apprehend a particular perceived good as something desirable and to be pursued. The apprehended object is presented by the reason to the relevant appetitive power as an object of appetite, and here we have our passive principle – the principle that undergoes something – which is the relevant appetitive power insofar as it is moved by the reason. Both of these principles are necessary for the formation of habitus, as the appetitive powers are not determined to any one single act, while the act of the apprehensive power presenting the object to the relevant appetitive power is necessary for habituating the appetitive powers to one object or type of objects in particular. The apprehensive power (the active principle) disposes the relevant appetitive power (the 210 See ST I.19.4, co. Thomas makes heavy use of this principle in the Book II of the Summa Contra Gentiles. See SCG II.20-24, 41, 43, 76, and 98. 211 ST I-II.51.2, co. 129 passive principle), which disposition just is an inclination to the good in question. The reason that this disposition takes the form of an inclination is because the appetitive powers are inclining powers. The result of all of this is that in choosing to act in one way or another – towards this or that object, in this or that way, or, most importantly, according or contrary to right reason – the moral agent is inclining his appetitive powers to further like acts, resulting in the generation of habitus: the appetitive powers are disposed by the apprehensive power. When it comes to the generation of vice in particular, reason presents an object to the relevant appetitive power that is contrary to right reason and to human nature. Thus, an agent might consider and judge the pleasure that accompanies a particular gluttonous act as a good in itself and as worthy to be pursued, and thus his concupiscible appetite, having been presented with a particular good (the pleasure that accompanies this potential act of gluttony) by his reason, moves the agent to desire said particular good. His concupiscible appetite is now inclined (or, at least, more inclined than it previously was 212) towards goods of a similar sort, where these goods include all of the relevant features that rendered that particular act of gluttony as contrary to right reason (for that particular agent, if for no one else, owing to various circumstances) in the first place. 213 The resulting habitus, it should be recalled, 214 is not something added to the power of the soul wherein it is seated, but rather just is the very ordering of that power itself. For example, the vice of gluttony, seated as it is in the 212 Thomas argues that a habitus cannot be caused by a single act, but only by many. ST I-II.51.3. The exception to this rule are certain intellectual habitus, which will not be discussed here. Another possible exception are the infused virtues – those virtues that are directly infused into their subjects by God. However, these are not caused by any act of man. See ST I-II.51.4, especially ad 3. 213 The acts of the virtue of prudence (which is a virtue that is seated in the intellect) have different active and passive principles. See ST I-II.51.2, co., where Thomas uses the example of science: "the [habitus] of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions." 214 See pages 96-97 above. 130 concupiscible appetite, consists in the ordering of one's concupiscible appetite towards inordinate pleasure in food and drink. Given Thomas's explanation for the generation of habitus, it should come as no surprise that he argues that habitus can increase in intensity.215 Thomas's reasoning for this claim recalls Aristotle's definition of "disposition" given above: since we speak of [habitus] and dispositions in respect of a relation to something… in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in [habitus] and dispositions. First, in respect of the [habitus] itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Second, in respect of participation by the subject: insofar as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom.216 Thus, an agent may be more or less inclined to gluttonous acts, owing to the number of objects to which his gluttonous vice extends, or to his own participation in the vice itself. In the first case, the difference in intensity is like that between, for example, a gluttonous man who desires immoderate pleasure in chocolate and wine, and another gluttonous man who desires immoderate pleasure in chocolate only. In the second case, the difference in intensity is like that between two or more gluttonous men who desire more or less immoderate pleasure in food and drink relative to each other.217 Naturally, these two intensities are not mutually exclusive, and any account of a particular agent's specific habitus will have to 215 ST I-II.52.1. Here Thomas considers an interesting objection to the effect that habitus cannot increase, since increase implies alteration, and alteration can only be in the third species of quality. Thomas responds: "Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science and virtue". ST I-II.52.1, obj. 3 and ad 3. 216 ST I-II.52.1, co. For our discussion of Aristotle's definition of "disposition", see pages 28-51 above. 217 Miner is not very clear on this point. See Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 78. 131 include both of them. In either sense, the intensity of a vice is increased by the same sort of actions which generated it. However, this is not to say that every vicious act increases the intensity of one's vicious habitus. The reason for this has to do with the will, by which one may choose to either use or not to use one's habitus when acting: since the use of [habitus] depends on the will… just as one who has a [habitus] may fail to use it or may act contrary to it, so may he happen to use the [habitus] by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the [habitus]. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the [habitus], or even surpass it, every such act either increases the [habitus] or disposes to an increase thereof…. If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the [habitus], such an act does not dispose to an increase of that [habitus], but rather to a lessening thereof.218 As Miner points out, Thomas is arguing here that some vicious acts actually weaken their respective habitus.219 This idea hinges upon the notion of an agent acting more or less in proportion to the intensity of the habitus. According to Miner, "This does not happen generally. It occurs in the special case in which a rational agent has genuinely established a habitus, but comes to perform its acts feebly or apathetically". 220 Note that this is not like the case of an agent who has a habitus and yet who fails to use it. Rather, the agent has the habitus in question and uses it, albeit not according to its intensity. If the case of an agent using and thereby weakening his habitus is an exceptional one, how are habitus normally weakened and eventually corrupted? One way that this can happen is through judgments that are contrary to the habitus in question: "the [habitus] of the 218 ST I-II.52.3, co. Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 79. 220 Ibid. By way of explanation, Miner points to Torrell's example of a craftsman who falls into repetitive routine. See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume II, 354. 219 132 appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason. Therefore a [habitus] either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice."221 Such contrary judgments, it would seem to follow, are especially powerful in weakening and corrupting habitus when the will consents to them and reason in turn commands an action contrary to the relevant habitus. Thus, a glutton who judges moderation in food and drink to be a good thing and who acts on this judgment has worked towards weakening and ultimately corrupting his habitus. Another way that a habitus may be weakened and corrupted is by disuse. Disuse diminishes a habitus because of the nature of the powers in which they adhere: these powers are able to be directed to many and various things, and so require habitus to focus them upon one particular object or type of object in particular. When one neglects to exercise one's habitus, one begins to perform acts that are contrary to the habitus in question: all [habitus] that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those [habitus], are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a [habitus] of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous [habitus] in order to moderate his own passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act.222 Thomas calls the corruption of habitus from cessation of act an indirect cause of this corruption: "the destruction or diminution of a [habitus] [that] results through cessation from 221 222 ST I-II.53.1, co. ST I-II.53.3, co. 133 act [is indirect], in so far, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that [habitus]. For it has been stated that [habitus] are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency." 223 Habitus are directly weakened and corrupted, then, insofar as one judges and acts contrary to said habitus, and habitus are indirectly weakened and corrupted insofar as the disuse of those habitus results in the aforementioned contrary judgments and acts.224 A vicious habitus, then, is weakened and corrupted by judging and acting, not necessarily in accord with right reason, but by judging and acting contrary to said vice. This may take the form of judgment and action in accordance with the virtue that opposes one's vice, or in accordance with the other vice that opposes that virtue – for example, if a gluttonous man were to shun all pleasure associated with food and drink. Additionally, one's vice may be diminished even while using it, as when this use is not in proportion to the intensity of the vice. Hence, the intimate relationship between vice, as a habitus, and act is further evident, as it is by acts that vices are generated, strengthened, weakened, and corrupted. And what makes any particular act vicious in each of these cases is its relation to the measure of reason, which measure is derived from human nature itself. Thus far, in our project of analyzing the relationship between vice and malice, we have endeavoured to understand the first part of that relationship: vice. We did this by proceeding from the categories, to quality, to habitus, and to unsuitable habitus: vice itself, including its relationship to virtue and to the mean, the connection of the vices, and the 223 Ibid. For these reasons, we cannot accept Miner's suggestion that disuse "is not just one mode of corruption, but more nearly the way in which habits are lost". Miner, "Aquinas on Habitus," 79. Emphasis in the original. See also page 56, note 176 above. 224 134 generation and corruption of vice. Now, we must shift our focus to that to which vice is directed, the vicious and sinful act, which, the reader will recall, is the means by which the vicious habitus is known and defined.225 Examining the sinful act will ultimately guide us to malice – playing as it does an important role in any analysis of the sinful act. Our task now, then, is to turn our attention to sin. 225 See pages 55-56 above. 135 PART TWO III SIN This chapter represents a shift in the scope of our project. Whereas in the first two chapters we were concerned with the accident of unsuitable habitus, here we are narrowing our focus to those things to which the aforementioned habitus are directed: particular, concrete, sinful human acts, as well as malice, which is an interior principle and cause of said acts. 1 The discussion of sin in this chapter will act as the hinge which allows us to transition from the analysis of vice to that of malice, as sinful acts are those by which vices are expressed and known, and malice itself is a cause of sin in a special way – especially when one considers those sins which are caused by vicious habitus. We will proceed as follows. Beginning with sin, we will examine Thomas's understanding of sin as a philosophical concept, before moving on to an analysis of sin as a human act. The latter discussion will include a brief explanation of the structure of the human act, as well as an application of this structure to specifically sinful acts. Following this, we will turn our attention to malice, which will be situated within its proper context among the interior and exterior principles of moral acts – here it will be necessary to say something about ignorance and passion as causes of acts. Next, we will examine malice itself, which 1 See ST I-II.76, Prologue. 137 examination will include the two issues of defining and translating malitia, the Latin word which has been and which will continue to be translated throughout this dissertation in the form of the English word "malice". Approaching malice from the side of the sinful act will allow us to explain the relationship between vice and malice more accurately in the final chapter of this dissertation, as malice is only fully intelligible in relation to the moral actions of which it is a principle and which it causes. Prior to analyzing sin as a human act, it will be necessary to establish the possibility of examining the concept of sin in a philosophical dissertation. Did Thomas have a philosophical understanding of sin? If so, what was it? Is there any benefit to retaining the term "sin" itself, or ought we to jettison it – at least in philosophy – in favour of a religiously neutral term such as "immoral act"? Only after we have answered these questions will we move on to examining the structure of the sinful human act. III.i. Sin as a Philosophical Concept "Sin" refers to sinful actions, actions which are unsuitable to the acting agent – much in the same way that vicious habitus are unsuitable to the habituated subject.2 The term itself is notoriously loaded with theological and religious baggage. For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church states: To try to understand what sin is, one must first recognize the profound relation of man to God, for only in this relationship is the evil of sin unmasked in its true identity as humanity's rejection of God and opposition to him…. Only the light of divine 2 Following Thomas's reasoning in saying that habitus are good or bad in relation to their proper acts (see pages 80-82 above), we must say that vicious habitus derive their unsuitability from the unsuitability of the sinful acts to which they are directed. 138 Revelation clarifies the reality of sin and particularly of the sin committed at mankind's origins. Without the knowledge Revelation gives of God we cannot recognize sin clearly and are tempted to explain it as merely a developmental flaw, a psychological weakness, a mistake, or the necessary consequence of an inadequate social structure, etc.3 This quotation highlights well two aspects of the theological account of sin that tend to overshadow any potential philosophical account of sin. First, the term "sin" tends to be analyzed in light of the religious doctrine of original sin. 4 Second, sin is usually understood to have a primarily theological meaning, such that non-theological accounts of sin (that is, theologically neutral accounts) tend to be viewed as insufficient precisely because they are non-theological.5 Divorcing the concept of sin from its connection to original sin and treating it in a conceptually insufficient manner are, on the face of it, unacceptable consequences of any attempt to treat sin philosophically.6 In order to understand Thomas's take on these issues, it is important to follow him according to his own understanding of sin. Sin [peccatum], for Thomas, "properly speaking… 3 Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§386-387. Emphasis in the original. The Catechism goes on to do just this. See ibid., §§388-421. Moreover, Thomas, as a theologian, is not one to shy away from such an analysis. See, for instance, In Sent. II.30-33; SCG IV.50-52; De Malo IV-V; and ST I-II.81-83. 5 The Catechism indirectly mentions philosophical / physiological accounts ("developmental flaw"), psychological accounts ("psychological weakness, a mistake"), and sociological accounts ("inadequate social structure") of sin as being insufficient. Catechism of the Catholic Church, §387. 6 Thus, some philosophical scholars, consciously or unconsciously, avoid the term "sin". See, for example, Colleen McCluskey, "Willful Wrongdoing: Thomas Aquinas on certa malitia," Studies in the History of Ethics 6 (2005): 1-54, who uses the term "transgressions" (pages 7 and 15), although she does use the term "sin" as well (pages 8, 20, 28, 43 n. 7, 45 n. 15, and 47 n. 26). See also Collen McCluskey, "Thomas Aquinas and the Epistemology of Moral Wrongdoing," in Handlung und Wissenschaft: die Epistemologie der praktischen Wissenschaft im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert – Action and Science: The Epistemology of the Practical Sciences in the 13th and 14th Centuries, ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Alexander Fidora (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008), where, as the title suggests, McCluskey uses the term "wrongdoing" (pages 107 ff.), and she uses the term "improper action" as well (page 110). 4 139 denotes an inordinate act".7 Specifically, Thomas adopts Augustine's definition of sin as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." 8 When considering this definition, in response to an objection which would replace "contrary to the eternal law" with "contrary to reason", Thomas writes the following: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being contrary to the eternal law, more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g., in matters of faith.9 Here, Thomas allows for sin to be considered both theologically and philosophically, albeit under different aspects, while maintaining that the theological concept of sin extends to more objects. Leaving the matters of faith aside, the two aspects of sin are two sides of the same coin: "it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law." 10 This is because when an agent acts against one, that agent is also acting against the other – the precise reasoning for this gets to the distinction between the eternal law and the natural law, the latter of which just is, primarily, man's participation in the former.11 The result is that sinful actions may be considered in two ways. 7 ST I-II.71.1, co. See also ST I-II.74.1, co. Wuellner gives a definition of "sin" which is undoubtedly influenced by this quotation: "an evil human act… an inordinate human act." Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "sin, n.". Wuellner goes on to distinguish between "philosophical sin", which is against reason, and "theological sin", which is against God. Henri Grenier writes that "sin, under the aspect of fault, may be defined: an evil human act." Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy Volume IV: Moral Philosophy, trans. J. P. E. O'Hanley (Charlottetown: St. Dunstan's University Press, 1950), §882. 8 ST I-II.71.6, obj. 1. See Augustine, Contra Faustum XXII, §27. 9 ST I-II.71.6, ad 5. 10 ST I-II.71.2, ad 4. See also ST II-II.154.12, ad 1, where Thomas writes: "Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature." See also Sweeney, "Vice and Sin," 152: "to be against human nature, i.e., reason, is to be against the law of God". 11 ST I-II.91.2 co.; and ST I-II.71.6, ad 4. The natural law has to do with man's nature as a rational creature. See ST I-II.94.4, co. 140 Either they may be considered as against the order of reason, in which case they fall under the purview of the philosopher and are also against the eternal law, or they may be considered as "an offense against God", in which case they fall under the purview of the theologian and are also against the natural law.12 In either case, both the theologian and the philosopher may consider sinful acts precisely as sinful, although in each case the sinful act will be considered under different aspects. Moreover, the Latin peccatum, which is usually translated as "sin", is not a specifically religious term. Deferrari defines peccatum as having the primary meaning: "fault, error, mistake, in the general sense of the word", and the secondary meaning: "fault, in the moral sense, transgression, sin."13 On this point, Ashley Dressel argues the following: Generally speaking, peccatum is a term used by both medieval Christian thinkers and by pre-Christian Roman ones like Cicero to denote any imperfect action. Incorrectly solving a math problem and even limping are sins in this sense because each is an imperfect action; perfect walking, after all, would not involve limping. Morally bad actions are sins because Aquinas considers them imperfect actions.14 The Latin peccatum is a term that is well suited to the discipline of philosophy. In particular, it fits nicely into the privation account of evil that Thomas endorses.15 Peccatum conforms perfectly to Thomas's eudiamonistic moral philosophy, which perhaps is why the term occurs more than eighty times throughout Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 12 I have only skimmed the surface of the eternal and natural laws. It is beyond the scope of my project to give these topics any more attention here. See ST I-II.91, 93-94. 13 Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "peccātum". Likewise, see the Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. "peccātum", which gives as a primary definition: "An error, mistake", and as a secondary definition: "A moral offense, misdemeanor, lapse." Thomas sometimes uses peccatum in contexts where he has non-moral fault in mind. See, for example, ST I-II.57.4, co. 14 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 10. See also De Malo II.2, co. 15 See De Malo I.1-3; and ST I.48.1-4. 141 The English word "sin" is less obviously appropriate for use in philosophy, although here too a strong case can be made for its use, at least when it comes to Thomistic scholarship. The theological and philosophical sides of peccatum are usually retained in English dictionary definitions of "sin". For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "sin" as "An act which is regarded as a transgression of the divine law and an offense against God; a violation… of some religious or moral principle", 16 while the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as "an offense against religious or moral law."17 Likewise, the Cambridge English Dictionary defines "sin" as "the offense of breaking, or the breaking of, a religious or moral law",18 while the Collins Dictionary defines the "variable noun" of sin as "an action or type of behaviour which is believed to break the laws of God", and the "countable noun" as "any action or behaviour that people disapprove of or consider morally wrong."19 In light of these considerations, it is difficult to imagine a more appropriate English translation of peccatum than "sin", as it adequately captures the theological and philosophical sides of peccatum in a way that is unique to the English language. 20 That "sin" is appropriate for use in philosophy is apparent, both from philosophical side of peccatum, as well as from 16 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "sin, n.". Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. "sin". 18 Cambridge English Dictionary, s.v. "sin". 19 Collins Dictionary, s.v. "sin". I am not here concerned with the accuracy of such definitions. 20 Here one might object that the term "immoral act" might be a prospective translation of peccatum. Against this it should be said that "sin" captures the "immoral" aspect of peccatum while still retaining the theological side of peccatum, something that Thomas wishes to maintain. On the other hand, "immoral act", at least in modern philosophy, does not lend itself well to that theological aspect. Notably, the Shapcote translation of the Summa Theologiae uses the English word "immoral" only three times, all of them occurring in the Supplementum. Of these, it is arguable that none are proper translations. See ST Supp.47.5, co.; Supp.48, Prologue; and Supp.48.2, obj. 2; where the words translated as "immoral" are inhonesta, inhonestam, and turpes respectively. 17 142 the perspective of the four English dictionaries cited above. 21 In philosophy, the term "sin" denotes a moral failing, an act that is unsuitable to the nature of the agent, an act that is contrary to right reason. The theological side of sin may extend to objects that are beyond man's reason, that is, to matters of faith, but this is neither here nor there for the discipline of philosophy, which is exclusively concerned with those matters which unaided human reason can touch upon – in these matters, as Thomas writes, "it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law."22 The traditional Christian distinction between mortal and venial sin, which Thomas adopts, is likewise compatible with philosophical discourse. In ST I-II.88.1, co., Thomas relies upon metaphor in order to illustrate the opposition of mortal to venial sin: Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus to smile is not opposed to being dry; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.23 Thomas's explanation of the metaphorical sense of "mortal", which implies the opposition of mortal to venial sin, refers to disease, and not to bodily death: "For sin, being a weakness [infirmitas] of the soul... is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing [inducet] an irreparable defect consisting in the failure 21 More can be produced. See the definitions of "sin" in Dictionary.com; The Free Dictionary; and Wiktionary. Full bibliographic information for these sources can be found in the bibliography below on page 302. 22 ST I-II.71.2, ad 4. Thus, Thomas is able to write both that "In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason" (ST II-II.54.1, ad 2), and that "the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness" (ST I.19.10, ad 2). 23 ST I-II.88.1, co. 143 [destitutionem] of a principle".24 Just as a disease is said to be mortal through causing an irreparable failure of some vital function of the sick individual (he will die), 25 so is a sin said to be mortal through causing an irreparable failure (or forsaking [destitutio]) of a certain principle; Thomas goes on to explain what this principle is, and why the forsaking of it implies an irreparable defect: Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end... and if this order be forsaken [destitutus], it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone... because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable.26 The issue at the core of mortal sins is their irreparability with respect to the intrinsic power of the sinning agent: he has forsaken his order to the last end, and he is unable to repair this order by his own power. Elsewhere in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas further explains this concept: the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation…. Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz., God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin…. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the removal [remotionem] of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature… so it is in matters concerning the soul. 24 Ibid. I have altered the translation to better reflect infirmitas, which Shapcote translates as "sickness". See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "infirmitas": "want of strength, weakness, feebleness, synonym of debilitas". Induco, meanwhile, can mean cause, but it also has strong connotations of leading to. Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "indūco". Finally, Shapcote translates destitutionem as "corruption", which is not correct. Destitutio means "destitution, a forsaking, a failure." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "dēstitūtio". In committing mortal sins, one's order to the ultimate end is not corrupted [corruptio], but forsaken. I have similarly altered the translations of the remainder of the ST I-II.88.1, co. text presented in the following pages. 25 See ST I-II.74.9, ad 2. 26 ST I-II.88.1, co. 144 Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles…. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally….27 An agent who is confused about the nature of geometrical shapes, for example, cannot be expected to do geometry in any meaningful fashion. Likewise, an agent who has forsaken the last end is no longer able to direct himself to that end. In the latter case, said agent requires the power of God in order to repair that agent's order to the last end. 28 Much like the agent who cannot do geometry with a faulty understanding of geometrical shapes, an agent who has forsaken his order to the last end cannot, by his own power, repair this order, as there is no higher order to appeal to by which he might repair it. Returning to the text of ST I-II.88.1, co., Thomas characterizes venial sin as being reparable by the power of the sinning agent: "On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial".29 The agent who sins, but without forsaking his order to the end, may, even by his own power, repair his order to that end. Such are venial sins, and the disorders 27 ST I-II.72.5, co. Shapcote translates remotionem as "destruction", but I have used "removal" instead. See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "remōtio": "a putting back, withdrawing, removal, in the ontological sense of the word". 28 See ST I-II.87.3, co.: "Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys [subtrahitur] the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art." 29 ST I-II.88.1, co. Elsewhere, Thomas writes that venial sin occurs when the soul "is disordered without turning away from God", and that (using the metaphor of sickness) "the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved". ST I-II.72.5, co. In the same place, Thomas likens the venial sinner to the agent who is in error with respect to speculative matters: "one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles." Using our example of the geometrician, this occurs when an agent is correct about the nature of geometrical objects, and yet has drawn some erroneous conclusions about them. By means of the principles (the geometrical shapes), he may be brought to correct his errors (even by his own power). See also ST I-II.87.3, co., quoted immediately above in note 28. 145 they imply consist not in the last end, but in the means – the things that are referred to the end. Thomas concludes: "Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin."30 The disease metaphor which allows for the distinction between mortal and venial sin does not transfer to mortal and venial sin when "mortal" is taken literally; when so taken, mortal sin is likened by Thomas to bodily death, and venial sin to sickness and disease. As Thomas writes, in this manner mortal and venial sin are not opposed to each other, nor are they even in the same genus. 31 In response to an objection, Thomas further clarifies the difference between mortal and venial sin as follows: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin... applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not against the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts beside the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends.32 30 ST I-II.88.1, co. See the first paragraph of ST I-II.88.1, co., quoted above on page 143. 32 ST I-II.88.1, ad 1. Emphases in the original. 31 146 Mortal sins, then, are sins proper; venial sins have the character of sin in a secondary or derivative sense. They differ as being irreparable and reparable – in the agent forsaking his order to the last end, or not.33 Far from being an exclusively theological concept, then, sin has a place in philosophical discourse. While it is true that there is a theological side to sin, there is equally so a philosophical side to sin, one which is at the same time unique from and consistent with the theological side. We are thus justified in speaking of sin philosophically. It remains to say something about sin as an act, which requires an examination of the human act. III.ii. Sin as an Act Sinful acts are a subset of human acts, 34 and human acts are distinguished, by Thomas, from acts of a human.35 Although these two labels – human acts, on the one hand, and acts of a human, on the other – may on the face of it appear to constitute a distinction without a difference, there are in fact significant differences between them. Writes Thomas: Of actions done by man those alone are properly called human, which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions 33 As a result, they differ in their punishments as well. See ST I-II.87. For an overview of Thomas's thought on punishment, see Peter Karl Koritansky, Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012). 34 I am not here addressing the possibility of the existence of immaterial creatures or their ability to commit sinful acts. See ST I.50.1; ST I.63.1; SCG II.91; and SCG II.48. Also interesting in the latter respect is De Malo XVI.2-6. 35 ST I-II.1.1, co. This distinction is presented by Thomas in the course of his establishing that human beings act for an end. 147 are found in man, they can be called actions of a man, but not properly human actions, since they are not proper to man as man.36 Human acts, then, are those actions which proceed from deliberate reason and will and which are proper to man as man, while acts of a human are the actions that a human agent might perform which do not so proceed. As an example of the former type of action, consider an agent who is attempting to write a powerful speech; such an action requires careful deliberation and express willing. This is a human act because it requires deliberate reason and will: the agent must deliberate as to the act of writing as well as to the contents of his speech, and likewise he wills both the deliberation and the act of writing. As an example of the latter type of action, consider the various digestive processes that occur after an agent has taken in food, and which occur without (and perhaps even in spite of) any volition on the part of the agent. These latter sorts of acts are not proper to man as a rational animal; when a human performs them, they are acts of a human, and not human acts per se. 37 What makes a particular action distinctively human is its proceeding from the principles that are proper to man: reason and will. Thus, human acts are those that proceed from man's nature as such. Closely related to the distinction of human acts and acts of a human is the distinction between voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions. The degree of voluntariness of an act will have important ramifications for said act with respect to its being classified as a moral 36 Ibid. Emphases in the original. Davies comments on the above quotation of Thomas: "Do we act with a view to ends? Aquinas suggests… that we sometimes do not, since we often act unthinkingly – as, for example, when we stroke our chins when talking to someone while focused on what we are saying and not at all on our chins…. One might, of course, deliberately stroke one's chin to relieve an itch, but we often pass our hands over ourselves and go through other bits of bodily behavior without deliberation. Aquinas therefore holds that we should distinguish between 'acts of a human being' (actiones hominis) and 'human acts' (actiones humanae). He thinks that we certainly go through various quasi-automatic movements…. He also maintains that we sometimes deliberately act with a view to particular and precise goals…." Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 155. 37 148 act or not – and so as a human act or as an act of a human. 38 Let us begin with the voluntary act. In the Summa Theologiae, while attempting to establish that the human act is voluntary, Thomas appeals to the principles of human acts: "we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone."39 A stone, owing to what it is, will naturally tend to fall towards the ground when in proximity to the earth. In contrast, that a stone is thrust upwards – away from the earth (again, when in proximity to it) – is not owing to the type of thing that a stone is, but rather to something extrinsic to it from which it receives this upward movement. Thomas continues: Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end... those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end.40 Here Thomas brings in another concept: that of a thing moving itself. In order to move oneself, according to Thomas, one must have within oneself the principle of one's motion, 38 See Jensen, Living the Good Life, 128: "It is unfair… to say that the action 'sleeping with another woman' [that is, sleeping with a woman who is not one's wife] is sometimes evil, when the man is aware of it, and sometime [sic] good, when he is unaware, thereby concluding that the morality of an action depends upon someone's intention. For 'sleeping with another woman' can mean two different things. When done with knowledge, it is a human action; when done in ignorance, it is an act of a human being." 39 ST I-II.6.1, co. 40 Ibid. 149 and have knowledge of the end of one's motion. These themes are immediately given greater treatment by Thomas: On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end.41 Recall the example of the stone. It may seem strange to claim that the stone does not move itself when it falls to the ground, especially since it has an intrinsic principle of its motion (its nature as a stone). However, it is important to remember the context of Thomas's discussion: the voluntary act. The point that Thomas is making is that the stone is not moved voluntarily, as man is in his voluntary actions, as it does not have knowledge of its end; the stone's movement to its end (to rest upon the ground) is directed by something that does have knowledge of its end.42 As Davies writes: "Aquinas notes that some non-rational things can be thought of as aiming at ends. But, he observes, they do not intentionally set themselves to the ends they pursue and therefore do not act voluntarily". 43 The two aspects of "moving oneself" are further explained by Thomas: And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word voluntary implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that... the voluntary is defined not only as having a principle within the 41 Ibid. A further explanation or defense of this aspect of Thomas's thought is beyond the scope of this dissertation. These themes play a central role in the Fifth Way, and as such are examined, defended, or otherwise attacked by scholars usually in the context of that argument. By way of an example, see Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 89-90. I examined these themes in Fehr, "Thomas Aquinas and the Teleological Argument," 69-77. 43 Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 158. 42 150 agent, but also as implying knowledge. Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.44 The two aspects of the voluntary action – (1) the principle of the action is intrinsic to the agent, and (2) the agent has knowledge of the end – allow for four combinations. Examples are given immediately below: (i) The principle of the action is extrinsic to the agent and it does not know the end – a stone is thrown upwards. (ii) The principle of action is extrinsic to the agent and it knows the end – a man is unwittingly launched over a wall, fully aware of his trajectory or the purpose of his being launched. (iii) The principle of action is intrinsic to the agent and it does not know the end – a stone falls down. (iv) The principle of action is intrinsic to the agent and it knows the end – a man deliberately walks across the room. Of these, only (iv) satisfies aspects (1) and (2) of the voluntary action. 45 The man therefore walks across the room voluntarily: he is not pushed or otherwise violently moved, and he knows the end for which he acts and the means he takes to achieve this end.46 44 ST I-II.6.1, co. Emphases in the original. The knowledge that is required for voluntary movement may be perfect or imperfect. It is perfect when the end is apprehended under the aspect of an end. Thus, nonhuman animals are said to act voluntarily in an imperfect sense of the word, as they have imperfect knowledge of the ends for which they act. See ST I-II.6.2, co. 45 Thus, those actions that proceed from habitus are called necessary in a non-strict sense, and yet are still voluntary, as they fulfill these two aspects. See pages 68-71 above. 46 Additionally, Thomas argues that there may be voluntariness without an act: "Since... the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and notacting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act." ST I-II.6.3, co. In this same place, 151 Involuntary actions are another matter. When commenting on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas writes the following: He says first that some involuntary actions seem to be of two kinds: those arising from violence and those arising from ignorance. This division is made in order to indicate that the involuntary is a privation of the voluntary. But the voluntary implies a movement of the appetitive power presupposing a knowledge via sense or reason, because a good perceived moves the appetitive power. A thing is involuntary on two accounts: first, because the movement of the appetitive power is excluded, and this is the involuntary resulting from violence; second, because a mental awareness is excluded, and this is the involuntary resulting from ignorance.47 Violence,48 then, deprives the agent of aspect (1) of the voluntary action, namely, that the principle of action be interior to the agent, while ignorance deprives it of aspect (2), namely, that the agent know the end.49 In effect, in a rational agent, violence helps to produce actions of types (i) or (ii),50 while ignorance – at least of the end – helps to produce actions of type (iii). Some further remarks on ignorance are required, as ignorance plays a crucial role in determining the voluntariness of an act, and as it will be a recurring theme throughout the Thomas uses the example of a helmsman or pilot of a ship who causes a shipwreck by neglecting to steer the ship. This analogy is discussed below at page 185, note 34. For more on the voluntary action, see In Ethic. III.4, §§425-431. 47 In Ethic. III.1, §386. The text that Thomas is commenting on is Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.1, 1109b30-1110a19. 48 The Latin word translated as "violence" is violentia, which means "power, force in the wider sense of this word… the opposite of natura naturale, and voluntarium". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "violentia". 49 This is not to say that all ignorance diminishes the voluntariness of an action. See ST I-II.6.8. We will return to ignorance and voluntariness presently. For more on violence and ignorance as they pertain to the voluntary act, see In Ethic. III.1-2, §§387-405 (violence); and In Ethic. III.3, §§406-424 (ignorance). As to involuntary actions due to violence, see Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 65: "It is force or coercion that renders [the involuntary act] involuntary and then they escape the moral order: we cannot be asked to give an account of why we perform them because it is not we who explain their occurrence." Emphasis in the original. 50 Whether the agent knows the end or not is accidental from the point of view of the exterior principle of action viz. the voluntariness of the action. 152 remainder of this dissertation. Thomas writes that "it is not every ignorance that deprives one of [the knowledge that is required for voluntariness]. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, concomitantly; in another way, consequently; in a third way, antecedently."51 The first of these, concomitant (together with) ignorance, occurs when one is ignorant of what one has done, but when one would have done that action in any event had one known. The example that Thomas gives is of a man who wants to kill his enemy, and who does indeed kill him, albeit accidentally, thinking that he was killing a deer. 52 Thomas follows Aristotle in denying that concomitant ignorance causes involuntariness, as the action performed (the killing of the enemy) is not repugnant to the will of the agent; instead they argue that this sort of ignorance causes non-voluntariness, as the action is still, strictly speaking, not voluntary.53 Non-voluntary actions, therefore, appear to constitute a mean between voluntary and involuntary actions.54 51 ST I-II.6.8, co. Emphases in the original. Ibid. See also In Ethic. III.3, §406. 53 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.1, 1110b18-1111a21. See also ST I-II.6.8, co.: "And ignorance of this kind... does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes non-voluntariness, since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed." Emphasis in the original. When speaking to the difference between involuntary and non-voluntary actions, McInerny writes: "The signal difference is that, in the one case, what I have really done is something I would have done willingly had I known. This is an example of… non-voluntary action. When what I really do is something I would not have done if I had known, the action is involuntary." McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 67-68. McInerny goes on immediately to liken non-voluntary actions to good luck and involuntary actions to bad luck. Thomas makes a similar point, although about sorrow, in De Malo III.8, co. In the same place, Thomas writes that "nonvoluntary" signifies the privation of the act of the will, while "involuntary" signifies that the will is opposed to what is done. For more on the non-voluntary act in the thought of Thomas, see Jeffrey Hause, "Aquinas on Nonvoluntary Acts," International Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 4 (2006): 459-475. 54 This is reflected in the types of ignorance which correspond to non-voluntary, voluntary, and involuntary action: concomitant ignorance corresponds to non-voluntary action, consequent ignorance corresponds to voluntary action, and antecedent ignorance corresponds to involuntary action. See ST I-II.76.3-4. These correspond according to whether the ignorance is not a cause of the sin, is willed, or is repugnant to the will, respectively. See the discussion of these types of ignorance immediately below. 52 153 Consequent (following upon) ignorance, on the other hand, occurs when the ignorance involved is voluntary. This, Thomas thinks, can happen in two ways. First, "because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin", 55 and then the ignorance is called affected ignorance, and corresponds to directly willed ignorance.56 Second, "ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it regards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense not to act and not to will are said to be voluntary",57 which corresponds to indirectly willed ignorance.58 This latter kind of ignorance is divided by Thomas into two kinds. The first is called ignorance of evil choice, and occurs "when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider".59 The second is not named by Thomas, and occurs when "one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have". 60 The difference between ignorance of evil choice and this latter unnamed kind of ignorance is the difference 55 ST I-II.6.8, co. See ibid.; and ST I-II.6.3, co. See also ST I-II.76.3, co., where Thomas writes that ignorance is directly willed "as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely". The Latin word translated as "affected" is affectata, which means "desired" or "coveted". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "affectātus", under "affecto". What makes the ignorance affected in particular is its being willed in view of obtaining an object of desire. 57 ST I-II.6.8, co. Emphases in the original. See ST I-II.6.3, where Thomas argues that there can be voluntariness without any act. 58 See ST I-II.6.8, co.; and ST I-II.6.3, co. See also ST I-II.76.3, co., where Thomas writes that ignorance is indirectly willed "as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin." 59 ST I-II.6.8, co. In the same place, Thomas mentions that ignorance of evil choice arises from passion or habitus. Elsewhere, Thomas writes that the ignorance involved in sins of habitus is affected ignorance only. De Malo III.8, ad 5. In the ST I-II.6.8, co. text, Thomas may simply be referring to a qualified or relative sense of the word habitus; see In Ethic. VII.4, §1359: "There is vice either in the complete sense, such as when the reason and the appetitive faculty aim at evil (this is the real vice that is contrary to virtue), or in an incomplete sense, such as when the appetitive faculty, but not the reason, tends to evil, which occurs in incontinence proper." 60 ST I-II.6.8, co. 56 154 between knowing something habitually but not actually considering it, 61 and not acquiring some knowledge that one could and should know – the knowledge is not even possessed habitually. Referring to the distinction between the two kinds of indirectly willed ignorance, Thomas writes: "if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge."62 Here, Thomas is referring to ignorance as a cause of sin which is prior to – and in some sense informs – the movement of the will towards the sinful act, which will be discussed in the following chapter.63 For now, it is sufficient to note that affected ignorance, since it is directly willed and so is in no way repugnant to the will, does not render the resulting act any less voluntary; in fact, Thomas suggests that such ignorance actually makes the resulting act "more voluntary and more sinful", 64 precisely because it is directly willed by the agent. Indirectly willed ignorance, on the other hand, diminishes the grievousness of the resulting sin insofar as it precedes the movement of the will and so results 61 See the discussion above of habitus as a mean between potency and act: pages 57-61. ST I-II.6.8, co. 63 See pages 188-193 below. An interesting text in this regard, insofar as ignorance as a cause of sin relates to voluntary action, is ST I-II.76.4, co. 64 ST I-II.76.4, co. The full quotation runs thus: "sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning." 62 155 in involuntariness,65 although, because it is willed ignorance, it does not entirely diminish the voluntariness of the act or excuse from the sin.66 In contrast to concomitant ignorance and consequent ignorance, antecedent (prior to)67 ignorance occurs when the ignorance is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.68 Unlike concomitant ignorance, antecedent ignorance causes involuntariness. And unlike consequent ignorance, which – when indirectly willed – causes involuntariness "in a certain respect", antecedent ignorance causes involuntariness simply. This is because the ignorance involved is entirely repugnant to the will, and the agent is unable to or is not bound to obtain the knowledge that he lacks.69 65 Thomas makes this point with the examples of a student and a drunk: "Sometimes... the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin." ST I-II.76.4, co. 66 See ST I-II.76.3, co. 67 For the labels "together with", "following upon", and "prior to", I am indebted to Jensen, Living the Good Life, 35. 68 ST I-II.6.8, co. At In Ethic. III.3, §413, Thomas writes the following: "The other ignorance is of singular conditions—for instance, that this woman is married, that this man is a parent, that this place is holy. It is about these conditions and on them that human activity is exercised; by reason of a justifiable ignorance of such conditions, a person deserves mercy and pardon, because he who is ignorant of one of these conditions acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is obvious that ignorance of particular circumstances of this kind—not, however, ignorance of what one should do—is the cause of an involuntary action." 69 See ST I-II.76.3, co.: "If... the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether." 156 Thus, ignorance has different relationships to the will, depending upon whether that relationship involves concomitant, consequent, or antecedent ignorance. Each of these types of ignorance will imply different levels of voluntariness for the agent. Simply put, the differences between these types of ignorance boil down to the following: (a) Concomitant ignorance (non-voluntary) – I don't know what I am doing, but if I did, I would want to do it. (b) Consequent ignorance (voluntary OR voluntary in one sense, involuntary in another sense) – I don't want to know what I am doing. (c) Antecedent ignorance (involuntary) – I don't know what I am doing, and if I did, I wouldn't want to do it; I am also unable or not bound to know what I am doing. These three types of ignorance will be important again at various points throughout this dissertation – for example, during the discussion of sins of passion and sins of malice. 70 For now, let us turn to an essential part of any human act: the will.71 Our remarks on the will must necessarily be brief. The topic of the will in the thought of Thomas is notoriously vast,72 and here we would do well to limit our scope to what suits 70 See pages 196-201, and 213-219 respectively. In the Summa Theologiae, after discussing voluntary action but before discussing the will, Thomas devotes a question to the circumstances of human action. We have briefly discussed these above, and so they will not be repeated here. See pages 110-111. See also ST I-II.7. 72 A search for English titles including the word "will" on Bibliographia Thomistica reveals 103 entries. This does not include scholarly works which include Thomas's notion of the will within their scope, but which do not include the word in their title. For example, Etienne Gilson's The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas contains a chapter on "Appetite and Will", while Jensen's Sin is concerned throughout with the will. Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1929), 284-303; Jensen, Sin. See < https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/bt/index.html >. Accessed September 1, 2021. If the https link does not work, the http link should work fine. 71 157 our immediate purposes: the structure of the sinful act. 73 After examining the will and its relationship to the intellect, we will explore the passions and their role in the human act. Finally, we will apply what we have said in this section about the human act to the sinful act in particular. Above, we saw that the will is the intellectual appetite. 74 As such, it regards the good in general, as opposed to the sensitive appetite, which regards particular goods; 75 Eleonore Stump writes that "the will is an inclination for what is good, where the phrase 'what is good' is used attributively and not referentially."76 The good to which the will is inclined, however, is not necessarily the good simply, as though the will only desires what is objectively good, but the good as apprehended by reason: it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. 73 Scholarly summaries of Thomas's thought on the will exist. See, for example, David M. Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. 6-17)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 69-89; and Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 278306. 74 See page 92. 75 See ST I-II.9.1, co. Porter writes that the will is "the distinctively human capacity to desire whatever the intellect judges to be good". Jean Porter, "The Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq. 58-122)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 275. 76 Stump, Aquinas, 278; see n. 8: "The distinction between referential and attributive uses of linguistic expressions is easier to illustrate than to define. If we say 'The President of the United States might have been the son of Chinese immigrants', we might be using the phrase 'the President of the United States' attributively, rather than referentially, to indicate that the position of President could have been filled by a person of Chinese ancestry. If, on the other hand, we were using the phrase referentially, we could be saying that the current president could have had different parents from the ones he had." In even simpler terms, to say that the will regards "what is good" in the attributive sense is to say that the will regards goodness considered as an attribute that something might have; this is opposed to the will regarding goodness in the individual, particular, referential sense (that is, that good thing). 158 Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good.77 Stump explains that the will, of itself, does not move to any good unless it is first presented with the good by the intellect: "By itself the will makes no determinations of goodness; apprehending or judging things as good is the business of the intellect. The intellect presents to the will as good certain things or actions under certain descriptions in particular circumstances, and the will wills them because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to it as good."78 Davies likewise comments: "Aquinas thinks that voluntary action has to proceed on the basis of understanding of some kind, so he argues that the will is set in motion by understanding. We would not will without some understanding of a possible good to be achieved."79 Thus, the intellect moves the will to act by presenting to it some object under the aspect of good; Thomas writes: "the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end."80 In addition to the intellect being able to move the will, the will is able to move the intellect, as when one wills to consider or not consider something, or even to accept or reject some proposition.81 Here, Thomas characterizes the will's moving of the intellect as an 77 ST I-II.8.1, co. See also ST I.59.1, co.: "Other things... have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed will." 78 Stump, Aquinas, 278. 79 Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 160. 80 ST I.82.4, co. Elsewhere, Thomas writes: "The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under the universal notion of good". ST I-II.13.5, ad 1. 81 ST I-II.17.6, co. 159 alteration or impulsion: "a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels [impellens] moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul". 82 The interactions between intellect and will, then, are different, depending on whether the intellect is interacting with the will, or the will is interacting with the intellect. The former of the above interactions occurs when the intellect presents an object to the will under the aspect of goodness. The will is then moved to desire said object. While it is true that the desired object functions as an end in these scenarios, it is not true to say that the will desires ends only; Thomas argues that the means 83 to the desired ends also fall within the purview of the will considered as a power: if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.84 When the will is considered with respect to its act, however, it is the end alone that is willed, not the means: If… we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of 82 ST I.82.4, co. See also ST I-II.9.1, ad 3: "The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act"; and ST II-II.2.2, ad 4: "the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end". Impello, when it is connected with the idea of motion, means "to set in motion, impel". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "impello". 83 The English word "means" is often used to translate Thomas's Latin phrase ea quae sunt ad finem (or sometimes just ad finem, as is the case with the Shapcote translation of ST I-II.8.3, s.c., for example). Unfortunately, "means" implies far less than does ad finem. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "means" means "An intermediary agent or instrument." Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "mean, n.3". Ad finem, on the other hand, implies something that is, literally, to the end, or, for the purpose of the end, so that ea quae sunt ad finem means, literally translated, "those (things) which are for the end". 84 ST I-II.8.2, co. 160 that power: thus to understand designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only insofar as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end.85 Elsewhere, Thomas writes that when the will is considered with respect to its act, the act of willing (volition) is directed to the end, while choice is directed to the means. 86 That volition and choice are different acts of the will (considered as a power) 87 is clear, Thomas thinks, from the fact that they have different objects: "Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act." 88 Thomas continues: "Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end."89 85 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. Thomas later reiterates this point with respect to the acts of intention and volition: "The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means." ST I-II.12.4, s.c. 86 In Ethic. III.5, §446. See also ST I-II.8.2, obj. 1 and ad 1. 87 From this point on, I will almost always use the word "will" to refer to the power, and "volition" to refer to the will's act of willing the end absolutely (see the following discussion of the acts of the will), unless context clearly indicates which sense of the word "will" is meant. Volition is sometimes called "simple willing" in the secondary literature, following Thomas's phrase simplex voluntas. See Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts," 81, especially n. 27. However, in the treatise on the will that we are concerned with now, Thomas prefers to use just the word voluntas. 88 ST I-II.8.3, s.c. 89 ST I-II.8.3, co. McInerny writes that "while we cannot want what is for the end without at the same time wanting the end – the end is the reason for wanting the means – it is clearly possible to want an end prior to any consideration of the means necessary to attain it." McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 72. I note that the above discussion of means and ends considers means and ends under those aspects. Thus, when an object is considered under the aspect of means, if it is willed, the end is as well. But when that same object is considered under the aspect of an end, whatever else is considered as a means to that end need not be willed along with the end. 161 There are, then, distinct acts of the will, which will be different depending upon whether the will bears upon the end or the means to the end. For Thomas, there are three acts of the will with regard to each the end and the means. With regard to the end, there is volition, enjoyment, and intention,90 and with regard to the means, there is choice, consent, and use.91 Regarding the acts of the will that bear upon the end, Thomas characterizes them as follows: the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have volition, whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Second, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus enjoyment regards the end. Third, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus intention regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we will it, but that we will to have it by means of something else.92 Using Thomas's example of health, we may characterize the acts of the will that bear upon the end in the following manner. Volition refers to health absolutely, as when anyone is asked whether they want health in general, they reply that they do. Enjoyment refers to health when it is considered as the good obtained, as when one takes delight in considering the obtaining of health.93 Intention refers to health as the terminus of a movement, as when one considers health as one's goal and chooses certain means in view of this end – the will in its acts can also bear upon these means. Choice refers to, simply put, the choosing of the means. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas asks whether choice is an act of the will or an act of the reason. An objection to 90 ST I-II.8, Preamble. ST I-II.13, Preamble. Thomas also treats of command, which shall be briefly explained below. See page 174, note 136. 92 ST I-II.12.1, ad 4. 93 Here, one need not actually possess the object of one's desire in order to enjoy it. See ST I-II.11.4. 91 162 Thomas's position that choice is an act of the will states: "It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason." 94 In response, Thomas writes: "Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself."95 In the same article, another objection states that choice is "a kind of conclusion in practical matters",96 to which Thomas replies that "It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called a decision or judgment, to be followed by choice. And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which results from it." 97 The practical syllogism that Thomas refers to falls under the domain of counsel, which is an act of reason.98 Counsel consists in an inquiry about what is to be done in view of the end intended; choice follows the conclusion of this inquiry as the desire thereof.99 Thus, Thomas is able to say both that choice is a preference for one thing over another, and that this preference follows an inquiry consisting in a practical syllogism: "choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism".100 Choice is an act of the will (as opposed to the intellect) because it consists in the appetite for the thing chosen: "choice is accomplished in a certain movement 94 ST I-II.13.1, obj. 1. In the next article, Thomas writes that "choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another". ST I-II.13.2, co. 95 ST I-II.13.1, ad 1. 96 ST I-II.13.1, obj. 2. The objector refers to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII. 97 ST I-II.13.1, ad 2. 98 See ST I-II.14; and ST I-II.13, Preamble. 99 See ST I-II.14.1, co. 100 ST I-II.13.3, co. See also ST I.83.3, co. 163 of the soul towards the good which is chosen." 101 In this way, choice is the will-regarding-themeans equivalent of intention: "Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means."102 Consent refers to "an application of the appetitive movement to something as to be done."103 Thomas likens consent to sense, specifically when sense is united with its object (something that is somewhat retained in the word "consent": co-sense).104 Consent is therefore similar to choice, although it differs from choice in this: whereas choice refers to the will's act in preferring a means to an end, consent refers to the will's movement to that means as something to be done. Thomas explains the difference in some detail: Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.105 101 ST I-II.13.1, co. If this process stopped at the intellect concluding the practical syllogism and did not include the movement of the will, the agent could hardly be said to choose anything, as he does not desire anything; he has simple figured out a means to an end, and nothing more. 102 ST I-II.13.4, co. See also ST I-II.13.5, co.: "the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end." 103 ST I-II.15.2, co. 104 See ST I-II.15.1, co.: "Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, insofar as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, insofar as it takes complacency in it." 105 ST I-II.15.3, ad 3. 164 Thus, one might intend health for oneself, and in view of this end make an inquiry as to the means that might be appropriate in view of such an end. After an act of counsel, the agent has determined that both medicine A and medicine B are conducive to the health he seeks; he has consented to them (again, in view of the end he intends). In preferring one over the other, he has chosen it.106 If, upon an act of counsel, only medicine A is determined to be appropriate (and no other means is determined to be appropriate), then choice and consent do not differ, except "in our way of looking at them", as stated above. Use [utor] refers to the act of the will of using the means to the determined end; Wuellner defines use as "an act of the will carrying out a command of reason in regard to the means already determined on to secure an end",107 while Deferrari defines utor as "to use in the proper and narrower senses of the word, i.e., to make use of a thing as a means to attaining an end".108 Use, too, is a unique act of the will. Just as choice and consent imply different things in an agent's pursuit of health, so does use imply a unique act, namely (in our example), the actual willing use of the medicine. During his discussion of consent in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas gives the following sketch of the order of the acts of the will that we have been examining: "the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the 106 Thomas writes: "If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other." ST I-II.13.6, ad 3. 107 Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "use, n.". 108 Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v., "ūtor". I am using Wuellner and Deferrari's definitions because Thomas's discussion of use does not allow for the brief explanation required here. See ST III.16; and ST I-II.17.3. See also Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts," 78-83, for a useful, more in-depth summary of Thomas's take on the acts of the will, including use. 165 counsel about the means; then the desire of the means." 109 Continuing to use the example of health, we might flesh out Thomas's sketch in the following manner. Recall that volition refers to health absolutely, enjoyment refers to health when it is considered as the good obtained, and intention refers to health as the terminus of a movement. 110 Thus, a sick agent might apprehend that health is a good that is to be obtained. He will will (volition) health absolutely, enjoy considering the obtaining of it, and intend the obtaining of it as an end. With a view to this end, he will perform a rational inquiry (counsel) as to the appropriate means, the conclusion of which he consents to as something to be done by him (again, in view of the end intended), before choosing between the various means consented to as the one of his preference. By command and use, the agent moves himself to pursue health via the means chosen. Thus far we are in danger of seeing human action as the result of the interplay of man's intellect and will apart from any other considerations. However, this would be to commit a serious error. Torrell writes: "because he is a body-soul unity, [man] is not simply made up of two spiritual faculties of the soul, intelligence and will…. We must also consider his sense knowledge and his sense appetites, in other words, the affective factors that also play a role in the quality of his actions." 111 Man, as a species of animal, is embodied, and so he is subject to the passions of his sensitive appetite. What we have said in the previous chapter about the sensitive appetite (that is, the concupiscible and irascible appetites) will not be 109 ST I-II.15.3, co. See page 162 above. 111 Torrell, Aquinas's Summa, 32. 110 166 repeated here.112 It remains to note the way that the passions interact with the intellect and will, and the role that they play in the voluntary human act. While discussing the moral quality of the passions of the soul, Thomas asks whether every passion decreases the goodness of an act. In response to an objection which states that every passion hinders the judgment of reason, and so is bad, Thomas writes the following: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from only [ex sola] the passion of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. Second, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.113 Thomas allows for passions that precede the judgment of reason to decrease rather than increase the goodness of any particular action. However, those passions that follow the judgment of reason increase the goodness of the act that follows (or, at the least, such passions are a sign of moral goodness). Likewise with sinful actions: "A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above [ad 1], it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous."114 Thus, an agent who judges an injustice to be wrong because of his passions is 112 See pages 89-90 above. ST I-II.24.3, ad 1. I have altered the translation. Shapcote translates "ex sola passione misericordiae" as "from the mere passion of pity." Solus, however, means "alone, only, single, sole". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "sōlus". 114 ST I-II.24.3, ad 3. See also ST I-II.73.6, ad 2. The Latin phrase "tendens in malum", translated here as "tends to evil", is a hapax in Thomas's corpus. The question is: How can a passion be said to tend to evil? In the article following the one quoted here, Thomas asks whether any passion is morally good or evil according to 113 167 not as morally upright – in that act of judgment – as the agent whose passion appropriately follows his judgment (in which case the passion is a sign of greater moral goodness), or the agent who uses the appropriate post-judgment passion to stir himself to right action (in which case the passion increases the moral goodness of the resulting action).115 The passions also interact with the will. Thomas writes that "it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition." 116 its species. He answers yes, and no: "We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts—viz., that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Second, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of shame which is base fear; and of envy which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act." ST III.24.4, co. The first emphasis is my own. In this text, Thomas writes that a passion can tend to an evil object when the passion itself is voluntary and "controlled by reason". In the tendens in malum text quoted above, the passion tends to evil and precedes the judgment of reason. The solution to our question is not clear. To make matters more complicated, earlier in the same question, Thomas writes that moral good and evil can only be in the passions if they are "considered as subject to the command of the reason and will". ST I-II.24.1, co. There are at least two potential solutions to these apparent contradictions. First, the passion that tendens in malum itself follows one judgment of reason, but precedes another, by which an agent commits a sin (which is therefore diminished in its gravity). This is the case when an agent works himself up into an angry fervor, which passion then influences him in judging another (innocent) agent as to be worthy of a physical attack (although, here too, distinctions must be made; see Thomas's discussion of drunkenness excusing from sin: ST II-II.150.4). Second, it may be pointed out that the article from which the tendens in malum text is from is concerned with whether or not passion increases or decreases the goodness or badness of an act, whereas the other two texts quoted in this footnote are concerned with the moral goodness of the passions. Read in this light, the tendens in malum text is seen to be speaking of evil actions, and not passions, so that we would be justified in qualifying the quotation thusly: "A passion that tends to an evil act, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes the sin". The passion itself has a perceived good as its object, although the agent does not experience this passion in a manner congruent with right reason – the act the passion tends to is evil. This is the case when an agent experiences the sudden arousal of a lustful passion, which then influences him to judge another's wife as worthy of sexual pursuit. The passion itself has as its object sensible pleasure, which in these circumstances tends the agent to commit an evil act. The agent is not (in this case) morally responsible for the passion – it is not a morally evil passion – although that passion does tend the agent to commit an action that is incongruent with right reason. 115 I use the word "appropriate" here to signify that not every passion which follows a judgment of reason, or which is used to stir oneself to action, need increase the moral goodness of the resulting action. For example, an agent who judges an injustice as wrong, and who derived intense sexual pleasure from this judgment (he is a sadist), is certainly not as morally upright as the agent who judges an injustice to be wrong because of some passion, all things being equal. The point here is that pre-judgment passions can decrease the goodness or badness of the post-judgment act, while post-judgment passions can increase the goodness or badness of the post-judgment act. 116 ST I-II.9.2, co. Thus we have an answer to a potential objection: How does a vicious habitus in the sensitive appetite imply an inclination on the part of the will? Caulfield's solution is as follows: " Thomas points 168 That is, an agent who is experiencing the passion of desire is disposed towards the object of his passion, and an agent who is experiencing the passion of aversion is disposed away from the object of his passion. Thomas continues: "Wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object." 117 The passions, then, can affect the will "on the part of the object", which object, we have seen, is presented to the will by the intellect.118 This would indicate that the passions affect the will via the intellect, specifically by preceding and clouding the judgment of the intellect; Thomas states this explicitly at one point: "the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, insofar as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not out that habit... is a stable disposition of the sensitive appetite. A disposition of this kind influences the subject who possesses it: for example, a man is inclined to delectation when his sensitive appetite is so inclined. The result is that the sensitive appetite influences the will, for the will is the inclination of the subject, and those things which are pleasing to the subject will be pleasing to the will. In other words, the appetite of the subject depends on the disposition of the subject, and the will, inasmuch as its is an appetite of a badly disposed subject, is inclined to the evil objects which are in accord with such dispositions…. We might say, therefore, that the habit of vice in the sensitive appetite includes the inclination of the will to evil, so that in acting from habit the will itself is said to move to evil." Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 116. McCluskey's solution runs along the same lines, although it is more detailed. See McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 171-173. Caulfield's remarks bring to mind the hylomorphic doctrine that Thomas holds, according to which the intellect of man is united to his body much in the same way that the roundness of a ball is united to its rubber. See ST I.76. In more precise terms, a vicious habitus in the sensitive appetite influences the will through the medium of the intellect, as the will is a passive principle of human action with respect to receiving its object from the intellect. See pages 158-159 above. The very acts which generated the vicious habitus in the sensitive appetite, therefore, influence the will via the intellect to tend towards similar acts. For example, an incontinent agent's passions influence his intellect to evaluate the pleasure associated with an adulterous act as an object worthy of pursuit, which the will then consents to – both the concupiscible appetite and the will are thereby further inclined to like acts in the future. See also ST I-II.50.5, co.: "from the very nature of [habitus], it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as [habitus] is that which one uses when one wills". 117 ST I-II.9.2, co. 118 See pages 158-159 above. 169 judge thus were it not for the passion." 119 Such passions would therefore diminish the goodness of the attendant act, as the will has been presented an object that has been perceived to be good by an intellect clouded by passion. The same holds true of sinful actions; the attendant sinful act will be less grievous than a sinful act that one judges to be worth pursuing aside from any antecedent influence from the passions. 120 When an agent decides to strike his neighbor, for example, without any prior influence from his passions (his decision is not motivated by anger or fear or anything of that sort), the action of striking his neighbor is recognized to be more grievous than a similar case where another agent is so influenced by anger, or fear, or some such passion, all things being equal. The influence runs both ways: the passions are able to be affected by the intellect and the will.121 The former is accomplished by applying "universal considerations" to particulars. For example, considering the evil of injustice and applying it to this particular act of injustice, an agent may excite the passion of anger. 122 The latter occurs when the will is able to move the intellect in such a way as to arouse or diminish the passions; 123 the will wills the intellect to understand,124 which may take the form of the intellect applying universal considerations to 119 ST I-II.10.3, co. Porter likewise writes: "The passions may be said to move the will, but only indirectly, by means of influencing one's intellectual judgments". Porter, "The Virtue of Justice," 275. 120 See note 115 immediately above. 121 Specifically, the passions can obey the reason. See ST I.81.3, co. 122 See ST I.81.3, co.: "by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited." 123 Thomas writes that the will is able to command or check the passions. ST I-II.24.1, co. This is surely done through the intellect. The passions thus allow for a large degree of gradation when it comes to the moral act. They contribute to the goodness or badness of an act depending upon whether they precede or proceed the judgment of reason, and they may also be aroused or diminished by the agent. 124 See ST I.82.4, ad 1. 170 particulars to arouse a passion, or the intellect considering something unrelated or opposed to an already aroused passion in order to diminish said passion.125 The intellect, will, and passions all work together in an agent in the production of his actions. Each of these aspects of the human act interact with the others, and the question remains as to whether the will – receiving influence from the intellect and passions – is determined in its act of volition: Is there free will? 126 Thomas admits that the will wills some things naturally (such as the good),127 and he allows for the will to will some things of necessity (as when a desired end can only be obtained by a single means, the means is necessarily willed along with the end).128 However, Thomas denies that the will wills whatever it wills of necessity. Writes Thomas: if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, 125 Stump provides a good example of this latter process: "while you are reading a magazine, you come across some organization's advertisement asking for money for children, with an emotionally powerful picture of a starving child. Your intellect recognizes that if you look at the advertisement for very long, you are likely to succumb to its emotional force. Intellect sees the goodness of contributing to the organization, but it also recognizes that if you give money to this organization, you will not have it for the new computer you have been coveting. Your desire for the new computer is strong and influences intellect to rank saving money for the computer as the best for you now in the circumstances in which you are. In consequence of the findings on the part of the intellect, and with this influence from the passions, the will directs the intellect to stop thinking about the advertisement and the organization, and (after a further interaction of intellect and will) you turn the page of your magazine." Stump, Aquinas, 279. 126 In the Latin, Thomas uses the term liberum arbitrium, which is usually translated as "free will". See ST I.83. Thomas writes that free will "is nothing else but the power of choice" (ST I.83.4, co.), and that "The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose" (ST I.83.3, co.). Thus, the question "Is there free will?" can be boiled down to "Can the will choose?" See the remarks on choice above: pages 162-164. For a focused treatment of liberum arbitrium in the thought of Thomas, especially as it relates to the modern notions of determinism and intellectual determinism, see Tobias Hoffman and Cyrille Michon, "Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism," Philosophers' Imprint 17, no. 10 (2017): 1-36. 127 ST I-II.10.1, co. 128 ST I.82.1, co.; and ST I.82.2, co. The will also wills the last end necessarily. See ST I.82.1, co. 171 is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, insofar as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as nongoods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.129 The reason for the lack of determination on the part of the will, then, lies in the imperfection in particular goods;130 the will is able to regard these goods under different aspects, and so under the aspect of whatever way they are without some goodness. And so while it is true that the will is determined to goodness in general, it is nevertheless the case that particular goods are many and varied, each lacking some aspect of goodness in general: "The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one."131 David M. Gallagher writes: "the will, while naturally determined to good in general, is not determined by nature to any of the particular goods. With respect to them it remains free".132 The will, then, has a certain degree of 129 ST I-II.10.2, co. Earlier in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas gives a similar argument where he more explicitly ties the last end to happiness and to God: "there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires." ST I.82.2, co. A parallel text occurs in De Malo VI. 130 Any perceived imperfection will do, even one which is in truth a perfection. 131 ST I.82.2, ad 1. The will can tend to particular objects, albeit secondarily: "the will tends primarily and principally to goodness itself, or utility, or something like that. It tends to this or that appetible thing, however, secondarily, inasmuch as it shares in the above reason." De Veritate XV.1, co. 132 Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts," 74. In support of his claim, Gallagher quotes De Malo VI: "an understood form is a universal under which many things can be comprehended. And since acts take place among singulars, in which there is nothing that is adequate to a universal power, the inclination of the will remains undetermined with respect to many, just as, when an architect conceives the form of a house universally, under which different shapes of houses are contained, his will can incline toward making a square house or toward making a round house or a house of another shape." I have copied the translation that Gallagher is using, which appears to be his own. 172 indeterminacy, which, as a power that is subject to habitus, is consistent with our earlier remarks.133 Until now in this section, we have been examining the human act; let us now tie together all of these issues with an eye to a specific kind of act: the sinful act. When he comes to the treatise on sin in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas asks whether Augustine's definition of sin ("Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law") is appropriate. 134 In the corpus of the article, Thomas brings together the voluntary act, the will, and reason: sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary… whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g., to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g., the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz., the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak.135 Any particular human act is human (as opposed to being an act of a human) owing to its being voluntary, there being two aspects required for a voluntary action: (1) the principle of the action is intrinsic to the agent, and (2) the agent has knowledge of the end. In the above quotation Thomas identifies an act's being voluntary with it being elicited by the will or being 133 See pages 41-42 and 50-51 above. We have only skimmed the surface of the issues surrounding libero arbitrio. For an excellent account of libero arbitrio in the thought of Thomas, see Dewan, "St. Thomas and the Causes of Free Choice", 175-185. 134 See Augustine, Contra Faustum XXII, §27. See also page 140 above. 135 ST I-II.71.6, co. Note the philosophical and theological sides of sin that we discu ssed above: pages 138-147. Recall that "it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law." ST I-II.71.2, ad 4. 173 commanded by the will.136 He then goes on to connect sin with the lack of conformity to (philosophically speaking) the rule of reason – and elsewhere he writes: it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man…. Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, insofar as it is contrary to the order of reason.137 The implication is that to sin is to elicit in the will or command with the will an act 138 which lacks conformity with the measure of reason. This measure is determined by the nature of the acting subject, in this case, by human nature; man is rational by his diversifying form: his rational soul.139 The precise ways in which any particular act can lack conformity to the rule of human reason will involve complex issues – at the center of which is teleology – that are beyond the scope of this dissertation; it will suffice to note the major themes at play here: the object of the act, the intention of the agent, and the other circumstances of the act all play a role in determining the moral quality of an act, as well as the degree of goodness or badness 136 In this vein Sweeney writes: "An act for Aquinas is only immoral to the degree that it is chosen." Sweeney, "Vice and Sin," 161. The difference between the will eliciting and the will commanding is the following. The will elicits acts immediately; such acts we have already seen above: those acts whereby the will is moved to the end, being volition, enjoyment, and intention, and those acts whereby the will is moved to the means, being choice, consent, and use. ST I-II.8, Preamble. Command is technically an act of the reason, although it presupposes an act of the will (Thomas will, nevertheless, usually refer to the will commanding acts; see ST I-II.8, Preamble). ST I-II.17.1. Command is most obviously associated with moving ourselves, or, with physically doing things. See ST III.71.6, co. Wuellner provides the following definition of "command": "an act of the reason, prompted by the will, directing oneself in human activity or in the carrying out of one's decisions and choices." Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "command, n.". 137 ST I-II.71.2, co. See also ST I-II.71.1, co.: "sin denotes an inordinate act". 138 There can be sin without an act as well. See ST I-II.71.5. See also SCG III.10, where Thomas explains that of the principles of moral actions, moral fault can only be found in the will. 139 See page 86 above. The rule of reason, and the degree to which the sinful act departs from it, will also determine the gravity of the sin. See ST I-II.73.2, co. 174 of said act.140 Connected with these themes and adding an additional layer of subtlety and nuance are the passions, which can obscure an agent's reason and influence him to commit acts which are incongruent with right reason. Additionally, the passions may be used by an agent post-judgment of reason, adding to the gravity of a resulting sinful act. Thus, one of the core issues when discussing sin as an act is the interplay between the intellect, will, and the sensitive appetite.141 In the sinful act, these principles can lack order and the will ultimately elicits or commands an act.142 The exact ways in which the relationships between intellect, will, and the sensitive appetite can go wrong will be the topic for the beginning of the next chapter; it is there that we will locate malice and begin our examination of it.143 140 See ST I-II.18-20; as well as ST I-II.73.2-10. Considering man's sensitive nature is especially important, as otherwise sin becomes unintelligible (or reduced to the sins of the angels): "the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason." ST I-II.71.2, ad 3. See also Gregory M. Reichberg, "Beyond Privation: Moral Evil in Aquinas's De Malo," The Review of Metaphysics 55, no. 4 (2002): 765, who, using the example of adultery, writes: "it [is] the difference between what is viewed as good for the concupiscible faculty, on the one hand, and the good of reason, on the other, which creates an opening for wrongful choice." 142 See ST I-II.78.1, co. 143 The preceding remarks on sin have been regrettably short. Space and topic restrictions prevent me from making further comments. An excellent work which is dedicated to sin is Jensen, Sin. On practical reasoning and practical ignorance, see Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions." 141 175 IV MALICE The powers of the soul that we have focused upon in this dissertation – the intellect, the will, and the sensitive appetite – each have a unique role to play in the act of sinning. Thomas names a cause of sin that corresponds to each of these: ignorance for the intellect or reason, 1 passion for the sensitive appetite, and malice for the will.2 He likewise examines the possibility of external causes of sin based upon these three powers. We will examine each of these in turn, beginning with the potential external causes of sin, before moving on to ignorance, passion, and, finally, we will examine malice itself. Here, our intention is to examine malice insofar as such an examination will prove fruitful for explaining the relationship between vice and malice in the following final chapter. A brief note on causality is in order, as this chapter is replete with the concept. In philosophical usage, the word "cause" has taken on numerous meanings, resulting in a 1 Thomas prefers to speak of ignorance as a cause of sin on the part of ratio (as opposed to intellectus: "intellect"), usually translated as "reason", which, in this context, can mean "the human faculty of arriving at a truth, called a conclusion, from other previously known truths, called premises", or it can refer "the act of reasoning, the act of the faculty of reason, discursive knowing". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "ratio". The implication that Thomas is stressing is that ignorance, as a cause of sin, stems not from the first principles in ethics, but from the discursive reasoning that an agent performs from these principles. At times, Thomas will speak of ignorance as a defect of the intellect in particular, indicating that, while he may prefer to associate ignorance as a cause of sin with reason, he is not opposed to associating it with the intellect. See, for example, ST I-II.78.1, co.; and In Sent. II.39.1.2, s.c. 2 ST I-II.76-78. 176 concept that many have found to be confused and imprecise – so much so that, as early as the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Bertrand Russell complained that "the word 'cause' is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable".3 Regardless of whether one shares Russell's sentiment or not, in Thomas's vocabulary the word "cause" [causa] performs an important function. In its most basic sense, "cause" refers to a principle from which something originates: "cause is said primarily only of that from which the existence of the posterior follows. Hence we say that a cause is that from whose existence another follows."4 The effect of a cause – the thing whose existence follows the cause – may be a substance, as when we say that a man and a woman caused their child to exist, or it may be an accident, as when we say that bleach caused the garment to become white, or that sin caused a vicious habitus. Indeed, the cause itself may be an accident as well, as is the case when a habitus causes its proper act.5 Here, we will not examine the nature of "cause" as Thomas understands it – doing so would take us much too far afield – except to note the following. First, Thomas does not have what, in modern parlance, could be called a deterministic or mechanistic view of causality. That is, causes may be impeded from producing their effects, which, Thomas thinks, is enough to show that not all things happen of necessity. 6 Second, "cause" covers a 3 Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13 (1912): 1. De Princ. III. See Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "cause, n.": "a principle from which something originates with dependence…. that which in some way gives existence to another; the reason for the existence of another being." 5 See pages 54-61 above. See also ST I-II.71.3, ad 3: "[Habitus] causes act by way of efficient causality". 6 See ST I-II.75.1, ad 2. See also In Metaph. VI.3, §1191: "some men held that whatever comes to pass in the world has some proper cause, and again that given any cause its effect necessarily follows. Hence, as a result of the connection between causes it would follow that everything in the world happens of necessity and nothing by chance." Thomas devotes some considerable space in refuting this position. In Metaph. VI.3, 4 177 vast range of phenomena. For example, if Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics is indicative of Thomas's own position, then there are four classes of causes and twelve modes of causes.7 These types of causes include not only what we usually mean by "cause" in the modern sense: the initiator or producer of an effect; also included in Thomas's notion of causa are concepts such as the end or purpose of whatever it is that initiates or produces an effect, as well others. And besides "classes" and "modes", numerous other adjectives qualify Thomas's use of causa throughout his corpus.8 Thus, for our purposes, where Thomas mentions an indirect cause, for example, what is to be understood is a cause to which the existence of the effect is indirectly related; or the adjective will not signify the cause's relationship to the effect, but to something else, such as is the case with the internal causes of sin, which are internal with respect to the sinning agent.9 §§1191-1200. Thomas's distinction between necessary and contingent causes is important here. See ST I.22.4, co. 7 In Metaph. V.2-3, §§763-794. These are the following. The four classes: material, formal, efficient, and final. The twelve modes: prior and subsequent, proper and accidental, and simple and composite, each of these being divided into potential and actual. The classes are based upon essential differences which constitute different species of causes, while the modes are based upon the different relationships between causes and those things that are caused. See In Metaph. V.3, §783. 8 To name just a few (as a sample from the section of the Summa Theologiae on the causes of sin): the direct cause (ST I-II.75.2, co.), indirect cause (ST I-II.75.4, co.), sufficient cause (ST I-II.75.1, ad 2), deficient cause (ST I-II.75.1, co.), necessary cause (ST I-II.75.1, ad 2), internal and external causes (ST I-II.75.2-3), impeding cause (ST I-II.75.1, co.), proximate cause (ST I-II.75.2, co.), remote cause (ST I-II.75.2, co.), and completive cause (ST I-II.75.3, co.). 9 Important texts of Thomas's on causa include In Metaph. V.2-3, §§763-794; and De Causis. See also Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "causa". So far as I can tell, there have been no attempts at a dedicated treatment of Thomas's notion of causa in the English secondary literature; the closest that I can find to such a thing is Stephen L. Brock, "Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas," Quaestio 2 (2002): 217-240; Leo J. Elders, S.V.D., The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective, trans. John Dudley (New York: E. J. Brill, 1993), 269-307; Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 88-159 (which, while broadly Thomist, purports to give a scholastic understanding of causality); and Michael Rota, "Causation," in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 104-114. See also Jason A. Mitchell, L.C., "From Aristotle's Four Causes to Aquinas' Ultimate Causes of Being: Modern Interpretations," Alpha Omega 16, no. 3 (2013): 399-414; and R. E. A. Shanab, "Ghazali and Aquinas on Causation," The Monist 58, no. 1 (1974): 140-150. For a more introductory treatment of Thomas's understanding of the four classes of causes in particular, see Edward Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide (London: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 16-23. 178 Before we move on to examine the exterior and interior causes of sin, it is important to ask whether it makes sense to speak of sin having a cause in the first place. In the Summa Theologiae, the article that Thomas devotes to this question asks whether sin has a cause. 10 There, he draws a distinction between sin considered as an act, and sin considered from the side of its inordinateness: "A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause."11 As any other act, precisely as an act, sinful action can be understood to have causes: He did this action because of such-and-such a reason or reasons – he perceives, he reasons, he chooses, he commands, the limbs move, the action occurs. An end is intended, and the resulting action takes on a specific formal character. The issue with speaking about sin having a cause, however, lies not in its character as an action, but in its character as an inordinate action: how can one speak of disorder or privation as having a cause? Thomas explains: "Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e., the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself, since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness." 12 We say that the 10 ST I-II.75.1. An objection to Thomas's affirmative position is indicative of the modern view of causality: "a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause." ST I-II.75.1, obj. 2. Thomas's reply is as follows: "If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity…. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded." ST I-II.75.1, ad 2. 11 ST I-II.75.1, co. 12 Ibid. 179 absence of the sun is the cause of darkness (presumably we are speaking of the darkness of night) because the absence of the sun is part of the explanation of the darkness. Thomas continues: "In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold." 13 That is, fire, which causes an affirmation (heat), which affirmation involves a negation (the absence of cold), is said to be the accidental cause of that negation: fire is the accidental cause of the absence of cold. Next, Thomas goes on to integrate these ideas with the sinful act: The first of these [the negation of the cause itself] suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.14 The will, then, is the direct cause of the sinful act as an act, as well as the indirect cause of the inordinateness of the act – the inordinateness of the sinful act is not intended. 15 If we apply this process to the example of fire given above, we might say that the will (fire) 13 Ibid. Ibid. 15 While the inordinateness of the sinful act cannot be intended, it may be chosen. See pages 219-231 14 below. 180 generates a sinful action (heat), which action (heating) just is its "principle tendency", 16 and the result of this sinful action is the evil (absence of cold) of which the will (fire) is an accidental and indirect cause (that is, the sinful character of an action (absence of cold) is not the "principle tendency" of the will (fire)). In these senses may we speak of sin, both the act and the inordinateness, as having a cause. 17 The final lines of the block quote immediately above summarize these senses well: "the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention". 18 The result of this is that Thomas's discussion of the exterior and interior causes of sinful acts (which immediately follows the texts that we have been considering above) should be read with some care. Where Thomas asks whether the passions can cause sin, for example, he is asking whether the passions can cause the will to will the sinful act directly, and the inordinateness of the sinful act indirectly. This is particularly important with respect to malice, as we shall see.19 16 Or, more specifically, heat is produced "in virtue of its principle tendency". See ST I-II.75.1, ad 1. 18 ST I-II.75.1, co. 19 See pages 219-231 below, especially 225-227. 17 181 IV.i. The Exterior Causes of Sinful Acts When Thomas asks whether there can be an exterior cause 20 of an agent's sinful actions, he is asking whether or not something outside the agent can be the sufficient cause of that agent's sin. The prospective candidates for external causes of sin correspond to the three powers of the soul that inform the human act and that man has some willful control over: the intellect (specifically, the reason), the will, and the sensitive appetite: 21 "something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite."22 Let us begin with the reason. Thomas's examples of an exterior cause of sin moving the reason are men and demons "by enticing to sin".23 In these scenarios, Thomas has in mind some external rational agent attempting to convince the agent in question of some rational error that might lead to some 20 While it is true that in the Summa Theologiae Thomas considers the interior causes of sin prior to considering the exterior causes of sin (see ST I-II.75.2-3; ST I-II.76, Preamble; ST I-II.76-78; and ST I-II.79-83), I have chosen to present the exterior causes of sin first because it better fits the general narrowing-of-scope theme that this dissertation has assumed. Also, it would be rather awkward to examine the interior causes of sin, among which is malice (which, in this dissertation, needs to be examined in great detail), after which the climax of this dissertation would be put off in order to examine the exterior causes of sin. Neither is it prudent to leave aside the exterior causes of sin altogether, as they provide important context for further consideration of the role of the will in the sinful act. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the De Malo considers the external causes of sin prior to the internal causes of sin. See De Malo III. This is perhaps due to the varying scopes of the Summa Theologiae and the De Malo. The Summa Theologiae is a work which, in the section containing the discussion of the causes of sin, is concerned with the intrinsic principles of human acts. See René Ardell Fehr, The Structure of the Summa Theologiae According to St. Thomas Aquinas, < https://www.academia.edu/42241788/The_Structure_of_the_ Summa_Theologiae_According_to_St_Thomas_Aquinas >, 28-33, and / or 105-106. Accessed January 10, 2022. The De Malo, meanwhile, is concerned with evil, particularly with moral evil. Thus, it considers the principles of good (God) and evil (represented by the Devil) before considering the interior causes of sin. 21 Thomas writes that "not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral [habitus], because act and [habitus] belong to the same subject." ST I-II.74.2, co. 22 ST I-II.75.3, co. 23 Ibid. In the De Malo, Thomas writes that the devil can be a cause of sin "in the manner of one persuading." De Malo III.3, co. He says something similar at ST I-II.80.1, co. 182 sinful act.24 For example, someone might try to convince his neighbor that adultery is not to be universally shunned in an attempt to induce his neighbor to commit an adulterous act (for whatever reason).25 At issue here is whether or not an external cause might move an agent to sin via the reason of necessity, which is a question that touches upon reason's relationship to the will. Thomas's position on this issue finds summary expression during his consideration of whether or not the devil is a direct cause of a human agent's sin. There, Thomas writes about the possibility of something moving the will through its object, the perceived good: As regards the object [of the will], a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Second, he that proposes or offers this object. Third, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end…. Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin.26 The reason that external persuasion does not move an agent to sin of necessity has to do with the will, which is only moved of necessity by the last end: "the reason being... fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not 24 On the side of demons, it goes without saying that such an attempted deception would be intentional; it is less clear as to whether or not the deception would be necessarily intentional on the side of men, although it would seem that it need not be. 25 In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas's discussion of men causing sin in other men is limited to original sin. See ST I-II.81, Preamble. As to the demons, one of Thomas's examples is of a demon influencing a man's imagination. See ST I-II.80.2, co. 26 ST I-II.80.1, co. Elsewhere, Thomas writes: "external enticement [does not] move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action". ST I-II.75.3, co. 183 altogether fettered, then, insofar as it is free, it can resist sin". 27 Men and demons, then, cannot make an agent to sin of necessity, although they may attempt to persuade him to do so, thereby acting as an external cause of sin.28 Thomas argues that something might be an external cause of sin "by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it." 29 This might take the form of a particularly delicious looking piece of chocolate, either by itself or as presented to the appetite by some external agent. As to the act of sin, the appetible object itself acts as the external cause of sin, while the passion it arouses, and which subsequently affects the agent's reason, functions as the interior cause of sin. 30 Here, as with men and demons, the external cause of sin operates via the medium of the internal causes 31 – and, again, "nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will."32 27 ST I-II.80.3, co. That the last end alone moves the will of necessity: ST I-II.10.2-4. See also De Malo III.3, co. 28 There is thus a difference between making a man sin (that is, of necessity), and causing a man to sin. Such a proposition is only confusing to one who has defined causality in a deterministic manner. 29 ST I-II.75.3, co. See the first way that an object might move the will, quoted immediately above from ST I-II.80.1, co. 30 Thomas writes: "when a sin is committed through passion… the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were." ST I-II.78.4, ad 4. 31 The internal causes of sin will be discussed below: pages 187-246. 32 ST I-II.75.3, co. The words "except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way" refer to the resistance which the sensitive appetite gives to the reason, and which may become, because of the appetite's disposition, strong enough to overcome the reason. See ST I.81.3, ad 2; and ST I-II.77.2. In such cases any resulting bad act may or may not be imputed to the agent as a sin, depending upon the agent's culpability for the arousal of the passion in question. See also ST I-II.75.3, ad 3: "If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power." 184 Thomas's remarks on the external cause of sin with respect to the will presuppose an earlier discussion whereby he argued that, of external agents, only God can move the will directly.33 However, Thomas writes, God cannot be a cause of sin, either directly or indirectly; that is, God does not make an agent sin, incline an agent to sin, and neither is an agent's sin imputable to God when God could have given that agent the help required to avoid sinning. 34 Elsewhere, Thomas maintains that God does not cause malice, 35 and that while God ultimately causes the sinful act as an act, he does not cause the defect itself.36 As he makes clear, Thomas thinks that exterior causes of sin operate "through the medium of the internal cause".37 The reason is that, so long as the agent remains free to act voluntarily, the external causes do not compel the will to act: "Therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished." 38 The reason why the will plays 33 ST I-II.9.6. Thomas also argues that God does not move the will of necessity. See ST I-II.10.4. ST I-II.79.1, co. Thomas's reasoning for the latter claim is as follows: "neither can [God] cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to [God] as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin." If the pilot represents God, the ship the agent, and the shipwreck the act of sin (as the most straightforward reading of the analogy would have it), the analogy would seem to indicate that God is not bound to steer men away from sinful acts (as he does not owe us anything), and so any resulting sinful acts could not be imputed to God as an indirect cause. This same analogy appears at ST I-II.6.3, co. in a different context. There, Thomas is clearer that the shipwreck is only imputed to the pilot when he can and ought to steer. It is noteworthy that in the parallel text in De Malo, Thomas does not consider God as an indirect cause of sin. De Malo III.1, co. 35 In Rom. IX.3, §782. 36 ST I-II.79.2; and De Malo III.2. 37 ST I-II.75.3, ad 2. The full quote reads: "The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated." Emphasis my own. 38 ST I-II.75.3, co. In the De Malo, Thomas writes: "nothing else is directly the cause of human sin but the will." De Malo III.3, co. See also ST I-II.75.1, co. 34 185 such a central role in the act of sin is its role in the voluntary act. 39 While discussing the role that the cause of a sin plays in that sin's gravity, Thomas writes the following: In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit... and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g., ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g., weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.40 The more a man wills to act, the more voluntary is the resulting act. The more a factor or factors influence the will so that its freedom of movement is diminished, the less voluntary is the resulting act – and no act can be sinful if it is altogether involuntary.41 As external causes of sin may be part of the explanation of why a particular sin was committed, they are still considered to be causes, although they are not in themselves enough to explain said sin – at the least, an act of the will is required for such an explanation. 39 See ST I-II.71.6, ad 2: "The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found". 40 ST I-II.73.6, co. 41 In the Summa Theologiae, after considering the exterior causes of sin, Thomas moves on to discuss "the cause of sin, insofar as one sin can be the cause of another." ST I-II.84, Preamble. His subsequent discussion deals with covetousness, pride, and the capital vices, which we have already examined above. See pages 116-128. In the De Malo, Thomas considers the capital vices well after his treatment of the causes of sin. See De Malo III (on the causes of sin) and VIII-XV (on the capital vices). Thus, the De Malo text does not consider the capital vices primarily as causes of sin, but rather as moral evils. This is expressed clearly in the articles on each of the capital vices – Thomas asks of each capital vice questions such as: "Is X a sin?" "Is X a mortal sin?" "Is X a vice?" This does happen in the Secunda Secundae, but in addition to this, Thomas also treats of the capital vices as causes of sin in the Prima Secundae. 186 IV.ii. The Interior Causes of Sinful Acts We move on now to the interior causes of sin. As noted above, 42 these correspond to those powers of the soul that the will has some direct influence over: the intellect or reason (ignorance),43 the sensitive appetite (passions), and the will (malice). 44 In speech, we sometimes say that an agent sinned from ignorance, or that his was a sin of ignorance; for Thomas, this way of referring to sins has a particular meaning: "When it is said that a person sins 'from something', we are given to understand that that is the first principle of the sin." 45 Thus, while it is true that the will is the only sufficient completive cause of a sinful act, 46 not all sins are sins of malice (the interior cause of sin which corresponds to the will), as not all sins have malice as their first principle – hence the designator from: this is a sin from ignorance. This is not to say that the intellect, sensitive appetite, and will and their acts are sinful of themselves: "That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food." 47 These powers can become disordered in their acts, by which an agent is caused to sin. Hence, the very name ignorance 42 See page 176. See page 176, note 1 above. 44 See ST I-II.76, Preamble. 45 De Malo III.12, ad 5. A first principle one which is not from another. Wuellner defines "first principle" as "a principle not from a principle; one which does not proceed from a prior principle in its own series." Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, s.v. "first principle", under "principle, n.". In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas writes: "Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way as the first principle, by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a first principle by reason of its not being from another." ST I.33.4, co. 46 See page 185 above. 47 ST I-II.75.2, ad 3. 43 187 implies an error in reasoning, the name passion can imply disordered desires, and the name malice implies a disorder in the acts of the will.48 IV.ii.a. Ignorance Let us begin with ignorance. The reason is a cause of sin by lacking due rule. 49 Ignorance is thus a cause of sin "because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, insofar as it directs human acts."50 For this reason, Thomas calls ignorance an indirect cause of sin, as it consists in a privation, rather than in a positive motive power. 51 In explaining how ignorance might cause a sinful action, Thomas appeals to practical reasoning: Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz., of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's will be so 48 It is important to remember that, in committing sins, as in all voluntary actions, an agent is acting for some perceived good – and this is even true in sins of malice; writes Thomas: "No one has ever willed malice under the aspect of malice but instead insofar as sin is esteemed good for the sinner, as if quieting his corrupt appetite and thus desired by itself." In Sent. II.43.1.1, ad 1. McCluskey likewise writes: "A particular act of wrongdoing originates in ignorance or a passion of the sensory appetite or primarily in the will even though what drives the process is fundamentally the same for all action: the agent's good as the agent perceives it." McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 128. In every voluntary act, sinful or otherwise, there is some perceived good that is pursued by the acting agent. See pages 158-159 above. 49 See ST I-II.75.2, co. 50 ST I-II.76.1, co. 51 Ibid. In the same place, Thomas distinguishes between a direct and indirect cause thusly: "A direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment". 188 disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not through ignorance but in ignorance, as the Philosopher states.52 Using Thomas's example, we may formulate the following practical syllogism: (P1) I ought not to kill my father. (P2) This man is my father. (C) Therefore, I ought not to kill this man. The universal premise (P1) and the particular premise (P2) produce the conclusion (C), by which an agent knows that he ought not to commit the sin of parricide (and by which he knows that this particular act is an act of parricide). Should the agent be ignorant of either of these premises – for example, say that he does not know that one ought not to kill one's father (although he knows the particular premise (P2)), or that he does not know that the man that he is killing is in fact his father (although he knows the universal premise (P1)) – the resulting act of parricide would be a sin of ignorance. However, the ignorance is only a cause of the sin if the knowledge of the premise about which one is in error would prevent the agent from committing the act – otherwise, the ignorance is concomitant with the sin; it does not influence the sin, and the resulting action is non-voluntary.53 By ignorance, then, what is usually meant is that an agent is unaware that a particular act is evil and ought not to be done. 54 This ignorance is a privation, and not a mere going without: the knowledge in question ought to be there. This distinguishes the ignorance that is 52 ST I-II.76.1, co. Emphases in the original. The reference to Aristotle is to Nicomachean Ethics III.1, 1110b24-27. 53 For concomitant ignorance and non-voluntary action, see page 153 above. 54 Some exceptions exist. See the discussion that follows immediately below. 189 a cause of sin from what Thomas calls "nescience" [nescientia] ("the mere absence of knowledge"), and the ignorance of what an agent has a natural aptitude to know, but of which he is not bound to know.55 By distinguishing between these types of ignorance, Thomas is allowing himself to account for cases where ignorance is voluntary on the one hand, and involuntary on the other: ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called invincible, because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.56 The ignorance which is a cause of sin, then, is both (i) a condition of the act of the sin, 57 and (ii) about matters that one could and should know. Point (i) makes ignorance to be the kind of thing that makes an act to be involuntary: "ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary." 58 Point (ii), on the other hand, ensures that ignorance does not make its act to be entirely involuntary, such that the resulting act is still rightly called sinful: 55 ST I-II.76.2, co. On the latter "not bound to know" type of ignorance, Thomas writes: "there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case." Deferrari suggests that nescience and ignorance-about-what-one-is-not-bound-to-know amount to the same thing; defining nescientia, he writes: "ignorance, of what one is not expected to know". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v., "nescientia". Thomas's words in ST I-II.76.2, co., however, suggest that Deferrari is mistaken in this definition. However, later in the Summa Theologiae Thomas writes that "Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is about what one ought to know". ST II-II.32.2, ad 4. 56 ST I-II.76.2, co. 57 In the sense that the agent would not have committed the sinful act had he not been ignorant. 58 ST I-II.76.3, co. 190 On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, 59 and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, insofar as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin.60 Thomas's two examples highlight well the ways in which ignorance can or cannot touch upon the substance of the sin. A man strikes another man, knowing that such an action is a sin, but the circumstance of which he is ignorant (that the man he is striking is his father) touches upon the very species of the sin. Likewise, he does not know that his victim will defend himself and fight back (which knowledge would have prevented him from striking out). In this case, ignorance is a cause of the sin, although the species of the sin is not changed. In either case, the attacker has sufficient knowledge to know that the act that he is engaging in is sinful, and so his ignorance does not entirely excuse him from his sinful act; the act is still voluntary to some degree. Thomas continues: Second, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge 59 I wish to highlight this sentence in particular: ignorance "of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin". Thus, ignorance may excuse from sin by degree – by more or less – it is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. 60 ST I-II.76.3, co. 191 which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know.61 In these latter types of cases, the ignorance itself is voluntary. If an agent wishes to vandalize a store by throwing a brick through a window, but he does not check to see if someone is on the other side of the window (because he doesn't want any excuse to avoid the act), then, assuming that he indeed hits a person with the brick, he will have committed a sin (hitting someone with a brick) for which he was voluntarily ignorant. As in the former types of cases above, this voluntary ignorance, as its name suggests, retains some aspect of voluntariness, and so it does not entirely excuse the sinning agent from his sin. Thomas neatly summarizes the relationship between ignorance and voluntariness in the following text: Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, insofar as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.62 As the examples of the last few pages show, the ignorance that causes sin is a particular kind of ignorance; it is not just a matter of the agent being ignorant that his action is evil, as Caulfield and McCluskey suggest. 63 In order for ignorance to cause an action, it is 61 ST I-II.76.3, co. ST I-II.76.4, co. Thomas summarizes the reason why ignorance reduces the sinfulness of an act in the same place: "when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin." 63 Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 94: "Ignorance which causes sin… is the ignorance which would prevent the action if it were known to be evil." McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 129. McCluskey's remark occurs in the context of a certain view of evil, but what she says there about ignorance implies that she thinks it applies to ignorance itself: "In the motive view of evil, wrongdoing due to ignorance… could not count as evil because, by definition, individuals who commit [acts from ignorance] do so… without realizing that what they do is evil". Emphasis my own. 62 192 enough that the agent be deprived of some knowledge that, had he had, would have prevented him from acting.64 This is even the case when the ignorance does not touch upon the substance of the sin. To use an example from above, when an agent strikes his neighbor, he is not necessarily ignorant that his action is evil. The facts that (i) the agent lacks the knowledge that his neighbor will defend himself, and that (ii) had the agent known this, he would not have struck his neighbor, are enough to say that ignorance caused the agent's action. The agent might still be well aware that the act of striking his neighbor is evil, and indeed, in this example, such awareness is quite accidental to the question of whether or not the action proceeded from ignorance.65 IV.ii.b. Passion Unlike ignorance and malice, passion does not – or ought not to – have an immediately negative connotation. As noted above, for Thomas, passio has multiple meanings, although in this context it refers to the movements of the sensitive appetite; the passions loosely correspond to what we call "emotions". 66 These movements are, of themselves, morally neutral, although they can take on a moral quality as they are subject to the command of reason.67 Thus, passions may be morally good or morally evil. 68 Thomas writes: "just as it is 64 Hence why concomitant ignorance is not considered to be a cause of action. For a more detailed treatment of ignorance, especially as it is a cause of sinful action, see Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 94-96 and 100-102; and Jensen, Sin, 185-193. Many of the themes and texts concerning ignorance in the above few pages were touched upon earlier in this dissertation in the context of the voluntary act. See pages 152-157 above. 66 See pages 25-26. See also Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "passio", who devotes three dense pages to defining passio. 67 See ST I-II.24.1, co.; and ST I-II.24.4, co. 68 See ST I-II.24. Moreover, Thomas insists that the passions are not all morally evil. See ST I-II.24.2. He has in mind groups, such as certain Stoics, who denied goodness in anything corporeal. 65 193 better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite". 69 The passions add to the moral goodness of an act as a help, "because when by a judgment of reason the will chooses anything, it does so more promptly and easily if in addition passion is aroused in the lower part".70 When it comes to passion as a cause of sin, Thomas writes that the sensitive appetite is a cause of sin as inclining to sin. 71 When he begins his treatise on this topic in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas proceeds by asking whether the sensitive appetite can move (i) the will, and (ii) the reason.72 First, the will. Thomas argues that the sensitive appetite cannot move the will directly, but only indirectly. This, Thomas writes, happens in two ways: First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, 69 ST I-II.24.3, co. De Veritate XXVI.7, co. Marie I. George looks to this text to affirm that "the principle purpose of our emotions [read: passions] is to allow us to execute rational decisions more promptly and efficiently." Marie I. George, "Aquinas on the Dangers of Natural Virtue and the Control of Natural Vice," Tópicos 40 (2011): 34. In fact, Thomas is not arguing in the cited text that this is the principle purpose of the passions, only that the prompt and efficient action aspect of the passions can add to the moral goodness of an act. Note that, by "the lower part", Thomas means the sensitive appetite. Moreover, recall that passion may precede or follow the judgment of reason, and that this affects the moral quality of the subsequent act. See pages 167-171 above. See also ST I-II.24.3, ad 1; and ST I-II.73.6, ad 2. Finally, note that not all passions are of the body; joy, for example, "seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul", as Thomas writes, and is contrasted with "bodily delights". ST I-II.31.3, ad 2 and 1, respectively. See also ST I-II.31.4, co.: "in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight." 71 ST I-II.75.3, co. At places, Thomas uses the word inclino in this context, and other places he uses moveo (ST I-II.77, Preamble; throughout ST I-II.77.1) or traho (ST I-II.77.1, co.; throughout ST I-II.77.2). Traho means "to draw, drag, or haul, to drag along; to draw off, forth, or away." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "traho". The implication is that the passions of the sensitive appetite cause sin by inclining, moving, or drawing the agent to the sinful act. Notice that in ST I-II.77.1-2, Thomas prefers to use moveo in connection with the will, and traho in connection with reason; following this, we might say that the passions move the will by drawing the reason. 72 ST I-II.77, Preamble. 70 194 another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.73 Thomas is arguing that the more the sensitive appetite moves towards its object, the less are the other powers of the soul able to act. An example of this would be the pleasure that one experiences during sexual intercourse: it is practically impossible to do metaphysics, for example, or will anything but the intercourse itself during copulation. 74 The movement of the sensitive appetite thus distracts the will. Thomas continues: Second, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.75 73 ST I-II.77.1, co. In the Secunda Secundae, Thomas refers to the "carnal" vices to make this point: "Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened— more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table." ST II-II.15.3, co. Thomas gives a more mundane example at another place: "for instance, when a person concentrates on hearing someone, he does not notice a man passing by." De Malo III.9, co. 75 ST I-II.77.1, co. The ST II-II.15.3, co. text cited immediately above refers to this manner of the sensitive appetite moving the will. 74 195 The stronger the movement of the sensitive appetite becomes, the more does it move the will. This, we have seen above, 76 is through the medium of the reason, so that the movement of the sensitive appetite draws the reason to judge something as good when it is evil, or evil when it is good, and the intellect then presents this object (under the appropriate aspect) to the will. 77 However, in both of the above texts, the resulting sin is not one of malice or of ignorance, as the first interior cause of the sin belongs to the sensitive appetite: it was the sensitive appetite which first affected the will through the reason, not the other way around. After the will, Thomas asks whether the sensitive appetite can move reason. As in the article on the will he had already affirmed this question, Thomas asks a more specific question: Can reason be overcome by passion against its knowledge? 78 In his response to this question, Thomas returns to practical reasoning: it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider.79 76 See pages 168-170. In response to an objection which claims that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite because the will does not have the passions of the sensitive appetite as its object, Thomas replies as follows: "Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated." ST I-II.77.1, ad 1. See also obj. 1. Moreover, see Caulfield, who writes that "To say that passion overcomes the reason supposes that in some way the reason so departs from its knowledge that it presents the good of the sensitive appetite to the will." Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 103. 78 The Latin reads: "Videtur quod ratio non possit superari a passione contra suam scientiam." Bear in mind that in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas presents his questions in the form of objections to his own position. Thus, "It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion against its knowledge", indicates that the question which Thomas is considering is: "Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion against its knowledge?" ST I-II.77.2, obj. 1. The phrase "against its knowledge" is to be taken in the sense of "contrary to its knowledge", and not in the sense of "without its knowing". 79 ST I-II.77.2, co. 77 196 Recall our earlier discussion of habitus as a mean between potency and act. 80 There, we saw that an agent might have some habitual knowledge without actually considering it. In such cases, the habitus of knowledge is in potency with respect to the first act that is actually considering. It is against this backdrop that Thomas identifies the influence of the passions on reason in the sinful act: "Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g., some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, insofar as the passions hinder him from considering it." 81 The passions, then, influence an agent such that he fails to actually consider what he already knows – it hinders him.82 This distinguishes sins of passion from sins of ignorance: in sins of passion, one is in possession of the relevant knowledge, he just fails to consider it; not so in sins of ignorance. Thomas goes on to explain how passion prevents the sinning agent from actually considering this knowledge: Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above [ST I-II.77.1, co.]. Second, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Third, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered [ligatur] so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws [trahit] the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.83 80 See pages 57-61 above. ST I-II.77.2, co. 82 The Latin word translated above as "hinder" is impedio, which means "to hamper, impede, hinder, prevent". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "impedio". 83 ST I-II.77.2, co. Besides "fetter", ligo can also mean "to bind, tie… a person…. to tie, bind, fasten something together" and to "suspend the action of, as of the reason, sense, etc.". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint 81 197 The first way that passion can hinder consideration was discussed above. 84 The second occurs because the object of the sensitive appetite need not be, and indeed often is not, congruent with the good as understood by reason. That is, the good of the sensitive appetite (for example, pleasure) is often something that may be or can only be pursued and obtained in a manner that is against the order of reason (for example, when that pleasure is within the context of an adulterous affair). The third occurs when the passion is so strong so as to prevent the reason from operating properly; that is, the strength of the passion prevents the reason from operating properly – this does not mean that reason is unable to operate simply. Thomas writes that the passion draws [trahit] the reason, implying that the reason is still operating, albeit improperly.85 It is his free use of reason that is fettered. In each of the ways that passion hinders consideration, the passion influences the reason to consider a different premise in the practical syllogism: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g., No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g., Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.86 Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "ligo". It is also used to describe the matrimonial bond. See, for example, ST Supp.44.1, ad 1. 84 See pages 194-195. 85 Recall that traho means "to draw, drag, or haul, to drag along; to draw off, forth, or away." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "traho". See page 194, note 71 above. 86 ST I-II.77.2, ad 4. The reference to Aristotle is to Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, 1147a35-b9. 198 In the De Malo, Thomas clarifies what the four propositions of practical reasoning are for the agent who sins from passion: (P1) No sin is to be committed. (And at the same time, he turns over in his mind:) (P2) Everything pleasurable is to be pursued. (And when, because of passion, premise (P2) prevails,87 he continues:) (P3) This is pleasurable. (C) Therefore, this is to be pursued.88 In this way, as Thomas writes, the agent who sins from passion judges in particular against his universal knowledge.89 The judgment (C) This [sinful object] is to be pursued, is against the universal premise (which he has knowledge of) (P1) No sin is to be committed. Sins of passion are unlike sins of ignorance, then, in that the agent is not strictly ignorant of one of the premises of the practical syllogism. In fact, in sins of passion, the agent has the knowledge that the one who sins from ignorance lacks, 90 although the agent's passion influences him to ignore it. Jensen connects the distinction between habitual and actual knowledge with the distinction between ignorance and ignoring: 87 In the incontinent man. Thomas argues that in the continent man, premise (P1) prevails, and he concludes, ultimately, that this act of sin is not to be done. De Malo III.9, ad 7. On incontinence, see In Ethic. VII.1, §1294: "If… perversity occurs on the part of the appetitive faculty so that the practical reason remains right, there will be incontinence – a condition that is present when a man has correct evaluation of what he ought to do or avoid but draws away to the contrary by reason of the passion of desire." 88 De Malo III.9, ad 7. Premises (P1) and (P2) are the universal propositions, while premise (P3) and the conclusion (C) are the particular propositions referred to in ST I-II.77.2, ad 4. 89 ST I-II.77.2, co. 90 The cases of an agent being ignorant of some circumstance of the sin that does not touch on its substance are exceptional, and will be set aside. See pages 190-192 above; and ST I-II.76.3, co. 199 we can distinguish between ignorance and ignoring, a distinction that follows upon Aquinas's distinction between habitual and actual knowledge…. the person who sins from weakness [passion] can have knowledge habitually but he does not use it in act. He can be aware, in habit, that this action is adultery, but under the pressure of the passions he focuses simply upon the pleasure and ignores the adulterous character of the action. His habitual knowledge is not used actually in his practical reasoning. In this case, is the person ignorant of the adulterous character of the action? Or rather, does he ignore the adulterous character of the action? We seem more inclined to the latter designation.91 In the same place, Jensen concludes: "Strictly speaking, then, the person who sins from weakness need not be ignorant. He must, however, be ignoring." 92 Calling sins of passion cases of ignoring implies the unfortunate connotation of a deliberate and conscious decision to ignore.93 This is too strong. When commenting on the passion that precedes the sinful act and causes it, Thomas writes that it actually diminishes voluntariness: if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin insofar as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, insofar as it diminishes its voluntariness.94 The ignorance involved in sins of passion is consequent ignorance, specifically ignorance of evil choice.95 Such ignorance is indirectly voluntary, and occurs "when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider"; Thomas argues that such ignorance arises from 91 Jensen, Sin, 190-191. Ibid., 191. 93 For instance, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "ignore" in part as "To refuse to take notice of; not to recognize; to disregard intentionally, leave out of account or consideration, shut 'one's eyes to'." Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., "ignore, v.". 94 ST I-II.77.6, co. Thomas continues: "On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin." 95 See pages 154-156 above. 92 200 passion.96 The very name "ignorance of evil choice" [ignorantia malae electionis] indicates that the agent is in some sense ignorant of the evil character of his action, which, when combined with the voluntary nature of the ignorance involved, fits well with ignoring aspect of sins of passion. Such ignorance, although it is indirectly willed, diminishes the voluntary nature of the resulting sin insofar as it precedes the movement of the will and is repugnant to it.97 If the passion is strong enough to render the act involuntary, the act itself is no sin.98 Much like ignorance, then, the passion which causes sin diminishes the voluntariness of the act. In sins of passion, when an agent ignores the universal premise that he knows, it is not a matter of him deliberately choosing to ignore said premise so that he may sin. Rather, the passion of the sensitive appetite draws an agent's mind away from the proper universal premise of practical reasoning. The difference is fundamental enough for Thomas to distinguish between an agent sinning "from choice" and an agent sinning "in choosing" – sins of passion falling into the latter category, indicating that the choice involved in sins of passion is not the first principle of the sin.99 96 ST I-II.6.8, co. In the same place, Thomas argues that ignorance of evil choice can also arise from habitus. I have address this comment above on page 154, note 59. 97 See ST I-II.6.8, co. 98 Thomas: "if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely." The exceptions are those passions which were voluntary in their beginnings: "a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause…. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin." ST I-II.77.7, co. See also ST I-II.77.8, ad 3: "Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial." 99 See ST I-II.78.4, ad 3. A parallel text is De Malo III.12, ad 11. Sinning "from choice" corresponds to sinning from malice, in which the will is the first principle of sin. Moreover, note the progression that is evident in the texts that we have made use of until now: we began by considering the interior causes of sin as conceptually distinct, but there is already some mingling of these causes – sins of passion involve some 201 One final note on sins of passion. As the sinning agent has the requisite knowledge, and as sins of passion do not arise from habitus, Thomas argues that the sinning agent is properly oriented, and that he regrets his action once the passion subsides: "[the defect in sins of malice] is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being", and as a result: "the passion which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions". 100 McCluskey comments that "The agent who acts under the influence of passion has a moral orientation that is fundamentally good, for she would not have committed the bad act except for the presence of a passion. When she is not under the undue influence of a passion, she pursues genuine goods as her ends."101 Passion, as a cause of sin, acts as a temporary distraction from one's end.102 Sins of ignorance and sins of passion diminish the voluntariness of sins and so diminish the gravity of their respective acts. In the case of ignorance, the agent would not have sinned had he had the knowledge which he lacks. In the case of passion, the agent has the relevant knowledge, but he is overcome by passion so that he ignores part of it. Sins of malice, however, because they imply a defect in the will itself, are fundamentally different than either of these. Having examined the interior causes of sin that affect the will indirectly, we now turn our attention to that cause of sin which directly affects the will: malice. ignorance (or, at the very least, some ignoring). 100 ST I-II.78.4, co. See also De Malo III.13, co. 101 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 130-131. 102 For more on passion as a cause of sin, see Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 103112; and Jensen, Sin, 124-157. 202 IV.iii. Malice The Latin word which is translated here as "malice" is malitia. While it is often translated into English as "malice", it is not uncommon for malitia to be translated as "evil". 103 Hereafter, excluding a few instances later in this dissertation, malitia will be translated as "malice". Malice is a flexible term in the work of Thomas. 104 In its most general sense, it refers to any kind of badness or baseness; it is opposed to bonitas, which can be understood as goodness.105 More narrowly, malice can refer to badness in the physical sense, 106 although usually it refers to moral badness. As an example of the latter sort of malice, and one which ties together many of the themes of this dissertation, consider the following text taken from Thomas's discussion of the contrariety of vice to virtue in the Prima Secundae: three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is sin, which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz., that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is malice: while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is vice: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature….107 103 See the Shapcote translation of the Summa Theologiae, where this is frequent. See especially ST III.18; and ST I-II.78. Some scholars object to the translation of malitia as "malice" in the context of the interior causes of sin. This will be addressed below. See pages 242-246. 104 See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "malitia". 105 See ibid., s.v. "bonitas". 106 See In Metaph. VI.4, §1230: "every perfection existing in things pertains to the perfection and goodness of their nature, whereas every defect and privation pertains to evil [malitiam]." 107 ST I-II.71.1, co. 203 Sin, vice, and malice, then, are contrary to virtue, albeit in different ways. Virtue, as a suitable habitus, is ordered to virtuous action, and in this respect sin, as contrary to virtuous action, is contrary to virtue. Vice is opposed to virtue of its very essence: vice is an unsuitable habitus, while virtue is a suitable habitus. When virtue is considered as "a kind of goodness", it is opposed to malice, which indicates that, in this quotation, Thomas is taking "malice" to mean a kind of badness. It is not this general (moral) sense that is our primary concern here, but the more narrow interior-cause-of-sin sense of malice. This section on malice will consist of four subsections. First, we will examine malice itself, including its status as an interior cause of sin, a crucial temporal / spiritual distinction, and the role of knowledge and ignorance in malice. Second, we will explore how malice relates to intention and choice, before, thirdly, explaining what malice is the choice of, exactly. Finally, we will address the issue of translating malitia. IV.iii.a. Malice Itself As an interior cause of sin, malice refers to a disorder of the will. 108 In the Summa Theologiae, this sort of malice is often called certa malitia, or, "certain malice".109 Certus is an adjective meaning "exactly, certain, firmly determined",110 so that certa malitia means roughly "firmly determined badness" – at times Thomas will write that to sin from certain 108 See ST I-II.78.1, co. This phrase ("certa malitia") occurs 116 times in Thomas's corpus, of which 71 are located in the Summa Theologiae. Note that I am only including those works which are regarded as authentic. 110 Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "certus". 109 204 malice is to sin on purpose [ex industria peccare].111 In this vein, McCluskey writes that by certa Thomas means "deliberate".112 In the Summa Theologiae, when answering the question as to whether or not anyone actually commits this type of sin, Thomas begins with the following: Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite turn aside [declinet] to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e., the will) and sensitive.113 These are the powers that correspond to the interior causes of sin. Thomas continues: "Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will." 114 Thomas goes on to explain the manner in which disorder can occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will: Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason115 or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain [potiatur] some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes 111 See ST I-II.78.1, co. Deferrari defines industria as "purpose, intention, premeditation". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "industria". 112 McCluskey, "Willful Wrongdoing," 2. 113 ST I-II.78.1, co. I have modified the translation, which translated declinet as "incline away". See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "dēclīno": "turn aside towards something". 114 ST I-II.78.1, co. This text is one of the few places where Thomas characterizes ignorance as a cause of sin as a defect in the intellect as opposed to the reason. See page 176, note 1 above. 115 Recall the discussion of sin as a philosophical concept above: pages 138-147. 205 knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to obtain [potiatur] a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.116 There are a number of aspects to Thomas's explanation of malice which deserve to be teased out: (1) The disorder of the will that produces the sinful act is that it loves more the lesser good. (2) Loving temporal goods more than spiritual goods is a disorder. (3) In this regard, the will is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good so that the agent may obtain some temporal good. This is done: (4) knowingly, in that the agent knows that he is suffering the loss described in (3). (5) The agent knows, too, that the love described in (2) is disordered, 117 and so (6) the agent is said to choose evil knowingly. Let us compare the above text from the Summa Theologiae with the parallel text from De Malo: "As the Philosopher says… some authors have held that no one is voluntarily evil; against whom the Philosopher says in the same place that it is irrational to say that a man wills to commit adultery and does not will to be unjust." 118 Here, unlike in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas begins with the voluntary act. He continues: The reason for this is that a thing is called voluntary not only if the will is moved to it principally and of itself as an end but also if the will is moved to it for the sake of the end; for example, a sick person not only wills to attain health but also to take the bitter medicine, which otherwise he would not, in order to recover health; and similarly a merchant voluntarily throws merchandise overboard so the ship will not be lost.119 116 ST I-II.78.1, co. I have altered the Shapcote translation, which translates potiatur as some form of "possess" in each instance. The Latin potiatur implies pursuit more than does the English word "possess". See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "potior, īri, ītus": "to take possession of, to get, obtain, acquire, receive". 117 Otherwise (6) would not follow. See De Malo III.12, co. 118 De Malo III.12, co. The reference to Aristotle is to Nicomachean Ethics III.5, 1113b14-21. 119 De Malo III.12, co. 206 Voluntariness extends, then, not only to the end of the act, but also to the means; we saw above that the will has certain acts that pertain to the means, and that "the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means."120 Thomas continues: If then a person should wish so much to enjoy some pleasure, say, adultery or some desirable thing of this kind, that he does not shrink from incurring the deformity of sin which he perceives to be conjoined to what he wills, not only will he be said to will that good he principally wills, but even that very deformity, which he chooses to incur, to avoid being deprived of the desired good. Hence the adulterer both wills principally the pleasure and wills secondarily the deformity….121 Again we notice a different line of argument. Because of his focus on the voluntary act, Thomas explains that the deformity which is a part of sin is willed by the agent – not primarily, but secondarily. This deformity is known to the agent and is even willed by him in pursuit of the end which he desires. Continuing: "But that someone desire some transitory good so much that he does not flee from being alienated from the unchangeable good can occur in two ways".122 This is where we see the Summa Theologiae line of thought come into play. Thomas connects what he has said above about the voluntary act and willing defects secondarily, to transitory (corresponding to temporal) and unchangeable (corresponding to spiritual)123 goods. The implication is that, in sins of malice, the defect or deformity just is the disordered value of temporal and spiritual goods. 124 Thomas goes on to list the two ways that 120 ST I-II.12.4, s.c. See pages 162-166, and page 161, note 85. De Malo III.12, co. 122 Ibid. 123 The Latin words are: commutabilis (corresponding to temporalis) and incommutabilis (corresponding to spiritualis). 124 This is not to say that temporal goods are incompatible with spiritual goods per se. Some temporal goods are actual, and not just perceived, goods, and are entirely compatible with spiritual goods. Food, for instance, can not only be a true good that is compatible with a spiritual good (as when it is desired and consumed according to reason), but its shunning can actually be incompatible with a spiritual good (as when reason demands that one eat in such circumstances). 121 207 an agent may desire some transitory good so much that he is willing to suffer the loss of the unchangeable good: in one way because he does not know that such an alienation is joined to that transitory good, and then he is said to sin from ignorance; in another way, from something internally inclining the will to that transitory good. Now a thing is found to be inclined to another in two ways: in one way as being subject to or acted on by another, as when a stone is thrown upward; in another way in virtue of its own form, and then it is of itself inclined to that, as when a stone falls downward. And in a similar manner the will is inclined to a transitory good to which the deformity of sin is joined, sometimes from some passion, and then the will is said to sin from weakness… but sometimes… the will by its own movement without any passion is inclined to that good. And this is to sin from choice either purposely or knowingly or likewise from malice.125 Comparing the De Malo text to that of the Summa Theologiae, we notice that the most significant difference is Thomas's treatment of the voluntary act in De Malo, and the subsequent explanation of the difference between what one wills principally and willing the deformity of sin secondarily.126 Significantly, both texts frame the discussion of malice in terms of goods that are temporal / transitory and spiritual / unchangeable. McCluskey, who draws from each of the above two texts, does not see the temporal / spiritual distinction as crucially important; she writes: Even though, in this case [the adultery example given in De Malo], we can identify both a spiritual good (obeying the moral law, which prohibits adultery) and a temporal good (the pleasure concomitant with the act of adultery), what makes [sins of malice] immoral is not fundamentally the distinction between temporal and spiritual activities but the disorder that attaches to the agent's choice.127 125 De Malo III.12, co. I have slightly altered the final line of this translation, which reads in the Latin: "et hoc est peccare ex electione, sive ex industria, aut certa scientia, aut etiam ex malitia." The sense is that it is the same thing to sin from choice, or on purpose, or knowingly, or from malice. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer of my upcoming article for pointing this out to me. See René Ardell Fehr, "Thomas Aquinas on Malice: Three Interpretive Errors," forthcoming in Res Philosophica (2023). 126 Thomas reiterates this point at De Malo III.12, ad 10. Another difference is that the De Malo text explains the disordered love of temporal things with a view to all three interior causes of sin. 127 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 117-118. 208 In a footnote to the above text, McCluskey clarifies in part: "Aquinas does not intend [the temporal / spiritual] distinction to do the heavy lifting here." 128 What Thomas does intend to do the heavy lifting, she writes, is a distinction between lesser and greater goods, so that malice occurs when "The agent prefers the lesser good to the greater good, knowing that it is a lesser good."129 Let us leave aside McCluskey's (erroneous) definition of malice for the time being;130 for now it is sufficient to note that Thomas does intend the temporal / spiritual distinction to do the "heavy lifting". Not only is this distinction central to his arguments in both the De Malo and the Summa Theologiae, but he makes it clear in the Summa Theologiae that (i) the will is disordered when it loves more the lesser good, and that (ii) malice occurs when a disordered will loves a temporal good more than a spiritual good, and chooses to suffer the loss of that spiritual good in order to obtain the temporal good. 131 Moreover, Thomas explicitly connects "the order of reason or Divine Law, or Divine charity, or some such thing"132 with spiritual goods, so that we are given to understand that any act which implies the willing deprivation133 of the order of reason or of the order of divine law 128 Ibid., 118, n. 4. Ibid., 118. McCluskey echoes this sentiment in "Willful Wrongdoing," 9-12. 130 We will return to it, and other similarly erroneous definitions, later in this chapter. See pages 232242 below. McCluskey's misunderstanding about what is doing the "heavy lifting" in the Summa Theologiae and De Malo texts contributes directly to her mistaken definition of malice. 131 The quote again: "Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly." ST I-II.78.1, co. A similar line of argumentation occurs in the De Malo text, as quoted above. 132 ST I-II.78.1, co. 133 I use the word "deprivation" here because of Thomas's use of privatur in ST I-II.78.1, co. See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "prīvo": "to bereave, deprive, rob, strip." "Rejection" might also work, although it does not imply an aspect of malice that must be kept in mind and that "deprivation" hints 129 209 constitutes a willing deprivation of spiritual goods. This should not be surprising, given that, as explained above, the philosophical and theological sides of sin are really two sides of the same coin: "it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law." 134 Thus, while it is true to say with Sanford that "When one sins through malice, the defect... [is through] the will itself", 135 it is not true to say with McCluskey that "[malice] includes all actions that are performed on the basis of a defect in the will",136 as in addition to a defect in the will, one requires the willing deprivation of a spiritual good in order to commit a sin from malice – it is not enough to act besides the order to the end. This is because malice requires the loss of a spiritual good,137 which gets to the heart of the distinction between mortal and venial sin mentioned above, 138 and which in turn implies that no venial sin can be malicious: "if someone intentionally commits a venial sin, it at: in sinning maliciously, the agent would prefer to obtain the temporal object of his desire without the loss of a spiritual good. See pages 225-227 below. 134 ST I-II.71.2, ad 4. See pages 138-147 above. 135 Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 80. 136 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 116. 137 Recall the text quoted above: "when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss [dispendium] of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good." ST I-II.78.1, co. Emphasis my own. In this context, "loss" need not imply prior possession. 138 See pages 143-147. See also ST I-II.78.2, ad 1, where Thomas writes explicitly: "Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity." See, too, ST I.63.1, ad 4: "Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself." 210 is not from malice."139 At stake in sinning from malice is the loss of a spiritual good, a loss which the agent knowingly and willing embraces in view of obtaining a temporal good. The above texts from the Summa Theologiae and the De Malo highlight an aspect of malice that starkly differentiates it from ignorance or passion: in sins of malice, the agent knows that he is choosing evil.140 Thomas also writes that "A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil", 141 and that "one who intends to inflict evil is said to be malicious".142 Jensen writes that "The person who sins from [malice] acts with full knowledge of the evil he chooses", 143 while Kent and Dressel note that sins from malice "are cases of willful wrongdoing: actions done knowingly and deliberately, without cognitive impairment caused by emotion."144 Reichberg states: "evil may deliberately be done by an agent who, possessed of calculation and foresight, acts with adequate awareness that his acts are wrong,"145 and Sanford specifies what type of knowledge is involved in sins from malice: 139 De Malo III.12, ad 9. The objection that Thomas is responding to highlights the fact that we may commit slight sins on purpose: "It happens sometimes that someone commits a very slight sin intentionally, for instance, by speaking an idle word or telling a jocose lie. But a sin from malice is said to be the gravest sin. Therefore to sin intentionally is not to sin from malice." De Malo III.12, obj. 9. Reichberg notes that venial sins cannot be malicious as well. Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 778, n. 77. Of Thomas's statement that no venial sin can be from malice, McCluskey admits that "I am at a loss to account for it." McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 133, n. 47. Unfortunately, McCluskey's mistaken definition of malice results in her confusion. If McCluskey is correct that malice consists in the preference of a lesser good over a greater (McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 118), then she is correct: Thomas's statement that no venial sin is from malice cannot be accounted for. However, McCluskey's understanding of malice is incorrect. See pages 232-242 below. 140 Other statements to this effect occur at ST I-II.78.1, s.c.; ST I-II.78.4, s.c.; and De Malo III.12, s.c. 1. 141 ST I-II.78.2, s.c. See also In Col. I.5, §55; and ST I-II.105.2, ad 9. 142 In Titus III.1, §86. 143 Jensen, Sin, 159. 144 Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and willful wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 35. 145 Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 777-778. I have removed Reichberg's inclusion of the Latin ex certa scientia, which followed "adequate awareness". 211 "It is the knowledge that [the agent] has departed from that very rule to which the will ought to bind itself, which is the order of reason".146 A number of scholars have argued that "malice" does not denote a kind of sin, but rather that it denotes a particular manner of sinning. For example, Dressel writes that malice "is not some particular set of especially grave actions, but one way of performing any morally bad action",147 and Reichberg notes similarly: "Malice refers not to a kind of sin (sins of the flesh can be done from malice); rather, it denotes a special way that sin, any kind of sin, can be carried out."148 To this, Kent and Dressel add that to sin from malice is to sin "in a particular way: deliberately, decisively, and without subsequent remorse." 149 While there is some truth to these claims,150 as an interpretation of Thomas they are not strictly accurate. For Thomas, "malice" (specifically "certain malice") denotes a cause of sin. The disorder of the will (specifically, when the disorder of the will consists in a love that is greater for a temporal 146 Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 80. However, Dressel, when writing apart from Kent, underspecifies the knowledge involved in the malicious action: "the [malicious agent] acts with occurent knowledge that her action involves some evil." Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 17. Emphasis my own. 147 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 1. 148 Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 778. 149 Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and willful wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 44. Note that Kent and Dressel's claim that malice implies a lack of subsequent remorse in the agent is simply false. Thomas is clear that the malicious agent may come to regret his malicious actions (the following quotation assumes that the reader is already aware that all vicious actions proceed from malice; such a claim will be covered in the following chapter of this dissertation): "He that sins through [habitus] is always glad for what he does through [habitus], as long as he uses the [habitus]. But since he is able not to use the [habitus], and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the [habitus] he is sorry for what he has done through the [habitus]. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin." ST I-II.78.2, ad 3. See also De Malo III.13, co., where Thomas writes that he who sins from malice "does not easily repent." For the discussion of the claim that vice implies malice, see pages 250-260 below. 150 Dressel is correct that malicious actions are not "some particular set of especially grave actions". Reichberg correctly notes that malicious sins are not all spiritual sins (see ST I-II.72.2 for the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins). Kent and Dressel are correct that malicious sins are committed deliberately. 212 good than it is for a spiritual good) causes a sinful action, which action, because of said disorder, implies a number of features in that action. Thus, strictly speaking, "malice" does denote a particular set of actions (contra Dressel), namely, the set of actions that arise principally from a disorder in the will (again, of the kind that loves a temporal good more than a spiritual good), which set of actions include (most of) the features described above. If, however, by "kind of sin" these scholars have in mind only a particular genus or species of sin, as Reichberg seems to mean, then they are correct: "malice" does not denote any one particular genus or species of sin,151 it denotes a sin whose first principle is a defect in the will, which results in the knowing choice of evil. Although malice implies some knowledge in the agent, nevertheless, a sin from malice, as a sin, involves ignorance: 152 "sometimes [ignorance] excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice."153 The malicious agent knows that his choice of action is evil; his ignorance consists in lacking the knowledge that such an evil action ought not to be performed for the sake of obtaining the good which he seeks in performing said action. For some reason (which we will articulate shortly), the malicious agent thinks that the evil action which he is performing ought to be performed for the sake of whatever good he is pursuing. In terms of a 151 Although, neither does it denote a "special way" to sin, as Reichberg claims, unless, again, he simply means that malice is a cause of sin that is unique from ignorance and passion. The underlying issue with Dressel, Kent, and Reichberg's points is that they are too vague to be entirely accurate or inaccurate. 152 See ST I-II.77.2, co. 153 ST I-II.78.1, ad 1. 213 practical syllogism, Thomas gives the following example of the intemperate man (who sins from malice): (P1) Everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed. (P2) This act is pleasurable. (C) Therefore, this act is to be done.154 As the agent knows that the act referred to in (P2) and (C) is evil, he is said to know that the action he chooses is evil. He performs the evil action in pursuit of some perceived good, which action, he thinks, is appropriate given the good pursued. His ignorance lies not in the moral character of the action he is performing (as he knows that it is evil), but in the fact that that evil action ought not to be performed in pursuit of that perceived good. In this case, the ignorance involved in malice is of the major or universal premise (P1) 155 – it is not true that everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed. Jensen's extensive treatment of practical reasoning and the interior causes of sin highlights the uniqueness of the error of the malicious agent: "The [malicious] person is confused concerning his identity. He supposes that he is someone for whom the end of sensible pleasure is greater than the end of the divine good." 156 Jensen, admitting that Thomas does not explicitly develop this particular line of thought when discussing malice, points to the following section of the Summa Theologiae wherein Thomas asks whether sinners love themselves: 154 De Malo III.9, ad 7. This is essentially the same reasoning performed by the incontinent man cited above on page 199, although in this case there is no alternative universal premise being considered; the intemperate man "yields entirely to the movement of concupiscence". Ibid. 155 The issue of the exact premise the malicious man errs in is in fact rather complicated, spanning over two different syllogisms. See Jensen, Sin, 158-169, who explains the issue well. What we have said here and in the following few pages is sufficient for our purposes. 156 Jensen, Sin, 164. 214 it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, insofar as they love their own preservation. Second, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place…. Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be.157 The malicious agent is mistaken in a way that the ignorant and passionate agents are not. While those who sin from ignorance and passion may, concurrent with their act of sinning, recognize their rational nature and (at least habitually) direct themselves to their proper end, the malicious sinner is, as Jensen writes, not so directed: [The] person who sins from [malice] has misperceived what is most central to himself. He recognizes that he is a being that can be ordered to God, but this feature, he thinks, is not most essential. Rather, he is most of all, so he thinks, an animal that can gain pleasure, or some such thing. This confusion follows upon his own evil will. He chooses to evaluate himself based upon his own predilections, rather than based upon his true nature.158 In this vein, Dressel writes that the malicious agent believes that the good he pursues is more conducive to his happiness than moral goodness,159 and Reichberg writes that the malicious 157 ST II-II.25.7, co. See Jensen, Sin, 164-165. Jensen, Sin, 287. 159 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 7. Later, Dressel uses the example of lust: "Lust, for example, inclines a person to pursue sexual pleasure as though that pleasure were her end…. The lustful man understands that the pursuit of pleasure involves giving up God's favor, but believes, falsely, that sexual pleasure is worth the evil incurred through disobedience." Ibid., 29. Together, Kent and Dressel argue that "When the person's will does not aim at her true ultimate end, she is prone to overvalue, and therefore pursue, merely temporal goods." Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and Willful Wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 48. Of course, pursuing temporal goods is not evil per se. Malice occurs when a person knowingly chooses to be 158 215 agent's sin "represents his… conviction about how his life ought to be lived." 160 The ignorance of the one who sins from malice is thus a double-ignorance: he is ignorant about what he is – what is primary in him, and so what is his greatest good – and, by this first ignorance, he is ignorant about his deed.161 This is not to say that sins of malice are reducible to sins of ignorance, however. The ignorance involved in sins of malice is consequent ignorance, specifically, affected ignorance; recall that affected ignorance occurs when the ignorance involved is directly willed by the agent.162 In the De Malo, Thomas writes: "the act of the will can precede the act of the intellect, as when someone wills to have knowledge, and for the same reason ignorance falls under the will and becomes voluntary", 163 and later he writes that "In him who sins… from choice, such ignorance is purely intentional, hence it does not diminish the sin." 164 In fact, such ignorance, Thomas argues, actually increases the sinful nature of the act: "When… a person directly wills to be ignorant so that he not be restrained from sin by knowledge, such ignorance does not excuse sin either wholly or in part but rather increases it, for a person seems to be afflicted with a great love of sinning that he would will to suffer the loss of knowledge for the sake of freely engaging in sin." 165 The love of sin can be so strong that one might will to be ignorant even of salvation: "[ignorance becomes voluntary] when a person deprived of a spiritual good in order to obtain some temporal good. 160 Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 778. 161 Hence the two syllogisms mentioned above: page 214, note 155. 162 See pages 154-156 above. 163 De Malo III.8, co. The ignorance involved in malicious action is not the first principle of the sinful action, but is rather dependent on the disordered will that wills it. 164 De Malo III.8, ad 5. 165 De Malo III.8, co. 216 directly wills to be ignorant of the knowledge of salvation so as not to be withdrawn from sin which he loves".166 And so the malicious agent's ignorance is directly willed; it is voluntary – he is ignorant about something he can and ought to know, and he desires this ignorance. Specifically, the malicious agent is willfully ignorant of the fact that the evil he chooses ought not to be suffered for the sake of pursuing the good that he pursues. The difference between ignorance as a cause of a sin and malice – and the reason why the latter does not collapse into the former – depends on the first principle of the sin. 167 Is it ignorance? Then the resulting sin is one of ignorance. Is it a disorder in the will itself? Then it is one of malice, and the ignorance that accompanies this malice is itself directly willed. The difference is highlighted by Thomas in the context of the distinction between passion and malice, and the difference between sinning while choosing and sinning through choosing, referenced already above:168 It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord... so that his 166 Ibid. Thomas goes on to cite Job 21:14: "They say to God, 'Depart from us! We do not desire the knowledge of thy ways.'" The "they" are the wicked. In commenting on this text, Thomas alludes to malice and to affected ignorance: "But one could respond that the impious, among the many evil deeds which they commit, also merit from God an earthly prosperity either by loving him, or knowing him, or serving him in whatever works; or at least by seeking temporal goods from him. But this Job excludes, saying, who have said to God, namely, sinning from a determined heart as if from a confirmed malice, depart from us, which pertains to a defect of love; we desire not the knowledge of thy ways, which pertains to a defect of knowledge through affected ignorance…." In Iob XXI.1, §316. The text in italics is Thomas's quotation of Scripture. 167 See De Malo III.12 ad 5 and ad s.c. 3. Thomas makes this point with respect to sins of passion on the one hand, and sins which proceed from malice on the other: "The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a [habitus], the will is inclined from within." ST I-II.78.4, ad 2. That all vicious acts are also malicious will be shown in the following chapter. See pages 250-260 below. 168 See page 201. 217 choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin through choosing.169 We might draw a parallel here between passion and malice on the one hand, and ignorance and malice on the other. In sins of passion, passion is the first principle of the sin insofar as it is that interior principle which initiates the movement of sin; the agent's will is not moved to the sinful object of its own accord, which is shown by the fact that the agent would not have chosen said object except for the passion which motivates him to such a choice. This contrasts with the malicious agent, for whom the will is the first principle of sin. In the particular malicious act, the movement of the malicious agent's will to the sinful object does not originate in his passions: "when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were."170 Likewise, in the agent who sins from ignorance, the ignorance is the first principle of the sin, insofar as it removes an impediment to sin, which is why concomitant ignorance is not considered to be a first principle of sin, or even a proper cause of the sinful action. 171 And while the malicious agent's action involves ignorance (as does the passionate agent's), that ignorance is not the first principle of the sin committed. 172 The disorder of the malicious agent is in the will itself, so that, prior to any consideration of action, his will is already inclined to the sinful act. The malicious agent is ignorant in one sense, although this ignorance does not inform his disordered will (it is, rather, the other way around). In another, more relevant 169 ST I-II.78.4, ad 3. Emphasis in the original. ST I-II.78.4, co. A parallel text is De Malo III.13, co. 171 See pages 153, and 188-189 above. See also ST I-II.76.1, co. 172 So long as the sin is one of malice. The malicious man may commit a sin of ignorance or passion. 170 218 sense, the malicious agent is knowledgeable, that is, he knows that the action he chooses is evil, and he chooses it regardless of this fact. The ignorance that accompanies the malicious act is secondary to this knowledge. 173 Thus, sins of malice are not reducible to sins of ignorance or to ignorance in the intellect.174 Before we move on to the relationship between vice and malice, it is necessary to confront three issues surrounding malice in the secondary literature. Doing so will allow us to examine said relationship more accurately. As it pertains to malice, the secondary literature on Thomas displays three curious tendencies which this writer cannot help but notice. The first of these concerns an interpretational error regarding terminology. The second is far more wide-spread and touches upon the very definition of malice. The third, while much less prevalent among scholars than the second, is all the more curious given its superfluousness. These three issues will be the focus of remainder of this chapter. IV.iii.b. Intention and Choice A number of scholars have noted a tension between Thomas's claims that (i) the object of the will is always an apparent good,175 and that (ii) in sins of malice, the agent chooses an evil knowingly.176 John Langan provides what is perhaps the most noteworthy charge of tension in this area. Langan interprets point (i) as a "psychological thesis" which claims that "the will's 173 Thus, Thomas writes: "[a sin] committed from deliberate malice has no ground for excuse". In Rom. II.1, §187. See also ST II-II.14.3, co. 174 See also De Malo III.12, obj. 7, co., and ad 7. 175 See ST I-II.8.1. 176 For example, see McCluskey, "Thomas Aquinas on the Epistemology of Moral Wrongdoing," 107; McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 118-119; Porter, "The Virtue of Justice," 275; and Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 754, n. 10. These scholars do not claim that this tension is anything more than apparent only, in contrast to John Langan; see immediately below. 219 choice is always a choice of good",177 and he writes: "Thomas's psychological thesis requires that the object chosen in a sinful choice be itself a good". 178 Langan then interprets point (ii) as entailing something incompatible with point (i): "the will in choosing what is evil out of malice must be choosing what is known to be evil." 179 In support of this perceived incompatibility, Langan quotes the following from the Summa Theologiae: "Since, as we have said, to be good and to be desirable signify the same, and since evil is the opposite of good, it is out of the question that any evil as such can be directly wanted, either by natural appetite, or by animal appetite, or by intelligent appetite, which is will." 180 Unfortunately, Langan cuts off the quotation too soon; if he had continued, he would have included the following: Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites…. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which evil is the privation.181 In fairness to Langan, he does consider the above line of thought later in his article, although he ultimately rejects it: "This way of interpreting sins of malice is consistent with Thomas's psychological thesis that choice is always of good; however, it fails to capture what Thomas himself speaks of as sin by choice, in which 'the man who sins with deliberate malice quite 177 John Langan, S.J., "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 7 (1987): 180. 178 Ibid., 188. Langan repeats these claims at pages 189, 190, 192, 194, 196, and 197. 179 Ibid., 183. 180 ST I.19.9, co. I have quoted the translation that Langan is using, which is "the Blackfriars translation published by Eyre & Spottiswoode in London and McGraw-Hill in New York from 1963 on." Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 197, n. 2. In the Shapcote translation which I am using, the quotation runs thus: "Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before, and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will." 181 ST I.19.9, co. The translation is Shapcote's. As an example, Thomas writes in the same place: "the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment [coniungitur]." 220 simply chooses what is evil'."182 Thus, according to Langan, the tension between points (i) and (ii) remains. As an interpreter of Thomas, Langan has committed a simple mistake. We will set aside an explanation of Langan's error for the moment. For now, let us turn our attention to performing a proper exegesis of Thomas's texts, after which we will identify Langan's error and its solution.183 In the Summa Theologiae, where Thomas asks whether anyone sins from certain malice, Thomas has an objector argue against his affirmative position: "Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that no one works intending evil. Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice." 184 In response, Thomas writes the following: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining [consequendum] another good... and in this case anyone would choose [eligeret] to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish [vellet] to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two proposed [sed duobus propositis], he would rather [magis vult] sin and thereby incur God's anger, rather than [quam] be deprived of the pleasure.185 182 Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 189. I have again used Langan's translation for his quotation of Thomas. The Shapcote translation runs thus: "he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord". Langan is quoting ST I-II.78.4, ad 3. 183 See pages 229-231 below. 184 ST I-II.78.1, obj. 2. Thus, Thomas has anticipated Langan's criticism. 185 ST I-II.78.1, ad 2. Note the contrast between the temporal good (pleasure) and the spiritual good (God's favour). See pages 208-211 above. Further, while it is true that ignorance is an evil, and that, in the case of affected ignorance, ignorance can be directly willed, this is not to be understood as though the ignorance is directly willed in the sense of as an end, or for its own sake. Rather, Thomas thinks, affected ignorance is willed so that an agent "may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin". ST I-II.6.8, co. Consequor can mean "obtain", but it also can mean "to follow after something". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "consequor". 221 From this text we may note two points: (a) evil cannot be intended for its own sake, and (b) evil can be intended for the sake of something else. The phrase "for its own sake" indicates that evil cannot be intended as an end, while the phrase "for the sake of" indicates that evil can be intended as a means, and so we may present the modified points (a) evil cannot be intended as an end, and (b) evil can be intended as a means. Both of these points square with other texts of Thomas's and with the vast majority of interpreters of Thomas. For example, in the De Malo, Thomas writes that "No agent intends evil as principally willed, but nevertheless the evil itself subsequently becomes voluntary for him if for the sake of enjoying the desired good he does not avoid incurring the evil", 186 and that "no one does evil except intending some good as it appears to him, for instance it seems good to the adulterer to enjoy sensual pleasure, and for that reason he commits adultery." 187 Reichberg argues that evil cannot be directly intended because it does not have the character of an end, 188 while noting Thomas's response to Augustine's famous claim that he stole pears for love of the sin itself: when Augustine says he loved the iniquity itself and not the pears he was stealing, this is not to be understood as if the iniquity itself or the deformity of fault can be willed primarily and of itself; but rather the thing willed primarily and of itself was either to act in accordance with the wishes of others or to have experience of something or to act in an uninhibited way or something of the sort.189 I have heavily altered the translation, especially near the end of the quotation. 186 De Malo III.12, ad 1. See also De Malo III.12, co.: "the adulterer both wills principally the pleasure and wills secondarily the deformity". 187 De Malo I.3, co. 188 Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 763. See ST I-II.8.1, co. 189 De Malo III.12, ad s.c. 2. See Augustine, Confessions, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2019), §§4.9-6.14. Thomas's infrequent references to taking pleasure in sin for its own sake should be interpreted along these lines. See, for example, ST II-II.14.1, s.c. See also In Sent. II.43.1.1, ad 1: "No one has ever willed malice under the aspect of malice but instead insofar as sin is esteemed good for the sinner, as if quieting his corrupt appetite and thus desired by itself." 222 Reichberg concludes that "Out of an ardent desire for some good a person may willingly accept an evil which he knows to be inseparable from this good",190 and later: "Agents can be said to do evil knowingly and deliberately… to the degree that they freely accept the privation which is inalienably joined to their wrongful deeds."191 Besides Langan,192 some scholars have criticized Thomas for not allowing for the possibility of an agent directly willing an evil as an end. Carlos Steel, for example, writes that "the most radical evil is not that of someone who accepts evil consequences as a deplorable, but inevitable, side-effect when he wants to obtain a particular good, but that of someone who intends the inordinatio, the immorality as such, the adultery, the murder, the lie, the fraud as such."193 Unfortunately, neither Langan nor Steel attempt to give any account of what a direct volition of evil itself as an end would look like, and so it is not possible to compare their accounts (if any) with Thomas's to see where they diverge and why. On the side of Thomas, at least, it is possible to give an account of his side of the argument. We have already discussed above the will as it relates to the human act.194 There, we saw that, for Thomas, the object of the will is the good as perceived by reason – since the will is the intellectual appetite, whatever the reason perceives as good naturally moves the will to 190 Reichberg, "Beyond Privation," 783, n. 91. Ibid., 784. 192 See Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 197. Langan records his own personal view in passing: "I should record my own view that there is a dark and troubling range of moral phenomena – among which are malice, hatred of God, envy of others, and attraction to evil for itself…." Ibid., 180. Except for the final example given by Langan, Thomas would endorse Langan's view without hesitation. 193 Carlos Steel, "Does Evil Have a Cause? Augustine's Perplexity and Thomas's Answer," The Review of Metaphysics 48, no. 2 (1994): 265. Steel goes on to note of Thomas's thought disapprovingly: "malice does not allow the will to intend evil directly and per se." Ibid., 273. 194 See pages 157-166. 191 223 desire it. Now, the will is of the good only, 195 so that nothing will be willed by the will unless it appears to the agent to be suitable to that agent in some way. To return to the example of Augustine's theft of pears, Augustine would not have committed that sin unless he regarded the act as good or desirous in some respect; there was some perceived aspect of the act by which he concluded that it was good to steal the pears. To claim that there was nothing whatsoever about the act of stealing pears that Augustine perceived to be good would be, in Thomas's view, nonsensical, as Augustine's will would have no means of moving toward that act – there would have been nothing in the perceived act for him to desire; there would be no reason for the will to move at all. The point here is not to present a robust defense of Thomas's "moral psychology" (to use Langan's term),196 but rather to provide the basis for the following: in order to show that one can directly will an evil of itself, Langan and Steel must provide a plausible account of the will wherein the will may move towards an object without or besides any consideration of perceived goodness or desire (following upon the perceived goodness) whatsoever. In other words, Langan and Steel must identify an object of the will that is not perceived goodness.197 195 196 See ST I-II.81, co. See the title of Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," and throughout. 197 Alternatively, Langan and Steel may attempt to show that Thomas's accounts of the will, or goodness, or desire, or appetite in general, etc., are faulty. The broader point spanning these pages, however, is that (contra Langan) Thomas is internally consistent when he claims that (i) no evil is willed as an end, and (ii) it is possible to make the knowing choice of evil. See Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 197: "I maintain that sins of malice do occur and that the clear-headed choice of known evil is possible for human persons. I observe, also, that Thomas, for various theological reasons, has to allow this possibility. This produces certain paradoxes and even contradictions in his argument because this possibility is not really compatible with his moral psychology, particularly with what I have been calling the psychological thesis, namely, that the object of choice is always a good. The various moves that Thomas and his followers make in order to reconcile the psychological thesis and the possibility of the choice of evil in sins of malice are ultimately unsatisfactory, since despite initial appearances, they do not really allow for the deliberate choice of evil." 224 Given that, according to Thomas, the object of the will is the perceived good, it follows that the malicious agent would prefer to obtain the pursued good without the attending evil that he chooses; we have already noted this above: 198 "a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two proposed, he would rather sin and thereby incur God's anger, rather than be deprived of the pleasure." 199 Elsewhere, Thomas characterizes the choice of evil as an enduring or suffering: "The will is always moved principally to some good; and it happens by reason of a vehement movement to some good that it submits [sustineatur] to the evil joined to that good."200 In the malicious agent, the perceived good that is desired is thought to be worth the suffering of the evil that is joined to it and is chosen; Caulfield writes: Although he chooses evil to attain this good, a man may wish that he could attain his end without the privation of any good: for example, he might wish that he could attain delectation without violating the order of reason or the law of God, but, faced with a choice of either one or the other, he chooses spiritual evil rather than the privation of delectation.201 In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas's example of the basic principle behind suffering an evil to obtain a perceived good is when a man needs to amputate a limb in order to save his life: "the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more."202 Jensen comments on this example: 198 See the quotation on page 221 above. ST I-II.78.1, ad 2. 200 De Malo III.12, ad 2. Deferrari defines sustineo as "to bear, undergo, endure, suffer". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v., "sustineo". 201 Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions," 115-116. 202 ST I-II.78.1, co. 199 225 The person who undergoes the amputation can truly recognize that the loss of a limb is evil and to be avoided; he can even recognize that it is, in general, to be avoided by himself…. But just as the person undergoing the amputation recognizes that death is to be avoided more than the loss of a limb, so the person [who sins from malice] supposes that the loss of pleasure, which he desires more than the divine good, is a greater evil than the loss of the divine good. All other things being equal, then, he would prefer to avoid adultery, which removes him from a desirable good. But all things are not equal. Avoiding adultery means the loss of pleasure, a loss that he feels more keenly than the loss of the divine good. He prefers to gain the pleasure of adultery by way of the loss of the divine good. His disordered desires – by which he loves pleasure more than the divine good – give rise to a clear-sighted choice for what he knows to be evil.203 Jensen argues that McCluskey misses this aspect of malice when she writes: "In the case of [certa malitia], there is no reluctance on the part of the agent. She engages in the action wholeheartedly."204 Elsewhere, McCluskey indicates that she is, in fact, aware of the sufferingevil aspect of sins of malice: "the agent would prefer to have this good without incurring the sin, but because the sin is necessarily attached to the pleasure, the agent is willing to incur the sin in order not to be deprived of the pleasure." 205 Kent and Dressel suggest that the malicious man is not reluctant in sinning, although he would prefer not to suffer the evil attached to the object he pursues: Aquinas does suggest that the [malicious agent] would prefer to attain his intended end without sinning. However, we need not take this to mean that the person acts reluctantly…. the [malicious agent] can come to desire some good so strongly that she sins decisively and gladly, even while recognizing that her action is a sin and wishing it were not.206 203 Jensen, Sin, 161. McCluskey, "Willful Wrongdoing," 10. See Jensen, Sin, 161, n. 10. 205 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 118. 206 Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and willful wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 47-48. Kent and Dressel point to In Iob I.4, §36, wherein Thomas comments that "when taking a bitter medicine, one can rejoice with reason because of the hope for health, although he suffers sensibly." 204 226 "Reluctance" is too strong a word to describe the evil-suffering of the malicious agent; it means "unwillingness, disinclination",207 in which case McCluskey and Kent and Dressel are certainly correct that the malicious agent does not sin reluctantly – it is better to say with them that the malicious agent prefers the object of his desire apart from the evil connected to his pursuit of it, as this word need not imply unwillingness or disinclination.208 If malice does not imply reluctance on the part of the sinning agent, it remains to ask whether it is compatible with regret or remorse after the action has been performed. Does an agent, after he has committed a malicious sin, regret that he has chosen a spiritual evil in pursuit of a temporal good? Does he come to his senses, so to speak, and realize that the spiritual good that he has willingly chosen the loss of constitute a greater good for him? Jensen claims that the one who sins from malice "can regret that he is so attached to bodily goods", although "Such regret is not likely to lead to repentance." 209 McCluskey argues that the malicious sinner feels no remorse for his actions, 210 and she suggests that neither does that agent feel regret.211 Likewise, Sanford writes that sins from malice are performed without regret.212 For his part, Thomas suggests that the malicious sinner does not repent after his sin: "the one who sins willfully does so from certain malice because his will is so prone to sin that 207 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "reluctance, n.". Steel uses the word "prefer" as well. Steel, "Does Evil Have a Cause?" 263 and 266. See the remarks on choice and preference above: pages 162-164. 209 Jensen, Sin, 173. 210 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 123. 211 Ibid., 130. 212 Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 82. Sanford refers to ST I-II.78.3 in order to support his claim, although there is nothing there that implies that the malicious agent does not regret his malicious action once he has performed it. Sanford may be referring to ST I-II.78.3, ad 1, but that text simply states that an agent who sins from his habitus does so with pleasure and "without heavy [gravi] resistance on the part of reason". Or, Sanford may be referring to ST I-II.78.2, ad 3. 208 227 he yields at once... and does not repent afterwards…. Therefore, they sin wilfully, i.e., continue in the will to sin." 213 This is not to say, however, that there is no hope for him: "if someone has fallen into a certain sin often and unchecked by any restraint, it is a sign that he sins from malice or choice, and he will not easily be amended."214 Elsewhere, Thomas makes an interesting comment that seems to indicate a basis for amendment in the malicious agent: those who are temperate do what they would, inasmuch as there is no lust in the tamed flesh; but because it cannot be totally tamed so as never to rise up against the spirit – just as neither can malice so abound that reason would never complain – therefore, in those instances in which they do lust, they are doing what they would not; but for the most part they do what they would.215 Elsewhere still, Thomas suggests that there are at least some malicious sinners who can only be amended by God's help: "those who out of malice are sunk in their many sins can be despaired of from the point of view of their own strength…. But no one should despair if it is a question of the divine power."216 Let us re-frame the above points with an eye to all of them together. First, the malicious agent does not repent immediately after performing his action. This is because of the ignorance associated with sins of malice; 217 he believes that the evil in his choice is worth suffering for the end he desires. Second, amending the malicious sinner is possible, which in 213 In Heb. X.3, §515. Elsewhere, Thomas comments on Prov. 2:14: "they are glad when they do evil, and rejoice in the worst of things. The reason for this is that they do not hate their sins: they do not sin from ignorance or weakness, but from malice." In Ioan. V.1, §706. 214 In Sent. IV.19.2.3.1, ad 2. Emphasis my own. Thomas continues, contrasting the malicious sinner with the man who sins from passion: "But if once, when the occasion of sinning was presented, he slipped into sin and afterward showed sadness and shame for his sin, it is a sign that the sin is from passion or weakness, and that he will be amended more easily." 215 In Gal. V.4, §315. Emphasis my own. 216 In Eph. II.1, §79. 217 See pages 213-219 above. 228 turn implies that regret over his malicious actions is likewise possible. 218 Third, amending the malicious sinner is difficult, if not at times impossible under our own power. He will not easily come to regret his actions and so amend his ways. The difficulty of this task cannot be overstated: Thomas writes that we are to despair of some malicious sinners apart from the help of God. What of Langan's error, then?219 How does one make sense of the two claims that (i) the object of the will is always an apparent good, and that (ii) in sins of malice, the agent chooses an evil knowingly? Recall that Langan interpreted these claims as stating that (i) "the will's choice is always a choice of good",220 and that (ii) "the will in choosing what is evil out of malice must be choosing what is known to be evil."221 As they stand, Langan's interpretations of points (i) and (ii) are certainly in conflict. The reader will notice, however, that Thomas's point (i)222 and Langan's interpretation of it are fundamentally different: Langan has expanded Thomas's point (i) to include choice, which, as we saw above, is a distinct act of the will which refers to a specific aspect of human action: the means.223 For Thomas, the object of the will refers to a different aspect of human action: the end.224 Here, the relevant 218 Recall the text of ST I-II.78.2, ad 3, quoted above on pages 101, and 212, note 149. See page 221 above. 220 Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 180. 221 Ibid., 183. 222 Thomas explicitly states the aspects of these points at many places just in the Prima Secundae: see ST I-II.1.1, co.; 1.1, ad 2; 1.2, ad 3; 1.3, co.; 2.8, co.; 5.8, co.; 8.1, co.; 8.1, ad 2; 9.1, co.; 10.1, co.; 10.2, co.; 11.1, ad 1; 13.5, ad 2; 19.2, ad 1; 20.1, ad 1; 56.6, co.; 77.2, co.; and 113.3, ad 2. Note that I have not included the objections in this list. 223 See pages 162-164 above. 224 See ST I-II.1.1, co. and ad 2. Many of the references in note 222 immediately above refer to this aspect of the object of the will as well. See also ST I-II.8.2, co., wherein Thomas explains how the will (the power) bears upon the means. 219 229 acts of the will are intention and choice. 225 That said, there are two points to make which will correct Langan's mistaken interpretation of malice as Thomas understands it: (1) choice is of the means, and (2) intention is of the end. Above, we quoted Langan as writing that I maintain that... the clear-headed choice of known evil is possible for human persons. I observe, also, that Thomas, for various theological reasons, has to allow this possibility. This produces certain paradoxes and even contradictions in his argument because this possibility is not really compatible with his moral psychology, particularly with what I have been calling the psychological thesis, namely, that the object of choice is always a good. The various moves that Thomas and his followers make in order to reconcile the psychological thesis and the possibility of the choice of evil in sins of malice are ultimately unsatisfactory, since despite initial appearances, they do not really allow for the deliberate choice of evil.226 Langan is correct: Thomas allows for the "clear-headed" choice of known evil, and this is part of what it means to sin from malice. Where Langan errs, however, is in the so-called "psychological thesis" that he attributes to Thomas, but which is in reality an invention of Langan's own making. For Thomas, it is not true to say that the object of choice is always a good. Choice, we have seen, is an act of the will that refers to the means, which means may be good or evil: one may knowingly make a good choice or an evil choice. In other words, the tension between Langan's points (i) "the will's choice is always a choice of good", and (ii) "the will in choosing what is evil out of malice must be choosing what is known to be evil", is the result of Langan's misinterpretation, and not the result of anything in the work of Thomas. What Langan has done is interpret Thomas's claim (i) "the object of the will is always an apparent good", which in the context of action is a point about intention, as being about 225 See the discussion of the acts of the will above: pages 162-166. Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 197. Emphases my own. For the quotation above, see page 224, note 197. 226 230 choice.227 By themselves, Thomas's points (i) and (ii) are not contradictory, as Langan would have it, since (i) concerns an entirely different act of the will – and a different aspect of the human act – than does (ii). Above, from the text of ST I-II.78.1, ad 2, we derived the points (a) evil cannot be intended as an end, and (b) evil can be intended as a means; 228 but to intend something as a means is just what it means to choose it.229 When evil is knowingly chosen, the agent recognizes its evil character, and so would wish to obtain the end he intends (a perceived good) without incurring the evil associated with the means. Nevertheless, he chooses (not intends) the means (not the end), as his intention (not choice) of the end (not the means) is such as to result in his viewing the incurring of said evil as appropriate given the desired end. Langan has mistaken one act of the will (choice) for another (intention), which, indeed, would result in "certain paradoxes and even contradictions". 230 However, if Langan means, along with Steel, to say that the clear-headed intention of known evil as an end is possible for human persons, then he must set aside his charges of paradoxes and contradictions, as, at least in this respect, they are not present in Thomas's texts, and work out an explanation for how this is possible. 227 The word "intention" and its related terms (in this case, "intended"), occur only three times in Langan's article: once unrelated to the discussion of Thomas (page 181), and twice when Langan is quoting Thomas's words (page 188). Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas." 228 See page 222. 229 See ST I-II.12.2. 230 Langan, "Sins of Malice in the Moral Psychology of Thomas Aquinas," 197. 231 IV.iii.c. The Choice of Evil A large number of scholars have interpreted malice as consisting in the preference of a lesser good over a greater good. For example, McCluskey claims that, in sins of malice, "The agent prefers the lesser good to a greater good, knowing that it is a lesser good", 231 and later, more explicitly: "Aquinas defines certa malitia simply as the pursuit of a lesser good at the expense of a greater good, knowing that it is wrong to bring about such a state of affairs." 232 Porter writes: "someone who sins out of deliberate malice prefers some temporal good to the order of reason or to charity".233 Sanford characterizes malice thusly: "Malice is to be found in the will that knowingly has departed from its right rule and prefers to elevate lesser goods above those superior [spiritual] ones."234 Likewise, Steel writes: "whenever someone prefers a temporal good over his eternal good, he knowingly wishes for absolute evil, and hence is said to sin through a certain malice… as if he chooses evil knowingly." 235 Sweeney, too, notes: "In malice, one can simply prefer a lesser to a greater good".236 The above scholars have interpreted malice in terms of an order of goods in general, so that malice is taken to consist in the choice or preference of any lesser good (usually 231 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 118. See also McCluskey, "Thomas Aquinas and the Epistemology of Moral Wrongdoing," 112: "In Summa theologiae, Aquinas describes the fundamental problem [what's going wrong when an agent sins from malice] as one in which the agent (in virtue of the will) prefers a lesser good to a greater good, moving her to forsake the greater good in order to obtain the lesser good…. He also describes the problem as a preference for temporal goods over spiritual goods". 232 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 131. 233 Porter, "The Virtue of Justice," 275. 234 Sanford, "On Vice and Free Choice," 81. Emphasis in the original. See also ibid., 86. 235 Steel, "Does Evil Have a Cause?" 266. We leave aside the question as to whether or not, in sins of malice, the agent "knowingly wishes for absolute evil". 236 Sweeney, "Vice and Sin," 162. 232 temporal) over any greater good (usually spiritual). In fact, as we will see in greater detail, 237 malice consists in a disordered will when that disorder consists in a greater love of a specifically temporal good over a specifically spiritual good, and when that love results in the choice of a spiritual evil. Here, our primary focus will not be on the above scholars, but on another who is illustrative of a stronger interpretation: Dressel. While commenting on ST I-II.78.1, co., the text of the Summa Theologiae where Thomas defines malice, Dressel writes the following: "the person who sins from malitia chooses a temporal good, like pleasure, over a spiritual good, like obedience to God's law or virtue…. The knowing choice to give up some spiritual good for a temporal one, then, is what Aquinas calls sinning from malitia."238 The reason why Dressel's interpretation is stronger than those of the other scholars quoted above is that Dressel comes closer to the correct interpretation of malice: malice consists in an act of the will, a choice, and not merely in a preference.239 While it is true that Thomas characterizes choice, as an act of the will, as "the taking of one thing in preference to another",240 interpreting malice simply in terms of this preference and not as a choice specifically has the unfortunate connotation of softening what occurs in the malicious action: evil is chosen, it is not simply preferred. The difference here between choice and preference is that between accepting a spiritual evil as something to be suffered for the sake of a temporal good here and now in this action, and a more general case, 237 See immediately below: pages 234-242. Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Wilfull Wrongdoing," 12-13. 239 The second of McCluskey's texts quoted above hints at this. McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 131. Notably, of the two halves of the quotation of Dressel above, the second gets even closer to the correct interpretation than the first. 240 ST I-II.13.2, co. For choice, see pages 162-164 above. 238 233 corresponding to volition,241 where an agent loves a temporal good more than a spiritual good, but has not acted on this love so as to exclude said spiritual good in pursuit of the temporal good. Where Dressel goes wrong, however, is what that malicious choice actually consists in. According to Thomas, the malicious choice is one of evil. According to Dressel interpreting Thomas, the malicious choice is one of a temporal good (or, according to the second half of the Dressel text immediately above, the giving up of a good). That Thomas thinks that malice is the (i) choice (ii) of evil is shown by pointing to the numerous texts wherein he states explicitly just that. For just a few examples, see the following: • "he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly." (ST I-II.78.1, co.) • "A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil." (ST I-II.78.2, s.c.) • "sometimes also a man, without having the [habitus] of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice." (ST I-II.78.3, s.c.) • "If then a person should wish so much to enjoy some pleasure, say, adultery or some desirable thing of this kind, that he does not shrink from incurring the deformity of sin which he perceives to be conjoined to what he wills, not only will he be said to will that good he principally wills, but even that very 241 For volition, see page 162 above. 234 deformity, which he chooses to incur, to avoid being deprived of the desired good." (De Malo III.12, co.)242 Other texts highlight the choice aspect of malice without specifying that this is a choice of evil in particular. For example: • "The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e., through deliberate choice or malice". (ST I-II.105.2, co.) • "Or, we could say that they were alienated in mind, i.e., by choice, maliciously contradicting God". (In Col. I.5, §55)243 Still other texts highlight the movement of the will to evil aspect of malice without specifying that this movement is one of choice in particular. For example: • "then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord." (ST I-II.78.3, co.) • "when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were." (ST I-II.78.4, co.) • "in him who sins from malice, the willing of evil is the first principle of sin because of itself… his will is inclined to the willing of evil". (De Malo III.12, ad 5) 242 Although not explicit in the quotation, Thomas is speaking about malice. Notice that in willing the end the agent is said to will the means to that end. See ST I-II.12.4, co. 243 The Latin reads: "Vel alienati sensu, id est ex electione contradicentes ei ex malitia." I have altered the translation somewhat. 235 In my own research, I have been unable to find a single instance of Thomas suggesting that malice consists in either a preference or a choice of a lesser good over a greater good. Without exception, Thomas is clear that malice consists in the choice of evil. Two potential objections come to mind. The first concerns the text of the Summa Theologiae wherein Thomas defines malice: ST I-II.78.1, co. This is the text which the scholars referred to in this section have drawn their problematic interpretations. 244 It runs as follows: the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to obtain a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.245 Dressel quotes this entire text in her dissertation, 246 and from it she derives her problematic interpretation of malice. At first blush, this might seem like a warranted derivation. Thomas writes that the will is disordered when it loves the lesser good more than the greater good, and that as a consequence, it can will to obtain a temporal good even if it means that the agent 244 These same scholars also draw from De Malo III.12, co. However, the text of the Summa Theologiae is much more conducive to their interpretations of malice, and as what I have to say about the Summa Theologiae text easily applies to the De Malo text, I will restrict my focus to the Summa Theologiae text. 245 ST I-II.78.1, co. We have analyzed this text above. See pages 205-206. 246 In her own translation, which does not differ in any relevant way from the Shapcote translation that I am using here. See Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Wilfull Wrongdoing," 12. 236 is deprived of a spiritual good. At the very least, there might appear to be a basis for the "the will prefers a lesser good more" interpretation of malice. If we break down the above text, however, we find no support for the interpretations of Dressel and company. We might present an analysis of said text in the following manner: (1) the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. This is a simple explanation of what it means for the will to be disordered. Thus far, there is no indication that Thomas has anything like malice in mind. (2a) Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: Notice that (2a) is not about the consequences of having a disordered will, but about the consequences of having a will that loves one thing less than another. In this case, whether the will is disordered or not, one is willing to suffer some hurt with respect to the thing loved less in order to obtain the good that one loves more. Next, in (2b), Thomas provides an example of the point he just made in (2a): (2b) as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. The example provided in (2b) is not meant to be an instance of the will being disordered (which it would be if (2a) were about the consequences of (1)). In the example, the man loves his life more than his limb, and so he is willing to suffer the loss of his limb in order to save his life. That is a consequence of that man loving his life more than his limb. He does not thereby have a disordered will, because he does not love the lesser good more; his life is a 237 greater good than is his limb, and he loves his life more than he does his limb. His will is (in this respect) properly ordered. What follows in (3a) is the antecedent of a hypothetical: (3a) Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, Here, Thomas refers back to (1), having set it aside during (2a) and (2b). Thomas is arguing in (3a) and (3b) that: (3a) when (1) happens in a certain way (P), the consequent (3b) follows. (P) refers to a will which loves some temporal good in particular more than a spiritual good 247 in particular. That is, when a will which loves more the lesser good loves some temporal good in particular (which is a lesser good when compared to a spiritual good) 248 more than a spiritual good in particular (which is a greater good when compared to a temporal good), the consequent (3b) will result. In (3a), Thomas also provides examples of temporal (riches, pleasure) and spiritual (the order of reason, Divine law, Divine charity) goods. (3b) it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain some temporal good. As (3b) is the consequent of (3a), (3b) retains the scope of (3a). That is, (3b) is still concerned with (1), a disordered will: (1) is the second "it" of (3b). This is not to say that (3b) applies to all disordered wills, only that when (1) happens in a certain way (P), then (3b) results. By itself, the text of Thomas does nothing to say that when (1) happens, it always happens in a certain way (P). The possibility that (1) may not happen in a certain way (P) is 247 Although Thomas does not mention spiritual goods in (3a), (3b) makes it clear that he has these in 248 That Thomas thinks this will be made clear in (5). mind. 238 left open.249 Here, (3b) is essentially an application of (2a) to (3a), so that we may say that when (3a) [(1) happens in a certain way (P)], then (3b) [(2a) results with respect to the goods of (P)]; that is, the will is willing to suffer the loss of the good it loves less (in this case, a spiritual good), in order that it might obtain the good that it loves more (in this case, a temporal good).250 Thomas's next point connects (3b) with (5): (4) Now evil is merely the privation of some good; This is the well known Thomistic dictum that evil has no substance of its own; it is the privation of some good, existing in some good.251 (5) and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to obtain a temporal good: As the will of (1) in the way (P) desires in the manner of (2a) with respect to the goods of (P), the agent is willing, knowingly, to undergo (3b). In (3b) it is deprived of a spiritual good, which, via (4), means that it suffers (5), a spiritual evil, so that it may obtain the temporal good which it loves more. Note the application that (2a) has to (5): the spiritual evil is suffered in order to obtain the temporal good. Again, this is done knowingly by the agent in question, just as in (2b) the agent is willing to suffer the amputation of his limb (the loss of a good, an evil) in order to save his life (a good which he desires more). Thomas concludes: 249 Indeed, the text implies that a will may be disordered without preferring a temporal good to spiritual good, otherwise (3a) would be redundant. Thus, preferring a lesser temporal good to a greater temporal good would not count as a sin from malice. See McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 135, who, in error as to aspect (P) and its importance, sees some malicious tension between an agent choosing an unhealthy breakfast over a healthier one. In fact, there is no tension: the issue is between two temporal goods. Where there is no willing deprivation of a spiritual good, there is no malice. 250 The following points (4), (5), and (6) are three different sentences in the Latin, although in the Shapcote translation they are translated as one sentence. 251 See ST I.48.1-4; and De Malo I.1-3. 239 (6) wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. It is this process that Thomas calls sinning from malice: the process from (1) to (3a) in a certain way (P); then, by (2a) through (3b); and finally by (4) we are lead to malice: (5). By (6), Thomas indicates that (5) is what he means by malice, (1) through (4) being the process by which he led his reader to the proper understanding of (5). The text of Thomas, divided in the above manner, appears thus: (1) the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. (2a) Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: (2b) as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. (3a) Accordingly when [(1)] an inordinate will (P) loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, (3b) it follows that [(2a)] it [(1)] is willing to suffer the loss of [(P)] some spiritual good, so that it may obtain some temporal good. (4) Now evil is merely the privation of some good; (5) and so a man [(3b)] wishes knowingly a spiritual [(4)] evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to obtain a temporal good: (6) wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. Having analyzed the text in greater detail, we can see where Dressel has gone wrong. 252 Recall that Dressel interpreted malice thusly: "the person who sins from malitia chooses a temporal 252 To make no mention of the other scholars, discussed above on page 232, who interpret malice as a "preference", and not as an act of choice specifically. 240 good, like pleasure, over a spiritual good, like obedience to God's law or virtue…. The knowing choice to give up some spiritual good for a temporal one, then, is what Aquinas calls sinning from malitia."253 Dressel writes that the person who sins from malice chooses a temporal good.254 This is incorrect; the malicious sinner chooses a spiritual evil on account of a temporal good. To be precise in naming the acts of the will, the malicious agent makes a choice for a spiritual evil because he intends a temporal good.255 It is not the case that the malicious agent makes a choice between a temporal good and a spiritual good in favour of the former, as choices make no sense without reference to an end. The malicious agent intends a temporal good as an end, which he sees is incompatible with a spiritual good. In intending the end, then, he wills the privation of the spiritual good, which just is to will a spiritual evil. The second potential objection concerns terminology: Doesn't it amount to the same to say (as Dressel claims)256 that, on the one hand, a good is given up, and, on the other hand, one incurs an evil? While any privation of a good is evil, 257 the English phrase "give up" implies that one has possession of that which one is in the process of giving up. In sins of malice, this need not necessarily be the case. A more suitable word might be "reject", 258 in which case the objection is certainly correct. However, it is worth noting that Thomas himself 253 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Wilfull Wrongdoing," 12-13. See page 233 above. Dressel is right to highlight the importance of the temporal / spiritual distinction (contra McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 118, n. 4). See pages 208-211 above. 254 Later, Dressel writes that the malicious man chooses pleasure. Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Wilfull Wrongdoing," 17. 255 Each of the words "choice", "spiritual", "evil", "intends", "temporal", and "good" are crucial here, both in their meaning and in their placement in the proposition. 256 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Wilfull Wrongdoing," 18 and 30. 257 This is why the second half of the quotation of Dressel above is more accurate. Se e page 233, note 239 above. 258 See the note on "deprivation" and "rejection" on page 209, note 133 above. 241 prefers to speak of malice in terms of incurring evil, suffering evil, and the like, and not in terms of giving up a good; we have seen this throughout this chapter: malice is the choice of evil, he who sins from malice wills the deformity of sin and suffers a loss, and so on. To my mind, there may be at least two reasons for this fact. First, "evil" is the proper term for the privation of good. Second, interpreting malice in terms of the willing of evil, as opposed to the willing deprivation of good, better communicates its grave character. This is clearly seen in Thomas's declaration that "he that sins through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his punishment."259 This claim is not as easy to accept when malice is interpreted as the choice for the willing deprivation of a good (even spiritual) so that one may obtain another good (even temporal) as when it is interpreted as the knowing choice of spiritual evil. Ultimately, Dressel and company err in interpreting malice primarily within the context of an order of goods, of choosing one good over another – such an interpretation only serves to soften Thomas's understanding of malice, divorcing it from the very context that gives it its grave character: malice is the knowing choice of a spiritual evil in pursuit of a merely temporal good. IV.iii.d. Translating Malitia The third issue pertaining to the secondary literature on Thomas's understanding of malice concerns the translation of malitia. A number of scholars have argued against translating malitia as "malice". For example, Dressel writes that "While English translators often call 259 ST II-II.14.3, co. See also In Rom. II.1, §187. 242 [malicious acts] sins from 'malice', this translation does more to confuse than to clarify." 260 The reason for this has to do with the grave connotations of "malice": "Though truly malicious actions, like torture, can be sins from malitia, more mundane actions, like lying, overeating, and extramarital sex can be sins from malitia as well."261 Jensen, in his work on sin in the thought of Thomas, writes that "I have avoided the standard translation of malitia, usually rendered 'malice.' The word 'malice'… seems too strong and restrictive for what Aquinas means by malitia."262 McCluskey rejects the English word "malice" as a translation of malitia for similar reasons: the English term 'malice' has implications that are not present in the Latin. The Latin word malitia is the abstract term for the adjective malus, which simply means 'bad.' Thus malitia literally means 'badness,' a term that is awkward in English. But the distinction between badness and malice is very important, for 'malice' is usually reserved for the most heinous kinds of evil, or evil performed on the basis of the worst motives. These are implications that are not present in the Latin; the Latin term is much broader and more neutral. It leaves open whether such evils fall under this category.263 According to these scholars, at issue here is the especially cruel connotation that seems to accompany the English word "malice" and which does not accompany the Latin word malitia. 260 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 9. Dressel, together with Kent, echoes this sentiment verbatim in Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and Willful Wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 44. 261 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 9. Dressel does not indicate what she believes to constitute a "truly malicious" action. Neither does she indicate what constitutes a "mundane" action. For Thomas, at least, fornication is anything but mundane. See ST II-II.154.2. 262 Jensen, Sin, 158, n. 1. Unfortunately, Jensen does not explain how "malice" is too strong and restrictive a word. 263 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 116. Later, McCluskey writes that a fellow scholar's translation of malitia as "malice" is unfortunate. See ibid., 122, n. 16. Elsewhere, McCluskey claims that "translating malitia as 'malice' implies that all sins of the will are particularly horrifying". McCluskey, "Thomas Aquinas and the Epistemology of Moral Wrongdoing," 112. 243 As a result, Dressel prefers to translate malitia as "willful wrongdoing",264 Jensen as "evil will",265 while McCluskey prefers "deliberate wrongdoing".266 In this chapter, we have seen that malitia is a complex and rich word which implies many subtle concepts, and in this sense "malice" is insufficient in capturing the meaning of malitia.267 Yet, the issue at hand is not that "malice" implies too little, but that it implies too much; specifically, the issue is that "malice" implies a gravity that malitia does not. However, the gravity that "malice" is thought to imply is indeed present in malitia. Above, we saw that sins of malitia imply the willing choice of the privation of a spiritual good in pursuit of a temporal good; sins of malitia are mortal sins, and these are the gravest of all sins.268 What's more, in sinning from malitia, the will is moved to choose evil of its own accord, prior to the influence of the sensitive appetite. For this reason, Thomas ties sins of malitia with falling into sin with great intensity.269 Malicious actions of any kind, then, are anything but mundane; rather, they are evil, in the strongest (moral) sense of the word.270 Further, it is not clear that the English word "malice" has the grave connotations that Dressel, Jensen, and McCluskey claim that it does. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines "malice" as "The intention or desire to do evil or cause injury to another 264 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 9. See also Kent and Dressel, "Weakness and willful wrongdoing in Aquinas's De malo," 44. 265 Jensen, Sin, 158, n. 1. 266 McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 116. 267 For example, the English word "malice" does not necessarily imply a disorder in the will itself, and still less does it denote as disordered will wherein said disorder consists a greater love of a temporal good over a spiritual good. 268 See pages 143-147 above. 269 See ST I.63.8, ad 3. See also De Malo III.13, co. 270 McCluskey is correct to note that malitia, in its abstract sense, means "badness". However, in its narrower moral sense (here I am referring to the interior cause of sinful action), it implies so much more than simple "badness". McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 116. 244 person; active ill will or hatred. In later use also in weakened sense: mischievous intent, the desire to discomfort."271 In legal settings, according to the same dictionary, "malice" means "wrongful intention generally".272 Merriam-Webster defines "malice" as "the desire to cause pain, injury, or distress to another", and secondarily as "intent to commit an unlawful act or cause harm without legal justification or excuse." 273 "Malice" is defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as "the wish to harm or upset other people", and as "the intention to do something wrong and [especially] to cause injury".274 Finally, the Collins Dictionary defines malice as "behaviour that is intended to harm people or their reputations, or cause them embarrassment and upset", as "the desire to do harm or mischief", further as "evil intent", and further still as "active ill will; desire to harm another or to do mischief; spite". 275 These definitions tell against Dressel, Jensen, and McCluskey's claims that "malice" implies too "heinous" a kind of evil;276 if anything, "malice" is too soft a word, as the above dictionaries define it in part in terms of mischief, discomfort, distress, upset, and embarrassment, all of which may just as easily apply to venial and non-malicious sins. And where the above 271 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "malice, n.". Ibid. 273 Merriam-Webster, s.v. "malice". Compare In Rom. II.1, §187: "[a sin] committed from deliberate malice has no ground for excuse". 274 Cambridge English Dictionary, s.v. "malice". 275 Collins Dictionary, s.v. "malice". These dictionaries highlight the aspect of intention in malice (rather than choice), although for our purposes we may simply say that they include an act of the will in the definition of malice. Perhaps the most significant difference between these dictionary definitions of "malice" and Thomas's use of malitia is that the English word "malice" often refers to harming other people, whereas Thomas's malitia is not so restricted. In fact, one might say that for Thomas, malitia involves the knowing harming of oneself, insofar as one knowingly deprives oneself of the order of reason or the divine good, or some other spiritual good. 276 The word is McCluskey's and was quoted above on page 243. See McCluskey, Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing, 116. 272 245 dictionaries do use stronger terms such as evil, injury, harm, and the like, they do not record "malice" as consisting in a particularly abundant quantity of these things. I submit, then, that the usual translation of malitia as "malice" is not at all inappropriate, at least not for the reasons that were analyzed here. Having examined first habitus and vice in Chapters I and II, and then sin and malice in Chapter III and here in Chapter IV, we are in an excellent position to turn to the object of our inquiry: the relationship between vice and malice. 246 PART THREE V THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICE AND MALICE Examining the relationship between vice and malice is not as straightforward as examining the relationship between vice and virtue; nor is it as straightforward as examining the relationship between malice and passion or ignorance. Where vice and virtue, on the one hand, and malice and passion or ignorance, on the other, are, roughly speaking, species of the same genus (habitus and interior causes of sinful actions), vice and malice are not different species of the same genus, and so do not as readily admit of comparison and evaluation with respect to each other. Vice is a habitus of a certain kind, an accident of the category quality, and is in the subject as a result of its form – vice belongs to the second sub-species of the first species of quality, and has as its principle and measure nature. 1 Malice, meanwhile, is of an entirely different nature. Malice, as an interior cause of sinful action, denotes a disordered will whereby an agent knowingly chooses a spiritual evil so as to obtain a perceived temporal good. The relationship between vice and malice may most fruitfully be examined not on the basis of a shared genus, but rather on the basis of the interplay between them. This is most evident insofar as the relationship runs from vice to malice: Thomas insists that all vicious 1 See page 28 above. 248 actions are malicious.2 Insofar as malice is related to vice, however, things are somewhat less clear, although here too something substantial can be said.3 This final chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, we will examine the relationship between vice and malice itself, consisting in, firstly, an examination of the relationship of vice to malice, and secondly, an examination of the relationship of malice to vice. Of second concern will be the generation of vice, as well as the progression of sins of passion to sins of malice. Finally, the weakening and corruption of vice and the rectitude of the malicious intellectual appetite will close out our project of examining the relationship between vice and malice. V.i. The Relationship Itself When it comes to examining the relationship between vice and malice, it is important to approach both vice and malice from the side of the other. This is because the relationship between the two is quite different depending upon whether one asks "What is the relationship of vice to malice?" or "What is the relationship of malice to vice?" In each of his two major treatments of malice, Thomas argues that, on the one hand, every vicious action is a malicious action, and on the other hand, not every malicious action need be a vicious action. 4 Exploring why Thomas argues for these two conclusions is crucial to properly understanding the relationship between vice and malice. We will discuss the former claim first. 2 See ST I-II.78.2; and De Malo III.13, co. See also the next section of this chapter, pages 250-260 below. 3 See pages 260-272 below. See ST I-II.78.2-3; De Malo III.13, co.; and De Malo III.14, co. McCluskey claims that in the De Malo, "Aquinas assumes that all acts of [malice] are the result of a bad habit". McCluskey, "Willful Wrongdoing," 46, n. 21. Unfortunately, she appears to miss the text of De Malo III.14, co. 4 249 V.i.a. Vicious Acts Are Malicious Acts In the Prima Secundae, Thomas asks whether everyone who sins through habitus sins through certain malice.5 His affirmative answer draws a distinction between a vicious agent sinning, and a vicious agent sinning by using his habitus: "There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the [habitus], and a sin committed by [habitus]: for it is not necessary to use a [habitus], since it is subject to the will of the person who has that [habitus]. Hence [habitus] is defined as being something we use when we will".6 That is, a vicious agent may not use his vicious habitus in acting, as said habitus is subject to his will. Thomas goes on to explain how a vicious agent might not use his vice in acting: And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious [habitus] may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad [habitus] does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious [habitus], acts, not from that [habitus], but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance.7 A vicious agent may not use his vice in acting, as he may instead act from passion or ignorance. Above, we saw Głowala make this point with respect to a spiteful man: "[the spiteful man's] action may be prompted by an immense fear (he may have been blackmailed into it); in this case it is not true that he did it because he is spiteful, although it was nasty and he actually is spiteful."8 Next, Thomas turns his attention to the agent who does use his vice in acting: 5 ST I-II.78.2. ST I-II.78.2, co. Emphasis in the original. That habitus are subject to the will of the agent in which they adhere was discussed above. See pages 66-71. 7 ST I-II.78.2, co. 8 Głowala, "What Kind of Power is Virtue?" 27-28. Emphases in the original. See page 68 above. 6 250 But whenever he uses the vicious [habitus] he must needs sin through certain malice: because to anyone that has a [habitus], whatever is befitting to him in respect of that [habitus], has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and [habitus] turn into nature [vertitur in naturam]. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious [habitus], is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain what befits him in respect of that [habitus]: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through [habitus], sins through certain malice.9 There are a number of aspects to the above quotation that deserve to be teased out and expanded upon; they are presented here in my own words: (1) Habitus, in a way, turn into nature. (2) The objects that habitus are directed towards are lovable to the agent with the habitus. (3) Vicious habitus are directed to objects that exclude spiritual goods. (4) Since a vicious agent loves objects that exclude spiritual goods, he is willing to choose spiritual evils in order to obtain the objects that his habitus are directed towards. (5) Whoever sins through habitus sins through malice.10 Let us examine these points in turn. (1) Habitus, in a way, turn into nature – Above we saw this point fleshed out in some detail.11 Recall that habitus involve what I have called the focusing of the powers of the soul. The powers of the soul that are subject to the will are able to be directed to many and varied things. The sensitive appetite, for example, may be directed towards different particular goods of sense that may have different relationships with the sensing agent: where an agent's sensitive appetite may be able to regard food in nearly endless ways, a habitus will focus his appetite so that he may enjoy food in a particular way promptly, easily, and pleasurably. 9 ST I-II.78.2, co. I have altered the translation somewhat. Shapcote translates vertitur in naturam as "second nature", which is not accurate; see pages 53-54 above. 10 These five points and the manner in which I have presented them are not meant to be illustrative of an attempt to reduce the above quotation to a formal argument. They are simply meant to provide the catalyst for further discussion. 11 See pages 52-71. 251 Regarding as they do something fundamental in man (certain powers) with respect to his form (certain powers of his soul), the focusing of the powers of his soul is quasi-permanent, so that they are called "nature" in a secondary sense.12 Thus, habitus, in a way, turn into nature. (2) The objects that habitus are directed towards are lovable to the agent with the habitus – This was discussed above in part. 13 Strictly speaking, habitus are directed to acts, and it is these acts that are directed to objects that are lovable to the agent with the habitus. Habitus are a mean between potency and act, and as such are secondary potency compared to action, which is second act compared to habitus. Further, the acts of a habitus, as acts, are directed towards perceived goods,14 that is, to goods that are perceived as appropriate or desirable to the agent in some way. As habitus, in a way, turn into nature, the objects of the acts to which they are directed are perceived as suitable to the agent in which the habitus adhere, and so said objects are lovable to that agent.15 (3) Vicious habitus are directed to objects that exclude spiritual goods – Again, strictly speaking, habitus are directed to acts, while it is acts that are directed to goods (real or perceived). The acts of a vicious habitus are unsuitable to the human agent, being in discord with his rational human nature.16 Such acts and the objects to which they are directed are 12 See In Ethic. VII.10, §1467. The text of In Ethic. will be very helpful throughout the remainder of this chapter, especially Book VII, which treats of continence and incontinence in a much more direct manner than does the Summa Theologiae. 13 See pages 54-61, where the direction of habitus to act was discussed, and pages 61-65, where the role of pleasure with respect to habitus was discussed. 14 See pages 158-161 above. 15 See ST I-II.29.1, ad 3: "To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad." 16 See pages 80-82 above. 252 against both the order of reason and the divine law,17 which are spiritual goods.18 The objects to which the vicious act are directed, then, exclude spiritual goods, as they are incompatible with such goods. This is an essential feature of vicious habitus; there is no vice that is not directed towards goods that are not incompatible with the order of reason or with the divine law.19 (4) Since a vicious agent loves objects that exclude spiritual goods, he is willing to choose spiritual evils in order to obtain the objects that his habitus are directed towards – This was explained above when discussing malice. 20 When someone loves one object more than another, one is willing to suffer some loss with respect to the latter object so as to obtain the former; Thomas's example was of a man who loves his life more than his limb, and so he is willing to suffer the loss of his limb in order to save his life. In the case of point (4), the vicious agent is willing to suffer the loss of spiritual goods in order to obtain temporal goods that are incompatible with said spiritual goods. (5) Whoever sins through habitus sins through malice – The conclusion to Thomas's argument follows from the above points. Put in simpler terms, a habitus makes its proper operation (and the end to which that operation is directed) lovable to the agent in which it adheres. The lustful agent, for example, delights in his lustful actions and in the pleasure that he derives from them. Now, vicious habitus in particular are directed to acts which are contrary to right reason and the divine law, which are spiritual goods. This is the case because 17 Recall that "it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law." ST I-II.71.2, ad 4. See page 140 above. 18 See ST I-II.78.1, co. 19 See pages 80-82 above. 20 See pages 232-242. 253 all vices, as unsuitable to the human agent, are contrary to right reason (and so are contrary to the divine law as well), as are the acts to which they are directed – it is of the very nature of vice that it is contrary to right reason and to human nature. The result is that, in using his vicious habitus, a sinning agent chooses a spiritual evil so that he may obtain the object that his habitus has made lovable to him, and this is just what it means to sin from malice. 21 Thus, to sin by using one's habitus is to sin from malice. Thomas considers three objections to the above position which will prove helpful to examine here. First, Thomas has an objector state: It would seem that not every one who sins through [habitus], sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through [habitus], as when he utters an idle word. Therefore sin committed from [habitus] is not always committed through certain malice.22 In response to this objection, Thomas does not deny that slight (that is, venial) sins are committed through vicious habitus, as might be expected. Instead, he offers an explanation that involves vicious habitus that are only relative evils: "Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the [habitus] thereof is not a simple but a relative evil." 23 Here, Thomas is arguing for something which has not yet come to our attention: a division of vicious habitus according as they are evil simply or evil relatively, according to which a resulting sin may be mortal or venial. Much as mortal sins are sins simply and venial sins are 21 Here, one may object that vicious habitus do not necessarily imply the knowledge that one is choosing a spiritual evil, which knowledge is necessary for malicious action. We will confront this objection below. See pages 284-287. 22 ST I-II.78.2, obj. 1. 23 ST I-II.78.2, ad 1. In the preceding article Thomas writes of malice: "and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply...." ST I-II.78.1, co. 254 sins in a secondary or derivative sense, 24 simple vicious habitus are vicious habitus simply, while relative vicious habitus are vicious habitus relatively. From a phenomenological or experiential perspective, the distinction between simple vicious habitus and relative vicious habitus appears to be warranted; it seems obvious that one may (1) be directed to the ultimate end, and yet (2) have an unsuitable habitus of speaking idle words, for example, which habitus results in (3) actions (that is, idle words) which do not destroy that agent's direction to the ultimate end and which are reparable as venial sins. Further, it would seem entirely within Thomas's line of thought that such relative vicious habitus could develop into simple vicious habitus as the agent continues to perform the relevant venial vicious actions.25 This line of thinking (simple vicious habitus vs. relative vicious habitus) has something in common with what Thomas elsewhere calls unqualified vice and quasi-vice: "although incontinence is not unqualified badness, it is still vice in some sense... it is then a quasi-vice, being but transitory. It is obviously not unqualified vice, because incontinence sins without deliberate choice but real vice with deliberate choice." 26 In this same work, Thomas writes: "There is vice either in the complete sense, such as when the reason and the appetitive faculty aim at evil (this is the real vice that is contrary to virtue), or in an incomplete sense, such as when the appetitive faculty, but not the reason, tends to evil, which occurs in incontinence proper."27 Similar, too, is Thomas's explanation of natural virtue and vice, 24 See pages 143-147 above. Thomas argues that any sin, even a venial sin consisting in an idle word, may become mortal. See ST I-II.72.5, ad 1. 26 In Ethic. VII.8, §1428. The transitory nature of quasi-vice reminds one of the permanence of habitus; see pages 44-47 above. 27 In Ethic. VII.4, §1359. 25 255 which correspond to dispositions of the body, and which, likewise, are not habitus in the primary sense of the word.28 In any event, when they are used, simple vicious habitus – to which we have and will continue to refer to exclusively when using the terms "vicious habitus" and "vice" – imply malicious actions, which in turn implies that said actions are mortal sins. 29 Again, such simple vicious habitus are vicious habitus in the primary sense, so much so that Thomas feels justified in arguing that all sins committed from habitus are malicious. Where he makes such remarks, we would do well to remember that he has simple vicious habitus in mind. The second objection runs thus: "Further, Acts proceeding from [habitus] are like the acts by which those [habitus] were formed.... But the acts which precede a vicious [habitus] are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from [habitus] are not committed through certain malice."30 That is, at least some actions which form a vicious habitus are from passion, and so it would seem that at least some of the actions which proceed from a vicious habitus must likewise be from passion, and not from malice. Thomas's response refers to the perfect acts that habitus are directed towards:31 "Acts proceeding from [habitus] are of like species as the acts from which those [habitus] were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion." 32 The acts which 28 See In Ethic. VI.11, §§1276-1278. See also George, "Aquinas on the Dangers of Natural Virtue and the Control of Natural Vice." 29 Such use assumes that the habitus in question are used in proportion to their intensity, or at least in enough proportion to imply malicious action. See page 132 above; and ST I-II.52.3, co. 30 ST I-II.78.2, obj. 2. The italicized text is a summary of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.1-2. 31 See pages 61-64 above. 32 ST I-II.78.2, ad 2. 256 precede and form a habitus are indeed like the acts which proceed from said habitus, albeit in species and not necessarily with respect to their interior causes.33 What is implied here is a twofold gradation. First, there is a gradation that occurs among sins of a certain species, such that numerically distinct sins of a single species might originate from an agent's passions, and then subsequently, once the habitus is formed, from one's disordered will – and nothing prevents subsequent sins of said species from originating from one's passions again in the future should that habitus weaken and corrupt, or should that habitus not be used by the sinning agent. Second, there is a gradation experienced by the agent himself which accompanies the formation of his vicious habitus: with each subsequent sin of passion, his sensitive appetite is more and more inclined towards similar objects in similar circumstances, until his appetite is so inclined that a habitus is formed, and his will originates subsequent sins prior to the influence of the passions. Again, this gradation may be reversed, so to speak, so that the habitus is weakened and corrupted, and the agent's sensitive appetite becomes less and less inclined to whatever object in whatever circumstances it is inclined to. In each type of gradation, however, the sins of passion are directed towards the sins of habitus, as what is imperfect is directed towards what is perfect.34 The third and final objection refers to remorse with respect to both the vicious agent and the malicious agent: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it... and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of [habitus]. But those who sin through 33 I write "not necessarily" because, as we will see in the following section of this chapter, sometimes an agent may commit a sin from malice without using a vicious habitus. See pages 260-287 below, where I will ultimately suggest that such malicious sins contribute to the generation of vice. 34 See ST II-II.64.2, co. 257 [habitus], are sorrowful after committing a sin: because bad men, i.e., those who have a vicious [habitus], are full of remorse.... Therefore sins that arise from [habitus] are not committed through certain malice.35 Thomas's reply has already been referred to above when we were speaking to the possibility of remorse in the vicious agent36 and again with respect to remorse in the malicious agent; 37 we will reproduce it here: He that sins through [habitus] is always glad for what he does through [habitus], as long as he uses the [habitus]. But since he is able not to use the [habitus], and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the [habitus] he is sorry for what he has done through the [habitus]. And so it often happens [Plerumque] that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.38 Thomas's reference to "reaping some disadvantage from the sin" is perhaps a direct reference to the text of Aristotle quoted above in the objection. The reason why vicious men are "full of remorse" (as the objector puts it) is in part because, according to Aristotle, "their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces." 39 Or by "reaping some disadvantage from the sin", Thomas may be referring to certain essential or accidental aspects of the sin committed, as 35 ST I-II.78.2, obj. 3. The italicized section of the text is a quotation of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX.4, 1166b23-24. 36 See pages 101-102. 37 See page 212, note 149. 38 ST I-II.78.2, ad 3. 39 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX.4, 1166b19-22. Thomas comments on this text: "[Aristotle] explains that [the wicked] can not find internal peace with their passions. He observes that people of this sort are not conscious of their own joys and sorrows. In fact their soul struggles against itself, for the sensitive part resists the reason. On the one hand it grieves, when withdrawing from pleasures, because of evil that dominates it and causes distress in the sensitive part; and on the other hand it rejoices according to reason that judges evil pleasures are to be avoided. In this way one part of the soul draws an evil man one way, but the other part draws him the opposite way; just as if his soul were rent into conflicting drives and fought with itself." In Ethic. IX.4, §1817. 258 when an agent regrets his adulterous action because it is incompatible with a spiritual good, or because he was caught in the act and publicly shamed. These explanations are by no means mutually exclusive, although Thomas's use of plerumque leads one to believe that he is not referring to the accidental aspects of any sin;40 whatever Thomas has in mind, he indicates that most – even a very great part – of the vicious agents who come to feel sorrow for their sins do so because of some disadvantage associated with said sins, and not because the sins themselves are displeasing to them. In any case, the fact that a vicious agent may come to regret his actions does not indicate that he does not sin from malice when he uses his vicious habitus to sin. Outside of the Prima Secundae, Thomas maintains his position that everyone who sins using his habitus sins from malice. For example, in the De Malo Thomas argues that "when someone sins from [habitus], which is to sin from malice, then the will of itself proceeds to the act of sin as it were already totally inclined from [habitus] after the manner of a natural inclination to the act of sin",41 and in his commentary on Romans Thomas reiterates: "a person who sins from [habitus] is said to sin from malice".42 In other places, Thomas writes that "the very inclination of a vicious [habitus]" is called malice,43 and that "real vice [sins] with deliberate choice."44 40 See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "plērumque", leading to "plērusque": "very many, a very great part, the most, most". 41 De Malo III.13, co. 42 In Rom. I.8, §158. See also In Matt. XII.2, §1033. 43 ST II-II.14.1, co. From the context of the article and the subsequent discussion, it is clear that Thomas has certain malice in mind. 44 In Ethic. VII.8, §1428. 259 Every sin proceeding from a vicious habitus is a sin of malice, then, because in every sin from a habitus the agent is choosing a spiritual evil (the rejection of the order of reason or the divine law) in order to obtain a desired temporal good. By sinning from a vicious habitus, the agent's will moves of itself, prior to any influence from the passions, to the desired object as an object of love suitable to the agent, even though this object excludes a spiritual good. Is the reverse true? If an agent knowingly chooses a spiritual evil, is this choice necessarily from a vicious habitus? V.i.b. Malice without Vice In the Prima Secundae, immediately after asking whether everyone who sins through habitus sins through certain malice, Thomas asks whether everyone who sins through certain malice sins through habitus.45 Thomas answers in the negative, and in the sed contra he compares good and bad habitus with respect to their use: The good [habitus] stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad [habitus] to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the [habitus] of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the [habitus] of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.46 In the corpus of the article, Thomas's argument relies upon much of what we have already seen in the above pages: The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, 45 ST I-II.78.3. Although I have divided the analysis of ST I-II.78.2-3 into two different sections, I do not wish to give the impression that these articles can or should be read in isolation. In fact, each article compliments the other, working together to point to the complex relationship that vice and malice share. 46 ST I-II.78.3, s.c. 260 this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord.47 In other words, that the will is inclined to evil is against the nature of the will, and so it must be explained by something besides it. Next, Thomas explains how the will can be moved to evil of its own accord: This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a [habitus] acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself.48 That is, an agent may be disposed to something unsuitable to him in reality but which is perceived as suitable to him because of a developed habitus or a bodily disposition. Because of this habitus or disposition, the will tends to an evil. The second way that the will can be moved to evil of its own accord is as follows: Second, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of something restraining [per remotionem alicuius prohibentis]: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.49 47 ST I-II.78.3, co. Ibid. 49 ST I-II.78.3, co. I have altered the Shapcote translation, which translates "per remotionem alicuius prohibentis" as "through the removal of some obstacle". Prohibeo is a verb, not a noun, which means "to hold back, keep in check, restrain, prevent, forbid, prohibit". Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "prohibeo". Jensen correctly notes that by "fear of hell", Thomas is referring to servile fear. Jensen, Sin, 178. Dressel notes this, too. Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 51. For servile fear, see 48 261 It may be difficult to see how malice due to the removal of a restraint does not collapse into malice to due a disposition in the malicious agent. 50 If a horse is restrained by a bridle, does that not mean that it is disposed towards running about? Likewise, if what prevents a man from sinning is the fear of hell (and nothing else), does that not imply that he is disposed towards sinning? Unfortunately, we cannot look to what actually removes the restraint for answers, as elsewhere Thomas refers to causes that act by removing restraints accidental causes and indirect causes.51 In Thomas's view, that which removes the restraint does not provide any new inclination to the thing moved 52 – the inclination is already there. The so-called bridle is simply preventing the malicious action from being performed. In fact, the reduction of malice due to the removal of a restraint to an already existing inclination on the part of the will is not at all problematic for Thomas; so long as the first movement of any particular sin which results from the removal of the restraint is in the will prior to any influence from the passions, and the ignorance involved is voluntary, that particular sin will be malicious. In the De Malo, Thomas likens the malicious agent who sins as the result of the removal of a restraint to water pouring forth from a broken vase. This is contrasted with a malicious sin which is the result of a vicious habitus, which is likened by Thomas to a heavy object which is naturally inclined downwards. The implication is that the water itself, like the heavy object, has a naturally inclination downwards, although the vase ST II-II.19.2, co. 50 The parallel texts are not helpful here. See, for example, ST II-II.14.1, co.; De Malo III.14, co.; and In Matt. XII.2, §1033. The first of these calls restraints to the choice of evil "that which might have prevented the choosing of evil", which seems to imply a disordered will that is already inclined towards malice. 51 ST I-II.85.5, co.; and ST I-II.88.3, co. In each of these texts Thomas uses the word prohibens. 52 In Phys. VIII.8, §1035: "one who destroys a column does not give to the supported weight an impetus or inclination downward. For it has this from its first generator which gave to it the form which such an inclination follows." 262 was restraining such a motion. When the vase is broken, the inclination of the water is realized.53 As Jensen notes: "As Thomas portrays it, the person has a desire, in his will, for the sin. This desire, however, is restrained by another desire, by the hope of heaven or the fear of hell. When the hope or the fear is removed, then the desire is set loose. In the end, the person does act from an evil desire of his will."54 Where Thomas's understanding of non-habitus malice is especially challenged, and where Thomas develops his thought on malice considerably farther than we have indicated thus far, is in the objections that he considers against his position on that issue, and in his replies to those objections. We would do well to consider each of those objections and replies here. Against his position that not every malicious sin is from a vicious habitus, Thomas presents this first objection: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through [habitus]. For the Philosopher says... that an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it, i.e., through choice, unless it be done through [habitus]. Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil.... Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the [habitus] of sin.55 In response, Thomas writes that to do an unjust action requires more than malice: "To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without heavy [gravi] resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a [habitus]."56 The implication is that malicious actions 53 De Malo III.14, co. Thomas is espousing the physics of his time, which, while out of date, makes the point well. This example will be referred to again below. See page 269. 54 Jensen, Sin, 178. 55 ST I-II.78.3, obj. 1. The reference to Aristotle is to Nicomachean Ethics V.9, 1137a5-25. 56 ST I-II.78.3, ad 1. I have modified the translation of gravi, which Shapcote translates as "any notable". Gravis has connotations of (heavy) weight or burden. See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas 263 which do not proceed from a vicious habitus are not performed with pleasure and are accompanied by "heavy resistance on the part of reason", which features (acts performed with pleasure and without heavy resistance on the part of reason) are essential to the notion of habitus. Thus, while malicious actions which proceed from a vicious habitus are performed with these features, they are not essential to the notion of malicious action itself. 57 The second objection that Thomas considers points to the fact that an agent does not come to commit a malicious sin without some prior "custom": Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little. But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom [consuetudinem], which may engender a [habitus].58 The third objection is like the second: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is passion or [habitus]. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness.... Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through [habitus].59 In response to both of these objections, Thomas highlights the fact that malice does not necessarily presuppose a habitus or, in the case of the third objection, passion: "It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; Aquinas, s.v. "gravis": "[literally], with respect to weight, heavy, weighty, ponderous, burdensome.... [figuratively], in a bad sense, grave, used to delineate the character of things, burdensome, grievous, painful, severe". 57 Additionally, these malicious actions need not be performed with the other features which accompany actions from habitus: promptness and ease. 58 ST I-II.78.3, obj. 2. See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "consuētūdo: "custom, usage, habit". In the same place, the secondary meaning is listed as "state of being conversant, experience". 59 ST I-II.78.3, obj. 3. 264 but this something is not always a [habitus], as stated above",60 and: "That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a [habitus] or a passion, but at times is something else."61 Thomas's replies to the second and third objections refer the reader back to the corpus of the article in order to determine what the "something else" is that inclines the will to evil; what is it that can incline the will to evil – and thus to malice – that is not a habitus or a passion? One answer lies in Thomas's discussion of corrupt dispositions. Here is that text again: for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a [habitus] acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself.62 Clearly, we can eliminate habitus as an explanation for malice, since the article in question is concerned to explain how not every malicious sin is the result of a vicious habitus. But that still leaves one option: a sickly condition on the part of the body. The Latin of the emphasized portion of the above quotation highlights the nature of this "sickly condition" in a manner which the English translation fails to capture: "vel est aliqua aegritudinalis habitudo ex parte corporis, sicut aliquis habens quasdam naturales inclinationes ad aliqua peccata, propter corruptionem naturae in ipso." That is, the "sickly condition" is an aegritudinalis 60 ST I-II.78.3, ad 2. Notice that Thomas does not deny that some "inveterate custom" may explain malicious sins that are not from a vicious habitus. This will be important immediately below. 61 ST I-II.78.3, ad 3. 62 ST I-II.78.3, co. Emphasis my own. 265 habitudo – habitudo bearing an obvious etymological relationship with habitus.63 This, together with ex parte corporis ["on the part of the body"] and inclinationes ["inclined"], indicates that Thomas has in mind dispositions of the body, referred to above.64 In this context, by referring to sickly bodily dispositions, Thomas has in mind something like the following examples. A man born with abnormally high blood flow around his genital region might, as a result, experience heightened levels of arousal more frequently – he may then commit the sin of lust maliciously. Or, a man who is experiencing chronic and severe pain might, as a result, be inclined to fits of anger directed towards those around him – he may then commit the sin of anger maliciously. In such cases, the will is inclined to evil of itself, as "some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it." 65 Any resulting sins do not necessarily collapse into sins of passion, as the first principle of any particular resulting sin need not be passion – it is enough to call a particular resulting sin malicious if the movement of the sin originates in the will, prior to any influence of passion, just as is the case in malicious sins resulting from an agent's vicious habitus.66 As Thomas writes in the De Malo: "a person sins from malice 63 See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "habitūdo: "condition, plight, habit, appearance, relation, respect". See also ibid., s.v. "aegritūdo": "illness, sickness, either of the body or mind or soul". 64 See pages 33-35, and 44-51. 65 ST I-II.78.3, co. See also the analogous discussion of how habitus in the sensitive appetite imply an inclination on the part of the will: page 168, note 116 above. 66 It is certainly true that, in these examples, sins of passion may very well be involved in inclining the will towards lustful or angry acts. However, the point here is that once the will is so inclined, a particular sin may be malicious as opposed to one of passion, as the impetus for a particular sin may be the will itself – again, once it has been so inclined by previous sins of passion. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of my forthcoming article for requesting some clarification on this point. See Ren é Ardell Fehr, "Thomas Aquinas on Malice without Vice," forthcoming. 266 because he wills a good to which an evil is joined and is not inclined to it from any passion or ignorance".67 There are further candidates for what might constitute the "something else" that accounts for the inclination of the will to evil. Recall that, according to Thomas, one of the ways that a will can be inclined to evil is through the removal of what is restraining it; Thomas's examples were of despair and presumption removing the bridles of hope and fear respectively.68 Elsewhere, Thomas expands on this idea: "Now, there are two ways it can happen for someone to choose an act of sin out of a certain deliberation, not impelled by a passion...." (Thomas goes on to explain malicious sins resulting from habitus, before continuing:) In the other way, sin is chosen out of a certain deliberation when the will rejects that whereby man could be withdrawn from sin. For example, someone refrains from sin because of expecting a future reward. If, then, one voluntarily rejects hope of future reward or some such thing that withdrew him from sin, he will choose what will be pleasant to him in terms of the flesh as if it were essentially good and thus will sin out of a certain malice.69 In the replies to various objections that follow, Thomas notes that there are two distinct sinful acts which are occurring here: a first sinful act by which the restraint is removed (for example, despair or presumption), and a second sinful act which "comes to be in him from a certain 67 De Malo III.14, ad 7. I note that, in his discussions of sins against the Holy Spirit, which discussions almost invariably include an examination of the ways in which someone may sin maliciously, Thomas does not mention the "sickly disposition of the body" possibility. See In Sent. II.43.1; ST II-II.14; De Malo III.14-15; and In Matt. XII.2, §1033. It seems to me that this is due to the scope of such questions: in the ST I-II.78.3, co. text, Thomas is tackling the issue of whether every malicious sin is from a habitus, whereas when discussing the sins against the Holy Spirit, such topics as sickly bodily dispositions are either not relevant, or may be assumed under the heading "sins of habitus" for all practical purposes. 68 See page 261 above. 69 In Sent. II.43.1.2, co. 267 choice due to the preceding act." 70 In the example quoted above, when the restraint is removed, the agent is moved to pursue pleasure as though it were essentially good, which, along with Thomas's examples of despair and presumption from ST I-II.78.3, co., indicate that Thomas has in mind the temporal / spiritual distinction that is central to his understanding of malice.71 However, we should be careful not to interpret all instances of non-habitus malice as instances wherein the removal of the restraint is the result of a sin on the part of the agent. Dressel commits this very mistake; she writes: In the [ST I-II.78.3, co. text], Aquinas refers to the 'removal' (remotio) of dispositions like hope or fear, which makes the person's role in the matter sound passive. In most places, by contrast, including passages in the Summa [Theologiae], Aquinas uses more active language to describe this person's role. Aquinas claims elsewhere, for instance, that this person 'casts aside' (abiicit) or 'rejects' (reiicit) dispositions like hope and fear, or the restraint the person associates with such dispositions.72 As a result of this "active language", Dressel concludes: Aquinas's relatively consistent use of active terms like those noted, highlights his conviction that the person's role in the removal of dispositions like hope or fear is a willful and active one. Going forward, I will describe the person as someone who 'gives up' dispositions like hope or fear. I intend this locution to capture the active, blameworthy, nature of the agent's involvement in the removal of such dispositions...."73 In a footnote to the first block quote above, Dressel refers the reader to ST II-II.14.1; In Sent. II.43.1.2; and De Malo III.14. These three texts, however, each refer to a specific type of 70 In Sent. II.43.1.2, ad 1. Jensen rightly notes this two-act structure, arguing that the malice in question consists in the second act. However, as far as the text of In Sent. II.43.1.2 is concerned, it is the first act which is a sin against the Holy Spirit (and such sins are malicious); see ad 3. In Sent. II.43.1.2, ad 1 implies, and ST III.78.3, co. states explicitly, that the act which follows the removal of the restraint is malicious. 71 See pages 208-211, and 232-242 above. 72 Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 48. 73 Ibid. 268 malicious sin: sins against the Holy Spirit. In fact, only when writing about sins against the Holy Spirit does Thomas speak to the removal of a restraint in language like abiicitur et removetur (ST II-II.14.1, co.; in the case of abiicit alone: De Malo III.14, co.),74 and rejicit (In Sent. II.43.1.2, co.).75 Where Thomas is writing about malicious sins as the result of the removal of a restraint outside of the context of sins against the Holy Spirit, we find him using what Dressel might refer to as passive language: remotionem, for example (ST I-II.78.3, co.).76 The De Malo text in particular is important in this regard, as it is unique in explicitly containing a discussion of non-habitus malice both apart from and considered as sins against the Holy Spirit: For he is said to sin from malice, as was said above, 77 whose will of itself is inclined to some good which has an annexed malice. Which can happen in a twofold manner. For even in natural things something is moved in two ways: either on account of an inclination, as a heavy object moves downward, or on account of the removal [remotionem] of an impediment, as water pours out of a broken vase. So then the will sometimes is inclined of itself to a good of this kind from its own inclination as a result of acquired [habitus], but sometimes from the removal [remotione] of that which was restraining it from sin, for instance, hope, fear of God, and other such gifts of the Holy Spirit by which man is kept from sin.78 Here, we find the "passive" language applied to what is explicitly identified as the non-sinsagainst-the-Holy-Spirit sort of malice. As this text occurs within the broader discussion of sins against the Holy Spirit, Thomas ultimately applies the removal of a restraint logic to sins 74 See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "abicio": "to cast away, throw aside"; and s.v. "removeo": "to move back, withdraw, remove". 75 See ibid., s.v. "rejicio": "to reject". 76 See ibid., s.v. "remōtio", which is similar to meaning with removeo: "a putting back, withdrawing, removal". Dressel acknowledges Thomas's use of this word in Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 48, quoted immediately above. 77 Thomas is referring to De Malo III.12-13, which does not consider malice as a sin against the Holy Spirit. 78 De Malo III.14, co. 269 against the Holy Spirit in particular, but there is nothing to suggest that all non-habitus malicious sins need be the result of the removal of an impediment that the malicious agent himself is responsible for. This, I argue, makes intuitive sense. In the two-act structure that characterizes sins against the Holy Spirit, it is the first sin – the one which removes the restraint – that is counted as the sin against the Holy Spirit,79 and as a sin, it makes sense that Thomas would characterize it as casting aside or as a rejection.80 On the other hand, non-habitus malice that is not a sin against the Holy Spirit, and which is the result of the removal of a restraint, can conceivably occur in any number of scenarios in which the agent is not morally responsible for the removal of the impediment. Thomas's examples of what removes the restraint are usually despair and presumption, although other non-theological examples could be given, including examples wherein the agent's lack of moral culpability for the removal of the restraint is evident. Jensen uses the example of a man who is restrained from committing adultery with his neighbor's wife because he is fearful of his vengeful neighbor – if the vengeful neighbor is removed from the picture, the agent may end up committing a sin from non-habitus malice.81 McCluskey offers the example of an agent who is refraining from stealing because he is afraid that he will be caught – if a natural disaster should make his chances of getting caught low enough, he may end up sinning from non-habitus malice.82 In 79 See In Sent. II.43.1.2, ad 3. See In Sent. II.43.1.3, co.: "sin against the Holy Spirit, properly speaking, as a determinate kind of sin, consists in the act of the will that rejects that whereby one is withdrawn from sin." 81 Jensen, Sin, 179. Jensen has trouble seeing how such a scenario differs from the case of a vicious agent being restrained from committing his sin. The difference is that, in non-habitus malice, there is no vice, or, at the very least, a vice is not used. 82 McCluskey, "Thomas Aquinas and the Epistemology of Moral Wrongdoing," 117-118. This example makes it clear that an agent need not be properly oriented to the final end prior to the removal of the restraint, as 80 270 each of these cases we have an example of an agent committing a malicious sin as the result of the removal of a restraint, although not from a vicious habitus, and in each of these cases the sinning agent is in no way morally responsible83 for the removal of the restraint (here we are assuming that the adulterous agent is not morally responsible for the removal of the vengeful husband). Such cases are, nevertheless, instances of an agent sinning maliciously without the use of a vicious habitus.84 We thus have two candidates that might explain how a non-habitus malicious sin might arise: a sickly disposition of the body, and the removal of a restraint that was "bridling" an existing inclination in the will. In either scenario, the resulting malicious sin is accompanied by heavy resistance on the part of the reason, and it is not accompanied by the sort of pleasure that does accompany actions from habitus.85 Thomas's replies to the three objections discussed above present a much more nuanced view of vice and malice than was suggested previously in this dissertation. In these last few pages, we have seen a significant gradation develop with respect to vice and malice. On the side of vice, this has taken the form of a space opening up for the concept of bodily disposition with respect to malicious action, a concept which, as it was presented in the first chapter of this dissertation, did not appear to Dressel explicitly claims and Jensen seems to think. Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 48; Jensen, Sin, 179-182. For non-habitus malice, it is enough that an agent – oriented to the final end or not – has a desire in his will to commit some sin, and where the agent is restrained from acting on this desire by some bridle; when the bridle is removed, if the resulting sin's first principle is his disordered will, and if he does not use a vicious habitus in acting, he will have committed a sin from non-habitus malice. 83 I use the phrase "morally responsible" in particular because an agent may be responsible to some degree for the removal of what restrains him, although not morally so. For example, the agent who desires to commit adultery may, in antecedent ignorance, accidentally kill the vengeful husband of whom he is afraid. 84 Further discussion of the sins against the Holy Spirit is outside the scope of this dissertation, and so they will not be taken up in any greater detail here. 85 See ST I.89.6, ad 3: "The acts which produce a [habitus] are like the acts caused by that [habitus], in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the [ habitus] of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably." 271 have any relevant bearing on malicious action. Malice, meanwhile, has been revealed to include, at least in some cases, heavy resistance on the part of reason and a lack of habitustype pleasure accompanying the performance of the malicious sins. The result of this gradation is that malice from habitus and non-habitus malice appear to differ as the perfect from the imperfect.86 In the former case, the agent commits his malicious sin wholeheartedly, so to speak, engaging his sensitive appetite and intellect without heavy resistance. In the latter case, the agent's will is indeed inclined to the choice of evil, although this inclination is the result of a sickly bodily disposition, and not a vicious habitus, or else it is only set loose once something that is strong enough to restrain it has been removed. Again, in the case of malice from habitus, there is no bridle to speak of, as there is nothing in the agent's sensitive appetite or any heavy resistance on the part of his reason to prevent him from sinning. The bridled agent, however, is restrained from the sin he desires by a consideration that outweighs this desire, and even when the bridle is removed, the sin is performed without the pleasure that is associated with vicious action and with heavy resistance on the part of the reason – the act is not yet perfect. This, in turn, implies that a vicious habitus is not yet formed, but that its generation is not far off (or, at least, if a vicious habitus has formed, that it is not being used in the performance of the malicious sin in question). Besides the discussion in Chapter II above, 87 further analysis of the generation of vice is required, as presently we are able to integrate malice into that discussion. Doing so will allow us to say something further about the relationship between vice and malice. 86 This is not unlike the division of vicious habitus into simple and relative vicious habitus. See pages 254-255 above. 87 See pages 128-131. 272 V.ii. Generating Vice, Becoming Malicious Earlier, we saw that the connection of the vices is primarily teleological – certain vices tend to generate and direct other vices to their own ends. 88 Part of this process has to do with the disordered will that is one of the essential features of malicious action: the disordered will loves more the lesser good. Such a will, we saw, is willing to give up what it loves less in order that it may obtain what it loves more. When this disordered will is malicious, it is willing to choose a spiritual evil so as to obtain a temporal good that it desires more. Thus, the vicious agent is inclined to generate further vices, should those further vices aid him in the pursuit of the temporal object that he desires – not even the fact that a sin may be against the order of reason or the divine law may be enough to restrain him from further sins in his pursuit of the temporal good of his desire. Here, as earlier when discussing the connection of the vices, pride and covetousness play unique roles among the vices: pride is the beginning of all sin according to the order of intention, but covetousness is the root of all sin according to the order of execution. That is, in desiring some temporal good for oneself that is incompatible with a spiritual good (which desired excellence indicates pride), one is willing to perform any sort of sin that one perceives to be useful in obtaining one's object; 89 likewise, by means of vast wealth (which, when desired inordinately, indicates covetousness), an agent might furnish the occasion for further sins in pursuit of the temporal object that he desires. With pride in particular, what results is the teleological generation of vices. For example, an 88 89 See pages 116-128 above. So long as that sin is not incompatible with some other good that one might desire more. 273 inordinate desire for one's own excellence (pride) with respect to illicit sexual pleasures (lust) may result in an agent not taking adequate counsel before acting (rashness). 90 The chain may be followed upwards, better revealing the causal connection between the sins and vices: the agent is rash so that he may be lustful, and he is lustful so that he may obtain some perceived excellence for himself. As the acts that result from his vicious habitus are malicious, the agent is especially prone to developing further vices in this way, as he is willing to choose a spiritual evil in order to obtain the temporal good that he desires – he is willing to abandon the mean of virtue in certain scenarios. In the second chapter of this dissertation, we examined Thomas's understanding of how vices are generated and strengthened.91 There, we saw that such a phenomenon involves a complicated series of processes, the scope of which includes certain powers of the soul, active and passive principles, and the Thomistic principle that every agent produces its like. It remains to integrate these processes with the interior causes of sinful acts: ignorance, passion, and malice. Vicious habitus do not arise from nothing, and neither do they arise from malicious actions without some previous sinful behaviour.92 Crucial to the development of vice and malice is man's sensitive nature: "the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason." 93 Sins of passion are the usual manner in which disordered inclinations begin to form in the appetites 90 For rashness, see ST II-II.153.5, co. See pages 128-131 above. 92 See ST II-II.24.12, ad 1. 93 ST I-II.71.2, ad 3. This is not so with the demons, in whom there is no sensitive nature. See ST I.59.4; and ST I.63.4, ad 1. 91 274 of an agent.94 In sins of passion, a passion in the sensitive appetite influences the agent's intellect to evaluate a particular sensible object as appropriate for pursuit in these circumstances, even though in truth it is not. The intellect then presents this perceived good to the will, and the agent is moved to perform the sin. 95 This results in an inclination being generated or strengthened in the relevant appetitive power 96 (the passive principle) by the apprehensive power (the active principle). 97 Eventually, through repeated sinful action, the agent will develop in his will an inclination towards some object that is incompatible with a spiritual good, which inclination does not yet constitute a vicious habitus. At this point, the agent may be restrained from pursuing the object of his disordered desire by the fear of hell, hope for eternal life, or some such thing, as whatever restraint prevents him from sinning is enough to bridle his sinful inclination. Should that restraint be removed, however, or should his inclination become strong enough to overcome it, 98 he is able to commit sins from malice, albeit without the pleasure that attends perfect acts and with heavy resistance on the part of his reason, as he has not yet developed the habitus of vice. Before the restraint is removed, if the agent commits sins of the species to which is disordered will is inclined,99 those sins will have more in common with sins of passion than 94 Sins of ignorance do not generate vicious habitus in the way that sins of passion do, as sins of passion are more connected to the appetitive powers than are sins of ignorance. A possible exception are sins of ignorance wherein the ignorance does not touch upon the substance the sin. See pages 190-193 above. 95 This process was explained above. See pages 193-202. 96 Here, not just the relevant sensitive appetite is concerned (be it concupiscible or irascible), but also the intellectual appetite (the will), which is a passive principle of action with respect to its receiving its object from the intellect, and which is inclined to similar objects with each like act. 97 See pages 128-131 above. 98 But without this inclination becoming a habitus. 99 McCluskey seems to suggest that in cases of an agent sinning from malice due to the removal of a restraint (and when such a sin is not the result of a vicious habitus), the agent does not sin from habitus because that agent would have never committed acts of that species before. McCluskey, "Thomas Aquinas and the Epistemology of Moral Wrongdoing," 117-118. It is not clear why McCluskey thinks this; it certainly does not 275 they would with sins of malice. In both cases, the agent judges that some action is not to be done (or is to be done) owing to the relevant circumstances, and yet he does it anyway (or does not do it). In the case of the bridled agent in particular, while his will is inclined to some temporal good that is incompatible with a spiritual good, still he does not sin, as he is afraid of hell, or hopes in eternal life, is afraid of a vengeful neighbor, or some such thing – he desires an object which is incompatible with a spiritual good, but given that he judges that object not to be worthy of pursuit in these circumstances (which circumstances include the bridle in question), he does not sin. Only if his passion should cause him to ignore the relevant aspect of the act (in which case the sin is a sin of passion) or if the bridle is removed (in which case his will, which is already maliciously inclined, will of itself move the agent to commit the sinful act, and it will be a sin of malice) will he commit the sin which his disordered will desires. These malicious inclinations can be strengthened to the point of dominating the reason: "if the perversity [perversitas] of the appetitive faculty becomes so strong that it dominates [dominetur] reason, reason follows that to which the corrupted appetite inclines, as a kind of principle, considering it to be the ultimate end." 100 Thomas writes that the appetitive faculty, as perverted, can dominate the reason, implying that a habitus has been formed; there follow from Thomas's texts, and her own example allows for the agent to have committed sins of the same species in the past – even maliciously, should, for instance, what restrained the agent originally become a restraint for him once more, and then should it be subsequently removed again. 100 In Ethic. VII.1, §1294. I have modified the translation, which was done by C. I. Litzinger, O.P. Litzinger translates "ratio sequetur id in quod appetitus corruptus inclinat" as "reason follows that to which the perverted desire inclines". Emphases my own. "Corrupted appetite" is a better translation for the emphasized words. See Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "appetītus" and "corrumpo". Perverto means "to overthrow, subvert, destroy, ruin, undo, corrupt." Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, s.v. "perverto". Perverto appears to refer to when a specifically natural disposition is corrupted. See In Ethic. VII.1, §1295. 276 is not heavy resistance on the part of the intellect. At this point, the agent considers that the object of his vicious habitus is his ultimate end; he is well and truly vicious. I suggest that non-habitus malice is directed towards habitus and to malice from habitus, just as imperfect acts are directed towards habitus and to perfect acts.101 This direction, at least as far as sickly bodily dispositions are concerned, would square with that which was examined above: bodily dispositions are directed to the soul (habitus), while habitus, being dispositions of the soul, are directed to act.102 The implication is that in the sinning agent who sins through a sickly bodily disposition, there is a degree of progression towards vice and the vicious act wherein he sins not from ignorance or passion, but from malice without vice. Likewise, on the side of bridled agent, there appears to be a progression which points towards perfect, vicious, and malicious actions, as indicated by the fact that (at least some) malicious actions resulting from the removal of a restraint are not from a vicious habitus, and so are imperfect.103 Moreover, the heavy resistance on the part of the reason that accompanies non-habitus malice and which does not accompany malice from habitus can be explained in terms of the ignorance of identity described above. 104 A vicious habitus makes its object connatural to its subject, so that in using his vicious habitus an agent is pursing objects in a manner which he thinks is in keeping with what is primary in him: his sensitive 101 See ST II-II.64.2, co. See pages 33-35. 103 Dressel argues that non-habitus malice is "perhaps" worse than malicious action from a vicious habitus, simply because the former actions are accompanied by heavy resistance on the part of reason and without the pleasure that attends vicious actions. Dressel, "Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing," 55-56. As an interpretation of Thomas, this is certainly incorrect, as for Thomas, the more the reason, will, and antecedent passions are engaged in a sinful act, the more grave will that action be. See pages 61-64 above, where I explain Thomas's understanding of acting truly badly or perfectly. 104 See pages 213-216. 102 277 nature. As such, malicious actions which result from such a habitus are directed towards objects which are perceived to be connatural with the sinning agent, and so there is no heavy resistance on the part of the reason: he is pursuing objects in a manner which agrees with what he perceives to be primary in himself. 105 On the other hand, when an agent sins maliciously, but not from a habitus, he is by extension understood to not be pursuing an object in a manner which is not connatural to him, as he is not using a habitus. In these cases, the "heavy resistance" on the part of reason is explained in terms of the agent's selfidentification: as the object of his non-habitus malice is not connatural to him, he, presumably, does not identify his sensitive nature as being primary in himself.106 Thus, non-habitus malice can be understood as a mean between sins of passion and sins of malice arising from a vicious habitus.107 As in sins of passion, the agent who sins from non-habitus malice is pursuing an object in a manner wherein he ignores a part of the practical syllogism that he already knows, although in the former case he is ignoring this fact because of his passions, while in the latter case his will moves to the sinful act of its own accord because of the removal of a restraint coupled with the inclination of the will (or because of a sickly disposition of the body which inclines the will). As in sins of malice arising from a vicious habitus, the agent who sins from non-habitus malice chooses what he 105 That is not to say that there is no resistance on the part of reason. See In Gal. V.4, §315. Thus, there are two aspects to malice at play when discussing malice from a vicious habitus and non-habitus malice: (1) the agent's orientation, and (2) the agent's identification of what is primary in himself between his rational and sensitive natures. Point (1) helps to distinguish malice from sins of passion, and is common to both malice from habitus and non-habitus malice. Point (2) is part of what distinguishes the two types of malice, and is what accounts for the "heavy resistance" on the part of reason that the non-habitus agent experiences. 107 Jensen makes a similar point, writing of non-habitus malicious sins that are the result of a removal of a restraint: "they share many features with sins of [passion], such that they might be mistakenly classified as sins of [passion]." Jensen, Sin, 182. The non-habitus malicious sinner therefore looks in many respects like the incontinent agent. See In Ethic. VII.4, §1359. 106 278 knows to be evil, although in the latter case this is in agreement with what he perceives to be primary in himself, and so there is no heavy resistance on the part of reason, while in the former case this is in disagreement with what he perceives to be primary in himself – hence the heavy resistance on the part of reason. A question presents itself: How can the will of itself tend to something to which the reason is giving heavy resistance? The answer to this question speaks further to the status of non-habitus malice as a mean between sins of passion and sins of malice from a vicious habitus: in sins of non-habitus malice, there may be syllogistic reasoning happening that is analogous to that of the incontinent agent, 108 although in this case, it is the inclination of the will itself, as opposed to the sensitive appetite, that influences the reason to conclude under the improper premise. Phenomenologically, in both sins of passion and sins of non-habitus malice, this takes the form of inner turmoil, inner debate, inner tension, inner conflict, and the like, 109 as the reason, influenced by passion (in sins of passion) or the will (in sins of non-habitus malice), attempts to conclude under one or the other particular proposition. In the case of the agent who sins from non-habitus malice – specifically with respect to the removal of a restraint – we might better characterize both the progression and the turmoil of the malicious sinner by means of the following example. Consider a man who does not wish to fornicate. He is careful to avoid situations wherein he might be tempted to fornicate, and when he is confronted with the desire to so act, 108 See pages 198-199 above. Recall that the discussion of the syllogistic reasoning of the incontinent agent occurs in the context of the ways in which passion can hinder consideration – in this case, by influencing the reason to consider a different premise in the practical syllogism. 109 I am grateful to Maxime Allard, O.P. for this point. 279 he immediately shuns it and turns his mind elsewhere. Eventually, he is suddenly confronted by a lewd image, which arouses spontaneous passion in him, and because of which which he lingers for a while, taking pleasure in it. After some time he turns his thoughts away, regretting his action, however much he enjoyed it. Now it is easier for him to fall into such thoughts, and he soon finds himself doing so. Later still, he might spend his idle time day dreaming about fornicating and taking pleasure in such daydreams, slowly inclining his sensitive appetite towards further like actions. Let us say that he now desires the sexual pleasure associated with fornication, although, at this point, the fear of hell is restraining him from pursuing it. Eventually, after many more day dreams, his sensitive appetite becomes so inclined to the pleasure that he desires that in a moment of passion, after no little struggle with his desires, he gives in and takes a woman to bed. When the passion wears off, he becomes distraught and repents of his sin, only to find himself day dreaming of similar acts soon after. His will, following his sensitive appetite, is being more and more inclined to lustful actions. The day dreams come more frequently now, and he finds it easier to get worked up into a passionate fury which sees him bedding some woman or another. His reason begins to give a little less resistance, and the regretful spells don't last as long anymore, nor are they as intense. His will is now, of itself, inclined to further acts of fornication, although his fear of hell still restrains him, except when he fornicates because of passion, wherein he ignores the sinful nature of his actions. After some more time, either independently of or perhaps because of his many acts of fornication, he commits the sin of presumption: he comes to believe that he will not be 280 damned because of his sins.110 Now his fear of hell no longer restrains him from fornication. His will, freed from its restraint and already inclined to further acts of fornication, moves of itself to another such action, and the agent sins once more – although now it is a sin of malice. Let us consider the fact that he may not have yet developed a lustful habitus. Although what once restrained him from sin is no longer restraining him, the fact that the agent has not yet developed a vicious habitus means that the pleasure associated with fornication is not yet connatural to him: he understands that he is primarily a spiritual being, and that he ought not to commit such lustful actions, as they are incompatible with his rational nature. Nevertheless, when the next occasion had arisen, after much struggle (this time, between his intellect and will, although not necessarily without antecedent influence from the passions), he concluded that he should bed another woman. The resulting sin is voluntary, as it is not repugnant to his will, and is malicious, as the impetus for the sin comes from the will, and he makes the knowing choice of spiritual evil. As he continues in his sins, his appetite becomes further inclined to lustful acts. He finds fornicating easier, he moves to such acts more promptly, and he begins to take the sort of pleasure in them that is associated with the acts of a habitus – in brief, he has developed a vicious habitus, and the pleasure associated with fornication has become connatural to him: he now sees himself as a primarily sensitive being.111 His reason no longer gives heavy resistance, and he engages in fornication wholeheartedly, even though he knows that such actions are not compatible with the order of reason and the divine law. He is vicious, ready 110 111 Notice that he still believes that fornication is a sin, allowing for the possibility of malicious action. As opposed to a primarily rational or spiritual being. 281 and willing to fornicate, creatively adapting to the various circumstances that he finds himself in in order to obtain the object of his desire which is now connatural to him. The above example implies a gradation of vice and malice that ought to be teased out. The generation of vice is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, so that a vice suddenly springs into being after the commission of a particular sinful act. Just as vices strengthen or weaken in proportion to the inclination of the appetite in question, 112 so we might see the generation of vice as a question of appetitive inclination – that is, a vice might be said to exist in a subject owing to the inclination of that subject. To what degree is one's sensitive appetite inclined to a particular good so that that good is connatural to the agent? To that degree can a habitus be said to exist in the subject. Malicious action follows upon this gradation. When one sins maliciously, to the extent that one pursues an object that is connatural to the sinning agent is that malicious sin considered to be from a vicious habitus; we have demonstrated in the above pages that not all malicious sins involve the pursuit of a connatural object – sometimes such sins are the result of a sickly bodily disposition or the removal of a restraint, in which case the object of pursuit need not be connatural to the agent (or, the agent is not said to sin from a vicious habitus to the extent that such an object is not connatural to him). Thus, we ought not to see the generation and strengthening of vice, and the development of malicious sin, as a series of discrete increments, but rather as a continuum that is able to be and that is most profitably discerned from a number of different perspectives. In every case, however, I have argued that imperfect vice and imperfect malice are directed to their perfect counterparts as ends. 112 See pages 128-134, especially page 131, note 215 above. 282 In the above pages I have sketched an interpretation of Thomas that sees vicious agents beginning with sins of passion, proceeding to sins of non-habitus malice, and finally arriving at vicious and malicious actions.113 Jensen aptly summarizes the bookends of this process: How does the vicious person come to desire pleasure more than the divine good? He does not begin having disordered desires. Rather, he forms his evil habit through repeated actions. He repeatedly chooses pleasure in opposition to the divine good, and his desire for pleasure (as a good independent of the divine good) increases. From where do these repeated choices arise? Evidently, through some other source of sin, such as passion or ignorance. With each repeated sinful choice, the disposition of the will increases toward disordered pleasure, that is, pleasure opposed to the divine good. Eventually, it increases to the point at which it exceeds the desire for the divine good. At that point, and not prior to it, the individual can sin from [malice]; he can sin with full knowledge that what he chooses is indeed adultery. He has a clear vision of what he chooses; at the same time, he now has a greater ignorance, for he is no longer aware that the divine good is to be desired more than pleasure.114 The final lines of the above quotation highlight the role of ignorance with respect to vice and malice. Thomas connects ignorance to vice a number of times throughout his corpus. For example, Thomas writes that vices cause ignorance: "Every vice or bad [habitus] distorts the principle, since it distorts the correct estimation of the end", 115 and later: "vice... perverts the judgment of the reason and causes deception in practical principles". 116 Thomas also writes that in the vicious, "deception in the distinction between good and evil occurs especially 113 It is perhaps possible that the middle stage – non-habitus malice – may be omitted, but if it is present, it is directed to vicious and malicious actions. 114 Jensen, Sin, 164. Jensen ends this quotation with a reference to ST II-II.156.3, ad 1. Jensen does not include non-habitus malice in his account of the vicious agent's progression to vice; as far as I can tell, this interpretation is unique to myself. 115 In Ethic. VI.4, §1170. 116 In Ethic. VI.10, §1274. In the same place, Thomas goes on to give an example: "to follow his desires seems the supreme good to the licentious man." See also In Metaph. XI.6, §2231. Elsewhere, Thomas writes that vice fetters the reason. See De Malo III.12, ad 12 and 13. 283 because of pleasure",117 and that even their own vices are hidden from them: "Real vice is hidden from the one having it and his deception consists in thinking that what he does is good."118 Perhaps as a result of all of these kinds of ignorance, Thomas claims that "he who sins from malice through the inclination of [habitus] is ignorant of the proper end by means of which he could be brought back to good".119 Above we have already noted the ignorance that is involved in sins of malice: the malicious are mistaken as to what is predominant in them with respect to their rational and sensitive natures.120 The malicious err in that they think that it is worth rejecting a spiritual good for the sake of the temporal good that they love more. Such ignorance is consequent ignorance121 – it is voluntary – and so they are morally culpable for it. 122 Here, it remains to address a potential objection that was noted earlier:123 How does vice imply the knowledge that is necessary for malicious action? If an essential feature of malice is that one knowingly chooses a spiritual evil, and if all vicious actions are malicious, it would seem to follow that 117 In Ethic. III.10, §495. Thomas is relaying what Aristotle has written, although the point agrees with Thomas's thought. Later, Thomas argues that a vice can cause a "diseased temperament" that "oppresses the judgment of reason after the manner of a perverse nature." In Ethic. VII.5, §1376. 118 In Ethic. VII.8, §1425. 119 De Malo III.15, co. Elsewhere, Thomas provides some context for this remark: "[A sin committed from malice, other things being equal, is graver than a sin committed from passion,] because he who sins from [passion] has a will ordered to a good end, for he intends and seeks the good but in some instances diverges from his intention on account of passion; but he who sins from malice has a will ordered to an evil end, for he has a fixed intention of sinning. But it is evident that the end in things to be desired or to be done is like a principle in theoretical matters.... Now he who errs about principles is ignorant in a most grave and dangerous way because such a person cannot be led back by means of any prior principles. But he who errs only about conclusions can [be] led back by means of principles in which he is not in error. Therefore he who sins from malice sins most gravely and dangerously and cannot easily be induced to refrain from sin as can the one who sins from [passion] in whom at least a good intention remains." De Malo III.13, co. 120 See pages 213-216. I am now speaking of perfect, or simple, malice. 121 See pages 154-156 above. 122 Moreover, such ignorance does not reduce the malicious act to error in the intellect. See pages 216219 above. 123 See page 254, note 21 above. 284 all actions that proceed from vice are knowing actions, in the sense that the vicious agent that performs them knows that the actions he performs are evil. Such an objection is not insurmountable for Thomas. 124 On the one hand, one can answer this objection from the side of its generation. That is, if vicious habitus are produced by sins of passion, and if sins of passion imply a proper orientation of the agent to his end (albeit an orientation that is ignored in the act of sinning from passion), then when his habitus is formed, the vicious agent retains his knowledge that the temporal object of desire is incompatible with a spiritual good – it is not as though he forgets this somehow. On the other hand, one must highlight the specific kind of knowledge that is supposed to accompany vicious habitus: knowledge that the obtaining of a certain temporal good implies the rejection of a spiritual good. Thus, one might erroneously conclude that one or more temporal goods ought to be pursued at the expense of spiritual goods (as all malicious sinners do), but it is enough for sins of malice that the sinner know that the temporal good he pursues excludes a spiritual good. Still, it might be objected that an agent might be ignorant that a particular temporal good that he pursues excludes a spiritual good, and yet he pursues this temporal good so frequently that he develops a vicious habitus.125 In such cases, it appears as though vice does not imply the knowledge necessary for malicious action. 124 Although it becomes stronger the more one slips into understanding habitus as the modern "habit". Habitus and the modern English word "habit" were discussed above: see pages 71-77. Modern notions of "habit" easily allow for one to acquire habits that are unknown to the acquiring agent, both in their moral quality and in their actual acquisition. 125 This example would appear to be an instance of sins of ignorance contributing to the generation of vicious habitus. 285 Especially helpful in answering this objection is Thomas's discussion of an erring conscience that occurs in the Prima Secundae.126 There, Thomas asks whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason. 127 In other words, if the will acts according to an agent's false belief or lack of knowledge, is the will good or evil? 128 An answer in favour of the latter would indicate that room for malice exists even in an agent who doesn't know, strictly speaking, that what he does is wrong. In the corpus of the article, Thomas recalls the different ways that ignorance can be related to the will, and what sorts of voluntariness these types of ignorance imply.129 He continues: If then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being evil.... For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know.130 Such cases allow for an agent to have developed a vicious habitus, and to sin from malice, even though he does not know, strictly speaking, that what he does is evil; it is enough that he ought to know. And his ignorance does not result in an involuntary act, as it is willed by him – it is not repugnant to his will. Continuing: But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil.... [For instance,] if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to 126 ST I-II.19.5-6. I am grateful to Maxime Allard, O.P. for directing me to this text. See ST I-II.19.6, obj. 1. 128 In the previous question, Thomas had established that an erring conscience binds, removing the possibility that an agent might not be bound to act according to his false belief or lack of knowledge. ST III.19.5, co. 129 See ST I-II.6.8, co. Here, in ST I-II.19.6, co., Thomas does not consider concomitant ignorance / non-voluntary action. See also pages 152-157 above. 130 ST I-II.19.6, co. 127 286 give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.131 In these cases, as the resulting act is involuntary, it is not sinful. Thus, any habitus that might develop with respect to such an action would not be vicious, as it takes its moral character entirely from the (involuntary) act to which it is directed. 132 All things being equal, these cases do not involve vicious habitus or malicious action. In answer to the above objection, then, we might say that an agent who does not know that a temporal good he pursues excludes a spiritual good, and who subsequently develops a vicious habitus, is still said to sin from malice in using that habitus insofar as he ought to know that the temporal good he pursues excludes a spiritual good. 133 In such scenarios, the ignorance involved may be concomitant (if the agent would sin maliciously even with the knowledge he lacks), or it may be consequent (insofar as the agent would not sin maliciously if he had the knowledge he lacks, and insofar as the ignorance itself is willed by him). 134 In either case, what results is, for all practical purposes, vicious and malicious action. V.iii. Towards Virtue The situation of the vicious agent is dire; he has developed an unsuitable habitus that is directed towards sinful acts in a manner which results in him knowingly choosing a spiritual 131 Ibid. Thomas is assuming that the ignorance involved is not concomitant ignorance. See pages 80-82 above. 133 In ST I-II.76.2, co., Thomas provides a few examples of what one is bound to know viz. the moral life: "all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state." 134 For concomitant and consequent ignorance, see pages 153-156 above. Antecedent ignorance is ruled out by the parameters of the example. 132 287 evil for the sake of a temporal good. The sins which result from his vicious habitus are performed promptly, with ease and with pleasure. At least in the act of sin, he rejoices in his choice of evil as something worthy of doing. His will is, prior to any influence of passion in his sensitive appetite, inclined to such a choice of evil. This inclination, as a habitus, has become like another nature to him. He has become a man who is ever ready to commit vicious and malicious deeds, to embrace objects which he knows to be incompatible with a spiritual good, and to rejoice in his sinful actions. Wherein lies the hope that the vicious and malicious agent will amend his ways and turn to virtue? In the first chapter of this dissertation, we saw that habitus imply a permanence in an agent in a way that dispositions do not; what divides habitus from disposition is the difference difficult to change.135 We also saw above that, for Thomas, some agents are so sunk in their sins that they can be despaired of, excepting the power of God. 136 These facts might seem to indicate that at least some of those who have developed vicious habitus are unable to corrupt their vices and develop virtue (again, excepting the power of God). However, Thomas argues that no evil entirely overcomes the good of nature, 137 so that even the most vicious agent is able to reason rightly with respect to moral matters and to will the true good, 138 however unlikely this may be – there remains in every vicious and malicious sinner a potential for 135 See page 44 above. See pages 227-229. 137 See, for example, ST I.48.4, where Thomas addresses this question with respect to evil in general; and De Malo II.12, where Thomas addresses this question with respect to moral evil. 138 See In Gal. V.4, §315, where Thomas indicates that malice cannot "so abound that reason would never complain [remurmuret]." See also ST I-II.78.2, co.: "a bad [habitus] does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired". 136 288 virtue and for a well ordered intellectual appetite. For the vicious agent, orienting himself towards virtue can only occur through the corruption of his vicious habitus. Above we saw that vicious habitus are corrupted by two means: disuse and by judgments that are contrary to the habitus in question.139 Additionally, a habitus may be weakened (although, presumably, not corrupted) by performing actions that do not match the intensity of the habitus from which they proceed.140 In practice, getting a vicious agent to the point of not using his vicious habitus according to its intensity, or to not use said habitus at all, and eventually to perform virtuous acts, requires the correction of his appetite as well as instruction so as to overcome his ignorance. The correction of the vicious agent's appetite is accomplished in much the same way that his vice was first generated: the apprehensive power disposes the relevant appetitive power, although in this case the apprehensive power presents to the appetitive power an object that is in accord with right reason. Thus, for example, the gluttonous man must judge that the proper amount of food and drink is good for him, which judgment, although it is contrary to the inclination of his disordered concupiscible appetite, informs said appetite and disposes it to be inclined towards food similarly in the future. In the man whose vicious habitus is fully developed, the agent will at first find acting contrary to his disordered appetite painful and difficult:141 his will is malicious; he desires the object of his vicious habitus more than the 139 See pages 132-134. Recall that disuse is an indirect cause of the corruption of habitus. See ST I- II.53.3, co. 140 See page 132 above, and ST I-II.52.3, co. A text already quoted above is relevant here; writes Thomas: "[Aristotle] explains that [the wicked] can not find internal peace with their passions. He observes that people of this sort are not conscious of their own joys and sorrows. In fact their soul struggles against itself, for the sensitive part resists the reason. On the one hand it grieves, when withdrawing from pleasures, because of evil that dominates it and causes distress in the sensitive part; and on the other hand it rejoices according to reason that judges evil pleasures are to be 141 289 order of reason or the divine law.142 Any relevant sinful acts that are performed at this stage would most likely be instances of that agent not using his habitus according to its intensity.143 Eventually, by repeated actions of the kind, the agent's sensitive and rational appetites will become increasingly disposed towards objects that are appropriate for him given his rational nature – he may even begin to not use his vicious habitus in acting. Here, he may or not be malicious in acting. If he is, then it may be that his habitus is no longer a habitus simply, but relatively – he requires only a bridle to refrain from continued malicious acts, or, if he is bridled, any resulting sins might likely be sins of passion, as his sensitive appetite struggles to reorient.144 Through continued effort and education, he may refrain from malicious action altogether. Around this point he may even come to love spiritual goods more than the temporal object of his desire;145 when this happens his will will no longer be disordered, and he may more easily perform actions that are contrary to his vicious habitus: virtuous actions. Through continued morally upright action, his appetites will continue to regard goods according to right reason until his vicious habitus is completely corrupted, and it is then that he may proceed to generate virtue. In the vicious man, the appetites will not regard their objects in an appropriate manner of their own accords; they require the judgment of reason to dispose them. Underpinning the avoided. In this way one part of the soul draws an evil man one way, but the other part draws him the opposite way; just as if his soul were rent into conflicting drives and fought with itself." In Ethic. IX.4, §1817. See page 258, note 39. 142 It seems likely that, if a malicious agent is willing to attempt to correct his will and corrupt his vicious habitus, he already well on his way to his goals, as such desires indicate a will that is in the process of orienting to its proper end, if it is not already. 143 Thus, he would still be considered to be acting maliciously, albeit less so. 144 See pages 275-276 above. I write "it may be that", because it could be the case that he still has his vicious habitus simply, although he is just refraining from using it. 145 If he is to go on to develop virtue, he must come to love spiritual goods more than temporal goods at some point. 290 above description of the corruption of vice and the rectitude of the malicious will is, then, the instruction of ignorance. This instruction has to do with the two manners in which the vicious and malicious sinner is in error. He is firstly in error concerning his sensitive nature, which he thinks to be predominant over his rational nature. Second, because of this first error, he is in error concerning his malicious actions, insofar as he believes that he ought to suffer the loss of a spiritual good so as to obtain the temporal object that he desires more. If one is to begin the process of corrupting one's vicious habitus, one must begin with the proper education concerning one's nature and end. This is all the more difficult because, in the vicious and malicious agent, there results a feedback loop of sorts, so that correction becomes extremely difficult: his ignorance informs his disordered desires, by which he desires ignorance, and so on. Breaking the loop is painful and difficult, but not impossible, even if it can only happen by the power of God. Only by correcting his intellect and properly ordering his desires can the vicious and malicious sinner hope to be reoriented to the divine good and find true happiness. 291 CONCLUDING REMARKS Our study in these pages has taken us from the categories through quality, habitus, vice, the sinful act, and malice. Of central importance has been the nature of the human individual; without this one concept, there is, for Thomas, no vice, no sin, no malice. 1 Man's rational and sensitive nature is crucial to explaining both the possibility and the reality of vice and malice. Vice and malice, then, straddle the line between what is natural for the human agent and what is contrary to his nature. On the one hand, vice and malice are natural in the sense that they arise from principles within man: most evidently, the powers of his soul (especially his will). On the other hand, the presence of vice and malice in man is unsuitable to him and against his rational nature. The relationship between vice and malice implies varying degrees of unsuitability, such that one will find that the former is always accompanied by the latter, but that the latter is not always accompanied by the former. Even here, it is not a matter of vice being less suitable to human nature (since vice always implies malice but malice does not always imply vice), as a habitus, of itself, is only suitable or unsuitable insofar as it is directed to action, 1 Human nature is the principle and measure which allows us to say anything at all of disposition and habitus in particular. See pages 28-51 above. 292 which suitableness is derived, ultimately, from the action to which it is directed. One finds, too, that within the parameters of vice and of malice themselves, there are degrees of unsuitability, according as one's vicious habitus is more or less developed or wide in its scope,2 and according to the degree to which one loves a particular temporal good more than a spiritual good. The result is that there is need for careful nuance and attention when examining vice, malice, and their relationship. Further areas of research require some attention. For example, especially interesting is the relationship of vice to the other interior causes of sin: ignorance and passion, as well as the relationship of virtue, in particular, to ignorance, passion, and malice. Continued research into the precise role of ignorance in sin and in vice, 3 and how this ignorance develops and changes along with the sinner and his inclinations, is important. Additionally, further exploration into the causal relationship between a habitus and its act is called for.4 I have, regrettably, been unable to examine malice as a cause as much as I would have liked. It would be good to see some research that integrates a Thomistic understanding of causality (including the classes, modes, and other adjectives 5 used by Thomas) with the interior causes of sin in general and with malice in particular – what type of cause is malice, exactly? In this dissertation, we have satisfied ourselves with a bare causal notion: "cause is said primarily only of that from which the existence of the posterior follows. Hence we say 2 3 See pages 131-132 above. Caulfield has already done excellent work in this area. See Caulfield, "Practical Ignorance in Moral Actions." 4 Here, too, good work has been done. See Głowala, "What Kind of Power is Virtue?" See also Blain, "Thomas Aquinas on How Habits Affect Human Powers and Acts." 5 See pages 176-178 above. 293 that a cause is that from whose existence another follows." 6 From sin a vicious habitus can follow, and from a vicious habitus a malicious act can follow; sins, vices, and malice can thus be said to be causes in this sense, although there is much room for further specification of what kind or kinds of causality are at play here. Further, I regret that I have been unable to situate Thomas's thought on vice and malice within its social context, as space limitations have restricted me to consider the vicious and malicious agent from a primarily individualistic perspective. Much is to be said about the roles that friends, counsellors, teachers, family members, other figures of authority, and social structures (including the state at all levels) play in the generation and strengthening of an agent's vice, and the weakening and corruption of vice and the subsequent development of virtue, to make no mention of the roles that such social figures and institutions play with respect to sins of ignorance, passion, and malice. Other areas of research beyond the discipline of philosophy recommend themselves. Specifically, it would be very informative to compare, as far as possible, the Thomistic notion of vice with psychological and physiological accounts of addiction and other forms of compulsive behaviour.7 Here, passion as an interior cause of sin is no doubt relevant as well. On the side of malice, the theological implications of malice ought to be given some substantial attention, especially as it relates to such concepts as grace, charity, and divine mercy. 6 De Princ. III. Somewhat relatedly, Sullivan makes some interesting points about the sciences and "physical and environmental factors that incline a person to virtue or vice." Sullivan, "Taking Nature Graciously," 380-386. Jensen, meanwhile, includes a brief section on compulsive behaviour in Jensen, Sin, 182-184. 7 294 This project began with the goal of examining the relationship between vice and malice according to Thomas. We have seen that this relationship runs in two directions, and that it implies a nuance that demands for one to go beyond discrete binary distinctions. Much like habitus requires one to go beyond the traditional act-potency distinction, 8 the relationship between vice and malice requires one to go beyond the usual notion of vice to that of simple vice and relative vice, and likewise it requires one to go beyond the usual notion of malice in order to allow for malicious actions that are not performed with pleasure, and which are accompanied by heavy resistance on the part of the reason. In these cases, proper exegesis requires considerable care and nuance, as the concepts involved imply a gradation that is surprising in its breadth and flexibility. Such is the relationship between vice and malice according to Thomas Aquinas. 8 See pages 57-61 above. 295 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Aristotle. "Categories." Translated by E. M. Edghill. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, 7-37. New York: Random House, 1941. ------------. "De Anima." Translated by J. A. Smith. 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