China’s Development Assistance in Southeast Asia: A Threat to Japanese Interests?

RAYMOND YAMAMOTO China’s Development Assistance in Southeast Asia A Threat to Japanese Interests? ABSTRACT China’s growing development assistance has become commonly perceived as a threat to the autonomy and development of Southeast Asian countries that had been promoted by Japan in the past. This paper challenges that understanding by comparing China’s development assistance with Japan’s engagement in the region. The comparison supports an alternative perspective, which sees Chinese development assistance as favorable for Japan’s interests. K E Y W O R D S : Japan, China, ASEAN, official development assistance, Belt and Road Initiative INTRODUCTION From the beginning of its official development assistance (ODA), Japan has supported the economies of developing countries bilaterally and multilaterally, primarily through loans for economic infrastructure. Until recently, not much attention has been focused on China’s position as an active provider of development assistance.1 Though traceable back to the 1950s, this assistance remained largely overlooked for two reasons. First, until the 2010s, China’s RAYMOND YAMAMOTO is Assistant Professor at Aarhus University, Denmark, and Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum, Honolulu, USA. The author would like to express special thanks to Yang Jiang, Stephen Nagy, Hironori Sasada, numerous colleagues from his department, the Pacific Forum, and the East-West Center, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Email: <raymond.yamamoto@cas.au.dk>. 1. This paper uses a broad understanding of the term “development assistance,” to include all types of transactions contributing to the economic development of a country, even those not fulfilling the Development Assistance Committee’s definition of ODA. In that definition, ODA is a concessional flow ( 25% grant element) to developing countries provided by official agencies with the primary objective of promoting economic development and welfare. Most of China’s Asian Survey, Vol. 60, Number 2, pp. 323–346. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.  2020 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web page, https://www.ucpress.edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.1525/AS.2020.60.2.323. 323 324  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 contribution was small in scale compared to other donors and limited to Africa. Second and more important, Chinese projects have not been under international scrutiny, due to the lack of data accessibility. In contrast, OECD countries, including Japan, need to report their assistance to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which monitors the quality and efficiency of the individual development contributions. China’s not being a member of the DAC is also a reason why China’s efforts cannot generally be regarded as “official”—a status reserved for contributions approved by the DAC. Despite the lack of public data, China’s development assistance engagement began to attract great attention as the country increased its economic engagement in Southeast Asia through large-scale infrastructure investments, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. According to AidData (2019), which has been collecting data on China’s development projects, it grew more than five-fold, from US$ 13 billion in 2008 to US$ 70 billion in 2009. In the early 2010s, yearly development assistance spending leveled off at roughly US$ 40 billion. Development assistance continues to be important for China. As one of the most economically dynamic regions in the world, Southeast Asia has become the main target of China’s infrastructure investments, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the BRI, with its ambitious goal of connecting Chinese markets to the global economy though an international network of railways, roads, and waterways. Under the BRI, numerous new institutions were created to finance development projects, or more precisely infrastructure investments. In addition to the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, China’s BRI projects are supported by the Silk Road Fund (worth US$ 40 billion), the ChinaASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (US$ 10 billion), and the multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with capital of US$ 100 billion. Although the Communist Party of China has not published any clear plans, it is estimated that the total infrastructure investments under the BRI will require at least US$ 1 trillion (Hillman 2018). Not only the enormous investment figures but also the inclusion of the BRI in the party’s constitution in October 2017 show that development assistance has become the backbone of China’s future economic and foreign policy. Approximately - development assistance does not meet the DAC definition of ODA due to the low concessionality of its loans ( 25% grant element). YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  325 45% of Chinese BRI projects in 2017 were assigned to Southeast Asia (Lubin et al. 2018, 44). Japan, formerly the uncontested provider of development assistance in Southeast Asia, also began to increase its efforts in 2012, as part of a comprehensive policy package to revive the Japanese economy, commonly known as Abenomics. After 2008, the growing engagement of Japan in Southeast Asia was increasingly contrasted to the reduction of its ODA to China.2 In 2016, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō announced plans to invest more than US$ 200 billion through 2021 in the promotion of infrastructure projects worldwide. Even earlier, initiatives such as the Infrastructure Export Strategy (2012), the Revitalization Strategy (2013), and the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future (2015) indicated Japan’s strong commitment to infrastructure investment. However, in comparison to the scale of China’s investments, Japan’s considerable efforts are not sufficient to maintain its position as the leading provider of development assistance in Southeast Asia. China’s rapid advancement to this position has caused great anxiety. Its engagement has often been interpreted as a geopolitical strategy drafted by the leaders of the Communist Party to increase the country’s power and influence, pulling recipients of its development assistance into Beijing’s political orbit. According to this view, China has been deliberately providing large loans for economically unsustainable projects specifically to create dependency and coerce substantial concessions from the partner countries. Such criticisms especially concerned the case of Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. In 2018, the failure of the port development project to generate profitable revenues forced Sri Lanka to lease the port to China for 99 years to offset its debt (Abi-Habib 2018). China has thus been accused of pursuing “debt-trap diplomacy” through its development assistance loans for economic infrastructure as a part of a “grand strategy” to increase its global power. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who in 2018 announced an alternative fund (worth US$ 113 million) to finance economic infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region, has vocally promoted this view (Wroughton and Brunnstrom 2018). The same year, further investments of up to US$ 60 billion were enabled by passage of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. This was a measure that would not draw partner countries into “a sea of debt,” according to US Vice 2. In 2018, the Japanese government announced a complete cancelation of ODA to China. 326  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 President Mike Pence, also a well-known critic of the BRI (White House 2018). Unsurprisingly, the leading world power’s categorical rejection of development assistance cooperation with China due to ideological differences strongly influenced the international debate. Consequently, the view that China is using all the diplomatic tools available to challenge and rebuild the international order became conventional wisdom among commentators, journalists, and scholars. This perspective, which could be related to the China Threat Theory, suggests that Asia has become the stage for a new Great Game,3 where the logic of infrastructure geopolitics is applied as part of China’s “unrestricted warfare.”4 The proponents of the rivalry argument align with the claim of realist thinkers such as John Mearsheimer (2001) and Hans Morgenthau (1962) that China has been making use of all means available, including economic strategies, to increase its power position in Asia. Its ultimate goal would be to challenge the traditional dominant powers in the region such as Japan and the US. The term “geo-economics” has gained more popularity among scholars with China’s rise as a provider of economic infrastructure, defining development assistance as a complementary tool of power politics (Wigell, Scholvin, and Aaltola 2018). The theory predicts a zero-sum competition for influence, where a gain for one actor means a loss for the other, suggesting that cooperation in the field of development assistance is unlikely. Arguments aligned with such realist interpretations often refer to the Chinese proverb, “Two tigers cannot occupy the same mountain” (yi shan bu rong er hu). Does China’s emergence as a leading development assistance donor in Southeast Asia represent a threat to Japanese interests in the region? In a wider sense, this paper sets out to investigate the meaningfulness of the realist interpretation of infrastructure investments. The analysis deals with the philosophy and the actual practices of China’s development assistance, relating them to Japan’s past and current ODA engagement in the region. It finds more similarities than differences in the countries’ strategies. Considering these parallels, I propose an alternative to the conventional wisdom on 3. This term refers to the rivalry of the British Empire and the Russian Empire in their pursuit of control over Central Asia in the nineteenth century. 4. This phrase is part of the title of the controversial book by Chinese People’s Liberation Army colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, suggesting that China is waging war on the US, primarily through economic means. For an English summary translation, see Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point, 2015). YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  327 Sino–Japanese relations. The analysis ultimately uncovers more positive than negative implications for Japan’s national interests of China’s rise in development assistance. THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE DEVELOPMENT MODELS Before considering the influence of China’s development assistance in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to understand Japan’s ODA philosophy. It began in 1954, when Japan provided reparations and economic assistance to Burma (now Myanmar). As the first development assistance provider in Asia, Japan fundamentally shaped the understanding of economic development in many countries in the region. At the same time, the country determined the development assistance practices of evolving new donors, including China and South Korea. Although Japan did not have official development assistance principles until the first ODA charter of 1992, three characteristics distinguished its assistance from that of Western donors. The first was the principle of noninterference. Compared to other DAC donors, Japan has refrained from applying political conditionality to its ODA. Violations of human rights and democracy in recipient countries played only a marginal role. Japan primarily applied sanctions to avoid Western criticism, as in 1989, when it only briefly suspended ODA to China following the Tiananmen massacre (Furuoka 2005). Second, Japan has used its ODA primarily to finance economic infrastructure through loans. In 2017, 50% of Japan’s ODA was used to finance economic infrastructure, although the DAC average was 17% at the time. In contrast to Japan’s ODA, the DAC has mainly (34%) focused on social infrastructure (OECD 2019). Third, the target region for Japan’s ODA has been Asia, which has received 60% of its ODA. Only 8.8% was allocated to sub-Sahara Africa—the target of 22% of other DAC donors’ ODA, on average (OECD 2019). The character of Japan’s ODA spending is closely linked to the country’s postwar history. Japan’s ODA originated in the reparations the country was obliged to pay after the Second World War and the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. It was then an important tool for restoring relations with the neighboring countries in Asia, on which Japan had inflicted enormous suffering and damage during the war. The country’s own 328  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 experience as a former recipient of World Bank loans also left its mark on ODA practices. Japan used World Bank loans from 1953 on to finance large domestic infrastructure projects, including the Kurobe Dam, the Tokaido Shinkansen (high-speed railway), and the Tomei and Meishin expressways. Essentially, economic infrastructure became a catalyst for the economy’s growth after the war. The idea of economic infrastructure as the foundation of economic growth was so widespread in Japanese society that scholars often referred to Japan as a “construction state” (doken kokka). Given that Japan’s economic boom was shaped by the infrastructural expansion, it was hardly surprising that the country later took the economic-infrastructure-centered development approach as a blueprint for its ODA. Japan’s ODA was also shaped by external factors. The non-interference principle is an important example, as a norm crucial to understand the cooperation with Southeast Asia, the region primarily targeted by Japan’s ODA. The significance of ownership, the right of states to choose their own development path without external interference, had been raised in 1955 in the Bandung Conference, which gathered mainly representatives of the developing states of Asia and Africa. This was also the first major international conference attended by Japan after the Second World War, one year before it was admitted to the UN. The Bandung Conference was critical for Japan’s approach to development assistance: it coincided with the beginning of its ODA history tied to the conclusion of Japan’s peace treaty with Burma in 1954, which paved the way for the agreement on reparations and economic cooperation. The conference hosted many countries that had suffered under colonialism, thus highlighting the importance of recognizing their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Inspired by the Bandung Conference, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand made those principles the core norms of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration.5 Being responsible for immense suffering in Asia in the past due to its imperialist ambitions, Japan had to be very mindful of the non-interference principle adopted by ASEAN. Consequently, Japan avoided establishing a donor–recipient hierarchy, presenting itself as a partner of equal standing pursuing mutually beneficial economic relations. Yet, Japan could not always succeed in maintaining this view. On his Southeast Asian trip in January 1974, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei faced 5. The only ASEAN founding member that did not participate in the Bandung Conference was Singapore. YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  329 the largest anti-Japanese protests in postwar history—reaction to the country’s past selfish economic behavior (Halloran 1974). Japan was forced to restate the centrality of mutual benefits in the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977, which promoted “heart-to-heart” relationships with Southeast Asian countries. This was one of the main reasons that Japan preferred the term “economic cooperation” (keizai kyoryoku) over “aid” (enjo), the latter implying a donor–recipient relationship (Hasegawa 1975). Moreover, separating economic from political interests allowed Japan to interact with countries beyond the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, a significant advantage over the ideology-driven assistance of other OECD countries. Like Japan’s, the philosophy of China’s assistance was influenced by the Bandung Conference. China showed great support for the spirit of the conference as a victim of colonialism and imperialism itself. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai addressed the anticolonial spirit of the conference by stating, “We need to develop our countries independently with no outside interference and in accordance with the will of the people” (Wilson Center Digital Archive n.d.a). A decade later (in 1964), on a visit to Africa, Zhou listed “Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries” (Wilson Center Digital Archive n.d.b): 1. The principle of equality and mutual benefit 2. Respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries 3. Fair and affordable loans 4. Support for self-reliance and independent economic development 5. Fast and affordable projects 6. High-quality equipment and materials 7. Know-how and technology transfer 8. No special treatment for Chinese experts. The ideological principles proclaimed by Zhou have many similarities with Japanese ODA. It could be argued that consolidation of this approach in China derived not only from Bandung but also from its receiving Japanese ODA beginning in 1978. In return for natural resources, primarily coal and oil, Japan provided goods and technology, supporting the Four Modernizations that were envisaged to strengthen China’s agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology sectors (Zhang 1998, 60–63). 330  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 The Chinese foreign aid white paper of 2014 emphasized that the country continues to adhere to those principles by “not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently choose their own paths and models of development” (State Council 2014). Though this is often dismissed as mere rhetoric, there is no strong empirical evidence that China has deliberately acted against these principles and used development assistance to restrict recipient countries’ autonomy and development. The African continent, where China has been active for decades, is a good example. While issues undeniably did occur with some Chinese projects, the same is true of projects by Western donors (Easterly 2006). There is no universal strategy, in the DAC or other development institutions, to guarantee successful economic growth, given the varying needs of developing countries. However, Chinese development assistance has attracted strong criticism for its focus on economic infrastructure, in a sharp contrast to the social-infrastructure focus of the DAC. Despite great skepticism and contrary to popular belief, China has contributed positively to the development of many countries in post-independence Africa. African scholars such as Dambisa Moyo (2009) and James Shikwati (2012) have been active proponents of a development model that focuses less on poverty alleviation and more on economic investments, thus supporting the way China provides assistance. At the same time, research on Chinese development engagement in Africa finds that by no means was it less efficient than other donors’ development assistance with a stronger focus on social infrastructure (Brautigam 2009). Quantitative analyses also indicate that Chinese assistance in developing countries in Africa and other regions has generally had positive economic effects, particularly through projects targeting transportation infrastructure (Blum et al. 2018). Thus, the frequent charge that China is pursuing “predatory” loan practices needs to be addressed, given its strong influence on the academic debate. The examples commonly used by realist critics to portray China as a generally harmful donor need to be considered with caution. For example, the story that the Hambantota port was forced on Sri Lanka by China as a part of “debt-trap diplomacy” is oversimplified. The decision to realize the project with Chinese investors was based on a 2006 feasibility study by Ramboll, a Danish consulting company, seven years before the BRI was announced. Ramboll attested to the potential profitability of the port with YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  331 Chinese loans worth US$ 450 million tied to Chinese contractors (Ramboll Group 2007). With an independent consulting company involved, the argument that China deliberately provided the loans to drown Sri Lanka in debt is less convincing. And though Sri Lanka does have a debt problem, only 10% of it can be attributed to China. Greater shares are tied to Japan (12%), the Asian Development Bank (14%), and the World Bank (11%). And the greatest share (39%) is loans from the international financial market (Department of External Resources 2019). The privatization of public assets to service debts is very controversial but not unusual; it is regularly advocated by the International Monetary Fund. A recent example is a concession by Greece following its financial crisis: Greece allowed Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide, a German company, to operate 14 regional airports for 40 years beginning in 2017 (Fraport 2017). The assertion that the Hambantota port will serve as a Chinese naval base in the future should also be questioned. The conditions of the port’s lease stipulate that it cannot be used for military purposes. According to a foreign ministry official from Sri Lanka, the country “cannot be seen aligned to one side [US or China] of any future tensions in our region” (quoted in MacanMarkar 2019). I have often debated with academic colleagues and experts who based their arguments on the case of Chinese naval vessels using the port of Hambantota. But this has not happened, at least as of this paper’s writing.6 Of course, in the future, China could disregard the original agreement and let the People’s Liberation Army Navy use the port. But doing this without Sri Lanka’s permission would jeopardize Beijing’s intentions to expand the BRI in Southeast Asia, a region highly sensitive to external interference. Vietnam provides another counter-argument to the portrayal of the BRI as an instrument with the primary goal of increasing geopolitical standing, as claimed by realists. The country is one of the main adversaries of China in the maritime dispute in the South China Sea. The dispute has included Vietnamese countermeasures against the Chinese deployment of the HD-981 oil rig in 2014, but this did not lead to the application, nor even the threat, of economic sanctions. Thus, contrary to realist assumptions, China did not apply mercantile coercion to increase its relative power position in Vietnam. 6. Chinese naval vessels have been making port calls only at Colombo (since 2014). 332  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 Vietnam would have been an ideal country for this tactic, with a much smaller economy and with China as its largest trading partner. China’s suspension of trade and investments would have caused great damage. But Beijing refrained from even threatening Hanoi with such measures, and continued to offer assistance to meet Vietnam’s growing infrastructural needs (Pham and Tostevin 2017). The case of the Philippines offers another example. The apprehension of eight Chinese fishing vessels by the Philippine Navy in the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012 did not lead to serious economic repercussions, contrary to the frequent claims (Poh 2017). Despite various disputes related to the South China Sea, Beijing continued to emphasize its wish to include the Philippines as a participant in the BRI. Still, dismissing the centrality of a realist motivation in China’s BRI does not mean that its infrastructure investments have not caused any problems. There has been growing resistance to projects that do not benefit local communities in Southeast Asia. Already in 2011, the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar, the largest project financed by China, was halted despite the traditionally close relations between these countries (Fuller 2011). Another problem China has been dealing with is related to its railway project in Indonesia, which began in 2015 and aims to connect the capital, Jakarta, to Bandung, in West Java. China must compensate a large number of landowners, a complex and time-consuming process Chinese companies are not used to in comparable domestic projects (Suzuki and Kotani 2017). Similarly, in 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad put on hold the East Coast Rail Link project connecting Port Klang on the Strait of Malacca with Kota Bharu in northeastern peninsular Malaysia, fearing that the loan would balloon the national debt (Lee, Latiff, and Menon 2018). In the case of Laos, it remains unclear how a high-speed rail project costing US$ 6 billion will affect the economy of a country with a GDP of roughly US$ 17 billion (South China Morning Post 2019). Despite the great importance China attaches to ownership, Beijing has realized that it cannot simply offer loans on request from developing countries. Poor project planning made even Pakistan, one of the greatest supporters of the BRI, raise concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (Jorgic 2018). The chairwoman of the Silk Road Fund, Jin Qi, highlighted in a 2017 interview that China needs to improve risk assessment through feasibility studies. Ensuring the success of the BRI in the future is necessary, but YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  333 not because of philanthropic motives. Rather, it is indispensable for China’s national interests (Silk Road Fund 2019). THE BRI AND CHINA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS Some of the mentioned project failures raised criticism in Southeast Asia, which could have provoked some form of economic retaliation by China. However, China refrained from such measures. On the contrary, the country demonstrated understanding and willingness to react to criticism from the recipient countries. At the Belt and Road Forum in 2019, China agreed to adopt a more inclusive and transparent approach, to ensure that its lending does not risk sovereign debt distress, to combat corruption under UN principles, and to have a stronger focus on sustainability (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 2019). In the case of Malaysia, China was willing to renegotiate the terms of the BRI rail project put on hold by Mahathir, reducing the costs by a third, from US$ 15.9 billion to US$ 10.7 billion (Sipalan, Lee, and Pollard 2019). China’s responses to the various criticisms illustrate the importance of the BRI projects to its national interests, particularly its economy, as emphasized by Jin Qi. Southeast Asia is particularly important for China. China surpassed the US in 2007 and Japan in 2010 as the largest trading partner for ASEAN (US Government Accountability Office 2015). Between 2011 and 2019, ASEAN trade volume has almost doubled, from US$ 363 billion to US$ 600 billion. In 2019, ASEAN overtook the US as China’s second-largest trading partner (China Daily 2019). ASEAN leaders, including the deputy secretary-general for community and corporate affairs, A. K. P. Mochtan, believe that trade relations between China and ASEAN will improve even further (Yiran 2017). However, the lack of economic infrastructure, for example transport infrastructure and electrical supply for the manufacturing sector, has constrained economic relations with the region. For decades, Western donors and multilateral institutions have been neglecting the importance of economic infrastructure, creating a large deficit in the sector. A report by the Asian Development Bank (2017, 43) estimated that Southeast Asia needs US$ 3.1 trillion in investments (US$ 210 billion per year) in economic infrastructure to maintain the momentum of economic growth. To extend trade relations with the region, China has a great incentive to close this economic 334  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 infrastructure gap with its BRI. This is especially beneficial for Yunnan Province, which borders Southeast Asia and is one of the least developed regions in China, not having profited much from the socioeconomic development of the east coast. The success of the BRI is closely tied to the economic growth that has also been serving the political legitimation of the Chinese Communist Party. As with the economic boom in postwar Japan and later, the pressure to maintain economic growth is ever-increasing since most Chinese grew up in an era of prosperity. Thus, China’s development assistance can be understood as part of the country’s general process of globalizing its economy, which has become necessary because domestic economic opportunities are not sufficient to sustain economic growth. The BRI is an important strategy for addressing these changes. There are other reasons for China to export economic infrastructure through its development assistance. Since the excessive economic expansion of the 1980s, the domestic need for construction has been continuously declining, creating a growing overcapacity in that field. According to the official statistics, given that economic adjustment takes time, the country currently needs to support the sector, which represents approximately 30% of its GDP and employs roughly 55 million workers (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2019). It is therefore understandable that most of the loans for economic infrastructure are tied to Chinese companies. Finally, China also is eager to use the BRI as a soft-power tool in the region to earn the trust that is indispensable for its self-proclaimed “peaceful rise” to great-power status. Financial power alone does not earn the trust of foreign partners. A poll by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in 2018 revealed that 51% of influential policymakers in Southeast Asia distrust China as a major power in the region, and 45% believe that China is becoming a revisionist power (a power that attempts to change the status quo for its own advantage, by force if necessary). Not surprisingly, 47% strongly distrust China’s BRI, limiting its ability to deepen its engagement with the region. In contrast, Japan is seen as the most trusted power in Southeast Asia. Only 17% distrust Japan, and 66% of the respondents said that they believe that Tokyo is doing “the right thing” (Mun et al. 2019). As Chinese development assistance fulfills domestically important objectives similar to those of Japan in the past, China may also aim for a “heart-to-heart” relationship with Southeast Asia based on mutual confidence and trust. The YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  335 popular opposition to Japan in the 1970s suggests that failing to achieve mutual trust could lead to a strong anti-Chinese mood. A THREAT TO JAPANESE INTERESTS? As we have seen, China’s development model shares many similarities with that of Japan. It is a model strongly emphasizing state-led development through economic infrastructure, rejecting any form of external interference in domestic matters. Contrary to widespread opinion, China’s infrastructure investments have many positive implications for Japan. First and most important, China’s spread of economic infrastructure investments gives the Japanese development model international legitimacy, which it failed to obtain in the past. Despite Japan’s great efforts to promote its model in the 1990s, for example, through the World Bank’s (1993) “East Asian Miracle” report, the DAC never fully acknowledged the development model. Despite the successful development of the economies of many countries of Southeast Asia, a skeptical view of Japan’s investments was predominant among DAC members, who insisted that economicinfrastructure-centered development did not contribute to international burden-sharing but primarily served the economic interests of Japan. This accusation restricted the application of the economic-infrastructure-centered approach and forced the country to adopt a softer, social-infrastructurecentered ODA strategy. The strong philanthropic tone of the 1992 Japanese ODA Charter mirrors the change, officially adopting the term “aid” despite the country’s past preference for “cooperation.” But with this adoption of a noticeably liberal attitude in the 1990s, public support for ODA began to decrease, leading to the reduction of Japan’s efforts since 1997. With China’s success in Southeast Asia, however, the Western donor community came to realize that the promotion of infrastructure was not solely in the interest of the donor but also seen by many recipients as necessary for their economic development, especially in Southeast Asia. The neglect of economic infrastructure by the Western donor community in the 1990s hurt economic development in the region by creating the abovementioned yearly investment gap of US$ 210 billion. China’s successful development assistance pressured established donors and institutions to rethink their traditional approach. The US, with a traditionally strong focus on social infrastructure, strengthened its engagement in 336  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 economic infrastructure through the 2018 BUILD Act. Multilateral institutions such as the Asian Development Bank became more flexible and less bureaucratic in the provision of economic infrastructure, responding to the demands in the region. In the past, the loan process had taken about two years. After the reforms initiated in 2015, which gave more responsibility to the personnel stationed in the applying country, this was reduced to half a year (Yomiuri Shimbun Political News Department 2017, 244–46). Even the UN included infrastructure in their Sustainable Development Goals, announced in 2015. The ideological shift in the international donor community triggered by China’s growing infrastructure investment gave Japan the permission and confidence to return to the old development principles at full capacity. Japan has arguably been returning to the principles of the “construction state,” which lost support in the 1990s due to strong international criticism. Prime Minister Abe’s strategy includes using the export and the development of economic infrastructure in Southeast Asia as a catalyst for the domestic economy. This change is manifested in the 2015 ODA Charter, in which the term “aid,” introduced in 1992, was again replaced by “cooperation,” highlighting that both donor and recipients should profit from development assistance. Japan has gained the confidence to be open about the mutual benefits of ODA, which the country avoided clearly stating in the 1990s. The 2015 Charter recognizes that “in light of Japan’s current economic and social situation, deepening its cooperative relations with the international community including the emerging and developing countries and tapping into their vigor are the keys to its own sustainable prosperity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). China’s practices even succeeded in sweeping away Japan’s reluctance to reintroduce its strongly criticized practice of tying ODA loans to its own companies and goods.7 Using the Special Terms for Economic Partnership, Japan provided 831 billion yen (roughly US$ 7.4 billion) in loans for economic infrastructure, an increase of more than 900% over 2014’s 90 billion yen (roughly US$ 800 million). Although the amount decreased in 2016 to 134 billion yen (US$ 1.3 billion), the general trend indicates a steady rise in loans directly benefiting Japanese companies (Japan International Cooperation Agency n.d.). 7. Like China’s, Japan’s ODA was also almost completely tied in the 1960s. Due to international pressure, the country gradually abandoned this practice by the mid-1990s. YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  337 From a macro perspective, China’s infrastructure investments support Japan’s interest in helping Southeast Asia close the economic infrastructure gap. As an advocate of the “flying geese paradigm,” in which the country’s economic growth is understood as being interlinked with the economies of less developed countries, Japan strongly supports ASEAN’s Connectivity Plan, declared in 2010. The plan aims to promote regional integration, especially in the economic sense, through the seamless movement of goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labor to enhance trade and production networks. Improving physical infrastructure is also perceived as indispensable for strengthening ASEAN’s relations with the world (ASEAN 2011, 2015). In the 2010s, the engagement of the two countries in Southeast Asia has been complementary and even synergetic. Due to the prominent role of economic infrastructure in these countries’ modernization, China has been able to provide affordable infrastructure in the fields of transport and energy. Japan, on the other hand, has been focusing on high-quality infrastructure that requires smaller investments but more technical expertise. This division is visible in the primary targets of the two countries’ infrastructure investments. China has been focusing on Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, the least developed countries in Southeast Asia. Japan has focused on middle-income countries including Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. To close the infrastructure gap in Southeast Asia, Japan needs China’s financial and logistical capacity to provide large-scale basic economic infrastructure in the region, since Japan lacks the capacity to implement such projects affordably. Indonesian Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati underlined this fact, saying, “You do not want to build infrastructure that is high quality but [that the] people cannot afford and [the] country cannot afford” (quoted in Tani 2017, brackets in the original). Naturally, China’s technological advancements could lead to competition with Japan, especially in the lucrative sector of infrastructure systems, such as railways. Such projects are seen as especially attractive because they include not only the construction of infrastructure and the provision of equipment but also management, operation, and maintenance. In 2015 Japan lost one such project to China: the US$ 6 billion contract to build Indonesia’s first high-speed railway, connecting Jakarta and Bandung. It was undoubtedly a huge setback for the Japanese companies directly involved. To win the project, China submitted a proposal including many financial risks, highly likely to result in losses (Dharma and Suryadinata 2018). 338  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 However, it is questionable from the economic point of view whether China will continue to challenge Japan in such an excessive manner. Such bidding wars reduce profit margins, which could discourage private investments, crucial for financing economic infrastructure projects that are increasing in scale, cost, and complexity. The competition could also lead to overambitious and unrealistic cost estimates that cannot be met, damaging the donor’s reputation as an infrastructure provider. One good example is the aforementioned case of Malaysia, where China had to reduce the cost of the East Coast Rail Link project by 30% to avoid the project’s cancellation. The combination of China’s capacity and expertise in construction and Japan’s know-how in evaluating project proposals and logistic arrangements could increase the efficiency of infrastructure projects, generating benefits for all involved. This is a view shared by Indrawati as well: “We definitely do need to build infrastructure. . . . I don’t think one country can solve it. I don’t think one institution can solve it. . . . That is why collaboration is very important. Collaboration for . . . better quality, for better cost, for more efficient and faster delivery” (quoted in Tani 2017). Overambitious rivalry could harm the long-term goal, which remains the economic development of Southeast Asia. Japan wants to create a complex supply-chain and trade network across Southeast Asian countries, extending to China. Despite having the common goal of increasing ASEAN connectivity, Japan in the past showed little interest in cooperating with China to close the infrastructure gap in Southeast Asia, not for economic but for political reasons. Abe’s nationalistic mindset and strong loyalty to the US have limited his cooperation with China, despite substantial economic reasons to do so. But the position of Japan’s private sector has been different—strongly in favor of collaboration with China—due to the lack of funding for their infrastructure projects. Consequently, despite his initial reluctance to cooperate with China, Abe softened his position following his return to elected office in 2012. The main reason was that economic growth became the center of his policies after his first term, intended to broaden his voter base. Abe returned to office as Sino–Japanese relations hit a low point following the Noda administration’s purchase of the Senkaku Islands from its private owner in 2012. Despite the tense situation, Abe let senior officials work in the background to improve ties with China. In 2014, after Abe appointed Nikai Toshihiro the deputy secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Nikai faction became the driving force of proactively improving YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  339 Sino–Japanese relations. Imai Takaya, a former official in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry who has been Abe’s executive secretary since 2012, also strongly supported the Nikai faction (Komori 2018). Nikai was a great supporter of Japan’s former economic policy, which strongly built on ODA. He was also a great advocate of Japan’s development assistance to China in the 1980s. So it was hardly surprising that he actively promoted cooperation with China in infrastructure investments in Southeast Asia. A breakthrough in bilateral relations occurred in May 2017, when Abe sent Nikai as his representative to participate in the One Belt One Road Forum in Beijing. Nikai conveyed the administration’s wishes for better relations and more cooperation. Interestingly, China skeptic and director-general of the National Security Council Yachi Shotaro was not informed about this, and was excluded from the rapprochement. With US President Donald Trump showing minimal interest in promoting regional economic integration, at least at the beginning of his term in 2017, Sino–Japanese relations took on great momentum (Terada 2018). Abe met President Xi in October 2018, and the two reached an agreement to increase cooperation in development assistance. The Japanese prime minister was finally decisive in allowing what had seemed rational for Japan from the beginning: to “switch from competition to collaboration” (Japan Times 2018). The 2018 agreement included 50 joint development projects and a “smart city” project in Thailand, among others (Shigeta 2018). CONCLUSION This paper set out to elucidate China’s engagement as a provider of development assistance and determine whether it poses a threat to Southeast Asian countries, or to Japan. The analysis focused on the ideological background of the countries’ development model, concluding that China and Japan pursue similar approaches, with a focus on financing economic infrastructure, informed by their own experience of development. I also addressed the generally exaggerated criticism of China’s development assistance by examining China’s great attentiveness to the needs of its partners—for its own interests. The future of China’s economic growth strongly depends on the expansion of its markets. Therefore, using its investments for “mercantilist coercion,” despite being a theoretical possibility, would come with high economic and political costs. 340  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 Due to the similarity of their approaches and interests, Chinese provisions of infrastructure in Southeast Asia would appear to benefit Japan, even though realist critics tend to frame them as threatening. Challenging the old DAC view of soft social infrastructure as the crucial element of development assistance, the success of China’s development assistance has demonstrated the significance of hard economic infrastructure in the region. The recipients see China’s development assistance as indispensable for the vitality of regional development. Contrary to the mainstream view, the announcement of the BRI arrived with perfect timing for Japan, overlapping with Abe’s pursuit of ways to stimulate the Japanese economy as a part of Abenomics. The emergence of China as an infrastructure provider allowed Abe to introduce policies that virtually recapitulate the success of the old Japanese ODA model. It enabled ODA to once again be a catalyst for the Japanese economy, which has been stagnating since the 1990s. Japanese construction companies are more than eager to offer their expertise to profit from the large-scale funding China allocates to its ambitious BRI strategies. More importantly, cooperation with China could help narrow the economic infrastructure gap, boosting the regional economy and consequentially improving the economic situation in both countries. Cooperation in development assistance could also create positive spillovers across various aspects of Sino–Japanese relations. After a low point in 2010, when a Chinese fishing vessel collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels, relations have been continuously improving, driven by the intention to increase cooperation in development assistance. Development assistance has gradually opened the doors to discussions of security issues. In 2018, when both countries agreed to collaborate on economic infrastructure projects, Abe stated that the relationship between Japan and China had “completely returned to a normal track,” which was greeted as a breakthrough, given that both countries “share a great responsibility to the peace and prosperity of the region” (Sankei Shimbun 2019). As an illustration of improved attitudes in other areas of bilateral relations and following more frequent interactions focusing on infrastructure cooperation, China welcomed Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Suzutsuki to Qingdao Port in Shandong Province in April 2019—the first visit of a Japanese destroyer to China in seven years. Thus, the collaboration of these countries could have positive consequences beyond economic development (Ryall 2019). YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  341 In addition to security, and considering that the economy-centered development of Southeast Asia is questionable from an ecological perspective, China’s cooperation with Japan—a leader in sustainable technologies in clean energy production, green building, and construction—could reduce harm to the regional environment in the future. I therefore find the realist framework focusing on power competition concerning Japan and geopolitical dominance in Southeast Asia to be unsuitable to explain China’s motivation to provide development assistance as well as interaction with other countries in the region. Among other arguments, analysis reveals the importance of domestic factors, which realist assessments disregard. For example, the empowerment of Southeast Asian markets through the provision of economic infrastructure is crucial for the Chinese economy in view of its slowdown over the last decade. For countries using development assistance to realize important domestic strategies, the interests of the recipient countries are crucial. Intentionally harming the interests of recipient countries in the pursuit of geopolitical goals would jeopardize the measures devised to counter the economic downturn, including BRI projects. In other words, pursuing geopolitical goals that disregard other countries’ interests would paradoxically represent the greatest threat to China’s stability. Even if China’s quick ascent as a globally leading provider of infrastructure has resulted in certain issues in the implementation of projects, there is no empirical evidence that China has tried to harm recipient countries. The lack of such evidence, coupled with the analysis of domestic factors, indicates that with its infrastructure investments, China is seeking to deepen economic ties with Southeast Asia, rather than politically subordinating it. The willingness to adapt its projects to the needs of recipients suggests that China is trying to follow Japan’s “heart-to-heart” approach to the countries of the region. However, whether China will succeed in these endeavors depends not only on its development assistance but also on the peaceful resolution of issues such as the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. REFERENCES Abi-Habib, Maria. 2018. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” New York Times, June 25, 2018. <http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/ world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html>. 342  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 AidData. 2019. “China’s Global Development Footprint.” <http://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance>, accessed May 5, 2019. ASEAN. 1967. “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967.” <http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/>. ASEAN. 2011. “Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.” Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN. 2015. “ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025.” Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Asian Development Bank. 2017. Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs. Manila. Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. 2019. “Joint Communique of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.” <http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2019/ 0427/c36-1311.html>. Blum, Richard, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael Tierney. 2018. “Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries.” Working Paper 64, AidData, Williamsburg, VA. Brautigam, Deborah. 2009. The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. China Daily. 2019. “China-ASEAN Trade Continues to Boom amid Global Growth Slowdown, Uncertainties.” July 23. <http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/a/201907/23/WS5d367792a310d8305640082a.html>. Department of External Resources. 2019. “Debt Indicators Summary.” <http:// www.erd.gov.lk/index.php?option¼com_content&view¼article&id¼86 &Itemid¼307&#government-external-debt-and-key-debt-indicators>, accessed May 20, 2019. Dharma, Siwage, and Leo Suryadinata. 2018. “Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail Project: Little Progress, Many Challenges.” ISEAS Perspective 2. Easterly, William. 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin. Fraport. 2017. “Fraport Greece Begins 40-Year Concession at 14 Greek Regional Airports.” Fraport AG, Athens, Greece. <http://www.fraportgreece.com/eng/media-center/news/fraport-greece-begins-40year-concession-at-14-greek-regional-airports>. YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  343 Fuller, Thomas. 2011. “Myanmar Suspends Construction of Myitsone Dam.” New York Times, October 1, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/10/01/world/asia/myanmar-suspends-construction-of-controversial-dam.html>. Furuoka, Fumitaka. 2005. “Human Rights Conditionality and Aid Allocation: Case Study of Japanese Foreign Aid Policy.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 4(2): 125–46. Halloran, Richard. 1974. “Tanaka’s Explosive Trip.” New York Times, January 21, 1974. <http://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/21/archives/tanakas-explosivetrip-roots-of-the-antijapanese-outbursts-in.html>. Hasegawa, Sukehiro. 1975. Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice. New York: Praeger. Hillman, Jonathan E. 2018. “How Big Is China’s Belt and Road?” CSIS Commentary, April 3, 2018. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC. <http://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-beltand-road>. Japan International Cooperation Agency. n.d. “honpō gijutsu katsuyō jōken” [Special Terms for Economic Partnership]. <http://www.jica. go.jp/activities/schemes/finance_co/about/step.html>, accessed May 14, 2019. Japan Times. 2018. “Abe and Xi Agree to Promote New Economic Cooperation amid U.S. Trade War Fears.” October 26, 2018. <http:// www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/26/national/politics-diplomacy/shinzo-abe-li-keqiang-agree-promote-economic-cooperation-amid-u-s-chinatrade-war/>. Jorgic, Drazen. 2018. “Fearing Debt Trap, Pakistan Rethinks Chinese ‘Silk Road’ Projects.” Reuters, September 30. <http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-pakistan-silkroad-railway-insight-idUSKCN1MA028>. Komori, Yoshihisa. 2018. “Amerika nōto: beichūkankei ga ken’aku ni naru to nikai-shi ga hōchū . . . sono ura ni hisomu kiken.” [America note: The danger of Mr. Nikai’s Beijing visit during the worsening of China–US relations] Sankei Shimbun, January 14. <http://www.sankei.com/politics/ news/180114/plt1801140004-n1.html>. Lee, Liz, Rozanna Latiff, and Praveen Menon. 2018. “Malaysia’s Mahathir Cancels China-Backed Rail, Pipeline Projects.” Reuters, August 21. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-malaysia/malaysias-mahathircancels-china-backed-rail-pipeline-projects-idUSKCN1L60DQ>. 344  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 Lubin, David, Johanna Chua, Piotr Kalisz, Edward L. Morse, Ernesto Revilla, Wei Zheng Kit, David Cowan, et al. 2018. China’s Belt and Road at Five: A Progress Report. New York: Citi GPS. Macan-Markar, Marwaan. 2019. “US-Sri Lanka Military Negotiations Hit a Roadblock.” Nikkei Asian Review, August 11. <http://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/International-relations/US-Sri-Lanka-military-negotiations-hit-aroadblock>. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. “Development Cooperation Charter 2015.” <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html>, accessed March 20, 2019. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1962. “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid.” American Political Science Review 56(2): 301–309. Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa. London: Allen Lane. Mun, Tang Siew, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, and Pham Thi Phuong Thao. 2019. The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2019. “China Statistical Yearbook.” <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/>, accessed May 9, 2019. OECD. 2019. “Aid at a Glance Charts.” <http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance. htm>, accessed May 20, 2019. Pham, My, and Matthew Tostevin. 2017. “Despite Strains, Vietnam and China Forge Closer Economic Ties.” Reuters, September 1, 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/vietnam-china-idINKCN1 BC3TL>. Poh, Angela. 2017. “The Myth of Chinese Sanctions over South China Sea Disputes.” Washington Quarterly 40(1): 143–65. Ramboll Group. 2007. “Feasibility Study for a New Major Seaport in Sri Lanka.” <http://ramboll.com/projects/group/hambantotaport>, accessed May 20, 2019. Ryall, Julian. 2019. “Why China Letting Japan Fly the Rising Sun Flag Is a Sign of the ‘Closer’ Times.” South China Morning Post, April 22. <http:// www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3007165/why-china-letting-japans-warship-fly-rising-sun-flag-sign>. YAMAMOTO / CHINA VS. JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  345 Sankei Shimbun. 2019. “Shushō, nitchūkankei kanzen ni seijōna kidō ni modotta.” [Prime minister states that Japan–China relations have completely returned to a normal track] March 6. <http://www.sankei.com/ politics/news/190306/plt1903060010-n1.html>. Shigeta, Shunsuke. 2018. “Thai ‘Smart City’ to be First of 50 Japan-China Joint Projects.” Nikkei Asian Review, October 25. <http://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/International-relations/Thai-smart-city-to-be-first-of-50-JapanChina-joint-projects>. Shikwati, James. 2012. China-Africa Partnership: The Quest for a Win-Win Relationship. Nairobi: Inter Region Economic Network. Silk Road Fund. 2019. “The Belt and Road Initiative: Launching a New Paradigm for International Investment and Financing Cooperation.” <http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23809/23812/35485/>, accessed September 5, 2019. Sipalan, Joseph, Liz Lee, and Martin Pollard. 2019. “Malaysia, China Agree to Resume Railway Project after Slashing Cost.” Reuters, April 12. <http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-china-malaysia-railway-idUSKCN1RO0LY>. South China Morning Post. 2019. “UN Warns Laos Is Hurting Its People with Appetite for Chinese Projects.” March 29. <http://www.scmp.com/news/ asia/southeast-asia/article/3003766/too-few-jobs-and-too-much-debt-unrights-envoy-warns-laos>. State Council. 2014. “China’s Foreign Aid 2014.” <http://english.gov.cn/ archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm>, accessed February 7, 2019. Suzuki, Jun, and Hiroshi Kotani. 2017. “Indonesian High-Speed Rail Project Stalls, Waiting on Land.” Nikkei Asian Review, February 15. <http://asia. nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Indonesian-high-speed-railproject-stalls-waiting-on-land>. Tani, Shotaro. 2017. “The Japan-China Infrastructure Battle Is a Welcome Rivalry.” Nikkei Asian Review, November 5. <http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20170511/Politics-Economy/The-Japan-China-infrastructure-battleis-a-welcome-rivalry>. Terada, Takashi. 2018. “Trump’s Trade War and the Thawing of ChinaJapan Relations.” USJI Voice 38, U.S.-Japan Research Institute, Washington, DC. <http://www.us-jpri.org/en/voice/usji-voice-vol-38>. US Government Accountability Office. 2015. Southeast Asia: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement. Washington, DC. 346  ASIAN SURVEY 60:2 White House. 2018. “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2018-apecceo-summit-port-moresby-papua-new-guinea/>. Wigell, Mikael, Sören Scholvin, and Mika Aaltola, eds. 2018. Geo-Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century: The Revival of Economic Statecraft. London: Routledge. Wilson Center Digital Archive. n.d.a. “Main Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai, Head of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference 1955.” <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121623.pdf>. Wilson Center Digital Archive. n.d.b. “China’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries.” <http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121560>. World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Wroughton, Lesley, and David Brunnstrom. 2018. “Wary of China’s Rise, Pompeo Announces U.S. Initiatives in Emerging Asia.” Reuters, July 30. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-idUSKBN1KK0V5>. Yiran, Zheng. 2017. “China-ASEAN Trade to Hit $1t by 2020.” China Daily, May 16. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-05/16/content_ 29364521.htm>. Yomiuri Shimbun Political News Department. 2017. Perspectives on SinoJapanese Diplomatic Relations. Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture. Zhang, Dong Dong. 1998. China’s Relations with Japan in an Era of Economic Liberalisation. New York: Nova.