China and Asia 4 (2022) 147–171
Research Note
∵
Albania, China, and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict
of 1979
Ylber Marku
Lecturer, School of History, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
markuylber1983@gmail.com / ylbermarku@zju.edu.cn
When, in February 1979, China and Vietnam had a brief armed conflict at
their border, the Albanian leaders followed the events with great interest. But
why would Albanian leaders be interested in events happening thousands of
miles away? The main reason that the Albanian leaders would be interested
in events that were happening thousands of miles away was perhaps the fact
that the conflict took place less than a year after the Sino-Albanian split in July
1978. That summer, after allying with and aiding Albania for almost two decades, China decided to withdraw hundreds of Chinese experts from Albania.
Albania was then the most isolated country in Europe, and its leader, Enver
Hoxha, was the last Stalinist dictator in the world.1 By contrast, China was
about to embark on an unprecedented reform process with dramatic consequences for its future as well as for the rest of the world.
Albanian leaders’ opposition toward any reforming and opening, after
Khrushchev’s promotion of destalinization in the mid-1950s – a process
Hoxha fiercely rejected – had been the main reason why they decided to side
1 Blendi Fevziu, Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania, ed. Robert Elsie, trans. Majlinda Nishku
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2016); James S. O’Donnell, A Coming of Age: Albania under Enver Hoxha
(Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1999); Thomas Schreiber, Enver Hodja: le sultan
rouge (Paris: J. C. Lattès, 1994).
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/2589465X-04010006
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with China and to end Albania’s alliance with the Soviet Union in 1960–1961.2
Similarly, when China and the United States decided to normalize their relations, Albania slowly but irreversibly grew distant from China. When, after
1976, China decided to push further the economic and political reform process, Albanian leaders feared that continuing the alliance with China would
undermine their political power at home. Consequently, they decided to publicly voice their disappointment, and, in July 1978, ended the alliance with
China. Thus, at the outbreak of the clashes at the Sino-Vietnamese border,
the Albanian leaders decided to publish two articles in support of Vietnam
in the party mouthpiece People’s Voice. The archival materials translated here
are records of the meetings at which the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha discussed with his close comrades the content of the articles which were subsequently published, and commented on the events in Southeast Asia. These
comments reveal that in 1979 Albanian leaders found it convenient to seize the
Sino-Vietnamese border conflict as an opportunity to attack China and support Vietnam.
However, in his comments, Hoxha attacked not only China, but also the
United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries, which indicated the isolation that Albania had succumbed to after the split with China. For Hoxha, all
the countries in the world were either revisionist or capitalist, and Albania was
the only upholder of communism and Marxism. The trends of history were
frightening to him, and the denial of the deep crisis of the communist system
in his country and beyond was what he really wanted to achieve. Nonetheless,
despite the isolation from the European communist camp, the publication of
the two articles in the party mouthpiece in support of Vietnam shows Albania’s
efforts to promote its international profile at a time of severe isolation.
China, Albania, and Vietnam
Albania’s contacts with Vietnam can be dated back to the 1950s, when, during
the wave of turmoil in Eastern Europe generated by the destalinization process,
Ho Chi Minh offered to play the role of mediator with the aim of preserving
unity within the socialist camp. To this aim, Ho Chi Minh visited Albania for
2 Elidor Mëhilli, “Defying De-Stalinization: Albania’s 1956,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4
(2011): 4–56; Ylber Marku, “Shifting Alliances: Albania in the Early Cold War,” Journal of Cold
War Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, (2022); Ylber Marku, “Communist Relations in Crisis: The End
of the Soviet–Albanian Relations, and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1960–61,” International History
Review 42, no. 4 (2020): 813–32.
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the first time on August 10, 1957. He was received by Albanian Prime Minister
Mehmet Shehu rather than Hoxha, who claimed to be ill “after a period of
hospital recovery in Moscow.”3 The truth is that suspicious as Hoxha was of
the reform process promoted by Khrushchev, he did not welcome any mediation, including that of Ho Chi Minh, that would aim at convincing him to
align with the Soviet leaders on the controversial issues that had emerged after
the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956.
In Hoxha’s view, Khrushchev’s revision of the Stalinist policies had unleashed
powerful destructive forces in Eastern Europe which attempted to undermine
the rule of the communist parties, and which, in one case, namely, that of
Hungary, even required the Soviet Union’s military intervention to reestablish
the power of the communist party in Budapest. When Ho Chi Minh offered to
mediate between Moscow and Tirana again during the Soviet–Albanian split
in 1960–1961, Hoxha rejected Ho’s suggestion altogether.4 Subsequently, from
1961 Albania and China established a strong alliance.
Yet, Albania maintained good relations with Hanoi, and some years later, in
1964, Hoxha proposed to China to form a formal military alliance which would
include Vietnam and North Korea, plus Albania and China. Chinese leaders
rejected that idea on the grounds that Albania’s distance from China determined that an official military alliance would be no more effective than the
military aid Albania was receiving from China.5 Besides, Vietnam almost certainly would have declined it because it was in close relations with the Soviet
3 Minutes of conversation between the president of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, and the leaders of
our party and state, 10 August 1957, in aqsh, F.14. ap-mppv, V.1957, D.1, f.2. The documents
cited here are at the Central State Archive, in Tirana, Albania [Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit–
aqsh, hereafter], Party’s Archive [Arkivi i Partisë–ap, hereafter], Leading Organs, [Organet
Udhëheqëse–ou, hereafter], Party’s Foreign Directorate [Drejtoria e Jashtme–dj, hereafter],
and relations between the Party of Labor of Albania and Vietnam’s Workers Party plavwp, [Marrëdhëniet ppv-ppsh–ap-mppv, hereafter], and relations between the Party of
Labor of Albania and the Chinese Communist Party, pla-ccp [Marrëdhëniet me pkk, apmpkk, hereafter]; Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Arkivi i Ministrisë së Punëve
të Jashtme–ampj, hereafter]; File, [Dosje–D., hereafter]; Viti, [Year–V., hereafter]; page,
[fletë–f., hereafter]. Translation from the original into English is mine.
4 Information of the Albanian embassy in Beijing sent to the leadership in Tirana, informing
of the meetings of the Albanian ambassador in Beijing, Reis Malile, with the Chinese leaders
Liu Shaoqi on 13.08.1961, Peng Zhen on 18.08.1961, Zhou Enlai on 21.08.1961, and Chen Yi
on 29.08.1961, regarding Ho Chi Minh’s initiative to mediate in order to solve the SovietAlbanian disagreements, Ho’s meeting with Khrushchev in Sochi to this aim, the refusal [of
Albania] to receive him, and the opinions of the ccp leaders on this issue, in F.14, ap-mpkk,
V.1961, D.14.
5 F.14/ap, ou, V.1963, D.12. This was at least the argument Zhou Enlai used to oppose such an
alliance.
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Union, which by then had become China’s most important rival within the
communist camp. Vietnam was also receiving enormous military aid from
both Moscow and Beijing, which would overshadow and make irrelevant any
formal alliance between Vietnam, China, and Albania.6
Nonetheless, Albania considered support for Vietnam as a “revolutionary duty . . . [for its] great contribution to humankind.” The Vietnamese war
against the United States was for Albania a demonstration that “even a small
country, through an armed struggle, could stand in front of any aggressor.”7
In Tirana, information on the war in Vietnam was collected from many diplomatic channels, which provided Albanian leaders with a general picture of
the war that went beyond official accounts.8 China also often provided some
information to Albania regarding the ongoing conflict in Vietnam. Meanwhile,
Vietnamese diplomatic missions in Tirana continuously updated the Albanian
leadership on the war. Both Hanoi and the communist provisional government of South Vietnam had embassies in Tirana. When the bombing of Hanoi
affected the foreign diplomatic residences, the diplomats were asked to evacuate, but the Albanian diplomatic officials, the employees, and their wives were
ordered to stay in the city. They were ordered to “stay there and show bravery
. . . do not make any request for better food and living conditions but show
solidarity with the Vietnamese people.”9 The Albanian embassy in Vietnam
was provided eventually with anti-air artillery, and in October 1972 the charge
d’affaires of Albania was reported to have been wounded by American bombs
in Hanoi.10 Other practical reasons also played an important role in Albania’s
sympathy with Vietnam. The first concerned the studying of Vietnamese
6
7
8
9
10
About the Sino-Soviet split and rivalry during the Cold War era see, among others, Jeremy
Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, “Jockeying
for Leadership. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961–July 1964,” Journal of Cold
War Studies 16, no. 1 (2014): 24–60; Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split:
Ideological Dilemma (London: Routledge, 2012); Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the
Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2009); Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist
World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
Records of the conversation between the Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu and
the North Vietnamese ambassador in Albania Nguyen Van Hong on 12 April 1971, in ampj,
Vietnam, V.1971, D.215, f.21.
Radiogram from Alger to Tirana, 30 December 1971, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1971, D.215,
f.55–57.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassy in Hanoi, May 1972 (undated), in ampj,
Vietnam, V.1972, D.185, f.39–40.
Tirana to Hanoi, 11-10-1972, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1972, D.185, f.80–81. His name is Qemal
Rahmanaj and he was wounded in his legs, arms, and head. His Albanian driver also was
wounded. Both survived.
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military fortifications, for which Albania sent a number of military delegations
to Vietnam, and this was initially suggested by Chinese leaders.11 The second
reason was that Albania’s support for the Vietnamese cause actually enhanced
Tirana’s credibility within the communist world, however modest Albania’s
assistance was. In their meetings with sister parties, Albanian officials lost no
chance to advertise the importance of the internationalist solidarity with the
Vietnamese people.
Such interests were not unnoticed in Hanoi. In a gesture of respect and gratitude for the solidarity received, the Vietnamese chief negotiator at the Paris
peace talks, Xuan Thuy, included Albania on the list of European countries
to visit after the end of the talks with the United States.12 During the visit in
Tirana in mid-April 1973, Xuan Thuy mentioned the great help Vietnam had
received from other countries, which contributed to the Vietnamese victories against the American troops, but Albania’s foreign minister stressed that
“you have relied primarily on your own forces . . . the assistance of other countries has been secondary,” possibly trying to downplay the importance of the
Soviet and Chinese aid.13 In fact, the Albanian minister made a similar affirmation regarding the Chinese assistance to Albania in 1960, after Albania’s
split with Soviet Union, when he said that “although we had great assistance
from China at the time, most important was the mobilization of our own [economic] energies . . . everything you will see, is built with our own energies.”14
Conveniently, the principle of self-reliance was stressed at a time when the
Sino-American normalization, which culminated with the visit to China of the
US President Richard Nixon in 1972, had caused great discontent in Tirana. In
another meeting held the next day, the Albanian minister tried again to minimize the importance of the Soviet and Chinese aid to Vietnam, affirming
that “those who helped you have pursued a two-faced policy: helping by day,
betraying by night,” clearly alluding to the Soviet Union.15 Hoxha, following
his instrumentalist line of interpretation of the events, posited a connection
between the pressure from the Soviet Union and the peace agreement when
he affirmed that negotiations with the Americans were a consequence of the
Soviet insistence on making it possible for Nixon to “retreat with honor” from
11
12
13
14
15
ampj, Vietnam, V.1971, D.215, f.25. A military delegation from Albania stayed in Vietnam in
war zones for around two months in 1967, and another delegation was sent in 1971.
Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1973, D.228, f.1–2.
Conversation on 16 April 1973 during the reception hosted by the minister of foreign
affairs, comrade Nesti Nase, to honor the minister of the drv comrade Nguyen Xuan Thuy,
in ampj, Vietnam, V.1973, D.228, f.22.
ampj, Vietnam, V.1973, D.228, f.26–27.
ampj, Vietnam, V.1973, D.228, f.51.
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the battlefield. Hoxha believed that the war should have continued until the
total defeat of the Americans.16
Despite their efforts at promoting and maintaining solidarity with the
Vietnamese leaders, Albanian leaders did not conceal their differences with the
Vietnamese leaders.17 The Cambodian communist leader Ieng Sary, who paid a
secret visit to Albania in 1972, and visited Albania again in June 1973 as a member of the entourage of Prince Sihanouk, contributed to causing disagreements
between the Albanian leaders and their Vietnamese comrades. Sary accused
the Vietnamese of betraying the Cambodian cause and related the end of the
American engagement in Vietnam to the escalating of the hostility between
Cambodia and Vietnam. He lamented Vietnamese obstacles in supplying the
communist forces of Cambodia and criticized Hanoi for its invitation to begin
talks for a peaceful solution to the conflict that existed in Cambodia between
the communists and the government of Prime Minister Lon Nol. Sary affirmed
that “we will continue the war until total victory.”18
Toward the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict of 1979 and Hoxha’s
Comments
Initially, Albanian analysis of the events in Indochina reflected Albanian leaders’ firm opposition to military intervention in foreign countries. This explains
why, on one hand, Hoxha attacked China during the conflict with Vietnam
in 1979, and on the other hand, he privately also condemned the Vietnamese
military intervention in Cambodia in 1978, which he considered being part of
the larger “Vietnamese chauvinist tendencies toward the other countries of
Indochina, with policies such as the intention to form the ‘Federation of the
Indochinese Countries,’ . . . invasion of Cambodian territories, and keeping
16
17
18
The meeting of comrade Enver Hoxha with the ambassadors of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thu, and the ambassador of the provisional revolutionary
government of South Vietnam, Nguyen Xuan Long, on 26 January 1973, in aqsh, F.14, oudj, L.29, D.378/3.
Notes during the meeting of the Vietnamese minister Xuan Thuy with comrade Enver
Hoxha on 18 April 1973, in aqsh, F.14, ou-dj, L.29, D.378/2; Meeting of comrade
Enver Hoxha with the delegation of the party and state of Vietnam headed by the
Vietnamese prime minister Pham Van Dong, on 31 October 1973, in aqsh, F.14, L.20, D.1,
f.3–4.
Conversation of comrades Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia with Ieng Sary, member of the
Politburo of the Cambodian communist party, during their meeting in Tirana on 7 June
1973, in aqsh, F.14, ou-dj, L.29, D.377/4.
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two military divisions in Laos.”19 For Albanian leaders, Vietnam was following a pro-Soviet line with clear intentions to play an important role in the
region that went, in their view, beyond the national interests of Vietnam. The
Cambodian leaders, on the other hand, “pursue a close-minded policy, are
deeply nationalist rather than Marxist-Leninist, and are openly pro-China.”20
Therefore, for Hoxha, alliances in Southeast Asia reflected the competition
and rivalry that existed in the region between the Soviet Union and China.
Consequently, the Vietnamese–Cambodian conflict was in fact, “not [a conflict] between Vietnam and Cambodia, but is related to the larger-scale
confrontation between China and the Soviet Union.”21
Apparently, Vietnamese problems with Cambodia became one of the causes
for the escalation of the rivalry between Hanoi and Beijing. In June 1978, an
official of the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense told an Albanian diplomat in
Hanoi that “recently there have been clashes at the border with China, and
Chinese troops have occasionally entered into our territory.”22 In an article
published on June 24, 1978, in People’s Voice, the organ of the Party of Labor of
Albania, titled “Imperialists, Hands off Vietnam” (Jashte Duart e Imperialisteve
nga Vietnami), Albania expressed support for Vietnam in its disputes with
China, but the article was centered on the disputes over the islands in the
South China Sea [Paracel and Spratly Islands, known in China as Xisha and
Nansha respectively] rather than on the direct military clashes at the border,
of which Albanian authorities were not aware.
Following the split between Tirana and Beijing in the summer of 1978,
the Vietnamese immediately contacted Albanian diplomats. Officials of the
Foreign Ministry in Hanoi told the Albanian ambassador to Vietnam that they,
“follow with great interest in this situation . . . we want to be informed and
we will inform you too [regarding relations with China].”23 Vietnamese leaders
probably thought that almost two decades of close relations between China
and Albania would have given Albania privileged access to information about
19
20
21
22
23
Information Nr.17 (Nesti Nase), 29 June 1976: On the problem of the islands in the South
China Seas and the Sino-Vietnamese disputes over this issue, in aqsh, F.14, ou-dj, V.1976,
L.32, D.731, f.5: Ylli Pollo (adviser at the embassy in Hanoi), A short history of the Vietnam–
Cambodia conflict, March 1978, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1978, D.474, f.35.
Ylli Pollo (adviser at the embassy in Hanoi), A short history of the Vietnam–Cambodia
conflict, March 1978, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1978, D.474.
Ylli Pollo, A short history of the Vietnam–Cambodia conflict, March 1978, in ampj,
Vietnam, V.1978, D.474, f.40–41; Ministry of Foreign Affairs [of Albania] to the embassy in
Hanoi, 8 January 1979, in mapj, Vietnam. V.1979, D.286, f.6.
Hanoi to Tirana, 27 June 1978, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1978, D.458, f.26.
Hanoi to Tirana, 17 July 1978, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1978, D.461, f.20–33.
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China, and therefore officials in Hanoi wanted “information, . . . documents,
and facts on Chinese politics, which could help us better understand China
[and its intentions].”24 The Vietnamese vice minister of foreign affairs visited
Albania in October 1978 and he asked to know “if you have thought about collaborating with us to fight against our common enemies,” adding that “[by]
informing each other we can better coordinate the actions against the common enemy . . . China is now our main enemy.”25 However, not much could be
offered from the Albanian officials.
In late 1978, China made the decision to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” for its
ambitions in Southeast Asia.26 Yet, as Xiaoming Zhang has shown, both political and military preparations for China’s military intervention in Vietnam
had been made during 1978, before the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia.
The preparations were supervised closely by Deng Xiaoping, who ultimately
decided to attack Vietnam.27 On February 17, 1979, a Chinese invasion force consisting of “nine field armies . . . more than half a million combatants” crossed
the border with Vietnam, where they fought until the day of their withdrawal
on March 16, 1979.28 Following the Chinese attack on Vietnam, Hoxha met with
his lieutenants to assess the situation, and to seize the opportunity to publicly
attack China as an “aggressive power . . . which confirms that China has turned
into a capitalistic social-imperialist country.”29 It is from this perspective – seeing China as a “social-imperialist” power – that Hoxha analyzed China’s attack
against Vietnam. Portraying China as a social-imperialist country made it easy
for Hoxha’s closed circle to make an argument against those in Albania – particularly people in the middle and lower ranks of the establishment–who worried about, with good reason, Albania’s economic survival without Chinese
assistance. It was from this perspective that Hoxha observed Deng Xiaoping’s
visit to United States before China’s attack on Vietnam. For Hoxha, “he [Deng]
must have reached a dangerous agreement with Carter. . . . It was precisely
during his visit to the US that Deng declared that ‘China would give Vietnam a
24
25
26
27
28
29
Hanoi [Albanian ambassador] to Tirana, 23.8.1978, in ampj, Vietnam, V.1978, D.461, f.63.
Hanoi to Tirana, 11 October 1978, in in ampj, Vietnam, V.1978, D..461, f.87–112.
Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 125. The phrase was used by Chinese
leaders after Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia.
Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and
Vietnam, 1979–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 40–89.
Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 90.
Daily meeting of the Party of Labor of Albania Central Committee secretaries on 19
February 1979. About the instructions of comrade Enver Hoxha on the article “The
Chinese leadership, headed by Deng Xiaoping, attacked Vietnam Militarily,” and talks on
the Middle East, in aqsh, F.14, ou-str [Struktura], V.1979, L.1, D.43, f.3.
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good lesson!!’ This means that the Chinese aggression against Vietnam has had
Washington’s approval.”30 Hoxha argued that China had betrayed the Marxist
path that the Chinese leaders had claimed to treasure so much, and the attack
on Vietnam indicated that China would embark on a new path, a path that was
not acceptable to Albania.
Hoxha then attacked Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia as a “barbaric regime
. . . our embassy in Phnom Penh has seen how the Cambodian people have
been treated in the most barbaric way by Pol Pot’s clique,” in a way justifying Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. Furthermore, on this point he also
wondered rhetorically “Why the Chinese imperialists should have the right to
defend the fascist and barbaric group of Pol Pot, while the Vietnamese have no
right to support the revolutionary forces and the Cambodian people to build
a sovereign, independent and free country?” Chinese support for the Pol Pot
regime was for Hoxha a consequence of Deng’s new path in China, where Deng
had “rehabilitated all the Chinese reactionaries, returning to them all their
properties and industries, and transforming China into a capitalistic socialimperialist country.” On the possible Soviet assistance to Vietnam, considering the treaty the two countries had signed the previous year, Hoxha argued
that the Soviet Union, “as Vietnam’s ally, will protest against, or even threaten
China, but they [the Soviets] do not want to get involved [militarily] with
China over Indochina.” Nonetheless, he believed that it was certain that “the
United States . . . and the Soviet Union want this war to last long . . . [because]
the Soviets want to weaken China; and the Americans want to see the weakening of Vietnam.”31 As we know, if the Soviets and the Americans did harbor such wishes, they were to be disappointed. China’s adventure in Vietnam
was relatively short, just as had probably been intended, and eventually the
relations between the two countries returned to normalcy with increased economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges.
aqsh, F.14, ou, V.1979, D.43.
This first document is the transcript of the meeting of Hoxha with his close
comrades only two days after Chinese forces crossed the border with Vietnam.
The Albanian leadership seized immediately the opportunity to publish an
article against China, which among others would deal with the ideological
aspects of the rule of Chinese leadership, such as, according to them, the new
30
31
aqsh, F.14, ou-str, V.1979, L.1, D.43, f.3.
aqsh, F.14, ou-str, V.1979, L.1, D.43, f.5–8.
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imperialist nature of China under Deng Xiaoping. China’s mutual understanding with the United States was also brought here in the discussion. The real
issue was, however, to portray China in a way that would highlight the fact
that Albania’s alliance with China, which had formally ended in July 1978, was
politically unsustainable, and that the decision to end it had been the right
one. Just as they had done in 1960 during the split with the Soviet Union, when
Albanian leaders attacked the Soviet leadership [Khrushchev] and not the
Soviet people, here too they are careful in attacking the leadership of China,
not the Chinese people.
Folder title: Daily meeting of the secretaries of the Party of Labor of Albania
Central Committee [pla cc] on February 19, 1979. About the instructions of
comrade Enver Hoxha regarding the article “The Chinese Leadership, Headed
by Deng Xiaoping, Attacked Vietnam Militarily,” and other discussions regarding the Middle East.
Attending the meeting are comrades Enver Hoxha, Hysni Kapo, Ramiz Alia,
Hekuran Isai [pla cc member], and Prokop Murra [pla cc member].32
In this conversation comrade Enver expressed his views on the article “The
Chinese Leadership, Headed by Deng Xiaoping, Attacked Vietnam militarily.” Then he and the other comrades talked about the situation in the Middle
East.33
Ramiz Alia: Today, the Vietnamese started their counterattack against the
Chinese aggressors and it is interesting that they [the Vietnamese] are
not requesting a meeting of the Security Council [of the United Nations].
Understandably, they have their reasons for doing this.
Enver Hoxha: Yes, yes, the purpose is to continue the war, and to “jump off the
air” of the Chinese so to speak, to discredit China completely.
Ramiz Alia: This is the first thing, which means that the Vietnamese want to
give the Chinese a good lesson and push them to the other side [of the border].
The foreign press agencies are saying that the Vietnamese have started the
artillery bombing of Chinese territory. But – and this is the second thing – the
Vietnamese also have a problem: if the issue is raised at the Security Council,
then the American resolution might be discussed and accepted. This would
mean that the discussion would cover not only the Sino-Vietnamese conflict,
32
33
Hysni Kapo was Hoxha’s closest and most trusted ally. He died of cancer in late 1979.
Ramiz Alia was a member of the Politburo and eventually became the successor of Enver
Hoxha as Albania’s communist leader following the death of Hoxha in 1985. Alia ruled the
country till 1992, when the regime collapsed.
In Albania, Hoxha was always addressed by his first name, comrade Enver.
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but also the Vietnamese–Cambodian question, and parallels would be drawn
between them. This is what Vietnam wants to avoid.
Enver Hoxha: Precisely, this is the path they will follow. The Vietnamese do
not want to fall into the trap of the Security Council. They want to show and
tell China that they can reject China and leave China with shame, give China a
lesson, and if China goes on. . . . These others [UN Security Council members]
will “give China the grade” [criticize China].34
Ramiz Alia: They will give the grade, and it will be a bitter grade.
Enver Hoxha: That is right. A bitter vote, and they [the Vietnamese] will tell
China to stop before it is too late.
Ramiz Alia: The Chinese people don’t want the war. This issue may get to the
point that the Soviets may tell China that they will enforce their obligations
toward Vietnam [a reference to the clauses of the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed in November 1979]
and enter the war.
Enver Hoxha: Yes, yes, they may tell China that they will comply with their
obligations. If this happens, it may take all the capitalist countries by surprise.
Hysni Kapo: These countries will react negatively to Chinese aggression.
Enver Hoxha: Yes, yes, they all will react negatively. Even Japan – which has
a treaty of friendship with China – has condemned the Chinese aggression
against Vietnam. China’s actions haven’t yet been condemned by Yugoslavia,
Romania, and us. Regarding our standing, I think we should prepare an article.
Ramiz Alia: Yes, yes. I have the article ready. But I thought we should meet and
discuss it first.
Enver Hoxha: If it is already ready, then that is ok. But I think that this article
should not give the impression that this is our revenge against China [after
China’s interruption of the economic aid to Albania the year before], meaning
that I take this as a chance to fire on China. The article should be stinging and
get to the point, but I want to say that when they [the readers] finish reading
the article, they get to conclude that the Albanians are people who can judge
objectively, and who lean on the right side. This is my view about the article,
but I repeat that we should speak without gloves. I think that the title of the
article should be “The Chinese Leadership, Headed by Deng Xiaoping, Attacked
Vietnam”; I emphasize “the Chinese leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping.”
In the article, we should say that we assess these issues very clearly and
with no hotheadedness and we do so for the people, not for the ruling cliques,
which in these unclear situations are acting at their people’s expense.
34
To “give someone a grade” is a way of saying in Albania which implies assessing/judging
one’s behaviour.
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Then the article should continue to analyze how China, headed by the
clique of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, is aggressive, and this aggression
has the characteristic of the old imperialist “gunboat politics” pursued by the
colonialists and neocolonialists in the past. As in theory and in practice, with
this fascist aggression China has confirmed that it has become a capitalistic
and social-imperialist country. She [China] attacked a heroic people, who haven’t done anything bad to humankind; on the contrary, [Vietnam] has served
humankind in an extraordinary way, by resisting and defeating American
imperialism – the most savage enemy of all humankind. Let’s say in the article that the Vietnamese people and its leadership, or maybe better not mention the leadership, have not done anything bad to the Chinese people, but
have been their friends. On the contrary, as history has taught us, it has been
the Vietnamese people who have suffered continuously throughout centuries
from Chinese rulers. The Chinese leadership as well as the social-imperialist
Soviet leadership, regardless of some small assistance that they have provided
in the war against American imperialism, have been an obstacle during the
thirty-year anti-imperialist war of the Vietnamese people.
Hysni Kapo: Perhaps it is better to write also that “although there were many
efforts to thwart it [the Vietnamese war against United States]” . . .
Enver Hoxha: Yet the Vietnamese people have been patient. Here we can mention Nixon’s visit to Beijing. At a time when all Vietnam was savagely bombed
by the United States of America, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were receiving
the head of the American imperialists and gave him great honors, making
agreements [with the Americans] behind the back of the Vietnamese people.
We also know and have seen, that the talks of Zhou Enlai with Kosygin at
the Beijing airport, after some rocambolesque [troublesome, in French] vicissitudes so to speak, were done precisely at Vietnam’s expense. At that time, or
some time earlier, the Vietnamese leadership had declared that they would not
allow any intervention of foreign countries in Vietnam’s internal affairs.
Deng Xiaoping went to the United States, and in Washington he certainly
must have reached a dangerous agreement with [US President Jimmy] Carter,
head of the American imperialists, at the expense of world peace. It was precisely there that Deng declared that “China would give Vietnam a good lesson!!”
This means that the Chinese aggression against Vietnam has had Washington’s
approval, otherwise President Carter would have disapproved, or opposed, this
affirmation of Deng Xiaoping, but he neither opposed nor disapproved it. This
is confirmed also by the fact that the American government is trying to put the
blame equally on both, China for the attack against Vietnam, and on Vietnam
for its alleged aggression against Cambodia.
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Then let’s talk about Cambodia. There – this should be said in the article –
people, the communists, and all Cambodian patriots have risen against the
barbaric rule of Pol Pot. The barbaric actions of this government are supported
by the imperialist group of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng and are serving the
expansionist policies of this group. [Prime Minister Norodom] Sihanouk himself, a friend of China, has openly spoken in the United Nations of the crimes
committed in Cambodia by the clique of Pol Pot. But our embassy in Phnom
Penh, which was among the first and the friendliest – because the Socialist
Republic of Albania has given to the Cambodian people all the possible help in
this war – was also surrounded by barbed wire. The employees of our embassy
have seen how the Cambodian people have been treated in the most barbaric
way by the clique of Pol Pot. It was impossible to find people in Phnom Penh
because the city was completely empty. There you could find neither food nor
medicine, not even an aspirin pill. We think that the Cambodian people have
acted late against this clique, which was tied to the Beijing clique and was at
their service. Why shouldn’t Deng Xiaoping support the Pol Pot and Ieng Sary
clique, when in China he after all has rehabilitated all the rottenness of the
Chinese reactionaries, returning to them all their properties and industries,
and transforming China – as our party rightfully has defined – into a capitalistic social-imperialist country?
Now the Chinese leadership is trying to justify its aggressive action with
the pretext that Vietnam “is seeking a small hegemony.” With this aggression,
Beijing needs to justify its own big hegemony instead.
What else should we address about Vietnam in this article? Let’s put the
fact that we Albanians have openly told the Vietnamese at the time of their
war against the Americans, but also now, that their alliance with the socialimperialist Soviet Union, or with any other imperialist state, including the
members of comecon [the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], was
dangerous for the Vietnamese people, and for other peoples as well.
Another issue to be tackled is the following: Why should the Chinese imperialists have the right to defend the fascist and barbaric group of Pol Pot,
whereas the Vietnamese have no right to support the revolutionary forces and
the Cambodian people to build a sovereign, independent, and free country?
The Vietnamese government has openly stated that it wants the countries of
that area to be free and independent. Therefore, we are, and we shall be, on the
side of the Vietnamese people, to defend their cause, because it is a right cause.
A great people like the Chinese people have allowed its leadership to
attack a fraternal nation at a time when it is trying to heal deep wounds, and
rebuild the country after thirty years of war. We have the right to address the
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fraternal Chinese people and ask them not to allow any world conflict to be
incited by adventurists like those leaders of China, who have rehabilitated all
counter-revolutionary reactionaries. We hope that the Chinese people will not
allow such policies, and that they will not be held responsible for such actions
in front of history.
All those cliques who pretend to be democratic, among whom are also communists – who for their own interests do not defend the cause of Vietnam –
will be one day subject to bitter consequences. Here leads the policy of empty
words such as “defending the peoples” and the so-called non-aligned policy.
How could you possibly be non-aligned?
What do you say comrades, can we do such an article? To be soft in the sense
that I have described: that it should not be understood as our revenge [against
China], but it should also be strong and unmasking.
Hysni Kapo: So, it should make strong arguments, everything should be based
on facts.
Enver Hoxha: Yes, strong. And it should use some stinging terms, the truth
should be said openly. It may be bitter, but right. What do you say?
Ramiz Alia: I agree, comrade Enver. The prepared article doesn’t contain all
the ideas you have just given us. For instance, the Cambodian question is not
covered at all.
Enver Hoxha: We should mention that too because we say the truth.
Hysni Kapo: What you said the day before yesterday regarding the Chinese
people’s war efforts also fits well into this article.
Enver Hoxha: Yes, yes, will the Chinese people allow this? Then we should also
mention in the article something on the measures taken by the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to rebuild their country, which are right measures. Right
were, for instance, also the measures toward the Chinese people living in
Vietnam, who had speculated on the blood of the Vietnamese people during
the war against the American imperialists. Clearly, this issue is one of the reasons of this aggression, which the Vietnamese government had asked to be
settled through talks.
We, in our article, should not use any term used by the Soviets, like
“Imperialists, Hands off Vietnam,” or other similar terms. We are convinced
that the Vietnamese people will reject the Chinese imperious aggression and
will rebuild the country without the assistance of anyone, neither the Soviets
nor the others.
Regarding the Soviet–Vietnamese treaty, we should say that we did not
agree, and that we have said this to the Workers Party of Vietnam, but this is
up to them. We have expressed our opinion at the right time and here again we
reaffirm it.
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Hysni Kapo: Yes, right, we say the truth, but we also defend Vietnam.
Enver Hoxha: We defend it with dignity. Those attacking them [the Vietnamese]
are the Chinese, the Soviets, and the Cambodians. Let it be emphasized in the
article that the Cambodian people have acted late in overthrowing the Pol
Pot clique, and we say this so that the Chinese people should understand, to
which we also say: Don’t wait too late to take action, don’t let the current fascist
leadership lead you into dangerous adventurism that will have severe consequences for you and for the entire world, otherwise, you will be held responsible in front of the judgement of history.
Ramiz Alia: Yes. I agree.
Hysni Kapo: We all should read this article. Then we should send it to the war
front in Vietnam because its forceful unmasking [of our real feelings] will
inspire even more courage in the Vietnamese soldiers to expel the aggressors
out of their country.
Enver Hoxha: Regardless of the respective reasons, everyone is condemning
the Chinese aggression. It is being condemned even by [Arnaldo] Forlani and
[Enrico] Berlinguer [both Italian political leaders], it is being condemned even
by Japan which has a treaty of friendship with China. In these situations, our
article should be wise, it should be a support for Vietnam, and a call addressed
to the entire world for supporting Vietnam and for drawing the conclusion that
those who don’t support Vietnam are supporting the warmongers. We say this
in our own right and without gloves because no one should have the right to
attack others’ borders. This is how I think we should arrange this article.
Ramiz Alia: Yes, yes. I agree.
Hekuran Isai: I think it will be a good article.
Ramiz Alia: Isn’t this aggression also connected with other issues? Is there any
connection with the events in Iran, comrade Enver?
Enver Hoxha: With Iran?
Ramiz Alia: I say this because perhaps there is a silent agreement between
the Americans and the Chinese. This means that while the situation in Iran
is deteriorating, China is trying to move the attention to the other side [of the
world], to Vietnam, so that in a way it can involve the Soviet Union in the war.
One may wonder to what extent? Well, border clashes and nothing more. This
is all about switching the public attention there, so that the Americans are left
with a free hand for possible actions toward Iran.
Enver Hoxha: I think the Americans cannot intervene in Iran.
Hysni Kapo: They cannot have a military intervention.
Ramiz Alia: Of course, they cannot do this.
Enver Hoxha: Other things are done by them instead, but are done also by the
Soviets.
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Ramiz Alia: Yes, right, the Soviets are also doing [these things].
Enver Hoxha: There is no sign of possible American military intervention.
Hysni Kapo: If that happens, there would be a big conflict.
Enver Hoxha: That is right. The Americans do not get directly involved, neither
in Iran nor in Arab countries. To this aim they have Israel, which they continuously incite to be involved. The Americans don’t play more games because they
were burned in Vietnam. Public opinion in the United States, despite being the
opinion of the bourgeoisie who support the policy of the imperialist expansion of their own government, still does not easily approve of war. This became
clear with the war in Vietnam, particularly during the last stages when things
procrastinated, when many Americans died there. Consequently, public opinion in the United States took another direction, people protested massively.
Therefore, now the Americans are hesitant about intervening in Iran, but they
use cia and other indirect ways, they try to complicate things for [Ayatollah]
Khomeini [Iran’s Islamist revolutionary leader].
Ramiz Alia: The Soviets too act the same way.
Enver Hoxha: Yes, yes, the Soviets too. Even if China had not attacked Vietnam,
the Soviets would act the same in Iran. But under these circumstances, with
the war in Vietnam, if the United States would move toward Iran [start a
conflict], then the Soviets might intervene, and that would be the end. The
Americans have not played this card, and since they have not intervened in
Iran, the Soviets also have not rushed to have a military intervention in Iran. It
seems that the Soviets have chosen the following approach: as Vietnam’s ally
they will protest against or even threaten [China] but they don’t want to get
involved with China over Indochina. The Americans will say to the Chinese:
look, neither you, nor them [the Vietnamese], are right. Then how this will
evolve? It is possible that the war between China and Vietnam might last for
some time. The United States want this war to last for some time. The Soviet
Union also wants this war to last. The Soviets want the weakening of China; the
Americans, on the other hand, want the weakening of Vietnam. In fact, China
will be weakened, and when it will retreat, [consequently] the United States
might seek to do whatever they want with China. However, in all this vortex of
events, the priority is the question of Southeast Asia, the defense of India, of
the Indian Ocean, of the Pacific, and particularly of the oil[-producing] region
in the Middle East where all these wolves have pointed their eyes.
Hysni Kapo: Recently, [US Secretary of Defense Harold] Brown visited these
countries and he said that Egypt should be armed. That is how the United
States do not get directly involved, but they do so by involving others in order
to preserve the position of the US. In Iran the American position is weak, and
they don’t know what to do. The Soviets are strengthening their position there.
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Although the [communist] Tudeh Party did not win, eventually Iran underwent transformation and the American position became weak: while the
[American] position is weakened there, others will gain advantages there.
Enver Hoxha: It was only to overthrow Mosaddegh that the United States intervened in Iran [referring to the overthrowing of the nationalist government of
Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran in 1953 in a plot organized and supported by
the United Kingdom and the United States], because until then it was all in
British hands, in the hands of the Anglo-Persians. When [the American diplomat William A.] Harriman intervened, together with the cia and [Fazlollah]
Zahed who removed Mosaddegh, he implemented his capitalist system of
“fifty-fifty” [referring to the oil revenues in Iran] – even more for the Americans,
some for the British, and only what was left for the Iranians.
At that time the Americans intervened. What about now? Now is even worse
as the English will try to occupy a place and make efforts to keep it; the Italians
have also occupied another corner; the French too will be there because of
their old links, but also because they now have Khomeini [Khomeini was living
in exile in France before returning to Iran]. Many Iranian students have studied
in France. When I was a student in France there were many Iranian students. I
even heard the name of a student who was my friend in Montpellier, Nastosili
was his name. Perhaps it was him, or maybe someone else with the same name.
So now the Soviet Union has a place in Iran. What I mean is that the US
influence there will be weakened, as will be the influence of Britain, when the
United States intervenes in Iran. Now their positions are being weakened and
there will be ten fingers [many states intervening]. Even what you said before,
Hysni, regarding Brown, is right. Brown is travelling all around, continuing his
tours, and so, as you said, the Americans don’t get directly involved.
Hysni Kapo: Here are the weapons, so fight – they incite others to fight.
Enver Hoxha: Here are the weapons and as they say [in French] en avant à la
guerre, charge forward to fight the war. The United States always acts like this,
giving weapons to others [allies], providing loans, pushing one to unite with
this, the other with that, but how united will they eventually become? . . .
But [Yasser] Arafat, “the hero of the day,” went to Iran, where he found
strong support. Now he also has the support of Kuwait, where 35 percent of
the population is Palestinian, but on this issue, Kuwait does not have much
leverage because it is a small country.
Hysni Kapo: Kuwait has 700,000 people, of which 300,000 are Palestinians.
Enver Hoxha: Right, 300,000 Palestinians, 300,000 Kuwaiti people, 100,000
Egyptians, which means that they [the Palestinians] can take all the oil one
day.
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Ramiz Alia: All the middle-class people in Kuwait are Palestinians and the
Kuwaiti people form the working class.
Enver Hoxha: Recently Arafat has had good relations with the Soviets. They
give him weapons, tell him to advise Khomeini not to fear the Soviets, in order
to ensure the borders on the side of Azerbaijan and Caspian Sea, so that there
they [the Soviets] want to be quiet, in order to concentrate on the Oman gulf,
and on the other side with the Cubans.
Hysni Kapo: He [Arafat] was called by the Soviets to go to Iran.
[End of transcript.]
F.14, ou, V. 1979, D.45.
This second document is related to the second meeting of the Albanian leaders
regarding the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. During this meeting, they discussed
a second article to be published in support of Vietnam and against China in
early March 1979. This meeting took place when China had announced its
intention to withdraw from Vietnam. Hoxha viewed with sympathy the resolve
of the Vietnamese in opposing China’s invasion. The discussion centered also
on the military strategies of China in the conflict, and how it may escalate to
including also Laos and Cambodia. Moreover, the position of the Soviet Union,
which had a defense treaty with Vietnam, was also discussed.
Folder title: Daily Meeting of the Party of Labor of Albania Central Committee
secretaries, March 6, 1979, on the following issues: On the request of the
ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to meet with the comrades of the Foreign Directorate of the Party [of Labor of Albania], regarding
the Chinese aggression against Vietnam; the preparation of an article which is
a call addressed to the Chinese people to stop the criminal hand of the Chinese
leadership in this aggression.
Attending the meeting are comrades Enver Hoxha, Hysni Kapo, and Ramiz
Alia.
Enver Hoxha: When is Pirro [Pirro Bita, head of the Party of Labor Foreign
Directorate] receiving the Vietnamese ambassador?35
Ramiz Alia: Today, comrade Enver.
Enver Hoxha: He should receive him as soon as possible. Did you read the
alarming radiograms we had received from the Vietnamese side? This means,
35
The Party Foreign Directorate was responsible for the party’s relations with foreign
organizations and parties, and the relations between the party’s leadership and
foreign political organizations and leaders.
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as it seems, that China has invaded some mountainous areas of North Vietnam,
and they have been advancing deep in the valley toward Hanoi. Yesterday
evening you heard the Chinese communiqué which states that allegedly China
will withdraw [its troops from Vietnam]. Vietnam has all the reasons not to
trust China as they are not trustful, they are great hypocrites.
Hysni Kapo: They [China] do this [issue the communiqué] to deceive.
Enver Hoxha: The prestige of China has fallen apart in the world, and to raise it
a little bit China is invading Vietnam, thinking that in this way they will reach
their goal. But as we heard in the communiqué, China relates its withdrawal to
the Cambodian issue. But they also don’t relate the two matters to each other,
it is not clear.
Ramiz Alia: No, they don’t relate these two things. They rely fully on public
opinion to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.
Enver Hoxha: Then that means that the attack against Vietnam was not about
this issue.
Hysni Kapo: The news, according to the bulletin of the atsh [Agjencia
Telegrafike Shqiptare (Albanian Telegraphic Agency)] issued yesterday, also
had something that was not mentioned in the Chinese communiqué.
Enver Hoxha: The Xinhua communiqué didn’t relate these issues but called on
the world’s public opinion to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.
It also called on Vietnam not to resume the border provocations. Now, it
depends on what China means by provocation. If they went to Vietnam for a
tour, and now try to return home triumphantly, without being attacked during
the retreat, then what has been told us by the Vietnamese might be true: that
China will consider possible Vietnamese attacks on its troops during the withdrawal as provocations and would use these as pretexts to return and attack
Vietnam again. In short, they are telling the Vietnamese: do not attack us, let
us return triumphantly, and let us be received with flowers at the border by the
Chinese people.
Hysni Kapo: Li Xiannian, at a certain point during the intervention, said that
if Vietnamese troops will provoke us [that is, the Chinese] during the retreat,
then we [the Chinese] will be obligated to respond.
Ramiz Alia: With this the Chinese are saying that they will attack again. Yes, yes,
in addition to Li Xiannian, this was affirmed also in the Chinese communiqué.
Enver Hoxha: The communiqué has given the impression that this could be
done either after or before the withdrawal.
Ramiz Alia: Last evening, Sofo Lazri [a Party of Labor adviser and official]
told me that Radio London, as he had heard, had broadcast news according
to which the Chinese are surrounded around the city of Lang Son. This means
that they are encountering some difficulties there.
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Enver Hoxha: According to the information from our ambassador in Hanoi
provided on March 5 [1979], the Chinese had occupied Railway No. 1 [probably referring to the Road No. 1], which is only one kilometer away from Lang
Son, and as Radio London informs, it is possible that Lang Son might fall to
the Chinese. But here the issue is not about the Chinese army being besieged
by the Vietnamese. As the Vietnamese say, the Chinese army is attacking in
waves on a very small front and at three main points alone they have gathered
300,000 troops. This is a big army; therefore, I find the decision of Vietnam to
call for a general mobilization to be right. With this move they are responding
to China by telling the Chinese that they are ready for general war, and that
they know China is lying [about its withdrawal]. Your war, they say to China,
will continue, therefore we will defend Hanoi, defend all our fatherland, but
we will also defend Laos, because, as I see it, China also has the intention to
attack Laos. China has two [military] objectives, which they have not made
clear–at the beginning they only made clear their objective on the eastern side
[Vietnam].
With the attack on the eastern side, they wanted to dominate the valley
toward Hanoi, but to control the western side [Laos] was another objective for
China. However, in my view, the western side is a secondary target for China.
According to the information from our ambassador in Vietnam, China tried
and achieved to unite these two directions, with the main one remaining the
one toward Hanoi and with Laos as the other direction. The main objective
of the march to Hanoi is to occupy the city, after that the Chinese will enter
Cambodia through Laos, and from there they will seize all of Vietnam. But they
may also stop at Lang Son, stop their attack there, and then move to Laos from
there.
Hysni Kapo: China declared that it would withdraw, but, on the other hand, the
Chinese are also moving toward Laos. I think that during the Chinese retreat,
Vietnam will attack and this might expand the conflict further.
Enver Hoxha: Naturally, Vietnam will defend the Laotian front. They must and
should have predicted the Chinese attack on this front.
The Soviets are evil, but they fear a world war with the United States, for
us this is clear. But the maneuver of [Leonid] Brezhnev [leader of the Soviet
Union], who is trying to calm the West, meaning calming nato [the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance of Western countries], gives
us the impression that he wants the West to remain calm because he wants to
have a free hand in the East. The Soviet efforts to reassure the West are baseless
as far as the military alliances, namely nato and the Warsaw Pact [a military
alliance of the European socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union], are
always put at combat readiness. With these efforts to assure the West of its
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pacific goals, the Soviets are telling Western Europe that in the context of the
events in Vietnam they have no intention to attack; on the contrary, they say
that they have done and are doing all sorts of proposals to the West. Even to
the United States the Soviets are saying that they are ready to sign the salt
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement.
If China doesn’t retreat but expands the war to Laos and Cambodia, so as to
encircle Vietnam, then the Soviet Union will not avoid intervention.
Ramiz Alia: In that case the situation would be very dangerous for that region
and for the world.
Enver Hoxha: We have to wait to see how the Soviet Union will intervene in
Vietnam, but there are some possibilities for such an intervention.
Ramiz Alia: Yes, yes, and if that happens, the situation in Southeast Asia will
become very dangerous.
Enver Hoxha: Certainly, the situation in Southeast Asia will be dangerous.
These events are also related to the visit of President Carter to the Middle
East, which will start tomorrow on March 7 [1979]. Carter’s visit has a great
significance since he is the President of the United States. This means that the
American imperialists have concluded that it is necessary to reach an agreement between Israel and Egypt. This [agreement between Egypt and Israel]
will serve as a means to defend North Yemen, Oman, and possibly also Persia
against a combined attack of the Russians with the [support of] Syrians, Iraqis,
and South Yemen.
Clearly the entire Middle East basin is burning, and that is why Carter is
trying to ensure the support of two countries [Egypt and Israel]. Such an evolving of the situation would also be a further expanding of the world conflict
[the confrontation between East and West], because the Soviet Union may
play this card in opposing any American involvement in the Sino-Vietnamese
war. In this war, which is ongoing, the Soviet Union has a treaty of friendship
and assistance with Vietnam, and Vietnam has been attacked by China, which
entered Vietnam and also wants to enter Laos, and which has expansionist
purposes. Therefore, the Soviets say: you Americans should not get involved in
these events, and if you do, then I can enter Iran. But with the social-imperialist
Soviet Union in Iran, it means to take away from the Western countries all the
oil basin, and the Soviets may also attack Saudi Arabia, and expand further in
the Middle East. In such a case there would certainly be a world war on the two
sides [east and west] of the Soviet Union.
We will see how the situation will evolve, but these are troubled situations.
We will also see what the Vietnamese ambassador wants from us.
Ramiz Alia: He, I think, based on what he has affirmed, will give us the declaration of his party and government.
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Hysni Kapo: He will come to inform us of the declaration, but he will also ask
for our support.
Ramiz Alia: In their declaration they are asking everyone to support them.
Enver Hoxha: We will read the declaration, which I think should be published,
and it would also be good to prepare again an article against China that can
unmask their aggression against Vietnam, unmask the current Chinese leadership as an aggressive leadership, which must be condemned by all the progressive forces of humankind. Vietnam is leading a just war, because it was
attacked by a great power for pure expansionist reasons, and so the article
should attack the Chinese leadership and [come out] in defense of Vietnam.
In this article we should also call on the Chinese people to stop the criminal hand of its leadership, otherwise they too are held responsible for this
barbaric aggression. We should also emphasize that this aggression is a threat
to the entire world, because it is aimed at pushing the entire humankind
toward war. Since they came to power, the leaders of China have been calling on all countries to prepare for war, because they would be attacked by the
social-imperialist Soviet Union. Without excluding the aggressive actions of
the Soviet Union, clearly this call from the Chinese government was to hide
the aggressive intentions of the Chinese leadership. The facts are that China
attacked Vietnam and may have intention to attack Laos and Cambodia, and
in this way expanding its empire toward Southeast Asia. This possibility is a
severe threat to all the asean [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, and to Burma, India, and Bangladesh.
Hysni Kapo: For all these reasons you have mentioned, comrade Enver, the
article should be written.
Enver Hoxha: Of course, it should. We should predict a little bit of these things
and publish them so that the world may know; after all, we cannot do much
more.
Hysni Kapo: We have something to say in this case, and by doing this we
will support also the Vietnamese. There is the possibility that others may be
involved in this conflict, which then may escalate [the current Sino-Vietnamese
conflict] to a world war.
Enver Hoxha: This is what Chinese leaders want, a world war. Some time ago
Mao Zedong had declared that it was not a big issue if 300 million Chinese
would die in a war, considering that they have 900 million that they cannot
feed. Therefore, he sought space for them, meaning invading foreign lands,
or eliminating 300 million people, which would leave China with 600 million
people – at least this is what the Chinese leaders think. They think that in the
case of a Soviet attack against them, China could always survive because
the Soviet Union cannot keep occupying such a large country, even less colonize
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it, if nothing else because the Soviets would face incompatible contradictions
with other imperialist countries. Therefore – the Chinese say – a war between
the two worlds, Soviet social-imperialism and American imperialism, would
be good. This clearly and visibly is what the Chinese leaders want. The other
thing is to see what the United States would do.
Hysni Kapo: They will, as always, try to get into conflict with others.
Enver Hoxha: To put the others in conflict against each other is something they
are all interested in, because they fear each other. This is what Western Europe,
the United States, but also Japan is interested in. The latter [Japan] is interested in seeing those others entering war, with Japan remaining a defender of
the United States’ interests. This latter, in turn, as usual, prefers to intervene at
the end.
At a certain point in the book Imperialism and Revolution [Hoxha’s own
book] it is affirmed that the United States of America, with China’s consent,
is keeping troops in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: Asian countries which in
the possibility of a new world war will be transformed into supporting bases
for the American imperialism. This means that the American Seventh Fleet is
around Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, which could be used together with
Chinese forces in the case of a possible war against the Soviets, despite the fact
that the Americans may not enter war before reinforcing these bases. China
has accepted these situations, and even more, it agrees that the United States
should further reinforce its military bases in the region. There is no doubt that
in the case of a Sino-Soviet conflict, the United States would further reinforce
their military bases, likely together with their bases [farther] away in Australia,
the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, Singapore, and everywhere else where
they have bases, because they don’t want China to spread like oil in the salad
[An Albanian saying, which is a reference to China’s possible increasing expansion in the region]. The United States is trying to play the role of mediator until
it reaches the objective of seeing the other powers in conflict, destroying each
other, and afterwards it will win over all of them. This is how they won in the
First World War, and then again in the Second World War, and how they would
do so in the third one.
Hysni Kapo: That is what the Americans are hoping, because by fighting each
other the revisionist and capitalist powers will weaken each other, and so the
United States can use this situation to strengthen [themselves] further through
a third world conflict.
Enver Hoxha: In these ongoing crises, things for the imperialists and the
social-imperialists will not move so smoothly because the people will react.
This should not pass unobserved, that they [the people] will not allow themselves to be treated as meat for slaughter.
China and Asia 4 (2022) 147–171
170
marku
Ramiz Alia: . . . as the imperialists and social-imperialists would wish.
Enver Hoxha: Indeed, they [the people] will not do what the imperialists want
them to do. Certainly, the people would react, as they did in the Second World
War. These possibilities are real. In a few words, imperialism would be further
weakened in a coming war.
Now we have to see how the war in Vietnam will evolve, if it will expand
or remain a partial [regional] conflict. The tendency now is for these wars to
remain limited regional conflicts, because in a general war both the American
imperialists and the Soviet social-imperialists are afraid of the atomic bombs,
and so they both try to avoid it.
Hysni Kapo: Since the Vietnamese are calling for general mobilization, perhaps they expect this to be a long war. Not even in the war against United
States did they call for general mobilization. Therefore, this suggests that the
war will continue.
[Note: the rest of the conversation is cut as it focuses on the war games in
Albania.]
[End of transcription—extracted from the tape recorder]
Acknowledgments
A special thank you goes to Altin Kokoli for his help in the Albanian archives.
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