After Virtue and Morality

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT SPRINGFIELD After Virtue and Morality Submitted to LNT program, in fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of the MA By Sorin V. Sabou UIN: 650383249 for Liberal & Integrative Studies Program Date: October 15, 2015 Degree Title: Philosophy Names of Committee members and their roles: William Kline, PhD – Thesis Chair Karen Kirkendall, PhD – LNT Advisor Roxanne Kurtz, PhD – Academic Advisor David Bertaina, PhD – Dean’s Representative Contents 1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………… 3 2. Aristotelian Teleology in Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics ……..…...… 6 3. MacIntyre’s Aristotelian Teleology in After Virtue …………………….....…. 23 4. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………….… 33 5. Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………. 36 2 1. Introduction This project is a critical analysis of the solution proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book After Virtue (1981, 1984, 2007) to the problem encountered in modern morality. According to MacIntyre, modern morality and post-Enlightenment moral philosophy have failed in that it seems ‘to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture’ (MacIntyre 2007, 6). Horton and Mendus, in interpreting the work of MacIntyre, rephrase this charge against contemporary moral philosophy as lacking any ‘coherent rationally defensible statement of the liberal individualist viewpoint’ (1994, 3). This failure shows that our moral arguments are ‘necessarily interminable,’ ‘impersonal’ in character, and have many historical origins (MacIntyre 2007, 8-9). According to MacIntyre, these disagreements cannot be resolved because their kind cannot be resolved (2007, 11). In this kind of climate, MacIntyre says, Emotivism was embraced as the moral theory in modernity. By Emotivism he means the doctrine in which ‘all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference’ (MacIntyre 2007, 12). This is the reason, according to MacIntyre, for which, in our times, ‘all moral disagreement is rationally interminable’ (2007, 12). MacIntyre goes back in the history of modernity and early Enlightenment to show that, by embracing Emotivism, the moral discourse and practice is like an 3 unintelligible mosaic of a variety of broken pieces. These pieces were used to be a part of some vision, but that is no longer in place. We use some fragments of it in a wide variety of ways without being able communicate a coherent moral argument (MacIntyre 2007, 110). Against this position MacIntyre proposes a secular version of Aristotelianism. The broken pieces of the unintelligible mosaic of modern morality are part of the ancient vision of which Aristotle is the voice. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze MacIntyre’s solution to the problem of modern morality; it is a critical evaluation of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism. The thesis of the project is that MacIntyre’s Aristotelian ethics in After Virtue is conceived in such a way that it does not land in a very different place than that of his emotivist partners in the debate. Aristotle’s ethics has a metaphysical grounding in that the Unmoved Mover, as the external main factor in the world around us, is the ultimate good and aim of the whole universe and the human race. If the human good is understood only in terms of practice, narrative unity, and tradition, the backbone of Aristotle’s ethics is dismantled in such a way that it will not lead to the solution MacIntyre claims. Because of the pure actuality, in the unmoved mover, the potentiality in every human being can be realized. If this framework of thought is dismantled there is no movement or change in human morality, as Aristotle understood it. The ultimate end in human lives is happiness 4 realized. This is reasonable only if these lives follow the function of man, if they practice virtue, and embrace contemplation which brings us closer to the gods. This upward movement of the inquiry is lost if the human end is redefined in social terms. This thesis will interact critically with MacIntyre’s Aristotelian teleology by going back to Aristotle’s arguments in Metaphysics 12 and Nicomachean Ethics 1, 2, and 10 to recover the meaning of teleology and metaphysics for his ethical system (chapter 2), and then will present an analysis of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian teleology in dialogue with other scholars (chapter 3); the conclusion of the study will be in chapter 4. 5 2. Aristotelian Teleology in Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics 2.1 Teleological Metaphysics - The Argument for the Unmoved Mover The literature written on the Unmoved Mover is vast and has been produced in a variety of historical and cultural contexts. This can be seen in the works of Aquinas and Averroës where we have a theistic Muslim (Averroës), and a Christian (Aquinas) in their Medieval context, or in the work of Randall (1960) and his naturalistic contemporary context. In Metaphysics 12, Aristotle presents his argument for the Unmoved Mover. I will follow Easterling, Stewart and Organ's suggestions that ‘the distinctions made in the Physics, particularly Book VIII, must be applied to Aristotle’s discussion of the unmoved mover in Metaphysics 12’ (Stewart 1973, 522, see also Organ 1962, 528), and that ‘Metaphysics 12 seems to combine the physical theory of Physics VIII with the earlier final causation of De Philosophia’ (Easterling 1976, 264). Thus, what we have in Metaphysics 12 offers a fair representation of what Aristotle thought about the Unmoved Mover. I will argue that in Metaphysics 12 the Aristotelian argument for the Unmoved Mover is built with reference to substance and actuality, necessity and movement, contemplation and goodness. These pairing concepts need to be understood together in order to arrive at what Aristotle argues for in Metaphysics 6 12. Substance and Actuality Aristotle’s argument for the Unmoved Mover is part of his ‘inquiry about substance' (Met 12.1). The relationship of the substance with the universe is in terms of being the ‘first part’ of universe (Met 12.1) pointing thus, towards its principles. Aristotle sees several kinds of substance: sensible (eternal and perishable), and immovable (Met 12.1). The sensible substances are studied by science of Physics, and the immovable substance is studied in Met. 12. Substance does not need other things for its existence; among all the categories, substance is the only one that can exist apart. That is why, Aristotle sees it as having primacy. Its very essence is actuality. The sensible substance is ‘changeable’ (Met 12.1) because ‘all things come out of that which is’ (Met 12.2), and the immovable substance is eternal, ‘not generable but movable’ (Met 12.2). According to Aristotle, the universe is subject to change and movement. Change implies the existence of an ‘immediate mover’ (Met 12.3) and, in Aristotle’s view, is a change from ‘matter’ to ‘form’ (Met 12.3), that is from the stuff something is made of to the particular kind of thing it is. The substances can ‘exist apart’ by themselves (Met 12.5) and ‘all things have the same causes’ (Met 12.5), meaning that without substances there is no movement and change. This change has the 7 route from potentiality to actuality (Met 12.2). Every substance has its potentiality that has to be reached in higher forms of being towards the perfection/actuality of the unmoved mover, who is pure actuality. Necessity and Movement The movement from ‘substance’ to ‘necessity’ is offered by the existence of the unmovable substances. The unmovable substance is a necessity (Met 12.6). Aristotle’s argument needs something ‘capable of moving’ but not moving itself (Met 12.6). He needs this because he conceives perfection in this way; if something/someone moves or changes that means it is not perfect. But god is perfect, so he does not move. He explains movement based on the necessity of an ‘existing cause’ (Met 12.6), a mover, a cause that is already there. Aristotle’s most complete axiom is given in Met 12.7 in the following terms: ‘there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.’ This is the climax of Aristotle’s inquiry about the immovable substance. Aristotle explains movement ‘without being moved’ (Met 12.7) with the help of desire and thought. Aristotle observes that when we think about something, that object is able to move our thought. This interaction between intellect and its object offers him a way of explaining how something moves without being moved. Aristotle says that in a similar way ‘the final cause produces 8 motion as being loved’ (Met 12.7). This abrupt introduction of ‘love’ in his argument is to be understood in the general framework of movement from potentiality to actuality. The immovable substance is pure actuality, that is the perfect climax there is out there, and everything else is on its way from potentiality to actuality. Because of this aspiration to actuality on the part of everything, the pure actuality, the immovable substance is loved. This is how the movement, or the ‘first kind of change’ (Met 12.7) takes place. Because there is motion/change there is a first mover. This ‘first principle or primary being’ ‘produces the primary eternal and single movement’ (Met 12.8). The relevancy of this inquiry into Aristotle’s metaphysics for our project of analyzing MacIntyre’s secular Aristotelianism is to be seen in the fact that, for Aristotle, the change from matter to form, from potentiality to actuality is possible because of the unmoved mover/god. If this external cause is eliminated there is no change for the good. The last pairing in Aristotle’s inquiry on immovable substance opens the discussion in this direction. Contemplation and Goodness The other angle from which Aristotle argues for the existence of ‘the final cause’ is that of the action of the good. This angle is less developed but important nonetheless (especially for our project). Its relevancy is in the area of love and 9 thinking. Aristotle says about the final cause that ‘its mode of being is good’ (Met 12.7). So far, the immovable substance/the unmoved mover/god was seen as the first cause, the pure actuality, but now a different aspect is introduced, god as thought. Understanding god as thought (Olson 2013, 101; see also Russell 2009, 144, 'God as pure thought'; Menn 1992) leads Aristotle deeper into the relationship between thinking and goodness. God as thought shows how the Good is a cause of motion (Menn 1992, 573). If the ‘thinking is the starting point’ of every movement and change, and if god’s mode of being is good, then ‘thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself’ (Met 12.7). This thinking in itself or the ‘act of contemplation’ is a continuous state for god. The most pleasant activity is the activity of contemplation, and, based on this, Aristotle says that ‘god is a living being, eternal, the most good’ (τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, Met 12.7[1072b]). In a way what Aristotle himself did so far in Metaphysics 12 was an intellectual activity, an inquiry showing himself as an example of someone practicing it. This will reappear in our argument when we will analyze happiness as contemplation/inquiry later in this chapter, and Aristotle is an example of someone reaching the state of being a happy person. Goodness (Met 12.7) is essential for Aristotle as he argues with the Pythagoreans and Speusippus (c. 408 – 339/8 BC), because, as the beginning is concerned, the ‘beauty and completeness’ of being are prior to everything. 10 These pair concepts: substance/actuality, necessity/movement, and contemplation/goodness need to be seen in their complex relationships, for understanding the Aristotelian argument for the existence of the Unmoved Mover. The existence of matter, and of motion, the understanding of completeness as applied to God, are the embedded layers in these various levels and angles of argumentation in Aristotle’s inquiry/contemplation on immovable substance in Metaphysics 12. Aristotle does not come with a concise phrase to explain all these layers of his argument. That is why, I will not attempt it either. I will leave the constellation of his ideas the way it is, but I will point to these pair concepts I identified. This metaphysical teleology has to stay in place for his ethical teleology to function. This will be seen in the next section that is a study of the human end, happiness, in Nicomachean Ethics. 2.2 Teleological Ethics - The Argument for Happiness In this section I argue that happiness is understood by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics from four perspectives and steps: 1) from the perspective of end, happiness is something final, self-sufficient, an end of action (NE 1.7.8), 2) from the perspective of the function of man is a sort of good life and good action (NE 1.7.14), 3) from the perspective of virtue happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue (NE 1.7.15), and 4) from the perspective of an activity happiness is 11 contemplation (NE 10.7.1). These four perspectives and steps are interwoven in an upward argument toward a mature, unitary life, that will almost transcend human life, and that type of life is manifested especially by the philosopher (Aristotle included). These four steps and perspectives point to a kaleidoscopic understanding of the subject; you see it at once both as steps or layers of an inquiry, and as a mosaic in which a variety of pieces are forming a larger image. We have to remember the fact that Aristotle offers only a 'broad outline' with premises that are 'mere generalities' and conclusions that can be seen as 'generally valid' (NE 1.3.4). Happiness as the Ultimate End Aristotle starts from the observation that there is a relationship between our undertakings and the good. This relationship is seen in terms of ‘aim.’ Our practical actions point to ‘some good’ (NE I.1.1). These aims or ‘ends’ are as diverse as our undertakings. Every ‘end’ is chosen as the ‘aim’ of our actions based on two considerations: either for achieving some other end, or for its own sake. Aristotle is interested in the last one for guiding his argument toward some ‘Supreme Good’ (NE I.2.1). If we would be able to know more about this ‘ultimate End’ (NE I.2.2) it would help us how to conduct our lives. The way Aristotle will develop the 12 argument is by focusing on two aspects: an outline of what exactly this ‘Supreme Good’ is, and on where it belongs in the scientific areas of study (NE I.2.3). This ‘Supreme Good’ is the object of study of the most authoritative of the sciences, the science of Politics (NE 1.2.4 - I.2.5). This science has the authority in the state, in that, it ordains which sciences, which branches of knowledge, the citizens are authorized to study (NE I.2.6); only those sciences, which are for the good of man, will be studied. That is why, the end of this science will be the end of all the others (NE I.2.7). In this way Aristotle identifies the ‘Good of man’ as being the end/aim of Politics (NE I.2.7). The equivalence between the ‘aim of Politics’ and the ‘highest of all the goods that action can achieve’ (NE I.4.1) leads Aristotle to identify it, in agreement with almost all people, 'as happiness' (NE I.4.2). Even if the great majority of people agree on this, they disagree on what constitutes happiness. This disagreement derives from the different types of lives people live. Aristotle identifies three types of lives: life of enjoyment, life of politics, and life of contemplation (NE I.5.2). People living these types of lives will identify happiness in terms of pleasure, wealth, honor, or contemplation (NE I.4.2; I.5.2). Aristotle navigates through all of these alternatives by going for the good that is ‘good in itself’ (NE I.4.3), which is the ‘cause’ of all other goods (NE I.4.3); the ‘good in itself’ is the good that does not depend on anything else for being good; its goodness is 13 not conferred by someone/something. This good is the cause of all other goods because all our activities aim to it. The notion of a ‘Universal Good’ has its own difficulties (NE I.6.1). At the heart of these difficulties is the observation that the ‘good is not a general term corresponding to a single idea’ (NE I.6.11). Different pursuits have different ends (NE I.7.1); for example, one is in medicine, and another is in strategy (NE I.7.1). That is why, it is difficult to provide a definition of the Good that will be true to all the arts (NE I.7.1). Aristotle goes back to his initial observation that ‘all actions aim towards an end,’ and starts from there by asking hypothetically about the possibility of uniting the ends of all human action (NE I.7.1); their sum will be ‘the Good’ (NE I.7.1), the ‘final end’ (NE I.7.3). The nature of this ‘final end’ is that it is always chosen as an end and never as a means (NE I.7.4). In this sense 'happiness is absolutely final’ (NE I.7.5); it is chosen for its own sake and never as a means to something else (NE I.7.5). At the same time happiness is ‘self-sufficient’ because by itself it is able to make life desirable and lacking in nothing (NE I.7.7). Based on these two facts Aristotle concludes one of his steps in investigating happiness: happiness being final and self-sufficient is the ‘End at which all actions aim’ (NE I.7.8). After drawing the first conclusion, Aristotle continues his analysis because we need a ‘more explicit account’ of what happiness is (NE I.7.9), and that can be attained by studying the function of man (NE I.7.10). 14 From the ‘Function of Man’ to Happiness The link between the 'function of man' and happiness is construed by Aristotle starting from the observation that ‘the good of man resides in the function of man’ (NE I.7.10). Every part of the human body has a function of its own, and a man has a certain function ‘over and above all the functions of his particular members’ (NE I.7.11). Aristotle identifies that function as being ‘the active exercise of the soul’s faculties in conformity with rational principle’ (NE I.7.14). This definition of the function of man is labeled by MacIntyre as ‘metaphysical biology’ and is rejected (Aristotle does not use this phrase). The reason for this rejection is that man is understood in a metaphysical framework. MacIntyre tries to extract man from this framework by rejecting it altogether and by proposing a social and secular version of Aristotelianism. Aristotle refines the function of man referring to ‘the Good of man’ as ‘the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence’ (NE I.7.15). This reference to the good of man is to be seen in the larger context of good as we explored it in the metaphysical context; the faculty of the soul is the activity of the mind; it is a rational activity. This larger metaphysical framework is seen 1) in the way in which Aristotle divides the ‘good’ things in several classes: external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul (NE I.8.1), and 2) in describing happiness 15 as ‘a form of good life’ (NE I.8.4). For him the goods, in the ‘fullest sense and highest degree,’ (NE I.8.2) are the goods of the soul. In Aristotle’s vision, the completeness of goodness is attained at the level of the soul. And identifying happiness as ‘a form of good life’ we need to have in view the larger vision of movement from ‘matter’ to ‘form’ in Aristotelian metaphysics. The reference to virtue/excellence is focused on ‘the best and most perfect’ among virtues (NE I.7.15); this mention of ‘perfect virtue’ is preparing the way for the final point in Aristotle’s inquiry on happiness in NE 10. There, contemplation, as the intellectual/rational activity, is the highest form of activity of man, since the intellect is the highest thing in us, according to the highest virtue, and that is the complete happiness. This section on the ‘function of man’ is short and sketchy in Aristotle’s inquiry but is a converging point of his main concepts: good, soul/intellect, and virtue. In his inquiry on happiness, the 'end' argument is converged into the 'function of man' argument, in NE I.8.2 where happiness is posted as an activity that shows ‘our actions and the soul’s active exercise of its functions;’ the criteria of finality is merged with rational activity of the soul according to virtue, in that the end of our activities is to be found among the goods of the soul. The next thing Aristotle has to do is to explore virtue, which is the excellence’s side of his inquiry. 16 Happiness and Virtue There is common ground between happiness and the Good. Their characteristics are the same (NE I.8.4). The characteristics of the Good include pleasure, experience of the soul, justice, acts conforming with virtue, (NE I.8.10), loving what is noble (NE I.8.11). The characteristics of the happiness include what is best, noblest, the pleasantest of things (NE I.8.14), and external goods (NE I.8.15). Happiness requires ‘both complete goodness and complete lifetime’ (NE I.9.10). A happy man will be ‘most often employed in doing and contemplating the things that are in conformity with virtue’ (NE I.10.11; at this point Aristotle announces the final point of his 'outline', that of contemplation). Because of this common ground between happiness and goodness, Aristotle has to examine the ‘nature of goodness’ (NE I.13.1) or more precisely the nature of ‘human goodness’ (NE I.13.5). Both the happiness and the goodness are related to the soul; the first is an ‘activity of the soul’ and the second the ‘excellence of soul’ (NE I.13.6). That is why, a study of the ‘nature of the soul’ is needed (NE I.13.8). The soul consists of two parts, one irrational (vegetative that causes nutrition and growth, and appetites and desire) and the other capable of reason (NE I.13.9). The appetitive part participates in the rational part as being obedient to it (NE I.13.18). Virtue is also differentiated in ‘correspondence with this division of the soul:’ ‘intellectual virtues’ (wisdom, intelligence, prudence) and ‘moral 17 virtues’ (liberality, temperance) (NE I.13.20). The intellectual virtues are produced and increased by instruction, and moral virtues are the product of habit (NE II.1.1). The moral virtues are no part of our nature, but our nature gives us the capacity to receive them (NE II.1.3). We acquire virtues by practicing them; we become just by doing just acts (NE II.1.4). At this point of his argument Aristotle reminds us about the fact that this type of discussion is 'inexact' (NE II.2.5) because things of conduct have nothing fixed and invariable about them (NE II.2.3). He guides the analysis towards an understanding of ‘how we are to act rightly’ (NE II.2.1). The common ground is given by the formula ‘to act in conformity with right principle’ (NE II.2.2) and the ‘observance of the mean’ (NE II.2.7) gives the path towards preserving and enhancing our moral qualities. Excess and deficiency destroy the moral qualities. The same actions can both generate and foster the virtues, they also can destroy them, but also the virtues will find ‘their full exercise in the same actions’ (NE II.2.8). Moral virtue is concerned with ‘pleasures and pains’ (NE II.3.1). Aristotle gives eight reasons for this (see the details in NE II.3.3 - II.3.10). Acts themselves and the agent himself have to be of a certain sort: the first, ‘in conformity with virtues,’ and the second, ‘in a certain state of mind’ (act with knowledge, choose to act for its own sake, the disposition of character is the source of his action) (NE 18 II.4.3). The repeated performance of just and temperate acts result in virtue (NE II.4.3). Aristotle sees virtues as ‘dispositions’ (NE II.6.5) (the ‘formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions’ (NE II.5.2)). This general definition is explored further on the premise that ‘all excellence has a twofold effect on the thing to which it belongs:’ it renders their goodness, and causes their well functioning (NE II.6.2). As the man is concerned, excellence will do the same: it renders him a good man, and causes him to perform his function well (NE II.6.3). Thus, virtue is ‘a mean state’ (NE II.6.13), a ‘settled disposition of the mind’ (NE II.6.15). That is why, it is not an easy task to be good; it is hard ‘to find the middle point in anything’ (NE II.8.2). Aristotle provides three rules in ‘aiming at the mean’: to avoid that extreme which is more opposed to the mean, to notice what are the errors to which we are ourselves most prone, and to guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure (see NE II.8.3 - II.8.6). Thus, virtue as disposition is the platform both for rendering a man as being good, and for making him fulfilling his function well. Acting on this, every human is on the way to happiness. Happiness as Contemplation Based on the previous observation that ‘happiness consists in activity in 19 accordance with virtue’ (NE X.7.1) Aristotle focuses now on what should be ‘the highest virtue;’ the best part of us is that which rules and leads us by nature (NE X.7.1). The activity of this part of us ‘in accordance with virtue proper to it will constitute perfect happiness’ (NE X.7.1). This activity is the 'activity of contemplation' (NE X.7.1) (see that contemplation was already part of the argument at NE I.10.11). This type of language of ‘best part’ or ‘perfect’ is a consequence of the ‘end/aim’ type of language. The goal/purpose of something makes us search for what is best, perfect and so on. The ‘highest thing in us’ is the intellect (NE X.7.2). There is common ground between contemplation and what was argued so far about happiness: it is pleasurable, self-sufficient, it has the highest degree of quality (NE X.7.4), and is loved for its own sake (NE X.7.5); this activity of the intellect constitutes ‘complete human happiness’ (NE X.7.7). This complete human happiness resembles the activities of the gods. They ‘enjoy supreme felicity and happiness’ (NE X.8.7). At this climax of his argument Aristotle brings together his metaphysical teleology and ethical teleology. In this section I have argued that Aristotle understands happiness in Nicomachean Ethics by building an argument in four steps/perspectives: ultimate end, the function of man, virtue, and contemplation. I have demonstrated this by showing that happiness is the ultimate aim, the 20 highest of all goods, and the good in itself, which action can achieve, always chosen for its own sake. Then, exploring further the subject by following the function of man approach, I showed that happiness is the result of our actions and of the soul's active exercise of its functions. Happiness is a form of good life. The next step in exploring happiness is by exploring the Good. I showed that there is common space between happiness and virtue in that both are related to the soul. Happiness is an activity of the soul, and goodness/virtue is an excellence of the soul. This activity is at the heart of acquiring virtues: we acquire virtues by practicing them. This practicing of them, or acting rightly, is acting in conformity with the right principle and by observing the mean. In this way virtue brings Aristotle's argument a step further: the soul's active exercise of its functions will be done with excellency and the person becomes virtuous/a better person. In the last upward step/perspective of Aristotle's argument I showed that is based on the previous ones in that happiness is the end of human life, it is some form of activity desirable in itself, and it is an activity according with virtue. Aristotle advances by going after the highest virtue. He identifies the best part in us as being the intellect (νοῦς) and, accordingly, the focus is now on the highest virtue of the best part of us. The activity of the intellect in accordance with virtue constitutes complete happiness; this is the activity of contemplation. Thus, this upward, dynamic, and kaleidoscopic interpretation of happiness is based on the structure of Aristotle's 21 argument and provides an integrated approach for practicing happiness. Thus, this is how Aristotle’s teleological ethics is grounded in his teleological metaphysics. The pure actuality/the Most Good is the goal of everything that moves from ‘matter’ to ‘form.’ The true identity of anything is achieved as the result of this process. The change towards the ‘form of good life’ is driven by power of love and thought; the highest thing in us is our thought and we are moved towards god as thought. Happiness is an external goal chosen for its own sake through the rational activity of the soul that works according to the virtue; this external goal is reached in all completeness when we exercise our thought in the activity of contemplation; in contemplation our lives resemble the activity of the gods. These are the essentials of Aristotle’s teleological vision that inform his teleological ethics. Against this recovery of Aristotle’s vision, I will present and evaluate MacIntyres’s revision of Aristotle’s teleology as other scholars analyze him. 22 3. MacIntyre’s Aristotelian Teleology in After Virtue MacIntyre interprets Aristotle’s account of virtues in the general context of ancient heroic society. In this society MacIntyre identifies that values and the place of man are predetermined, and his duties derive from his status. The structure of society and morality are one and the same (MacIntyre 2007, 122-123). The elements of this structure are those of kinship and household, and everyone knows what is expected from him based on his role and status. The focus of our analysis is how MacIntyre interprets and redefines the goal of man in Aristotle. For Aristotle, every activity, enquiry and practice aims at some good. Our humanity has a specific nature and, because of this, it has a specific goal, and this goal makes us to move towards a specific telos (MacIntyre 2007, 148). The good of man is defined based on our specific nature and goal. MacIntyre calls this Aristotelian presupposition a ‘metaphysical biology’ (this phrase is used five times by MacIntyre (p. 58, 148, 162, 163, 196) without offering a detailed explanation). This biology has to be replaced with a different account of our humanity that still preserves a teleological orientation. MacIntyre sees the need for teleology, but not in metaphysical terms. He argues for an understanding of the human good in terms based on a sociological teleology: practices, traditions, and narrative unity. These three factors are used by MacIntyre to argue for a telos 23 that is ‘the good of a human life conceived as a unity’ (MacIntyre 2007, 202). This means that the unity of life is understood as ‘the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life,’ and the good of man is understood as ‘how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion’ (MacIntyre 2007, 218). This is the fundamental move MacIntyre does in his revision of Aristotle. Everything that follows in this chapter is a criticism of this move: social teleology versus metaphysical teleology. Human characteristics define the human telos (MacIntyre 2007, 148). This telos (the ultimate end) has a name, eudaimonia (happiness), but its content is not defined specifically. Happiness is achieved by the possession and exercise of virtues. MacIntyre mentions the ambiguity of the relationship between means and ends in achieving the good of man (MacIntyre 2007, 148). The human good is realized in a complete human life, and the practice of virtues is a central part of this life. The virtuous man practices the virtues. These two facts go hand in hand. The whole attempt to provide an account of the good has both a local and a universal context for Aristotle. He envisions the good mainly for the city-state (Athens) but also for the whole world. MacIntyre sees this distinction between the particularity of a situation and the generality of human life. At some point in life for someone, something will be the good to be realized, but we need to focus on what is really good for someone as man. To achieve this good, we practice the virtues (MacIntyre 2007, 149). 24 In this context we need to understand the laws of the polis; they are important to understand the practices of life in the polis. Some of them will prohibit or prescribe some types of actions irrespective of circumstances or consequences (MacIntyre 2007, 150). For Aristotle, the individual in the city is the whole picture in which the virtues are practiced; in such a context we have the famous saying that the man is a politikon zôon (‘a living creature in the city’). There will be situations of the life in the city for which there are no laws. In such circumstances it is expected to act kata ton orthon logon (‘according to the right reason,’ MacIntyre 2007, 153). Phronêsis, as the virtue of right reason, is a central virtue, in that the individual knows how to act in a particular situation. The other virtues of character can be exercised based on this intellectual virtue (MacIntyre 2007, 154). The center of the virtues in the terms of phronêsis (knowing what is due to you) and the bond of friendship keep the polis real. Its members will aim at the same good; they share and pursue the common good. This harmony of virtues leads to harmony in the life of the individual and of the city. Aristotle, as understood by MacIntyre, understands the conflict in the city as either the result of flaws in character, or unintelligent political decisions (2007, 157; the worst evil is the civil war). MacIntyre sees that in Aristotle’s vision, in its historical context, beliefs and 25 practices form a particular tradition known as the rational tradition of inquiry that took place in the polis (see Wallach 1992, 626). The major components of this tradition are justice, practical reasoning, relationships; and they are all part of the social order of the city. All is understood and practiced in the frame of a wellordered polis. This led MacIntyre to see the rational tradition of the Greek polis as being ‘rationally superior’ to its predecessors (Wallach 1992, 627). The ultimate Aristotelian human telos, the contemplation, according to MacIntyre, shows the tension that exists between man as understood politically and metaphysically. Both are needed: the individual, and the polis; the material and the social (MacIntyre 2007, 158). MacIntyre rejects the Aristotelian metaphysical biology (that humans have a specific nature, and because of this, they have specific aims, and with their help they move toward a specific telos), and tries to save the teleological aspect of his account of virtues (2007, 162). In order to provide an account for his teleology MacIntyre grounds virtue with the help of narrative unity, tradition and practices, and he sees the human telos in terms of a search for the meaning of life. This teleological account provided by MacIntyre is open to varied criticism and here are the main points of it. Grounding virtue with the help of narrative unity, tradition and practices is undermined by the dilemma that on one hand, some of our lives are unified and others are not, and this is because of our choices, and on the other hand, every act 26 we do is part of some narrative (Schneewind 1982, 659). If we define the good by our tradition, we do not have a fixed social identity and the virtues do not have priority. The virtues as traits in achieving the good have an illusory priority because the notion of the good is ‘for practical purposes vacuous’ (Schneewind 1982, 661). This lack of content at the practical level for the common good is seen when we acknowledge that, all what is left about it is that we, as people, work together to secure it. Thus, MacIntyre’s position collapses in a similar way to modernity (Schneewind 1982, 661). This failure is because MacIntyre’s account of the good is too thin to ground an alternative ethic (Schneewind 1982, 661). Schneewind applies to MacIntyre the same criticism MacIntyre applies to the Enlightenment project, and I go beyond that by arguing that we need to discern the overall Aristotelian metaphysical framework and then to compare it with what MacIntyre proposes. If the human good is understood in social practical terms we cannot go beyond the dead end of modern morality. If the human telos is understood, as MacIntyre does, in terms of inquiry and search for meaning in human life (Weinstein 2003, 54) then, this search has to be cultivated and is not an autonomous act. The human good is to be understood in the general context of our social structures and not detached from society. This social teleology is oriented towards the actualization of the human potential; it is a movement towards human virtue or excellency. The nature and morality of 27 humans is to be explained given a particular history, as the individuals are ‘bearers of traditions’ (Weinstein 2003, 55). Thus, from an overall point of view, MacIntyre replaces the foundation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy: metaphysical biology (that humans have a specific nature, and because of this, they have specific aims, and with their help they move toward a specific telos) is replaced with social history and historical sociology (Knight 2007, kl 2808). He does this replacement because he thinks that in the Greek classical traditions the concepts of good and virtue are not based on ‘metaphysical biology,’ as in Aristotle, but on history and culture (Knight 2007, kl 2839). So, MacIntyre, following the early Enlightenment thinkers, rejects Aristotle’s metaphysical biology, but does not abandon Aristotle’s teleological ethics, and combine ethics with social science (Knight 2007, kl 2849). For MacIntyre the telos is not a temporal end of an action, but a state of completion. There is no such thing as some external element/factor that causally effects a temporal movement towards some final end. Consequently, eudaimonia, the final telos of man, is understood by MacIntyre not as something that is consequent upon all goals of practical reasoning, but as the condition in which humans flourish in thinking and acting virtuously (Knight 2007, kl 2901). Thus, teleology is redefined by MacIntyre in intentionalist terms as purposiveness (Knight 2007, kl 2911). In this respect he works in the large area of utilitarianism. When teleology is 28 understood in terms of means and ends you cannot go beyond the logic of the utilitarian consequentialism. Then, when the teleology is applied to morality, the traditional scheme of (1) the human good as realized human telos, (2) the conception of man as he happens to be, and (3) the rules of rational ethics, needs to be revised as follows. When we apply the moral rules/precepts to move a person from his/her state/nature towards a desired aim, because Aristotle’s metaphysical biology is untenable, the first step has to be revised/replaced. The human telos is understood in sociological terms. These sociological terms are part of the sociological vision we discussed earlier: practices, narrative unity, and traditions (Knight 2007, kl 3012). The development of the concept of virtue follows these three stages, and this is what MacIntyre proposes to replace the Aristotelian metaphysical conception of telos. We live our lives according to some narrative order and our practices have an internal teleological structure of some goal (Knight 2007, kl 3022). We need to discern the overall Aristotelian framework and then compare it with what MacIntyre proposes. If the human good is understood in social terms we cannot go beyond the dead end of modern morality. This form of Aristotelianism proposed by MacIntyre is lacking the backbone of whole ethical system worked out by Aristotle and integrated for nearly twenty centuries in the 29 West after his death. This backbone is that the human good is the ultimate end, and this end has a metaphysical grounding, not a social one. If we try to revise the ethical Aristotelian vision by taking out its metaphysical grounding, we do not go beyond the Enlightenment project. As Hinchman observes, MacIntyre’s arguments against the Enlightenment are at least partially compatible with Enlightenment (Hinchman 1989, 635). In the Enlightenment project there is the focus on the individual. Individualism becomes a social institution. We live our lives as we try to extract ourselves from the narrative order of life, from traditions and social contexts (Hinchman 1989, 644). MacIntyre labels this type of society as a ‘collection of citizens of nowhere’ (MacIntyre 2007, 156). In this society, several forms of life evolved to establish an individualist foundation: the aesthete (the discriminating consumer), the therapist, and the bureaucratic manager (Hinchman 1989, 645). These forms of life do not lead to the development of virtue. That is why, we are not able to reach moral consensus. The problem with MacIntyre’s social teleology is that it does not lead us in a very different place. If the human good is understood in sociological terms we cannot go beyond our will; and that leads to fragmentation. Practices and tradition are weak and subdued to the power of our will. We will transcend them without anywhere to go. I believe that the MacIntyre’s call to return to the classical 30 vision of life is right, but not attainable because of his secular social revision of Aristotelianism. My criticism of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism concerns his understanding of teleology. Aristotle’s teleological ethics has to be understood in the light of his teleological metaphysics. There is change for the good in Aristotle’s world only in terms of moving from potentiality to actuality, and the ‘pure actuality’ that makes this movement towards change is the Unmoved Mover, the ultimate end, the Most Good of the whole universe. At the ethical level, the human ultimate end, happiness is reached by an upward movement based on the function of man (‘metaphysical biology’), practice of virtue, and, at the end, the activity of contemplation. This is the closest we can get to the gods and the stage in which we become happy. If we dismantle these structures, change is not possible, and man is left with broken fragments of this vision that cannot help him to move forward. You cannot dismantle an ethical system of its metaphysical grounding and reorient it in practical social terms. If the ultimate human aim is understood in social terms the whole argument ends as the Enlightenment project ended: autonomy and fragmentation. This surgical intervention will, in the end, be unsuccessful as seen in MacIntyre’s later publications where he adopts a thomistic position; see especially Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1989) and Dependent Rational Animals (1999). In 31 Aristotle there are anticipations of Aquinas: theoria as ‘god-like’ life, the Unmoved Mover, the rational order of the polis as an anticipation of the rational order of the cosmos. Aquinas corrects the rational defects of the Aristotelian tradition, enhances its virtues and it was rationally ‘vindicated by history’ (Wallach 1992, 627). This journey of MacIntyre from Aristotelianism to Thomism shows that he was dissatisfied with Aristotle and it gives another example, this time of himself, why MacIntyre’s solution in secular Aristotelian terms did not become popular and accepted. MacIntyre says in the Preface of the 3rd edition of After Virtue that he has become a Thomist after writing After Virtue because Aquinas was a better Aristotelian than Aristotle, and by that he meant that Aquinas was able ‘to extend and deepen both Aristotle’s metaphysical and his moral enquiries’ (MacIntyre 2007, kl 79; see some similar comments in MacIntyre 1999, kl 41-66). 32 4. Conclusion This thesis goes beyond the leading scholarly positions of Schneewind, Hinchman, Wallach, Weinstein, and Knight as the failure of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian teleology is concerned. Neither of them explores the arguments of Aristotle’s teleology and then compare them with MacIntyre’s Aristotelian teleology, and based on them criticize MacIntyre’s vision. Knight comes close but he does not explore the relevancy of Metaphysics 12 for understanding the good of man (happiness) in Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s teleology, as outlined in this project (both in the area of metaphysics and ethics), shows several essential elements. It is related to divinity (the Unmoved Mover) and biology (function of man, soul and thought). These both have metaphysical grounding. When MacIntyre revises this vision and turns the end towards the life in the city, he destroys it. He uses Aristotelian language (virtue, end, city), but in a very different framework. Everything is at human level (his ethics is grounded in his sociology), and human traditions do not have the power to guide the human mind. In the end, the will is more fundamental than our intellect, and it has the upper hand on everything, as Nietzsche shows us. Emotivism is inevitable. I believe that MacIntyre is right by turning to Aristotle to find an answer to 33 the problem of modern morality, but he is mistaken in revising Aristotle’s vision. In Aristotle there are the resources for a virtue ethics in modernity. But for doing that, the main framework designed by Aristotle has to stay in place: teleological ethics is grounded in teleological metaphysics. There is no change without an external Ultimate Mover, and there are no virtues without an external Supreme End/Good. If this framework is dismantled, we are left with our Emotivism. When Aristotle’s teleology was integrated in the traditions of the West (Jewish, Christian and Islamic) his vision was left almost intact: The Unmoved Mover was simply replaced with God of the Jews, Christians, or Muslims. The nature of man, as a relational being that searches for fulfillment in serving God, is understood as reflecting the imago Dei, and points always upward. This metaphysical grounding has to stay in place if the Aristotelian vision is to work. But MacIntyre, in After Virtue, dismantles this, and, that is why, he does not arrive at the end of his argument in a very different place than that of Emotivism with its relativistic and utilitarian flavor. Ultimately, in MacIntyre’s vision, my virtues are grounded in my will, not in my metaphysical ultimate end, and the will-guided intellect is the only rule. This leads to perpetual fragmentation and divergent positions. The reign of the will is what we are left with, and, even if I intend to be virtuous, I do not have the resources in my will to attain that. I have the power to transcend even my own will, and then I find no place to go. Living like this in the 34 city does not exhibit harmony and friendship, but competition and harm. Most of the time my will is driven towards freedom and power. 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