Sohaira Siddiqui*,
In her article, “Islamic Legal Studies: A Critical Historiography,” published
in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, Ayesha Chaudhry criticizes the
field of Islamic law, and Islamic studies more broadly, for promoting
two hegemonic methodologies: White Supremacist Islamic Studies and
Patriarchal Islamic Studies. She argues that these modes of scholarship
perpetuate patriarchy, decenter Muslim narratives, privilege precolonial
texts, and create barriers to entry into academia. Her resolution is a new
form of Islamic studies—Intersectional Islamic Studies—which seeks to
recenter Muslim narratives, is committed to social justice, and exposes the
problematic power structures within academic inquiry. Chaudhry argues
that scholarship produced using the first two methods is “bad scholarship,”
whereas scholarship produced using the third method is “good scholarship.” In this article, I problematize the dichotomy between “good” and
“bad” scholarship and argue that Chaudhry’s methodology is restrictive,
hegemonic, and detrimental to meaningful scholarly engagement.
ON PUBLICATION, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law sparked a
wide-ranging and provocative scholarly debate. This was largely due to
its opening essay, “Islamic Legal Studies: A Critical Historiography,” by
*Sohaira Siddiqui, Georgetown University Qatar, 3300 Whitehaven St., NW., #B116, Washington
DC, 20007-2401, USA. Email: szs8@georgetown.edu. I would like to thank my colleagues and the
JAAR’s anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback on earlier versions of this article.
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XX 2019, Vol. XX, No. XX, pp. 1–33
doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfz101
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Academy of
Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
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Good Scholarship/Bad
Scholarship: Consequences of
the Heuristic of Intersectional
Islamic Studies
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion
1
Chaudhry oscillates between a critique of Islamic law and a general indictment of Islamic studies;
as she advocates Intersectional Islamic Studies as a method, her critique is best read as one of the entire field, using the study of Islamic law as a specific case study.
2
Certain debates on this article took place on private listservs and social media accounts and are
thus not easily documented. In response to some public critiques, Anver Emon and Rumee Ahmed,
the editors of the Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, posted a statement on The Immanent Frame
website, entitled “Smuggling Scholarship—In re The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law” (Emon and
Ahmed, 2019).
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Ayesha Chaudhry (Chaudhry 2019, 5–44). The essay, ostensibly a historiographical analysis of the study of Islamic law in the Western academy,
is in fact an indictment of the field of Islamic studies, its methodologies,
and the lack of sustained moral engagement by its scholars.1 The essay has
been widely read and has generated intense debate on social media and
academic listservs.2 Some have critiqued Chaudhry for her ad hominem
attacks and lack of critical academic engagement; others have praised her
intervention in the field of Islamic studies as groundbreaking.
Like Chaudhry, I am a cisgender, heterosexual, Canadian SouthAsian Muslim woman, and I share some of her assessments of the field
and her commitment to eradicating patriarchal and white supremacist
domination, both implicit and explicit. Ironically, however, her critique
of Islamic studies strips me of the agency to determine the nature of my
scholarship and the potential of my scholarship to be both informative
and transformative in ways that she fails to acknowledge or theorize.
This article is composed of four sections. In the first section, I analyze Chaudhry’s dichotomization of “good and bad scholarship” and
place it against the backdrop of her own scholarship on gender violence,
Islamic law, and Quranic exegesis. In the second section, I examine
intersectionality within feminist studies as a method of analysis and in
the third section I explore current methodological debates in Islamic legal
studies and Islamic studies more broadly. By highlighting these debates
in feminist studies and Islamic studies, I argue that Chaudhry’s methodological critiques are not new and that her interventions should be
situated within ongoing productive scholarly conversations. Finally, in
section four, I discuss the potential consequences of adopting Chaudhry’s
Intersectional Islamic Studies (IIS) method as the only method of “good
scholarship” in the field. I argue that her method and classification of
scholarship has four detrimental consequences: (1) it radically circumscribes the agency of scholars who offer understandings of history and
tradition that diverge from those of Chaudhry’s; (2) it undermines any
meaningful engagement among scholars with different methodologies and
normative projects; (3) it encourages the type of superficial performative
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
3
DISPLACING WHITE SUPREMACIST ISLAMIC
STUDIES AND PATRIARCHAL ISLAMIC STUDIES
Chaudhry begins by noting that she will examine the “politics of
knowledge production” in Islamic studies to challenge current methodological trends and propose a new method for scholarly engagement
(Chaudhry 2019, 6). She divides Islamic studies into two branches
she calls White Supremacist Islamic Studies (WhiSIS) and Patriarchal
Islamic Studies (PILS). She traces WhiSIS to the Western academy,
founded by white men who claimed to set the standard for good scholarship. According to Chaudhry, the standard for good scholarship according to WhiSIS has four elements: (1) objectivity; (2) a focus on
precolonial texts and decentering of the everyday Muslim experience;
(3) a mastery of Arabic; and (4) an avoidance of moral stances. Defining
scholarship solely on the basis of these four elements, Chaudhry asserts,
creates a restrictive notion of legitimate or good scholarship (Chaudhry
2019, 10–16). Even more problematic, for her, is that WhiSIS “condones
what is immoral” because “it acquiesces to and legitimates a patriarchal
version of Islam because all of its privileged texts were written by men
in patriarchal social and historical contexts” (Chaudhry 2019, 14–15).
Thus, WhiSIS scholars not only exclude Muslim voices but also support and perpetuate patriarchal understandings of Islam by privileging
precolonial texts. Moreover, for Chaudhry, this category of scholars includes the “Muslim scholar of color who writes and speaks in the language of WhiSIS” (Chaudhry 2019, 15). These Muslim scholars replicate
the iniquities of WhiSIS to gain acceptance into a field that, ironically, is
constructed to exclude them.
Like WhiSIS, PILS emerged during the colonial period but is not
limited to the Western academy—it is pursued in “secular and religious
universities, in madrasas and in governments, in NGOs and think tanks”
(Chaudhry 2019, 16). PILS prides itself on representing Muslim beliefs and
practices, but, like WhiSIS, it does so in a narrowly defined way. The key
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behavior that, in her view, Islamic studies currently promotes; and (4) it
collapses the distinction between the analytical and the political, reducing
scholarship to an instrument to justify certain political positions. Though
Chaudhry aims to liberate Islamic studies from the dominant structures
of power, her project of Intersectional Islamic Studies is not free from
the dynamics of politics and power she critiques and may result in new
forms of hegemony and power that could limit the agency of Muslim and
non-Muslim scholars alike.
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion
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elements of good scholarship in PILS are (1) a focus on medieval texts; (2)
a privileging of “maleness and adherence to a particular patriarchal performance of faith as the key to true knowledge of Islam” (Chaudhry 2019,
17); (3) a commitment to faith, which is often performative in nature; and
(4) a commitment to the historical past as the “true” and “real” locus of
Islam. According to Chaudhry, PILS scholars are either male or privilege
the male, focus on a precolonial past, and use performative acts of faith
to include or exclude individuals (Chaudhry 2019, 20–23). “[W]omen, by
virtue of their gender are disadvantaged” and are relegated to the fringes
if the performative elements of their religious practice fail to adhere to the
standards established by PILS scholars (Chaudhry 2019, 20).
According to Chaudhry, PILS and WhiSIS share a focus on precolonial
texts, an explicit or implicit commitment to patriarchy, and the demand
for performativity on the part of all who seek to participate (Chaudhry
2019, 20). By not challenging established WhiSIS and PILS standards of
scholarly excellence within the field of Islamic studies, Chaudhry argues,
scholarship not only serves projects of domination but also perpetuates
them. It is this fear of perpetuating projects of domination that serves
as the catalyst for Chaudhry to advocate for a new approach to Islamic
studies: Intersectional Islamic Studies (IIS).
IIS directly responds to what Chaudhry regards as the morally questionable aspects of WhiSIS and PILS. For scholarship to be “good,”
Chaudhry postulates that it must possess five interconnected elements:
(1) a commitment to social justice; (2) a recognition that scholarly subjectivity and positionality are important; (3) a recognition that true objectivity is impossible and that scholarship “is always produced in a nexus
of power” (Chaudhry 2019, 27); (4) a demand that all scholarship be
morally accountable; and (5) a recognition that the Quran is a “meaninggenerating” text that belongs to “living communities” and that “good
scholarship” must therefore engage Muslim voices (Chaudhry 2019, 27).
Unlike WhiSIS and PILS, IIS eschews a focus on the precolonial Islamic
world and centers the scholarly gaze on living communities and voices.
IIS scholars are committed to social justice, are cognizant of the power
structures they inhabit, and demand moral accountability. Any scholarship that fails to abide by these standards is “morally failed,” “irrelevant,”
and “bad” (Chaudhry 2019, 29).
The fixation on precolonial texts is one of the central elements of
Islamic studies scholarship that Chaudhry seeks to displace through the
promulgation of IIS. In her view, precolonial Islamic texts legitimize a
“patriarchal version of Islam” that reflects the contexts in which they were
produced. The argument follows from her monograph, Domestic Violence
and the Islamic Tradition (Chaudhry 2013), in which she catalogues a
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
5
3
Chaudhry acknowledges the diversity of precolonial discourse when she states, “The Islamic tradition is indeed complex and varied, and includes disciplines such as theology, jurisprudence, mysticism, lexicology, philology, exegesis, philosophy, legal theory, and more. For the purposes of this
study, we will examine the two most relevant disciplines, Qur’anic exegesis and Islamic law.” Be that
as it may, Chaudhry also argues that her conclusions apply to all precolonial intellectual production
(Chaudhry 2013, 15).
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range of historical interpretations of Q. 4:34. To her dismay, she finds that
precolonial Muslim exegetes and jurists uniformly condoned the physical disciplining of wives and espoused what she denotes as a “patriarchal
cosmology.” Chaudhry defines cosmology as “a representation of a perfect world, a vision of the world as it should be rather than as it is; in
the case of the Muslim scholars under study, idealized cosmologies are
visions of the universe as it would exist if all humans submitted entirely
to God’s laws” (Chaudhry 2013, 11). Patriarchy is not simply the result
of the contexts in which scholars write, but figures prominently in their
vision of a “perfect world.” The defining feature of this precolonial patriarchal cosmology is the belief that a woman’s connection to God is facilitated by her husband—a point Chaudhry considers morally repugnant.
Then, she conflates the “Islamic tradition” with precolonial scholarship
and argues that “…the ‘Islamic tradition,’ defined by pre-colonial Islamic
scholarship, obfuscates rather than facilitates a gender-egalitarian vision
of Islam” (Chaudhry 2013, 10). Chaudhry acknowledges the numerous
discourses and disciplines that constitute the precolonial tradition; thus,
it is perplexing that she essentializes all precolonial Islamic discourses as
supporting a patriarchal cosmology on the basis of juristic and exegetical
interpretations of Q. 4:34.3
In response to this precolonial patriarchal cosmology, Chaudhry argues contemporary Muslims have adopted an “egalitarian cosmology”
(Chaudhry 2013, 9,11). For her, WhiSIS and PILS scholars not only fail to
challenge patriarchal cosmologies but actively perpetuate them. Moreover,
to the extent that these scholars privilege precolonial texts, they do so at
the expense of everyday Muslims who today subscribe to an “egalitarian
cosmology.” The failure of WhiSIS and PILS scholars is thus twofold: they
fail in their moral duty to adopt a position that opposes “patriarchal cosmologies” and its acceptance of domestic violence, and they fail in their
scholarly duty to include Muslim voices.
By arguing that the precolonial tradition espouses a patriarchal cosmology and that engagement with precolonial texts is bad scholarship,
Chaudhry leaves little room for scholars to engage with the precolonial
tradition on terms other than hers. Moreover, by classifying precolonial
thought as “fundamentally patriarchal” and upholding a “patriarchal cosmology,” she treats all precolonial discourses through a unitary lens and
6
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form
and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established,
has a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the
practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and
proper performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point
of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it
should be modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to
other practices, institutions and social conditions). (Asad 2009, 14)
For Asad, the replication of an essentialized past, by rehearsing either
doctrinal tenets or cultural understandings, is not a proper understanding of, or engagement with, tradition. Rather, tradition informs
ongoing inquiry into Muslim beliefs and practices in contemporary
4
Though scholars and laypersons have presented new interpretations of Q. 4:34, these interpretations are varied. In section VII of her essay, Chaudhry provides conclusions from a survey of 200
Muslims in Canada and Malaysia on interpretations of Q. 4:34. She acknowledges that, although many
individuals surveyed do not condone domestic violence, some tolerate it (Chaudhry 2019, 37–40). In
her book, she discusses contemporary reinterpretations of Q. 4:34 in greater detail (Chaudhry 2013,
135–221).
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fails to acknowledge their relevance to contemporary Muslim communities. Ironically, Chaudhry perpetuates the same faulty intellectual approach
through which early WhiSIS scholars allegedly essentialized the Islamic
past. Undoubtedly, precolonial Muslim scholars wrote in patriarchal contexts, but to read all intellectual production through a singular lens is to
reject the dialectic between text, author, context, and interpreter (Gadamer
2013, 182–202). Chaudhry’s essentialism goes so far as to problematize the
current pedagogy in Islamic studies. Addressing the prerequisite of language competence in Arabic for Islamic studies scholarship, she states,
“But, because IIS centers Muslims in the study of Islam and Muslims, there
is no reason that Arabic should be a necessary prerequisite for scholarship
on Islam and Muslims. Most Muslims do not speak Arabic, nor see the
Quran as an authoritative legal text, nor live lives structured by Islamic
laws, or what they believe to be Islamic laws” (Chaudhry 2019, 29). Yet,
Chaudhry does not substantiate her assertion that the legal past has become both theoretically and practically irrelevant to Muslim communities
even if contemporary interpretations on Q. 4:34 have indeed shifted.4
It is the analytic problematic of flattening the Islamic past, the Islamic
present, and the discourse of rupture that Talal Asad seeks to remedy by
proposing a new methodological apparatus to approach the study of Islam
and Muslims. Asad suggests that Islam should be understood as a “discursive tradition,” which he defines as
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
7
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contexts. Discourses are informed by a past but are by no means limited
to it, and practitioners regularly make arguments for the modification or abandonment of past practices. According to Asad, the aim
of a tradition-based inquiry is not replication of the past, but a critical engagement with it. In this type of reading, one may recognize the
patriarchal elements of precolonial texts, advocate for their lack of relevance for modern Muslim communities, and reconstitute the tradition.
However, by reducing all precolonial Islamic thought to a product of
patriarchal cosmology, Chaudhry pits contemporary Muslim discourses
against the precolonial Islamic tradition as she defines it. Not only does
this argument assume a static monolithic tradition on the basis of interpretations of Q. 4:34, but it also leaves little room for a tradition-based
inquiry, even if the objective of that inquiry is to overcome precolonial
interpretations of Q. 4:34. Indeed, Chaudhry would regard a traditionbased inquiry, even if it challenges patriarchy, as “bad scholarship” because it adopts the methods of WhiSIS and PILS.
Chaudhry’s assessment of scholarship as good or bad echoes Mahmood
Mamdani’s distinction between good and bad Muslims, which he traces to
the post 9/11 era. In his book, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, “bad Muslim”
refers to Muslims whose political identities are seen as threatening.
Mamdani problematizes this distinction as the product of a state security
project introduced by George W. Bush as part of his War on Terror. This
good/bad distinction arises out of what he calls “Culture Talk,” which “assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and then
explains politics as a consequence of that essence” (Mamdani 2004, 17).
In defining premodern societies, Mamdani argues that Culture Talk takes
one of two positions. One position holds that “premodern people are notyet-modern” and therefore the past should be approached with “relations
based on philanthropy.” According to the second position, Culture Talk
assumes that the premodern is the antimodern, an approach that instills a
fear of the past (Mamdani 2004, 18). On this reading, “premodern” Islam
is not incapable of certain things that modern societies are capable of,
but fundamentally resistant to modernity and, therefore, the antithesis
of the modern. In other words, the premodern Islamic tradition is static
and inimical to change. Chaudhry’s distinction between good and bad
scholarship instantiates Mamdani’s good Muslim/bad Muslim dichotomy.
According to Chaudhry, by designating the precolonial tradition as its
locus of inquiry, bad scholarship “acquiesces to and legitimates a patriarchal version of Islam because all of its privileged texts were written
by men in patriarchal social and historical contexts” (Chaudhry 2019,
14–15). On this reading, scholarship on precolonial texts is not merely
8
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
INTERSECTIONALITY AND INTERSECTIONAL
ISLAMIC STUDIES
Kimberlée Crenshaw introduced the concept of intersectionality in
the 1980s in two ground-breaking articles focusing on violence against
Black women and the legal and social responses to it (Crenshaw 1991;
Crenshaw 1989). Crenshaw argues that although anti-discrimination discourses address gender and race, the focus of gender anti-discrimination
is white women, and the focus of race anti-discrimination is Black men.
The result is that Black women are marginalized in both discourses despite being the recipient of “double discrimination” (Crenshaw 1989, 149).
Regarding identity politics and classifications, she argues, “The problem
with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some
critics charge, but rather the opposite—that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup difference” (Crenshaw 1991, 1242). While maintaining
the “ongoing necessity of group politics,” Crenshaw notes that group politics pushes certain individuals within a particular group to the margins
(Crenshaw 1991, 1242). Intersectionality becomes a mechanism to recognize multiple identities within group politics, multiple axes of power,
and the problems associated with unitary understandings of discrimination. Over time, intersectionality has become a dominant analytical
method in the humanities, especially in women’s studies. Nevertheless, as
intersectionality has spread across disciplinary lines, scholars have questioned its value as a dominant analytic.
The contentious nature of intersectionality is captured in the “Key
This Keyword” panel at the 2014 American Studies Association conference. The panel, which convenes annually, facilitates scholarly debate on the utility of various keywords used in the field. Jennifer Nash
notes that “nothing generated more unease than intersectionality” (Nash
2017, 117). Despite initial enthusiasm for “killing” intersectionality as
a keyword, the conference audience was unable to agree on the merits
of this move and no consensus was reached. After the conference, Nash
observes, “Feminist debates around intersectionality—which I term the
intersectionality wars—have become particularly and peculiarly contentious. Nearly everything about intersectionality is disputed: its histories
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incapable of undoing the damaging effects of patriarchy, but is also resistant to recognizing patriarchy as a problem-space, because patriarchy is
the fundamental cosmological principle of precolonial societies and texts.
The only alternative to the fetishization of precolonial texts, Chaudhry
argues, is IIS.
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
9
It adapts to the different discursive and research protocols in these environments, perhaps modifying how race, gender, and other social dynamics are conceptualized. . . . Studies of intersectionality also begin to
conform to methodological standards and practices of each field and
strive to make central contributions to those fields. (Cho, Crenshaw, and
McCall 2013, 792)
Centrifugal intersectionality does not seek to displace disciplinary
methods and practices but takes its place alongside them—sometimes
interrogating them and sometimes enhancing them. As Cho, Crenshaw,
and McCall note, studies in this mode usually start as empirical and then
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and origins, its methodologies, its efficacy, its politics, its relationship
to identity and identity politics, its central metaphor, its juridical orientations, its relationship to ‘black women’ and to black feminism” (Nash
2017, 117–18). Though Nash begins her article by highlighting the discontent over intersectionality, she emphasizes new engagements with
intersectionality that demonstrate its continued resilience and scholarly
relevance.
Together with Sumi Cho and Leslie McCall, Crenshaw has undertaken
an appraisal of the scholarly use of intersectionality. They note three dominant uses: some scholars use the term to describe a framework for investigation, others interrogate its scope and content, and others use it to advocate
for political interventions. Clearly, intersectionality has many modes: it
can be used to evaluate, to interrogate, and to mobilize. Connecting these
three modes of intersectionality is their use as “a gathering place for openended investigations of the overlapping and conflicting dynamics of race,
gender, class, sexuality, nation, and other inequalities” (Cho, Crenshaw,
and McCall 2013, 787). Although intersectionality represents a “nodal
point” for “open-ended investigations,” it is most often used to raise theoretical and methodological questions. Because Chaudhry advocates for
intersectional Islamic studies as a new method of Islamic studies, it is important to understand how Crenshaw and others understand the use of
intersectionality as a method in disciplinary settings.
Cho, McCall, and Crenshaw insist that the goal of intersectionality is
not to demand “greater unity across the growing diversity of fields that
constitute the study of intersectionality” but rather to understand the
ways in which it has been deployed to see if there are potential avenues
of collaboration (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 792). They divide
intersectionality into centrifugal and centripetal methods. In the centrifugal method, intersectionality travels to other disciplines and countries,
where the following takes place:
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Here, scholars interested in intersectionality strike out mainly in the margins of their disciplines and are often skeptical about the possibility of
integrating mainstream methods and theories into their intersectional
research. As they are less beholden to disciplinary conventions, their projects may draw on a variety of methods and materials, integrating them
into innovative insights that might have otherwise been obscured. (Cho,
Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 793)
Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall recognize that the two intersectional methods
cannot easily be synthesized, even within a particular field. Although
they prefer the centripetal method, they specify that they “do not take
the position that centrifugal projects are inherently misdirected” (Cho,
Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 793). They add:
We are mindful that disciplinary conventions import a range of assumptions and truth claims that sometimes contribute to the very erasures to
which intersectionality draws attention. . . . At the same time, efforts to
produce new knowledge cannot dispense with the apparatuses through
which information is produced, categorized and interpreted. (Cho,
Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 793)
Thus, they recognize that although the “methodological insurgency”
of centripetal intersectional inquiry is necessary to discover “new,
cutting-edge methods,” the centrifugal method can also make disciplinary inroads. What happens when the two different methodological
modes of intersectionality are advocated within a single discipline? Cho,
Crenshaw, and McCall respond, “It would seem that the future development of intersectionality as a field would be advanced by maximizing the
interface between centrifugal and centripetal processes” (Cho, Crenshaw,
and McCall 2013, 794). Instead of allowing these two contrasting methods
to polarize scholars, they argue for the creation of spaces that allow for a
productive interface.
One might envision centripetal and centrifugal scholars working together to identify disciplinary dynamics that perpetuate domination.
Indeed, the success of intersectionality as method is not measured by
its unified application within disciplines but by its ability to generate a
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“inform theoretical and methodological interventions” (Cho, Crenshaw,
and McCall 2013, 792). Methodological interventions can be identified in
the fields of sociology, political science, psychology, and philosophy.
The second, centripetal method, operates on the periphery of disciplinary discourse.
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
11
Efforts to think critically about certain conditions involve active engagement with the analytical conventions and categories that make up
those conditions. That there are always elements of power embedded in
language, disciplinary methods, metaphors, and other signs is by now a
basic understanding that need not stymie the productivity of the field.
(Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 796)
They add, “We do not see literary or scientific or poststructural or legal or
any other kind of method as inherently antithetical (or central) to this enterprise” (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 795–76). Disciplinary methods
are laced with elements of power, yet the presence of power alone does not
immediately render a discipline or method irrelevant. Thus, intersectionality
is not a method for erasing power structures, but a method intended to expose them, with the aim of addressing them productively. This is exemplified in Crenshaw’s own work; invoking intersectionality to highlight the
legal marginalization of Black women at the hands of antidiscrimination
discourse that privileges white women and Black men, she works within the
discipline and methodologies of her field of legal studies.
Another advocate of intersectionality, Barbara Tomlinson, underscores the tension between the desire to challenge dominant disciplinary
trends and the distance that results from these modes of engagement. She
argues that “[r]eading, writing and arguing are material social practices
laced with ideologies of legitimacy and propriety so powerful and pervasive that we presuppose their value rather than examining their effects”
(Tomlinson 2013, 994). For Tomlinson, as for Crenshaw, every discipline
has “discursive technologies of power” that often limit scholarly discourse.
Criticizing methods that serve dominant discourses is essential, but one
cannot disregard all disciplinary methods. Responding to the frustration of feminist scholars, Tomlinson observes, “The torment of hope
makes disappointments and defeats hard to endure, generating a desire
for distance from prevailing paradigms, concepts, and theories that seem
tainted with failure” (Tomlinson 2013, 998). The result for her is that “feminist criticism can too quickly discard still-useful concepts and categories,
replacing them with ‘new objects and analytics in hopes of making its
investments come true’” (Tomlinson 2013, 998). At their core, according
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heightened awareness of the powerscapes prevalent in institutional and
academic settings that perpetuate domination and marginalization.
Intersectionality is best understood as an “analytic sensibility” reflecting
a specific “way of thinking and conducting analyses” and less as a methodology that requires rigorous and uniform application (Cho, Crenshaw,
and McCall 2013, 795). For Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall,
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion
Intersectional Islamic Studies
For Chaudhry, IIS is the only mode of “good scholarship” in Islamic
studies because it does not “replicate [the] racist, misogynist, classist structures of inequality” that characterize both WhiSIS and PILS (Chaudhry
2019, 25–26). She asserts that academics should be morally accountable in their scholarship and display a commitment to social justice.
Intersectionality helps scholars to identify and resist power structures in
WhiSIS and PILS and to ensure that scholarly assumptions regarding social justice are properly interrogated (Chaudhry 2019, 25–26). It targets
WhiSIS and PILS scholars who study Islam through “racist, misogynist,
classist structures of inequality” and also IIS scholars who assume they have
fully grasped the complexity of social justice work. Although Chaudhry’s
analysis of PILS and WhiSIS scholars is simplistic, she is surely correct to
highlight the Orientalist and colonialist roots of Islamic studies, the effects
of which remain with us today. However, this insight precedes her and it can
be traced to, at its earliest, Edward Said’s Orientalism (Said 1978). Because
scholars have broadly agreed on the genealogy of Islamic studies, I want to
focus on Chaudhry’s representation of IIS as a panacea for the methodological problematics in Islamic studies while taking into account the analysis of intersectionality by feminist scholars, including Crenshaw herself.
As I illustrated above, for Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall the centrifugal
method of intersectionality critiques disciplinary power structures and
modes of inquiry while integrating intersectional methods into the disciplines themselves. Centrifugal scholars are located at the center of their
disciplines, pushing boundaries from within. Centripetal scholars, by contrast, are on “the margins of their disciplines” and remain “skeptical about
the possibility of integrating themselves into mainstream methods” (Cho,
Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 793). IIS adopts the centripetal method,
which is less “beholden to disciplinary conventions” and promotes a type
of “methodological insurgency” geared toward displacing previously held
modes of disciplinary inquiry. Although potentially effective on the margins, the centripetal method may disregard useful methods and contributions in a manner that may be detrimental to the field (Tomlinson 2013,
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to Tomlinson, feminist projects have a desire for actual change in the inhabited world. The struggle against power structures within disciplines
can be exhausting and drive feminist scholars to despondency, sometimes
leading to an abandonment of disciplinary methods altogether. The result
is a closing of discursive spaces within disciplines.
In light of this reading of the uses and challenges to intersectionality,
how can we understand Chaudhry ’s call for IIS?
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
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5
Based on Chaudhry’s description of the scholar’s work and conversations with my colleagues,
I think it is likely that Chaudhry is critiquing the work of Aysha Hidayatullah (2014).
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998). As noted, for Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall, because power is always
embedded within disciplines, its presence alone does not justify discarding
disciplinary methods (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 796). To be clear,
the persistence of these power structures within disciplines must be exposed, but the purpose of intersectionality is not the eradication of power
qua power, which is not possible. Rather, it is to reveal these power structures, contend with them, and reduce their ability to discriminate and
marginalize. On this reading of intersectionality, Chaudhry’s call for the
replacement of current disciplinary methods in Islamic studies with IIS
can “stymie the productivity of the field” and accentuate tensions between
centrifugal and centripetal methods (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013,
796). Instead of collaborating to address structures and methods of dominance within the field, scholars increasingly will become polarized and
assume the superiority of their method of analysis.
Chaudhry’s arguments for IIS exemplify this polarization, demonstrated acutely in the way in which she assesses certain examples of
WhiSIS and PILS scholarship. For example, Chaudhry criticizes a “Muslim
woman of color” who analyzes IIS scholarship using the language and
logic of WhiSIS and PILS (Chaudhry 2019, 29).5 According to Chaudhry,
the woman argues that “Muslim feminists might be making the Quran say
something it doesn’t say, that it may not be as gender egalitarian as they
are claiming” (Chaudhry 2019, 29). Chaudhry dismisses this woman’s
thesis, accusing her of using WhiSIS and PILS methodologies to override “contemporary Muslim interpretation and engagement with the
text” (Chaudhry 2019, 29). The paradoxical trap into which Chaudhry
falls is that the analysis proposed by the Muslim woman of color is part
of “contemporary Muslim interpretation and engagement with the text”
that should not be discarded simply because it does not accord with the
methods and conclusions of IIS scholars. It is evident that the scholar in
question shares a commitment to justice and to the elimination of patriarchy, but her critique of feminist hermeneutics leads Chaudhry to classify her methodology as WhiSIS and PILS and to dismiss it as irrelevant.
Even worse than Chaudhry’s unwillingness to engage with the argument
is her refusal to allow this Muslim woman of color the agency to classify
her own scholarship as she so chooses, resulting in an incongruity between Chaudhry’s advocacy in theory and advocacy in practice insofar
as Chaudhry claims to promote the centrality of Muslim voices in IIS
scholarship.
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion
In both WhiSIS and PILS, these identities and their performance
matter more than the content of your scholarship. So that, no matter
how rigorous your scholarship is, if you’re the wrong color, the wrong
gender, the wrong race, or wear the wrong clothes (which is to say,
you’re the wrong combination of race, gender and religion, or if you
perform that combination in the wrong way) then your argument is
irrelevant because you are already disqualified from making an argument. (Chaudhry 2019, 22)
For Chaudhry, hyper-perfomativity is required of Muslims, especially
women, who seek to enter WhiSIS and PILS spaces. She argues that women
must conform to “an idealized patriarchal femininity” that is often reduced
to the clothes they wear (Chaudhry 2019, 21). She recounts instances in
which her own performativity vis-à-vis her sartorial choices was the lens
through which her scholarly engagements were evaluated. Here, I agree
with Chaudhry that the performance of Muslims, especially Muslim
women, is used at a litmus test for entry into conversations on Islam and
Islamic law. However, hyper-performativity is not emphasized exclusively
in WhiSIS and PILS spaces. As a Muslim woman who chooses to wear
the hijab, on countless occasions I have found myself in conferences, on
panels, and in spaces that would be classified as IIS spaces—according to
Chaudhry’s definition—where I was expected to hyper-perform. These
demands for performance were intended to convince others of my commitment to resist patriarchy, of my desire for change in Islamic law, and of
my recognition of the structures of dominance within the field of Islamic
studies. Other women in Islamic studies who wear the hijab have related
similar sentiments to me. Paradoxically, the IIS critique of performativity
creates what it seeks to remedy, thereby raising the question of how acute
and extensive the problem of performativity will be if IIS becomes the only
legitimate methodology in Islamic studies.
IIS also champions a commitment to social justice and demands that
all scholarship be morally responsible. However, the advocacy of social
justice presupposes that all scholars agree on a definition of justice and
generate a consensus on what a practical politics of social justice looks
like within an academic space. Social justice projects vary according to
the intersectional identities of the individuals in communities. Insofar
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Let us now consider some potential consequences of IIS in Islamic
studies. Chaudhry singles out three shared features of WhiSIS and PILS:
a focus on precolonial texts, a tacit or explicit commitment to patriarchy,
and a demand for performativity by participants. It is this third element
I seek to interrogate here. According to Chaudhry:
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as Chaudhry recognizes this, she is likely to agree that the investigation
into the nature of justice, and what constitutes a social justice project for
Muslims, does not take place in a vacuum. As Alasdair Macintyre has argued in his Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, concepts such as justice
and rationality are constructed through engagement with longstanding
intellectual and historical traditions. He adds: “Since there are a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histories, there are, so it will turn out,
rationalities rather than rationality, just as it will also turn out that there
are justices rather than justice” (Macintyre 1988, 9). Macintyre recognizes
that there is no agreed on method of rational justification that can be used
to evaluate discourses as “just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened
or unenlightened” (Macintyre 1988, 6). Eventually, he concludes, rational
justification must be the result of a tradition-embedded inquiry that seeks
to “transcend the limitations of and provides remedies for the defects of
their predecessors within the history of the same tradition” (Macintyre
1988, 9).
Accordingly, if IIS seeks to be transformative, it must engage in a
conversation that accommodates a tradition-embedded inquiry. One
way for IIS to do this is to adopt a centrifugal intersectional method that
leads to productive collaboration, as advocated by Crenshaw and others.
Accommodating a tradition-embedded inquiry within the centrifugal
method requires taking the past seriously as a point of departure, which
IIS does not do because it casts the precolonial Islamic past as patriarchal
and irrelevant. This means that IIS will resist constructing a shared notion of social justice through a tradition-embedded inquiry—even if that
inquiry seeks to transcend the past. Practically speaking, if IIS is the sole
method of good scholarship, its scholarly advocates will monopolize the
definition of social justice leading to both intellectual and performative
essentialism. To the extent that IIS scholars wield institutional power
through endowed chairs, tenured positions, research appointments, and
the like, they—like the scholarly advocates of WhiSIS and PILS they criticize—may demand hyper-performativity on the part of others. And even
if they do not demand hyper-performativity, junior scholars will be compelled to perform by virtue of their participation in the field. IIS would
substitute its own forms of domination for those of WhiSIS and PILS.
IIS, as advocated by Chaudhry, has clear weaknesses: It dismisses
precolonial texts, it closes off avenues of collaboration between centrifugal and centripetal intersectional methods, and it participates in the
politics of performativity. In making her argument, Chaudhry does raise
certain methodological points that demand further reflection, though
16
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
THE MANY MODES OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
In response to critiques of scientific objectivity and the promotion of
pure reason in universities, scholars in the humanities have had to contend
with the introduction of new discourses and adapt to shifting methodologies and competing modes of inquiry (Macintyre 2007). This evolving
process may be more evident in Islamic studies than in other disciplines
in the humanities because of its cross-departmental location in theology,
religious studies,6 and Near Eastern and Middle Eastern studies (Ernst and
Martin 2010, 3). These departments have their own genealogies and preponderant frameworks, whether the American Protestant theological tradition in the former two or the Orientalist7 tradition in the latter two cases.
The proliferation of subdisciplines within Islamic studies complicates the
matter further. Islamic law and Islamic theology each claim their own
scholarly frameworks and genealogies. Before turning to broader debates
within the field of Islamic studies, this section will provide an overview
of current methodological debates in the field of Islamic law in response
to Chaudhry’s characterization of her own article as a “critical historiography” of Islamic legal studies. This will establish that a productive methodological critique of the field has been underway for some time and that
Chaudhry’s failure to engage with these larger debates in her own intervention ultimately prevents productive collaboration and engagement.
Islamic Legal Studies: From Colonialism to Orientalism
It is widely accepted in scholarly literature that the study of Islam
and, specifically, Islamic law, is tied to the European colonial project.
Specific elements of Islamic law were either controlled or manipulated by
European colonizers to further their own economic and political agendas.
Islamic law was also characterized as irrational and barbaric in order to
legitimize its dismissal and replacement with European legal codes. In his
case study of colonial Algeria, David Powers demonstrates how French
6
According to Carl Ernst, the study of Islam in departments of religious studies was earliest advocated by Charles Adams in the late 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s up until the first decade of the
twenty-first century, the study of Islam grew exponentially (Ernst and Martin 2010, 5–8 and Adams
1974, 1–10).
7
On the impact of Orientalist modes of analysis on Islamic studies, see Albert Hourani (1992). In
these essays, Hourani explores the intellectual history of European Orientalism and its impact on the
discipline of Islamic studies.
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these points are not original and merely restate existing insights and ongoing debates within Islamic studies.
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
17
The persistence of legal Orientalism is a result of complex ingredients;
European power, intellectual credibility and subtlety as well as racism.
It does not merely assert power, but it also uses the superior location
that power provides to motivate an intellectual system which necessarily
subjects Islam to European evaluation. (Strawson 1995, 21)
In the postcolonial context, this persistence of legal Orientalism continues
to shape scholarly engagement with Islamic law and sustains the conclusions and methodological assertions of early Orientalist scholars. This is
evident in the Orientalist preoccupation with the question of the origins
of Islamic law, which applies the historical-critical method to trace the development of Islamic law to reveal its indebtedness to other legal systems
and to investigate the authenticity of the Quran and hadith (Hallaq 2002,
6–19).8 By using historical-criticism and philology, Orientalists present
8
Wael Hallaq argues that the Orientalist paradigm still operates in the works of scholars such as
Patria Crone (see Crone, 2002). The most influential early Orientalist scholars are Ignaz Goldziher
and Joseph Schacht (see Goldziher 1967; Goldziher 1980; Schacht 1982; Schacht 1979).
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colonial officials used legislative enactments that weakened family endowments as a way of overcoming restrictions on the purchase of land.
Aware that the optimal way to remove family endowments was to discredit the institution in the eyes of Muslims, French orientalists published
studies on endowments based on “largely specious” evaluations of the
institution in Islamic history. They argued that family endowments, far
from being religious, actually “deviated from the pious and humanitarian
goals of public endowments and so were, from an Islamic perspective,
not only immoral but also illegal” (Powers 1989, 543). Other elements of
Islamic law, particularly Islamic criminal law, which colonizers characterized as uncivilized or contrary to modern norms, suffered a similar
fate. According to Jörg Fisch and Radhika Singha, the British abolition of
Islamic criminal law in India was a gradual process aimed at convincing
Muslim subjects that the British Penal Code would ensure the rule of law
and protect individuals from arbitrary and barbaric punishments (Fisch
1983; Singha 2000).
As evidenced above in the case of French Algeria, colonial elites often
relied heavily on Orientalist scholars to manipulate and classify Islamic law
in ways that benefitted colonial economic and political interests (Hussin
2016). This process, which included the translation of texts and the presentation of arguments in language that appealed to Muslim sensibilities, gave
rise to legal Orientalism, which continues to impact the study of Islamic
law today. John Strawson, an early critic of legal Orientalism, argues:
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion
Misconceptions and erroneous reconstructions of history plus an
underlying manipulation of basic principles of research. . . . have been
the function (nay, the necessary outcomes) of both a thoroughly negative
attitude toward Islam and its law and a programmatic construction of
discourse aimed at appropriating the Orient, physically and intellectually.
(Hallaq 2002, 6)
According to Hallaq, the same power that operated in colonial settings
and facilitated the physical and economic subjugation of Muslim populations continues in academic settings in which Orientalist scholars unleash intellectual violence on Islam in “service of power and domination”
(Hallaq 2002, 30). Islamic studies remains a site of colonialist discourse as
it investigates a narrow set of questions, upholds the veneer of objectivity,
reaffirms the erroneous conclusions of early Orientalist scholars, and assumes the superiority of Western legal systems.
In his Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge, Hallaq
argues that the Orientalist paradigm is indicative of a larger intellectual
problem plaguing secular humanism. He states:
For it is my argument that secular humanism, like liberalism, is not only
anthropocentric, structurally intertwined with violence, and incapable of
sympathy with the nonsecular Other, but it is also anchored, perforce, in
a structure of thought wholly defined by modes of sovereign domination.
(Hallaq 2018, 5)
The secular humanist engagement with the other, especially the nonsecular
other, always takes place through domination and violence. As such, the
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their conclusions as impartial and objective representations of Islamic
legal history. Though many scholars have subsequently challenged early
Orientalist skepticism towards scriptural sources and narratives of intellectual decline and have established new narratives of Islamic legal history
(Azami 1996; Brockopp 2000; Motzki 2001; Dutton 2002), many argue
that the question of the origins of Islamic law continues to cast a long
shadow over the field.
The most outspoken critic of Orientalism in the study of Islamic law
is Wael Hallaq. In his 2002 article “The Quest for Origins or Doctrine?
Islamic Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse,” Hallaq argues that the
Orientalist “quest for origins” reveals a longstanding “epistemological
xenophobia” that undergirds all Orientalist scholarship (Hallaq 2002, 21).
Orientalism is not simply a methodology but a paradigm that informs all
scholarly engagement with the Muslim other. He notes:
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Orientalist approach to the study of Islam is not an isolated intellectual
or academic problem but indicative of a larger structure of knowledge
and relationality that is defined by domination. Orientalism, therefore,
cannot be resolved by a simple methodological shift but requires shedding “secular humanism, anthropocentrism, colonialist potency, and
a sovereign epistemology” (Hallaq 2018, 25). According to Hallaq, this
dominating structure of modern knowledge infects all disciplines—economics, journalism, science—and has created a moral crisis that requires
a wholesale reevaluation of the “foundational assumptions,” “epistemological mainstays,” “discursive formations,” and institutions that allow for
its perpetuation (Hallaq 2018, 174).
Hallaq’s critique of the epistemological foundations of modern knowledge is peppered with reflections on how Islamic history may serve as
a counter discourse to the modern crisis of knowledge. In speaking of
“Oriental culture,” he argues that “in their organicist view of the world
and their reflective ways of living in it,” there can be “heuristic sources
for articulating new ways of thinking about the world and living in it”
(Hallaq 2018, 246). With respect to law, he argues that the modern notion of law, based on coercion and an external subject, can be positively
shaped by Islamic law and its recognition of “internal moral restraints”
(Hallaq 2018, 261). By ignoring the potential contributions of Islam to
Western discourses, Orientalism not only commits violence against Islam,
but also commits violence against itself by remaining willfully ignorant of
the moral crisis that it engenders and possible solutions to it.
Other scholars, though less critical than Hallaq, have also challenged
the resilience of legal Orientalism as a framework of inquiry (A. Ahmad
2016). Lena Salaymeh, in her The Beginnings of Islamic Law, critiques
Orientalist legal paradigms that force scholars to apply a “genealogicalhistorical approach” to Islamic law that assumes a singular moment of
origin followed by a linear development that eventually leads to decline.
Salaymeh argues the “origins framework” produces certain “essentialist”
features of Islamic law that are used to construct an origins story, to distinguish between “borrowed” and “authentic” elements of Islamic law, and
to create a notion of legal orthodoxy (Salaymeh 2018a, 2–4). Orientalists
also tout the genealogical-historical method as the most objective way to
study Islamic law, discounting other modes of inquiry as biased. She argues
that scholars should adopt a “critical historical jurisprudence approach”
that “begins with questioning dominant disciplinary methodologies, recognizing ideology in scholarly production, and identifying the limits of
modern terms and concepts” (Salaymeh 2018a, 11–12). Critical historical
jurisprudence seeks to shift the scholarly focus away from the questions
20
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
It must be asserted then that while the greatest majority of scholars may
entertain the noblest of intentions when they embark on the study of
Islamic and other non-Occidental cultures, their intentions and, at times,
their admirable work and erudition have little to do with how the aggregate literary production, as a cultural collectivity, percolates into a
paradigm that ultimately partakes in domination and endless forms of
violence. (Hallaq 2011, 407)
In these terms, the existence of substantive and methodological differences does not, for Hallaq, change the fact that Orientalism continues
to be a discipline of domination and subjugation. Although he acknowledges that Orientalists have “now largely abandoned explicit colonialist
claims over the ‘Orient,’” the structure of legal Orientalism remains tied to
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of origins, borrowing, and parentage towards a recognition of how power
and ideology shape the study of Islamic law. Accordingly, half of The
Beginnings of Islamic Law is dedicated to deconstructing three dominant
frameworks within the study of Islam: (1) the emphasis on the origins of
Islamic law, (2) the question of borrowing, and (3) the construction of
Islamic legal orthodoxy through a linear narrative history. In a more recent
article, “Historical Research on Islamic Law” in The Oxford Handbook of
Legal History, Salaymeh reviews Islamic legal historiographies produced
by Western scholars and argues that legal Orientalism has led to a limited
set of questions focusing on certain periods and privileging certain textual
traditions (Salaymeh 2018b, 761–69).
The broad critiques of Orientalism, as exemplified by Hallaq and
Salaymeh, are multifaceted and go beyond the argument that Orientalist
scholars served colonial power and often harbored contempt for Islamic
law. In response to “The Quest for Origins” and other works, David
Powers challenges Hallaq’s conceptualization of paradigmatic Orientalism
(Powers 2010, 130). According to Powers, despite his acknowledgement
of diversity within Orientalist opinions, Hallaq is not “interested in disagreements over methods and/or conclusions between and among these
scholars. Indeed, he denies—here—the very possibility of such disagreements” (Powers 2010, 134). On Power’s reading, Hallaq’s assertion that all
Orientalist scholarship is grounded in shared “epistemological assumptions” leads to a unified and unfair classification that overlooks divergences and disagreements on methods and conclusions. Responding to
Powers, Hallaq states that this reading is “wrong and unwarranted” and
notes that in his original intervention he explicitly states “Orientalism is
‘multifaceted and quite diverse in both its methodological approaches and
positive findings’” (Hallaq 2011, 389). Be that as it may, Hallaq insists:
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“the thought-structure of totalistic domination” (Hallaq 2011, 408). Like
Salaymeh, Hallaq points to restricted scholarly “topical selection” as evidence of the resilience of legal Orientalism. He asserts that research questions chosen by scholars “reflect the intellectual and cultural concerns
of Euro-American scholars themselves, rather than what was important
to first century Muslims” (Hallaq 2011, 412). Although Hallaq acknowledges that Powers is correct to highlight the diversity of opinions among
Orientalist scholars, he insists that the paradigm that facilitates their conclusions subjects Islamic law to Western scholarly interests and power.
Other scholars point to new challenges in the study of Islamic law. In
her article “The Politics of (Mis)recognition,” Lama Abu-Odeh warns of
the rise of “liberal Islamic law scholars” who privilege “medieval Sunni
legal thought” to the neglect of contemporary legal discourses (AbuOdeh 2004, 811). She analyzes the syllabi and pedagogical practices of
four prominent Islamic legal historians—Wael Hallaq, Khaled Abou El
Fadl, Frank Vogel, and Sherman Jackson—to argue that a new form of
Islamic legal scholarship presents an idealized notion of the past and produces a “fantasy effect” about the historical development of Islamic law.
In addition, she argues that these scholars fail to explore adequately the
“European legal transplant” into contemporary Muslim societies (AbuOdeh 2004, 791). This brand of scholarship, Abu-Odeh continues, is produced only in Western academia and finds no counterpart in the Muslim
world. This scholarship is not only biased but also “leaves the impression
with the uninformed reader that it is only when we look into the medieval that we can find the authentically Islamic and therefore the only (potentially) legitimate constitutions in the Islamic world must be derived
from that era” (Abu-Odeh 2004, 811). Abu-Odeh differs from Strawson,
Hallaq, and Salaymeh in what she considers to be the main problem of
Islamic law scholarship. She is less concerned with legal Orientalism and
more concerned with the scholarly dismissal of modern Islamic intellectual activity and its uncritical focus on the classical Sunni legal tradition.
She contends that “[g]iving Islamic law an overarching status analytically
in our approach to law in the Islamic world, distorts our understanding of
legal phenomena in these countries” (Abu-Odeh 2004, 823). Instead, she
argues, Islamic legal studies should be subsumed within a larger inquiry
into contemporary Muslim societies rather than operating as a distinct
discipline. The continued disciplinary isolation of Islamic law, for AbuOdeh, results in “self-exoticization” and uncritical scholarship. Abou El
Fadl, without directly responding to Abu-Odeh’s critiques of his scholarship, maintains that Islamic law is indeed a distinct field that should be
studied on its own terms. “We ought to be always mindful of the fact,” he
argues, “that there is not just a considerable amount of literature, but there
22
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
Islamic Studies: Questioning the Place of Normativity
At present, debates in Islamic studies9 largely focus on two methodological questions: (1) the extent to which historical and philological
methods should remain dominant methodologies in the field, and (2)
the legitimacy of normative arguments within scholarly inquiry. Though
I will focus on the second question, a few words on the first are germane.
The historical-philological method remains central to the study of
Islam despite the rise of new methodologies. Reflecting on the field in
2010, Carl Ernst and Richard Martin note that a focus on the study of classical Arabic texts and the scriptural sources of Islam can easily be identified in job advertisements. Though they concede to the importance of
precolonial texts in the study of Islam, they argue that “an exclusive focus
upon them leaves out an enormous amount of premodern Islamic civilization” (Ernst and Martin 2010, 13–14). As a result, when scholars study
Islam, “it is somehow convenient to gloss over the need to document and
trace multiple varieties and regional variations of Islamic religiosity in later
and recent history” (Ernst and Martin 2010, 13–14). The consequence
is that graduate students define Islam normatively through reference to
the past “without feeling the need to refer to the questions of contemporary scholarship and methodology” (Ernst and Martin 2010, 14). The
9
Carl Ernst and Richard Martin refer to scholarship on Islam produced after the critique of
Orientalism as a “post-Orientalist approach to Islamic Studies” (Ernst and Martin 2010, 4, 8–13).
They describe this approach as one “that includes the study of foundational texts but that insists
upon connecting them to questions and debates of contemporary scholarship across disciplines and
regions.” This post-Orientalist approach not only connects historical questions to contemporary ones
but also incorporates methods of inquiry from anthropology, sociology, and political science. In addition to these methodological developments, the impact of Said’s interventions and a further elaboration of them, continues (see Varisco 2007; Hallaq 2018).
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is a considerable amount of human lived experience with what constitutes
the law, the pathology of the law, and the patterns and behaviors of the
law” (Abou El Fadl 2019, 15).
Chaudhry misrepresents her argument as original scholarship by
failing to acknowledge that long before her intervention others had challenged the field of Islamic law for its colonial genealogy (Powers 1989),
its methodological and theoretical domination by the concerns of EuroAmerican scholars (Hallaq 2011), its subtle racism (Strawson 1995), its
narrowing of scholarly discourse by the privileging of certain texts and
discourses (Salaymeh 2018b), and its claim of objectivity. This too can
be said of Chaudhry’s critique of normativity in relation to WhiSIS and
PILS, which also follows a nuanced methodological debate within Islamic
studies that is still unfolding but is conspicuously absent in her essay.
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23
What was the relationship of the views of traditional jurists to those of
the present? Are there enduring themes in the Islamic legal position on
women and gender or do we see great variation over time? What are the
basic premises of the Islamic legal constructions of women and gender
and how have they been affected by historical contingencies? (Tucker
2008, 2)
In these opening musings, Tucker indicates that one should not assume
there is an epistemological rift between the precolonial and postcolonial
periods. She finds that her own work, which examines a period two centuries before the incident under question, can both illuminate and challenge contemporary understandings of Islamic law. It will be noted that
Tucker is a historian who does not explore Islamic law from a faith-based
perspective; nevertheless, her reflections raise the question of what relationship, if any, there should be between one’s scholarly arguments and
normative commitments.
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privileging of Arabic precolonial texts is indeed a problem that continues
to haunt the field. In What is Islam?, the late Shahab Ahmad, although
recognizing the importance of historical and philological methods, critiques scholars and methodologies that privilege the study of precolonial
legal and theological texts and use these texts as the basis to define Islam.
To displace a disciplinary and geographical focus on Islam that privileges
the Arab world and colonial narratives of Islam, Ahmad calls on scholars
to define Islam through the “Bengal to Balkans” complex and the “SufiPhilosophical” amalgam (S. Ahmad 2016).
Although S. Ahmad, Ernst, and Martin correctly point to certain historical fixations in Islamic studies, they recognize that scholars cannot
study the postcolonial period without considering precolonial legal and
theological texts, which, in subtle and profound ways, continue to affect
modern Muslim communities. An example is scholarship that evaluates the transformation of Islamic law during the British colonial period.
In his influential article “Framed, Blamed and Renamed,” Scott Kugle
surveys the consequences of British jural colonization on Islamic law
in India. Though much of Kugle’s analysis focuses on the application
and subsequent manipulation of English legal logic on Islamic law, his
characterization of Islamic law in South Asia rests on an evaluation of
the precolonial legal and textual tradition (Kugle 2001). Similarly, Judith
Tucker begins her book on Ottoman courts with an anecdote about a
woman who was condemned to death by stoning. She struggles to reconcile this event with her research from the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. She asks:
24
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
10
In the special issue, Russell McCutcheon, Aaron Hughes, Herbert Berg, John Kelsay, Richard
Martin, Ruth Mas, and Andrew Rippin contributed essays.
11
In the roundtable, Julianne Hammer, Elliott Bazzano, Jonathan Brockopp, Sarah Eltantawi, and
Zareena Grewal participated.
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The debate on normativity in Islamic studies, which has its roots in
the insider/outsider debate in religious studies, became acute after 9/11
when large numbers of Muslims entered the field of Islamic studies.
According to Caeiro and Stefanidis, these Muslim academics, unlike their
predecessors, operated in a social and political context that demanded an
Islamic reformation. This context placed a premium “on scholarship that
can help along the reform process while simultaneously building bridges
with Muslims” (Caeiro and Stefandis 2018, 76). In turn, the debate on
normativity assumed center stage, as exemplified by a public exchange
between Omid Safi and Aaron Hughes that was triggered by Hughes’ critique of Safi in his book, Theorizing Islam (Hughes 2012). Safi uploaded
his response, “Reflections on the State of Islamic Studies,” to Hughes on
the Jadaliyya website. Hughes countered with “When Bad Scholarship is
Just Bad Scholarship: A Response to Omid Safi” in the Bulletin for the
Study of Religion (Hughes 2014) and his 2016 book, Islam and the Tyranny
of Authenticity, in which he examines the consequences of normative
scholarship in Islamic studies (Hughes 2016).
In addition to the more public debate between Safi and Hughes,
there were also productive conversations and publications addressing the
question of normativity. The issue was first debated in a special issue of
Method & Theory in the Study of Religion (McCutcheon 2012, 309–13).10
Subsequently, in 2013, a roundtable at the American Academy of Religion
conference titled “Normativity in the Field of Islamic Studies” resulted in
a roundtable here in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion dedicated to this topic (Hammer 2016, 25–27).11 And most recently, the edited
volume Identity, Politics, and the Study of Islam (Sheedy 2018) has been
published. Normativity is now a part of the study of Islam and it cannot,
and should not, be removed. Normative arguments, in turn, should be
subject to the same debate and analysis as other scholarly works. As Anna
Gade remarks in her response to the Journal of the American Academy of
Religion roundtable, “I call for methodologically disciplined steps in order
to take Islam, when it is cast instrumentally as a production of projects
for change (possibly our own) also to be an object of phenomenological
study” (Gade 2016, 113).
Now that normative projects are articulated within Islamic studies,
scholars should ensure that these projects are subjected to analysis and critique.
However, Chaudhry’s categorization of WhiSIS, PILS, and IIS is constructed in
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
25
If constructs such as qiwamah, wilayah, fitna, bid’a, or sabr are deployed to silence Muslim women in the face of abuse and deprivation, the silencing properties of terms such as ‘patriarchy’, ‘oppression’ or ‘mansplaining’ cannot be simply
ignored or dismissed as epiphenomena of male paranoia. (Jackson 2018, 106)
Likewise, if Chaudhry characterizes any critical engagement with, or rebuttal of,
her argument, as I have undertaken here, as “supporting white supremacy” and
“upholding patriarchy,” she is discounting and limiting engagement.
Critical scholarship is most effective when it presents and is receptive to critique. Reflecting on her interventions in feminist theory, Saba
Mahmood notes “Critique, I believe, is most powerful when it leaves open
the possibility that we might also be remade in the process of engagement
in another’s worldview” (Mahmood 2006, 209). Mahmood emphasizes
the importance of remaining open to critique as her work seeks to reveal
forms of agency that are not captured within the “logic of subversion and
resignification of hegemonic norms” (Mahmood 2006, 180) that dominates Western feminist discourse. According to Mahmood, Western feminists conceive of agency in a narrow manner, focusing only on the moral
autonomy of individuals in the face of power. She finds that this framework is inadequate in understanding moral agents shaped by nonliberal
traditions. Mahmood claims that feminist theory is embedded within a
liberal tradition that makes specific political and epistemological assumptions that privilege Western women even as it critiques male-centric notions of power and agency.13 Specifically, she argues that poststructuralist
12
Jackson’s article is in response to Kecia Ali’s Al-Faruqi Memorial Lecture, “Muslim Scholars, Islamic
Studies, and the Gendered Academy,” at AAR in which she raises important and incisive critiques of the
manner in which women’s scholarship within the field of Islamic Studies is substantively neglected in secondary works. This follows forth from her 2013 article, “The Omnipresent Male Scholar,” (Ali 2013).
13
Mahmood states, “I question the overwhelming tendency within poststructuralism feminist
scholarship to conceptualize agency in terms of subversion and resignification of social norms, to
locate within those operations that resist the dominating and subjectivating modes of power. In other
words, the normative political subject of poststructuralist feminist theory often remains a liberatory
one whose agency is often conceptualized on the binary model of subordination and subversion. In
doing so, this scholarship elides dimensions of human action whose ethical and political status does
not map onto the logic of repression and resistance. . . . I want to argue that it is crucial to detach the
notion of agency from the goal of progressive politics” (Mahmood 2006, 186).
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a way that does not prioritize or emphasize the need for scholarly engagement.
By discounting the methods of WhiSIS and PILS, Chaudhry renders illegitimate any critique leveled against her scholarship drawing on these methods.
As I have argued earlier, because the disciplinary categories she constructs are
thinly theorized, it is easy for her to reject any rebuttals. Such simplification and
circumvention is not unique to Chaudhry’s approach. Lamenting the reductiveness of feminist critiques of Islamic law, Sherman Jackson comments12:
26
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
A richly configured political or intellectual morality bears an openly contestable character insofar as it must be willing to give an account of itself
and be tested against other accounts of the good. And it cannot encode itself as law, or in law, without losing its philosophical and spiritual depths.
(Brown 2001, 27)
The danger of normative scholarship in Islamic studies is its immunization from critique and its contention that it is the only form of “good
scholarship.” Chaudhry’s scholarship manifests both tendencies. She not
only presents IIS as the only option for the future of Islamic studies but
also characterizes it as the only moral option. By dismissing WhiSIS and
PILS scholarship as “morally failed” (Chaudhry 2019, 29) while calling for
scholarship to be “morally accountable” (Chaudhry 2019, 27), Chaudhry
introduces a type of academic moralism similar to the political moralism
against which Mahmood and Brown caution. Furthermore, by casting
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feminists subscribe to a notion of agency that supports a progressive political project that is not universal. Indeed, feminist scholars increasingly
warn against the universalizing nature of political projects and the collapsing of the distinction between the analytical and the political. In her
article “Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It,” Martha Minow identifies the risk feminist scholars take in “treating particular experiences as
universal and ignoring differences of racial, class, religious, ethnic, national and other situated experiences” (Minow 1988, 48). Minow notes,
“Feminists make the mistake we identify in others—the tendency to treat
our own perspective as the single truth” (Minow 1988, 56). To ignore this
warning and oppose critiques of your own work is to potentially replace
one hegemony with another. According to Wendy Brown, increasing political disorientation and political impotence have led contemporary academics to substitute one regime of domination with another. For her,
progressive politics contains an “impulse to wholly indict the structures of
the present and stake all on the absolute justice of a radically transformed
future” (Brown 2001, 20). In Politics out of History, she asks what happens when scholars of progressive politics realize that the objects of their
critique—state power, capitalism, injustice—are pervasive in society. For
Brown, the result is a form of political moralism that is identifiable in both
public politics and intellectual discourses. The danger of this moralism is
its unwillingness to accept critique, which paradoxically undermines it.
She writes: “The moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged
identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those
practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born”
(Brown 2001, 35). She adds:
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
27
UNIVERSAL IIS: A HEGEMONIC HEURISTIC
If IIS is accepted as the only method to produce good scholarship, it
may establish a new hegemony even as it seeks to subvert current power
structures in academia. This would radically circumscribe the arena for
meaningful scholarly engagement and reduce the agency of scholars to
research and discuss the precolonial Islamic world in ways that make it
relevant to lived Muslim communities. In her essay, Chaudhry singles out
the “Muslim scholar of color who writes and speaks in the language of
WhiSIS” (Chaudhry 2019, 15) and recounts negatively an anecdote about
a Muslim man engaged in such scholarship (Chaudhry 2019, 6–8). This
hints at the hyper-performativity expected of junior scholars, scholars of
color and, more generally, all scholars who challenge the widespread application and conclusions of IIS. The demand for hyper-performativity,
combined with the effort to insulate IIS from critique, would result in
an intellectual hegemony that undermines the discursive and contested
nature of knowledge that is the foundation of robust intellectual inquiry.
Until this point, I have focused predominantly on Chaudhry’s substantive assertions and put them in conversation with larger debates
within gender studies and Islamic studies. However, I would be remiss not
to mention certain fundamental shortcomings in Chaudhry’s article such
as inadequate citations, ad hominem attacks, and a basic failure to substantiate her arguments with evidence and footnotes. In response to these
methodological critiques of her article, editors of the volume in which
the essay was incorporated, Rumee Ahmed and Anver Emon, published a
short piece online entitled “Smuggling Scholarship” where they put forth
a defense of Chaudhry’s eschewal of academic standards. They argue that
she intentionally breaks the “positivist mold” of scholarship and seeks to
hold every reader to account, not just the ones cited. They state: “Without
citing a single article, the essay implies that every reader is on the hook for
enabling, perpetuating, and universalizing those arguments” and every
reader “would inevitably read themselves” as the subject of her critique
(Emon and Ahmed 2019). They conclude by disregarding what they label
as the “whimpering,” “lashing out,” and “fixating” of critics as simply the
cost of “subversion in institutions of higher education.” By arguing that
“every reader is on the hook,” Ahmed and Emon problematically universalize Chaudhry’s inadequately theorized and poorly substantiated claims.
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opposing methodologies as patriarchal and supremacist, Chaudhry seeks
to safeguard her assertions from substantive critique by drawing boundaries between good and bad scholarship on politicized moral lines.
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion
CONCLUSION
As the academic study of Islam expands, debates on its history,
methods, and future continue to animate scholarly exchange. Chaudhry’s
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In doing so, they exemplify precisely some of the dangers I have described
above regarding IIS. In their defense of Chaudhry, Ahmed and Emon
refer to Robin D. G. Kelly’s concept of the academic refugee and what
Fred Moten and Stefano Harney refer to as the undercommons (Kelley
2016; Harney 2013). In the former article, Kelly calls on Black students
to repurpose the resources of the university to serve their struggle, which
calls for critiquing the “fully racialized social and epistemological architecture upon which the modern university is built” (Kelley 2016). Kelly
ends his essay by praising students who are “ruthless in their criticism
and fearless in the face of powers that be” (Kelley 2016). But crucially he
states, “And they do this work not without criticism and self-criticism,
not by pandering to popular trends or powerful people, a cult of celebrity
or Twitter, and not by telling lies, claiming easy answers, or avoiding the
ideas that change us all” (Kelley 2016). Although Ahmed and Emon may
defend Chaudhry’s article as reflecting the ethos of the academic refugee,
neither she, nor they, display openness to receiving academic criticism
through a rigorous scholarly exchange with their work. Instead, ideological labels and personal experiences act as a subterfuge to evade proper
academic discourse. If IIS scholars can critique an entire field of study,
argue that their critique encompasses every scholar, and rely on an unscholarly methodology—providing no citations, no secondary source engagement—all while heralding their intervention as “subversive,” then the
ability of IIS to be hegemonic is already fully on display.
My critique of Chaudhry should not be used to deny or legitimize the
continued regimes of power and dominance that are active in the academic study of Islam and in Muslim communities more broadly. However,
as I have argued above, Chaudhry’s critique of power and dominance in
Islamic studies is not novel and should be read in light of longstanding
methodological debates and interventions. To this extent, the contribution of IIS to the exposition of power structures embedded within knowledge production can be most productive only when it is addressed in the
context of these wider ongoing debates. Building on Crenshaw’s reflections on the modes of intersectionality, centrifugal intersectionality may
be the most effective way to introduce new methods into Islamic studies,
to expose powerscapes, and to address regimes of power in a way that
does not promote new hegemonies.
Siddiqui: Good Scholarship/Bad Scholarship
29
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