A philosophical epilogue on the question of autonomy

PREPRINT: Gallagher, S. 2012. A philosophical epilogue on the question of autonomy. In H. Hermans and T. Gieser (eds.), Handbook of the Dialogical Self Theory (488-96) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A philosophical epilogue on the question of autonomy Shaun Gallagher Department of Philosophy University of Memphis (USA) School of Humanities University of Hertfordshire (UK) One of the great strengths of dialogical self theory (DST) is that it is not just a theory of the self, since even in being a theory of the self, it is also a theory of the social other. The chapters gathered together in this volume demonstrate in great detail, across a number of issues, how DST is able to explain the self only in relation to the other, whether that other be a different person or a set of persons, or a different position that stands, in some degree, as other to self, and yet, as Chaudhary (Chapter 9) suggests, an ‘otherness in the self’. I want to stay with this thought, while at the same time acknowledging that these chapters bring to bear a comprehensive set of resources to address a wide range of issues, from developmental questions to the effects of changing cross- and multi-cultural factors; from psychodrama and narrative to action in lived space as well as cyberspace; from specific methodologies to various mal-adaptations and psychopathologies; from theories to therapies and applications in the areas of education, counselling, and consumer preferences. The ability to see DST as applicable to all of these various aspects of knowing and living is part of why I think it holds promise to address a particular philosophical problem that is essentially related to the question of how the self is only in relation to the other. The problem is the one of autonomy. As Ho (Chapter 23) suggests, there is an ambiguity involved with the possible transpositions of self-in-other and other-in-self, and at the same time a call for personal and social responsibilities. The starting point for thinking about autonomy is not a consideration about the coercive or collaborative nature of social relations, to use Nir’s terms (Chapter 16), but something more primary that precedes any claim about coercion or collaboration. It lies closer to the developmental origins of the dialogical self, discussed by Bertau (Chapter 3). The issue concerns the fact that we are immersed in interactive relations with others before we know it. I’ve argued, in other places (Gallagher 2005, 2008), for the interaction theory of social cognition as an alternative to the standard theories found in philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience – theories that frame the problem of intersubjectivity in terms of mindreading the other’s mental states from an observational standpoint. The standard theories assume, as part of the problem, a clear separation of minds, and accordingly a lack of access to the other person’s mental states. Moreover, they look for a solution that reinforces this assumption with another one: the assumption of methodological individualism: the working assumption that access to knowledge about the minds of others depends on cognitive capabilities or mechanisms of an isolated individual, or on processes that take place inside an individual brain. The standard solution, therefore, is cast in terms of a ‘theory of mind module’ (Leslie 1992) or a set of neurons the activation of which constitutes a simulation of the other person’s mind (Gallese 2001; Goldman 2006). In contrast, interaction theory appeals to developmental studies to show that we are not thirdperson observers of others, but rather are involved, from the earliest point in infancy, in secondperson interactions and dialogical relations with others, and that we start to ‘understand’ others through a variety of embodied practices. I won’t rehearse the evidence here (but see Gallagher 2005; Hobson 2002; Reddy 2008). I will, however, emphasize the importance of timing and emotional attunement as essential to the kind of interaction involved. Infants and caregivers are affectively and temporally attuned to each other in their dialogical vocalizations and gestures (e.g., Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; and experiments by Tronick et al. 1978, and Murray and Trevarthen 1985). The upshot of interaction theory is that meaning and emotional significance is co-constituted in the interaction -- not in the private confines of one or the other person’s head, and that such embodied interactive practices continue to characterize our mature adult behaviour – supplemented and transformed via communicative and narrative practices (Gallagher and Hutto 2008). In communication, for example, we coordinate our perception-action sequences; our movements are coupled with changes in velocity, direction and intonation of the movements and utterances of the speaker (Issartel et al. 2007; Kendon 1990; Lindblom and Ziemke 2007). Our movements are imperfectly synchronized in resonance with others, following either in-phase or phase-delayed behaviour, and in rhythmic co-variation of gestures, facial or vocal expressions (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009; Gergely 2001). In this interactive process, attunement, loss of attunement, and reestablished attunement maintain both differentiation and connection. There is significant evidence that a pre-social, pre-personal interaction develops prenatally and primes the kind of post-natal intersubjective interaction we find in infants. A variety of behavioural and neuroscientific studies show that the proprioceptive and kinaesthetic registration of bodily movement develops prenatally, and that this development is facilitated by fetal movement. Cortical connections and body-schematic proprioceptive processes are in place by 26 weeks gestational age, but proprioceptors in the muscles (muscle spindles) first appear even earlier, at 9 weeks gestational age (Humphrey 1964). Parts of the vestibular system develop as early as the fourth month of gestation (Jouen and Gapenne 1995). In addition a differential perception (which may be conscious or non-conscious) of stimuli occurs in the late-term fetus. For example, in response to auditory stimuli, starting around 24 weeks gestational age, fetal heart rate changes; and after 25 weeks the fetus responds by blinking its eyes or moving its limbs. Cortical response to such stimuli has been demonstrated in premature infants between 24-29 weeks gestational age (Fifer and Moon 1988). The fetus shows preference for some sounds (such as the mother's voice) rather than others (DeCasper and Spence 1986). Bright light directed on the lower abdomen of the mother in the third trimester can elicit fetal eye blinks (Emory and Toomey 1988). Fetal facial movements prompted by music or voice may be indicative of a similar differential awareness (Birnholz 1988). There is also evidence that a dialogical sensitivity to the difference between touching and being touched, moving and being moved develops prenatally since a certain kind of embodied interaction predates all of these late-term developments, and can be found in the initial and very early movements of the fetus. For example, at 10 weeks gestational age, fetuses display structured bodily movements which they develop through habituation (Krasnegor et al. 1998), e.g., regular mouth opening and closing, and swallowing, as well as movement in response to stimuli such as the mother’s laugh or cough. From 12 weeks gestation, spontaneous and repetitious movements, e.g., movement of the hand to mouth, occur multiple times an hour (De Vries, Visser and Prechtl 1982; Prechtl 2001; Tajani and Ianniruberto 1990). Moreover, in a study of twins in utero, kinematic analysis shows that between 14 and 18 weeks gestational age movements   of   one   twin   towards   the   other   are   different   in   duration   and   deceleration   compared   to   movements   directed   towards   the   uterine   wall   or   self-­‐directed   movements   (Castiello  et  al.  2010).   The neuroscientific principle is that movement influences morphology: brain development results from the system as a whole adapting to new levels of organization at more peripheral levels, rather than the neurological developments unfolding to ‘allow’ increasing proprioceptive capacities (Edelman 1992; Sheets-Johnstone 1998; Van der Meer and Van der Weel 1995). If we ask about this originating movement that sets the train of development in motion, then we should say that it is a kind of intercorporeal interaction. Some early fetal movement is spontaneous and repetitive and starts out as a reflex that unfolds genetically (de Vries, Vissor and Prechtl 1982). Other early fetal movement, however, appears regulated and practiced – non-reflex (Krasnegor et al. 1998) – and it starts out as a response to stimuli. That is, even at this early stage, the fetus is not simply bouncing around in a container. It is responding to something. To what is this movement a response? Quite likely, to the mother’s movement: It is likely that these earliest regulated movements, which are prior to proprioceptive capacity, are a response within and to, the maternal body in her regulated and habituated, body schematic movement. … Add to physical movement the regular maternal heart beat, digestion, and breathing and we can see that the intrauterine world is not only a moving but quite rhythmic or regulated animate world (Lymer 2010: 230). Of course this is not strictly interpersonal interaction (the mother doesn’t even know she’s pregnant this early; and the fetus is not an experiencing subject), but it is what we might call intercorporeal interaction – a non-conscious motor coupling between mother and fetus driven toward and then driven by proprioception and touch. This kind of movement and intercorporeal interaction is, accordingly, sub- or pre-personal. To such pre-personal aspects of interaction, which remain immanent in what later becomes interpersonal interaction, we need to add superpersonal aspects. As suggested above, the intersubjective interaction that is found in infancy and that continues through adulthood is not reducible to mechanisms that belong to the individuals involved in the interaction – it’s not reducible to a sum of individual capacities (De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher 2010). Rather, interaction produces a surplus where 1 + 1 is greater than 2. That is, the interaction goes beyond each participant; it results in something (the creation of meaning) that goes beyond what each individual qua individual can bring to the process. Just as when two people dance the tango, something dynamic is created, which neither one could create on their own. Moreover, as we just saw in regard to the pre-personal aspects of interaction, we are in the tango before we even know it. If we consider both the pre-personal and the super-personal aspects of interaction, then, not just in its origins, but as an ongoing process, interaction seems to transcend the control of the participants (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Merleau-Ponty (1964, 40) talks about the infant getting caught up in the “whirlwind of language” – but prior to that the infant is caught up in the whirlwind of interaction – and even as adults we remain in that whirlwind. This, then, motivates the following question: If I, always already, even before birth, am caught up in a whirlwind of interaction, and that interaction always goes beyond me and my ultimate control, is there really any room for individual autonomy or self-agency? There are current lively debates about self-agency and the related concept of autonomy, with a variety of positions being staked out. From materialist and reductionist perspectives, and based on neuroscientific studies, or the results of psychological experiments, numerous theorists argue that self-agency is an illusion (e.g., Wegner 2002; Banks et al. 2006). Those who defend the notion of self-agency often appeal to processes that are in the head, or to mind-body connections – mental causation, intention formation, reflective decision-making, or the phenomenological sense of agency. These approaches follow a traditional view that conceives of self-agency (or the lack of it) as a matter of individual subjectivity. Agency and autonomy are either in the individual system or they don’t exist. Even those theories that take social phenomena into account often use the individual as a measure: e.g., for social determinists, individual free will doesn’t exist precisely because we are fully determined by our social interactions or our culture. In general, discussions of autonomy and self-agency are framed in terms of methodological individualism – they focus on the individual – the question is framed in just this way if we ask about individual autonomy. Just here I want to argue that we can conceive of autonomy and selfagency in different terms if we conceive of the agent as something other than an individual who either has or does not have free will. If we view the self as something that emerges from intercorporeal and intersubjective interactions, and develops in social interactions with others, then we are forced to face the question of autonomy in a different way. Can we still speak, and do we have a good model for speaking about self-agency in a system that is not reducible to a simple individual? An important step for this way of thinking involves the concept of dialogical self. If we view the dialogical self as something that is won in social interactions with others, then this could offer a good model for self-agency that is not based on the assumption of methodological individualism. Beyond the idea that the concept of dialogical self allows us to think about the self-in-the-other and the other-in-the-self, it also allows for a certain volitional space to open up – the possibility of taking a critical perspective on ourselves. We can think of this in a number of different ways. For example, we can think of it as the possibility for having what Harry Frankfurt (1971) calls second-order volitions – that is, volitions about volitions – volitions in which we consider our own first-order action volitions. On Frankfurt’s view, this, or what Charles Taylor (1989) calls the possibility for a strong evaluation of our own desires, is what is essential for attaining the status of moral personhood. We might think, however, that this way of putting it is still too closely tied to methodological individualism. From an interactionist/dialogical perspective, we should say that this kind of strong evaluation is possible only as a result of a social process. For Taylor especially, this is a hermeneutical and dialogical enterprise. Not only do we gain self-understanding as we understand others, but there is a dialogical dimension built into self-understanding and self-evaluation. In strong evaluation I take a position on myself – and I am able to occupy such a position because I have always occupied such a position vis a vis others. Hubert Hermans (2011: 660) puts it this way: The dialogical self is a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous ‘I-positions’ … involved in processes of mutual dialogical relationships that are intensely interwoven with external dialogical relationships with actual others. … When positions emerging from social interactions are interiorized, the self is able to respond to these positions in the form of counter-positions. In the interplay between positions and counter-positions the agency of the self comes to its full expression. The autonomy of the self, then, is not constituted in just an internal intra-individual negotiation made by one self-position with respect to another, but is “intensely interwoven with external dialogical relationships with actual others.” Self-agency – and a proper sense of autonomy (which comes along with a proper sense of responsibility) – can be found only in the context of social interaction, which is dialogical, and which is where our intentions are formed in or out of our interactions with others. After all, we learn to act, and we learn our own action-possibilities, from watching and interacting with others acting in the world. Through our interactions with others we generate shared intentions and we form our own intentions out of the same fabric. In this regard, self-agency becomes a matter of degree rather than an all or nothing issue. In case this notion sounds a little too abstract, let me add a few clarifications about how this kind of autonomy can emerge. Interaction theory holds that, starting early in development, communicative and narrative practices play a major role in intersubjective relations (Gallagher and Hutto 2008). Just such communicative and narrative practices allow for the possibility of strong evaluation – the possibility of taking a critical perspective on ourselves. I don’t mean to rule out other possible attitudes, for example, the non-evaluative attitude that Hermans-Konopka (Chapter 24) calls depositioning oneself, that is, the possibility of leaving a particular dialogical position and entering a form of consciousness that witnesses, in a transcendental and nonjudgmental way. What evaluative and non-evaluative positions have in common, however, is a narrative distance established between the narrating self (evaluating or witnessing self) and the narrated (evaluated or witnessed) self.1 From an interactionist perspective, importantly, this is                                                                                                                 1 Narrative distance is a concept that goes back to Aristotle’s Poetics, and holds for autobiographical (or self-) narrative as well as other kinds of narrative. Specifically, one can ask about the distance between the self who possible only as a result of a social process, in a social world, where we act, and where we gain communicative and narrative competence. The autonomy that comes with this set of socially constituted possibilities (i.e., possibilities for communicative and narrative practices, and for whatever strong evaluation or depositioning such practices afford) is the possibility for what I would happily call, following Gonçalves and Ribeiro (Chapter 17), ‘innovative moments’ – moments of insight into my own possibilities for actions that are not divorced from others, but that are either fostered or discouraged by others, where others may be other persons, or other dialogical self-positions. References     Banks,  W.  Pockett,  S.  and  Gallagher,  S.  2006.  Does  Consciousness  Cause  Behavior?  An  Investigation  of  the  Nature  of   Volition  (109-­‐124).  Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press.     Bedwell,  J.,  Gallagher,  S.  Whitten,  S.  and  Fiore,  S.  2010.  Linguistic  correlates  of  self  in  deceptive  oral   autobiographical  narratives.    Consciousness  and  Cognition.  Published  online,  October  2010.   doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.001.   Birnholz,  J.  C.  1988.  On  observing  the  human  fetus.  In  W.  P.  Smotherman  and  S.  R.  Robinson  (eds.),  Behavior  of  the   Fetus  (47-­‐60).  Caldwell,  NJ:  Telford  Press.   DeCasper  A.  J.  and  Spence,  M.  J.  1986.  Prenatal  maternal  speech    influences  newborns'  perception  of  speech   sounds.  Infant  Behavior  and  Development  9:  137-­‐150.   De  Jaegher,  H.,  and  Di  Paolo,  E.  (2007)  Participatory  Sense-­‐Making:  An  enactive  approach  to  social  cognition.   Phenomenology  and  the  Cognitive  Sciences  6,  485-­‐507   De  Jaegher,  H.,  Di  Paolo,  E.  A.  &  Gallagher,  S.  2010.  Can  social  interaction  constitute  social  cognition?  Trends  in   Cognitive  Sciences  14  (10):  441-­‐447.   De  Vries,  J.  I.  P.,  Visser,  G.  H.  A.  and  Prechtl,  H.  F.  R.    1982.    The  emergence  of  fetal  behaviour:  I.  Qualitative   aspects.  Early  Human  Development,  7:  301-­‐22.   Edelman,  G.  1992.    Bright  Air,  Brilliant  Fire.    New  York:  Basic  Books.     Emory,  E.  K.  and  Toomey,  K.  A.  1988.  Environmental  stimulation  and  human  fetal  responsivity  in  late  pregnancy.  In   W.  P.  Smotherman  and  S.  R.  Robinson  (eds.),  Behavior  of  the  Fetus  (141-­‐61).  Caldwell,  NJ:  Telford  Press.   Fifer,  W.  P.  and  Moon,  C.  1988.  Auditory  experience  in  the  fetus.    In  W.  P.  Smotherman  and  S.  R.  Robinson  (eds.),     Behavior  of  the  Fetus  (175-­‐88).  Caldwell,  NJ:  Telford  Press.   Frankfurt,  H.  1971.    Freedom  of  the  will  and  the  concept  of  a  person.    Journal  of  Philosophy  68:  5-­‐20.   Froese,  T.  and  Gallagher,  S.  (submitted).  Being  together:  Strong  interaction  and  dynamical  systems  theory.   Fuchs,  T.  and  De  Jaegher,  H.  2009:  Enactive  intersubjectivity:  Participatory  sense-­‐making  and  mutual  incorporation.   Phenomenology  and  the  Cognitive  Sciences,  8,  465–486.   Gallagher,  S.  2005.  How  the  Body  Shapes  the  Mind.    Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press/Clarendon  Press     Gallagher,  S.  2008.  Inference  or  interaction:  Social  cognition  without  precursors.  Philosophical  Explorations  11  (3):   163-­‐73.     Gallagher,   S.   and   Cole,   J.   2010.   Dissociation   in   self-­‐narrative.   Consciousness   and   Cognition.   doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.003.   Gallagher,  S.  and  Hutto,  D.  2008:    Understanding  others  through  primary  interaction  and  narrative  practice.  In:  J.   Zlatev,  T.  Racine,  C.  Sinha  and  E.  Itkonen  (eds.),    The  Shared  Mind:  Perspectives  on  Intersubjectivity  (pp.  17-­‐ 38).  Amsterdam:  John  Benjamins   Gallese,  V.  2001:  The  ‘shared  manifold’  hypothesis:  from  mirror  neurons  to  empathy.  Journal  of  Consciousness   Studies,  8,  33-­‐50.   Gergely,  G.  2001:  The  obscure  object  of  desire:  ‘Nearly,  but  clearly  not,  like  me’:  Contingency  preference  in  normal   children  versus  children  with  autism.    Bulletin  of  the  Menninger  Clinic,  65,  411-­‐26.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       narrates and the self who is narrated. For an empirical study of narrative distance in cases of deception, see Bedwell et al. (2010); and for a discussion of this concept in relation to psychopathology, see Gallagher and Cole (2010).   Goldman,  A.  I.  2006:  Simulating  Minds:  The  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Neuroscience  of  Mindreading.  New  York:   Oxford  University  Press.   Gopnik,  A.  and  Meltzoff,  A.N.  1997.    Words,  Thoughts,  and  Theories.  Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press.   Hermans,  H.  J.  M.  2011.  The  dialogical  self:  A  process  of  positioning  in  space  and  time.    In  S.  Gallagher  (ed.),  The   Oxford  Handbook  of  the  Self  (654-­‐80).  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press.   Hobson,  P.  2002.  The  Cradle  of  Thought.  London:  Macmillan.   Humphrey,  T.  1964.    Some  correlations  between  the  appearance  of  human  fetal  reflexes  and  the  development  of   the  nervous  system.  Progress  in  Brain  Research,  4:  93-­‐135.   Issartel,  J.,  Marin,  L.,  &  Cadopi,  M.  2007:  Unintended  interpersonal  coordination:  ‘Can  we  march  to  the  beat  of  our   own  drum’?    Neuroscience  Letters,  411,  174–179.   Jouen,  F.  and  Gapenne,  O.    1995.    Interactions  between  the  vestibular  and  visual  systems  in  the  neonate.  In  P.   Rochat  (ed.),  The  Self  in  Infancy:  Theory  and  Research    (pp.  277-­‐301).    Elsevier    Science.   Kendon,  A.  1990:    Conducting  Interaction:  Patterns  of  Behavior  in  Focused  Encounters.  Cambridge:  Cambridge   University  Press.   Krasnegor,  N.  A.,  Fifer,  W.,  Maulik,  D.,  McNellis,  D.,  Romero,  R.  and  Smotherman,  W.  1998.  Fetal  behavioral   development:  Measurement  of  habituation,  state  transitions,  and  movement  to  assess  fetal  well  being  and   to  predict  outcome.  The  Journal  Maternal-­‐Foetal  Investigation  8:  51–57.   Lindblom,  J.  and  Ziemke,  T.  2007:  Embodiment  and  social  interaction:  implications  for  cognitive  science.    In  T.   Ziemke,  J.  Zlatev  and  R.  Frank  (Eds.),  Body,  language,  and  mind:  Embodiment  (pp.129-­‐162).  Berlin:  Mouton   de  Gruyter.   Lymer,  J.  2010.  The  phenomenology  of  the  maternal-­‐foetal  bond.  Ph.D.  Dissertation.    Wollongong  University,   Australia.   Murray,  L.,  and  Trevarthen,  C.  (1985)  Emotional  regulation  of  interactions  between  2-­‐month-­‐olds  and  their   mothers.  In  Social  Perception  in  Infants  (Field,  T.M.,  and  Fox,  N.A.,  eds),  177-­‐197,  Ablex   Prechtl,  H.  2001.  Prenatal  and  Early  Postnatal  Development  of  Human  Motor  Behavior.  In  Kalverboer  and   Gramsbergen  (eds.),  Handbook  of  brain  and  behaviour  in  human  development  (415-­‐418).    Dordrecht:  Kluwer   Academic  Publishers.   Reddy,  V.  2008:  How  Infants  Know  Minds.    Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press   Sheets-­‐Johnston,  M.  1998.  Consciousness:  A  Natural  History,  Journal  of  Consciousness  Studies,  5  (3):  260-­‐94   Tajani,  E.  and  Ianniruberto,  A.  1990.  The  uncovering  of  fetal  competence.    In  M.     Papini,  A.  Pasquinelli  and   E.  A.  Gidoni  (eds.),  Development  Handicap  and     Rehabilitation:  Practice  and  Theory,  Amsterdam:   Elsevier  Science   Taylor.  C.  1989.  Sources  of  the  Self.  Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press.   Tronick,  E.,  Als,  H.,  Adamson,  L.,Wise,  S.,  &  Brazelton,  T.  B.  1978.  The  infants’  response  to  entrapment  between   contradictory  messages  in  face-­‐to-­‐face  interactions.  Journal  of  the  American  Academy  of  Child  Psychiatry  17:   1–13.     Van  der  Meer,  A.  L.,  Van  der  Weel,  F.  R.  and  Lee,  D.  N.  1995.  The  functional  significance  of  arm  movements  in   neonates.    Science,  267,  693-­‐695.   Wegner,  D.  2002.  The  Illusion  of  Conscious  Will.    Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press.