Emel Parlar Dal, "Assessing Turkey’s ‘Normative’ Power in the MENA region: New Dynamics and Their Limitations", Turkish Studies, Volume 14, N.4, December 2013

This art icle was downloaded by: [ Marm ara Universit esi] On: 21 Decem ber 2013, At : 02: 55 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Turkish Studies Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions for aut hors and subscript ion informat ion: ht t p:/ / www.t andfonline.com/ loi/ ft ur20 Assessing Turkey's “Normative” Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region: New Dynamics and their Limitations Emel Parlar Dal a a Depart ment of Polit ical Science and Int ernat ional Relat ions, Marmara Universit y, Anadoluhisari Campus, Beykoz, Ist anbul, Turkey Published online: 20 Dec 2013. To cite this article: Emel Parlar Dal (2013) Assessing Turkey's “ Normat ive” Power in t he Middle East and Nort h Africa Region: New Dynamics and t heir Limit at ions, Turkish St udies, 14:4, 709-734, DOI: 10.1080/ 14683849.2013.861113 To link to this article: ht t p:/ / dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/ 14683849.2013.861113 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. 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Term s & Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm s- and- condit ions Turkish Studies, 2013 Vol. 14, No. 4, 709 –734, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861113 Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region: New Dynamics and their Limitations EMEL PARLAR DAL Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Anadoluhisari Campus, Beykoz, Istanbul, Turkey A BSTRACT In this study, the extent to which Turkey has been pursuing a normative foreign policy (NFP) toward the Arab revolts will be analyzed on the basis of Nathalie Tocci’s description of a NFP actor, built on the following three conceptual tools: normative goals, normative means and normative results or impact. With a special emphasis on the conditioning factors that impacted Turkey’s pursuit of an NFP, this paper also investigates the limitations and effectiveness of Turkey as an NFP actor in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in order to understand if Turkey’s role in the changing MENA region has gone beyond rhetoric to become empirically justified. It concludes that despite increasing normative representations and rhetoric in its foreign policy, Turkey does not currently possess a cohesive and ambitious NFP agenda and, thus, is still far from being a normative power. Introduction The 2011 Arab upheavals marked a turning point for Turkey’s decade-long foreign policy, which had already started to booster Turkey’s role in the changing international order as a rising regional power with an ambitious foreign policy agenda. In accordance with its rising “value-driven” and “ideational” posture in its region, Turkey then added a normative dimension to its evolving soft power, promoting democracy and humanitarian values in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Although normative power has been defined as a concept that has a strong association with the European Union (EU), it does not only apply to the latter.1 Other actors can also pursue normative aims and normative means, and as a result can achieve normative results even though policy may change on a case-by-case basis due to different circumstances. While major Western powers such as the EU Correspondence Address: Emel Parlar Dal, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Anadoluhisari Campus, Beykoz, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: emelparlar@yahoo.com # 2013 Taylor & Francis Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 710 E. Parlar Dal and the US attribute more importance to the core values and the norms of international law that they themselves have established throughout history in foreign policy behaviors, regional powers can reveal their own conceptions of the “normative” in their foreign policy practices. Among other regional powers, Turkey seems to have a different international status due to its rooted and long-lasting institutionalized relations with the West and within Western institutions, and thus the “normative” in its foreign policy needs to be analyzed separately at both the discursive and empirical levels. The body of literature on normative power in Europe has generally focused on discussions about whether the EU acts as a normative power with normative goals and means, and it acknowledges that the EU foreign policy practice has created some normative effects, albeit limited, especially in its neighborhood. For the purposes of this article, the academic and policy discussions on the concept of European normative power will not be included. Instead, acknowledging that the concept of normative power is not equal to normative foreign policy (NFP), the question of interest in this paper is whether a rising regional power like Turkey has embraced normative rhetoric and created normative effects in its foreign policy practice, especially regarding the recent developments in the Arab world. Regarding the widespread discussion of norms – interests divide in normative power literature, this analysis considers that the distinction between norms and interests is problematic itself,2 since norms and interests cannot be easily separated3 and despite their different logics of actions on an ontological level they are mutually constructed.4 Norms and values in foreign policy are generally conditioned on an interest-based incentive structure determining an actor’s foreign policy decisions. In short, norms represent “the ‘bounded rationality’ within which they operate.”5 On the other hand, in some instances an international actor’s interest-based considerations may initially weigh more heavily than its normative motivations or they may be competing with each other. There may also be competing paths or means to realize norms causing inconsistencies in actors’ foreign policy behaviors. In such cases, some gradual shifts from “realpolitik to normative” or from “status quo to normative” can be observed in the actors’ foreign policy outcomes, which might end up with the state’s commitment to international legal frameworks or its institutional requirements. Depicting in Turkey’s recent MENA foreign policy such a shift “from interests to norms,” as remarkably seen in the Libyan case, this study also attempts to transcend the puzzling divide between interests and norms and claims that what mainly distinguishes an NFP from a realpolitik one is its compliance with existing universal legal norms, and thus the achievement of precise normative results in the final analysis. The incorporation of universalism is also needed to avoid the usage of norms as an instrument for the pursuit of interests.6 Putting “normative” at the center of the analysis as “the most universaliable basis upon which to assess foreign policy,”7 in the light of four selected Arab cases, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, this paper aims to understand to what extent the normative connotation read into Turkey’s new role in the shifting international system retains its validity and to what extent it would be possible for Turkey to construct Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 711 its distinctiveness in the MENA region while pursuing an NFP with normative results through the deployment of normative goals and means. To this end, the analytical framework proposed by Nathalie Tocci in her 2008 edited book entitled Who Is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners, which is built on the following three conceptual tools—normative goals, normative means and normative results or impact—will be applied to Turkish foreign policy in the MENA region. Against this background, the paper will be structured in three parts: the first part seeks to provide a brief overview of the “normative power Europe (NPE)” concept launched by Ian Manners to define the EU’s difference in the international system and an explanation of the concept of “NFP.” The second part intends to combine the concepts of “the normative” and “normative power” with Turkish foreign policy from a historical perspective in order to assess the normative connotations embedded in Turkey’s foreign policy behaviors since the start of the Republican era. Using Tocci’s three-dimensional categorization of NFP, the third part seeks to find out what kind of normative goals and means Turkey has deployed since the start of the Arab uprisings. With a special emphasis on the conditioning factors that impacted Turkey’s pursuit of an NFP, this part of the study also elaborates on the normative results or impacts of Turkey’s foreign policy in its direct or indirect actions and inactions regarding the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Finally, the limitations and effectiveness of Turkey as an NFP actor in MENA will be investigated to understand if Turkey’s NFP role in the changing MENA region has gone beyond rhetoric to become empirically justified. From “NPE” Concept of Manners to “NFP” Since the concept of NPE was first introduced in Ian Manners’ 2002 seminal article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”8 it has become a very popular topic in academic and political circles and been the subject of several debates, with many critics among EU foreign policy advisors and international relations (IR) scholars. There is still confusion about the empirical and normative contents of the concept itself, as well as its mechanisms of influence. This study aims to bridge two different definitions of the “normative,” first from a Eurocentric perspective by using Manners’ NPE concept and second from a more universal perspective by decoding Tocci’s “NFP” analytical framework to illustrate to what degree Turkey has pursued an NFP vis-à-vis the Arab Spring countries. Theorizing “ NPE” Acknowledging that the civilian power concept suggested by Duchêne in the early 1970s is still an important source of debate regarding the EU’s role in IR,9 Manners reinterprets this concept by defining its three key features as such: 712 E. Parlar Dal Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Being the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems; the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; and the willingness to use legally binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress.10 Underlying the limitations of a civilian power generally located in an economic framework, Manners presents the idea of the EU and the ideational impact of the latter’s international identity/role as representing a “normative power” characterized by common principles.11 In his view, “normative power” resembles concepts such as “ideological power”12 or “power over opinion.”13 He also defines normative power simply as “the ability to shape conceptions of “normal”.”14 Acknowledging normative power as the power of example, Manners argues that the “most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says but what it is.”15 Considering the EU a normative actor willing to shape, diffuse and “normalize” rules and values in international affairs,16 he lists sustainable peace and liberty, social freedom, consensual democracy, human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance as constituting nine core normative principles of the EU.17 According to Thomas Diez, as most of these norms are of a universal nature, they are also appropriated with other actors on the international scene, including the US.18 Aside from Manners’s definition of the normative through the concept of NPE, which considers the EU “a force for good” and its own normativity as the yardstick for NFP,19 a second definition of the “normative” based on the primacy of universal legal norms in states’ foreign policy behaviors has also flourished in IR academic literature focusing on the normative.20 In contrast to Manners’ Eurocentric understanding of the normative, Sjursen’s argumentation puts universalism and international legitimacy at the core of NFP behavior and claims that NFP behavior should be defined on the basis of a universal rather than a parochial (European or other) conception of the “normative” and has to comply with existing universal legal norms.21 In parallel, Nathalie Tocci provides a second definition of “the normative” and of “NFP” which interprets the normative in a non-neutral way by referring to a universally accepted and legitimate set of standards in her 2007 and 2008 works. Decoding Tocci’s “NFP” Framework Tocci states that “normative” can be described in two different manners: neutral and non-neutral. Underlying the necessity of reducing risk of subjectivity and presumed universality, Nathalie Tocci favors a non-neutral definition of the “normative.” In contrast, the neutral definition sees “the normative” as what is normal in IR and attributes to it a strong sense of standardization, so that norms cannot be evaluated independent of the power status of the actors. The author states that in case of attributing a “good” or “ethical” meaning to an NFP,22 there is a risk of subjectivity that could lead to the emergence of imperial foreign policy behaviors. For her, in order to analyze the degree of the normativity in one state’s foreign policy, a set of standards coming from an “external Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 713 reference point”23 “that are as universally accepted and legitimate as possible” should be set up by taking into account three principal dimensions of an NFP:24 In short, “a NFP would pursue normative goals (what an actor wants) through normatively deployed means (how it acts) and would be effective in fulfilling its normative intent (what it achieves or in other words, normative impact or results).”25 Establishing strong criteria for considering any country a “perfect” normative power, Tocci states that the real concern is not to determine if a state is a normative power or not, but to assess the degree to which a state is a normative power. For this purpose, there is a need to establish a link between the normative ends, means and impact of a state’s foreign policy in given particular circumstances and over time.26 Given the difficulty in making a clear-cut distinction between normative goals and strategic ones, Tocci prefers explaining “normative goals” by referring to Wolfers’ definitions of “milieu” goals and “possession” goals. While milieu goals do not directly concern an actor’s specific interests but rather aim to shape the international environment constantly over time by “regulating it through international regimes, organizations and law,”27 “possession” goals refer to defending or increasing national possessions by excluding others with the aim of “the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value.”28 In line with this definition, an NFP goal pursues international institutionalization and regularization and is normatively bound with the foreign policy behaviors of all parties, including that of the actor. NFP means are defined as instruments that are deployed within the boundaries of existing law and international frameworks. While using a variety of foreign policy instruments, the actor itself should be legally committed to “internal legal standards of democracy, transparency and accountability”29 as well as to external legal commitments such as the UN framework and international law. As the third variable of the NFP, normative impact or result describes how both foreign policy actions and inactions of an actor fulfill its normative intent. In order to create a normative impact, an international actor’s direct or indirect actions and inactions should preserve the international legal environment and lead to some institutional, policy or legal changes within a third country.30 Tocci classifies four types of different foreign policies: normative, realpolitik, status quo and imperial foreign policy types. An NFP type claims to satisfy both normative goals and normative means conditions by pursuing its milieu goals with the aim of strengthening international law and institutions and conforming to the rights and duties required by international law and multilateral frameworks. In the realpolitik foreign policy type, an international actor uses policy instruments (coercive and non-coercive) by pursuing possession goals in disregard for its internal and international legal obligations. In the imperial foreign policy type, the international actor pursues NFP goals without restricting itself to existing international law and uses all policy instruments with the aim of setting new norms. The status quo foreign policy type does not aim to develop international institutions and law by pursuing NFP goals. However, the actor conforms to its internal and international legal frameworks and acts in accordance with the demands of international organizations, if necessary.31 714 E. Parlar Dal Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Table 1. Foreign Policy Outcomes in Tocci’s NFP Framework According to Tocci, an international actor seeking to pursue an effective NFP also has to create a distinct normative impact by ensuing normative goals and deploying normative means. Tocci distinguishes two types of impact as “intended” or “unintended” for her four types of foreign policies. When the goal and the impact are identical, the impact of the foreign policies becomes “intended.” The results of a foreign policy will be “unintended” “where the goals are normative but the impact is not, or vice-versa”32 (Table 1).33 Since international actors could pursue different foreign policy types over time and in different regions, in her seminal work the author also proposes to look at the evolution of foreign policies through three principal conditioning factors that influence the way that an actor will pursue a normative or non-NFP: the internal political context, internal capability and the external environment.34 Bridging the Concepts of the “Normative” and “NFP” with Turkish Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Analysis Like foreign policies of many other international actors, Turkish foreign policy is marked by some claims and instances regarding its normativity at different degrees. To understand the normative dimension of Turkish foreign policy vis-àvis MENA countries currently undergoing important changes, it is worth looking at the normative connotations embedded in foreign policy of Turkey since the Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 715 Republican era under two distinct periods by mainly focusing on the internal and external dynamics leading to an interplay with Turkey’s normative goals and normative means. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 The “Normative” Credentials in Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy Since the early Republican era to this day, Turkish foreign policy was based on some unchanged ideals and moral principles based on its commitment to “peace at home, peace in the world,” international law and justice, political and economic interdependence, non-interference in the internal affairs of third countries and equality among all states. However, during the Cold War and in the 1990s, Turkey’s complex domestic constraints combined with its security-based foreign policy priorities of avoiding normalization of relations with its neighbors did not create an appropriate context for a normative understanding of foreign policy. A closer look at the main historical contours during and after the Cold War era justifies that despite some exceptional periods in the 1960s and 1970s, when the growing Cyprus conflict forced Turkey to intervene militarily in the island, Turkey has generally pursued a peaceful and status-quoist diplomacy by remaining strongly and explicitly attached to universal norms diffused by major international organizations. In this regard, it can be argued that the traditional Turkish foreign policy has been based on a varying blend of status quo, realpolitik and normative approaches, so as to diversify its policies at both the country-to-country and regional levels. Nonetheless, it would be false to claim that there is a long tradition of seeing the foreign policy of Turkey as having important normative undertones with a special emphasis on principles such as human rights, democracy, freedom and rule of law. Turkey’s long-lasting democracy deficiencies, which became more apparent most particularly under military rules, as well as in the 1990s, avoided it pursuing a foreign policy largely inspired by a sense of moral conviction and universal norms. On the other hand, it can be argued that there is a strong correlation between Turkey’s rising power status on the international scene and the increasing importance of “the normative” in its foreign policy. As argued by Sinan Ülgen, When Turkey had little influence in its region, it mattered little whether Ankara had a normative foreign policy or not. Turkey had the luxury of acting without giving much thought to its responsibility to espouse a more ambitious foreign policy based on “values”. When Turkey increased in power and influence, the question of values became a much more important issue.35 An important landmark event that affected the shift in Turkish foreign policy toward a normative approach was the declaration of Turkey’s official candidacy for EU membership in 1999. After this declaration, the EU’s norm diffusion toward this country led to a rapid Europeanization process that also contributed to raising awareness of Turkey about the importance of defending the core principles of the EU both in domestic and foreign policies in order to reach its “European” ideal. As “norm Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 716 E. Parlar Dal entrepreneur” or “norm leader,” the EU attempted to socialize Turkey to accept its own norms and as a result, Turkish foreign policy gradually started to achieve a “norm-taker” or “norm-follower” status.36 With the acceleration of EU reforms in the country after 1999, increasing compliance between the EU’s and Turkey’s normative standards has become apparent and the EU’s norm diffusion toward Turkey has succeeded in achieving some normative impacts mainly due to the operationalization of the political conditionality principle. Nevertheless, Turkey’s domestic political weaknesses, long-lasting democracy shortcomings, the lack of its material capabilities both at home and abroad, as well as the unfavorable external environment in the first years of the 2000s made it difficult to increase receptivity of the EU’s norms at the institutional level. On the other hand, the emergence of deadlock in EU – Turkey relations in 2006 mainly due to the Cyprus problem combined with the change in the power relationship between Ankara and Brussels as a consequence of Turkey’s rising soft power37 on the international scene led to the raising of Ankara’s criticism toward the credibility and normativity of the EU giving way to Ankara’s insistence for more equal and ethical relations with Brussels. Accusing the EU of having a biased and unfair position toward its own membership in general and the unresolved Cyprus problem, in particular, Turkey today questions the EU’s normative approach associated with “a distinctive set of principles” and attempts to spread its own justice and equality-based norms toward the EU with the aim of creating a renewed normative ground for the restoration of EU –Turkey relations. The AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and NFP With the arrival of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in power in 2002, Turkey’s idealistic approach in foreign policy started to become more apparent not only in rhetoric but also in practice. Turkish foreign policy in Davutoğlu era merits special attention in this regard, as he portrayed a moral-based and value-driven understanding of foreign policy especially in Turkey’s neighboring regions which was also pursued in accordance with the country’s strategic and realpolitik considerations. This last point needs to be underlined as one of the main characteristics of Turkey’s present-day NFP approach, which tends both to spread the EU norms—most of which are also seen as universal—as well as its own norms to the third countries and to promote its particular interests at the same time. Another landmark event observed in the last decade that can also be traced as the starting point in the pursuit of an NFP was the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the March 1 motion in 2003 seeking to allow the US troops to use Turkish soil for the removal of the Iraqi Government.38 Aside from strategic calculations and economic preoccupations that became decisive in Turkey’s decision regarding the March 1 motion, “moral imperatives” also played a crucial role in the normative approach of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis military intervention of the US in Iraq in 2003. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 717 Turkey’s new neighborhood policy conveys an idealized foreign policy understanding39 seeking to create a common awareness in its surrounding regions.40 Turkey’s international mediation efforts which “blends the ability for empathy with the conflicting sides and an ethical stance in dealings with the parties of a conflict”41 can also be seen as its willingness to involve a normative understanding in its new foreign policy configuration. Turkey’s increasing credibility and sense of regional leadership in international affairs in combination with its rising material and discursive capabilities gave it an upper hand in its NFP orientation.42 On the other hand, Turkey’s normative approach to foreign policy shows some differences from that of the West in some circumstances and contexts. In their criticism toward the West of having adopted a double-standard vis-à-vis the international crises, Turkish leaders attribute to their country a crucial role aiming to “bring a higher moral standard to global governance and politics and achieve a harmony of realpolitik and norms-based foreign policy.”43 Underlying Turkey’s role as the defender of the people of the Middle East, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claims: The communities that perceive themselves as the crushed, worn, propelled, victimized and downtrodden, and the communities that have no belief in justice and sincerity, make it impossible to establish peace and stability on a global scale. This is what we have emphasized in our foreign policy. We defend justice, peace, law, and democracy in every area. We, as a conservative and democratic party, are struggling to hold both real and normative policy together.44 Similarly, Davutoğlu’s emphasis on the necessity of establishing a new international justice-based UN system giving way to a balanced participation of states in decision-making processes may also be viewed as Turkey’s attempt to diffuse its own normative goal to the entire world.45 A general overview of the last decade of Turkish foreign policy has proven that Turkey has been pursuing an increasingly active engagement in and within certain international and regional organizations. Turkey’s long-lasting activism in NATO since the Cold War years notwithstanding, Turkey’s active engagement in the UN in recent years through its first Security Council non-permanent membership between 2009 and 2010 and its recent declaration for candidacy for non-permanent membership for the years 2015 – 16 merit special attention in order to assess to what extent Turkey gives importance to international law and justice as part of its new approach to foreign policy (Accessed June 2, 2013. http://www.un.int/turkey/). On the other hand, Turkey’s criticism toward the UN system and the global international order is also an illustrative example of how Turkey is challenging existing international normative practices. The Prime Minister’s criticism of the UN Security Council’s representative capacity, which is restricted by the veto of one permanent member, can also be associated to the rise of normativity in Turkish foreign policy. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 718 E. Parlar Dal Furthermore, in recent years Turkey has started to adopt the emerging international norm of inter-civilizational dialog as one of its foreign policy priorities. The emergence of inter-civilizational dialog as a new norm in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s involvement in the UN Alliance of Civilizations serve to create a legitimate space for both “its political survival in its domestic political sphere” in order to balance Turkey’s authoritarian secularist establishment and its multifaceted foreign policy role within the changing international system.46 The adoption of this inter-civilizational dialog as a new foreign policy norm also helps the Turkish ruling elite to challenge existing international norms. In this regard, Erdoğan states that “If an Alliance of Civilization is to be possible, first an equal representation of the world in terms of continents and religions is necessary.”47 Similarly, in Davutoğlu’s own words: We think that in the UN there should be a much more participatory political order, a much more justice-oriented and economic order and a much more inclusive cultural order. . . . Turkey wants to play a much bigger role in the United Nations . . . Now we have again applied for 2015 – 2016. Why? Because if you take the agenda of the United Nations, if you have ten agendas of the United Nations Security Council at least eight or nine of them are directly related to Turkey.48 In addition, Turkey’s more nuanced active diplomacy in some regional organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the South East European Cooperation Process and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation can also be interpreted as a strong signal of Turkey’s normative commitment in both regional and international affairs and of the latter’s willingness to spread its own normative presentations to the entire globe. Davutoğlu’s appeal for a new Middle East is, in this regard, a clear example of Turkey’s promotion of its own norms to this region as a new regional norm entrepreneur. In Davutoğlu’s words: Unlike the Wall of Berlin, we are demanding borders, which are open to neighbors. We demand a Middle East where people, products, capital and ideas can travel freely.49 Of course, Turkey’s gradual shift to a normative approach in foreign policy can also be explained by the structural changes occurring in the international order during the last decade. The growing diversity of actors with influence in the world leads to the emergence of new modes of cooperation at both the regional and international levels giving way to the re-balancing of the power relationships in accordance to the aspirations of the rising powers. The new emerging international order and new power relations also pushed Turkish leaders to make both normative and strategic adjustments in foreign policy on a delicate balance sheet. It seems clear that it would also be in the interest of major powers such as the EU and Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 719 US to demand “a more ‘normative’ approach to foreign policy from its aspiring partners.”50 Another striking aspect of Turkey’s current normative approach to foreign policy is its strong link with the rising de-politicization and normalization that we have been witnessing in the country in the last few years. A further look at the new regionalism and geocultural policies of Turkey as seen clearly in the case of Turkey’s new African opening and its increasing activism in the Middle East confirms the well-known argument which considers normative power a power that is able to shape conceptions of the “normal.”51 Paradoxically, in the last few years Turkey has attempted to reassert its normativity by representing a meaningful normative challenge to Europe while promoting its own normative agenda that at times has led to clash of norms with those of the EU.52 Nevertheless, despite differences between the EU and Turkey in articulation and implementation of some norms such as democracy, human rights and rule of law, with the Arab Spring a common “normative” ground shared between Turkey and the EU, as well as the US, has become more apparent. Understanding Turkey’s NFP in the MENA Region: Goals, Means, Impact and Conditioning Factors To assess to what degree present-day Turkey has been pursuing an NFP in a MENA under transformation, the triad (normative goals, normative means and normative impact or results) offered by Tocci serves as a basis for our analysis, which aims to examine in which cases and under the influence of which conditioning factors in the Arab Spring period Turkish foreign policy has been normative, when at other times it has been realpolitik or status quo oriented, or when it has been a synthesis between either the normative and the realpolitik or the normative and status-quoist in terms of its goals. Table 2 originally developed by Tocci, is reorganized according to our selected four case studies and is illustrative of Turkey’s normative goals/means/impact concerning the Arab revolts. Before moving on to our case studies, it is of paramount importance to underline that at the very early stages of the revolts, which were first triggered in Tunisia, Turkey was caught off guard, just like its European and American allies who long supported the pro-Western authoritarian Arab regimes with an ambiguous democracy promotion agenda, and who thus failed in producing a real democratic change in the Arab countries under reform. At this initial stage, Turkish foreign policy cautiously showed some status-quoist tendencies. However, as the revolts progressed, they took on different forms, generally varying from status quo and realpolitik forms to NFP types, depending on the case. Certainly, it should be noted that Turkey was not pushing some universal norms—such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law—forcefully within both discursive and practical consciousness before the unfolding of the Arab upheavals. However, this does not mean that since the launch of the “zero problems” policy, which is seen by 720 E. Parlar Dal Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Table 2. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Types: Selected Case Studies (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria) Davutoğlu as a value itself, Turkey has been pursuing “a values-free realpolitik agenda, solely focused on advancing its economic and security interests.”53 As an idealistic project, the zero problems policy is itself driven by this delicate blend of norms and interests that serves to frame new options in Turkish foreign policy, especially in Turkey’s surrounding region. With the Arab Spring, the “normative” shift in Turkish foreign policy accelerated with the frequent usage of value and norm-oriented messages in Turkish leaders’ discourses, generally reflecting the rise of “normative milieu goals” in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, in Davutoğlu’s words: Today if we turn our face to Libya, to Egypt, to Syria and if we say you should listen to the voice of your people, you must respect the demands of your people because these demands are not the demands of your people only. These Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 721 demands are the demands of all humanity. Transparency, rule of law, political participation, freedom, constitutional reforms, we can say these to our neighbors, because we are observing these values, human rights and all these. When you compare then years ago with Turkey today, you can see the change of democratic spirit and institutionalization.54 Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Normative Goals, Means and Impact Policies toward Tunisia and Egypt, 2011– 13: Normative-intended. In the Tunisian and Egyptian cases, Turkey advanced normative goals and deployed normative means. In both cases, the “normative-intended” dimension carried considerable weight. Despite the fact that at the very beginning of the uprisings in Tunisia in January 2011, Turkey displayed a cautious status-quoist orientation, it later readjusted its policy according to the emerging new realities on the ground and ended up binding itself to universal international norms and institutional commitments. As a result, Turkey started to strongly support the democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people. In the Egyptian case, Turkey also pursued normative goals and means from the very beginning, as seen with Prime Minister Erdoğan’s very early appeal for Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in a televised speech on al-Jazeera in February 201155 (Hurriyet Daily News, February 1, 2011). On the other hand, Turkey’s normative stance vis-à-vis Tunisia and Egypt still remains problematic today due to Turkey’s ambiguous position on democracy promotion. The lack of a consistent democracy promotion agenda with a strong civil society dimension constitutes a principal obstacle to Turkey’s effectiveness in development and democracy assistance toward the MENA countries. However, Turkey’s rising development aid to Tunisia56 and Egypt57 in recent years, Turkish civil society’s increasing engagement with the Arab civil society organizations, as well as the development of close contacts between Turkey’s ruling party and the Islamic parties of these two countries are concrete but incomplete signs showing that Turkey is still on the normative side in terms of pushing for democracy in Tunisia and Egypt. Moreover, in the post-Arab Spring era the rise of the so-called Turkish model debates in political and intellectual circles of the transforming MENA countries has also pushed the Turkish ruling elite to use more institutionalized policy mechanisms in order to fulfill Turkey’s normative intent in its external actions vis-à-vis these two countries. Policies toward Libya, 2011 – 13: Realpolitik-unintended. The third case, Libya, merits special attention as it was marked by inherent tensions between Turkey’s realpolitik and normative considerations. Turkey initially pursued realpolitik goals and means by strictly opposing military intervention of NATO in Libya for the removal of Gaddafi. In Libya, Turkey’s economic and human security-based interests were weighted more heavily than its attachment to universalistic norms. In our analysis, Libya’s difference among other Arab protests stems from the fact that in the Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 722 E. Parlar Dal outbreak of the revolts Turkey was deeply concerned by the evacuation of its citizens working in this country, as well as by its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the rights of Turkish companies in conformity with all international resolutions and agreements. As stated by Davutoğlu, Turkey conducted the biggest evacuation effort in its history as it transported 25,000 Turkish citizens and around 10,000 foreign nationals from Libya in one week58 (Bloomberg, February 23, 2011). Although initially Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that the NATO operation was unnecessary and would have dangerous consequences, Turkey later insisted that command of the international operation has to be handed over to NATO and criticized the French Government’s leading role in air attacks on Gaddafi’s forces. Thus, Turkish foreign policy turned from realpolitik to normativity once Turkey took NATO’s side by participating in the humanitarian dimension of the intervention. Davutoğlu explained the volteface as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed on March 18, 2011, and the Arab League’s support for a no-fly zone, and stated that Turkey was against any unilateral NATO action. Another concern about the Libyan affair was closely related to its diplomatic efforts deployed in convincing Gaddafi to step down and have new elections, demands that were stopped by the start of French air attacks on Libyan ground forces.59 Turkey’s involvement in NATO’s Libya campaign showed that Turkey was committed to its legal responsibilities derived from NATO membership, as well as to existing international law and thus, created an “unintended” normative impact. In addition, in the Libyan affair the international community called, for the first time, on the “R2P”) principle—established by the UN General Assembly in 2005—to justify the Libya campaign.60 With these examples, it can be argued that in Libya, Turkey has exemplified the concept of a realpolitik foreign policy with “unintended” normative results. Policies toward Syria, 2011– 13: From status quo-unintended to normative-intended. Turkey has pursued a two-tier foreign policy toward the Syrian conflict that can be analyzed under two different foreign policy categories and periods: a status quo-unintended policy from the start of the revolts till August 2011 and a normative-intended policy from August 2011 up until now. Interestingly, despite initially acting as a status quo player and adopting at first non-normative goals, Turkey has deployed normative policy means regarding Damascus since the very beginning of the Syrian revolts. Turkey’s initial appeal to the Bashar Al-Assad regime for political reform in the country and its high-level diplomatic efforts to convince Al-Assad to “heed his people’s calls”61 in order to gradually transform Syria into a democracy clearly show how Turkey’s support was normatively conditional and how the latter prioritized political dialog and diplomacy at the very initial stage of the Syrian quagmire. The indications of Turkey’s normative engagement with Syria can also be seen in its open and clear support for the demonstrators seeking political reform in the country, while at the same time putting Damascus under pressure for a gradual transition of power under Al-Assad’s control. However, with the increase in violence and the number of civilian deaths in Syria, Turkey’s confidence and optimistic policy Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 723 toward Al-Assad started to be criticized by its allies and Arab neighbors for having sided with the autocratic Baathist regime instead of unequivocally supporting the opposition groups seeking change in the country. Consequently, by mid-August 2011 Turkey started to display a consistent NFP attitude vis-à-vis Syria by pursuing normative goals and employing normative means. For instance, Turkey’s involvement in the EU’s and the US’s sanctions policies vis-à-vis Syria is unequivocally normative. This shift in Turkey’s foreign policy from “status quo-unintended” to “normative-intended” was realized at the risk of deteriorating its commercial relations with this country, as well as the “newly established” Turkish – Syrian rapprochement, which was seen as the litmus test of its zero problems-based neighborhood policy. Regarding the normative impact of the Syrian case, it can be argued that Turkey instrumentally and cautiously adopted a number of relatively normative policies vis-à-vis Syria62 (Al Monitor, May 26, 2013). As seen clearly in Turkey’s previous efforts in Geneva I conference and in its diplomatic engagement policies in regional organizations, such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the OIC, in order to push these organizations to use all diplomatic means for transition in Syria, as well as its diplomatic efforts regarding the Geneva II conference, Turkey deployed many institutional and normative means in the framework of existing international law to search for a non-military option for a peaceful solution.63 Another concrete sign of Turkey’s results-oriented NFP toward Syria can be seen in Davutoğlu’s press conference on May 24, 2013 in Istanbul where he indicated that the “synchronization of steps” with the US as agreed during Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Washington visit on May 16, 2013 and the “consolidation of positions” in Amman on May 23, 2013 were the reasons Turkey was still hopeful about a “Geneva outcome”64 (Hurriyet Daily News, May 25, 2013). Turkey’s normative-intended foreign policy in Syria has also included Turkey’s strong criticism of the existing UN international conflict resolution system, as well as of the West’s “wavering” performance in Syria as they have done almost nothing despite their declaration of the Syrian regime as illegitimate. Conditioning Factors The internal political context. A general overview of Turkish foreign policy’s normative agenda that was pursued following the start of the Arab revolts shows that with the exception of the Libyan case, where realpolitik factors were more important, and in the Syrian case, where a rapid and sharp transition in Turkish foreign policy from a differentiated status-quoist foreign policy approach to a normative one was observed, in the rest of the Arab revolts Turkey declared a set of milieu goals that have remained broadly consistent since the start of the uprisings. Of course, a domestic explanation is necessary but not sufficient in assessing the move or adjustments to a normative orientation in making foreign policy. In the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, the pursuit of normative goals by Turkey did not lead to strong criticism by either the Turkish public or the opposition. Although Prime Minister Erdoğan’s call for Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 724 E. Parlar Dal secularism during his first visits in Tunisia and in Egypt in 2011 has harshly been criticized in the Arab world, his strong emphasis on secularism and his attempt to diffuse this norm to the Middle East gave a strong signal to the Turkish public and relieved those in Turkey and abroad who feared the Islamic tendencies of the AKP.65 However, it seems clear that even in the domestic arena the Syrian case appears quite different from the other Arab revolts since the AKP government and the opposition have differed widely over Syria since 2012 when the Turkish Government broke off ties with Al-Assad66 (Hurriyet Daily News, March 24, 2012). Obviously, the fragmented public opinion regarding the government’s Syrian policy and the rising criticism voiced from inside Turkey, mostly from the main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has put the AKP government in a difficult position in security, economic and social terms.67 Turkey’s Syrian policy, in the words of prominent Turkish journalist Cengiz Çandar, Has not only lead to qualms over and criticism of Turkey’s Middle East policy that has otherwise been praised in recent years, it has also poisoned the country’s domestic politics. In the latest example, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu are going to court over of their opposing views on Turkey’s Syria policy.68 Criticizing the Prime Minister’s staunch support for the Syrian opposition and accusing him of “sending terrorists into Syria,” Kılıçdaroğlu considered Erdoğan’s Syrian policy responsible for the death of Turkish citizens in the May 11 bombings in Reyhanlı, and labeled Erdoğan a dictator and a murderer.69 Clearly, the emergence of the Syrian affair as an issue of political battle, one that has the potential to create social divisions and polarize society, has proved that there is no alternative for Turkey other than pursuing a normative foreign approach toward the Syrian crisis. The Syrian affair also shows that in order to create an NFP impact, the international norms that a state adopts need to resonate with national interests and domestic politics. Internal capabilities. In the last decade, new civilizational identity politics70 and the emergence of a new neighborhood and a new understanding of alliances have moved the civilian power aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy to the fore. Putting “ideas” at the core of its new foreign policy approach, Turkey has based its actions on liberal-internationalist undertones, prioritizing international cooperation in order to establish a delicate balance between national interests and a peaceful commitment to the international order.71 In search for a balance between realpolitik and ideal-politik, the Turkish foreign elite has started to adjust Turkey’s foreign policy agenda in the transforming Arab countries to the new realities emerging in the MENA region in the postArab Spring era mainly by using the indirect diffusion of influence mechanisms (emulation) such as lesson-drawing and cultural diffusion.72 As a consequence of its increasing internal capacity, in recent years Turkey has emerged as an international donor in the global development assistance Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 725 system thanks to its new civilian approach to peace building. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Kordinasyon Ajansı) and many other non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations have accelerated their efforts in managing new projects in MENA countries that are reforming through technical assistance and cultural projects, projects that also illustrate Turkey’s NFP approach. Another concrete sign of Turkey’s internal capability of deploying normative policy instruments is the existence of close ties between Turkey’s political parties and civil society organizations and Islamist groups in Arab countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the alNahda Movement in Tunisia, the National Forces Alliance in Libya and the Syrian National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. With the gradual move to a democracy promotion role in the MENA region and the frequent use of mediation and development/economic aid by the Turkish ruling elite as diplomatic tools, Turkey has already engaged in deploying new foreign policy instruments in this region.73 However, there still exist many political instruments at Turkey’s disposal that could be used toward the region such as the expansion of free trade zones and of visa-free opportunities, new regional cooperation frameworks, a new and institutionalized Turkish neighborhood policy, etc. A more effective Turkish NFP in the MENA region largely depends on further exploring Turkey’s potential internal capabilities, especially those strongly related with its problematic democracy. The external environment. Turkey’s external environment has seen tumultuous change in the last few years, a fact which also explains why Turkey has started to pursue an NFP agenda. The overall analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the MENA region does not still clearly show to what extent the normative policies have been successful. However, Turkey has given out strong messages to the MENA countries about the necessity of carrying out democratization and economic liberalization by conforming to Western institutional frameworks. Since unlike the Libyan affair the Syrian conflict has a large risk of rapid internationalization, it is of vital importance for the Turkish ruling elite to manage this crisis to avoid it having negative repercussions on Turkey’s zero problems with neighbors’ foreign policy on one hand and on Turkey’s economy and internal security on the other. Despite the growing Syrian threat to its security in its backyard and the aggravation of Syrian refugee problems on Turkish soil, Turkish authorities prefer to act multilaterally and in the UN framework and to accommodate US’s and EU’s positions toward the Syrian conflict on a normative basis. In the EU’s May 27, 2013 decision to not renew the arms embargo on the Syrian opposition,74 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s strong support for the Anglo-French position on the partial lifting of the arms embargo to the moderate sections of the Syrian opposition75 seems to have created a positive impact. With this argument, it can be argued that in the Syrian case Turkey cannot be seen as pursuing narrow self-interests rather than following a normative approach to the crisis. 726 E. Parlar Dal Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Conclusion Turkey, in its current trajectory of pursuing a more nuanced NFP, did experience a stage in which its “normativeness” results from what it does rather than what it is. From this perspective, it can be argued that Turkey’s normative power is not intrinsic to its ontological foundation. However, there have certainly been some periods in which Turkey has adopted an NFP profile rather than a status-quoist or realpolitik one. It seems likely that due to its rising emulative power, especially in the postArab Spring MENA region, Turkey today has more capability and potential to produce normative changes in actors’ behaviors in the region. As discussed in the previous section, Turkey’s NFP vis-à-vis the MENA region has already started to produce some “normative” effects, albeit limited, by inspiring and diffusing norms, values and ideas. However, it is still too early to see Turkey as a complete “normative power” actor. The argument here is that pursuing an NFP differs from being a “normative power.” Turkey can display a normative, realpolitik or status quo foreign policy in different regions and in different policy areas at different points in time. Yet, as seen in our case studies, it can engage in one foreign policy type and then in another subsequently. Despite increasing normative representations and rhetoric in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey does not currently possess a cohesive and ambitious NFP agenda, and thus it is still far from being a normative power in practice. Turkey’s current NFP gives it an appearance of using normative instruments in a very realpolitik type of way. President of the Republic of Turkey Abdullah Gül’s recent emphasis on “virtuous power”76 also shows how the Turkish ruling elites’ national role conceptions and new geopolitical imaginations correspond to the newly developing normative understanding in Turkish foreign policy. Rhetoric and practice clearly prove the existence of a strong interdependence and interconnectivity between rising ethics and morality, as well as the normativity in actual Turkish foreign policy. In Abdullah Gül’s words: A virtuous power is a power that is not ambitious or expansionist in any sense. On the contrary, it is a power where the priority lies with safeguarding human rights and interests of all human beings . . . That is what I mean by a virtuous power: a power that knows what is wrong and what is right and that is also powerful enough to stand behind what is right.77 Regarding the limits of Turkey’s NFP vis-à-vis the MENA region, it is important to underline the necessity of improving Turkey’s internal capabilities. This would entail a further strengthening of Turkey’s own democracy at home, on the one hand, and of economic, societal and cultural ties with the states of the region by diffusing international norms and rules to these states on the other. Additionally, since Turkey’s active involvement in the Middle East both in discourse and in policy is a recent phenomenon, as it can only be traced back to the last decade,78 the degree to which Turkey’s increasing normative power diffusion toward the MENA region in the last several years has caused institutional change is still not certain. The existence Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 727 of a “secular” barrier between Turkey and the Arab countries under reform, leading at times to strong criticism of the latter regarding Turkey’s “passive secularism” in the context of the so-called “Turkish model” debates,79 also renders Turkey’s normative emulation in the MENA region more difficult and complex. However, Turkey’s “NFP actor” role in its region may also be seen as a “learning by doing” process. The success of Turkey’s NFP in the MENA region largely depends on its rising legitimacy as an actor that is to be normatively and institutionally emulated,80 as well as on the degree Middle Eastern countries are receptive to Turkey’s influence. Since the normative power of a state also signifies its ideological influence on the international scene, increasing “normative” touches on Turkish foreign policy can also forge positive perceptions and expectations regarding Turkey’s new international role as, for example, a model or inspirational state to the entire Middle East. Turkey, as an NFP actor, serves as a real accelerator of democratization both at home and in its region and has thus a dual-track policy. First, increasing normativity in Turkish foreign policy will give an upper hand to Turkish decision-makers in promoting their country’s new international role as both an accommodating actor to universal norms and to international legal frameworks, as well as it being a challenging actor seeking a revision of the UN-based international order. Second, pursuing an NFP by diffusing mostly universal core norms such as democracy, human rights, freedom, rule of law, equality and good governance will not only make Turkey more visible and attractive in the eyes of both its neighbors and its Euro-Atlantic allies but will also help both Turkey’s own stalled democratic reform process (which needs to be revitalized) and its external democracy-supporting activities. This second point would serve first to empower Turkey in the sense that an NFP actor role requires putting universal norms at the top of its domestic policy agenda. Secondly, the rise of normativity in Turkish foreign policy would also impact other actors in Turkey’s region in terms of both their domestics and foreign policies. The diffusion of universal norms by Turkey to the MENA countries would lead to empowering of these countries in the international scene, increasing their recognition and international status.81 However, having the best intentions will not necessarily cause success, and hence it is of vital importance for Turkey to engender a normative impact through a variety of policy practices such as the transfer of knowledge and experience to third countries, the development of economic cooperation and trade opportunities, the transfer of material resources and the strengthening of cultural diffusion toward these countries.82 From this perspective, as an extension of soft power or “the hardest version of a soft power relationship,”83 normative power capabilities of a state can also be seen as a strategic tool to be deployed in order to attain its interests. Last but not least, there is no doubt that Turkey today has a more favorable combination of external and internal factors that is preparing the ground for its still evolving normative role. However, a stronger emphasis on normativity in Turkey’s external policies needs to go hand in hand with its domestic democratic reform process. The recent civil demonstrations, first triggered on May 31, 2013 in Istanbul’s Gezi 728 E. Parlar Dal Park and then rapidly spread to other cities of Turkey,84 clearly show the degree to which Turkey’s domestic political context and internal capabilities, most particularly related to its democracy shortcomings, appear as the most important determining factors negatively influencing not only Turkey’s rising image on the international scene but also its emerging NFP. Accelerating Turkey’s “fatigued democratization spirit”85 seems to be the most important prerequisite for becoming an attractive NFP actor in the MENA region. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Paul Kubicek and Tarık Oğuzlu for their insightful comments on the earlier versions of this article. Notes 1. Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others,” 620–623. 2. Diez, “Normative Power as Hegemony,” 201. 3. Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power,” 226–247; Diez, “Normative Power as Hegemony,” 201. 4. Brown, “Ethics, Interest and Foreign Policy,” 26. For Chris Brown, the pursuit of the interests of one’s people is no less of a value than respect or promotion of the norms of international society; Youngs, “Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests,” 420. 5. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 6. 6. Sjursen, “The EU as a ‘Normative’ Power: How Can This Be?” 243. 7. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 1. 8. Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 235–258. 9. Duchêne, “Europe’s Role in World Peace,” 32– 47; Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainities of Interdependance,” 1– 21. 10. Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor,” 445; Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU,” 12; Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 236–237. 11. Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 238. 12. Galtung, The European Community, 33. Galtung distinguishes three types of power: ideological, remunerative and punitive. He explains the ideological power as the power of ideas where “the powersender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient.” 13. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 108. Carr separates between military power, economic power and power over opinion. 14. Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 252. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., 238. 17. Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union,” 73; Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 244– 245; Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 184. For Manners, the EU’s norm diffusion is carried out in six ways: contagion (unintentional diffusion), informational diffusion (strategic and declaratory communications by the EU), procedural diffusion (institutionalization of relationships by the EU), transference (exchange of benefits by the EU and third parties), overt diffusion (the physical presence of the EU in third states and organizations) and the cultural filter (cultural diffusion and political learning) in third states and organizations. It is important to note that the common denominator of these norm diffusion factors is the absence of physical force in the process of imposing the norms. See also Manners and Whitman, “Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union,” 231– 249; Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 729 18. Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others,” 613–636. 19. Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 235–258. 20. Sjursen, “The EU as a Normative Power,” 235– 251; Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 7; Tocci and Manners, “Comparing Normativity in Foreign Policy,” 308, 310. 21. Sjursen, “The EU as Normative Power,” 243–245. 22. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 4. 23. Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power,” 171– 173. 24. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 5. 25. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 1. 26. Hamilton, “The United States: A Normative Power?” 77–78. 27. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 7. 28. Wolfers, “The Goals of Foreign Policy,” 73. 29. Stavridis, Why the Militarizing of the EU is Strengthening the Concept of Civilian Power Europe? 9. Cited by Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 10. 30. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 11. 31. Diez and Manners, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe,” 173– 188. 32. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy,” 13. 33. Ibid., 14. 34. Ibid., 16–20. 35. Ülgen, “Place in the Sun,” 20. 36. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 895– 905. 37. Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 81–97. 38. Yeşiltaş, “Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 25– 51. 39. Kardaş, “Turkey’s Middle East Policy Reloaded,” 1 –2. 40. Parlar Dal, “The Transformation of Turkey’s Middle Eastern Relations,” 246. 41. Aras, “Turkey’s Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative,” 4. 42. Ibid. 43. Gregoriadis, “Learning from the Arab Spring,” 5; Erdoğan, “The Changing Balances and the Rising Importance of Turkey.” 44. Erdoğan, “The Changing Balances and the Rising Importance of Turkey.” Accessed May 26, 2013. http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/341/the-changing-balances-and-the-rising-importance of-turkey. html. 45. Davutoğlu, “Yeni bir Ortadoğu istiyoruz”. Accessed on May 17, 2013. http://www.iwf.org.tr/2012/10/ disisleri-bakani-ahmet-davutoglu-yeni-bir-ortadogu-istiyoruz/?lang=tr. 46. Kılınç, “Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations,” 58. 47. Erdoğan, “Speech Delivered by R.T: Erdoğan at the Opening of the Vienna Global Forum”. 48. Davutoğlu, “Vision 2023.” Accessed on May 20, 2013. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-_ vision-2023_-turkey_s-foreign-policy-objectives__-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of -foreign-af.en.mfa. 49. Davutoğlu, “Yeni bir Ortadoğu istiyoruz”. 50. Ülgen, “Place in the Sun,” 19. 51. Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others,” 615. 52. Averre, “Russia: A ‘Normal’ or a ‘Normative’ Power?,” 1. 53. Davutoğlu, “Zero Problems in a New Era.” Accessed May 18, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2013/03/21/zero_problems_in_a_new_era_turkey. 54. Davutoğlu, “Vision 2023.” Accessed on 15 May, 2013. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-_ vision-2023_-turkey_s-foreign-policy-objectives__-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of -foreign-af.en.mfa. 55. Tocci, “Turkey and the Arab Spring,” 3. 56. “Turkey Grants 35 Million USD Worth of Aid to Tunisia.” Accessed on June 1, 2013. http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-03/19/c_132245958.htm. Turkey agreed to grant 35 million dollars worth of aid to Tunisia. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 730 E. Parlar Dal 57. “Turkey to Give Egypt Rest of $2 Billion Loan Within Two Months—Sources.” Accessed on June 16, 2013. http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id¼a8787681-af2e-46e6-914e-a6890b5754cc. In 2012, Turkey agreed to accord a $2 billion aid package to Egypt and that the first half of the package has already been delivered in the form of a loan. Additionally, another 1 billion dollars in aid to Egypt would also be accorded by Turkey’s Eximbank. 58. Harvey, “Turkey Mounts Biggest Evacuation in Its History to Rescue 5,000 From Libya”; Davutoğlu, "Vision 2023: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives." 59. Head, “Libya: Turkey’s Troubles with NATO and No-fly Zone”. 60. The concept of “R2P” was first presented in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in December 2001 and was finally adopted at the UN 2005 World Summit. The idea behind R2P is that the state bears the primary “responsibility” for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state fails to protect its populations or is the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council. Therefore, the UN preferred not to talk about a “right to intervene” but a “R2P.” For further information, see The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on International and State Sovereignty, December 2001. 61. Kardaş, “Turkey’s Syria Policy,” 1. 62. Çandar, “Davutoglu Cautiously ‘Not Pessimistic’ On Syria.” 63. Ibid. 64. Yetkin, “Turkey Rekindles Syria Hopes after Amman Meet.” 65. “Erdoğan Offers ‘Arab Spring’ Neo-Laicism” Hürriyet Daily News, September 15, 2011; Yinanç, “Arab Wave Sweeps Iran Model Out, Turkey In.” 66. Yetkin, “Syria as Part of Turkish Domestic Politics.” 67. Özcan,“Problems of Change and Security in Turkey’s Syria Policy.” 68. Çandar, “Turkey’s Syria Policy.” 69. Ibid. 70. Parlar Dal, “The Transformation of Turkey’s Middle Eastern Relations,” 250–252. 71. Kardaş, “Charting the New Turkish Foreign Policy,” 2 –3. 72. Parlar Dal, “Assessing the Effect of Indirect Diffusion Mechanisms on the Turkish Model-Role,” 41– 61; Börzel and Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion,” 9– 10. 73. Parlar Dal, “Assessing the EU’s and Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Policies”; Parlar Dal, “Assessing Turkey’s Post-Arab Spring Role in the EU’s Democracy Promotion Towards MENA.” 74. “Britain: EU Agrees to Lift Arms Embargo on Syrian Opposition, but No Immediate Plans to Send,” The Washington Post, May 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/eu-foreignministers-seek-solution-on-syria-arms-embargo/2013/05/27/48927e2a-c6a4-11e2-9cd9-3b9a22a4000 a_story.html. 75. Wintour and Traynor, “Syria: EU Split Over Push to Lift Rebel Arms Embargo.” 76. Paparella, “Neo-realism & Virtuosity.” Accessed on May 17, 2013. http://theriskyshift.com/2013/01/ turkeys-rise-between-the-western-and-the-eastern-belts/. 77. Gül, “Turkey’s Moment,” 7. Interview with Gül, “Turkey’s Moment,” 7. 78. Parlar Dal, “The Transformation of Turkey’s Middle Eastern Relations,” 249. 79. Cagaptay and Pollock, “Whatever Happened to the Turkish Model?”; Elshinnawi, “Would the Turkish Model Work in Arab Spring Countries?”; Kuru, “Muslim Politics Without an ’Islamic’ State.” See also Parlar Dal and Erşen, “Assessing Turkish Model Role.” The Muslim Brotherhood is actually not open to secularism, which is seen as status-quoist and anti-religious. Moreover, it seems clear that the Muslim Brotherhood government prioritizes Islamization rather than economic growth. Unlike in Tunisia where secularist opposition parties also take place in the political system, in Egypt the main competitors of the Muslim Brotherhood were not secularists or liberals but extreme Salafi parties and movements. Downloaded by [Marmara Universitesi] at 02:55 21 December 2013 Assessing Turkey’s “Normative” Power in the MENA Region 731 80. Jetschke and Murray, “Diffusing Regional Integration,” 174– 191; Lenz, “Spurred Emulation,” 155– 73. 81. Scheipers and Sicurelli, “Empowering Africa,” 607–623. 82. Parlar Dal, “Assessing the Effect of Indirect Diffusion Mechanisms.” 83. Oğuzlu, “Being a Soft Power Does Not Mean Having Soft Power.” 84. Protests against the urban redevelopment plan of Taksim Square in Istanbul are labeled as the Gezi Park events. Due to the police’s excessive use of force against demonstrators on May 31, 2013 and to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inflammatory rhetoric used in dealing with the protestors, these civil protests took a new form of political opposition against the government and prime minister. The sit-in at Taksim Gezi Park was restored after police withdrew from Taksim Square on 1 June, and developed into an occupy-like camp with thousands of protestors in tents. Peaceful demonstrations continued in Gezi Park until June 16, 2013 when police rapidly cleared and occupied the park and the square. For more information, see “Turkey Divided More Than Ever by Erdoğan’s Gezi Park Crackdown,” June 20, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/turkey-divided-erdoganprotests-crackdown; “Turkey Police Clash with Istanbul Gezi Park Protesters,” May 31, 2013. Accessed June 17, 2013. 85. Bacık, “Turkey and the BRICS.” Notes on contributor Emel Parlar Dal is Assistant Professor at Marmara University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations. After graduating from Galatasaray University, she received her MA and Ph.D. degrees at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Paris 3 Nouvelle Sorbonne Universities in France. She received the Swiss Government’s scholarship and conducted research as a visiting fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva (2010–11). Between November 2013 and February 2014, she will conduct research as a visiting fellow at The Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford. She authored articles on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey and the Mediterranean region, Turkey’s Middle Eastern relations, transatlantic relations, as well as Turkish–Iranian relations. During 2011–12, she edited a special issue on the new Turkish foreign policy and a collective book on Turkish politics. 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