Consti Cases

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC   G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents. G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994 RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents. G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994 RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654. Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.   QUIASON, J.: In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and parties. I G.R. No. 104654 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992. On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23). In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26). On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28). The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted. On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H"). Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33). On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34). On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law. After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court. G.R. No. 105715 This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon. Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position. Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992. On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days. In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality. Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen. Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us. Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent. G.R. No. 105735 This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715. In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18). The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon. In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter. Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.). On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo, p. 50). The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time. The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private respondent’s disqualification because of his American citizenship. II G.R. No. 104654 We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s citizenship. In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship. He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his political rivals. He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed. It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media. Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms. The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law. Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms. The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law. Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]). The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period. A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]). Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies. Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality. G.R. No. 105715 In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondent’s proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for questioning the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged." Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship. Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]). G.R. No. 105735 In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. 178831-32               July 30, 2009 JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 179120               July 30, 2009 LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,  vs. HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. Nos. 179132-33               July 30, 2009 OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,  vs. HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. Nos. 179240-41               July 30, 2009 RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents. R E S O L U T I O N PERALTA, J.: The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks a reconsideration of the Court’s April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong’s petition forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogo’s petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement. Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the pending incident. After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack of merit. Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling on his motion as follows: The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives. Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v. COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But, first things first. The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. In our Decision, We held that: However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that: Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register: 1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally; 2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered asprima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same: 3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention; 4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General]; 5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied) As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that: x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant. Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.4lavvphil These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and that the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been affirmed. He even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was composed of two parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part. For this purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final. SO ORDERED.5 Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC should not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections. His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and apply only that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and discard the prejudicial part which, obviously, would just be a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which Biraogo dichotomized was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2,7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained its finality. Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held: x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, andassumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.8 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.10 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. x x x x Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong’s proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction. The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.11 The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato,12 to the effect that: In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction: x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate. Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the House of Representatives. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.13 Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.lavvphi1 In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his motion for reconsideration. In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said departure or turn-around. Such a position deserves scant consideration. The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit: [A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but inno way is that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated. We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it. Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action. In sum, we hold that Biraogo’s Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based on citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 151914            July 31, 2002 TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,  vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,1 dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The facts are as follows: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.2 From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.3 Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.4 Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000. On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.6 On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."7 On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.8 He subsequently took his oath of office. On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings: Respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected. All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections.9 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition. I. Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner. A.         With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this case should be dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, §4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28, 2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and should be dismissed. Private respondent’s contention has no merit. Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts: Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling. Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, §2 should be counted from the receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division.10 In this case, petitioner received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days later, on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed within the period provided for in Rule 19, §2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), §7 of the Constitution. It is contended, however, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and, consequently, this petition should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It was actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the COMELEC en banc that — An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes the said Motion pro forma.11 We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.12 But, as we have held in another case:13 Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,14 or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,15 or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,15 or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,17 or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.18 The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters." Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law. B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondent’s petition for cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by private respondent? R.A. No. 6646 provides: SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added) SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC19 and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,20 the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation but on the merits. II. On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he had not. First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides: Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added) The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"21but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).24 In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the United States Code provides: Requirements of naturalization. – Residence (a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added) In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.26 It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country. Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.27 The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §1328 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)29 and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,30 in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31 Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayanincludes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.32 He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections33 in support of his contention that the residency requirement in §39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship requirement under §39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, §39(a) of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election." Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.34 What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen. Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency. Petitioner’s invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:36 A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in the records. III. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides: SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. Indeed, it has been held that a candidate’s statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so37 or that the candidate was a "natural-born" Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen38 constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC39 that a candidate who used her husband’s family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en bancare AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996 RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.   PANGANIBAN, J.:p The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon - (i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation; (ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or (iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"? In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms. G.R. No. 123755 This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Facts On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition with the following disposition 6: WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon: Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060 Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440 Raul R. Lee 53,304 Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925 On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor. On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition. Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation. Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon. Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof. On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition." The Issues in G.R. No. 123755 Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions" 15: First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition; Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor; Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon. G.R. No. 120295 This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows: 1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines"; 2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and 3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo. The Facts and the Issue The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.) the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election." Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void. By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon. On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda. The Consolidated Issues From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? 2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? 3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"? 4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? 5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"? The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this. The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. xxx xxx xxx Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160). Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects. Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship. En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim. First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23 This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26 The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well. Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application. Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996. On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people. So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: * a citizen of the Philippines; * a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected; * a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; * able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. * In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day 32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens,i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration. The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended thecitizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else. Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36 So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995." 37 It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected. There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible. But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended." On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43 A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedyand a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation. The Solicitor General 44 argues: By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041). In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative. In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein. At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994? While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation. Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. 47 And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case. And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot. Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date. It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50 On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51 By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government." These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. 52 The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification? Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in totoby Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines." We do not agree. It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55 The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands. The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317 Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action." This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled: The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.) The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same. The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid? Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons: First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer." In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows: The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus: But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case. The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was. Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo: The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected. The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory? In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.) This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc 63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied) Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings. Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after thefifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict. Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections. Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final. The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge? Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc. Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor. In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision. Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule! At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience. E P I L O G U E In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: . . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted). 67 The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed. In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice. WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing: (1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED. (2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006 JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN,Respondents. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that "it is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino citizen. The Case The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States. The Facts The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7 Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged: 1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan; 2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondent’s Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State; 3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8 The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows: The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasa’s passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9 The BID ordered petitioner’s deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the following summary deportation order: Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the respondent’s Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked. By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996. In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, ‘81461’ should be ‘86461’], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired. It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10 Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. 12 On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioner’s detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. 13Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioner’s temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. 14 However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. 15 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasa’s petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquired––by repatriation––his Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171—the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioner’s parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16, 1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996––more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court considered petitioner’s "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us. The Issue The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien. The Court’s Ruling The Court finds no merit in this petition. RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz: Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.) Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not. Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171 To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:18 the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171 Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit: Section 1. Composition.—The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted. Sec. 2. Procedure.—Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied). Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.—The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions. Sec. 4. Effectivity.—This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately. In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship. What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic.22 Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN. Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171 Even if petitioner––now of legal age––can still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified." 23 Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to ‘political or economic reasons’ is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24 Petitioner’s argument has no leg to stand on. A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171, to wit: Ms. Domingo: x x x From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country. The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere. Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.) x x x x x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who leave their country. And the two types—the economic and political refugees—are the ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people who left the country because of political persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back to the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back because they are treated no different from any other class of alien. 26 From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity. Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to one’s native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance," and his father’s loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity." 27 This argument has no merit. While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one’s native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere. Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful. Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation. Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation. This theory is incorrect. As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law. Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation: 2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the alien’s valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis thereof. 3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be ‘86461’], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. 28 In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held: It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. x x x 29 Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION   G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999 GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner,  vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.   VITUG, J.: The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29 December 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Marikina City in Case No. N-96-03-MK, entitled "in the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y Legaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 965 and 263[0]." Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, "applying for naturalization," he averred that — FIRST. — His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of this petition. SECOND. — His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residence was in Las Vegas, U.S.1âwphi1.nêt THIRD. — His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the properties of his parents which he has been engaged since his arrival here in the Philippines. FOURTH. — He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He lost his Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. He is at present a citizen or subject of the United States of America. Copy of his birth certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A." FIFTH. — He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila and now resides at petitioner's residence at Marikina, Metro Manila. Copy of their marriage contract is hereto attached as Annex "B." SIXTH. — He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in 1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attached as Annex "C." SEVENTH. — He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine citizenship, and possesses none of the disqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least six months immediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. EIGHT. — He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government. He is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of men's ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. The nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war with the Philippines. NINTH. — It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen. 1 On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing on 27 January 1997 2 which, along with the petition and its annexes, was received by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") on 10 May 1996. On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order of 12 July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other things, that — A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewise show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under R.A. 8171. 3 Concluding, the court ruled: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning. SO ORDERED. 4 After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996 to the following effect; viz: After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the undersigned, the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of this order. Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil Registrar, Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality. SO ORDERED. 5 On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. The motion was found to be well taken by the trial court; thus, in an order, dated 22 September 1997, it adjudged: This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on March 19, 1997. The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization, which is composed of the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, which shall process the application; that if their applications are approved they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, affect which they shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship and the Commission of Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the same should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo Angat y Legaspi took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on October 03, 1996 and on October 04, 1996, the petitioner was ordered repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines. On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on March 19, 1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion. The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdiction over the herein petition as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on Naturalization. Considering that this court has no jurisdiction over this case, the order granting the same is therefore null and void. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its re-filing before the Special Committee on Naturalization. SO ORDERED. 6 A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the aforequoted order asservating that since his petition was filed on 14 March 1996, or months before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the President under AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authority to take cognizance of the case. In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure submits the lone assignment of error that — The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on Retroactive Application. Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization 7 filed on 11 March 1996, and that he had acquired a vested right as a repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following the order, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on 03 October 1996. The contention is not meritorious. R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic necessity. The pertinent provisions of the law read: Sec. 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 631, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude: or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9 the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court elaborated: This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist." The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not-repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress — once created — to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well. 11 Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; 12 hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, 13 promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality 14 nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.15 It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 16 and R.A. No. 2630 17 since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22 September 1996, issued by the court a quo, dismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 163256             November 10, 2004 CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIÑE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents. D E C I S I O N AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The factual antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2 On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer3 stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition. On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period.4 Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum5 subsequently. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus: x x x The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows: SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. xxx. (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. [SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:] xxx. (d) Those with dual citizenship. xxx. (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad. In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965). x x x Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991. As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. 6 In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.7 On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz: (1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997; (2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004; (3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004; (4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen; (5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their records and for petitioner's reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship. On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.8 The Comelec en banc held, thus: The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners. When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondent's only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner. Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex "2" – Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex "3" – Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex "4" – Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex "5" – Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex "6" – Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization. Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004. The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex "3." This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171. As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)9 On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. In its Comment,10 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioner's name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioner's opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition. In his Reply,11 petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices. Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec. The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division. As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.12 Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.13 First Issue: Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation? The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171,14 thus: SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply? In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as "applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term." The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus: Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: * a citizen of the Philippines; * a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; * a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; * able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect." * In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day." From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.16 (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that "the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus: x x x …The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events—i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being—in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. x x x Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his American citizenship—was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.17 Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above. Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division? The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated: The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.19 It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case. WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. D E C I S I O N GARCIA, J.: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189. The facts: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response: Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality …, it is the Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 4 Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, 6therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. 7 The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved. Observing the petitioners’ and the COMELEC’s respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189. The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition. In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated. We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows: SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx. SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a nonresident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL 8 - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows: Section 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. Section 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: (a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws; (b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country; (c) Those who have … [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have … been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, ….; (d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. (e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority …. (Words in bracket added.) Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it - … violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The challenger] cites … Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his claim [where] the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. [The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. 10 (Words in bracket added.) As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises: As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." 11 Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx xxx xxx Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship …; 3) xxx xxx xxx. (4) xxx xxx xxx; (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy … political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. Opposing the petitioners’ bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12 COMELEC argues: 4. ‘DUALS’ MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES 4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The ‘duals,’ upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, ‘duals’ must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13 The Court disagrees. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal: It is clear from these discussions of the … Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, …, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus: Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact. Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution …. xxx xxx xxx Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this? Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of "residence" is synonymous with "domicile." As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law. This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we – that Congress – must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos. If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President. Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad." The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And "residents" (sic) is a qualification. xxx xxx xxx Look at what the Constitution says – "In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election." Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office. I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros …. We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. …. As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote. xxx xxx xxx Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember. The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence … – "residency" has been interpreted as synonymous with "domicile." But the third more practical reason, … is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise – to enfranchise them and empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted) Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body: 1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15 Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections; While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads: SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 160869             May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,  vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,Respondent. D E C I S I O N QUISUMBING, J.: This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads: SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003." SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective. SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation. In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance? We shall discuss these issues jointly. Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3 In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following: x x x x Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution… Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over. Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved. Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained. x x x x Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance. Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House. x x x x Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship. Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.) From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7 For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8 To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.