No
2022/1
WORKING
PAPER
Research Institute Promitheas
“Keep the Wheels Turning”
Politics in Turkey:
Crisis and Labour Regime during
the Age of the Pandemic
by Nikos Moudouros
Lecturer, Department of Turkish
and Middle Eastern Studies
University of Cyprus
INEP, Working Paper 2022/1
– “KEEP THE WHEELS TURNING” POLITICS IN TURKEY:
CRISIS AND LABOUR REGIME DURING THE AGE OF THE PANDEMIC –
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Research Institute PROMITHEAS
N I KO S MOU D OU RO S
“Keep the Wheels Turning”
Politics in Turkey:
Crisis and Labour Regime
during the Age of the Pandemic
Working Paper 2022/1
4
Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
Nikos Moudouros
Lecturer, Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies , University of Cyprus
“Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during
the Age of the Pandemic
2022, Research Institute PROMITHEAS (INEP)
Working Paper 2022/1
Nikos Moudouros completed his doctoral dissertation
at the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern
Studies of the University of Cyprus, focusing on the
transformation of Turkey and the rise of political Islam.
In the period 2008-2013, he worked as an Associate of
the President of the Republic, Dimitris Christofias, on
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot issues. He is a Lecturer at
the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern
Studies of the University of Cyprus and his research
fields focus on modern history of Turkey, issues of
social and political transformation of Turkey, as well as
on the evolution of Turkey’s relations with the Turkish
Cypriot community.
He is the author of The Transformation of Turkey: From Kemalist Dominance to
“Islamic” Neoliberalism (Alexandria Publishing, Athens 2012) and the book State
of Exception in the Mediterranean: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Several other studies have been published in academic
journals and collective volumes.
5
Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
N I KO S MOU D OU RO S
“KEEP THE WHEELS TURNING”
POLITICS IN TURKEY:
CRISIS AND LABOUR REGIME
DURING THE AGE OF THE PANDEMIC
Abstract:
This paper deals with the policy pursued by the Turkish government during the first phase of the Covid-19 pandemic. The first part briefly examines
the global changes in the economy. The second part focuses on the analysis
of key aspects of AKP policy. It seeks to decipher the basic orientations of
the government, which were expressed under the slogan “Keep the wheels
turning”, and to identify how they were expressed in relation to the labour
regime. The last part of the paper deals with recording the major impact this
policy had on the working class.
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Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
Introduction: the pandemic of poverty
The pandemic
restored even more
intensely and directly the dynamics
of the deepening
of social and class
antagonisms at a
worldwide level.
The world found
itself at an existential crossroads
comprising pandemics, a deep
economic recession,
catastrophic climate
change and extreme
inequality. In this
context, Covid-19
has been described
as the “pandemic of
poverty”
Suddenly, humankind found itself in a different world: empty roads, closed shops
and unusually clear skies, but also a huge loss of human life. Early reports on the
economy were negative, worldwide. The Covid-19 pandemic caused, perhaps,
the deepest and most immediate economic recession in the history of capitalism.
It developed much faster than the crisis of 2008 or the Great Recession of 1929
(Roubini, 2020).
The Covid-19 pandemic may have emerged as a health crisis, but it soon
expanded into a huge economic and social crisis. It had a profound effect on
everyday life, on the processes of production, reproduction and consumption,
both at local and global levels. These developments revealed all the failures of
capitalism through a magnifying glass (Stevano et al., 2021). At the same time,
they imposed an intense wave of uncertainty on societies, which reached entirely
existential dimensions, as well as dimensions associated with the wider stability
and economic development (Gökay, 2021, p. 154).
In this sense, the pandemic restored even more intensely and directly the
dynamics of the deepening of social and class antagonisms at a worldwide level.
Not at all coincidentally, the UN Human Rights Council report, published in the
summer of 2020, points out that the world found itself at an existential crossroads
comprising pandemics, a deep economic recession, catastrophic climate change
and extreme inequality. In this context, Covid-19 has been described as the
“pandemic of poverty” (Alston, 2020, p. 9).
According to World Bank data, the world economy shrank by 4.3 per cent in
2020 and is considered the largest recession since World War II (World Bank,
2021, p. 1). Beyond the tragic loss of human life, the World Bank estimated that
in 2020, some 124 million people were driven to extreme poverty, while those
with a daily income of no more than 5.5 US dollars, reached 210 million (World
Bank, 2021, p. 1). The International Labour Organization (ILO) pointed out that
in 2020, 255 million full-time jobs were lost, a loss that is four times the size of
the one recorded in the 2008 crisis (ILO, 2021a, p. 1). According to the same
data, global unemployment reached 6.5 per cent, recording an increase of 1.1 per
cent since 2019 and adding another 33 million people to the list of unemployed
(ILO, 2021a, p. 9). Job losses and unemployment also had a direct impact on
labour income dividends. In 2020, labour incomes fell by 8.3 per cent, equivalent
7
Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
to about $3.7 billion and accounting for 4.4 per cent of world GDP (ILO, 2021a,
p. 2). From 2019 to 2020 more than 31 million people were pushed into the
category of “working poor” – people who work but whose salary does not allow
them to lead a decent life, keeping them trapped below the poverty line. In 2020,
the year with the strongest impacts of the pandemic, a total of 630 million people
fell into the category of the working poor (ILO, 2020, pp. 36–37). At the same
time, in early 2020, for the first time in 20 years, a drastic increase in child labour
was recorded, with the total number of child labourers reaching 160 million
(Euronews Türkçe, 2021).
The aforementioned dramatic socio-economic consequences had as a direct
consequence a widespread uncertainty, which affected people’s daily lives and
raised questions about the immediate future (Buğra et al., 2020, p. 140). The
Covid-19 pandemic, as well as its management by many governments, challenged
people’s daily routines and changed the setting in which large sections of society
felt even a relative degree of security. This had a negative impact on relations
of trust and solidarity, while at the same time raising questions even about
basic human freedoms which had, before the pandemic, been taken for granted
(Gülseven, 2021, p. 45).
At the geopolitical level, new pursuits were also recorded, often with a highly
competitive content (Gülseven, 2021, p. 46). In fact, the problems created by the
pandemic for global supply chains raised substantial questions concerning the
global architecture of production and trade processes. This in turn prompted
new research in many developed and developing countries, especially in relation
to China’s strategic position in regard to global trade circulation. For example,
the US has taken initiatives to move its investments from China to countries
such as Taiwan, India and Vietnam (Taştekin, 2020). Right from the beginning
of the pandemic, Ankara considered that it could capitalize on the situation, take
advantage of its geostrategic position and emerge as an alternative, safeguarding
the circulation of trade, production and investment (Öngel, 2021).
In his first address regarding the pandemic early in 2020, Erdoğan characteristically
noted that “At this point we cannot know the impact the period we live in will
have on mankind. It is very difficult to guess in which direction the world will
evolve… It is clear, however, that nothing can remain as it is. We are entering
into a period of radical political, economic and social change on a global scale.
It is essential for Turkey to take an advantageous position in this photograph”
(TCCB, 2020a).
Covid-19 had a negative impact on relations of trust and
solidarity, while at
the same time raising questions even
about basic human
freedoms which had,
before the pandemic,
been taken for granted.
China’s strategic
position in regard to
global trade circulation.
Ankara considered
that it could capitalize on the situation,
take advantage of its
geostrategic position
and emerge as an alternative, safeguarding the circulation of
trade, production and
investment
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Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
In these conditions of extreme insecurity and intense antagonism, ontological
security acquired a decisive role and was eventually exploited by many political
elites for the promotion of authoritarian measures and political orientations
(Gülseven, 2021, p. 42). Thus, the anguish that overwhelmed large sections of
societies also worked as the basis for the reproduction of war rhetoric on the part
of many political and economic elites worldwide.
Erdoğan and Politics of the Pandemic: Keep the wheels turning…
The pandemic
generated
insurmountable problems for labourers in
Turkey, as their socioeconomic situation
had already been hit
by the previous period
of economic destabilization
The Covid-19 pandemic hit Turkey at a particularly difficult juncture because
of the previous period of economic crisis and destabilization. Up until mid2018, the country was recording high unemployment rates and a growing
current accounts deficit. The credit expansion that took place in 2017 before
the referendum caused an intensification of the fragile characteristics of the
economy, while the geopolitical tensions of the period increased the outflow of
foreign capital, as a result of which the government was unable to restrain the
devaluation of the Turkish lira against foreign currencies. Up until the first eight
months of 2018, the Turkish lira lost 40 per cent of its value against the dollar.
From late 2018 to mid-2019, Turkey’s economy shrank (Öngel, 2021).
The pandemic promptly became an issue generating insurmountable problems
for labourers in Turkey, as their socio-economic situation had already been hit
by the previous period of economic destabilization (Meçik & Aytun, 2020, p.
6). Back in 2019, the unemployment rate in Turkey had already reached 25 per
cent (Öngel, 2021). In the same year, the number of working poor was estimated
at 3.999 million, recording an increase of 15 per cent from 2017. Thus in 2019,
the percentage of working poor in Turkey reached 14.4 per cent of the entire
workforce (DİSK/Genel-İş, 2021, p. 6).
According to data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) for 2018, the
richest 40 per cent of the population in the country possessed 68.5 per cent
of the total national income, while the poorest 40 per cent of the population
owned only 16.7 per cent of the national income. Among the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states, Turkey
ranked in the third worst position in terms of distribution of income (Akyüz,
2020). The deterioration of income equality was also confirmed by Eurostat data.
Specifically, for 2019 the richest 20 per cent of the population of Turkey had
profits 8.3 times higher than the poorest 20 per cent (DİSK/Genel-İş, 2021, p. 3).
9
Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
According to TÜİK (2017) data, in 2017 the percentage of households living
below the poverty line was 20.1 per cent. But for households with two adults and
three or more children, that percentage increased to 47.3 per cent. Furthermore,
the World Bank reports that the poverty rate in Turkey increased from 8.5 per
cent in 2018 to 10.2 per cent in 2019. According to the same data, the total
number of people living below the poverty line in Turkey in 2019 increased by
1.5 million in one year, reaching 8.4 million in 2019 (World Bank, 2021, p. 42).
As a result of the consequences of the previous period of crisis, the government
of Turkey sought to address the outbreak of the pandemic through a combination
of interconnected ideological and political axes with corresponding economic
choices. Two of the key axes were as follows. The first was the imposition of
an ideological framework of “war”, the successful outcome of which required
the mobilization of all citizens in support of state policy. Through this axis the
government cultivated the need to protect the country against a “global threat”
and called for “national unity” (Gülseven, 2021, p. 52). As a matter of fact, the
cultivation of a war climate as a result of the pandemic was combined with the
burdensome reminder of the previous economic “attacks” suffered by the country
and therefore the framework for the “national mobilization” of society was more
easily constructed. Erdoğan described the formula for confronting the pandemic
as follows: “Our country, like the rest of the world, is facing a threat that may not
have appeared before in world history… As a country and as a nation we have
managed to face all the attacks against us so far by strengthening our unity and
brotherhood. We will face the coronavirus threat in the same way” (TCCB, Ulusa
Sesleniş Konuşması 2020b).
The second axis, interconnected with the first, was the emergence of the need
for an unhindered production process, so as to not only address the difficult
economic situation as a result of the pandemic but to also enable Turkey to
completely overcome the consequences left behind by the 2018 destabilization.
In his first comprehensive approach on tackling the pandemic, Erdoğan said:
“Apart from the fact that daily life will halt due to voluntary or compulsory
quarantine, this process will have serious financial consequences. As Turkey we
are obliged to prevent the spread of the pandemic, but also to keep production,
trade and employment alive. We are living through a time when we cannot lose
control of the economy, since our country has just begun to find its way again
after the attacks we suffered in August 2018” (TCCB, Koronavirüsle Mücadele
Eşgüdüm Toplantısı Öncesi Yaptıkları Konuşma 2020a).
Τhe cultivation of a
war climate as a result
of the pandemic was
combined with the
burdensome reminder of the previous
economic “attacks”
suffered by the country and therefore the
framework for the
“national mobilization” of society was
more easily constructed.
Τhe emergence of
the need for an unhindered production process, so as to
not only address the
difficult economic
situation as a result of
the pandemic but to
also enable Turkey to
completely overcome
the consequences left
behind by the 2018
destabilization
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Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
Turkey’s “obligation” to
keep production, trade
and employment alive was
codified in the general
strategy he called “keep
the wheels turning”. The
Τhe need for “employment
protection” demonstrated
by the Turkish government
was understood to be a key
result of the unhindered
production process
Turkey’s “obligation” to prevent the pandemic on the one hand, but to keep
production, trade and employment alive on the other, as described by Erdoğan,
was codified in the general strategy he called “keep the wheels turning”. The
specific political statement was made on 30 March 2020 and was characteristic
of the priorities set by Ankara in the conditions created by the pandemic: “Our
most important sensitivity here is to continue production to sustain the supply
of basic goods and support exports. Turkey is a country that needs to continue
production and keep the wheels turning under all conditions and circumstances”
(TCCB, 2020c).
The motto “keep the wheels turning” eventually became the epicentre of an
inclination that sought to stabilize the accumulation model in the face of a new
global crisis. This insistence by the government was essentially a continuation of
its previous choices to postpone the consequences of the more general crisis of
the reproduction of society. Just as on previous occasions, especially after 2013,
so during the pandemic period the Erdoğan government focused more on crisisprevention policies through the promotion of labour-intensive sectors and the
expansion of credit (Ercan & Oğuz, 2020, p. 106).
It was no coincidence that the need for “employment protection” demonstrated
by the Turkish government was understood to be a key result of the unhindered
production process and was supported by key business circles in the country
(Gülseven, 2021, p. 52). As a matter of fact, Erdoğan himself made no secret of
the fact that a primary task of the measures adopted by the government was to
facilitate the country’s industrialists and export infrastructure to continue the
production process (TCCB, 2020d). The head of Zorlu business group assessed the
pandemic as a platform of global change where Turkey should attract the interest
of the new supply chains to be created. In the same framework, the president
of the Machinery Exporters Association (MAİB) suggested that because of the
pandemic the trend for changes in the global manufacturing industry chain
would intensify, something that should benefit Turkey (Öngel, 2021).
According to Turkish business circles, a key condition for the successful conclusion
of the unhindered production process policy under pandemic conditions was
to ensure the continuation of the main features of the labour regime. Some of
the demands of organized employers were permanent flexibility in the labour
market and ensuring teleworking was possible even after the pandemic was over
(Karadeniz, 2020). The same was true with the promotion of a cheap labour
force. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) prepared a report for foreign
investors in order to attract purchase of real estate in Istanbul. Among the main
11
Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
arguments was the cheap labour force, especially in the manufacturing industry.
Specifically, according to ITO, the hourly labour cost in the manufacturing
industry is 5.6 dollars in Turkey while in Germany it is 47.2 (T24, 2020).
On a practical level, the government’s insistence on the continuation of the
production process was expressed through avoiding a total lockdown of the
economy, at least for the largest part of 2020. In the early phase of the pandemic,
a traffic ban was imposed at weekends, as well as a travel ban between 30 large
provinces with particularly high incidence rates. In essence, the government
issued recommendations to the citizens to implement a kind of “voluntary
quarantine”. By means of advertising campaigns like “Turkey: stay at home”, it
was implicitly emphasized that every citizen should individually apply his or her
own self-isolation period (Sarıöz-Gökten, 2021).
Among the early measures implemented by the government after the declaration
of the coronavirus as a pandemic was the closure of premises connected to night
entertainment or the sale of alcohol, followed later by the shutting down of
restaurants, barbers, hairdressers and shopping malls (Kurtulmuş, et al., 2020,
p. 344). In total, about 270,000 premises were closed down and freedom of
movement was only curtailed for those over the age 65 and under the age of 20.
(Öktem, 2021, p. 3). Very quickly, however, and despite the quarantine imposed
on the specific age-groups, the Ministry of Interior clarified that young workers
aged 18–20, both in the public sector and in formal employment in the private
sector, were excluded from the restriction (Sarıöz-Gökten, 2021). In this way, the
government managed to keep most of the workforce active (Gurses, et al., 2021).
On 18 March 2020, Erdoğan announced the first package of measures in response
to the pandemic under the name “Economic Stability Shield”. It was a set of
economic policy measures worth 100 billion Turkish lira (about $12 billion)
(TCCB, 2020a). It included suspension of tax payments, subsidies to boost
domestic consumption and a reduction in value-added tax on some products,
as well as suspensions of payments to social security and health insurance funds
(Gülseven, 2021, pp. 52–53). Therefore, the majority of the measures focused
on large and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while at the same
time government expenditure was kept at 1 per cent of GDP, a particularly small
percentage in relation to the size of the country’s economy (Gökay, 2021, p. 153).
At the same time, from mid-March 2020, the government enacted the grant of a
lump sum of 1000 Turkish lira to households entitled to social assistance (Öktem,
2021, p. 4), while on 30 March, Erdoğan announced the launch of a state charity
Despite the quarantine imposed ... young
workers aged 18–20,
both in the public
sector and in formal
employment in the
private sector, were
excluded from the
restriction.
In this way, the government managed
to keep most of the
workforce active.
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Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
... the government
completed the basic
policies related to
work, on two axes:
the payment of shortterm labour compensation and the ban on
redundancies, with
enactment of unpaid
leave instead
campaign, under the slogan “We are self-sufficient” (Biz bize yeteriz Türkiyem),
with the aim of allocating money to sections of the population who had lost their
income (TCCB, 2020c).
The second economy support package was submitted before the National
Assembly on 14 April 2020 and included the extension of measures such as the
ban on redundancies in conjunction with the enactment of compulsory unpaid
leave. In this way the government completed the basic policies related to work,
on two axes: the payment of short-term labour compensation (60 per cent of
salary) and the ban on redundancies, with enactment of unpaid leave instead (a
monthly benefit of 1170 Turkish lira was paid to those placed on unpaid leave)
(Öktem, 2021, p. 5).
But the cost of protection of employment, as the most important aspect of the
unhindered production process, was passed on to the state and to the workers.
The consent of the employers was reached after the dismissal of employees in
the form of unpaid leave, with the state providing for the payment of a daily
allowance, which, however, was separated from the unemployment fund
(Kurtulmuş, et al., 2020, p. 346). Tens of thousands of workers were forced to
take unpaid leave during the pandemic, receiving a monthly allowance of 1,170
Turkish lira (around 198 euros, at the then exchange rate of Turkish lira against
the euro) from the state – an amount that was about 50 per cent of the minimum
wage (DİSK – AR, 2020, p. 8). More specifically, in the period April–June 2020,
1.7 million workers were forced to take unpaid leave (İleri Haber 2020), and as
of 31 December 2020 the number of workers forced into the same status reached
2,216,622 (Kara, Kaya and Kozan 2021).
By the end of May 2020, more than 270,000 companies that were operating as
normal had applied for short-term employment compensation from the state.
This amounted to some 2.7 million workers (Kurtulmuş, et al., 2020, p. 346). At
the same time, shopping malls, barbers and hairdressers resumed their normal
operation, while from June 2020, restaurants, organized beaches, parks and
kindergartens were reopened and all internal transport was restored (SarıözGökten, 2021). The Social Security Institution also issued a directive clarifying
that Covid-19 could not fall under the categories of “occupational disease” or
“occupational accident”. By this particular regulation the possibility to claim
compensation by workers who fell ill with Covid-19, due to continuing to work
in conditions of exposure to the disease, was ruled out (Sarıöz-Gökten, 2021).
This measure was not accidental, since the exposure of labourers to Covid-19 due
to the policy of unhindered production did indeed create additional dynamics
in labour reactions. Typically, as of September 2020, the Ankara Chamber of
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Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
Medicine had warned that 70 per cent of Covid-19 cases in the capital concerned
factory workers, as well as employees of public organizations (İzci, 2020).
The political thesis to “keep the wheels turning” essentially led to the absence
of any clear distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” sectors of
the economy, an approach followed by other governments. Almost from the
beginning of the pandemic in Turkey, industries outside the food and medical
industry continued to operate normally, increasing the health risks for a large
proportion of workers (Odman, 2021). This was a dynamic development, as
in the course of the pandemic the Erdoğan government expanded as much as
possible the range of sectors of the economy that were mobilized for the sake
of continuous production (World Bank, 2021, p. ΙΙ). Sectors such as those of
construction, mining, the iron industry, the textile/clothing industry, the
electrical industry, the furniture industry and export trade – i.e. sectors that were
more concerned with stabilizing the accumulation model than meeting basic
social needs – continued to operate (Taştekin, 2020). In most cases, in fact, their
operation was the result of government intervention through special decrees and
permits to employers (Kurtulmuş, et al., 2020, p. 342).
According to DİSK data for the Gaziantep Organized Industrial Zone, the vast
majority of the 150,000 workers continued with production from day one of the
pandemic. Most businesses easily obtained exemptions from bans by decree from
local governors. As a matter of fact, the focus of production was not related to
basic social needs in times of a pandemic, but rather concerned wood processing
and furniture, charcoal packaging, footwear and clothing (Taştekin, 2020).
The management of the Dardanel factory decided to isolate within its premises
those workers who had tested positive for Covid-19 and invoked the provisions of
the regulation of the regional council of public health. The workers were moved
in full isolation to student dormitories in the area and their transfer to and from
the factory was arranged, without being allowed to return home (El Yazmaları,
2020a). A similar incident was recorded at a construction site of the Limak
contracting company in Artvin province. After the appearance of 100 positive
cases among the 2000 employees, the company imposed a quarantine inside the
construction site and in this way, for the next 105 days, work continued. The
confinement of the workers was the result of a similar decision by the regional
public health council (El Yazmaları, 2020a). The management of the Sarkuysan
factory (a metal works) also decided to continue with production after the
detection of positive cases among workers and even managed to suppress the
mobilization of protests through a decree by the Kocaeli district administration
(Kurtulmuş, et al., 2020, p. 354).
The political thesis
to “keep the wheels
turning” essentially
led to the absence of
any clear distinction
between “essential”
and “non-essential”
sectors of the economy, an approach
followed by other
governments.
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Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
An important aspect of the “keep
the wheels turning”
policy includes the
measures for increased control and
discipline at work.
Another prime example of the control and
discipline of labour in
the conditions of crisis was the launching
of “isolated production zones”.
An important aspect of the “keep the wheels turning” policy, aimed at
stabilizing the accumulation model under conditions of crisis, includes the
measures for increased control and discipline at work. For example, The
Turkish Employers Association of Metal Industries (MESS) promoted the
idea of the “electronic collar” as the “technology of the future” that would
protect workers and the production process. This is an electronic collar that
workers should wear around their neck while on factory production lines
and that would send a “warning” in the event distances dictated due to the
pandemic were not maintained. In this way the factory managers could
more easily control and monitor the production process. Indeed, the use of
this technology was observed in some factories by the end of 2020 (SarıözGökten, 2021).
Another prime example of the increasing trend for control and discipline of
labour in the conditions of crisis created by the pandemic was the launching
of “isolated production zones” by the Independent Industrialists and
Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD). This organization, also known as the
organization of Turkey’s Islamic capital, brought back an older proposal, at
the heart of which was the guarantee of unhindered production processes,
either in the event of a pandemic or in the face of other natural disasters.
The renewed proposal was made public in May 2020. Among other things, it
provided for the creation of a type of organized industrial area that would host
more than 1000 families of workers and would apply quarantine measures
without necessarily interrupting factory production (MÜSİAD, 2020). It was
a closed workplace, where workers would be isolated and would function
as a modernized type of “labour camp”. In this way, the pandemic and its
management by the Erdoğan government revived the question of the relative
separation between the employee’s private residence and the production
space (El Yazmaları, 2020a).
The expansion of credit channels was another key pillar of the AKP’s policy
to support the economy. So-called “financial inclusion”, which had been a
central pillar of the AKP’s economic policy since the beginning of its rule,
continued to be promoted as a solution to the adverse conditions resulting
from the pandemic. The focus of this policy was the banking sector, through
the encouragement of credit expansion throughout 2020. Thus, the “keep the
wheels turning” policy was supplemented by the so-called “social policy by
other means”, which relied on deferrals of loan instalments and the granting
of subsidized loans, especially by state-owned banks. In fact, according to
the International Monetary Fund, Turkey was among the countries with the
15
Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
smallest state sponsorships for combating the pandemic (Yücel, 2021). These
policies led to one of the largest credit expansions worldwide in 2020 (World
Bank, 2021, p. Ι). At the same time, they led to a new phase of household overindebtedness. For example, in April 2020 alone, about one million people
received a loan, and of those, 920,000 were people who had applied to banks
for consumer loans for the first time (Sarıöz-Gökten, 2021). By June 2021,
personal loans from banks and the Housing Development Administration of
the Republic of Turkey (ΤΟΚΙ) reached 965.9 billion Turkish lira, of which
172.3 billion are credit card debts (Evrensel, 2021b).
Turkey was among
the countries with the
smallest state sponsorships for combating the pandemic.
Impact on the working class in Turkey
It is a fact that the main political orientation of the Erdoğan government during
the pandemic led to a relative economic recovery, in fact much improved in
relation to many G20 countries. Turkey’s GDP for 2020 increased by 1.8 per
cent (World Bank, 2021, p. Ι). The growth trend of the economy continued
into the first quarter of 2021 at a rate of 7 per cent, the highest among OECD
member states (Yeni Şafak, 2021). The main axis of this relative recovery was
the increase in industrial production (Öngel, 2021). From June 2020 until
May 2021, industrial production recorded a steady increase. Specifically, in
May 2021 the annual increase of industrial production reached 40.7 per cent
(TÜİK, 2021).
Nevertheless, it is also a fact that this particular growth trend in the economy
did not lead to an improvement in the situation of labourers, nor to a
reduction in poverty levels. This was mainly a growth based on the increase
in consumer loans and expenses, without creating new jobs or general trends
for increasing employment. (BirGün, 2021). For example, according to data
from the Turkish Statistical Institute, in the first quarter of 2021 business
revenues increased by 3.9 per cent compared to the same period in 2020,
while the employee dividend decreased by 3.5 per cent compared to the first
quarter of 2020 (DİSK-AR, İşçiler büyümeden pay alamadı! 2021a). The
World Bank figures moved in the same direction, emphasizing that in the
conditions of the pandemic in 2020, another 1.6 million people in Turkey
were driven into poverty, recording an increase in the poverty rate from 10.2
per cent in 2019 to 12.2 per cent in 2020 (World Bank, 2021, p. 43).
Another dramatic development was the increase in the loss of full-time jobs
throughout the pandemic. From the beginning of 2020 until June 2021,
a total of 3.613 million full-time jobs were lost in Turkey, a number that
...this particular
growth trend in the
economy did not lead
to an improvement
in the situation of
labourers, nor to a
reduction in poverty
levels.
This growth increased
consumer loans and
expenses, without
creating new jobs or
general trends for increasing employment.
Another dramatic
development was the
increase in the loss of
full-time jobs.
16
Research Institute PROMITHEAS, Working Paper 2022/1
...the Covid-19 pandemic did not have
the same consequences for all social strata
and classes in Turkey
The “voluntary” nature of the quarantine
created grounds for
new discriminations
in relation to which
parts of society could
indeed be restricted,
either by not working or working from
home
The pandemic eventually turned into a
pandemic for labourers.
corresponds to 13.2 per cent (DİSK-AR, 2021b). The World Bank points
out that job losses decisively affected the poorest sections of the country’s
population. It was estimated that 60 per cent of job losses concerned the
poorest 40 per cent of the population. On the contrary, most of the upper
income strata retained their jobs, while a proportion of them managed to
increase their profits (World Bank, 2021, p. 43). According to DİSK data,
by July 2021 rising unemployment in Turkey had reached 23.6 per cent, a
percentage corresponding to 8.4 million unemployed (DİSK-AR, 2021c).
As understood in the above, the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the
management of its effects by the government, did not have the same
consequences for all social strata and classes in Turkey. The pandemic did
not, of course, choose to hit specific social classes, but it is impossible to
argue that its adverse impact was equally shared by the rich and the poor.
The Erdoğan government’s basic orientation to continue production created
an environment in which most workers were forced to continue working
and thus be exposed to Covid-19. The “voluntary” nature of the quarantine
created grounds for new discriminations in relation to which parts of society
could indeed be restricted, either by not working or working from home
(Kurtulmuş, et al., 2020, p. 354). From the beginning of the pandemic only
24 per cent of the country’s total workforce were able to work from home
(Meçik & Aytun, 2020, p. 3).
Under the weight of the aforementioned consequences the pandemic
eventually turned into a pandemic for labourers. Freelancers, the selfemployed, workers in the informal sector,and workers in factories and small
shops, did not have the opportunity for “self-isolation and protection”, as
this would lead to loss or reduction of their income (El Yazmaları, 2020b). In
this way, the slogan “Turkey stay at home” essentially referred to a situation
in which total protection from the pandemic was one more class privilege.
Characteristically, 741 Covid-19-related deaths of workers were recorded in
2020, amounting to 31 per cent of all accidents at work in the same year.
During the period from March 2020 to March 2021, 861 Covid-19 related
deaths of workers were recorded (İSİG, 2021). During the same period,
another 391 health workers lost their lives to the pandemic (DİSK, 2021).
The development of the pandemic, in combination with the management
and the choices made by the government in dealing with the economic
consequences in Turkey, has left behind rifts in relation to the political system
itself. The Erdoğan government had been facing a number of problems for
17
Nikos Moudouros, “Keep the Wheels Turning” Politics in Turkey: Crisis and Labour Regime during the Age of the Pandemic
some time and these have now been amplified. Its decline has been made
more acute and it seems that since the beginning of 2021 this has triggered
the estrangement of a significant part of the electoral core of the ruling
coalition. Irrespective of the specific course and its final outcome at electoral
level, it is a fact that the era of the pandemic leaves behind most profound
changes in social relations throughout Turkey, with the challenge to the myth
of Erdoğan’s absolute supremacy at its core.
18
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Εκδόσεις Ινστιτούτου Ερευνών Προμηθέας
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