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Securing Afghanistan:
Historic Sources of India's Contemporary Challenge
Avinash Paliwal
OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION
Securing Afghanistan:
Historic Sources of India's Contemporary Challenge
Avinash Paliwal
OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION
About the Author
Avinash Paliwal is a doctoral candidate in Defence Studies at the King's
College London. Specialising in Indian foreign policy and strategic thought, his
thesis looks at India's Afghan policy post 2001. Avinash was associated as a Visiting
Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation earlier this year.
2013 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.
Securing Afghanistan:
Historic Sources of India's Contemporary Challenge
Abstract
Withdrawal of the Western security umbrella has problematised
India's current development aid-led soft power approach in
Afghanistan. As New Delhi debates its post-2014 policy options,
this paper looks at the tensions that shape India's strategic thought
in the region. The northwest frontier has traditionally defined
India's territorial defence. In looking at historical debates regarding
this region, this paper will highlight the impact of India's territorial
construct on its strategic outlook. The Bombay and Ludhiana
Schools of Indian Defence in the early nineteenth century
respectively reflected advocacy of a muscular forward and a
diplomatic passive policy. They formed the basis for the duallayered buffer defence system called the 'ring fence'. Developed to
defend the Raj from external and internal threats, this defence
system steered the transformation of frontiers into modern South
Asian boundaries. India and Pakistan's inheritance of these
boundaries constructed by the Raj shape their strategic vision of
the region. New Delhi's response to geopolitical developments
such as the Soviet military intervention, rise of the Taliban and the
US military intervention post 9/11 are rooted in tensions
emanating from its political geography. Striking a balance between
Islamabad-Rawalpindi and Kabul and choosing between hard and
soft power options form the basis of India's Afghan dilemma.
Keywords: India, Afghanistan, Security and Foreign Policy, British Raj,
political geography, strategy
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Introduction
A
fghanistan has proved to be a security lynchpin in South and
Central Asia over the last two decades. Home to a variety of
militant networks with regional and global links, Afghanistan's
stability is crucial for the peaceful development of the region. With the
withdrawal of US forces scheduled for 2014, there is tremendous anxiety
among the neighbouring countries. Concerned about a spillover of
violence and instability throughout the region, Afghanistan's neighbours
are working hard to develop a regional mechanism to cope with the
challenge. According to Washington, regional powers, particularly India
and China, should play a proactive role in stabilising Afghanistan. Also
of much consequence will be the role of Pakistan and Iran, both of
whom stand at various odds with Kabul. Interestingly, both India and
China, despite having supported the idea of a regional solution, have
been hedging their bets in Afghanistan. Both have refused to fill the
security vacuum, and neither is increasing its aid and investment further
than what has already been committed. For India, security concerns
emanating from Afghanistan are even more immediate and large scale
than those for China. Facing serious security challenges in Kashmir and
having witnessed attacks on its soil by groups trained in the Afghan
hinterlands, New Delhi is particularly concerned about the stability of
Afghanistan. India's strategic-security community finds itself at a policy
crossroads as the salience of these security issues increases. With the
central theme being India's defence, the dilemma is rooted in developing
mechanisms to achieve security within a certain structural and normative
context.
What policy choices does India have in Afghanistan post 2014?
Buttressing its soft power approach with hard power will strain relations
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with Pakistan. Limited Indian engagement with Kabul, however, might
increase Pakistan's political influence in Afghanistan.
This paper will look at debates from the days of the British Raj until now
that have shaped India's strategic thought on Afghanistan. It will
highlight the impact of India's territorial construct on its strategic
imagination and will argue that India's Afghan policy is determined by its
political geography.
An important theatre for India's security, the northwest frontier has
traditionally defined India's territorial defence. Indeed, India's threat
perception from China and strategic worth of the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR) rose in significance primarily in late twentieth and twenty-first
centuries; importance of the northwestern frontier, however, has
endured over centuries. With 1947 a watershed year, studies on South
Asian geopolitics often focus more on the post-Independence era. The
debate on India's frontier and defence policies, however, date back to the
early nineteenth century.
Steered by the Napoleonic Wars, the Bombay and Ludhiana Schools of
Indian Defence emerged as the two competing lines of thought
1
regarding India's defence. The Bombay School advocated a forward
military policy for defending India with River Oxus being the primary
line of defence. The Ludhiana School, on the other hand, advocated an
economy-and diplomacy-driven policy with the River Indus being the
outer bulwark. These schools transformed into the classic clash between
the Forward School and the Closed Border School following the Indian
revolt of 1857 and the Russian advance to Central Asia from 1860s
onwards. These schools reflected opposition between ideas regarding
the defence of India. Debates over security and administrative
arrangements were predominant during the British Raj. While Britain
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feared invasion or coalition against itself while it was only one state
among many in Europe, the fulcrum of the debates shifted towards its
colonial enterprises when it became a paramount power in Asia with the
defeat of France. The Raj envisioned a dual-layered 'ring fence' defence
2
system for India. Consisting of an Inner Ring and an Outer Ring, this
system of defence sought to develop a 'series of buffer zones along the
landward periphery of the subcontinent'.3 While the Inner Ring was
made of areas like Baluchistan, Northwest tribal areas and the Naga
Hills, the Outer Ring consisted of Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma.
Stability in the region between the River Indus and the Hindu Kush,
geographically divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is crucial for
India's security and development. The Partition of 1947, though
complicated, did not reduce the geopolitical imprint on India's strategic
choices.4 There is a striking similarity between modern India's discourse
on strategy and the earlier debates. These similarities reflect the tension
over balancing relations between Islamabad and Kabul as well as opting
between hard and soft approaches. The following sections will provide
an overview of the historical debates and their legacy in contemporary
India. The first section will delve into the debate between the Bombay
and the Ludhiana Schools. Though both schools had strong policy
appeal, the Ludhiana School remained successful for most of the first
half of the nineteenth century. The second section of this paper will
discuss the debate over Nehru's visit to the Northwest Frontier
Provinces (NWFP) in 1946 and its fallout. Discussion surrounding
Nehru's NWFP visit reflects the strategic relevance of this region and
the impact of political geography on strategy. The third section will
focus on key dilemmas facing India during the Cold War period and
afterwards. The last section provides the contours of current policy
challenges New Delhi faces with the withdrawal of US combat troops
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from Afghanistan in 2014. With swords crossed between passive and
active policy proponents, the legacy of nineteenth century debates
continues.
Expanding the Raj
The quest for logical territorial limits of the Indian Empire steered
diplomatic, political and military activity of the Raj in the nineteenth
century.5 Reasons for this were as much related to defence from external
threats as much as they were to exercising sovereign authority over a
defined territory and people. The Durand Line Agreement of 1893 was a
step aimed at defining these territorial limits in the northwest regions.6
Where to draw the line and the nature of Raj's relationship with
7
Afghanistan and Persia were hotly debated subjects. From the time of
the emergence of Britain as a great power by 1818, these debates became
increasingly intense over the years. With the defeat of France following
the Napoleonic Wars the fulcrum of threat shifted from Europe to Asia.
Concerns were that Russia would attempt to attack India rather than
challenge British authority in Europe. Though the British navy provided
ample protection to the British Isles, it could not afford to protect Asia.
The defence of India therefore required a substitute. Beginning in
December 1829, the Great Game was played for the rest of the century
8
precisely to develop this substitute. There were two main questions
facing Britain. Firstly, who poses the threat and of what nature, and
secondly, on what lines should the defence be structured? As the answer
to the first question became relatively clear, seeking a definite answer to
the second became increasingly complicated and formed the basis of
debate. Not only was there a collision of opposing philosophies, there
was also a deep conflict of interest within the British bureaucracy
regarding the defence of India.
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Emerging from the difference of opinion between the Bombay and
Ludhiana administrations, the two schools of Indian defence debated
throughout the 1820s and 1830s. The Bombay School stated that India
could be best secured from a Russian advance with River Oxus being the
primary line of defence, and Afghanistan and Persia being British
protectorates. The Ludhiana, and later Punjab, School(s), on the other
hand, viewed the River Indus as the outer rampart for India's defence
and relied more on diplomacy with the tsar to contain the Russian
9
advance (See Map 1). Providing a blueprint for the debate between the
Forward School (drawing from the Bombay School) and the Closed
Border School (drawing from the Ludhiana School) that gained salience
later in the nineteenth century, these advocacies played a critical role in
shaping the Raj's frontier policies and evolving contemporary India's
strategic framework. Moreover, adherence to these advocacy groups
played a critical role in the making and breaking of careers. With most of
its impetus coming from a strong bureaucratic logic, the dynamism of
these debates and the legacies they left withstood major structural
overhauls. The following paragraphs will outline key features of these
debates.
Map 1: British India and Persia in nineteenth century10
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Securing Afghanistan
The first round of these debates started between the first GovernorGeneral of India, Richard Wellesley, and the Secretary of State for War,
Henry Dundas, after the 1798 invasion of Egypt by Napoleon
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Bonaparte. While the former wanted to ally with Persia against France,
the latter advocated alliance with Afghanistan. Fear of invasion of
British India rose particularly after the Franco-Persian alliance following
the treaty of Finkenstein (1807). George Canning, the then Foreign
Secretary, sided with Wellesley to challenge the threat from this FrancoPersian alliance. The idea was to attract Persia towards Britain rather than
to let it drift towards France. Dundas, however, bitterly contested an
alliance with Persia. The result of this clash was a unique British
initiative, taken by Lord Minto, to send simultaneous missions to Persia,
Afghanistan, Punjab and Sind in 1808.12 The idea was to cultivate the
goodwill 'of all states and countries to the east of Indus, but also the
Afghan government, and even the Tartar territories east of the
Caspian.'13 Further complicating the debate, however, was the issue of
sending Christian missionaries to India, which involved a strong security
angle. Most of the actors who feared a French, or later Russian, invasion
14
were equally concerned about a rebellion by Indians. Conversion to
15
Christianity, it was argued, would reduce such a threat.
Persia's decision to let Napoleon access the port of Bandar Abbas
16
further heightened the threat of invasion in 1808. Of the four missions
mentioned above, John Malcolm headed the one to Persia. Malcolm,
who would later become the Governor of Bombay and the torchbearer
of the Bombay School, was given the job of undercutting French
influence in Persia. In case this Persian initiative failed, the British would
try to develop an alliance with Afghanistan. Mountstuart Elphinstone
would cultivate a relationship with the Afghan leadership, Shah Shuja at
that time. An archrival of Malcolm, Elphinstone became one of the
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leading advocates of the Ludhiana School. Supporting Elphinstone in
his advocacy was Charles Metcalfe, who led the mission to Lahore and
later became the acting Governor-General of India from 1835-1836.
While Malcolm wanted an active economic and defence policy with
Persia and expansion of the British mission in Tehran, Elphinstone and
Metcalfe advocated the same with Kabul and Lahore.17
All four missions, however, ran into difficulties from the very beginning
because of rivalries between Punjab and Afghanistan. For instance,
Elphinstone realised that a defensive or an offensive alliance with Kabul
–against France and later Russia–meant antagonising Ranjit Singh, the
strong ruler of Punjab. An unfriendly Ranjit Singh could make any plans
of linking Persia with India impossible.
Moreover, with the French influence in Persia still strong, Malcolm's
efforts did not yield much fruit either. Finally, the missions to Persia and
Lahore were deemed failures and Afghanistan was the only bulwark in
the region that agreed to ally in the defence of India.18 Unfortunately for
the British, of all the four states beyond the northwest frontier, Kabul
was the weakest and the most difficult to handle politically. The four
missions thus increased the risk of a frontier war instead of uniting the
frontier states into a defensive coalition. Though the frontier war was
still far away, the missions had already sparked a war within the British
bureaucracy. Elphinstone and Metcalfe's leanings were towards the
Ludhiana School; Lord Minto and Wellesley were to be the forerunners
of the Bombay School, and Malcolm its epitome. With one focusing on
Persia and the other on Punjab, interestingly, both wanted to avoid
fighting in Afghanistan. Apart from the geographical and climatic
difficulties, relations with Kabul had jeopardised ties not only with
Punjab, but with Persia too.
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As the first round of the debate came to an end with the defeat of
France, the second round began in 1829, this time with the Russians as
potential aggressors. Arthur Wellesley, then Prime Minister of Britain
and the younger brother of Richard Wellesley, and Lord Ellenborough,
19
President of the Board of Control, reinvigorated the debate. It was to
become the famous Great Game in Asia. Sharing the common concern
of a Russian invasion of India in response to a British provocation in
Europe, the question became one of travel routes. Would the Russian
advance come from the Caspian through Khiva and up the River Oxus,
or from Georgia through Tehran and Herat? This issue had a strong
political element to it as well as a military angle. Though the British were
confident of defeating a Russian army marching into India, they were
20
not sure whether this could be done quickly. While a setback at the
frontier would guarantee rebellion, the prospect of invasion would
threaten one.21 Correct assessment of the route, thus, was very crucial.
Claude Wade, the Resident in Ludhiana in the 1820s and 1830s, and John
Malcolm, now the Governor of Bombay, spearheaded the debate in the
1830s. Wade and his associates in the Ludhiana School expected a
Russian advance from the Caspian through Khiva. Malcolm and his
associates in the Bombay School expected Russia to take the route
through Persia and Herat. The solutions offered by both these schools
were based on their premises about the routes. The Ludhiana School
proposed the stabilisation of the northwest frontier. This could be done
either by using armed intervention in Afghanistan or by preparing a
strong defence at the Indus in alliance with the Sikhs. The Bombay
School, on the other hand, sought deepening of the Persian connection.
A common point between the two schools was the acceptance of
keeping the defence of India separate from the balance of power in
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22
Europe. It was clear that India's defence should not be tied to British
power in Europe as this would reduce maneuvering space for London
within the European continent. Under no circumstance was Britain's
insular position as a group of isles protected by a powerful navy to be
given up for the defence of India. Even though the British navy provided
security for India's sea lanes of trade and communication, the threat of
invasion remained serious mostly through land. As a result, the point of
contention boiled down to the choice of allies.
Though the proponents of these schools took turns in power and
popularity, the Ludhiana School remained victorious for most of the
early nineteenth century. This was mostly because of the turf battle
between John Malcolm and Harford Jones Brydges, the first Resident in
Baghdad. Termed as 'Malcolmites' and 'Harfordians', the admirers of
both these men fought tough battles to gain control of the Persian
mission. Despite being at their zenith between 1828 and 1830 and having
run the Persian mission successfully for more than twenty-five years
since its inception, the Malcolmites hit a dead end when a new
government was elected in 1830.23 The departure of Malcolm, Wellesley
and Ellenborough was followed by the arrival of hardcore adherents of
the Ludhiana School–William Bentinck, the Governor-General of Fort
William, Charles Metcalfe, Bentinck's close associate and head of the
Lahore mission, and Henry Willock, former envoy to Persia who later
became the chairman of the East India Company. Almost immediately a
policy of restraint was adopted and the importance of the Persian
mission declined. Expecting an advance through Khiva, the Ludhiana
School suggested developing Afghanistan as a buffer and forestalling
any quarrels with Persia and Russia using tools of diplomacy. This was
also the phase when the debate over the tools of diplomacy–economic
or military–became more animated. Debate between the Ludhiana and
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Bombay Schools eventually shifted into a standoff between the Punjab
and Bombay Schools of Indian defence in mid-and late-nineteenth
24
century. Often termed as the Forward School and the Closed Border
School, these doctrines emerged after the 1860s.25
This time it was the Indian Revolt of 1857 and a renewed Russian
advance in Central Asia that intensified the debate. Spearheading this
phase of the debate were John Lawrence, Viceroy and GovernorGeneral of India from 1864-1869, and Henry C. Rawlinson, a senior
26
British Indian army officer. While the former was a proponent of the
Closed Border School, the latter championed the Forward Policy. The
Closed Border School advocated non-interference in the domestic
Afghan affairs. The precondition was that Russia too should keep its
hands off Afghanistan. According to this school, only direct diplomacy
between St. Petersburg and London could solve the problem. Moreover,
in case of war, Britain should fight Russia all over the world–particularly
near the Mediterranean or the Black Sea–than restrict the war to the
northwest frontier. Forward School opponents, however, derided this
policy as 'masterly inactivity'.
According to Rawlinson and his Forward School associates, the Russian
advance could only be stemmed by building military outworks in Kabul
and Kandahar. This would require the government of India to get
closely involved in domestic Afghan affairs. They also advocated signing
of a defensive and offensive alliance with Kabul and station a British
agent in Afghanistan. Forward School strongly believed that the Russian
War Ministry and local commanders were fairly independent in
determining the nature and extent of Russian influence in Central Asia.27
In order to buttress the defences in Kabul and Kandahar, suggested
Rawlinson, London could also capitalise on its presence in Persia.
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Creation of a military nucleus of 5,000-10,000 Persian soldiers trained
and sustained by Britain was proposed. Though this policy was never
implemented, there was a strong constituency in its favour. Moreover,
unlike the Closed Border School, the Forward School believed that
Britain did not have enough resources to fight Russia all over the world.
A Forward Policy, however, was to be dismissed as 'mischievous activity'
28
by its opponents.
Ideological Impetus
The core philosophies guiding these debates were Evangelical
Reformism and Utilitarianism on one hand, and Conservative
imperialism on the other. The Ludhiana or the Closed Border Schools
drew from the Utilitarian and Evangelical Reform traditions of British
politics. The Bombay School or Forward Policy doctrine attracted its
proponents from among the romantic, Conservative imperialists. While
the Conservatives were votaries of civil liberties, the Evangelicals and
29
Utilitarians vouched for 'equal opportunity of salvation' and self-help.
The debate between Dundas and Wellesley after Napoleon's invasion of
Egypt in 1798 also had strong undertones of these guidelines. Although
both schools ended up annexing just as much territory as the other, the
30
Reformists abhorred use of force and believed in persuasion.
Conversely, Conservatives advocated annexing territory and resorted to
31
force without much ethical dilemma.
In a bid to make the Indus the external frontier of India and keep the
Russians at bay, a Conservative Ellenborough proposed trade with
Central Asia through the Indus in 1830. It was to be supported by
military means and carried out by steamers. Ellenborough's policy was
clear that British goods were to be given diplomatic, and when needed,
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military protection in the frontier region. Countering this view with
reformist and utilitarian ideals was Charles Grant, Ellenborough's
successor at the Board of Control in 1831. According to Grant, shifting
the frontiers to the Indus was not required, as the Sikh kingdom and
amirs of Sind could be motivated to both defend India and provide a
stable northwest frontier. Moreover, Grant was of the view that as soon
as 'privilege and superstition were done away, the two most serious
obstacles to the safety of British India i.e. rebellion and bankruptcy,
32
would be overcome.' Utilitarians believed that there was no need of
excessive political influence or the deployment of the army with the
steamers on the Indus. Both schools banked upon trade and stable
frontiers to win the Great Game, but in divergent ways. The
Conservative vision was to turn Punjab and Sind into protectorates and
have a chain of political buffer states separating the European and
Indian political systems. The Evangelical Reformist vision supported by
Utilitarianism expected trade to do the same.
The debates mentioned above were subject to external shocks
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These ranged
from internal turbulence either in Afghanistan, Punjab and Sind, to the
Russian advance across Central Asia after the Crimean War (18531856).33 Russia annexed Tashkent and Bukhara in 1866, Khiva in 1873,
and Merv in 1884, making its boundaries coterminous with
Afghanistan.34 Even though British influence over Afghanistan was
uncontested and the 1873 Anglo-Russian Agreement recognised it, the
threat from Russia would haunt the British till the very end of the Raj.
Adding to the insecurities was the Indian Revolt of 1857 that played an
important role in providing space to the advocates of Forward Policy.
Not surprisingly, Britain hammered out various treaties with different
rulers of Afghanistan between 1855 and 1921 that included the crucial
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Durand Line Agreement of 1893. It also annexed chunks of Afghan
territory including the Khyber Pass as well as rights to conduct the
35
foreign affairs of Kabul. The Raj's Forward Policy was to be further
reflected in its leasing of the Bolan Pass on a permanent basis in 1883
from the Khan of Kalat and declaration of some parts of Balochistan as
British territory in 1887. These conquests unleashed dynamics that
would define modern India's political geography.
Political Geography: 'Ring Fence' and the Frontiers
The above-mentioned conquests contributed towards evolution of
frontiers into boundaries.36 The Durand Line Agreement made it clear
that with the advent of the Forward School, there was little scope for a
politically neutral territory. This transformation led to the development
of the 'ring fence' concept according to which India would have a duallayered defence system i.e. the Inner Ring and the Outer Ring. The idea
was to develop a series of buffer zones along the northwestern periphery
of India. The territorial construct of India thus came to consist of three
kinds of frontiers: the administered frontier, the non-administered
frontier, and the external frontiers.37 Forming India's Centre was the
administered frontier with defined bureaucratic mechanisms and linear
boundaries. Beyond the frontiers of administration were internal nonadministered frontiers–Inner Ring–that included the NWFP,
Baluchistan, Kashmir, Nepal, and the Naga Hills. Though the writ of the
state and its bureaucracy hardly ever ran in this area, claims of
sovereignty were often made using military force. As an inheritor of
these frontiers after 1947, the Government of independent India and
Pakistan claimed sovereign rights over them. The third kind was the
frontier of influence i.e. Outer Ring. Lacking in geographic definition
but of high diplomatic concern and lying beyond the frontiers of
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administration and non-administered areas, these included places like
Afghanistan, Persia, Tibet, Burma, Sinkiang, and Siam. The idea was to
exert influence in these areas to keep other great powers at bay. The
states in this outer circle, according to Brobst, were treated as
38
protectorates.
This dual-layered territorial defence system formed the backbone of
both colonial and independent India's regional strategic outlook. For
example, even though London asked Calcutta not to annex more
territory, foreign policies of the Raj 'expressed needs and interests
rooted in the subcontinent'.39 This was partly also because of the
determination to keep the defence of India independent of the balance
of power in Europe. Independent India inherited this territorial
construct and the problems associated with the same. With the political
geography established, future debates on India's defence would happen
within this ambit. Though the impact of British bureaucratic and
strategic culture on modern Indian thought is hotly debated, it has been
difficult for most Indian planners to overlook the geographic realities of
South Asia. The one time the foreign and security policies of the Raj
were challenged was by Jawaharlal Nehru just before Independence, only
40
to be reset by the new Pakistani political leadership.
Nehru and the Frontier
The Partition of 1947 challenged the dual-layered defence strategy.
Cutting right through the middle of what is considered India's Centre,
the Partition created a deep rupture in the innermost administrative
frontier of the Raj. Not surprisingly, Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan,
now dominated the minds of Indian strategists. However, if the British
Raj played an important role in articulating a strategic vision for India,
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the debate on the NWFP right before Independence set the tone for
India's vision of the region. Mostly about whether Nehru should visit
the NWFP in October 1946 or not, the debate took place primarily
between Nehru, Governor of the NWFP Olaf Caroe, and British Field
Marshall Viscount Wavell. More than the details of the events that
unfolded during and after the visit, of importance is the political
structure within which the visit and the debate took place. Partition was
still ten months away and Nehru had just been given the portfolio of the
Vice-President of the Executive Council, External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations, under the interim government, in September
1946. In essence, even though everything indicated a partition, this was a
unique period in which an Indian nationalist governed a united India.
There are as many versions of Nehru's visit and its fallout as there were
actors involved. Events unfolded somewhat like this–Abdul Ghaffar
Khan invited Nehru to the NWFP in September 1946, after the election
of the latter as the head of the interim government of India in the same
month.41 The invitation came in the backdrop of increased communal
violence across the subcontinent and victory of the Congress in the
recently held provincial elections in the NWFP. Moreover, as relations
between the All India Muslim League (AIML) and the Indian National
Congress (INC) became increasingly tense, the visit had the potential to
unleash serious political violence. Sensing trouble, Caroe and Wavell
strongly advised Nehru to refrain from accepting the invitation. Senior
Congress leaders including Gandhi, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and
Maulana Azad too discouraged Nehru from visiting the Frontier. This,
however, was not to happen and Nehru landed in Peshawar on 16
October 1946. The following incidents would prove that the visit was
indeed problematic. Apart from the warmth showered by Ghaffar
Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars (KK), Nehru's presence solicited major
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protests. Along with public protests by AIML cadres, and an angry
reception by the maliks of various tribal agencies including Waziristan
and Malakand, Nehru had to face stone pelting and blockades. Losing his
temper at one point and calling the maliks of Waziristan 'petty
pensioners', Nehru's public posturing further worsened the situation.42
The end results were clear–Nehru apparently made up his mind that the
NWFP was a lost cause.43
Of interest here are the tensions that marked the visit and the fallout of
the same on policy perceptions. First was the clash between Indian
nationalists' thought process with that of the Raj. Imagined as a frontier
of the Raj, the tribal areas of the NWFP were to provide a protective
buffer not only from Russians, French, Persians and Afghans, but also
44
from internal insecurities. Caroe, the foremost proponent of Forward
Policy, had never allowed any party politician to build a mass base in the
frontier agencies. The British advocacy in the NWFP entailed a complete
disconnect between the mountainous tribal belts of the NWFP and the
settled areas.45 Therefore, even the KK movement was restricted to
Peshawar and other districts in the settled areas. Governor Caroe, in
typical divide-and-rule fashion, had barred even the newly elected Prime
Minister of the NWFP, Khan Sahib, from entering Waziristan and
Malakand. From his side, Caroe used Political Agents (PA, directly
reporting to him) to maintain contact with the maliks and mullahs of the
tribal areas. Even though there was discontent among some tribal elders
over this British policy, dissent was kept under check using cash,
weapons, internecine tribal rivalry, and the rhetoric of Islam. Party
politics had the potential to undermine this setup by undercutting British
influence over tribal leaders. Nehru's visit with Ghaffar Khan as his host
was to challenge this basic tenet of British Frontier Policy.
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A classic exchange of letters between Caroe, Wavell and Nehru after the
visit highlights the depth of the issue. In a letter to Wavell, Caroe made
no bones that Nehru should not have visited on party lines, and more so,
46
not with a Frontier leader by his side. He conceded that he had advised
Nehru that "….a party approach to the tribal problem was bound to
fail….if he had gone round by himself quietly and without losing his
temper…he would have been politely received….it was fatal to take a
party politician like Abdul Ghaffar Khan…"47
Practicing Forward Policy at its best, Caroe played an active role in
48
influencing tribal leaders to reject Nehru's political overtures.
Challenging this Frontier Policy was Nehru's take on the situation in the
NWFP. In a letter to Caroe he made it clear that if it were to happen, the
NWFP would be fully integrated into the Indian political and economic
system. The policy of isolating the region was not acceptable.
Emphasising on land routes between India and Afghanistan, and a
brewing class conflict in the tribal agencies, Nehru expressed the need to
reverse the Frontier Policy from 'controlled isolation' to 'complete
reintegration'. Charging British authorities with exacerbating class
conflict in the NWFP by issuing subsidies to the maliks and mullahs,
Nehru sought a definite end to it. Though he appreciated the risks
involved with such opening up after centuries of isolation, he stated
categorically that "….It seems essential to me that the barriers which had
been erected around the Tribal areas preventing free movements should
be largely done away with. People from the Frontier Province should be
allowed to go there and people from the Tribal Areas should be allowed
to come to the Frontier Province."49
The second point of tension was between Pashtun nationalism and
Islam. The idea of 'Pashtunistan' took shape immediately after Nehru's
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visit and the impending referendum on opting between India and
Pakistan. Having been left by the Congress to fend for himself, Ghaffar
Khan sought a plebiscite between Pakistan and Pashtunistan. However,
with AIML workers actively courting tribal maliks in the name of Islam,
Ghaffar Khan was becoming increasingly marginalised. Adding to the
woes of the KK was Britain's ready acceptance of the AIML's political
presence over that of the KK. Though non-violent in nature, the KK
50
was a cadre-based movement also known as the Red Shirts. Viewing the
army-style, disciplined Red Shirt volunteers as potential storm-troopers,
Caroe was outspokenly averse to KK activism.51 Moreover, the idea of an
independent Pashtunistan ran against every tenet of British frontier
policy as well as the interests of the newly emerging Pakistani elite. From
a strategic perspective, the creation of Pashtunistan would have posed a
serious threat to Pakistan on its western border. With relations between
AIML leadership, later Islamabad, and Kabul at an all time low, the
concept of Pashtunistan was anathema. Interestingly, India was silent on
this aspect.
The above tensions had multiple impacts on modern India's strategic
framework. Firstly, the geographical rupture between India and
Afghanistan led to a decline in the latter's strategic immediacy to New
Delhi. Viewing Kabul mostly in conjunction with Pakistan, policy
interaction between independent India and Kabul occurred while
keeping Islamabad-Rawalpindi in sight.52 Marked by cautiousness,
India's Afghan policy was rooted in security concerns emanating from
the Pashtun hinterlands of South and East Afghanistan. Pakistan's use
of Pashtun tribal fighters from the NWFP and Afghanistan in the 1948
war over Kashmir raised New Delhi's concerns of Pakistani influence in
the Afghan hinterlands. Secondly, India maintained a studied silence on
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Islamabad's claims over the Durand Line. Having inherited the frontiers
of the Raj, India was to claim these hypothetical lines as legitimate
international borders with China. Undermining Pakistani claims on the
Durand Line would jeopardise its own position vis-à-vis China. Thirdly,
the discourse on the importance of trade routes between India and
Afghanistan, as Nehru articulated, became policy pronouncements and
long-term interests. And finally, as claimed by Embree, 'concern for the
inviolability of frontiers that has been of such importance to
contemporary India is one aspect of the nineteenth-century
53
inheritance'.
Inheriting the Raj's Legacy
The legacy of the above debates persisted even after the Partition of
1947. This is reflected most in the strategic choices facing New Delhi
post-Independence. On one hand, it wanted to develop good
neighbourly relations with Pakistan; on the other, it wanted to undercut
Pakistani military's influence in Afghanistan. A new nation with high
sensitivity towards its territorial inheritance, India thus faced security
challenges similar to that of the Raj. Three indicators are particularly
important in this respect. Firstly, debate over the construct of India's
Centre. Various lucid and detailed accounts exist about the debates
surrounding the consolidation of the Indian Union before
Independence. Political diplomacy undertaken by Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel and Nehru, with support from Lord Mountbatten, to build the
Indian nation state-by-state and province-by-province is well
54
documented. Constructing the geographical contours of
contemporary India using political and military tools was a critical part
of consolidating India's Centre. Even though Nehru lost hope over the
NWFP after his 1946 visit, the discourse surrounding the event was
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crucial. Political debates that led to the formation of India were the first
step towards claiming sovereignty over most of India's Centre as
envisioned by the Raj.
Secondly, India and Pakistan's assertion that the outer limits of the Inner
Ring are their international borders. Inheritance of the frontiers
constructed by the Raj proved problematic. It contributed to almost
every security concern emanating in the region post 1947. Both India
and Pakistan have had difficulty exercising sovereign control over
regions lying within the Inner Ring. Islamabad's woes in the FATA
region and India's security problems in the North East are live examples
of this. While India has attempted to integrate these regions into the
administered frontiers by extending the writ of the state, Pakistan
continued with the Raj legacy. The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of
1901, for instance, introduced by the British to maintain control over the
Pashtun areas of Pakistan, still remains in place. Furthermore, Pakistan's
boundary dispute with Afghanistan and New Delhi's rivalry with Beijing
over Arunachal Pradesh are testaments to problems associated with the
continuation of borders set by the British Raj. Thirdly, a critical point
whose adequate appreciation is beyond the ambit of this paper, is the
deep impact of British bureaucratic institutions on India's strategic
thought.55
Despite the moralpolitik and nonalignment advocated at the global stage,
Nehru's regional policies were modern translations of the Inner Ring
concept. The dichotomy was most reflected in the first four treaties India
signed with Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Afghanistan. While the first three
reinforced the Bombay School's doctrine of Forward Policy in the
frontier, the one with Afghanistan shifted gears reflecting tenets of the
Ludhiana School. For instance, the Peace and Friendship treaties, signed
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with Bhutan and Nepal in 1949 and 1950 respectively, were similar to the
Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of Sinchula (1865) and the Nepal-Britain
Mutual Treaty (1923). Even the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1950 drew
upon the patron-client equations laid out by the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty
of 1861. All these Himalayan kingdoms more or less became
protectorates of India, with their foreign and defence policies being
influenced by New Delhi. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship with
Afghanistan (1950), however, was simply a confirmation of India's
continued interest in its extended neighbourhood. Nehru did not seek
influence over Kabul's foreign policy as sought by most proponents of
the Bombay School nor did he continue the supply of arms to the
Afghan army, as was planned according to an agreement in 1945. At the
heart of this contradiction was the division of the subcontinent, which
shifted the odds in favour of tenets advocated by the Ludhiana School.
Lack of contiguous borders with Afghanistan and a tense relationship
with Pakistan challenged the logic of coercive diplomacy with Kabul. A
forward diplomatic approach with Afghanistan became the domain of
Islamabad instead of New Delhi.
Diplomatic arrangements between New Delhi and Kabul could have
been different if the Partition had not have happened. Case in point was
India's tacit adoption of the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919) in which the
Afghan leadership accepted the Durand Line as a boundary between
Afghanistan and British India. Strategically favouring Pakistan, the logic
was to seek legitimacy for India's own territorial assertions with China.
As a result, India's stand on the Pashtunistan issue too has been in
continuation of the Raj. Nehru was against the idea and articulated so on
many occasions. Moreover, not only did he reject a military pact with
Kabul, he also discontinued the supply of weapons to the Afghan army
at subsidised rates based on a 1945 agreement. Training of Afghan
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officers on Indian soil, however, was permitted. Closely connected to the
increasing turbulence in the Pashtun hinterlands of Afghanistan,
Nehru's decision to cut down military aid had a strong resonance with
the Ludhiana School's advocacy of practicing restraint. Added to this
was the utilitarian tenet of using economic tools to promote security and
stability. The External Affairs Division (EAD) agreed to increase
economic assistance to Afghanistan in 1950. Given a group of Indian
National Congress members representing the British Indian
government in 1937 already having established a trading agency in
56
Kabul, economic cooperation was easy to implement.
The 1979 Soviet military intervention complicated India's options in
Afghanistan. Friendship with the Soviet Union became an important
factor, particularly with the rise of the Islamabad-Washington-Beijing
nexus. One strand was totally opposed to the intervention and stated it in
just as many words. Leading a Janata Party government in 1979 when the
Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan was Charan Singh. Quick to assert
India's reservation of military intervention in its neighbourhood and
aversion to undermining the sovereignty of Afghanistan, Charan Singh
made India's stand fairly clear.57 Supported by key right-wing leaders
including Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Charan Singh reflected the basic political
instinct that India had inherited from the Raj–that of territorial
sensitivity towards a region that India considers to be its zone of
58
influence. This was the first time the traditional nineteenth century
threat of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan actually materialised. The
strategic buffer had been violated. Not surprisingly, Pakistan's reaction
was even worse, leading to its spearheading what became one of world's
largest covert campaigns against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Indira
Gandhi soon replaced Charan Singh, and she too was personally against
the intervention.59 The public stand, nonetheless, was supportive of
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Moscow. The decision led to fallout within India's foreign policy
60
bureaucracy.
Of essence here is the way in which New Delhi dealt with the dilemma.
Despite the support to the Soviets, Gandhi sent a special emissary to
Pakistan in order to assure President General Zia-ul-Haq that he could
'could remove as many divisions as he wished from the Indian border
without fear of any advantage being taken by India and suggested talks
on reduction of force levels'.61 Not only was this an attempt to develop
communication mechanisms with Islamabad but also a way to restrict
Pakistan from altering the regional balance of power. Washington had
promised a regular supply of sophisticated weapons and large amounts
of money to Islamabad in wake of the Soviet-Afghan war. Then Foreign
Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Pakistan in June 1981 occurred in
this context. Rao made it clear to his Pakistani audience that India was
'unequivocally committed to respect Pakistan's national unity, territorial
integrity, and sovereign equality' and its right to obtain arms for selfdefense.62 As a result, the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission was formed
in 1982 to facilitate trade and commerce, General Zia visited Delhi on 1
November 1982, and talks to establish the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) were initiated. Instead of Forward
Policy, New Delhi was engaging Pakistan as per the tenets of the
Ludhiana School.
Contemporary Policy Challenges
Debates over the Afghan question during the 1990s civil war, and
particularly after 9/11, interestingly, are much more reflective of
nineteenth-century debates. Having emerged as a confident power with
a strong economy and modern military, India must decide how far it can
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go in terms of using hard power options in Afghanistan. This debate is
particularly critical given the immediacy of security challenges from the
northwestern frontier and the asymmetric nature of threats. A sole focus
on soft power options became problematic for India given Pakistan's
recourse to asymmetric warfare techniques. In what is seen as a shift
towards the Forward School, India provided financial and logistical
63
support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance from 1996 till 2001.
Throughout this period India's strategic community was divided
between proponents of Forward and Closed Border School. Just like
Metcalfe, Bentinck, and Willock advocated steamers with British Indian
goods across the Indus and into Afghanistan and Central Asia, one
strand of the strategic community advocates overland trade links
between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics
(CARs). And similar to Malcolm, Ellenborough and Wellesley's
advocacy of military boots and hard power, the other strand advocates
increased training and equipping of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF); committed support to non-Pashtun groups to counter a
reversal of the Taliban; honing relations with Pashtuns to undercut
Pakistan's influence; and finally, in hushed tones, supporting armed non64
state actors in Afghanistan against Pakistan. The difference between
conservatives of the nineteenth and the twenty-first century is that while
the former developed myths about the greatness and righteousness of
Britain, the latter hold similar myths about India as a strong power.
Unlike with the Soviets, there was no resistance to the US-led North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) intervention in 2001. In fact, India viewed it as a
much-needed intervention and offered its air bases to ISAF aircrafts.65
Not only did the NATO-ISAF presence in Afghanistan allow India to
reestablish official contacts with Kabul, it undercut Pakistan's looming
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presence on the Afghan political landscape established during the
Taliban years. After six long years of diplomatic absence in Kabul, India
realised that non-engagement, including with the Afghan Taliban, was
not really an option. Former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh was the first
to break the taboo of talking to the Taliban. During his visit to Kandahar
during the IC814 hijack crisis in December 1999, he expected an opening
66
with the Pashtuns. This met with antipathy from not only Pakistan but
also from the foreign affairs bureaucracy in New Delhi.67 However, as
India's thinking on Afghanistan developed over time, the first thing it did
after reopening its embassy in Kabul was to engage with the Pashtuns.
For India, this was the only way to increase its presence in the troubled
Pashtun hinterlands of Afghanistan. India adopted a comprehensive
developmental partnership with Kabul and committed about US$ 2
billion as development and reconstruction aid over the years. Most small
development projects that India undertook were focused in the Pashtundominated south and east Afghanistan. Moreover, similar to the
approach Nehru adopted in 1950s, India also agreed to train Afghan
army officers, but only on Indian soil. New Delhi ruled out hard military
presence in Afghanistan and signed the India-Afghanistan Strategic
Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2011.
The SPA 2011 faced its first challenge with the request of arms transfer
to Kabul by Afghan President Hamid Karzai in May 2013. The demand
came at a time of increased tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
intensifying New Delhi's security dilemma. Complicating this context is
the expected removal of the US-led security umbrella post 2014 and the
entry of Chinese investments into a war-torn Afghanistan. Despite its
alleged economic rivalry with Beijing and unsolved border disputes,
India and China organised a counter-terrorism dialogue on
68
Afghanistan. Joint mechanisms by the Asian giants could help bring
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stability in Afghanistan over the long run. However, the question of
accommodating Pakistani sensitivities post 2014 is problematic. With
India's national security closely linked to the ground situation in
Afghanistan, the nature of Pakistan's involvement remains crucial.
Pakistan's overarching presence in India's debate over the Afghan
question challenges the very fundamentals of India's strategic vision of
the subcontinent.
Conclusion
Does India plan its security using a Forward Policy approach by arming
Kabul, or a passive policy approach by discussing the Afghan question
with Pakistan? According to Gurmeet Kanwal, a former Indian Army
officer and strategic expert, India should send its troops to Afghanistan
'if invited'.69 Kanwal is a strong advocate of Indian military presence in
Afghanistan under the UN peacekeeping umbrella, if not on its own.
Going one step further is Sushant Singh, security commentator,
suggesting 'shifting the battleground' to Afghanistan rather than fighting
the Pakistani army on its Eastern front.70 According to Harsh Pant, an
Indian foreign policy expert, 'New Delhi will have to prepare itself for
making some tough choices in the coming days. The days of merely
relying on 'soft power' in Afghanistan are well past their sell by date'.71
Even though there is less antipathy towards talking to the Taliban today,
there exists a strong constituency within India's foreign policy
72
bureaucracy that advocates supporting non-Pashtuns. Further
reflecting the tenets of Forward School are Indian army officials
associated with Afghanistan. According to a senior retired Indian Army
official, India needs to have a proactive Afghan policy and 'should not
shy away from supporting Afghans in the security sphere'.73
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The clash between proponents of Forward and Passive policy
proponents over Afghanistan and Pakistan has intensified during the
course of the last decade of war in Afghanistan. The counter-narrative
to the Forward School of thought remains that India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan should solve the Durand Line and Kashmir disputes
diplomatically. Moreover, focusing on the economic angle, there is a
strong lobby that advocates trade overland routes between India and
Afghanistan. Similar to what the Ludhiana School proposed, the idea is
that connecting the subcontinent through trade and commerce will
reduce security threats. According to C. Raja Mohan, India's top strategic
analyst, India should work towards Pakistan's borders in both east and
west. Promoting legitimisation of the Durand Line, Raja Mohan
presents a case with strong tenets of the Closed Border School.74 From
this perspective, securing Pakistan's boundaries will decrease pressure on
the Pakistani state. While supported by many, India's policy overtures
over the last decade have been marked by caution. Despite a strong
forward policy constituency, the political leadership has refrained from
engaging in the same. As best stated by Gautam Mukhopadhaya, India's
ambassador to Afghanistan (2010-2013), 'we (India) are trying to expand
75
the neutral space in Afghanistan rather than taking sides'. For advocates
of a cautious policy, focus on neutrality and economic link remains key.
Nonetheless, dynamics between advocacies are often contingent on the
way Pakistan reacts to the situation in Afghanistan.
Despite the Partition, the imprint of geography on strategic choices
made by India is visible. Split over choosing between hard and soft power
approach in Afghanistan, India is dealing with dilemmas similar to those
during the Raj. Policy advocacy of the Bombay and the Ludhiana
Schools is resonant in choices India faces in Afghanistan today. Despite a
cautious policy in practice, there is strong resonance of adopting a
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muscular approach. Calling for a coercive but pragmatic foreign policy,
Jaswant Singh has been recognised as having 'Curzonian ambitions' for
76
India. Moreover, Mani Dixit, considered Curzon 'among the greatest
77
of the Indian nationalists.' Attraction towards the Bombay School is
reflected in India's policy towards the CARs. In 2002, under the
stewardship of Jaswant Singh, India opened its first air base in Ayni,
Tajikistan despite the fact that it was already operating from the Farkhor
Air Base in the country since 1996. Though the Manmohan Singh
government decided to continue with these forward air force bases, it
was combined with diplomatic initiatives to assuage concerns in
neighbouring capitals.
In many ways, the Manmohan Singh government faces a challenge
similar to that of Wellesley and Dundas in 1808. Then the issue was to
defend India from Napoleon's wrath by balancing between Persia,
Punjab and Afghanistan. Not much different is New Delhi's diplomatic
trapeze act to balance Islamabad-Rawalpindi and Kabul. The difference
between then and now, however, is UPA's conscientious efforts to make
India's neighbouring countries feel secure about its intentions, done
mostly by non-interference in domestic political affairs and promotion
of trade links–much like the Ludhiana School. An arms commitment to
Kabul would reflect a shift in gear towards forward policy. India's
contemporary strategic choices in Afghanistan very much reflect
tensions rooted in its territorial construct inherited from the Raj.
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Endnotes:
1.
These terms were coined by British historian H.W.C. Davis in The Great Game
in Asia: 1800-1844 (1927) (OUP, UK)
2.
On 'ring fence', see Ashley Tellis (1990) 'Securing the Barrack: The Logic,
Structure and Objective of India's Naval Expansion – Part I' Naval War
College Review, Volume XLIII, Number 3, Sequence 331, Pp. 77-97
3.
See Peter John Brobst (2005) The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe,
India's Independence, and the Defense of Asia (Ohio: UAP)
4.
Embree (1989) 'The Diplomacy of Dependency: Nineteenth Century
Foreign Policy,' in Imagining India: Essays on Indian History (OUP: UK)
5.
Ibid, 'Frontiers into Boundaries: The Evolution of the Modern State'
6.
The Durand Line was an arrangement between the British Raj and the amir of
Afghanistan to mark their respective spheres of influence
7.
The terms Raj and British Raj have been used interchangeably in this paper
and they denote the security imperatives of pre-Independence India
8.
Ibid Pp.153
9.
Edward Ingram (1979) The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia 1828-1834
(Clarendon Press: Oxford) Pp 118-121
10.
From 'Celebrated Travels and Travelers,' by Jules Ver ne,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/26658/26658-h/26658-h.htm
11.
Ingram (1984) Pp. 130-133
12.
Lord Minto was the Governor-General of India, 1807-1813
13.
Embree (1989) Pp.127
14.
Ingram (1984) Pp. 137
15.
Ingram (1979) Pp 85-87
16.
Ingram (1984) Pp 132-133
17.
Ibid Pp. 142-143. The missions sent to Punjab and Sind were testing waters
regarding the strength of their respective kingdoms and the willingness of
the kings to ally with the British
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Securing Afghanistan
18.
Ibid Pp 180-183
19.
Ingram (1879) Pp. 83
20.
C.J. Lowe (1967) The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902,
Volume 1 (Routledge and Kegan Paul) Pp. 76-77
21.
Ingram (1984) Pp. 156
22.
Ibid Pp. 154
23.
Ibid Pp. 182, Malcolm's appointment as the chief of the Persian mission was
a victory against the Harfordians
24.
Davis (1927) Pp. 67-69
25.
An important member of the Forward School was Lord Curzon, Viceroy and
Governor-General of India (1899-1905). See C. Raja Mohan (2004) Crossing
the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan: USA)
Pp. 204-205
26.
Sneh Mahajan (2002) British Foreign Policy 1874-1914: The Role of India
(London: Routledge) Pp. 22-25
27.
Ibid Pp 23
28.
Ibid Pp. 24
29.
Ingram (1984) Pp 88-89
30.
Ibid Pp. 91
31.
Ibid
32.
Ibid
33.
Fought over control of Ottoman territories, the Crimean War took place
between the Russian Empire and an alliance of the French, British and
Ottoman Empire plus the Kingdom of Sardinia
34.
Lowe (1967) Pp 75
35.
This arrangement ended after the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and the
signing of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921
36.
Frontier is 'an area, mostly a transitional zone, between geographic regions as
well as ethnic groups, and boundary is a line drawn on the ground and on a
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map'. See C. B. Fawcet (2010) Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography
(Clarendon Press: Oxford) Pp 24
37.
Brobst (2005)
38.
Ibid Pp 77-79
39.
Embree (1989) Pp 117-118
40.
Nehru was the first Prime Minister of independent India
41.
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a Pashtun leader known for his non-violent
credentials and closeness to the Congress, particularly Mahatma Gandhi
42.
The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Volume VIII, The Interim Government, Letter
from Sir O. Caroe (NWFP) to Field Marshall Viscount Wavell (Governor's
Camp, Parachinar) 23 October 1946
43.
Gandhi (2004)
44.
Gandhi (2004) Pp 159
45.
The NWFP was divided into settled areas and tribal areas. The tribal areas
were later made into a separate province called the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and settled areas became the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
46.
The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Caroe to Wavell
47.
Ibid
48.
Based on diaries of British officials such as Lord Cunningham and Caroe,
using cash, weapons and Islam to hone control over the tribes and the mullah
networks of the Frontier was common practice
49.
The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Volume VIII, The Interim Government, Letter
from Pandit Nehru to Sir O. Caroe (NWFP) Enclosure to No. 520, New
Delhi, 24 October 1946
50.
Members of KK wore red-coloured outfits as a uniform
51.
Brobst (2005) Pp 100-103
52.
'Islamabad-Rawalpindi' here refers to the importance of Rawalpindi, home to
Pakistan's Army HQ, in its regional policies. Islamabad is the political capital
of Pakistan but its influence over these matters has often been eroded
because of strained civil-military relations
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53.
Embree (1989) Pg 118
54.
Mountbatten was the last Viceroy of India, 1947-48
55.
For a detailed account see Dixit (2004)
56.
Interestingly, Nehru was not very happy with economic aid as, 'this kind of
generosity is a risky business in the long run.' See SWJN, Volume 1, Nehru to
the EAD
57.
JN Dixit (2000) An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban (Konark Publishers:
India)
58.
The argument was put forth in the name of Afghanistan's sovereignty. A
similar instinct was shown by Vajpayee, his foreign minister Jaswant Singh
and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra during the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, 1998-2004
59.
Dixit (2000)
60.
Ibid. Brajesh Mishra, then India's Permanent Representative to the UN, was
against supporting the Soviet intervention
61.
US Library of Congress, http://countrystudies.us/india/123.htm
62.
Ibid
63.
Author's interview with a former junior associate of the late Ahmad Shah
Massoud of the Northern Alliance
64.
Author's interviews with senior Indian army and intelligence officials.
65.
'US offered to make India mly ally: weekly,' The Dawn, 10 November 2001
http://archives.dawn.com/2001/11/10/int5.htm
66.
Author's interview with senior Indian intelligence official who handled the
IC814 hijacking case
67.
Ibid. Most bureaucrats and intelligence officials assisting Jaswant Singh in this
case were averse to such an idea
68.
'Ahead of 2014 pullout, India, China plan Afghan dialogue', Indian Express, 04
March 2013
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ORF Occasional Paper
69.
Gurmeet Kanwal 'Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: The Role of
Neighbours' 13 December 2012, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
PeaceandStabilityinAfghanistanTheRoleofNeighbours_gkanwal_131212
70.
Sushant K Singh, 'Indian Presence in Afghanistan' (2008) ISN/ETH Zurich,
h t t p : / / w w w. i s n . e t h z . c h / D i g i t a l - L i b r a r y / A r t i c l e s / D e t a i l /
?lng=en&id=88656
71.
Harsh V Pant, 'Afghan Endgame: Tough Road Ahead for India',
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/afghan-endgame-tough-roadahead-for-india/20130701.htm
72.
Author's interviews with former Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) officials
73.
Author's interview with a very senior retired Indian Army officer
74.
C. Raja Mohan 'India and the Af-Pak question: In search of a Regional
Framework,' 10 April 2011 Unpublished paper, presented to the
Government of India
75.
Author's interview with G Mukhopadhaya, Kabul, 11 April 2013
76.
Raja Mohan (2005) Pp 204
77.
Ibid
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