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The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Executive Summary
Nuclear energy is intertwined with developments in social, economic, environmental, political, and cultural spheres. Therefore, it is a complex social and technological phenomenon that influences societies but is also shaped by societies as
can be explored in this chapter about the history of the relations between nuclear
energy and society in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).
In the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, when the United States had
launched the Atoms for Peace program and the first nuclear power plant went online in Germany, nuclear power seemed to be a modern solution to humankind’s
energy problems. Just over a year after the Federal Government had adopted the
Atomic Energy Act in 1959 on the peaceful utilization of atomic energy and the
protection against its hazards, the first nuclear power plant went online at the
border of Hesse and Bavaria. With it, nuclear power in West Germany started as an
industrial business. In the 1960s a phase of development and planning followed
that was hardly noticed by the public. The first commercial nuclear reactor went
on the grid in 1961, but it took many government incentives to convince energy
companies to switch to nuclear power completely. The planning and building of
nuclear power plants, radioactive waste disposal facilities, or reprocessing plants in
the federal states of Baden-Württemberg (Wyhl), Schleswig-Holstein (Brokdorf),
Lower Saxony (Gorleben), North Rhine-Westphalia (Kalkar), and Bavaria (Wackersdorf) provoked massive and recurring protests throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The protests against the construction of the plant in Wyhl (Kaiserstuhl) on the
French border in Germany’s southwest gave power to the nascent environmental
movement when – in 1975 – 30,000 people demonstrated, occupying the site and
developing protest structures.
Where nuclear sites were close to two or sometimes three different countries –
for instance this was the case in protests against nuclear plants in Wyhl, people of
diverse nationalities usually had similar interests. Furthermore, since the travel
distances were rather minimal, it was easier to join and support local protests.
Through activists, but also experts, politicians, organizations, and the media there
was an exchange of knowledge and ideas. Women were often at the forefront
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
among critical citizens and since the 1970s they had raised their voices louder than
ever. Especially the Chernobyl nuclear power plant catastrophe in April 1986 led
to an upswing of intensified debates in Germany and also gave rise to the Mothers
against Chernobyl movement. As a result, a Ministry for the Environment was
founded at the federal level and citizens’ initiatives – many initiated and run by
women – sprang up in high numbers. In 1998, the red-green coalition agreement
decided to phase out nuclear energy within 20 years. Two years later, the Federal
Government and electric supply companies signed an agreement about the future
operation of German nuclear power plants. After a tsunami and partial meltdown
at the Japanese nuclear power plant Fukushima Daiichi in 2011, the topic received
renewed attention with continued protests. Chancellor Angela Merkel announced
the shutdown of all German power plants by 2022 with eight of the 17 operating
German reactors shut down immediately. Until March 2011, these 17 reactors produced 25 percent of the country’s electricity. In 2016, the remaining eight reactors
produced 16 percent, while half of Germany’s electricity was generated from coal.1
1 This chapter is based on a short country report on the history of nuclear energy and its relation to
society in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1945. It was part of a collection of 20 short country
reports tackling the complex sociotechnical system around nuclear energy in different countries in the
project ‘History of Nuclear Energy and Society, HoNESt’, funded by the Euratom Research and Training
Programme Ref. 662268. The reports examine the history of nuclear energy in different countries, and
document findings with references. Moreover they assemble information on basic elements of narrative
and analysis for further historical research, and provide accessible information on nuclear-societal
relations for the purposes of outreach and communication with stakeholders (civil society, industry,
associations, policymakers, journalists).
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Historical Context (Narrative)
Introduction to the historical context
Concerns about nuclear power were publicly expressed for the first time in the
1950s and 1960s and focused on the high costs, unproven technology, and dangers
of nuclear waste disposals (Rudig 1990, 63). In later decades, activists criticized the
Federal Government because they perceived the politics in which it pursued its
big-industry projects as nontransparent and authoritarian (Glaser 2012, 12), and
loyal state citizens often had experiences that turned their trust into skepticism.
Large parts of the population frequently mistrusted both the state and the energy
industry, and faith in the problem-solving strategies of experts and academics
faded. Moreover, low-level radiation, catastrophic disasters, disposal of radioactive
waste, and other environmental impacts were criticized (Schils 2011, 4), alongside
a more general critique of large-scale technology. Finally, opponents doubted that
there were issues with alternative sources of energy and disapproved of the lack of
the political will to actually invest in it (Hubert 2012). The societal controversy
over nuclear energy that had already begun in the 1950s has been interpreted as a
true success story of Germany’s social and political culture (Radkau 1987; Weitze
and Trischler 2006). The controversy was carried out at all societal levels and
integrated not only small groups of experts and stakeholders, but numerous intermediary social groups and actors.
Contextual narrative
On 7 May 1946, the Allied Control Council Law No. 25 came into force. With this
law, the Control Council strictly forbade West Germany any strand of research that
had civil and military applications, which included nuclear physics (Müller 1990,
vol. 1, 44). Yet, the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his government
did not want to be excluded from international developments and were not
inclined to accept Allied restrictions in this field. After the ratification of the
General Treaty (also: Germany Treaty) in 1952, which regulated the relationship
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Allies (France, Great
Britain, and the USA), Chancellor Adenauer and the physicist Werner Heisenberg
publicly pushed for the construction of a nuclear reactor. To connect to international developments, an organizational frame was necessary. To this end,
Adenauer initiated the building of a body that was to prepare the nuclear energy
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
industry. The ratification of the Bonn–Paris conventions in 1955 put an end to the
Allied occupation of West Germany and freed the way for the civilian use of
nuclear energy (Tiggemann 2010, 47 et seq.). The primary goal of the West German government was now to reduce the research backlog of more than a decade
and to found structures to support nuclear energy. In the same year, the West German government decided to convene the German Nuclear Commission – though
it was not responsible to the parliament, it functioned as an advisory body to the
atomic minister (Gleitsmann 1987, 34 and 38). A driving motif to promote nuclear
energy was the pronuclear, euphoric atmosphere in West Germany, but it was
accompanied by a fear of possible energy shortages in the future, after the Technical
University in Karlsruhe had predicted a coal shortage for the mid-1970s (Radkau
1983, 113).
The euphoric atmosphere in West Germany was partly inspired by the first
international conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy organized in 1955
in Geneva under the leadership of the United Nations. The Federal Republic
undertook steps for international cooperation and was amongst the founding
members of the European Atomic Energy Community (also known as Euratom) in
1957 (Stamm 1992, 39 et seq.). Finally, it created the legal basis for the construction
and operation of nuclear power plants in Germany: in 1959 the Federal Government adopted the Atomic Energy Act on the peaceful utilization of atomic energy
and protection against its hazards (Atomic Energy Act 1959, 814). In the same year,
the German Atomic Forum was created. Following the US American model, it
became the representative for the private sector and the public for the support of
nuclear energy (Müller 1990, vol. 1, 198 et seq.). In 1961, the forum opened up for
interested organizations, companies, and associations.
In the same year, the first nuclear power plant went online between Karlstein
and Kahl at the border of Hesse and Bavaria, which heralded the start of nuclear
power in West Germany as an industrial business. Soon German politicians spoke
about a future that would solve all distribution problems through cheap atomic
energy.
A phase of development and planning followed which went nearly unnoticed
by the public. Physicist and Nobel laureate Werner Heisenberg in particular became
a driving force of the nuclear sector. For him, a powerful nuclear industry was
crucial to the overall economic competitiveness of West Germany, and he understood the forceful development of nuclear research centers as a necessary first step
in that direction. His vision of building up a strong federal atomic program,
however, remained contested, along with the question of siting nuclear research
facilities. (Figure 1)
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Figure 1 Werner Heisenberg’s report on the Possibilities of Technical Energy
Production from Uranium Fission classified as ‘secret’
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Energy companies like Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG (RWE Power
AG) or PreußenElektra, which paid for and operated the nuclear reactors, were
especially critical of nuclear power because of the costs and the technical
uncertainties involved.
For instance, their relatively new facilities for producing brown coal would
have been shut down if they had changed to nuclear energy – something RWE
firmly rejected (Tiggemann 2010, 62). They were reluctant to adopt a new and
unproven technology and pleaded instead for renewable energy. As a result, Franz
Josef Strauß’s successor in the Atomic Ministry, Siegfried Balke, saw energy supply
companies as opponents to his politics. He tried to use energy politics against the
energy industry, for instance by keeping them out of the planning for the first
atomic program (Radkau 1983, 116 et seq.). Until the end of the 1960s, RWE
clearly gave preference to brown coal over nuclear energy. However, in 1968 the
energy supply company staged a turnaround and took the lead in the German development of the nuclear industry by placing the order for Biblis A. Historians
described the project as having set new standards in power plant construction
worldwide (Tiggemann 2010, 63 and 176). The plant was built in the South Hessian
municipality of Biblis and consisted of two units: unit A, with a gross output of
1,200 megawatts, and unit B, with a gross output of 1,300 megawatts. The
pressurized water reactor Biblis A began operating in 1974. After the nuclear
catastrophe in Fukushima in 2011, bloc A was shut down; however, bloc B was
already in a scheduled revision and therefore did not have to be closed down.
In an effort to make a case against critics of the nuclear energy industry, the
German government established major research centers in Karlsruhe and Jülich in
1956 and 1962 that soon became influential in European nuclear research and
development. The plan to promote research to generate arguments against critics
of nuclear energy worked only in part. This time, opposition came from civil
society, especially women. Local women’s associations in Karlsruhe were critical of
the research centers because of the danger posed to citizens in a city with a high
population density. The city of Karlsruhe had commissioned a survey that revealed
that only 27 percent of interviewed women approved of the research centers,
compared with 63 percent of interviewed men (Renn 1995, 762). The civilian and
military use of nuclear power was a topic that frequently divided the sexes on the
issue of quality of life. Green politician Petra Kelly expressed the opposing views of
men and women on the military use of nuclear energy as follows: “[n]uclear war
and war in general [is] a manifestation of the constant war between masculine and
feminine values” (Women should push, 1984, no page numbers).
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Not only women opposed research centers and nuclear sites, the 1950s was
generally the time of the first protest wave in Germany. When the German government planned to equip the German army with so-called tactical nuclear warheads
and launch sites for short-range missiles, 18 German nuclear scientists – including
Nobel laureates Heisenberg, Max Born, Otto Hahn, Max von Laue, and Wolfgang
Paul – opposed this with the Göttingen Manifesto of 12 April 1957. The
proclamation pointed at the destructive power of these weapons and warned of the
military and political consequences of nuclearization (Schirrmacher 2007; Lorenz
2011). The Campaign against Atomic Death formed in response to fear of the
atomic armament of the German army and led to skepticism towards civilian
nuclear facilities as well (Milder 2017). The decade also saw the foundation of
critical nuclear energy non-governmental organizations, some of which were
politically contested. One example was the World Union for Protection of Life
(WSL), which became active in over 30 countries. The association was founded in
1960 by the Austrian writer, environmentalist, and former Nazi party member,
Günther Schwab. Membership grew rapidly and from 1970 onwards, the WSL was
an influential power in the growing ecology movement. For instance, the German
WSL was one of the founding members of the Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen
Umweltschutz, which is the umbrella organization of all environmentally active
citizens’ initiatives in Germany. Due to its partly right-wing activities and members,
the German WSL branch was banned from the international association in 1985
and dissolved in 2001 (Kirchhof 2011, 36 and 41; Engels 2006, 78 and 332). These
first protests differed from later ones because protestors did not take direct
democratic measures or cooperate transnationally.
These steps were taken for the first time in the mid-1970s with the protest
against a power plant in the Badensian village of Wyhl. The actions are widely
recognized as the starting point of the anti-nuclear movement in Germany and
historians have interpreted them as a national site of memory deeply embedded in
German culture (Rusinek 2003). Though – as explained above – this protest was
not the first one, it did become an example to activists for later protests.
In 1973, Wyhl was chosen as the site for a nuclear power plant, which caused
direct opposition. In the following two years, signatures and appeals against the
construction of the nuclear power plant were submitted to the minister of the
interior. When these actions did not affect the political decision, local people –
who were transnationally supported – increased their opposition and occupied the
construction site. In 1975, it was decided that construction should be interrupted,
but the decision was reversed and the site in Wyhl was occupied once more. In
March 1977, the administrative court withdrew the construction license for the
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
plant but later initiated a process of second instance. In 1982, the minister president
of Baden-Württemberg declared the construction of the nuclear power plant in
Wyhl unnecessary and confirmed his decision five years later. In the end, the plant
was never built (Engels 2003, 350 et seq.; Tiggemann 2010, 212 et seq.).
A few other projects played particularly critical roles in the public debate in
West Germany. The (planned) building of reactors in Brokdorf, Kalkar, Wackersdorf, and Gorleben caused a further shift from optimism to pessimism over nuclear
energy and triggered massive protests as well as violent disputes between activists
and police. In 1975, 25,000 people took to the streets in Wyhl; in 1977, 40,000–
60,000 people demonstrated at the site at Kalkar; and two years later, in 1979,
100,000 people joined the Gorleben track protest. Up until then, the rallies against
nuclear facilities had been the biggest in West Germany’s protest history (Mende
2011, 332).
Concerns about a light-water nuclear power reactor proposal at Brokdorf, near
Hamburg, had become a public issue in November 1973 (the plans for it dated
back to the late 1960s). But it was not until 1976 and 1977 – during the first
construction phase – that opponents started to protest violently against it. The
police had learned from their experience at Wyhl and wanted to avoid similar
incidents at all costs. Shortly after receiving the permit for building the reactor, the
police cordoned off the Brokdorf site which led to violent clashes between
opponents and the police and a demonstration with 30,000 people a few weeks
later. This promted a halt in construction that was justified by the lack of a disposal
strategy for spent fuel. In 1981, construction continued and about 100,000 people
demonstrated, causing a severe confrontation with police once again. More
conflicts with the police followed in 1986, the year the Brokdorf nuclear power
reactor eventually started operating (Glaser 2012, 12 et seq.).
In 1985 the Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH (German waste disposal company DWK) decided to build and
operate a reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf, a municipality in the district of
Schwandorf in Bavaria, Germany. When they started clearing the woodland,
30,000 people demonstrated, occupied the building site, and erected a hut village.
After the Chernobyl nuclear power plant catastrophe in April 1986, the violent
dispute between police and anti-nuclear activists reached its peak. A large number
of initiatives – many organized and run by women – mushroomed, such as the
group Mothers Against Nuclear Power (Figure 2), which took part in hearings against
Wackersdorf (Blomeyer and Wurzbacher 2016; Wurzbacher 1988; Mütter 1988).
Finally, the protesters were successful: the energy company Vereinigte Elektrizitäts
und Bergwerks Aktiengesellschaft (United Electricity and Mining Corporation,
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VEBA) changed its politics and was no longer interested in the reprocessing plant,
resulting in a building freeze in 1988.
The building of a radioactive waste disposal facility in Gorleben, Lower Saxony,
which was planned as a future deep final repository for waste from nuclear reactors,
also provoked massive protests. The decision to use Gorleben as site for storing
nuclear waste came in 1977 under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD, Social
Democrats) and Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht (CDU, conservatives). Before the
decision was made, over one hundred salt domes had been considered. Most important were the geopolitical criteria, such as the sparse settlement at the border
area close to East Germany. Protest against the decision arose early on and the site
was given up as a final repository. Today the plant serves as an intermediate storage
facility for waste from Germany’s nuclear power plants, which is reprocessed in
France and then sent back to Germany for final storage. Current protests against
nuclear energy in Gorleben are directed at the annual transport of dry cask containers from France to Germany and continue to demand a huge police presence
(Glaser 2012, 15; Khoo and Rau 2012, 156).
An interesting technological project that failed and later became an enterprise
of the burgeoning leisure sector was the construction of SNR-300, a pilot-scale
fast breeder reactor, in Kalkar. The project started in 1972 as an international
collaboration. Built to produce 327 megawatts of electricity for the Rhineland,
SNR-300 was a solution to limited uranium reserves in the Federal Republic and a
means to become independent from energy imports in the near future. Criticism
soon arose about the safety of the breeder and international demonstrations took
place in 1974 and 1977. Experts expressed their concerns about the reactor coolant
as well as the controlling process, and a four-year halt in construction was agreed
upon. Even after the construction of SNR-300 was completed in 1985, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia did not authorize use of the building because of
unforeseeable risks in operating the reactor. The shutdown of the project was
announced in 1991, and the unused machines and facilities were transferred to
reactors and production complexes in other countries. Finally, the reactor was sold
and turned into an amusement park.
The transition from optimism to pessimism manifested in Germany’s political
landscape too. While the Social Democratic Party (SPD) strongly advocated
nuclear energy as a trigger for technological and industrial modernization during
the 1950s and 1960s, it switched sides and became a critic of nuclear energy in
the 1970s. In 1998 – under the newly elected Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder – the red-green coalition decided to phase out
nuclear energy within 20 years. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Free
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Figure 2 “Don’t say you didn’t know”. Protest of the newly founded
Mothers Against Atomic Power Initiative in May 1986 shortly after the
Chernobyl accident happened. Munich, Marienplatz
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Democratic Party (The Liberals, FDP) coalition government that was elected in
September 2009 was committed to rescinding the phase-out policy. Yet, after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced
the closedown of all German power plants by 2022. Parliament and most German
politicians approved of the moratorium.
Women were often at the forefront among critical citizens and since the 1970s
they had raised their voices louder than ever. Many of them argued that there was
an essential connection between the suppression of women in a patriarchal society
and the subjugation of nature, resulting in its damage. They pointed out that
humans are no longer an integral part of the environment and claimed a new
concept of nature focusing on intuition, emotionality, and spirituality (Thiessen
2010, 37–44). The Protestant theologian, political scientist, and colleague of Petra
Kelly, Eva Quistorp, was one of the first women to talk publicly about this
ecofeminist theory when she gave a presentation entitled “Women and Mothers
against the Destruction of the Natural World” at the Free University of Berlin in
1976 (Quistorp 1979, 152). Within the ecofeminism school of thought, positions
based on difference feminism theory emerged, elevating gender differences to a
defining category. The theories implied differences between men and women with
regard to their biological and social gender but claimed the principle equality
between genders. This newly formulated political trend within the broader feminist
movement presented female qualities as non-deficient and aimed at putting an end
to the perception that women were an aberration from the male norm. It created a
positive reference to shared femaleness and became a source of emotional strength
and legitimization for political activities in the women’s peace movement of the
1980s (Flaake 2005, 158–175). In particular, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
catastrophe in April 1986 led to an upswing of intensified debates in Germany.
Women highlighted the differences between the sexes and founded new initiatives,
informed themselves and others about the risks involved in the civilian and
military use of nuclear power, published leaflets, gave speeches, and organized
conferences. One example was the international congress “Women and Ecology:
Against the Feasibility Delusion” that took place in Cologne in October 1986 and
was organized by feminists in the local area, by the Greens, and by the autonomous
women’s movement (Lenz 2010, 855).
Historiography has given various reasons why the opposition against nuclear
power was generally strong in Germany and also violent at times. Historians found
answers in Germany’s national socialist past, which might have resulted in a strong
skepticism towards the authorities as well as a lack of religious influences in the
movement, as can be found in the United States. Others emphasize society’s
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
criticism of cost-benefit analyses. First, nuclear opponents feared future generations’ accusations that their ancestors had failed to act against the atomic industry
and had become its accomplices instead; children and grandchildren had made
similar arguments regarding the country’s national socialist past. Those who did
not wish to be seen as traitors and followers had a duty to oppose nuclear power.
Additionally, large parts of the population frequently mistrusted the state and the
energy industry, and faith in the problem-solving strategies of experts and
academics faded. Up until then, loyal state citizens had had experiences that had
turned their trust into skepticism (Interview Szepan). In particular, the suspicion
that state authorities would bend practice and law to favor the interests of nuclear
energy advocates also supported doubts against the state within non-critical circles.
They saw a connection between the extension of atomic energy and democratic
deficits and argued that the atomic lobby lacked transparency as well as honesty.
Opponents perceived the relationship between the atomic industry and the
population as one of traitors and victims. This mistrust in the truthfulness of state
and the nuclear industry justified militant actions for some activists. Additionally,
the police’s brutal responses to militant acts and the obvious intention of some
politicians to criminalize dissidents only increased skepticism and suspicion of
authorities in politics and the economy in Germany. (Schüring 2015, 89 et seq.;
Tompkins, Grassroots 2016, 117; Mende 2011, 330 et seq.).
Second, a different understanding of civil disobedience, as can be found in the
US, is also emphasized. The historian Michael Hughes argues that non-violent
protest in America has two origins that were missing in Germany and might have
resulted in a greater openness to violent actions. According to Hughes, these
influences stemmed from the American author and philosopher Henry David
Thoreau’s argument for disobedience to an unjust state, as well as from the
Christian roots of the US American Civil Rights movement (Hughes 2014, 236–
253). Violence as a means of political dispute could be found especially in leftist
political activists, such as in communist cadres as well as the so called Sponti scene
(Mende 2011, 333 et seq.). Third, resistance against nuclear power plants also
expressed a critique of large-scale technology. In the opinion of many citizens, the
costs of the facilities far exceeded the benefits, and tend to be under-estimated
(Engels 2006, 348).
On a global scale, different environmental, peace, disarmament, and antiuranium movements inspired each other worldwide. This was possible through a
significant transfer of ideas conveyed through activists, politicians, experts, social
organizations, and the media, which functioned as transmitting agents for relevant
information, ideas, and values. Transfer of ideas did not necessarily result in
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cooperation between ecological groups on a broader scale. There were a number of
reasons why social movements did not always find it easy to cooperate. For one
thing, there may have been too many social movements to be united under a single
cause, sometimes even in one nation state. Moreover, despite common ideologies
and views, each movement had a different focus, and the lack of a common
“language” hampered this coalition building further. Another reason is that it was
difficult to maintain international contacts and to travel, both of which were vital
to transnational collaboration. Travel distances and costs generally prohibited
many activists from international involvement and transnational cooperation, at
least until the last quarter of the twentieth century. Finally, the internal structure,
different strategies and choreographies, cooperative culture, and diverse social
milieus of the environmental action groups could sometimes lead to misunderstandings and be an obstacle to coalition building between groups and movements. Cooperation worked slightly differently at nuclear sites that were close to
borders, because some of the “obstacles” described above only applied to a minor
extent. Where nuclear sites were close to two or sometimes three different countries,
people of diverse nationalities usually had similar interests. Furthermore, since the
travel distances were rather minimal, it was easier to join and support local protests.
This was the case in protests against nuclear plants in Wyhl and Cattenom (interview Avena) where French and German activists worked together, or in Kalkar, as
the common protest of Dutch and German activists shows (Kirchhof and
McConville 2015, 332–333; Tompkins, Grassroots 2016, 131 et seq.).
While activists learned from each other how to organize protests more
effectively, government officials and police chiefs too learned from confrontations,
as the Wyhl case shows. Since the interactions between activists and the police
became increasingly violent, the latter developed special strategies to protect
reactor sites and hinder activists from lasting occupation (Milder 2014, 197).
Main Actors
Government, as the main funder of research and development, has been a strong
proponent of nuclear power until recently, specifically through various ministries
such as the Federal Ministry of Nuclear Affairs, which was founded in 1955, or the
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, and
Nuclear Safety, which was founded in 1986 under the name Federal Ministry for
the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Reactor Safety. Bodies like the
Reactor Safety Commission, which was set up by order of the Ministry of Nuclear
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Affairs in 1958, also had a strong interest in the sector. Responsibility for licensing
the construction and operation of all nuclear facilities is shared between the
German Federal Government and the federal states, which confers something close
to a power of veto to both.
Science has been another driving force of the nuclear sector. The physicist
Werner Heisenberg, Nobel laureate and science advisor to Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, opted for an early and strong engagement in atomic research to pave the
way for industrial activities and international collaboration (Carson 2010; Carson
2002). Allied restrictions in applied nuclear research and technology were only
lifted in 1955 when West Germany received sovereignty, but in the early 1950s a
number of both large-scale nuclear research centers and university-based research
reactors had already been founded, including big science establishments in Karlsruhe, Jülich, Geesthacht, and Munich (Rusinek 1996; Oetzel 1996; Interview Popp
2016). When the foundational mission of these centers came to an end in the
1970s, they diversified into many other fields of both basic and applied science,
including renewable energies. But up until today, the centers have kept a foot in
the nuclear realm and continue to conduct research and training, particularly in
nuclear safety.
Private companies have been vital in the construction of German reactors. In the
foundational period of the 1950s, however, the energy industry was hesitant to
engage in the nuclear sector and it needed the state to set the scene (Radkau 1983).
Once established, the nuclear industry became the core proponent of nuclear energy and continuously attempted to enlarge nuclear markets both domestically and
abroad. The engineering company Siemens and its subsidiary company Kraftwerk
Union (KWU) had a monopoly position in developing nuclear power plants for
Germany for decades, until after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in September
2011 when Siemens withdrew from the nuclear industry. At the same time, it
concluded its cooperation with the global leader AREVA – a French multinational
group specializing in nuclear power and renewable energy, whose German branch
is in Erlangen (Interview Schuch and Meyer zu Schwabedissen). This leaves four
remaining nuclear energy companies: E.ON Kernkraft GmbH (the biggest German
energy company), Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy GmbH (the Swedish company
opposed the phasing out in Germany, which gave it a bad image), RWE Power AG
(critical of nuclear power in the 1950s for cost reasons and pleaded for renewable
energy), and EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg (the third-biggest energy
company, which suffered heavy financial losses after the phase out because of
strong investments in nuclear power). The state subsidized or gave indirect financial
benefits for the construction and operation of nuclear plants (at the expense of
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taxpayers). Thus, some critics point out that the costs for nuclear energy had been
held low artificially with the help of subsidies worth billions (AtomkraftwerkePlag
– Atomlobby Konzerne and Atomlobby Subventionen).
Professional associations including the German Atomic Forum (founded 1959) and
the Nuclear Society (founded 1969) often have strong formal and informal links to
each other. For example, the former is a member of the latter organization and
supports it financially. Moreover, there are links to politics, e.g. well-known institutions funded by the Federal Government, such as the Deutsche Bahn AG, the
Helmholtz Center Munich and Berlin, and the Max Planck Institute of Plasma
Physics, to name a few, are members of the German Atomic Forum and the Nuclear
Society, among others, and support them through membership fees. Further associations are: Bürger für Technik (BfT), Energie-Fakten.de, Europäisches Institut für
Klima und Energie (EIKE), Informationskreis KernEnergie (IK), Initiative Neue
Soziale Marktwirtschaft (INSM), Internationale Länderkommission Kerntechnik
(ILK), Nuklearia e.V., Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission (RSK), Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), TÜV SÜD, Wirtschaftsverband
Kernbrennstoff-Kreislauf und Kerntechnik (WKK), and Women in Nuclear (WiN)
(Government’s reply to minor interpellation 2014).
Trade Unions supported the use of nuclear energy for decades. When the “green”
nuclear opponent Frank Bsirske became head of the trade union Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (Ver.di) in 2008, the new service union took a critical stance
on this technology. At around that time, the Union for Heavy Industry, Engineering, and Electronics (trade union IG Metall) started to cooperate with the antinuclear movement as well because they saw a future for jobs in the field of
renewable energies. After the nuclear disaster in Fukushima in 2011, the head of
Trade Union of Mining, Chemicals and Energy Industries demanded sufficient
alternative energies, but no longer questioned the phasing out of nuclear energy
(von Appen 2011, 36; AtomkraftwerkePlag – Gewerkschaften und Atomkraft).
In the 1970s, societies became increasingly skeptical of nuclear power. In
Germany the controversy was carried out at all societal levels and integrated intermediary social groups but also experts that founded alternative ecological research
institutes; like the Freiburg Institute for Applied Ecology (Öko-Institut). It was
founded in 1977 and is one of the most important institutes in its field in Germany.
Protests against nuclear sites took direct democratic measures, engaged in transnational cooperation, and resorted to extreme violence at times. Opposition to the
construction of a power plant at the Badensian village of Wyhl was carried out by
local inhabitants, especially wine farmers, but transnationally supported. For the
first time, actions became especially violent with protests against the light-water
reactor in Brokdorf, which caused “civil-war-like confrontations between police
forces and opponents of the project” (Glaser 2012, 12; also: Kirchhof 2013, 2015;
Kirchhof and Meyer 2014; Mende 2011; Milder 2014; Tompkins, Better 2016). The
movement finally culminated in a new party, the Greens which was founded in
1980.
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Figure 3 1986: Police before reactor 2 in Brokdorf
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Showcase
Wonderland Kalkar
The Kalkar project started as an international collaboration in 1972 when the
Belgian-German-Dutch Fast Breeder Nuclear Reactor Ltd. was founded in Essen.
The company instructed the Siemens subsidiary Interatom to carry out the
construction of fast breeder sodium cooled nuclear reactor (SNR-300) in Kalkar,
North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany and the foundation stone laying ceremony
took place in 1973. The site was supposed to comprise a total area of 17,000 square
meters with an output of 300 megawatts. The motivation to build the reactor was
the limited uranium reserves in the Federal Republic of Germany. Advocates of
atomic energy hoped that by building the breeder, minerals could be utilized
efficiently and Germany could cease to be dependent on energy imports in order
to generate electricity in the foreseeable future. The Rhenish-Westphalian Power
Plant (RWE, which in 2000 merged with Vereinigte Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen, or
VEW) originally chose the North Rhine-Westphalian village of Weisweiler as site
for the fast breeder. But it seemed too risky to build a reactor in the broader
Aachen city region because of its density of population. The idea was given up and
the sparsely populated area around Kalkar was chosen instead (Marth 1992, 43).
Soon criticism arose about the building of the fast breeder, based on doubts about
the safety of nuclear energy, and in 1974 around a thousand people, predominantly from the Netherlands, took to the streets. A mass rally three years later was
attended by 50,000 people (Tompkins, Grassroots 2016, 129) (some authors speak
of 60,000 people [Mende 2011, 332]) from France, the Netherlands and West
Berlin. The police presence is regarded as the biggest in the history of the Federal
Republic of Germany. The police were extremely violent and many demonstrators
felt they were treated like terrorists. The writer, feminist, and co-founder of the
German Green Party, Jutta Ditfurth, remembers how activists on their way to
Kalkar were stopped by the police so that many could not reach their destination:
A commuter train from Duisburg to Kleve was stopped in open country by
federal border guard helicopters. Federal border guards and police officers
with truncheons, gas masks, tear gas canisters, and submachine guns surrounded the train and harassed the passengers. … They stopped our buses
and closed motorways across the whole state. In their large federal border
guard helicopters, they flew low over demonstrators, landed, beat them up,
and flew off (Mende 2011, 337).
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
According to the former Foreign Minister and co-founder of the Green Party
Joschka Fischer, the events at Malville and Kalkar signaled the end of this form of
extra parliamentary mass resistance against the construction of nuclear power
plants (Mende 2011, 337).
Another example further demonstrates that the government’s treatment of
members of the anti-nuclear-movement, or even of people who were only suspected
to be opponents of nuclear power, was reminiscent of defense against terrorists.
The German engineer Klaus Traube was managing director of Interatom, which
had built the nuclear power plant SNR-300 in Kalkar. Originally a proponent of
nuclear power, Traube reconsidered his views in the early 1970s after having read
the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth. When the German secret service suspected
(falsely) that he had passed on secret information to the Red Army Faction (RAF),
they illegally wiretapped Traube’s apartment and he lost his job because the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND), one of the three German secret services, informed his employer about the issue. The illegal operation
was uncovered in 1977, Traube was cleared of all charges, and the government was
plunged into a crisis, as a result of which the then Federal Minister of the Interior,
Werner Maihofer, was dismissed (Mrusek 2011).
The anti-nuclear movement’s opposition rose even more in the coming years,
especially with the impact of the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power
plant in the USA in 1979. Two court proceedings were launched against Kalkar, the
second of which was the biggest in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Engineers that were involved in the process calculated that statistically every five
years a “GAU” (a German acronym for worst-case scenario) would be a possibility
at Kalkar (Kalter Kaffee 1984, 78; interview with Szepan 2016). Moreover, experts
expressed concerns about the coolant and the control process that was considered
to be too difficult. On the one hand, a Bethe-Tait accident (Bethe 1956) could not
be ruled out; on the other hand, liquid sodium was used for cooling, which was
chemically especially aggressive. In contrast to the low-enriched uranium of
conventional reactors, it was possible to also produce atomic bombs with the
uranium that was used in the breeder, as Jo Leinen – leading figure of the antinuclear movement, later Environment Minister of Saarland – pointed out. Because
the technology would have to be exported to be profitable, countries which had
not had atomic bombs before would now get the chance to gain access to
them (Bretschneider 2011). Since the opponents of the construction lodged
a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, the German
parliament’s commission of inquiry ordered that construction be interrupted for
four years in light of the safety concerns. Because of the difficulties involved in
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construction, the costs of the project also rose. From the initially planned 500
million marks (today ca. 256 million euros), the price rose to 1.7 billion marks. In
the end the whole project cost seven billion marks, which was 14 times higher than
the original price (Meyer-Larsen 1981). When the North Rhine-Westphalian
social-democratic/liberal coalition endorsed the anti-nuclear course, the Minister
of Economic Affairs, Horst Ludwig Riemer (FDP), blocked the partial construction
licenses, which caused a crisis.
The construction of SNR-300 was finally completed in 1985 and the reactor
was put into partial operation: the sodium coolant was running through the
coolant loop and the reactor was ready to receive nuclear materials. The operational
costs totaled 105 million marks (today 93 million euros) annually. Against the
wishes of the Federal Government and the christian-democratic/liberal coalition,
the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (which was the authority in issues concerning
nuclear power) rejected the authorization to begin operations at the plant. The
Minister of Social Affairs and Labour of North Rhine-Westphalia, Friedhelm
Farthmann (Social Democratic Party), who was responsible for the planning
permission, argued that commissioning the plant was irresponsible because the
risks were ultimately not calculable. According to the atomic law the Federal
Government was able to enforce the authorization, but did not want to carry the
responsibility for the controversial SNR project alone. One reason for this decision
was the disaster in Chernobyl that had happened in April 1986 and caused the
atmosphere in West Germany to become increasingly critical of nuclear energy
(Interview Avena 2016). No politician wanted to make unpopular decisions and
risk negative results in the upcoming elections for the German parliament in 1987.
Instead, the German government decided not to take SNR-300 into operation at
that time. In the coming years, the applications underwent time-consuming
examinations. According to SNR advocates the whole process was delayed so long
that the closing down of the reactor was unavoidable. Moreover, since energy
consumption had risen slower than expected, electricity suppliers were no longer
interested in the commissioning of the reactor. The termination of the project was
announced by the then German Federal Minister of Education and Research,
Heinz Riesenhuber, on 21 March 1991. The reasons for this decision were a) the
certain radioactive contamination of system parts when commissioning the reactor
which b) would cause high costs and preclude further use of the complex buildings.
The mega project, thus, had developed into a huge investment failure.
Successively the new and never used equipment and machines were sold
because demolishing the whole complex would have cost another 75 million euros
and was economically not possible. The owner of the reactor core was the RWE
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Power AG, but the company had no license for fuel which was enriched with
plutonium. Therefore, the plutonium was integrated into so-called MOX fuel
elements (MOX = mixed oxide fuel which is an alternative to the low-enriched
uranium [LEU] fuel used in the light-water reactors) in La Hague’s reprocessing
plant and eventually used in traditional nuclear power plants. Moreover, 12 unused
blanket fuel assemblies that contained depleted uranium were transferred to the
United States. Here the mostly decommissioned nuclear production complex,
Hanford Nuclear Reservation on the Columbia River, took the assemblies in.
The German government sold the complex for 2.5 million euros at a public
auction in 1995 to the Dutch entrepreneur Hennie van der Most, who converted it
into a leisure park. The price was rather low for an object that had cost multiple
times that to build, but since the German government did not want to cover the
cost of dismantling the nuclear facilities at Kalkar itself it agreed to the price. At
first the amusement park was called “Kernwasser Wunderland” (“Corewater
Wonderland”), but this name probably reminded guests too much of the project’s
original purpose, so it was renamed later as Wunderland Kalkar (“Kalkar Wonderland”). The space, originally intended to become one of Europe’s landmark nuclear
projects, is now open to the general public. Besides hotels to stay in overnight,
and bars, pubs, and restaurants for culinary enjoyment, the “wonderland” provides
a family amusement park with climbing walls, white-water rides, flying carousels,
and merry-go-rounds offering fun and adventure for the whole family (Kohlrausch
and Trischler 2014, 229 et seq., and Wunderland Kalkar Webpage).
Figure 4
Amusement park Wonderland Kalkar with cooling tower
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Events
German atomic program – first nuclear research center
Who was involved: Federal Government in general and the Federal Ministries of
Atomic Affairs and Economics in particular, state governments of Bavaria and
Baden-Württemberg, communities of Garching, Munich, and Karlsruhe, German
Research Foundation, technical universities of Munich and Karlsruhe, atomic
physicists, and NATO.
When and where did it take place: In the years 1952 to 1957 in the states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria and in the communities of Garching, Munich, and Karlsruhe.
What type of process was it – changes over time: Formation of nuclear research
infrastructure and science policy process. When the Allied restrictions on nuclear
science and technology seemed to come to an end in 1952, the German Research
Foundation established a committee on atomic physics headed by the renowned
physicist Werner Heisenberg. As early as November 1952, the commission
demanded the establishment of a federally funded nuclear research center. Heisenberg, who worked in close collaboration with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and
became an informal advisor of the Federal Government, saw his hometown of
Munich as the only possible location for the first German nuclear reactor station.
He presented his ideas for a research reactor that would run on natural uranium,
and thus not require US uranium enrichment facilities, to the Federal Minister for
the Economy, Ludwig Erhard. At the same time the state of Bavaria was improving
its chances of being chosen as the reactor site by establishing the subject of nuclear
physics at the Technical University of Munich. The driving force there was the
physicist Heinz Maier-Leibnitz (Carson 2002, Carson 2010, Gleitsmann 1988,
Eckert 1999, Trischler 2015). What followed was an intensely fought competition
between the state governments of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg with the cities
of Munich and Karlsruhe with their respective technical universities as candidates
for the siting of the federal reactor station. When the Federal Government finally
decided on Karlsruhe, it took into consideration a veto by the NATO Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, who favored a site more distant from the Iron Curtain
than Munich.
While Munich ultimately lost out to Karlsruhe in the contest for the reactor,
the Max Planck Society came up with a compensatory solution that enabled
Heisenberg to save face by accepting the Bavarian offer to move the Max Planck
Institute for Physics from Göttingen to Munich. In addition, Bavaria was
compensated with a light-water reactor for research based in Munich (Forschungs-
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Figure 5
Model of the first research reactor in Karlsruhe
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reaktor München, or FRM), headed by Maier-Leibnitz and administered by the
Technical University of Munich. It began operation in Garching, near Munich, in
October 1957 as the first German nuclear reactor and was quickly followed by a
rapidly expanding research infrastructure of reactor (Figure 5) stations, including the
big science centers at Karlsruhe, Jülich, Geesthacht, and Hamburg.
Evaluation of engagement events: The intervention of the NATO Supreme Allied
Commander Europe in the siting conflict points to the interrelations of the civil
and military dimensions of the nuclear sector. Although the scientific community
tried hard to present nuclear science as a strictly civilian endeavor, not least to strip
it of its historical origins in the so-called Uranverein (a project to develop nuclear
weapons) under National Socialism, military rationales did play a substantial role
in West Germany’s early nuclear history (Kelleher 1975; Cioc 1988; Küntzel 1992;
Hanel 2015).
Relevant documents: articles in science and engineering journals, media reports in
e.g., Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Tageszeitung, Die Zeit,
Der Spiegel, Federal Archives of Germany (German Atomic Program), State
Archives of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, Archives of the Deutsches Museum
(Papers of Heinz Maier-Leibnitz), Archives of the Max Planck Society and the Max
Planck Institute for the History of Physics, State Archive Karlsruhe (GLAK), interview with the head of the Research Center Karlsruhe, Manfred Popp.
Civil society interaction – the Wyhl example
Who was involved: Federal State Government of Baden-Württemberg, Federal Ministry
of the Interior, Kraftwerksunion (subsidiary of Siemens and AEG, a company that
built nuclear power plants), planners, and activists.
When and where did it take place: In the years 1972 to 1977 and 1982 to 1987 in the
state of Baden-Württemberg and in the community of Wyhl. Court cases took
place in the cities of Fribourg and Mannheim.
What type of process was it – changes over time: Public participation and public communication. Before Wyhl was chosen to be the site for a nuclear power plant, politicians and planners considered the community of Breisach in the southwest of
Germany as a possible site which – in the summer of 1972 – caused direct
opposition because local farmers and wine growers expected negative environmental effects caused by emissions from the planned wet cooling towers. The Federal
State Government did not want to risk the coming state elections and put the plans
on ice. A year later it became publicly known that a new site in Wyhl had been
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
found, which was only a few kilometres away from the original site and caused
direct opposition again, this time well-organized. In 1973 and 1974 some 100,000
signatures and appeals against the construction of the nuclear power plant were
submitted, including to the Federal Minister of the Interior, who at that time was
Werner Maihofer (FDP, liberals). This did not change the political decision at first
and on 17 February 1975 the construction of the first reactor was started even
though the final license for the building of the nuclear power plant had not yet
been granted. This provoked opposition again, mostly from local people, many of
them wine farmers, who spontaneously occupied the site and were supported in
their resistance by activists from the nearby town of Fribourg. Crucial to this
resistance was the successful fight against the erection of a lead chemical plant in
Marckolsheim in neighboring French Alsace on the other side of the river Rhine.
On 21 March 1975 the administrative court ruled that construction should be
interrupted. This decision was overturned half a year later after an objection made
by Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, Hans Filbinger (CDU, conservatives).
In autumn 1976 some 1,000 inhabitants demonstrated against Filbinger. Because
the preparations for construction continued and site electricity connections were
installed, the site in Wyhl was occupied by protestors again. In March 1977 the
administrative court withdrew the construction license for the plant. But two years
later the administrative court of Baden-Württemberg opened up a second case. In
1982 the court of justice decided again that the construction of the nuclear power
plant was legal and caused a rally of 30,000 opponents. Filbinger’s successor as
Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth (CDU, conservatives),
declared that the construction of the nuclear power plant in Wyhl would not be
necessary before 1993 and in 1987 he reconfirmed this decision, stating the plant
would not be needed until the year 2000. The plant was never built and was turned
into a nature reserve in the mid-1990s instead (Engels 2003).
Evaluation of engagement events: Wyhl has been interpreted by historians as a national site of memory deeply embedded in German culture (Rusinek 2003). The protest
against the possible nuclear site in Wyhl was not the first protest against nuclear
power in Germany, but the protest structures that were developed here are widely
recognized to have served as an example for the West German environmental
movement in later protests. Fribourg in Baden-Württemberg, the so-called green
city, is a leader in environmental protection, renewable energy, and sustainability
today. It produces less waste and consumes less water than comparable cities, and
is leading in solar energy research. The founding of certain related institutes was
inspired by the environmental movement’s protests; the Institute for Applied
Ecology, founded in 1977, is one of the most important institutes in its field in
Germany.
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Relevant documents: newspaper articles, e.g., in Die Zeit (Kühnert 1977), reports
by German non-governmental organizations, e.g., BUND (BUND 2014), film
documentaries (Nabel 2013), Federal Archives in Koblenz, Archive for Social
Movements Fribourg, protest flyers and calls to protest, squatting journal Was wir
wollen, archive of the Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz, Bonn.
Civil society interaction – the Wackersdorf example
Who was involved: Bavarian State Ministry for Regional Development and Environmental Questions (StMLU), Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufbereitung von
Kernstoffen mbH (DWK), cabinet, police, activists.
When and where did it take place: In the years 1980 to 1988 in Bavaria, especially the
municipality of Wackersdorf in the district of Schwandorf.
What type of process was it – changes over time: Public participation and public
communication. In 1980 the Bavarian State Ministry for Regional Development
and Environmental Questions was authorized by the cabinet to find a site for a
reprocessing plant (Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage, WAA). Two years later the DWK
made an application to the StMLU for the granting of a nuclear licensing procedure
for the construction and operation of a WAA in Wackersdorf. Even though other
possible sites were debated, Wackersdorf was chosen because a “high potential of
protest (…) [was] not to be expected” (Schardinger 2012, 18). In 1985 the DWK
finally decided on Wackersdorf as appropriate location for the construction site and
announced the development plan. After the clearing of the woodland had
started, a major demonstration with 30,000 people took place in Wackersdorf.
Demonstrators occupied the building site, erected a hut village, and called it “Freies
Wackerland” (free Wackerland) (Knoll 2006). Citizens’ initiatives, such as the
Mothers Against Nuclear Power, raised objections to the reprocessing plant at a
hearing in Neunburg. Here, they claimed for themselves and their families,
especially their children, the fundamental right to life, health, physical integrity,
and free development of their personality, which they did not see as being
guaranteed if the reprocessing plant was built (Wurzbacher 1988, 1). The objections
had to be handed in by a specific deadline to the approving authority, in that case
the Bavarian Ministry of the Environment, which invited the people who protested
to the hearing. The previous speaker before the women’s initiative at the hearing
was Robert Jungk, author of the influential book Der Atom-Staat (The Nuclear
State). The audience the “Mothers” spoke to consisted of the approving authority,
who were in favor of the reprocessing plant, representatives of the DWK, who had
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
proposed the building of the reprocessing plant, and experts such as radiation
biologists, who were consulted by the approving authority to justify factually and
technically the envisaged authorization. As Karin Wurzbacher, member of the
Mothers Against Nuclear Power reports, the atmosphere in the hall was “in the
beginning bored – now we patiently endure the ‘Mothers’ and then we call it a day
and [the men in the audience] showed a friendly face. In the end they were
probably impressed. The representatives of the DWK showed no emotions
whatsoever, they just reported their prepared answers” (Blomeyer and Wurzbacher
2016 and Wurzbacher 1988).
Up until the Chernobyl nuclear power plant catastrophe in April 1986 the
Bavarian state government kept proclaiming publicly that hazards were not to be
expected, either from the reprocessing plant or from any other nuclear power
plant. The Chernobyl disaster – the so-called Super-GAU – then led to the peak of
the violent disputes between police and anti-nuclear activists. West German police
armed with stun grenades, rubber bullets, water cannons, CS gas, and CN gas were
confronted by demonstrators armed with slingshots, crowbars, and Molotov
cocktails at the site of the nuclear reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf (Germans
1986). Finally, the energy company VEBA changed its policies and was not interested in the reprocessing plant anymore. Additionally, the prominent advocate of
the reprocessing plant, the Bavarian Minister President Franz Josef Strauß, had
died, so the building plans were frozen in 1988.
Evaluation of engagement events: The plans for the plant were abandoned in 1988. It
is still unclear whether protests, plant economics, or the death of Minister President
Franz Josef Strauß, a strong proponent of the plant, in 1988 led to the decision
(Isenson 2009).
Relevant documents: media reports in Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Tageszeitung, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, interview with the head of the energy
company VEBA (Walraff 1989), film documentary about Wackersdorf (BUND
2015), printed papers of the Bavarian state parliament (Final report of the committee on Wackersdorf 1986), documents in the archive of the initiative Mothers
against Nuclear Power, photographs of protests organized by the member of the
initiative, Cornelia Blomeyer, statements about and transcripts of appeals against
Wackersdorf by Cornelia Blomeyer and Karin Wurzbacher, report by Thea Bauriedel about contemporary experiences in Wackersdorf, documents in the archive of
the Deutschen Gesellschaft für die Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen
(DWK).
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Civil society interaction – the Gorleben example
Who was involved: Politicians, activists, German Society for the Construction and
Management of Long-Term Waste Storage Units (DBE mbH), police, Federal
Agency for State Protection and Counter Terrorism, Brennelementlager Gorleben
GmbH (a subsidiary of the Society for Nuclear Services, GNS, which is owned by
the energy companies E.ON, RWE, and Vattenfall Europe).
When and where did it take place: village of Gorleben in the district of LüchowDannenberg (Lower Saxony). Controversies since 1977 up until recently, especially
then when there are cask transports to the site in Gorleben.
What type of process was it – changes over time: Public participation and communication
process. The only controversial nuclear project that still has relevance today in
Germany is the repository site near the village of Gorleben (Lower Saxony, former
West Germany). The decision for a storage site for nuclear waste came comparatively late. In the beginning the government did not see need for action to create a
final repository because the quantity of waste was relatively small. For instance,
high level waste did not exist because the reactor’s fuel elements were brought back
to the countries they came from. In cases where high-level waste was produced, the
government planned to reduce the volume by reprocessing it and keep an open
mind about further technological developments instead of deciding on certain
methods just yet (Tiggemann 2010, 121; Müller 1990, vol. 1, 525). Germany and
other countries considered different ways of storing radioactive waste. Ideas that
were considered and/or debated were storage in space, in ice caps on earth, or in
the sea. All of these concepts were contested and the Federal Republic decided to
concentrate on disposal onshore in salt deposits. Because of the existing salt domes
in Lower Saxony, the government considered a site for storage in this state. To this
end, in the years 1967–1978 it tested the former salt mine Asse II in the Asse
mountains of Wolfenbüttel for research purposes as a deep geological repository
for radioactive waste (Tiggemann 2010, 126 et seq.).
In the end the government decided in favor of storing nuclear waste at the
Gorleben site, a decision that came about in 1977 under Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt (SPD) and Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht (CDU, conservatives). At the
site, there exists today:
1 a storage unit for radioactive waste which emits faint heat;
2 an interim storage unit for dry cask storage;
3 a conditioning plant (and a pilot plant in a salt dome).
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Figure 6 Colourful Protest in the hut village Free Republic of Wendland, Lower Saxony 1980
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Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
1 The salt dome was intended to become a long-term storage plant for different
kinds of radioactive waste and is run by the German Society for the Construction
and Management of Long-Term Waste Storage Units (DBE mbH), but at present
this use is still controversial and it has not yet been finally decided upon. It was the
then Minister President of Lower Saxony Ernst Albrecht (CDU) who decided on
the site in Gorleben in 1977. Reasons for the choice were political and economic,
especially the closeness to the East German border and the low population density
in the area (Endlager Gorleben 2009). Soon public protest arose against the plans.
In 1979 a convoy of 500 tractors went to Hanover, and on 31 March that year the
biggest demonstration in the history of Lower Saxony took place with 100,000
people present. Afterwards, Minister President Albrecht declared the plans as not
feasible, which ended them (Jaschick 2010). In parallel, test drillings for the
repository were carried out and were also accompanied by strong protests and a hut
village was erected called the micronation “Republik Freies Wendland” (Free
Republic of Wendland). (Figure 6) The hut village was evacuated in the same year by
police forces. Protests against the repository plans have continued ever since and
have been carried out granted by action groups like Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz
Lüchow-Dannenberg (Citizens’ Initiative for Environmental Protection LüchowDannenberg) or Bäuerliche Notgemeinschaft (Farmers’ Emergency Association).
2 The site for an interim storage unit for dry cask storage was built between 1981
and 1983 in the face of massive protests and collisions with police. Protesters
suffered from fractured ribs, insured kidneys, fractured heads, and blinded eyes
that were caused by water guns (Geisler 2010). Opponents of the transports were
systematically spied on by police and the Federal Agency for State Protection and
Counter Terrorism (Verfassungsschutz 2001). Because of litigations and massive
protests, the plant only started operating in 1995 with the first so-called Castor
(cask for storage and transport of radioactive material) transport. Two casks filled
with spent fuel from various German reactor sites and high-level nuclear waste
from reprocessing facilities in France where shipped to the interim storage facility
in Gorleben. The second transport was shipped in 1996 with one cask from the
reprocessing plant in La Hague and a third transport a year later, in 1997, included
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
six casks. The fuel elements and vitrified waste block containers are in dry casks
standing in a hall above ground and cooled by the surrounding air. They will stay
in the casks for decades until they have cooled down from 400 °C to 200 °C and
an appropriate repository has been found. Within these first three years the number
of protesters increased from 4,000 to 10,000; police numbers increased to three
times as much (from 7,600 to 30,000). As of 2011, 113 casks had been shipped to
Gorleben. The Castor transports often become large events and receive remarkable
national media coverage for several days in a row.
Figure 7
Gorleben protest: Conflicts between police and protesters
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Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
3 In Gorleben there is also a “pilot conditioning plant” where tests are made to
condition the fuel elements in order to store them in a deep repository, and also to
reload the containers for the vitrified waste blocks into containers suited to longterm storage. For technical reasons the dry cask storage containers are not suitable
for long-term storage and cannot be placed in the salt dome.
Evaluation of engagement events: Like the anti-nuclear protests in the decades
before, the clashes between opponents and police became extremely violent. The
government’s handling of it was perceived as inappropriate by the anti-nuclear
movement and the broader public alike (Glaser 2012, 16, Narr 1997, Hintergrund
2010).
Relevant documents: Media articles e.g., Der Spiegel (Gorleben 1982), Gorleben archive (also accessible online, e.g., for Gorleben chronicle), online archive
and active archive on documents for Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz LüchowDannenberg, archive of the Rechtshilfe Gorleben, Gartow, Archive of the State
Parliament of Lower Saxony; (Figure 7) Federal Archive in Koblenz, archive of the
research mine Asse, Remlingen, Castor transport reports (Narr 1997).
Energy transition after Fukushima
Who was involved: Professional associations (e.g., the German Atomic Forum) and the
Federal Government (Social Democratic Party and the Greens, later also the Christian Democratic Party), Germany’s Ethics Commission on Safe Energy Supply,
energy companies.
When and where did it take place: In the years 1998–2011 on the government level.
What type of process was it – changes over time: Communication process.
In the year 1998 the red-green coalition decided to phase out nuclear energy within 20 years (Munsberg 1998). In 2000 an agreement about the future operation of
German nuclear power plants between the Federal Government and electricity
supply companies was signed (Informationskreis Kernenergie 2015). After the
tsunami and partial meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011, the topic received
renewed societal attention. Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that all German
power plants would be closed down by 2022 with eight of the 17 operating German reactors being shut down immediately (Germany 2011). There have always
been strong links between the government and professional associations based on
collaboration that goes back decades. When the German government decided to
phase out nuclear reactors, lobbyists such as the German Atomic Forum and the
Nuclear Society tried to counteract the so-called Energiewende (energy transition).
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Since then, even the German Atomic Forum has made its peace with the goals of
the German energy transition and has begun to focus its activities on keeping up
engineering competence in dismantling nuclear reactors and radioactive waste
storage (Interview Güldner). Energy companies like Areva changed their policy to
focus on export and scientific research instead of processing fuel elements (Interview Schuch and Meyer zu Schwabedissen).
Evaluation of engagement events: The evaluations of the event vary in Germany and
Europe. German society, politicians, and historians interpret the controversy over
nuclear energy, including the phase-out, predominantly as a success story (Radkau
1987; Weitze and Trischler 2006) and regard the process as deeply democratic. In
contrast, many other countries and academic colleagues are critical of the violence
of the debates and protests (Hughes 2014) and consider the phase-out decision as
“a misguided and potentially damaging interpretation of the precautionary principle” (Moore 2012, no page numbers). This shows that nuclear energy and society’s
perception and interpretation of the developments vary considerably from country
to country.
Relevant documents: Interviews with Matthias Schuch and Christian Meyer zu
Schwabedissen from the German subsidiary of the French energy company Areva,
and Ralf Güldner, President of the German Atomic Forum, documents from the
Federal Archive, newspaper articles e.g., in Der Spiegel, TAZ, Die Zeit, agreement
between the Federal Government of Germany and the energy supply companies,
numerous media reports, archives of energy companies e.g., PreußenElektra,
Hanover, Green Memory Archive, Berlin, Archive of Social Democracy (archive
for documents on the SPD), Bonn, Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy
(CDU), Sankt Augustin.
Facts & Figures
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of nuclear power in Germany.
This section contains such data as the number of reactors, reactors’ locations,
technical and chronological details of reactors’ construction, as well as statistics
on electricity production, periodization, and social connections to nuclear
construction.
155
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Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
Data summary
– Germany shut down most of its reactors following the Fukushima accident in
2011.
– Previously, Germany had 17 operating reactors, which provided 25 percent of
electricity in the country.
– Public opinion about nuclear power in Germany is negative.
Key dates and abbreviations
Key dates
1955
After the Federal Republic of Germany gets its sovereignty, Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer and the Federal Government establish the Federal
Ministry for Atomic Issues (16 October 1955), and Franz Josef Strauß
becomes Minister for Atomic Affairs.
1956
Nuclear research centers in Berlin, Hamburg, Geesthacht, Jülich,
and Karlsruhe.
1957
Establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) in March and founding of the International Atomic
Energy Agency at the end of July.
1957
The first nuclear reactor in Germany, called “Nuclear Egg” starts
operations at the end of October. It is a research reactor at the
Technical University of Munich.
1958
Establishment of the Reactor Safety Commission (ReaktorSicherheitskommission – RSK).
1959
Establishment of the German Atomic Forum (Deutsches Atomforum) –
a platform to connect business, science, and industry for promotion
of peaceful nuclear energy.
1959
The Atomic Energy Act is announced in Germany, which makes
construction and operations of NPP legal.
1960
Start of Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) project in Karlsruhe,
Baden-Wuerttemberg.
1960
The Atomic Energy Act comes into force in January and the first
Radiation Protection Ordinance comes into force in September.
1961
In March, the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center puts FR-2 into
operation, a heavy-water reactor and the first German-built reactor.
1961
First time electricity from a test nuclear reactor is generated for the
national grid by research NPP (Versuchsatomkraftwerk, VAK)
in Kahl, Bavaria.
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
1967
1969
1973
1974
1976
1977
1977
1981
1982
1986
1986
1986
1986
1990
1998
2009
2010
2011
Experimental nuclear waste storage in the Asse salt mine in the
West German state of Lower Saxony.
Establishment of the German Nuclear Society (Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft).
Announcement of Wyhl, Baden-Wuerttemberg, as site for a nuclear
power plant and first strong protests against it.
Construction of first 1,200 MWe reactor in the world begins in Germany,
Hesse, at Biblis NPP.
Anti-nuclear demonstrations in Brokdorf in the West German
state Schleswig-Holstein in the north of Germany.
The first German-made FBR reactor is put into operation at the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in Baden-Wuerttemberg in the
south of Germany.
Anti-nuclear demonstrations in Kalkar in the West German state
of North Rhine-Westphalia.
Mass anti-nuclear demonstration in Brokdorf becomes violent.
Beginning of foundation construction for Germany’s first large
uranium enrichment plant in Gronau, Westfalia.
Massive anti-nuclear demonstration against the construction of
the Wackersdorf reprocessing plant in Bavaria in response to the
Chernobyl disaster.
Founding of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation, and Reactor Safety (BMU).
Decision to phase out nuclear energy in Germany within ten years
at the SPD party conference.
The Brokdorf NPP is put into operation.
German reunification and shutdown of nuclear power reactors in
East Germany.
Federal elections and formation of the coalition government, which
decides to phase out nuclear energy as a future policy.
New government cancels the phasing out of nuclear energy.
The coalition government decides to give life extensions to NPPs.
After the Fukushima disaster, parliament decides to speed up phasing
out of nuclear power. Phase-out policy is reintroduced in Germany
and eight reactors are shut down immediately after Fukushima.
157
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Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
Abbreviations
AEG
Allgemeine Elektricitätsgesellschaft
ANP
Advanced Nuclear Power
BBR
Joint venture of Brown, Boveri & Cie. (UK) and
Babcock & Wilcox (USA), now ABB
BBC
Electric Company = Brown Boveri Electric Company
BBK
Brown Boveri-Krupp Reaktorbau GmbH
BNFL
British Nuclear Fuels Limited; renamed Westinghouse
BWR
Boiling Water Reactor (SWR 1000)
EPR
European Pressurized Water Reactor
EVU
Energieversorgungsunternehmen (energy supply enterprise)
ERAM
Endlager für radioaktive Abfälle (nuclear waste repository)
EURATOM Europäische Atombehörde (nuclear agency)
FBR
Fast Breeder Reactor
GE/AEG
General Electric/ Allgemeine Electricitäts-Gesellschaft
HRB
Hochtemperatur Reaktorbau GmbH
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
KWU
Kraftwerk Union
MWe
Megawatt electrical
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
OECD/
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/
NEA
Nuclear Energy Agency
PWK
Projektgesellschaft Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH
(Society for reprocessing of nuclear fuel)
PWR
Pressurized Water Reactor
RSK
Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission (Reactor Security Commission)
SNR
Schneller Natriumgekühlter Reaktor
SWR
Siedewasserreaktor (Boiling Water Reactor)
THTR
Thorium-Hochtemperaturreaktor (Thorium High-Temperature
Reactor)
VAK
Versuchsatomkraftwerk (Experimental Atomic Power Plant)
WAK
Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage (Reprocessing Plant)
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
Map of nuclear power plants
Map 1 represents a map of nuclear power sites in Germany
Map 1: Nuclear power plants in Germany
Currently, there are no operating power plants in East Germany because of the
type of reactors built in the German Democratic Republic.
Source: public domain
159
160
Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
A List of reactors and technical and chronological details
The tables below show the list of reactors, suppliers, operators, and dates.
Table 1: Operational commercial nuclear power reactors. Sources: IAEA 2019, WNA 2016
No.
Name
Operator
Type
MWe
net
Construction Grid
date
power
Planned
shutdown
2001
Agreed
March 2011
shutdown shutdown
2010
& May 2011
closure plan
1
2
3
4
5
6
Biblis A
Biblis B
Brokdorf
Brunsbüttel
Emsland
Grafenrheinfeld
RWE
RWE
E.ON
Vattenfall
RWE
E.ON
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
1167
1240
1370
771
1329
1275
1970
1972
1976
1970
1982
1975
1975
1977
1986
1977
1988
1982
2008
2011
2019
2009
2021
2014
2016
2018
2033
2018
2035
2028
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Grohnde
Gundremmingen B
Gundremmingen C
Isar-1
Isar-2
Krümmel
Neckarwestheim-1
Neckarwestheim-2
Philippsburg-1
Philippsburg-2
Unterweser
E.ON
RWE
RWE
E.ON
E.ON
PWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
1360
1284
1288
878
1400
1976
1976
1976
1972
1982
1985
1984
1985
1979
1988
2017
2016
2016
2011
2020
2031
2030
2030
2019
2034
Shutdown
Shutdown
2021
Shutdown
2022
Shutdown
2015
2021
End 2017
2021
Shutdown
2022
Vattenfall
EnBW
EnBW
EnBW
EnBW
E.ON
BWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
1260
785
1305
890
1392
1345
1974
1972
1982
1970
1977
1972
1984
1976
1989
1980
1985
1979
2016
2009
2022
2012
2018
2012
2030
2017
2036
2026
2032
2020
Shutdown
Shutdown
2022
Shutdown
2019
Shutdown
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
161
Before the Fukushima disaster, Germany planned to shut down its reactors as they
reach over 30 years of operation. In 2010, the shutdown timetable was agreed upon
as presented in Table 1. However, after Fukushima, eight reactors were shut down
immediately and the scheduled shutdown time for other reactors was significantly
reduced.
Table 2: Reactors in Germany shut down before Fukushima. Sources: IAEA 2019, WNA 2016
No.
Name
Operator
Type
MWe
net
Construction
date
Grid
power
Shutdown
1 AVR Jülich
2 Greifswald-1
AVR
EWN
13
408
1961
1970
1967
1973
1988
1990
3 Greifswald-2
EWN
408
1970
1974
1990
4 Greifswald-3
EWN
408
1972
1977
1990
5 Greifswald-4
EWN
408
1972
1979
1990
6 Greifswald-5
EWN
408
1977
1989
1989
Dismantled
7 Großwelzheim
HDR
8 Gundremmingen A KRB
9 Kahl
HTGR
WWER440/213
WWER440/213
WWER440/213
WWER440/213
WWER440/213
BWR
BWR
BWR
25
237
15
1965
1962
1958
1969
1966
1961
1971
1977
1985
Dismantled
Dismantled
Site
unrestricted
10
11
12
13
14
Kalkar KNK-2
Karlsruhe MZFR
Lingen
Mülheim-Kärlich
Niederaichbach
KfK
KBG
RWE
SCN
KfK
FBR
PHWR
BWR
PWR
HWGCR
17
52
183
1219
100
1974
1961
1964
1975
1966
1978
1966
1968
1986
1973
1991
1984
1979
1988
1974
15
16
17
18
19
Obrigheim
Rheinsberg
Stade
THTR
Würgassen
EnBW
EWN
E.ON
HKG
Preußen
PWR
WWER-210
PWR
HTGR
BWR
340
62
640
296
640
1965
1960
1967
1971
1968
1968
1966
1972
1985
1971
2005
1990
2003
1988
1994
Elektra
Status
Dismantled
Safestor
Site
unrestricted
Dismantled
Safestor
162
Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
B Data on electricity production, nuclear development and companies
Share of electricity in 2013: gas declined 21 percent from 2012, and coal share rose
before declining in 2014.
In the first half of 2014: gas-fired input dropped a further 14 percent to 16.6
terawatt-hours/TWh, lignite provided 69.7 TWh, hard coal 51.9 TWh, nuclear
45.0 TWh, wind 26.7 TWh, solar 18.3 TWh, biomass 25.6 TWh, and hydro 10.5
TWh. Total for six months: 264.3 TWh, of which 16.1 TWh was exported.
Germany’s electricity production in 2014 (preliminary International Energy Agency
figures): 615 TWh gross. In 2014 coal provided 275 TWh (more than half being
lignite), nuclear 97 TWh, gas 61 TWh, biofuels and waste 57 TWh, wind 56 TWh,
solar 35 TWh, and hydro 25 TWh.
Electricity exports: about 34 TWh, compared with 20 TWh in 2012.
Imports: gas, coal, and oil worldwide. Apart from lignite and renewables,
Germany has only a few domestic resources. In 2011, Russia provided almost 40
percent of gas, followed by Norway, the Netherlands, and UK, while 14 percent
was produced domestically.
Annual consumption: about 6400 kWh per capita. Gross consumption was 576
TWh in 2014.
Generating capacity in April 2014: 169.6 gigawatt electrical/GWe.
GWe comprising: 12.1 GWe nuclear, 5.6 GWe hydro, 33.7 GWe wind (0.6 offshore),
36.9 GWe solar, 28.2 GWe gas, 21.2 GWe lignite, 26.3 GWe hard coal, and 5.6 GWe
biomass (Fraunhofer Institute). In the first half of 2014 wind and solar PV had capacity factors of 18 percent and 11 percent respectively, compared with 85 percent
for nuclear.
C Nuclear development
Until 2010, the 17 nuclear units totalled 20,339 MWe. The last came into
commercial operation in 1989. Six units were boiling water reactors (BWR) and
eleven were pressurized water reactors (PWR). All were built by Siemens-KWU. A
further PWR had not operated since 1988 because of a licensing dispute. This
picture changed in 2011, with the operating fleet being reduced to nine reactors
with 12,003 MWe capacity, and then to eight reactors with 10,728 MWe. In 2000,
two of Germany’s biggest utilities, VEBA and VIAG, formed E.ON, which owned
or had a stake in 12 of the country’s 19 nuclear reactors, which were operating then.
From January 2016, E.ON spun off Uniper, which will take over E.ON’s global
energy trading and power generation in and outside of Europe. E.ON will continue
operating and slowly close down its nuclear generating capacity in Germany.
The History behind West Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out
D Equities of utility companies operating in Germany
E.ON has equity in the following nuclear plants (January 2016), which will be
managed by its subsidiary PreußenElektra: Isar-1 100 percent, Unterweser 100
percent, Krümmel 50 percent, Brunsbüttel 33.3 percent (all shut down), Grafenrheinfeld 100 percent, Gundremmingen B and C 25 percent, Grohnde 83.3
percent, Brokdorf 80 percent, Isar-2 75 percent, Emsland 12.5 percent.
RWE has equity in the following nuclear plants: Gundremmingen 75 percent,
Biblis 100 percent, Emsland 87.5 percent.
Vattenfall has equity in the following German nuclear plants: Brunsbüttel 66.7
percent, Krümmel 50 percent, Brokdorf 20 percent. It has written off SEK 10.2
billion (euros 1.2 billion) on Brunsbüttel and Krümmel. Also in Sweden: Ringhals
70 percent, Forsmark 66 percent.
EnBW has equity in the following nuclear plants: Neckarwestheim 100 percent,
Philippsburg 100 percent.
163
164 Astrid Mignon Kirchhof / Helmuth Trischler
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