Michael Brenner A State Like Any Other State or a Light Unto the Nations? A t the height of his career, David Ben-Gurion wrote in Israel’s Government Year Book: Two basic aspirations underlie all our work in this country: to be like all other nations, and to be different from all the nations. These two aspirations are apparently contradictory, but in fact they are complementary and interdependent. We want to be a free people, independent and equal in rights in the family of nations, and we aspire to be different from all other nations in our spiritual elevation and in the character of our model society, founded on freedom, cooperation, and fraternity with all Jews and the whole human race . . .1 These two contrasting and often conflicting aspirations have characterized the Zionist movement from its very outset and the State of Israel during the last seventy years. On the one hand, there was the desire that a Jewish state would put an end to viewing the Jews as the eternal “others” and return them to the “normal course of history”. To be a nation like any other nation, ke-khol am ve’am—this phrase even entered Israel’s Declaration of Independence. On the other hand, there was the striving for the prophetic ideal to be a “light unto the nations”—or la-goyim.2 A Jewish state, the logic went, had to reach for higher ideals than other nations, and to be a model state. The conflict between normalcy and uniqueness was not a brainchild of Ben-Gurion, but deeply engrained in the Zionist idea. Theodor Herzl believed that only when the Jews, “like all other nations” had their own state, antisemitism would cease and they would be respected by the world. He was supported by other Zionists in this longing for a normal existence. Addressing the fifth Zionist Congress in 1901, his closest associate, Max Nordau, demanded an end to the peculiar situation of the Jews especially with respect to their occupational structure, and proclaimed the beginning Israel Studies 23.3 • doi 10.2979/israelstudies.23.3.02 3 4 • isr ael studies, volume 23 number 3 of a normal existence, similar to that of all other nations: “The Jewish people can only be redeemed from its bitter misery once it leads a normal economic life on its own soil.”3 Jacob Klatzkin formulated the tasks of Zionism as follows: “In Eretz Israel the Jewish people will regain their normality. . . . Only by being rooted in its own soil will they leave behind their elitist Jewish traits and become a real people.”4 A prominent example of the Zionist longing for normality was the long-time leader of the Zionist movement. Chaim Weizmann is reported to have responded with great pride, when asked by an aristocratic British lady admirer if the Jews really wanted to give up all that made them special over the millennia, just to become another Albania: “Yes! Albania! Albania!”5 The eminent Oxford philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin, who told this story, was later asked a similar question by the Russo-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève: “Jews . . . with their rich and extraordinary history, miraculous survivors from the classical age of our common civilisation—that this fascinating people should choose to give up its unique status, and for what? To become Albania! How could they want this?” Berlin’s reply was sharp: However it might look to the world in general, to condemn the oyster for wishing to avoid the sufferings that led to the disease that might, in some cases, result in a pearl, was neither reasonable nor just. The oyster wished to live an oyster’s life, to realize itself as an oyster, not solely to serve as the unhappy means of enriching the world with masterpieces of art or philosophy or religion that sprang from its sufferings.6 The concept of a normal nation, or a fictitious “Albania”, however, always competed with the claim to be and to remain a special nation with a unique state, based on divine promises and their secular transformations. Rather than regarding his new movement merely as a means to liberate Jews from oppression and to lead them back to their old homeland, Herzl had much more ambitious plans of an “experiment for the well-being of all humanity”.7 In his view, a Jewish state was to become a model state for the improvement of people from all nations and religions: At first we shall only work on and for ourselves in all secrecy. But the Jewish State will become something remarkable. The land of the seven-hour working day will be not only a model country for social experiments and a treasurehouse for works of art, but a miracle country in all civilization. It will be a destination for the civilized world which will come to visit us the way it now visits Lourdes, Mecca, Sadagora.8 A Light Unto the Nations? • 5 In The Jewish State he states, “Yes, we are strong enough to form a State, and, indeed, a model State.”9 He further elaborates: “We will seek to bestow the moral salvation of work on men of every age and of every class; and thus our people will find their strength again in the land of the seven-hour day.”10 Herzl’s vision embodies a paradox that Zionism would never be able to solve: To turn the Jews into a nation like any other nation, while at the same time entrusting them with a state that would serve as a model to all humankind. Ben-Gurion’s notion of a model society, held to different standards than all other nations, is thus well-grounded in early Zionist thought. It was Ben-Gurion who repeatedly emphasized Israel as a “light unto the nations”, for example when it came to Israel’s aid to developing countries or to its moral obligations vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In many speeches and articles, he reiterated the conviction of Israel’s uniqueness and its task to live up to the ethics of the biblical prophets: “From the beginning we were a people set apart. We became a people of the book, of the Prophets, of the End of Days, the Eternal People.”11 The Jewish state was, according to him, the beginning of both Jewish and general human redemption.12 In another speech before young officers during the War of Independence, he emphasized that they should not only take care of their bodies’ performance and their physical stability, but that during the war they must also remain true to the unique traditions within Jewish history.13 In 1957, still entrenched in the consequences of the Sinai Crisis, Ben-Gurion found time for an extensive exchange of thoughts with the philosopher Nathan Rotenstreich. In his notes, Ben-Gurion emphasized the connection of Israel’s existence with biblical history, while he downplayed the relevance of two millennia of exile. He regarded the modern State of Israel as a continuation of the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Young Israelis, he argued, would find the consciousness for their new state not in the Zionist writings of Herzl, but rather in the Bible. The prophets “are closer, more instructive and had more vital sap for the generation born, growing up, and living in Israel,” he told them “than all the speeches and discussions at the Basle congresses.” For him the State of Israel was a messianic fulfillment in a “social-cultural-moral sense”.14 This p rophetic v ision o f c reating a m odel s ociety w as s hared n ot only by his close associates, but also by many of his political opponents. Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the World Zionist Organization in the post–WW II era, who otherwise agreed with little that Ben-Gurion said, supported the idea of Israel’s global mission. On the occasion of Herzl’s centenary, he asked, “Do you think that what other nations admired about 6 • isr ael studies, volume 23 number 3 Zionism was the fact that the Jews, too, wanted a state with ministers, ambassadors, cabinet crises and a flag? As if the world had not enough states. . . . In the historical perspective, what inspired the finest of the Jews with enthusiasm for Zionism was precisely its Utopian aspect.” Jews, he continued, “have still to cling to the great humanitarian ideals, not the short-sighted, provincial realism of some groups in Israel.”15 A few years later Goldmann accused Ben-Gurion of elevating the state and of forgetting that a state is nothing but a means to materialize the identity of a nation. It would be the greatest danger for Israel to lose its special character and be satisfied to be a state like all other states. To me it is clear that a Jewish state can only survive if it constitutes a unique phenomenon in our world; if it becomes a state like any other state, its triumph will be only the collective assimilation of the Jews.16 The secular Zionist Goldmann shared this belief of Israel’s unique status in the family of nations with the Orthodox scientist and philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who stressed “the unique historic destiny” of the Jewish people. He suggested relinquishing Israel’s membership in the United Nations, as its historic role must be “in accordance with this historic and national uniqueness”.17 Ben-Gurion’s most significant r ival i n I sraeli p olitics, M enachem Begin, was also convinced that the Jews were a unique people with a unique destiny, but he meant something quite different than Ben-Gurion when he spoke of uniqueness. Ben-Gurion had combined prophetic teachings and socialist principles in his efforts to create a model state, and while biblical writings had influenced Begin as well, his heroes were not the prophets, but the ancient fighters—from Joshua to King David—associated with the Jewish return to the Land of Israel and the establishment of the kingdom of Israel. He was profoundly attentive to the actions of the many enemies of the Jewish people mentioned in the Bible, from the Amalekites to Haman. Begin never ceased to believe that most of the world hated the Jews, and that Israel had to take on the fight against the dark elements of humankind. He also gave legitimacy to the rising force of religious Zionists after his election as prime minister. This new spirit could be felt at the very night of the mahapakh, the political revolution of 1977, when television viewers were witness to a rather unusual scene. In the Likud headquarters a group played traditional Hassidic melodies and a bearded Jew blew the shofar. There was a messianic feel in the air.18 A Light Unto the Nations? • 7 Orthodox Zionists had clear expectations that a Jewish state could not just be a state like any other. While the early Mizrahi movement was dominated by the belief that messianism could be “neutralized” by the Zionist movement and that a Jewish state would simply serve the humanitarian purpose to save Jews from persecution in the diaspora, there existed always an active messianic stream within religious Zionism. The champion of the activist brand of messianic Zionism was Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Palestine’s first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi. In his opinion, even when they were violating Jewish religious laws, the Zionists were unintentionally performing holy deeds by propelling the Jews back to their land: “The Divine Spirit prevails in their aspirations even against their own wills.” Kook argued that the future Jewish state cannot be a state like any other state, as “the State of Israel is the foundation of God’s throne on earth, directed towards the unity of the Lord and His name.”19 In Jewish apocalyptic tradition, the way for the ultimate appearance of the Messiah ben David (of the House of David) will be prepared by a more violent Messiah ben Yosef (of the House of Joseph). For Kook, Zionism as a movement represented the messianic stage of this “preparatory messiah”. He argued that “nothing in our faith, either in its larger principles or in its details, negates the idea that we can begin to shake off the dust of exile by our own efforts, through natural, historical processes.”20 After 1967, this sense of Israel’s uniqueness grew among the political right and the national religious movements, as the state was increasingly interpreted as an important detail in a larger supernatural process, as a necessary element in the unfolding of the coming of the messiah. In such an understanding, Israel’s role differed substantially from the role ascribed to other nations. Intellectuals who fought this sense of exclusivity and stressed Israel’s need to be just like any other nation, now found themselves increasingly on lost ground. A.B. Yehoshua, one of Israel’s most prominent novelists, may be the most outspoken protagonist of the path towards normalization. He argued that Jews—and Israelis—should give up their claims to difference: Deep among the primary strands of our identity is the demand to be different, singular, unique, set apart from the family of nations. One of the fundamental elements of the Jewish religious conception is embodied in the phrase “You have chosen us.” It runs like a thread through all spiritual levels of Jewish religious-national activity. . . . The notion of being “like all the other nations” has a clearly negative ring for the Jew.21 8 • isr ael studies, volume 23 number 3 Jews had to learn again to become a people like all others. The best way to accomplish this was to regain their sovereignty: I repeat the simple truth, that the Jewish people is a people like all other peoples, and am astonished to discover to what extent it does not appear simple to many. That is the first seed of trouble. I am amazed to see that the simple meaning of normality, the basic equality of the Jewish people with all other peoples, is not readily comprehensible to many Israelis. One cannot constantly insist on legal-political equality while not acknowledging our equal spiritual status with humanity as a whole.22 Yehoshua’s voice seems to be part of a dwindling minority, as the conviction that Israel was a unique state with a special mission among the nations continues to be popular among secular politicians across the political spectrum. The two most influential Israeli politicians of the last decades may exemplify this sense of identity. Like his mentor Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres emphasized that the fate of the Jewish state was unique, just as the course of Jewish history: “The unusual, the paradoxical, and the extraordinary are our daily lot. Whether we be Jews or Israelis, we seem in some way to be a people apart, who always give rise to an endless number of complex questions, the likes of which we would be hard pressed to find in any other nation in the world.”23 In an address at the Herzliya Conference in 2010, Benjamin Netanyahu called the Jewish people “a proud people with a magnificent country and one which always aspires to serve as ‘a light unto the nations’.”24 His former education minister, Gideon Sa’ar, declared that the task of the country’s education system should be turning the country into “a light unto the nations”.25 As long as Israel was an overwhelmingly secular society with undisputed secular values, the reference to biblical notions with respect to Israel’s special role in history seemed rather innocent. In a society that is increasingly defined by religious values, however, the emphasis on Israel’s uniqueness takes on a theological importance that had not been intended by its founders. The employment of biblical justifications for the existence of Israel and of its unique role among the nations by its secular founders begins to backfire and to lend legitimization to those Jews and Christians who understand the Jewish state not so much as a purpose for itself, but rather as part of a larger theological scheme. As Israel turns seventy, its demography looks very different than at the time of its founding or even twenty years ago. Today, only a minority of first-graders attends secular public schools, and the Orthodox population A Light Unto the Nations? • 9 segments are continuously growing. The secular Jewish population is still in the majority, but even among them, ideas of the uniqueness of the Jewish people and of the State of Israel are firmly entrenched. So are theological justifications for the existence of the state. In a recent Pew Study, 61% of the Jewish respondents claimed that Israel was given to the Jews by God.26 Outside of Israel, the influence of evangelical Christians over the definition of Israel is growing, especially but not exclusively in the US. Israel plays a very active part in their eschatological concepts. Israel faces many challenges today. One of them is the danger to become used as a pawn in what both Orthodox Jews and Evangelical Christians regard as a divine plan. Against this background, the continuous employment of essentially religious notions of Israel’s uniqueness and the reference to biblical concepts like “a light unto the nations” by Israel’s secular leaders serves a different cause than it did during Israel’s early years. Rabbi Kook’s words about the secular Zionists as useful tools (or fools) in a larger cosmic process might indeed prove prophetic: “The Divine Spirit prevails in their aspirations even against their own wills.” Notes This article is based on my book, In Search of Israel: The History of an Idea (Princeton, 2018). 1. David Ben-Gurion, Like Stars and Dust: Essays from Israel’s Government Year Book (Sede Boker, 1997), 299–300. 2. In Hebrew, it is usually referred to as or la-goyim, although the original references in the book of Isaiah (42:6, 49:6, 60:3) speak of am le’or goyim, which has a different meaning. 3. Stenographic Protocol of the Procedings of the Zionist Congress in Basel (Vienna, Eretz Israel, 1901), 108–9. 4. Jakob Klatzkin, Crisis and Decisions in Judaism (Berlin, 1921), 190 [German]. 5. Martin Sieff, “Isaiah Berlin and Elie Kedourie: Recollections of Two Giants,” Covenant: Global Jewish Magazine 1, no. 1 (2006): 3. 6. Isaiah Berlin, “A Nation among Nations,” Jewish Chronicle, 4 May 1973, 28. 7. Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York, 1946), 61. 8. Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, ed. Raphael Patai (New York, 1960), 1, 105. 9. Ibid., 34. 10. Herzl, The Jewish State, 50. 11. Anita Shapira, Israel: A History (Waltham, 2012), 656. 10 • isr ael studies, volume 23 number 3 12. Anita Shapira, “Ben-Gurion and the Bible: The Forging of an Historical Narrative?,” Middle Eastern Studies 33 no. 4 (1997): 654. See Ben-Gurion’s writings: The Renewed State of Israel, 1 (Tel-Aviv, 1969) and “Eternal Israel,” Government Year Book (1954) [Hebrew]. 13. Ben-Gurion, The Young Commanders (Tel-Aviv, 1949), 16–17 [Hebrew]. 14. Ariel L. Feldestein, “Ben-Gurion, Zionism and American Jewry,” in State of Israel, Diaspora, and Jewish Continuity - Essays on the ‘Ever-Dying People’, ed. Simon Rawidowicz (Hanover, 1986), 103; David Ohana, Messianism and Mamlachtiut— Ben-Gurion and the Intellectuals Between Political Vision and Political Theology (Sede Boker, 2003) [Hebrew]. 15. Nahum Goldmann, “The Road Towards an Unfulfillable Ideal,” in Herzl Year Book 3 (New York, 1960), 141–2. 16. Ibid., 65. 17. Ehud Ben-Ezer, Unease in Zion (New York, 1974), 190. 18. Avi Shilon, Menachem Begin: A Life (New Haven, 2012), 258. 19. Menachem Friedman, “The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma,” in The Israeli State and Society, ed. Baruch Kimmerling (New York, 1989), 171–2. 20. Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Chicago, 1996), 87; Yehudah Mirsky, Rav Kook: Mystic in a Time of Revolution (New Haven, 2014), 49. 21. A. B. Yehoshua, Between Right and Right (New York, 1981), 51. 22. Ibid., 64. 23. Shimon Peres, The Imaginary Voyage: With Theodor Herzl in Israel (New York, 1999), 1. 24. Speech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom /2010/pages/pm_netanyahu_herzliya_conference_3-feb-2010.aspx. 25. Todd Gitlin and Liel Leibovitz, The Chosen Peoples: America, Israel, and the Ordeals of Divine Election (New York, 2010), 60. 26. http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/views-of-the-jewish-state -and-the-diaspora/. MICHAEL BRENNER is Professor of Jewish History and Culture at Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich and Professor in Israel Studies at American University, Washington, DC. His recent publications include: In Search of Israel: The History of an Idea (Princeton, NJ, 2018); editor, A History of Jews in Germany since 1945 (Bloomington, IN, 2018); A Short History of the Jews (Princeton, NJ, 2010); Prophets of the Past: Interpreters of Jewish History (Princeton, NJ, 2010); Zionism: A Brief History (Princeton, NJ, 2003).