Emel Parlar Dal & Gonca Oğuz Gök, “Reconciling Multilateralism between Universalism and Regionalism: UN-EU “Security” Cooperation After the Kosovo Crisis”, in Mechi, Migani, Petrini (eds.), Networks of Global Governance, Cambridge Scholars Press, December 2013.

RECONCILING MULTILATERALISM BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND REGIONALISM: UN-EU “SECURITY” COOPERATION AFTER THE KOSOVO CRISIS Emel Parlar Dal (PhD)  Emel Parlar Dal is lecturer in Political Science and International Relations Department of Marmara University in Turkey. and Gonca Oğuz Gök (PhD)  Gonca Oğuz Gök is research assistant in Political Science and International Relations Department of Marmara University in Turkey. “The United Nations was not created in order to bring us heaven, but in order to save us from hell.” Jan Klabbers, “The Changing Image of International Organizations”, in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen (eds.), Legitimacy of International Organizations, New York, United Nations University Press, 2001, p. 221. INTRODUCTION The consecutive Balkan crises of the second half of the 20th century played an undeniable role in shaping the policy preferences of both the UN and the EU in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention. In 2000, the UN underwent a new reform on the basis of the recommendations of the Brahimi report Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/55_502e.pdf . and appealed to regional and sub-regional organisations for assistance, with a view to adequately meeting the growing demand for peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building activities. The UN’s willingness to reform its peace operations in the framework of the Brahimi report, in order to respond to the changing nature of threats and peacekeeping mechanisms, coincided with the EU’s engagement in laying the foundations for a European security and defense policy (ESDP). With the framework of its ESDP, as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU could provide the UN with the financial and logistic aid required to fulfil its complex tasks. A robust engagement of the EU with regard to peacekeeping and peace enforcement was designed to contribute to its emergence as a “global actor and security provider”. See Jan Wouters, Tom Ruys , “ UN-EU cooperation in crisis management”, in Frank Hoffmeister, Jan Wouters, Tom Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: an ever stronger partnership, The Hague, the Netherlands, T.M.C Asser Press, 2006, p. 229. The questions arising about the very foundations of the existing legal order as embodied in the United Nations Charter paved the way to wide debate on the future of the UN, and multilateralism. Just like the UN, which embodies the universal form of multilateralism, the EU, one of the world’s most successful cases of regionalism, has been increasingly obliged by developments in the international environment to strengthen its foreign and security actorness through new tools and concepts. A particularly rich debate on this aspect starting soon after the European Security Strategy (ESS) was launched in December 2003 by the European Council, which has provided the strategic framework for EU Foreign and Security Policy of which the ESDP forms an integral part. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.) European Security and Defence Policy, The First 10 Years (1999-2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf. In the ESS, the concept of “effective multilateralism” has been given a key role, thus becoming one of the fundamental credos of the European integration project. In its most widely accepted definition, effective multilateralism is “an effective system of global governance, i.e. a system able to ensure at the global level access to the core public goods that at the national level the State provides – or is supposed to – to its citizens: stability and security, an enforceable legal order, an open and inclusive economic order and global welfare in all of its aspects (such as access to health, a clean environment, education, etc.)” Sven Biscop, “Effective Multilateralism: Bringing the European Way into Practice”, in Sven Biscop (ed.), Audit of European Strategy, Egmont Paper no. 3. Brussels, Royal Institute for International Relations, 2004. To achieve these aims, international relations should be organised through strong, negotiated, and enforceable multilateral regimes. Espen Barth Eide (ed.), Global Europe, Report 1: Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and Revitalized UN, London, The Foreign Policy Center, British Council, The European Commission in association with Wilton Park, 2004, p. 2. Accordingly, as stated in the ESS, the EU would assume responsibility for ensuring “effective multilateralism” and supporting all international organisations, the UN in particular. Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations, Intersecting Multilateralisms, New York, Palgrave Mcmillan, 2006, p. 2. As a consequence, since 2003 the UN and the EU have entered into a more structured relationship through the conclusion of a joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management and the creation of a joint consultative mechanism. The main aim of this article is to examine the theoretical framework, the background and present state of the UN-EU cooperation in crisis management from policy to practice. In this regard, an analysis will be made of the assets and challenges encountered by the EU and the UN while putting effective multilateralism into practice in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The two actors’ commitment to effective multilateralism and their cooperation in the structural and operational spheres will be examined in the light of the case-study of the Kosovo’s joint state-building process, with a special emphasis on the United Nations’ Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and on the EU Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The analysis is deals with the following issues: To what extent are the UN and the EU “natural” and “interdependent” partners in multilateralism? Today, does the EU appear a reliable and vital UN partner in the maintenance of peace and security and the building of effective multilateralism? In what way does NATO play a complementary role in UN-EU cooperation in crisis management and conflict resolution? What are the limitations of the EU in its contribution to strengthening the UN and enabling it to fulfil its responsibilities? Effective multilateralism in theory and in practice from ESDP to ESS: Between achievements and constraints Today European foreign-policy tends to stress the positive connotations of multilateralism by using the term “effective multilateralism” as a strategic concept that can unite the different European views on multilateralism under “a single umbrella” and that can boost the legitimacy of the EU in international affairs. As stated by Joachim Krause, “…the European perception of multilateralism is not uniform, but rather, there are many differing forms and rationales behind [the] more general approval of it.” Joachim Krause, “Multilateralism: Behind European views”, The Washington Quarterly 27 (2), 2004, pp. 43-59. In academic literature, effectiveness is defined according to criteria that organisations set for themselves, based on their definition of their own aims and purposes. Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 10. In the context of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, what does the concept of effective multilateralism signify? Here the legitimacy factor also plays a crucial role in that “effective multilateralism” hinges on legitimacy. As clearly indicated in the UN High Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Changes, UNSC authorisation should be sought for in any operation to be conducted by regional organisations. This statement, in fact, goes beyond the UN Charter, which only requires authorisation in the case of the use of military force. In the case of UN-EU cooperation, effective multilateralism calls for consistent and regular communication between both organisations engaged in a peace operation, as indicated in article 54 of the UN Charter. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Foreword”, in Martin Ortega (ed.), The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in effective multilateralism, Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper N. 78, June 2005, p.9. On the other hand, it is often argued that the concept of “effective multilateralism” introduced by the EU in the ESS and in the Non-Proliferation Strategy, contributed to favouring a consensus among EU member states on various divisive debate issues. This concept, which served to forge a common identity for the EU in the international system, is used to redefine the EU’s common foreign policy objectives and enhance the EU’s legitimacy, both within and without. Indeed, “effective multilateralism” provides a framework for what Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith call “internal effectiveness” and not “external effectiveness” Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, “Introduction, the European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure?”, in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms, Houndsmills, Palgrave McMillan, 2006, pp. 16-19. However, some scholars also argue that the notion of “effective multilateralism” is quite ambiguous. According to Benjemin Kienzle, the concept has served to fulfil three major functions for the EU: first, as mentioned, to create internal cohesion by forming a common identity for the EU and its member States and by providing a common image of the EU to the outside world; second, to give the EU, as an international actor, strategic coherence in the form of means and objectives; third, to give legitimacy to the EU’s activity in international affairs. Benjamin Kienzle, “Effective Multilateralism? The EU and International Regimes in the Field of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Garnet Conference Paper : The EU in international affairs, 2008. Available at: http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_III_1_Kienzle.pdf. One can also argue that, while strongly committing the EU to the legitimacy of UNSC resolutions, “effective multilateralim” has also made the EU a flexible security provider and a foreign policy actor in its own right. From an EU viewpoint, effective multilateralism hinges on three key principles: first, in the UN-EU partnership, effective multilateralism should be based on legitimacy; second, a commitment has been made to qualitative standards of peacekeeping; third, the capacity to quickly and adequately respond to threats must be ensured. On considering the third principle, it is important to bear in mind that the greatest weakness in international peacekeeping is the UN’s lack of resources to immediately respond to threats, especially in complex environments. The UN’s “Strategic Reserve” concept has been specifically created for this mission. These would be made up of troops from member states and taken out from their regular duties for rotation periods of up to 12 months to form a component in the Strategic Reserve. The EU’s battle group concepts would also contribute substantially to the UN’s Strategic Reserve capacity. For further details see Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Foreword”, op.cit., p.10. Therefore, as argued by the EU, the idea of “effective multilateralism” as a European strategic concept aims at the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order. Accordingly, it is argued that strengthening the UN by equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and act effectively, is a European priority. Alyson J. K. Bailes, The European Security Strategy: An evolutionary History, SIPRI Policy Paper, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2005. , p: 32-33.. Available at: http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf . Furthermore, for the EU, effective multilateralism within international organisations aims at founding a system of global governance. As argued by Manuela Scheuermann, this concept is used by the EU as a political argument in its commitment in military crisis management, side by side with UN peacekeepers. The term is thus used to label the EU’s activities in the UN-family and to characterise the relations with the UN in the wider context of global governance. For the UN, the term is used to call for the EU’s loyalty and partnership. Manuela Scheuermann, “Effective or multilateral? The UN-EU Partnership in Military Crisis Management”, Conference Paper “Effective Multilateralism? - The EU and international institutions”, CSIG, Loughborough University, 13-14 January 2011., p: 3. Available at http://opus.bibliothek.uni-wuerzburg.de/volltexte/2011/6556/pdf/Scheuermann_CSIG_Opus.pdf . From a critical perspective, one can argue that both actors consider multilateralism as one of their major “political objectives” and use it to label and value their partnership. Some scholars also argue that the EU uses this term as an instrument of its external action and that, in effect, it has no intention of strengthening the UN. Whatever the rhetoric used by the EU and the UN in promoting “effective multilateralism” in their cooperation, it is important to ask how this concept has been implemented, and whether there is a gap between the ambitious discourses of the two organisations and their practical action, especially in military crisis management. On the other hand, it seems likely that in some cases the objectives of the two bodies with regard to the above term diverge and consequently their operational partnership in the event of military crisis is not in line with “effective multilateralism”. It is therefore of utmost importance to take a more practical look at the crisis management partnership between the UN and EU, which has grown in recent years. Historical background of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been increasingly involved in maintaining international peace and security, and this has paved the way for a more intense EU-UN cooperation. In the 1990s, with the emerging post-Yugoslav crisis, first during the Bosnian-Croatian wars in 1995 and then during the Kosovo crisis of 1998/1999, both the UN and the EU faced important challenges. As these crises ended, the UN was sidelined despite its diplomatic and security efforts. On one hand, the Balkan crisis demonstrated the limitations of both the UN and the EU: the UN’s ineffective multilateralism combined with the EU’s diplomacy of equidistance and lack of political agreement on the use of outright force. On the other hand, the Bosnian crisis had played a role in accelerating the development of Europe’s CFSP; consequently, in 1999, the EU launched a new political process for the “Western Balkans”, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), offering a wide range of political tools to the countries of the region This region includes Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, the FYRO Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. , including a EU membership perspective. Especially after the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the EU reinforced its military and political presence in the Balkans due to the growing strategic importance of the region and its geographical proximity with the EU. The Kosovo crisis was not only a catalyst not only for the EU’s efforts to develop its own foreign and security policy, but it also paved the way for an intensified UN-EU security cooperation by testing the capacity of the two actors in crisis management in the face of the changing regional and international circumstances. In fact, the first tentative steps in developing a more systemic UN-EU relationship in this field were taken in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, in September 2000, by the French Presidency of the UN General Assembly. Speech of 12 September 2000. Available at: http://www.un.int/france /eu/speeches/debat/0912F.htm. During the same year, this appeal was followed by other practical measures taken in order to reinforce the EU-UN partnership, especially in the area of security. In September 2000, it was also decided that “high level” meetings would be held between the two organisations twice a year. In June 2001 the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) made some concrete proposals in its draft conclusions on EU-UN cooperation, especially in the areas of conflict prevention, particular regional issues such as Africa and the Balkans, and civil and military crisis management. The document places emphasis on the EU’s developing military and civilian capacities, which would provide a real added value for the UN in the future. In particular, after the Göteborg Summit in June 2001, a platform for intensified cooperation was established for the exchange of information and consultation between the two organisations. Alexandra Novosselof, “EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects”, International Peace Academy Report, June 2004, pp. 3-4. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/noa01/noa01.pdf. The year 2003 was a landmark at the structural and operational levels both for the United Nations and the European Union. According to the GAC of July 21st 2003, crisis management became a priority in the relations of the EU with the UN. General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522nd Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003. In the military domain, the GAC emphasised the need for a strong cooperation in crisis management and training activities, as well as for an exchange of “best practices” and the establishment of more regular contacts between military experts from the two organisations. J. Wouters and T. Ruys, “UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management”, in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (eds.), op.cit., p. 244. On 10th September 2003, the European Commission submitted to the Council and the Parliament a communication on “The EU and the UN: the choice of multilateralism”, a new strategy for EU-UN relations calling for “improving the EU coordinating mechanisms in Brussels, New York and Vienna, establishing direct EC representation in the fora that deal with issues of Community competence, and establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU services and those of UN agencies, including hands-on co-operation in the field.” The European Union and the United Nations EU-UN –“Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism”, EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/09/2003. This communication was complementary to the Security Strategy paper presented by the CFSP’s High Representative, Javier Solana, at the Thessaloniki European Council of 20 June 2003, which identified one of the EU's three strategic objectives as the “need to build an international order based on effective multilateralism.” Catriona Guarlay and Daniela Manca, “Towards effective Multilateralism: EU-UN co-operation gets practical”, European Security Review, N. 19, October 2003. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/isis/vol19/vol19d.html. See also Gerrard Quille, “Making Multilateralism Matter: The EU security Strategy, European Security Review, Number 18, July 2003, p.1. The communication also stressed that the EU should adopt a “front runner” approach to the negotiation for, and implementation of, multilateral initiatives, particularly in the fields of sustainable development, poverty reduction and international security. The EU was also to strive to establish common positions as early as possible in major UN conferences and Security Council meetings and actively seek to build alliances in support of important multilateral initiatives. According to this communication, in the area of ESDP, the EU was to provide, through the development of its military capacity, UN-mandated or UN-led peace-making and peace-keeping operations with “active and early support”. It should also act as a model and a catalyst for other world regions in the implementation of key UN instruments in the global fight against terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, in combating international organized crime, in the protection of human rights, and in refugee and asylum policy. The European Union and the United Nations EU-UN – “Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism”, EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/09/2003. Catriona Gourlay and Daniela Manca, “Towards effective multilateralism: EU-UN co-operation gets practical”, op.cit. The next step towards for putting the communication of the Commission into practice was made when a joint declaration on EU-UN cooperation covering both the civilian and military aspects of crisis management was signed by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the acting EU President, Silvio Berlusconi, on September 24th 2003, in New York. This joint declaration became the framework for “the development of practical initiatives to facilitate interchange between the two organizations, through the establishment of information and consultation mechanisms”. General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th EU General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003. In the declaration, the European Council reaffirmed the European Union’s commitment to help achieve United Nations objectives in crisis management and conflict prevention. General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council Meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003. For further information, see Catriona Gourlay and Daniela Manca, “Towards effective multilateralism: EU-UN co-operation gets practical”, op.cit. After September 2003, the European Council also put into place a number of measures in order to apply the Joint Declaration for crisis management. In November 2003, France and the United Kingdom proposed a “new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to help the EU in short-term crisis management situations.” “Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defense”, Franco-British Summit, London, 24 November 2003. In December 2003, the EU Council accepted this proposal and developed the concept of “coherent, credible battle-groups” of 1,500 men to be deployed at short notice and on a short-term basis. Alexandra Novosseloff, “EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects”, op.cit., p. 7. These forces were designed primarily for higher intensity operations in order to respond to UN demands. J. Wouters and T. Ruys, “UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management”, op.cit., p. 235. On 13th December 2004, the European Council adopted another document on the implementation of the Joint Declaration, albeit with regard to civilian crisis management “EU-UN cooperation in civilian crisis management”, Annex IV of the ESDP Presidency report adopted by the Council, Document N. 16062/04, 13 December 2004. Available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st16/st16062.en04.pdf. In this document three final scenarios determining the modalities for practical cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management have been identified. These three scenarios have been mostly based on the options set out in Göteborg Summit in 2001: 1) National contributions to an operation with information exchanged between EU; Member States to improve efficiency 2) An EU ‘clearing house’ to co-ordinate Member State contributions; 3) An EU contribution following a request from the UN. The joint consultative mechanism established between the two organisations became operational in February 2004 under the direction of an EU-UN Crisis Management Steering Committee composed of officials from the EU Council and the UN Secretariat meeting two to three times a year at senior level. Daniela Manca, “Follow-up to the European Security Strategy: Effective Multilateralism”, European Security Review, No. 23, 2004, p. 3. Available at: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_24.pdf. As a result, the joint declaration of 24th September 2003 formalised the concrete steps already taken by the two organisations since 2000 - and paved the way for a more institutionalised, but flexible, partnership between the UN and the EU. The year 2003 also saw the exacerbation of the transatlantic drift between U.S and Europe over the Iraqi crisis, the initial signs appearing in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, especially over the military intervention in Afghanistan: “Broad rhetorical attacks on multilateralism and the UN in the first years of George W. Bush alienated European foreign policy elites and publics and had the effect of driving them, along with much of the rest of the world, into a strong pro-UN stance.” Bruce Jones, “The Coming Clash? Europe and US multilateralism under Obama”, in Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski (eds.), The Obama Moment: European and American Perspectives, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p.68. Another important factor spurring European political circles to strengthen EU-UN cooperation throughout 2003 was their willingness to prepare and foster the existing security infrastructure of the EU before its enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, which was to welcome ten new EU members in 2004. When EU-UN cooperation increased its pace in 2003, the EU was already engaged in reconstructing its institutional relations with NATO, with the aim of addressing certain US objections against the ESDP, and of reaching a consensus with a non-EU but NATO member country, Turkey, regarding the basis of the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements. Emel Parlar Dal, “ La Turquie et l’ambivalence des relations transatlantiques: ses marges de manoeuvre après 2003 (Turkey and the Ambivalence of Transatlantic Relations: the Limits of its Manoeuvres since 2003)”, Eurorient, Numbers 35-36, October 2011, p.149. The EU’s autonomous stance in the areas of security and defence throughout the ESDP has largely depended on the introduction of more institutionalised relations with NATO. In this regard, it can be argued that NATO also contributed to the development of UN-EU cooperation throughout its substantive support to the ESDP which remained “separable but not separate" from the Alliance over the basis of principles such as burden-sharing, division of labour, interoperability, cooperative planning and political and strategic dialogues. See “ESDP and NATO: Companions or Competitors?”. Available at: http://www.rand.org/natsec_area/products/MR1463.html. In 2003, the above advances in EU-UN cooperation were further strengthened on two occasions: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) and the Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) granted its mission according to a well-prepared and executed plan. In Operation Artemis, as a response to the urgent appeal for military assistance made by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the EU Council declared its willingness to help the UN. In fact, after Annan had made his appeal to the EU during a visit by EU High Representative Solana to New York in May 2003, he asked the French President Jacques Chirac separately if France would be willing to lead such an operation. Afterwards, the UN passed its official demand on the EU, and finally, on May 16, 2003, France accepted Annan’s proposal and accordingly declared that it would lead this intervention by sending a multinational force into Ituri; France then drafted the corresponding resolution which authorised Operation Artemis. After the creation of “Operation Artemis” by the EU as a result of the EU Council Joint Action 2003/423/CSFB of 5 June 2003, it was launched by the EU Council Decision 2003/432/CSFB of 12 June 2003, one week after the authorisation of UN Security Council resolution 1484 ( 30 May 2003) calling for the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia under close cooperation with the existing UN mission in DRC, MONUC. For further details, see Alexandra Novosseloff, “EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management : Developments and Prospects”, op.cit., p. 12. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/noa01/noa01.pdf. In both cases, UN-EU cooperation proved successful not only at a structural level, but also at an operational one, through transparent and simple procedures. Operation Artemis was the first EU-led operation launched outside Europe to realise, without recourse to NATO assets which was served as a rapid reaction force. Operation Artemis thus directly triggered the decisive step towards a deepened EU-UN cooperation through the creation of a consultative mechanism in 2003-2004. The lessons learned in Artemis led to a EU-UN agreement on crisis management to institutionalise the partnership in the fields such as planning, inter-organizational communication on a regular basis, collaboration in training for peace operation and common lessons-learned-processes for best practices. Manuela Scheuermann, “The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, EU-Grasp Working Papers, Working Paper N.14, 2010, p.16. The successes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Artemis also put paid to the UN’s initial fears that ESDP would distract the EU member states from contributing to UN peacekeeping. In the following section three core questions will be answered. First, in what ways have the ESDP and ESS contributed to UN crisis management? Second, to what extent is ESDP complementary to the UN in the area of peacekeeping in assuring effective multilateralism? Third, in what way has NATO affected UN-EU cooperation in crisis management and thus contributed to the credibility and operability of this partnership? The UN-EU cooperation vis-à-vis the ESDP and NATO Through ESDP, launched in 1999 and emerging in 2001, the EU has engaged in developing its own competence in crisis management. When the ESDP was first established, some UN officials were worried that the ESDP would be a threat rather than an aid to UN peacekeeping. As previously indicated, the ESDP and effective multilateralism as conceived by the EU created ambivalence towards UN-EU cooperation in crisis management. On the one hand, the EU considers the UNSC the only central and legitimising actor that can decide on the use of force in the international arena, and hence contributing to the UN’s peacekeeping financially with the highest share of all other member at about 40%. See http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7114_en.htm. The top ten providers of assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations for 2010 are: United States (27.17%), Japan (12.53%), the United Kingdom (8.16%), Germany (8.02%), France (7.56%), Italy (5.00%), China (3.94%), Canada (3.21%), Spain (3.18%) and the Republic of Korea (2.26%). Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml On the other hand, the EU tries to put a distance between itself and the UN, especially in the field of peacekeeping in order to be an autonomous “security provider actor” in line with ESDP objectives. For example, the EU would not need a UN mandate for ESDP operations in Europe with the consent of the host state and of a non-coercive and civilian nature. The operations that the EU realised in Europe without UN mandate are the EU Police Mission ( EPM) in Bosnia Herzigovina, Operations Concordia and Proxima in FYROM. Outside Europe, the UN realised three civilian operations created in Georgia ( EUJUST THEMIS), Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) and Iraq (EUJUST LEX). Thierry Tardy, “EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping”, in Martin Ortega (ed.), The EU and the UN: Partners in effective multilateralism, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper, N.78, June 2005, p.52. Another sign of the EU’s autonomous posture in peacekeeping is that, over the last fifteen years, EU member states have contributed very little to UN-led operations, especially in Africa “UN-EU Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations, Elements of İmplementation of the UN-EU of Joint Declaration”, ESDP Presidency Report, Annex II, European Council, 15 June 2004, para 4. , while they have significantly contributed to UN-mandated peace operations. Clearly, the unwillingness of the EU member states to place their troops under UN command imposes a constraint on UN-EU cooperation in the framework of ESDP, and this is mainly due to their scepticism about the reliability of the UN structure. The rigidity with regard to the modalities of ESDP operation is also an obstacle to empowered UN-EU cooperation. According to the ESDP philosophy, if an operation is EU-led but under UN-mandate, it should be considered within the framework of UN-EU cooperation. On the other hand, it seems likely that the UN remains in favour of two-speed peace operations, some UN-led, poorly-equipped and with a weak political support, and others either led by states themselves or by regional organisations such as the EU and NATO, and having an important political backing. Thierry Tardy, “EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping”, in Martin Ortega (ed.), op.cit., pp. 52-53. Faced with of all these constraints, UN-EU cooperation still has an important potential in creating opportunities for promoting effective multilateralism. Today it seems clear that the initial fears of UN officials about the ESDP’s autonomous peacekeeping stance have given way to the idea that the EU could become a reliable burden-sharing partner in this field. In this field, the UN lacks rapid deployment force and “enabling assets”, such as movement control, intelligence, medical units or logistics, which are less available than infantry battalions. Thus, it asks the EU member states to provide the resources that it lacks itself. Report of Secretary General on the recommendation of the special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/59/608, 15 December 2004, para.72. In general, UN officials criticise the Western countries on the Security Council for calling for involvement in crisis, but for being reluctant to send troops, or sending them only for short-term operations. They also complain about the poor participation of EU member states in UN peacekeeping. The contribution of EU members, in December 2004 amounted to 10.7 % of the total personnel deployed in UN operations. See Bjorn Moller, “The EU as a Security Actor: Security by being and Security by doing”, DIIS Report, Copenhagen, 2005: 12, p.21. Available at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/diisreport-2005-12.pdf . According to the EU, the UN Security Council should assume prime responsibility in dealing with the international crises. In order to respond to UN expectations, at the Göteborg summit in 2001 it was decided that the EU would intervene in an international crisis under a UN mandate and following the UN Security Council’s legal authorisation of the use of force (Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the Statement). At the Göteborg summit in 2001 the following basic principles were decided on for strengthening UN-EU cooperation in the field of security: 1) The EU will exercice a political and strategic control on its operations; 2)The cooperation of the EU will be realised on a case-by-case basis; 3) The EU will not be involved in crisis automatically; 4) The EU will not constitute a pool of forces. The EU’s intervention will only be realised for conducting specific missions or operations. There were to be no forces earmarked for any stand-by arrangement. See Alexandra Novosseloff, “EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management : Developments and Prospects”, op.cit., p. 7. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/noa01/noa01.pdf . These principles clearly limit the options for the types of EU-UN cooperation existing in robust peace operations. However, they do enhance the legitimacy of the EU’s contribution to peacekeeping operations with the help of the UN’s `legitimising` role in crises management. Therefore, despite the rigidity of the ESDP in political-decision making, its development is complementary to the UN’s peacekeeping in many ways, especially when rapid deployment capacities are needed, and when, for political reasons, states are reluctant to place troops under UN-mandate operations. Of course, the ESDP has not developed at the expense of the UN. As Kofi Annan stated on 14 October 2004, “the ESDP’s development should not mean a weakening of the commitment to provide troops for UN peacekeeping missions, since our starting point must be one of commitment to the Charter and solidarity with our fellow men and women, regardless of whether they live in Kosovo or Darfur or Afghanistan or the Congo.” Secretary-General’s address to the National Forum on Europe, 14 October 2004, Dublin. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1131. This relationship was tested at the operational level respectively in EUPM and in Operation Artemis in 2003 and in EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. EU-led operations have reinforced UN operations in complex situations and have allowed the UN to deploy troops elsewhere. In addition to the ESDP, the European Security Strategy (ESS) states that the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. However, in its ESS, the EU does not explicitly state whether a UNSC mandate would be required for coercive military action. Since this proves that the EU wishes to maintain its autonomy while setting the agenda for EU-UN cooperation, it indicates that there is a divide between the UN demand and EU supply. Thierry Tardy, “EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping”, in Martin Ortega (ed.), op.cit., pp. 49-50. Although the wording of the ESS does not explicitly rule out the possibility of military intervention without a UNSC mandate, as in the case of Kosovo, for the EU this should be considered an exception. This also explains why the “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, also adopted in 2003, explicitly refers to the UNSC as “the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance”. “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, European Council (2003b), Brussels, 12 December 2003. Accordingly, in May 2004, in a paper submitted by the EU to the UN’s Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, it was stated that “multilateralism alone is no guarantee of an effective response” and “collective tools and collective will to use them must be built together.” Paper for Submission to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Brussels, 17-18 May 2004. Here, in the view of the EU, the UNSC should resort to military intervention only if there are no other valid options. Sven Biscop, Edith Drieskens, “The European Security Strategy: Conforming the Choice for Collective and Comprehensive Security”, in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister, Tom Ruys ( eds), op.cit., p. 274. In December 2004, the High-Level Panel’s final report also confirmed the position of the UNSC as the “international community’s collective security voice” and affirmed that there was no need to find “alternatives to the UNSC as a source of authority”. United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. Thus, strikingly, the dualism in the EU’s security approach vis-à-vis the international crisis reflects its ambivalence between multilateralism and autonomy. The high risk of blockage of the UNSC forces the EU member states to either operationalize the ESDP mechanisms, in conformity with the EU’s security approach vis-à-vis its immediate neighbourhood, or to cooperate with NATO, and hence their grand ally, the US. In practice, the ESDP allowed the Europeans to conduct small-scale operations in their neighbourhood, in areas in which the US was reluctant to intervene, while NATO generally concentrated on large scale and out-of-area operations. Since the creation of the ESDP, the EU and NATO have implicitly agreed on a geographic division. Claudia Louati, “Military Intervention in Libya: Where is ESDP?”, 20 April 2011. Available at: http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/military-intervention-libya-where-esdp?page=0,1. While Africa has been the main area of EU engagement with its military and civilian missions, NATO has often remained inactive vis-à-vis the crisis triggered in this area. In this regard, the recent Libyan crisis, with the decision to hand over the whole operation “Unified Protector” to NATO, represents a major change in the EU’s and NATO’s crisis management policies towards Africa. Ibidem. As a result of the Libyan crisis, NATO has reaffirmed itself as the most credible military actor of the international system, and has also played a substantial “complementary” role in the development of UN-EU cooperation on the ground. Of course, NATO’s Libyan mission and the ESDP’s inactivity in the Libyan crisis was bound to have an impact not only on the future of NATO, but also on the development of UN-EU security cooperation, since the international community has been called, for the first time, upon the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) - established by the UN General Assembly in 2005 - to justify the Libya campaign. The concept of “Responsibility to Protect” was first presented in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001 and was finally adopted at the United Nations (UN) 2005 World Summit. The idea behind R2P is that the state bears the primary “responsibility” for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state fails to protect its populations or is the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council. Therefore, the UN preferred not to talk about a “right to intervene” but a “responsibility to protect.” For further information please see The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on International and State Sovereignty, December 2001. Available at: http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. On the other hand, as some scholars and international observers argue, the EU showed reluctance towards military engagement in the Libyan crisis with significant security implications for the Union’s secure y policy. It has even been declared that “the Libyan crisis marks the effective end of the CSDP Due to the amendments made in the Treaty of Lisbon the Common Security and Defence Policy was given more space than the ESDP that preceded it. , and indeed even of the CFSP, of which it is an integral part.” See Anand Menon, “European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 53, No.3, June-July 2011, pp.75-90. In the extraordinary European Council of 11th March 2011, the option of military intervention was rejected since the member states were far from agreeing on how to act in this crisis and on the legitimacy of the use of force. While France and the UK were in favour of the use of force, other countries, most famously Germany, appeared reluctant to send a military mission to Libya. For further information, see Anand Menon, “European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya”, op.cit., pp.75-90. The EU member states once again faced the difficulty of reconciling their diverging national interests. As observed, the “ESDP was grounded on a French-British agreement which, at the beginning, generally triggered supportive reactions - or at least benevolent passivism - from the other Member States.” Claudia Louati, “Military Intervention in Libya: Where is ESDP?”, 20 April 2011. Available at: http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/opinions-0.. The ESDP’s inactivity in the Libya crisis raises some further questions about the possibility of the EU being represented in the UNSC as a single actor and, if it were not represented in the UNSC with a single voice, how could the EU contribute effectively to the UN in security dossiers? Today, the country holding the EU presidency is invited to Security Council deliberations and directly represents the EU in the most important UNSC debates. Yet neither the High Representative nor the EU Presidency possesses voting rights in the UNSC, most negotiations for draft resolutions being conducted by UNSC members in caucusing sessions or in informal meetings outside of formal UNSC sessions. Sven Biscop, Edith Drteskens, “Effective Multilateralism in Collective Security: Empowering the UN”, in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.)…op. cit., p.123. On examining both the voting behaviour of the member states on security issues and presidency statements, it is clear that the EU could act in a cohesive and coordinated way in the UNSC and UNGA. Nevertheless, in spite of the growing presence of the EU in the UNSC, particularly over the last decade Ibidem. , the recourse by the EU member states, especially those who are also permanent members of the UNSC, shows that national approaches are still common, particularly in crises. Another institutional constraint on effective multilateralism is depends on the tendency of some EU member states to consider the US as their point of reference and seek American confirmation and guidance instead of promoting a single EU foreign policy Sven Biscop, Edith Drteskens, “Effective Multilateralism in Collective Security: Empowering the UN”, op.cit., p.125. , thus making it difficult for the EU to appear as a credible and autonomous actor with a common strategic culture. In conclusion, the EU’s effectiveness in the UN’s peace-making and crisis management missions depends largely on its internal effectiveness, its actorness The concept of actorness could be defined as the capacity to exert a significant influence on global issues with a strategy based on bi-lateral and international relations. Annegret Bendiek and Heinz Kramer, “The EU as a “Strategic” International Actor: Substancial and Analytical Ambiguities”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.15, 2010, pp . 454, 473. in the field of CFSP/ESDP and its constructive cooperation with NATO. In other words, the UN-EU partnership could be based on effective multilateralism only if the EU were to establish its actorness effectively in the UNSC and in ESDP on the one hand, and in NATO on the other. In the following section, the potential and the limitations of UN-EU cooperation will be analysed by focusing on, in particular, Kosovo’s state-building case, since the latter contributed greatly not only to the elaboration of the EU’s security and defence policy, but also to the strengthening of UN-EU joint cooperation in the field of state-building. Therefore, in order to better understand the role played by the Kosovo crisis during the last decade in the EU’s efforts to promote the ESDP and to further promote UN-EU cooperation in status settlement and state-building, in the next section a closer analysis is made first of the specific conditions of the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and second at those of the establishment of European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX-Kosovo). 4. Reassessing UN-EU Security Cooperation in Kosovo: A Further look at State-Building Process from UNMIK to EULEX This part of the study deals with the Kosovo crisis as a case-study of the successes and failures of UN-EU cooperation throughout UNMIK and EULEX-Kosovo to serve as lessons-learned for an enhanced UN-EU cooperation in the field of state-building. On June 10th 1999, at the end of the Kosovo war, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, authorising the UN Secretary-General to create an international civilian presence in Kosovo with the aim of establishing autonomy and self-governance within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In this regard, the UNMIK was established with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999. Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf. Essentially, the UNMIK aimed to develop provisional institutions to which it could progressively transfer its responsibilities, without deciding on the future status of Kosovo. This was the first time that the UN had been entrusted with such a broad mandate, being given full responsibility for the administration of a territory. East Timor followed only few months later. Alexandros Yannis, “Kosovo under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict”, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 2001, p.16. Accordingly, the tasks of UNMIK were challenging, and the UN was not adequately prepared to fulfil this broad mandate. The main tasks of UNMIK according to Resolution 1244 were: first, to establish a functioning interim civil administration, including the maintenance of law and order; second, to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government, including the holding of elections; and third, to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status. Ibid, p.17. Resolution 1244 explicitly welcomed all contributions from other international organisations, thus providing for some sort of post-conflict division of labour and thereby assigning a role to the different international organisations involved. Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert, “How Effective Is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2001, p. 561 UNMIK, led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRGS), functioned under the direction of four components called Pillars, headed by Deputy SRGSs and supported by specific international organisations. In the first ever operation of its kind, UNMIK initially brought together four “pillars” under United Nations leadership. Pillar I (humanitarian assistance), led by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pillar II:  Civil Administration, under the United Nations, Pillar III: Democratisation and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Pillar IV:  Reconstruction and Economic Development, managed by the European Union (EU). Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12.html . Pillar IV, referred to as the “European Pillar”, dealt with economic development. In fact, the EU’s contribution to UNMIK was not restricted to financial support, but it also sent experts and recruited local manpower. Michael Karnitschnig, “The United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo-The Challenges of Joint Nation-Building”, op.cit., p.327. Of course, the establishment of personal links between the EU and UNMIK through Pillar IV helped the EU gain experience in the Balkans through the help of the UN’s expertise in administrating transition countries and consequently contributed to creating synergies between the two organisations. Parallel with its cooperation with the UN, the EU played a crucial role in the stabilisation and reform process of Kosovo since 1999 through the tools of its Stabilisation and Association Process. In June 1999 the European Commission established a Kosovo Task Force on the ground in order to put its stabilisation and reconstruction programme into effect. The EU granted aid to Kosovo through the European Agency for Reconstruction The European Agency for Reconstruction was created by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2667/2000 of 5 December 2000, OJ (7 December 2000) L-306/7. in the framework of “Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS)”. Since 1999, the EU has provided Kosovo with significant financial assistance, and has become the leading donor. Its assistance shifted smoothly from reconstruction and the generation of energy supplies, to institution-building and rule of law. As the largest donor in Kosovo, the EU had leverage in the implementation of policy reform goals. However, the difference between UNMIK and the EU objectives and aid priorities precluded the use of EU aid in Kosovo in a more effective way. Indeed, the increasing divergences between the EU and UNMIK on economic policy issues, especially on the privatisation process, caused problems. The complex relations between the numerous actors, UNMIK’s leadership, Pillar IV, the EU and the UN Headquarters (UNHQ), together with the growing political pressures, made it difficult for the UN and the EU to gain consensus on some critical questions, particularly in the context of privatisation, and this led to questions regarding the competence achieved between the two organisations working together. In this respect, the privatisation project became a test case for the future of UN-EU cooperation and ended up by impacting negatively on its development. Michael Karnitschnig, “The United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo - The Challenges of Joint Nation-Building”, op.cit., p. 328. Another dimension of the EU’s contribution to UNMIK was the application of autonomous trade measures (ATMs) in Kosovo, creating a separate customs territory with a trade policy independent from that of Serbia. In addition, the EU`s membership perspective for Kosovo obliged both UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) to follow the EU’s suggestions and practices. The establishment of a specific Kosovo SAP Tracking Mechanism (STM) by the European Commission in November 2002 led to much closer coordination between EU, UNMIK and PISG experts in the area of reforms to be implemented in Kosovo. The establishment of a joint-recommendation mechanism between these three actors in the field led to an increased EU presence in Kosovo both at political and operational levels. The EU, by supporting Kosovo in all these fields, increased its political clout and was consequently granted a leading role in settling Kosovo’s reform process and its final status. Ibid, p.340. Thanks to the EU’s willingness to be present diplomatically on the ground during and after the negotiations for its settlement, Kosovo was pushed into working very closely with the UN, especially during the status talks, which started in 2005. The close involvement of the EU in the settlement talks led by the UN through its SAP also enhanced UN-EU cooperation in this complex quasi-state environment. Despite its limited intervention powers, the EU played an important role in building up the Kosovo’s capacity by using SAP’s tools, especially its conditionality, in managing an EU police mission under its ESDP and in assuring the rule of law. Kosovo’s experience was also a test case for the future of the ESDP, which assumed its biggest mission through EULEX Kosovo Currently EULEX has 500 international and 200 local staff on the ground. When fully deployed, its full strength will comprise 1,900 international and 1,100 local staff. - a police and civilian rule of law mission –the largest ESDP Mission to be deployed to date, which includes civilian police, prosecutors, judges and customs officers. Alexandra George, “Ten Years of ESDP Missions: The European Way for Attaining Global Peace and Security”, Eulex Kosovo European Union Rule of Law Mission, 17 November 2009. Available at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/features/0011.php Despite the divergence among the EU member states over the possible recognition of independent and sovereign state of Kosovo, on February 4, 2008, almost two weeks before Kosovo’s declaration of independence of 17 February 2008, the EU approved EULEX to Kosovo within the framework of the ESDP. The central aim of EULEX was to assist and support Kosovo’s institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in becoming more sustainable and accountable, developing into inter-ethnic services and acting independently from political interference and according to the best possible international and European standards. Giovanni Grevi, “EULEX Kosovo” , in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009), Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies ( ISS), 2009, p. 357. In this regard, the initial objective of EULEX was to take over - from UNMIK - the civilian mission established in the Serbian province following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999. The legal basis for the mission was created in a Joint Action resolution of the European Council of 4th February 2008. Vedran Džihić and Helmut Kramer, “Kosovo After Independence: Is the EU’s EULEX Mission Delivering on its Promises?”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, 2009, p.15. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/06571.pdf. However, the strong opposition from Serbia, which demanded approval from the United Nations Security Council, obliged the EU to start using the term “reconfiguration” of an option, sought on the basis of which Resolution 1244 would remain in force; EULEX, however, would, within the framework of UNMIK’s mandate, take over the central role as a “Rule of Law Mission”. Vedran Džihić and Helmut Kramer, op.cit., p.16. Available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/06571.pdf . In the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council of 12 June 2008, a “Six-Point Plan” was outlined, and the new UN strategy formulated: The EU/European Union would: play an enhanced operational role in the area of the rule of law under the framework of resolution 1244 (1999) and the overall authority of the UN/United Nations; gradually assume operational responsibilities in the areas of international policing, justice and customs throughout Kosovo. The Six-Point Plan enabled the EU to save its diplomatic face and forge ahead, after the initial legal chaos, by setting up the EULEX mission, which officially commenced on 9th December 2008. “EU Kosovo mission finally on track as US joins”, Euractive.com. Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-kosovo-mission-finally-track-us-joins/article-176723. In 2009, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was transformed into a smaller mission with a greater political focus. At the end of June 2009, the mission completed its reconfiguration, which the Secretary-General had initiated in response to the changed situation on the ground, notably the deployment of the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in December 2008. Finally, the EULEX declared that is was fully operational in April 2009. See United Nations Peace Operations 2009, Year Review. Available at : http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2009.pdf. Today, it seems clear that both the UN and the EU have gained important experience in the Kosovo case by testing their organizational capacity and institutional efficacy during status settlement and state-building of “failed states”. The two organizations learned important lessons from Kosovo for their future international state-building efforts and their cooperation in the management of crisis and the prevention of conflict. CONCLUSION Although the EU, as a regional system sui generis, and the UN, as a global organisation, are collective actors with a long history of ever-deepening relations, their cooperation in crisis management is a new inter-organisational field. The threats emerging from significant shifts in international politics, regional crises and failing/failed states have paved the way for a closer cooperation between both organizations on all security issues. The increasing awareness of the fact that all security challenges are interrelated and that no single international actor can tackle the new security threats unilaterally, has opened the path toward strengthening their internal effectiveness and reconstructing their cooperative identity in the field of security. In this regard, the Iraqi crisis in 2002/2003 certainly played a crucial role . On the one hand, the “drift” among the EU member states over any eventual support for US-led military intervention against Iraq forced the leaders of the EU’s major states, especially France and Germany, to increase the full operational capability of ESDP through promoting UN-centred effective multilateralism. On the other hand, the relationship between the United Nations and the EU in crisis management has undergone major changes over the last ten years. Today the EU appears an indispensable partner of the UN in crisis management and conflict prevention. Since 2003, through its own security strategy, the EU has been much more involved in crisis management in collaboration with the UN, and the growing interdependence between the two organisations has become more tangible. In addition, the EU’s increasing external and internal effectiveness in the UN, including the UNSC, have also played a significant role in empowering the UN-EU cooperation and promoting effective multilateralism. As argued by Thierry Tardy, “from the very beginning, this relationship has been shaped by a presumption of a mutually-beneficial cooperation between two natural partners on the one hand, the inherent limitations to cooperation between two security actors on the other hand.” Thierry Tardy, “United Nations - European Union Relations in Crisis Management”, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2008: Partnership - The United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, p. 1. In this sense, despite the strong willingness of the two organisations to make this relationship more constructive, some limits to the implementation of “effective multilateralism” on the ground have persisted. The UN insists that the EU should participate not only in UN-led operations usually under a subcontracting model, but also in UN-mandate operations. Yet this demand has not always found a positive response on the European side. The EU prefers autonomous decision-making in the ESDP and has a more flexible approach to UN-EU cooperation, and therefore finds it hard to fulfill all the UN’s demands. Furthermore, in a highly politicised area such as crisis management, the two actors do not necessarily adopt the same approach to crisis; moreover, both are working in period of transition that is forcing them to focus more on their internal reform process than on revitalising their partnerships. Idem., Ibidem. However, although the UN-EU relationship in crisis management started only twelve years ago, it has since gone through a process of institutionalisation that has no equivalent with other regional organisations. Through the concrete examples of the ESDP missions in support of the UN, one can argue that the UN-EU partnership in crisis management gave an added value to the EU, the new security provider, despite its shortcomings on the ground. “Even though the ESDP grew out of its very status nascendi during the operational premiers, it is still an adolescent project of the European Union.” Manuela Scheuermann, “The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, EU-Grasp Working Papers, Working Paper N.14, 2010, p.25. As it has proved right on the ground in the initial UN-EU operations respectively in Artemis 2003 and Eurofor DR Congo 2006, the EU played a more leading role than the UN in institutionalising the UN-EU partnership on a level beyond case-by-case contacts. Ibid., p. 17. The cooperation of the two organisations in Kosovo’s state building process gives hope for future joint actions of the UN and of the EU vis-à-vis any failing or failed states. One of the major constraints to further developments of this inter-organisational cooperation was the fact that the two organizations have different strategic and institutional cultures, which hindered smooth collaboration. The existence of different approaches of multilateralism of the UN and the EU, and the fact that the UN is still considered by many EU member states as an arena for national diplomacy, seem to increase the ambiguities of UN-EU cooperation. Another hindrance to an improved UN-EU relationship in crisis management “comes from the tension between on the one hand the need to institutionalize as much as possible the relationship, and on the other hand the specificity of each situation that makes any standardized approach difficult.” Thierry Tardy, op.cit., p.13. Finally, another important constraint that faces UN-EU cooperation in this field is that the strong demand of the EU for autonomy and visibility as a single actor has limited a credible commitment to effective multilateralism. A further constraint is linked to the absence of a single EU voice in the UNSC, especially in time of crisis. When there is no cohesion between the EU member states, they prefer to act individually. The overemphasis on national interests by the EU member states in the UNSC damages the EU’s actorness in European common foreign policy; without the Europeanisation of its foreign policy, the EU is unlikely to ever be a single actor within the UN. PAGE 1