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Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
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Title
Investigating Convention Shifts and Team Reasoning in Multi-Agent Simulations
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0392n0zg
Journal
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 33(33)
ISSN
1069-7977
Authors
Coen, Anna
Raafat, Ramsey
Chater, Nick
Publication Date
2011
Peer reviewed
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University of California
Investigating Convention Shifts and Team Reasoning in Multi-Agent Simulations
Anna Coenen (anna.coenen.09@ucl.ac.uk)
Ramsey Raafat (r.raafat@ucl.ac.uk)
University College London, Department of Psychology
26 Bedford Way, WC1H 3AE London, UK
Nick Chater (Nick.Chater@wbs.ac.uk)
Warwick Business School
CV4 7AL Coventry, UK
Abstract
choose the same action in order to receive the highest payoff from each strategy. If these equilibria or conventions
can also be pareto-ranked, coordination games illustrate the
dilemma that players can get ’stuck’ using one convention
even if a more beneficial alternative exists. This is what happens when players converge to a pareto-inferior Nash Equilibrium (such as (C1, C1) table 1) that yields lower payoffs
than another equilibrium in the game for at least one of the
players and does not improve any other player’s outcome.
Although it seems intuitive for each player to aim for the
Classical game theory struggles to explain how rational players should decide between a number of social conventions,
even if some yield higher individual payoffs than others. Thus,
on a population level a group or society may be stuck in using one convention when there exist alternative and potentially
more beneficial ones. Using an agent-based model the current
study examines how convention shifts from less to more beneficial conventions can come about. To investigate this, we
use the concept of team reasoning, a mode of reasoning in
which actors maximise the utility of a group rather than their
own. Unlike other social decision-making mechanisms, such
as forms of imitation, team reasoning enables the spread of
a more profitable convention through a population even if no
global knowledge about the population is available to agents.
Keywords: Conventions; Team Reasoning; Agent-Based Simulation; Equilibrium Selection; Social Learning.
Table 1: A Hi-Lo Coordination Game
P1/P2
C1
C2
Introduction
Social conventions enable people to act in situations that require coordination with others. That is, situations in which
all participants can profit if they follow the same course of
behaviour or the same set of rules. Examples of social conventions that regulate our daily interactions are traffic rules,
language, currencies, or property. More recently, the internet has created new kinds of interaction which crucially rely
on social conventions: Successful use of social networks, for
instance, primarily relies on other people using the same service, and only secondarily on the potential advantages one
service may have over others.
A central property of social conventions is that they are self
stabilising and self perpetuating (Lewis, 1969). Once a convention has been established and it yields a minimal benefit
for everyone, it will be difficult to abolish or alter. This article will examine a special case of this problem: Given that
a group of people, or a society has converged on using one
particular convention, how can it change this convention or
start adopting an overall more beneficial one?
To investigate this question we will study conventions as
outcomes of coordination games, which will be described in
the next section.
Conventions in Coordination Games
In classical game theory, conventions can be expressed as
equilibria in coordination games, such as the Stag Hunt game
or the Hi-Lo game (see table 1). These are games with several strict Nash Equilibria that require players to select corresponding strategies; in most cases this means players have to
C1
2, 2
0, 0
C2
0, 0
5, 5
pareto-dominant equilibrium when choosing their strategies
(Harsanyi & Selten, 1988), according to classical game theory players have no rational reason to prefer it over inferior
alternatives (Bacharach, 2006). This is because each player
only has a reason to play any equilibrium strategy if the other
player(s) do so as well, which, in turn, again depends on this
player’s strategy choice, etc., leading to an infinite regress of
the strategy selection process. Coordination games are therefore an instance of the more general Problem of Equilibrium
Selection within game theory. To investigate how it is possible for a group or society to overcome this problem and to
converge to playing payoff-dominant conventions is the aim
of this study.
Note, that the type of equilibrium selection problem in
coordination games differs fundamentally from that of another family of well-studied problems: games of cooperation.
An example of the latter is the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma
in which players can profit from cooperation, but can also
exploit each other’s willingness to cooperate. Cooperation
games are therefore particularly relevant for the study of behavioural norms and moral rules that may require being enforced by forms of punishment against defectors. Unlike
these games, coordination problems do not lead to a conflict
between the collective and self-interest of players. Instead,
they show how groups of rational players with similar interests can end up in a state that is undesirable for all.
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Solving the Problem of Equilibrium Selection
The equilibrium selection problem in coordination games
has triggered a range of responses, both from psychologists
and game theorists. Schelling (1960) for instance famously
showed how people often select equilibria according to how
salient their respective labels are. According to this approach
successful coordination relies on shared representations between players. Other authors proposed that behaviour in coordination games can be modelled using some form of multiplelevel reasoning in which players select their strategies based
on their assumptions about the belief-state of the other player
(e.g., Crawford, Gneezy, & Rottenstreich, 2008; Camerer,
Ho, & Chong, 2004). Such a theory runs into similar problem as classical game theory, however. Again, an agent’s assumptions about its co-player’s beliefs rely on what the latter
beliefs what the former beliefs, etc. Thus, without any strong
initial reason to believe that another player would play the
payoff-dominant option, this process leads to a similar type
of infinite regress that lies at the heart of the equilibrium selection problem.
Social Learning Whereas such theories approach the problem of equilibrium selection on an individualistic level, it
may be more useful to tackle the question of how convention
changes come about on a population level directly. Within
the literature on social learning, authors have more generally addressed the problem how norms and conventions can
change and stay adaptive given that they are transmitted between individuals. It has been suggested that humans can
weed out maladaptive traits or behaviours via selective imitation mechanisms that rely on the success of a certain trait
or norm (Laland, 2004; Boyd & Richerson, 2005). By imitating successful individuals in particular, a population can
pick up new and more beneficial behaviours, rather than keep
transmitting out-dated information by blind copying. Selective imitation mechanisms are thus a candidate for the driving
force of convention changes.
Team Reasoning Classical game theory, Schelling’s focal
point approach, as well as the social learning literature are
grounded in the assumption that players choose the strategies
that best promote their individual payoff. This individualistic assumption is transcended by the team reasoning approach
(e.g., Gold & Sugden, 2007; Sugden, 2000). Team reasoning
assumes that, in interactive situations, people often maximise
the payoff of a group or team, rather than their own. Once
several players have established their membership to the same
group, they can play their part of a joint strategy which maximises the payoff of all players combined. The theory presupposes that players enter this special mode of reasoning once
they have established their membership to a team. This can
happen via explicit agreement but also due to shared experiences or mutual observations (Sugden, 2003).
Team reasoning points to some important features of human interactions that can help solve the problem of equilibrium selection in coordination games. Given that they
manage to reach mutual confidence in some way, team reasoners can coordinate their actions through conventions that
maximise their collective payoff. Similarly, team reasoning
should also be able to motivate convention change. If, in a
society or group, there exists a payoff-dominant alternative to
a convention and a team of individuals are aware of it, they
are expected to behave in accordance with this new convention when interacting with each other the next time.
In this study we explore the prerequisites and dynamics of
convention change using an agent-based simulation, asking
(i) what the general dynamics are that underlie convention
shifts in a population, and (ii) how team reasoning and social
learning mechanisms compare in their ability to trigger them.
Study I: Dynamics of convention shifts with
simple reinforcement learning
The first study aims to demonstrate the dynamics of a simple
version of our model in which agents update their strategies
using a reinforcement learning rule. In the second study we
will then turn to a strategy comparison between social learning and team reasoning.
The Model
A population of 49 agents is placed in a 7 by 7 lattice that
is folded from North to South and East to West. This yields
a toroidal structure without any edges and guarantees that all
agents have the same number of neighbours on all sides. Each
agent can then interact with its eight direct neighbours (to the
N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, and NW). Agents repeatedly interact with one another in pairs, each time having to coordinate
their actions. Each agent can choose from two actions, corresponding to two conventions: Convention 1 and Convention
2 (henceforth: C1 and C2). Subsequently they receive their
payoff from this interaction according to the payoff matrix
shown in table 1. The payoff structure is that of a pure coordination game with two Nash Equilibria:(C1,C1), in which
both players receive a payoff of 2, and (C2,C2), where agents
both receive a payoff of 5; if coordination fails, both agents
get a payoff of 0. The equilibrium (C2,C2) pareto-dominates
(C1,C1) thus representing a case in which one convention, if
applied successfully, is more beneficial than the other.
The simple learning rule When agents interact they decide which strategy to play in the coordination game using
a strategy selection rule. Previous studies on conventions in
agent-based simulations have used some type of reinforcement learning to model strategy selection, that takes into account an agent’s history of strategies played and payoffs received (for example, Shoham and Tennenholtz (1997) and
Delgado (2002) using a highest cumulative reward rule for
strategy selection; Barr (2004) using a one-layer neural network). Similarly, in this first study it is assumed that agents
rely on a simple learning rule that chooses a strategy based
on the payoff it has generated for that agent in its remembered past. During each encounter both agents look back at
their last m interactions, where m corresponds to an agent’s
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1
1
Proportion of C2 Users
Mean Payoff
0.9
0.9
Average Payoff and C2 Use
Average Payoff and C2 Use
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0
Proportion of C2 Users
Mean Payoff
0.8
0.8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability p of Choosing against Learning Rule
0
15
0.5
20
25
30
Size of Subpopulation
35
40
Figure 1: Average payoff and use of C2 for different probabilities p of choosing against the learning rule
Figure 2: Average payoff and use of C2 for different levels of
initial C2 users
memory capacity. Then, they choose the strategy that has
yielded the highest average payoff over these interactions. If
both strategies generated the same average payoff in that time
period, agents randomly pick one of them. If one strategy has
never been played and therefore not remembered before, its
average payoff equals zero. At the beginning of the simulation all agents remember only having played strategy C1, and
always having received the associated payoff of the coordination equilibrium (C1, C1).
Given this model, one can now investigate the roles that
different key parameters play in shifting the population from
using convention C1 to using convention C2. To illustrate, it
shall be shown what impact different ways of introducing the
better convention have on the dynamics of the model. Unless stated otherwise, all results reported in the next section,
were obtained from simulating a population of 20 agents with
a memory capacity, m = 3 1 that were randomly matched for
2000 interaction rounds. The outcome measure of each simulation is the proportion of agents that, in their last interaction,
adhered to the better convention, C2, and the average payoff
all agents received in this interaction. Each simulation was
repeated for 1000 runs and the outcome measures reported
are averages over these runs.
p increases, the amount of times that a population flips from
most agents adhering to C1 to most agents adhering to C2
grows rapidly. Note that, because of the random parameter
p, no population ever converges to using purely one convention, but for lower levels of p both conventions are basins of
attraction. As p approaches 0.5, naturally, the behaviour of
the population approaches randomness as agents cannot rely
on their learning rule any more. Given the current parameters,
this shows that a certain degree of ’adventurousness’ can trigger population to shift from one convention to another, payoff
dominant one, without communication between the agents.
A second way of introducing a convention in a population,
and possibly a more realistic one regarding how new conventions get introduced in real societies, is by having a group of
agents enter this population that already adhere to the new
convention. Using the same parameter settings as before, but
with no random perturbation of strategy use, it is possible to
introduce a subpopulation of C2 users in the population. In
the beginning of each run, agents in this subpopulation remember only having played strategy C2 and receiving the associated higher payoff from the more beneficial convention.
Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the population dependent on
the size of this subpopulation.
As expected, the proportion of times a population shifts
strictly increases with the size of the subpopulation. Up to
a size of 22 initial C2 users, the new convention practically
never catches on in the population. Since agents from the
new group initially have negative experiences with C2 when
interacting with C1-playing agents from the population, they
often adapt rather quickly to playing C1 as well. It takes almost the same amount of C2 users compared to C1 user to
turn the behaviour of the whole population more than half
of the time. This shows just how difficult it is to break with
an established convention, even given a significant amount of
people that have successfully used a new and better convention already.
Results: Basic model with simple learning
One way of introducing the new convention in the population is by letting agents randomly deviate from their strategy
choices with a certain probability p. In the initial population
this will lead to agents occasionally ’trying out’ to act in accordance with the new convention.
Figure 1 shows the average use of strategy C2 in the population for different levels of p. If p is very low (between 0 and
0.06) C2 almost never spreads through the population. Once
1 This memory size could be shown to produce the greatest probability of convention shifts to happen in the current population, all
else being equal.
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Study II: Imitation and team reasoning
the-successful, as it does not rely only on the success of one
single neighbour, but on the overall performance of the strategies. As with the first imitation rule, if there is a tie between
the strategies’ average payoffs or if only one of the strategies
has been played in a neighbourhood, agents use their simple
learning rule to pick a strategy.
Using a basic reinforcement learning rule the model does not
seem to explain how it is possible for a new convention to
catch on in a group or society given less beneficial conditions,
for instance, when a large majority is not already adhering to
the new convention. However, in interactive situations people
usually do not exclusively use information about their own
experience to make a decision, but also consider cues in their
social environments, such as the actions and experiences of
others. As mentioned above, one important driving-force of
cultural evolution are social learning strategies that rely on
selective imitation or copying mechanisms (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Laland, 2004). Moreover, in interactive situations
people may be using different modes of reasoning altogether.
Thus they might aim at maximising the payoff of a group or
team of people, rather than just their own utility.
This second study therefore aims at exploring convention
change under more realistic assumptions about the strategy
selection process. Three questions shall be investigated: (i)
how two well-studied social learning rules and (ii) a version
of a team reasoning rule manage to explain convention shifts
and (iii) how the performance of these different strategy selection rules compares in achieving this. It is of particular interest whether team reasoning can explain convention
shifts more successfully than the more widely studied social
learning rules. Since the concept sets out to explain how
humans derive solutions of coordination problems, it should
give some additional insight into the dynamics of convention
change.
In the next section, the three new strategy selection rules
will be explained. Subsequently, their performance in triggering convention shifts will be investigated in another round
of multi-agent simulations.
Team Reasoning The concept of team reasoning supersedes the assumption underlying the other two strategy selection rules discussed so far. These assumed that agents
rely on some sort of learning to help maximise their individual payoff. Team reasoning, on the other hand, assumes
that sometimes what people maximise is the payoff a group
or team of people. In order to count towards such a group or
team, there has to exist a mutual confidence between members that establishes common knowledge of group membership. Such confidence can be installed for instance by explicit
agreement, but also shared experience (Sugden, 2000, 2003).
Since the current model assumes no direct communication
between agents, group membership is established by shared
experience: Given two agents who can observe a successful
application of the better convention (i.e. observe two agents
using C2), and these two agents can also observe each other,
they establish their membership to a team. The next time they
interact with each other, they will play their parts in maximising this team’s payoff and thus adhere to C2. If there is no
common knowledge between them, they resort to the simple
learning rule.
Results: Comparing the strategy selection rules
Strategy Selection Rules
We tested three strategy selection rules:
Imitate-the-best-neighbour (Imitation 1) First, we draw
on a well-studied class of mechanisms of social learning
are those involving selective copying or imitation of the behaviour of others. One common variant of such imitation
learning is copying the behaviour of the most successful
member(s) of a group (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001;
Gigerenzer, 2010). In this study we therefore specified an imitation mechanism as follows: When choosing which strategy
to play (C1 or C2), an agent determines which of her neighbours received the highest payoff in their last interaction and
imitates that strategy. If all neighbours have been equally successful, or have been using the same strategy, the agent uses
the simple learning rule specified above.
Imitate-the-best-strategy (Imitation 2) A second imitation rule is to copy not the most successful neighbour, but
the strategy that has yielded the highest average payoff in
one’s neighbourhood (see, e.g., Alexander & Skyrms, 1999).
It could be said that this is a more careful version of imitate-
The three strategy selection rules as well as simple learning
were pitted against each other using the same model as in the
previous study. For the two imitation rules and team reasoning it was assumed that agents could observe the actions and
payoffs of their eight neighbouring agents and use this information to update their strategies.
Figure 3 shows the average use of the new convention in a
population for different sizes of initial C2 users, separately for
each strategy selection rule. Both imitation and team reasoning lead to a higher rate of convention shifts than the simple
reinforcement learning rule for most levels of subpopulation
size.
For the two imitation rules, this result confirms previous
research on social learning, showing that selective imitation
can increase the adaptiveness of behaviour. Copying successful strategies thus facilitates the spread of group beneficial
conventions, even given that another inferior convention initially prevails in a population. In this study the imitate-thebest-neighbour (Imitation 1) rule outperformed the imitatethe-best-strategy (Imitation 2) rule slightly for all levels of
subpopulation size. This is not surprising given that the former always leads to strategy switches when the latter does,
but not vice versa. This is because if one neighbour has applied C2 successfully in their last interaction, that neighbour
will be imitated for certain using Imitation 1. With Imitation
2, this one positive interaction might be cancelled out in the
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1
Proportion of C2 Users
1
0.9
0.8
Average Use of C2
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.4
Imitation 1
Imitation 2
Team Reasoning
0.8
2
3
0.3
5
6
(a) Average use of C2
Simple Learning Rule
Imitation 1
Imitation 2
Team Reasoning
0.1
0
5
10
15
20
25
Size of Subpopulation
30
35
300
40
Conversion Speed
0.2
0
4
Size of Subpopulation
Figure 3: Average use of C2 for different sizes of a subpopulation adhering to C2, by strategy selection rule
average payoff of C2, if two or more other neighbours have
failed when using it in their last interactions.
Why is team reasoning so much more successful at triggering convention shifts than the two imitation rules? According
to team reasoning, once two agents in a population interact
with each other using C2, there will always be surrounding
agents observing them and thus establishing mutual confidence. This is why, a single successful interaction can initiate
the deterministic spread of the better convention. Whether
a population switches conventions, then only depends on the
likelihood of two agents of the initial subpopulation meeting
each other while they are still adhering to C2.
In contrast, the two imitation rules do not lead to such a deterministic spread of C2. Consider the first imitation rule: If
two interacting agents use C2, they will probably be imitated
by their surrounding neighbours. However, it is not guaranteed that these neighbours similarly meet agents that imitate
the initial successful pair as well, for instance because they
are not themselves neighbours of this pair. Hence, applying
C2 might fail repeatedly, eventually also causing the initial
C2 users to switch to using C1.
To illustrate this difference between the team reasoning
rule and the two imitation rules, the model was run again
starting with a non-random configuration of agents that belong to the initial subpopulation of C2 users. Two to six subpopulation members were placed in neighbouring cells in the
lattice of agents and were the first ones to interact in each run.
As a consequence, at the beginning of each simulation there
would always be two or more C2 users interacting with each
other. Figure 4a shows the proportion of convention shifts
resulting from these different starting configurations for the
three strategy selection rules. As expected, the team reasoning rule always leads to the conversion of the population to
the new convention under these parameter settings. This was
not the case for the two imitation learning rules, although both
performed better than previously when subpopulations of the
Imitation 1
Imitation 2
Team Reasoning
250
200
150
100
2
3
4
Size of Subpopulation
5
(b) Median conversion speed
Figure 4: Average use of C2 and conversion median speed for
clustered subpopulation size, by strategy selection rule
same sizes were not clustered, but randomly distributed in the
population.
This difference also manifests itself in the number of interactions that it takes a population to completely converge to
the better convention. Figure 4b depicts the median number
of interactions it took a population to converge to C2, again
given that a subpopulation of C2 users is clustered together in
the lattice of agents. The team reasoning rule in general converges faster than the two imitation rules and its conversion
speed decreases with the number of agents in the clustered
subpopulation. This decrease is not detectable for the two
imitation rules. This illustrates that team reasoning leads to
the steady spread of a convention through a population, while
imitation rules take a more complicated route that involves
much ’blind’ copying of strategies, leading to repeated failures and slower progress.
Discussion
Using various multi-agent simulations the current study investigated how conventions can change in a population. It
was shown that two imitation learning rules and one team reasoning rule for strategy selection could outperform a simple
reinforcement learning rule in triggering convention shifts.
Moreover, the team reasoning rule proved to be more successful than imitation, providing a possibility of establishing
common knowledge and playing joint strategies without central coordination.
The study of conventions is relevant for the question of
the adaptiveness of culture. As has been discussed above,
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6
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (2005). The origin and evolution
of cultures. Oxford University Press, USA.
Camerer, C., Ho, T., & Chong, J. (2004). A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
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Crawford, V., Gneezy, U., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2008). The
power of focal points is limited: even minute payoff asymmetry may yield large coordination failures. The American
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Enquist, M., Eriksson, K., & Ghirlanda, S. (2007). Critical
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Enquist, M., & Ghirlanda, S. (2007). Evolution of social
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culture. Journal of theoretical biology, 246(1), 129–135.
Gigerenzer, G. (2010). Moral satisficing: Rethinking moral
behavior as bounded rationality. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2(3), 528–554.
Gold, N., & Sugden, R. (2007). Theories of team agency. In
F. Peter & H. B. Schmid (Eds.), Rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press.
Harsanyi, J., & Selten, R. (1988). A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press Books, 1.
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. (2001). The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and
Human Behavior, 22(3), 165–196.
Laland, K. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learning &
Behavior, 32(1), 4-14.
Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Schelling, T. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge:
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Shoham, Y., & Tennenholtz, M. (1997). On the emergence
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whether culture is adaptive or not crucially depends on the
capacity of norms and conventions to transform and adapt to
changing environments (Rogers, 1988; Boyd & Richerson,
2001; Enquist, Eriksson, & Ghirlanda, 2007). The current
study has confirmed some of the key characteristics authors
have attributed to conventions. They are self-stabilising patterns of behaviour that are not easily overturned as long as
self-interested agents get some benefit from adhering to them.
This is a problem for the claim that culture is adaptive, since it
makes it very difficult for a new, more beneficial, convention
to replace a current one.
As has been shown here, adaptive filtering mechanisms,
such as forms of selective imitation, can aid convention shifts
under certain conditions. Such mechanisms have proven to be
successful in spreading behaviours whose payoff does not depend on other individuals but rather, for instance, on states in
the environment (Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; Laland, 2004).
However, since conventions rely on the coordination with
others, imitation often leads to failures in the early stages
when the old convention still prevails. This is the case even
if copying is selective, that is, when only successful strategies or individuals are imitated. Thus, our study suggests
that imitation may not be among the motors of convention
changes, since there is often no immediate advantage of imitating other people’s successful behaviour when playing coordination games.
What seems to be necessary for a new convention to replace another one without leading to excessive failures of coordination, is a form of common knowledge between interacting individuals that unites them as a team with common
preferences. As proponents of the team reasoning view on
strategy selection (Sugden, 2003) have pointed out, people
often maximise the utility of a team or group when interacting with others. This is one reason why, for example, they
find it easy to choose payoff-dominant equilibria in coordination games. Similarly, the current study has shown that
common knowledge helps to promote equilibrium shifts on a
population level. A sense of common interest between agents
and mutual confidence in group membership, can thus help to
change conventions adaptively, and replace current coordinative behaviours with more beneficial alternatives.
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