Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 86 (2020) 103897
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp
Do humans possess an autonomous system justification motivation? A
Pupillometric test of the strong system justification thesis☆,☆☆
T
Chuma Kevin Owuamalama, , Russell Spearsb
⁎
a
b
University of Nottingham, Malaysia
University of Groningen, the Netherlands
A R TICL E INFO
A BSTR A CT
Keywords:
System justification motivation
Cognitive dissonance
Pupil dilation
Eye-tracking
Group disadvantage and social identity
To investigate the existence of an autonomous system justification motive that guides human behavior, we tested
the dissonance-inspired strong system-justification thesis: that the cognitive effort expended to justify societal
systems on which people depend, is greater amongst the disadvantaged than amongst the advantaged when their
group identities are weak in salience/strength. Using a novel pupil dilation paradigm to tap cognitive effort, we
exposed an ethnic minority group (Ntotal = 263) to depictions of their ingroup as disadvantaged or advantaged
after they had stated four things they liked about their ethnic group (strong group identity salience) or grandmother (weak group identity salience). We then measured fluctuations in their pupil diameter as they contemplated support for societal systems that were either relevant (high dependency) or irrelevant (low dependency) to their ethnic group. Results revealed that pupil sizes were larger in the group disadvantage
condition than in the group advantage condition—indicating greater cognitive effort—but only when group
identity was salient (Experiment 1) or when group identification was strong (Experiment 2). These effects occurred only for high dependency systems. Combined, this evidence contradicts the system-justification thesis,
and questions the existence of an autonomous system justification motivation in humans.
The idea that human behavior arises from a motivation to satisfy
psychological or material needs was sovereign within the social, political, economic and psychological sciences, until the advent of perspectives that de-emphasize self-interest, such as system justification
theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Jost and Banaji (1994, p. 10) proposed a new kind of need that “does not [… operate] in the service of
protecting the interests of the self or the group” which they called the
system justification motive. According to SJT, most humans possess a
“tendency to defend, bolster and justify aspects of the societal status
quo, often at a nonconscious level of awareness” (Jost, 2017a). Consequently, this tendency helps to ease uncertainties “on behalf of the
system” (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003, p.18), even or
indeed especially amongst those who are disadvantaged by such systems (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Challenging the status quo can be risky
and could potentially destabilize traditions to which people are
accustomed. Hence, the system motive operates to ensure system stability and, ironically, to help people to plan and control their lives.
Importantly, the strong system justification thesis assumes that the
system motive operates mostly when the personal/group identities of
the disadvantaged are relatively weak or nonsalient (Jost et al., 2003).
Although we have disputed this claim on the grounds that it deviates
from the original statements of Festinger (1962) (i.e., a dissonance-induced system justification should occur when group identities are relatively strong and important to the disadvantaged, see Owuamalam,
Rubin, & Spears, 2016, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b), there is as yet no
direct empirical evidence to resolve this theoretical disagreement.
Hence, we provide the first test of the dissonance-inspired and diagnostic version of the system justification thesis, using a novel pupil
dilation paradigm that more directly taps dissonance effects (Hess &
Polt, 1964). We undertook this test because the “strong system
☆
This paper has been recommended for acceptance by: Susann Fiedler.
Author Note: We are grateful to Andrea Soledad Matos Devesa, Shin Yin Ng, Hanisa Anais Binti Haizan and Maas Misha'ari Weerabangsa for their help with data
collection and preparation, and Daphne and John Keats Foundation for a grant to the first author. We are also grateful to A/Prof. Mark Rubin for comments on an
early draft of this paper. The first author further wishes to acknowledge, with thanks, the immense support that he received from his life partner (Martina
Owuamalam) throughout the process. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone.
⁎
Corresponding author at: Division of Organizational and Applied Psychology, University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus, Jalan Broga, Semenyih 43500,
Selangor, Malaysia.
E-mail address: Chuma.Owuamalam@nottingham.edu.my (C.K. Owuamalam).
☆☆
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103897
Received 3 December 2018; Received in revised form 12 September 2019; Accepted 12 September 2019
0022-1031/ © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 86 (2020) 103897
C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
justification thesis” represents SJT's most distinctive proposition that
separates it from other mainstream theories. This thesis has generated
enormous debate in the literature (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004;
Reicher, 2004; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje,
2001), and continues to do so (Brandt, 2013; Jost, 2017b; Owuamalam,
Rubin, & Spears, 2016b), with a combined citation count exceeding
3000 (Google Scholar).
justification thesis. As Jost et al. (2004) explained:
1. The debate
The logic behind this proposition is that supporting prevailing systems should not be difficult for those who benefit from them because
such support works in favor of their self-interests. Hence, instances of
system supporting attitudes amongst the advantaged are generally seen
as being undiagnostic of an autonomous system justification motivation
because it is difficult to believe that the advantaged are doing anything
else than following their (self) interests.
In contrast, supporting unequal social arrangements is potentially at
odds with the interests of groups that are disadvantaged by the relevant
societal systems: significant cognitive effort is needed to make sense of,
and live with such realities, given the ordinary tendency for people to
act in their interests (Owuamalam, Paolini, & Rubin, 2017; see also
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). As Jost et al. (2003, p.16, our
emphasis) explained, “a hybrid of dissonance theory and system justification theory would predict that those who suffer the most also have the
most to explain, justify, and rationalize” (but see the section on cognitive
dissonance theory below). It is often difficult to change societal traditions, especially when they are legitimate and stable (Jost et al., 2004,
2012) and so SJT assumes that the disadvantaged are drawn towards
aligning their attitudes with the status-quo because this is easier to do.
In short, the cognitive effort expended in justifying disadvantageous
societal systems, is regarded as being diagnostic of the existence of an
autonomous system justification motivation. Importantly, SJT proposes
that they do this only or especially when group interests and/or identities
are subjectively weak (Jost et al., 2004), because then personal and/or
group motives cannot interfere with system justifying attitudes/behaviors (see also Brandt, 2013).
the strongest, most paradoxical form of the system justification
hypothesis, which draws also on the logic of cognitive dissonance
theory, is that members of disadvantaged groups would be even
more likely than members of advantaged groups to support the
status quo, at least when personal and group interests are low in salience
(p. 909; emphasis added).
A central question in the debate between system justification researchers (Jost et al., 2004) and others (e.g., Owuamalam et al., 2019a,
2019b; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Spears et al., 2001) rests on how to
untangle an autonomous system justification motivation from motives
that are rooted in personal/collective interests. That is, assuming an
autonomous system justification motivation exists, then there must be a
way to demonstrate its existence unambigiously.
To this end, SJT researchers have proposed that an autonomous
system justification motivation exists if people are supportive of societal
systems that ultimately undercut their personal and collective interests
(Jost & Hunyady, 2005, p. 261) and, all the more so, if they support
such arrangements more strongly than those who benefit from them
(Jost et al., 2003). This proposition is not without merit. The disadvantaged, amongst other instances, sometimes:
a. show ambivalence towards their ingroup, and tend to favor higherstatus outgroups over their own group in some cases, even at the
implicit/unconscious level of awareness (Jost et al., 2004; Jost &
Burgess, 2000);
b. oppose policies aimed at resolving their material disadvantage (e.g.,
wealth redistribution) moreso, or at least to the same degree as their
advantaged counterparts (Henry & Saul, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; see
Jost et al., 2004 for a review) and/or,
c. are unwilling to engage in collective protest to address social inequity (Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius, & Van Der Toorn,
2012; Osborne & Sibley, 2013; cf. Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, &
Sibley, 2019).
2.1. The system dependency caveat
Consistent with the dissonance perspective (Festinger, 1962) recent
reformulations of the system justification thesis (e.g., the system dependency caveat, Kay et al., 2009; see also Jost, 2019) propose that the
system justification motivation should be most visible when people are
dependent on their social systems for some benefit (see also van der
Toorn et al., 2015). This system dependency caveat assumes that the
disadvantaged should care enough for the relevant system to expend
cognitive resources/effort justifying its maintenance at the expense of
advancing their own personal/group interests. Hence, a true test of the
dissonance-inspired strong system justification thesis should demonstrate that greater cognitive effort is expended in justifying systems on
which peoples' “livelihoods depend” (Jost, 2017a, 2017b p.73). In
short, to establish that an autonomous system justification motive exists, one should show that the disadvantaged expend greater cognitive
effort in justifying societal systems—especially those systems that they
depend on—when their group identities are relatively weak in salience
or when their group identification is weak.
However, a growing number of recent findings have cast doubt on
the assumption of an autonomous system justification motive grounded
in system-justifying attitudes amongst the disadvantaged. For example,
evidence from controlled experiments (e.g., Trump & White, 2018), and
large representative surveys (Brandt, 2013; Caricati, 2017; Kelemen,
Szabó, Mészáros, László, & Forgas, 2014; Vargas-Salfate, Paez, Liu,
Pratto, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018), show either stronger system justification
effects amongst the advantaged than the disadvantaged, or no difference at all. The existence of an autonomous system justification motivation is complicated further by Owuamalam, Rubin, Spears, and
Weerabangsa (2017, Study 1). These authors showed that even in those
instances where the disadvantaged support societal systems more
strongly than the advantaged, that such behavior seems to be driven by
collective interests (e.g., to manage the ingroup's moral reputation,
Hässler, Shnabel, Ullrich, Arditti-Vogel, & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2018).
2. The critical but largely ignored issue
Previous studies on the topic have relied almost exclusively on selfreports that are often vulnerable to social desirability responding (e.g.,
Owuamalam, Rubin, & Issmer, 2016; Owuamalam, Paolini, & Rubin,
2017). None of the early studies in support of, or against SJT's proposition have directly tested the cognitive dissonance basis for the system
justification motivation using a method that is invulnerable to biases,
especially under conditions in which group identities and interests are
weak. This makes it profoundly difficult to conclusively accept or reject
the existence of an autonomous system justification motivation that is
predicated on there being supportive evidence for the strong system
3. An alternative view based on cognitive dissonance theory
An alternative proposition, based on the original statements of the
cognitive dissonance theory, is that dissonance effects should manifest
most strongly amongst the disadvantaged when the competing realities
are self-relevant and important (Owuamalam et al., 2016; Owuamalam
et al., 2018a, 2018b; Owuamalam et al., 2019a, 2019b). As Festinger
(1962, pp. 179–180) explained:
The magnitude of the dissonance, of course, will also be affected by
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
participant. This estimate guided data collection effort in this experiment, and the subsequent replication.
those variables that affect the importance of the cognitive elements
involved in the dissonance. The more important the elements, the
greater will be the magnitude of the dissonance.
5.1.2. Participants and design
One-hundred and-thirty-two ethnic Chinese Malaysian students
were randomly recruited at a university campus by a Chinese research
assistant to participate in this study (84 were women, Mage = 21.33,
SDage = 2.53). Participants were randomly assigned into one of 4 cells
of a 2 (group status: disadvantaged, n = 66 vs. advantaged, n = 66) x 2
(identity salience: salient, n = 66 vs. nonsalient, n = 66) design, while
group identification was measured. These three factors were the focal
independent variables. Participants' pupil sizes as they contemplated
(and indicated) their support for various societal systems were measured, and both of these measures represented the key dependent
variables.
Hence, from a cognitive dissonance standpoint, the disadvantaged
should expend greater cognitive effort in rationalizing systems that are
important to them when their group identification is strong and important to them; or when their group identities are salient and therefore
relevant to them (Owuamalam et al., 2016; Owuamalam et al., 2018a,
2018b; Owuamalam et al., 2019a, 2019b). Jost (2019) has objected to
the supportive indirect evidence for this alternative view (e.g.,
Owuamalam et al., 2016) on the grounds that the conceptualization of
systems, and the design of the experiment itself leaves much to be desired (see also Jost, Badaan, Goudarzi, Hoffarth, & Mogami, 2019).
Here we used clear-cut examples of conventional societal systems and
an established but nonetheless novel pupillometric technique that directly taps cognitive effort (see Hess & Polt, 1964).
5.1.3. Apparatus
The materials and stimuli for this study were presented on a 17-inch
monitor that was equipped with Tobii T120 eye-tracking capability.
This device records pupil dilation at a constant data rate of ~60 Hz with
a sampling rate standard deviation of 0.003 Hz (Tobii Technology,
2010). A Dell laptop running the Tobii Studio software (version 3.3.1)
was used to program the experiment, and the questionnaires that were
constructed in Qualtrics survey suit were linked to the Tobii eye-tracker
via this software. A chin rest was provided to participants to ensure
accurate pupillometric measurements. This chin rest was placed approximately 65 cm to the Tobii monitor and helped to ensure minimal
head movements. Because luminance can affect the precision of pupillometric measurements (Hammond & Mouat, 1985) we blinded the
windows adjacent to the Tobii monitor with black plastic bags to
maintain a constant lighting across participants with daylight florescent
tubes that were suspended on the ceiling.
4. Pupillometric measurements of cognitive effort
One of the key functions of the pupil is to enable vision by regulating the amount of light that enters the eye via the actions of the
constrictor and dilator muscles in the iris, which are respectively controlled by the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous systems. While
the dilator muscles functions to increase pupil sizes in dark conditions,
the constrictor muscles shrinks pupil sizes in well-lit conditions (Sirois
& Brisson, 2014). Importantly, pupil size fluctuations are also sensitive
to information processing, so that the greater the cognitive demands,
the wider the pupil diameter becomes (Sirois & Brisson, 2014). Given
this function, researchers have used dilations in the pupil diameter to
measure cognitive effort (Sirois & Brisson, 2014). This makes pupillometric reflexes a particularly useful approach to measuring dissonancebased justification processes, because they are automatic and consequently less vulnerable to deliberate distortion, compared to self-report
measurements of system justification that can be influenced by image
management bias (e.g., Owuamalam et al., 2016, Study 1).
Indeed, there is ample evidence that increases in pupil diameter taps
cognitive effort with precision (e.g. Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Querino
et al., 2015). For example, classic studies adopting a mental stress
paradigm in which participants are given difficult versus easy tasks
generally show that the pupil dilates when the task is difficult rather
than easy (e.g. Hess & Polt, 1964; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Metalis,
Rhoades, Hess, & Petrovich, 1980; see also Sirois & Brisson, 2014 for a
review). We focused on pupil dilations as an index of the cognitive
effort implied by a dissonance-induced system justification: a) because
dissonance assumes that competing choices are operational and should
demand greater effort to process than non-conflicting ones; and b) because “pupil dilation appears to index the processes involved in decision making” (Sirois & Brisson, 2014, p. 682). In short, the aim was to
determine whether pupil dilations—that indicate cognitive effort—are
larger amongst the disadvantaged (than the advantaged) when system
justifying decisions are contemplated in situations where the salience/
strength of their group identity is weakened (as per the strong system
justification thesis) or strengthened (as per the alternative view based
on cognitive dissonance theory).
5.1.4. Materials and procedure
Participants were told that the study was about social attitudes and
perceptions and that they will be required to respond to questions about
a series of systems and institutions in Malaysian society. Participants
then underwent a gaze calibration protocol and were told this was
necessary in order to ensure that they paid attention to the tasks. In
reality the gaze calibration was designed to ensure that a) the Tobii eyetracker was capturing their gaze, and b) their gaze could reach the
different angles on the screen.
5.1.5. Identity salience and strength
The salience of participants' ethnic identity was manipulated by focusing participants' attention to the ingroup as a whole. For the second
group, participants were encouraged to focus on their grandmother,
and this was meant to invoke a more interpersonal context in which
individual identity is likely to be more salient than the group identity.
This approach is underpinned by self-categorisation theory (Turner,
1999) to the extent that a) people categorise themselves at different
levels of abstraction and, b) the salient self in a situation is the primary
driver of social behavior. Specifically, in the strong group identity salience condition, participants were asked to write down four things they
liked about their ethnic Chinese Malaysian identity, while in the weak
group identity salience condition participants wrote four things they
liked about their grandmother (see Panel A, Table 1).
5. Experiment 1
5.1. Method
5.1.6. Group status manipulation
Next, we capitalized on the relatively unique feature of Malaysian
society, in which ethnic Chinese are a minority group that suffer political disadvantage but, at the same time, are more economically successful than other ethnic groups. This context makes it possible to
meaningfully manipulate group disadvantage vs. advantage amongst
ethnic Chinese Malaysians while retaining the real-world relevance that
an actual (rather than ficticious) group presents (see Owuamalam,
5.1.1. Sample size estimation
Assuming a moderate effect size (f = 0.25), with alpha and power
set at respectively 0.05 and 0.80 (Cohen, 1988), we estimated using
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), that a 2 × 2 design
with a moderating covariate will require 128 cases to achieve a significant critical F-value of 3.92, assuming a single datapoint per
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
Table 1
The group identity salience x group disadvantage treatments across experiments 1 and 2.
Experimental conditions
Treatment variable: group identity salience
Strong
Weak
1. What does your grandmother mean to you?
2. How do you feel about your grandmother?
3. What is the most important thing you would share with the world about your
grandmother?
4. What do you like so much about your grandmother?
1. What does your Chinese identity mean to you?
2. How do you feel about being a Chinese?
3. What is the most important thing you would share with the world about your
Chinese identity?
4. What do you like so much about your Chinese identity?
Experimental conditions
Treatment variable: group status
Disadvantaged
Advantaged
The system of providing educational subsidies in Malaysia has been based on the spirit of
the National Education Policy (1961) and the New Economic Policy (1971) that
Malaysia adopted following independence. These policies are aimed to significantly
raise the attainment of Malays, often at the expense of other groups in Malaysia such
as the Chinese. In particular, these policies provide quotas for Malay students in
higher education to receive MARA government scholarships even when higher
achieving Chinese students do not receive similar support. Moreover, under these
policies some government positions are reserved for Malays, while private businesses
owned by the Chinese are required to hire Malays and are often denied access to
UMNO-led government loans when Chinese-owned companies fail to meet this
requirement.
The Chinese are considered one of the wealthiest ethnic groups in Malaysia and have
been more prosperous than other ethnic communities. In 2001, Malaysian Business
released its list of 20 richest Malaysians – 16 of the 20 and 9 of the top 10 were ethnic
Chinese. The Chinese have the lowest poverty rates amongst major ethnic groups in
Malaysia. For example, average income rose from RM 394 in 1970 to RM 4279 in
2002 amongst Chinese Malaysians - 80.0% above the average Malay income, and
40.5% above the average income amongst Indians. Moreover, the Chinese have the
highest household income amongst the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia. The
monthly average household income was RM 4437 in 2007. These statistics reflect the
historical dominance of the Chinese in finance, commerce and economic sectors.
Paolini, & Rubin, 2017). Research has shown that activating a mindset
of group disadvantage depends on who people compare themselves to,
or the specific status-relevant dimension on which such comparisons
are based (Caricati, 2017; Caricati & Sollami, 2017; Owuamalam,
Rubin, & Issmer, 2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Hence, in the group
disadvantage condition, we reminded participants about their political
disadvantage in Malaysian society relative to the Malay majority outgroup in various ways. For example, through the MARA scholarship
policy – an initiative that helps the majority ethnic group (Malays) at
the expense of minority groups (including ethnic Chinese). In the group
advantage condition, participants' focus was directed to their ethnic
group's economic success relative to other ethnic groups in Malaysia
(see Table 1, Panel B).
higher education gap between the Malays and the economically more
successful Chinese minority. Given that our Chinese participants were
already in higher education, and the fact that none of them were in
receipt of the MARA scholarship, we reasoned that participants will be
less dependent on this sub-system. Similarly, UMNO (United Malays
National Organization) is a political party that is generally seen as the
party of the majority Malay outgroup, created to advance the political/
economic interests of the Malays rather than the ethnic Chinese minority. That is, ethnic Chinese Malaysians are unlikely to be highly dependent on MARA scholarship and UMNO political sub-systems, at least
relative to transportation and healthcare sub-systems that are more
closely linked to survival, following Kay et al.'s (2009, p.425) examples
of high dependency systems. In short, these micro-systems are subsumed within the overarching ‘Malaysian system’ in which Chinese
Malaysians are disadvantaged—at least politically–relative to the majority Malay outgroup (see Owuamalam et al., 2018b for a typology of
societal systems).
Unbeknownst to participants, their pupil sizes were recorded as they
contemplated support for the sub-systems we exposed them to. It was
important too that the experience of dissonance preceded self-reported
system justification and this consideration informed the capture of
pupil measurements prior to the rating scales: when participants are
making their support decisions. This was done to rule out the alternative possibility that self-reported system justification actually reduces
dissonance if pupil measurements were captured at the point where
participants were merely reporting a decision that has already been
made.
Participants saw an instruction slide that reminded them to rate the
fairness, perceived confidence and functionality concerning each subsystem following previous studies that have used either of these three
indices to operationalize system justification (e.g. Brandt, 2013;
Caricati, 2017; Jost et al., 2003; Kay et al., 2009). Participants could
exit the instruction slide (with timing set at infinity) by pressing any
key on the keyboard, which was then followed by a screen containing
one of the sub-systems they were to give their opinions on. That is,
there was one word describing a sub-system on each slide and our interest was on the pupil size fluctuation(s) for this slide alone. The word
5.1.7. Dependent measures
The system is interpreted in SJT framework as including sub-components of an overarching system/order in which people are advantaged or disadvantaged (Jost et al., 2004; Kay & Zanna, 2009; cf.
Owuamalam et al., 2018a, 2019a, 2019b). If system justification
amongst the disadvantaged is induced by dissonance in the SJT sense,
then according to SJT, the cognitive effort expended to justify subcomponents of an overarching order that is disadvantageous to one's
social identity should be greater when a) people are strongly rather
than weakly dependent on such systems; b) group identity is rendered
nonsalient or weak (versus salient/strong, Jost et al., 2004); and/or c)
group identification is weak (rather than strong). Such an effect should
manifest itself in the form of increased pupil sizes as the disadvantaged
contemplate support for relevant societal systems.
To operationalize system dependency, participants were asked to
indicate their support for four Malaysian (sub-) systems that we chose
on the basis of the extent to which the livelihoods of ethnic Chinese
Malaysians might depend on them (Owuamalam et al., 2017). These
included 2 sub-systems that are unambigiously relevant to ethnic Chinese peoples' survival (transportation and healthcare systems) and 2
sub-systems that they are ostensibly less dependent on (MARA scholarships, UMNO political party). The MARA scholarship scheme was
introduced by the Malay-led ruling party in Malaysia to help close the
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
denoting the relevant sub-system was written in 50-point Calibri font
on a dark grey slide with white ink1 and this was presented in the center
of the screen for 5000 milliseconds (ms, see flow diagram in Fig. 1). To
maintain roughly equivalent levels of luminance across each system
stimulus—given the varied character length for system-describing
words—hashtags
were
added
to
shorter
words
(e.g.,
“#####UMNO#####”) so that they are the same length as the
longest word (e.g., “transportation”).
Participants then completed the three-item system justification scale
immediately after pupil size measurements, each time one of the four
sub-systems was presented for response. Response were collected on a
5-point scale with the following anchors for: fairness (1 = very unfair,
2 = somewhat unfair, 3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat fair, 5 = very fair),
functionality (1 = it does not function as it should, 2 = it somewhat does
not function as it should, 3 = neutral, 4 = it somewhat functions as it
should, 5 = it functions as it should) and, confidence in the relevant subsystem (1 = I do not have confidence in this system, 2 = I somewhat do not
have confidence in this system, 3 = neutral, 4 = I somewhat have confidence in this system, 5 = I have confidence in this system). Finally, presentation of the four sub-systems was completely randomized to eliminate the possibility that the anticipated dissonance effects are loaded
on the initial sub-system that was presented to participants for response.
A 6-item exit questionnaire measuring the strength of participants'
ethnic identity, which we adapted from Luthanen and Crocker (1992)
and, Owuamalam & Rubin, 2014 was completed after the manipulations and participants' system justification ratings: “I value being a
Chinese”; “Being a Chinese is important to my sense of who I am”; “I am
proud to be a Chinese”; “Being Chinese is a positive experience”; “It is
important to me to be a Chinese” and “I am pleased to be a Chinese”
(1 = disagree completely, 6 = agree completely, α = 0.93). This identification scale was included towards the end, so that it did not contaminate an effect of the identity salience treatment on the dependent
variable. On completing the experiment that lasted approximately
30–45 min, participants were rewarded with course credits/candies,
thanked and debriefed.
as participants contemplated their decisions beyond the baseline, reflects the cognitive effort expended during the decision task and these
pupil size fluctuations were measured in millimeters. We combined the
relative pupil size changes for high dependency sub-systems (healthcare
and transportation) and low dependency sub-systems (MARA and
UMNO), based on a confirmatory factor analysis showing that these
item-pairs fit well together as theorized, X2(1) = 1.10, p = .294,
CFI = 0.994, RMSEA = 0.027, SRMR = 0.021 (see Appendix A, Fig. A1
for factor loadings).
6.2. Self-reported system justification
For each of the four sub-systems, we combined participants' scores
on the 3 dimensions of fairness, confidence and perceived functionality
of the system. This procedure generated reliable scales of system justification for the four sub-systems, which were again combined to
generate indices of system justification for high and low dependency
sub-systems (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and scale reliabilities).
6.3. Preliminary analysis
In line with SJT's system dependency caveat (and cognitive dissonance theory), we needed to show that pupil sizes and self-reported
system justification were greater for high relative to low dependency
sub-systems. Consistent with both perspectives, results from a paired ttest confirmed that participants exerted greater cognitive effort in justifying systems they were more rather than less dependent on (see
Table 3).
6.4. Main analysis
Do the disadvantaged expend greater cognitive effort in justifying
systems they are highly dependent on, when their group identities are
relatively weak in salience/strength compared to the advantaged? SJT
assumes that they do and, this is the basis for assuming the existence of
an autonomous system justification motive. Hence, to compare this
strong system justification thesis with the alternative prediction that we
derived from cognitive dissonance theory, we ran a 2 (group status:
disadvantaged vs. advantaged) x 2 (group identity salience: strong vs.
weak) MANCOVA. In this analysis group identification (mean centered)2 was also specified as a moderating covariate. Changes in pupil
sizes for the high and low dependency sub-systems were entered in the
model as the outcomes. Pupil sizes scores were transformed to normality using Templeton's (2011) 2-step transformation approach because they were highly positively skewed (see supplementary document
|SOM-R|, Table S1, for details).
Results revealed a multivariate group status x group identity salience interaction, Wilk's λ = 0.927, F(2, 123) = 4.858, p = .009, ηp2 =
0.073. At the univariate level, the group status x group identity salience
interaction3 significantly predicted the level of cognitive effort expended in justifying high dependency systems, F(1, 124) = 9.708,
p = .002, ηp2 = 0.073. Contrary to SJT, simple effect analyses revealed
no significant difference in the level of cognitive effort expended to
justify high dependency sub-systems amongst our ethnic Chinese participants who focused on their group's disadvantage (M ± SEM;
−0.509 ± 0.146)
relative
to
their
group's
advantage
6. Results
6.1. Data preparation
Pupil dilation data for the 4 systems were extracted for each participant and invalid data identified by the eye tracker as artefacts, including blinks and missing data, were discarded. This resulted in approximately 300–600 data units of pupil size scores for each participant
and for each sub-system stimulus, for the left and right eyes. Pupil size
data for the right and left eyes were aggregated for each sub-system
stimulus and for each participant. We employed the same procedure to
extract pupil sizes relating to the last word on the instruction slide,
which we used as a baseline for calculating the relative pupil size
changes for each of the four systems with the following formula:
p =
(p
b)
b
where p* is the normalized relative pupil size change estimate, p is the
raw pupil size data for each system and b is the pupil size associated
with the baseline. The last word on the instruction slide was used as the
baseline because participants would not have started deliberations
(requiring cognitive effort) prior to being shown the sub-system on
which they were to provide an opinion (see Fig. 1 for experimental
flowchart). Hence, the pupil should largely come to a resting position at
the point where participants have just finished reading the instructions
for the decision task that lay ahead. In short, any increases in pupil sizes
1
2
A test of orthogonality between the manipulated and measured independent
variables revealed that they were largely independent processes (full details are
shown in our supplementary document, SOM-R).
3
Assuming an 80% power, an alpha =0.05 two-tailed, 4 groups of the 2 × 2
design, a post-hoc sensitivity power analysis suggests, that a sample size of
~130 cases has sufficient power to detect a critical F-value of 3.918; and an
effect size of f = 0.319 for this key interaction. The observed F-values and effect
sizes (f) for both studies were: Experiment 1 = [8.75 & 0.26] and for
Experiment 2 = [5.36 & 0.21].
In Experiment 2, we used a white slide with black ink.
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 86 (2020) 103897
C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
Fig. 1. Experimental flow chart. Slide contents are approximations. Fixation crosses (+) were included in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1. Slide backgrounds
were dark grey in Experiment 1 but white in Experiment 2.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for self-reported variables in experiments 1–2.⁎, ⁎⁎
Experiment 1
System justification
Experiment 2
High dependency systems
Low dependency systems
High dependency systems
Low dependency systems
Transport
Healthcare
UMNO
MARA
Transport
Healthcare
UMNO
MARA
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
M (SD) α
3.04 (0.90) 0.79
3.30 (0.90) 0.85
1.85 (0.72)
0.72
2.03 (0.83)
0.77
3.48 (0.80) 0.79
3.54 (0.86) 0.85
2.07 (0.76) 0.81
2.34 (0.85) 0.82
M (SD) r
4.13 (0.75)
0.65⁎⁎⁎
M (SD) r
3.99 (0.74)
0.49⁎⁎⁎
M (SD) r
1.97 (0.92)
0.50⁎⁎⁎
M (SD) r
1.70 (0.86) 0.49⁎⁎⁎
System dependency
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, α = Cronbach's alpha, and r = Pearson's correlation coefficient.
⁎
p < .050.
⁎⁎
p < .010.
⁎⁎⁎
p < .001.
Table 3
Fluctuations in pupil sizes and self-reported system justification as a function of level of system dependency.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
System dependency
Cognitive effort (Pupil size
change)
Self-reported system
justification
High
Low
0.205
(0.040)
3.169
(0.061)
0.026
(0.004)
1.939
(0.059)
t
p
dCohen
95% CI
System dependency
Lower
Upper
High
Low
−0.006
(0.007)
3.510
(0.055)
−0.113
(0.005)
2.202
(0.055)
4.489
< 0.001
0.391
0.100
0.258
17.263
< 0.001
1.503
1.089
1.371
t
p
dcohen
95% CI
Lower
Upper
15.500
< 0.001
1.350
0.094
0.121
20.508
< 0.001
1.792
1.181
1.433
Note. Pupil sizes scores in Experiment 1 were non-normally distributed and, although the non-parametric Wilcoxon test (W) yielded a similar (albeit marginally
significant) outcome, W = 5124.000, p = .066; a Bayesian pairwise contrast that quantifies the amount of evidence in support of the experimental hypothesis,
revealed an “extreme” support for the observation that pupil sizes increase more for high (than low) dependency systems (BF10 = 948.859, error % = 8.912e-9).
(−0.413 ± 0.144, p = .638, ηp2 = 0.002, 95% CI = |-0.502, 0.309|)
when their group identity was weakly salient. Interestingly, the predicted group status effect was, however, visible only when group
identity was salient (see Fig. 2, see left panel solid data points): Here
our ethnic Chinese participants expended greater cognitive effort to
justify high dependency systems when they were focused on their
group's disadvantage (0.851 ± 0.148) than their group's advantage
(0.044 ± 0.144, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.110, 95% CI = |0.398, 1.214|).
The group status x group identification interaction was not significant
(see Table 4 for full model results). A similar analysis that we conducted
with pupil size scores for low dependency sub-systems did not yield any
significant main or interactive effects (see Table 4 and also Fig. 2, right
hand panel). The outcome was largely similar when we used the raw
untransformed data instead (see SOM-R, Table S2).
6.5. Exploratory analyses
SJT assumes that the decision to support societal systems (i.e.
system justification) arises from cognitive dissonance, and that this is
visible when group identities are weak in salience, especially amongst
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 86 (2020) 103897
C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
Fig. 2. The effect of group status on pupil size fluctuations from the baseline when the salience of group identity was either strong or weak (Experiment 1). Error bars
are 95% CIs.
size increases and self-reported system justification for the high and low
dependency systems across our experimental conditions. Contrary to
SJT's dissonance-induced system justification assumption, results revealed no reliable correlation between changes in pupil size and selfreported justification of high and low dependency systems (see
Table 5).
Table 4
Univariate effects of group status, identity salience and group identification on
pupil sizes.
System dependency
High
Experiment 1
Group status (GS)
Identity salience (IS)
Group identification
(ID)
GS*IS
GS*ID
Experiment 2
Group status (GS)
Identity Salience (IS)
Group identification
(ID)
GS*IS
GS*ID
Low
F
p
ηp2
F
p
ηp2
5.93
39.34
0.07
0.016
< 0.001
0.798
0.046
0.241
0.001
0.56
3.79
0.01
0.456
0.054
0.945
0.004
0.030
< 0.001
9.71
0.02
0.002
0.883
0.073
< 0.001
0.84
0.47
0.361
0.494
0.007
0.004
0.46
0.16
1.53
0.501
0.694
0.219
0.004
0.001
0.012
0.04
0.42
0.18
0.848
0.518
0.676
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.28
5.36
0.597
0.022
0.002
0.041
0.73
3.12
0.396
0.080
0.006
0.024
7. Discussion
Three key findings emerged from this study: a) greater cognitive
effort was expended when justifying systems on which people were
highly dependent and this outcome is consistent with both cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962) and system justification theory
(Jost, 2017b; Kay et al., 2009); b.) the disadvantaged expended greater
cognitive effort in justifying high dependency systems but only when
their group identities were more (not less) salient and, this outcome is
counter to the “strong system justification thesis” (Jost et al., 2003/
2004) but supportive of cognitive dissonance theory. And; c) the cognitive effort expended to justify societal systems were not significantly
related to participants' self-reported system justification and this outcome contradicts the system-justification theory because it shows that
the experience of dissonance (quantified here as cognitive effort) does
not necessarily predict support for the system in all instances. In short,
whether system justification relates to self-reported reactions to intergroup hierarchies in which the ingroup is disadvantaged (as in
Owuamalam et al., 2016, 2017; but see Jost's, 2019 argument against
this approach) or to the cognitive effort expended to justify conventional systems (as depicted in pupil size fluctuations in the current
study), the evidence seem to converge on the idea that a dissonanceinduced system justification is plausible only when group identity is
salient/strong rather than nonsalient/weak (see also Owuamalam et al.,
2016).
Note. Analysis for Experiment 1 is based on the transformed data. Further
analyses using untransformed pupil scores in Experiment 1 are presented in the
supplementary document (SOM-R, Table S2). In Experiment 1, and for high
dependency systems, changes in pupil sizes were larger in the disadvantaged
condition (0.553 ± 0.030) compared to the advantaged condition
(0.450 ± 0.030) and; pupil sizes were larger when group identity salience was
strong (0.633 ± 0.030) rather than weak (0.370 ± 0.030). Also, in
Experiment 2, the marginal effect of group identity salience on pupil sizes for
low dependency system occurred because cognitive effort (pupil size) was
greater when the salience of group identity was strong (0.554 ± 0.035) rather
than weak (0.457 ± 0.035).
the disadvantaged. However, this crucial assumption has never been
directly tested before, beyond the indirect test offered by Brandt
(2013). Hence, to examine whether dissonance artefacts (i.e. indexed
by cognitive effort) predict manifest levels of self-reported system justification, we performed pairwise Bayesian correlations between pupil
7.1. Limitations
Firstly, it is possible to question the current results based on how
difficult it is to be certain that the high and low dependency sub-
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
Table 5
Bayesian pairwise correlations between pupil sizes and self-reported system justification.
Experiment 1
Group disadvantage condition
Strong identity salience System dependency
Weak identity salience
System dependency
Group advantage condition
Strong identity salience System dependency
Weak identity salience
System dependency
Experiment 2
Untransformed data
Transformed data
Untransformed data⁎
r (BF10)
95% credible interval
r (BF10)
95% credible interval
r (BF10)
95% credible interval
High
Low
High
Low
0.06 (0.23)
−0.22 (0.46)
−0.29 (0.81)
−0.21 (0.42)
−0.278,
−0.509,
−0.561,
−0.498,
0.378
0.125
0.055
0.139
−0.11 (0.26)
−0.19 (0.36)
0.22 (0.44)
0.12 (0.27)
−0.424,
−0.479,
−0.504,
−0.435,
0.237
0.163
0.131
0.225
0.03 (0.21)
0.40 (3.21)
9.30e-4 (0.23)
0.01 (0.23)
−0.288, 0.343
0.070, 0.624
−0.343, 0.345
−0.333, 0.355
High
Low
High
Low
−0.16 (0.32)
0.22 (0.44)
0.27 (0.65)
0.05 (0.22)
−0.459,
−0.133,
−0.080,
−0.288,
0.187
0.502
0.542
0.369
−0.13 (0.28)
0.02 (0.22)
0.24 (0.52)
0.03 (0.22)
−0.433,
−0.316,
−0.107,
−0.304,
0.217
0.352
0.522
0.354
0.03 (0.24)
−0.13 (0.29)
−0.01 (0.21)
−0.17 (0.33)
−0.337,
−0.459,
−0.317,
−0.452,
0.385
0.242
0.307
0.158
Note. 95% credible intervals relate to the posterior distribution for the pairwise correlations. Pupil size scores in Experiment 2 were normally distributed and we did
not transform these scores as a result. Data in bold represents 95% credible confidence intervals, which is roughly equivalent to p < .050.
⁎
The transformed scores for self-reported endorsement of high dependency systems was used due to normality issues on this scale (see Supplementary Document,
SOM-R).
systems were regarded as such by participants. Secondly, it is unwise to
discard the system justification motive based on results from a single
experiment, however compelling the evidence might seem. We therefore conducted a replication study to ascertain the reproducibility of the
key results (cf. Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In doing so, we
addressed the outstanding issue of whether participants themselves
agreed with the distinction we make concerning the degree to which
they are dependent on the four sub-systems used in the current investigation.
combined for each system type (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and
scale reliabilities). Participants were paid RM5 as compensation for
their time on completing the study and were thanked and thoroughly
debriefed before exiting the lab.
8.2. Results
8.2.1. Preliminary analyses
We aggregated system dependency and system importance scores
for each system cluster prior to entering these into a repeated ANOVA
that also included group status as a between subject factor. This was
done to be sure that the system dependency factor was necessarily independent from the group status manipulation, especially because some
of the subsystems that used in the group status manipulation (e.g.,
UMNO and MARA), were also used to determine the level of system
dependency. Results revealed a main effect of system dependence, F(1,
129) = 989.68, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.885. Consistent with prior speculations in Experiment 1, participants agreed that they were more dependent on the high dependency sub-systems (4.059 ± 0.052) than the
low dependency sub-systems (1.835 ± 0.057, p < .001, 95%
CI = |2.085, 2.364|). Hence, our distinction with regards to system
dependency is supported by the evidence. Importantly, the main effect
of system dependency was not further influenced by group status, F(1,
129) = 1.902, p = .170, ηp2 = 0.015, demonstrating that these factors
are independent, fulfilling an important assumption for using ANOVA
to test the key predictions underlying this investigation.
Secondly, a repeat of the confirmatory factor analysis that we used
to organize the pupil size scores in Experiment 1 revealed that a twodimensional factor structure corresponding to high (healthcare and
transportation) and low (MARA and UMNO) dependency systems best
characterized our data, X2(1) = 0.032, p = .859, CFI = 1.00,
RMSEA < 0.001, SRMR = 0.003 (see Appendix A, Fig. A2 for factor
loadings). Hence, we proceeded to test SJT's system dependency caveat
as we did in Experiment 1. Corroborating the evidence from Experiment
1, and consistent with both SJT and the alternative view dissonance
thesis, paired t-test results confirmed that high (relative to low) dependency sub-systems elicited greater cognitive effort (see Table 3). In
addition, and consistent with both theses, self-reported system justification was also greater for high (than low) dependency sub-systems
(see Table 3).
8. Experiment 2
8.1. Method
One hundred and thirty-one ethnic Chinese Malaysian participants
took part in this study and they were recruited by a research assistant
with
an
ethnic
Malay
background
(86
were
women,
Mage = 21.47 years, SDage = 2.60).
8.1.1. Procedure
This replication mirrored Experiment 1 as closely as possible with
minor extensions: We additionally measured participants' views on how
much they depended on the four sub-systems, and how important those
systems were to them, in order to address the shortcomings in
Experiment 1. Ratings were provided on a 5-point scale (for importance: 1 = not important to me at all, 5 = very important to me, for
dependency: 1 = I don't depend on it at all, 5 = I depend on it completely).
As in Experiment 1, participants were all undergraduate students at
a university in Malaysia and were randomly assigned to a 2 (group
identity salience: strong, n = 64 vs. weak, n = 67) x 2 (group status:
disadvantaged, n = 66 vs. advantaged, n = 65) between-subjects design. Group identification was measured as a continuous moderator as
in Experiment 1 (α = 0.91), while the dependent measures were pupil
sizes that we recorded via the Tobii eye-tracker and participants' selfreported system justification. With respect to self-reported system justification scales, we took the opportunity to also include a fourth item
concerning the perceived legitimacy of the 4 systems that participants
rated (1 = not legitimate at all, 5 = very legitimate). All the other items
on this system justification scale (including the fairness, confidence and
functionality items) were rated on a 5-point Likert scale, which we
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
Fig. 3. The effect of group status on pupil size fluctuations from the baseline when group identification was either strong (M + 1SD) or weak (M-1SD; Experiment
2).Error bars are 95% CIs.
8.2.2. Main analyses
To compare the predictions from the strong version of the system
justification thesis versus the alternative dissonance thesis, we again
performed a 2 (group status: disadvantaged vs. advantaged) x 2 (group
identity salience: strong vs. weak) MANCOVA. In this analysis, changes
in pupil sizes relating to the two system types were specified as dependent variables, while group identification (mean centered) was included as a moderating covariate (see Table 4 for full model results).
Results revealed a multivariate group status x group identification interaction, Wilk's λ = 0.951, F(2, 124) = 3.219, p = .043, ηp2 = 0.049.
At the univariate level, we observed a significant group status x group
identification effect on pupil sizes relating to high dependency systems,
F(1, 125) = 5.36, p = .022, ηp2 = 0.041 (see Fig. 3). Conceptually replicating the patterns in Experiment 1, simple effect analyses revealed
that when group identification was weak (M -1SD), no visible difference
emerged in the cognitive effort that participants expended to justify
high dependency sub-systems across the two group status conditions
(disadvantaged condition: −0.009 ± 0.015 versus advantaged condition: 0.015 ± 0.014, p = .245, ηp2 = 0.011, 95% CI = |-0.063,
0.016|). However, and corroborating the patterns in Experiment 1,
greater cognitive effort was expended in justifying the high dependency
systems when strongly identifying (M + 1SD) ethnic Chinese participants focused on their group's disadvantage (0.007 ± 0.014) relative
to their group's advantage (−0.036 ± 0.014; p = .036, ηp2 = 0.035,
95% CI = |0.003, 0.082|). The group status x group salience interaction
was not significant and, there were no significant main or interactive
effects for the low dependency system as in Experiment 1 (see Table 4,
and Fig. 3).
dependency systems (see Table 5). Interestingly, pupil size increments
significantly predicted self-reported justification of low dependency
systems amongst ethnic Chinese Malaysians who focused on their
group's disadvantage. However, contrary to SJT, this happened when
the salience of ethnic identity was strong and not when it was weak (see
Table 5).
8.2.3. Exploratory analysis
Like Experiment 1, we investigated whether dissonance artefacts
(i.e., cognitive effort) predicted manifest levels of self-reported system
justification amongst ethnic Chinese who focused on their group's disadvantage under varying salience of their ethnic identity.
Corroborating the evidence from Experiment 1, results from a pairwise
Bayesian correlation revealed that pupil size increments (cognitive effort) were unrelated to self-reported system justification for high
9. General discussion
8.3. Discussion
The current findings provide a conceptual replication of the patterns
reported in Experiment 1: Cognitive effort (in terms of pupil size increases) was greater amongst the disadvantaged when identification
was strong (not weak) contrary to the system justification thesis, but
supportive of the alternative view that we derived from cognitive dissonance theory.
It is important to note, however, that while all pupil size changes
assumed a positive value in Experiment 1, the corresponding values for
pupil size changes across most conditions in Experiment 2 were negative. It is tempting to interpret these negative values as evidence of
pupil constriction. However, as Sirois and Brisson (2014, p. 681) have
pointed out, results such as this are “likely due to luminance confounds,
as psychological effects on pupil diameter are exclusively linked to
dilation.” Indeed, the degree of luminance in Experiment 2 ought to
have been higher than it was in Experiment 1, due to the white stimulus
slides used in that study. That is, a white slide could have increased
screen brightness (and therefore luminance) much more than the dark
stimulus slides that we had used in Experiment 1. Future investigation
should avoid this oversight.
The 25 years of research on system justification has witnessed extensive application of the system justification motive to the understanding of social, political, economic and psychological issues despite
the controversy surrounding its existence (Owuamalam, Rubin, &
Issmer, 2016, Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2016, Owuamalam et al.,
2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b). This motivation is predicated on the
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
acknowledge that differences exist. For example, the identity salience x
group status effect on pupil diameters occurred in Experiment 1, but
was absent in Experiment 2, while the conceptually similar group
identification x group status effect was only found in Experiment 2 but
not Experiment 1. Why might this be so? It is important to note that
Experiment 1 was administered by an ethnic Chinese research assistant
(ingroup), and Experiment 2 was administered by a Malay research
assistant (outgroup). A series of studies in the intergroup literature
show that social identities become more salient when people are placed
in a context comprised of outgroup members (Owuamalam & Rubin,
2014; Wigboldus, Spears, & Semin, 2005). It is possible, therefore, that
this change could have intensified the salience of our Chinese participants' ethnic identity before a Malay experimenter, which could have
diluted the potency of the identity salience treatment in Experiment 2.
Also, the fact that the group identification x group status interaction
emerged only in Experiment 2 that was conducted by an outgroup
(Malay) research assistant suggests that a competitive context (e.g., the
presence of an outgroup) may be necessary to provoke the identification effects that was recorded in that study. This competitive context
was largely absent in Experiment 1 that was conducted by an ingroup
(Chinese) research assistant and this might explain the lack of group
status x group identification interaction in that study. Also, if the experimenter's identity did raise the salience of group identity across
conditions in Experiment 2, the onus of finding the dissonance effects
may have shifted to identification (i.e. amongst high identifiers). Put
differently, when the salience manipulation was stronger (Experiment
1) this might have overshadowed conceptually similar effects of identification. Such possibilities remain speculative so future research could
investigate this further.
A key strength of the current investigation was the use of an existing
social group that more credibly represented the intended phenomena in
the real world. But it also presented challenges with regards to differentiating SJT's system dependency assumption (Jost, 2017b; Kay &
Zanna, 2009) from its legitimacy assumption (Jost, 2012). It is entirely
possible that the high dependency systems are also systems that could
be perceived as high in legitimacy by our participants because the
Chinese enjoy the benefits of the Malaysian healthcare and transportation systems as well as any other Malaysian ethnic group. Likewise, it
is possible too that the low dependency systems (i.e. MARA scholarship
and UMNO political systems) can be seen by ethnic Chinese Malaysians
as being largely illegitimate because benefits from these systems are less
open to their ethnic group than to others (e.g. the Malay majority ethnic
group). So, although there was evidence that the high and low dependency systems were perceived as such, it was not possible to completely rule out a legitimacy-based explanation for the effects reported
here because high dependency systems are also high in legitimacy and
low dependency systems are low in legitimacy. In fact, an analysis of
participants' self-reported legitimacy in Experiment 2, confirmed that
high dependency systems (transportation and healthcare) were seen to
be more legitimate (3.538 ± 0.063) than low dependency systems
(MARA and UMNO; 2.405 ± 0.069, p < .001, 95% CI = |0.962.
1.306|).
Nonetheless, there is at least one reason why this confound does not
undermine the current test of the strong system justification thesis. The
confound-to-treatment pairing with regards to legitimacy and dependency were congruent with SJT's proposition because the theory
requires both dependency and legitimacy to be high and, these conditions were met across the two studies. Hence, the legitimacy confound
actually created a maximal condition to confirm the strong system
justification thesis. The lack of support for the theory, even in this
optimal condition, raises important questions that researchers should
address.
crucial, but largely untested assumption that the “strongest, most
paradoxical” form of system rationalization processes (and the one most
distinct from predictions derived from other theories) can be gleaned
via the cognitive effort that the disadvantaged expend in justifying those
systems on which their livelihoods depend, especially when their group
identities are also weak in salience or strength (Jost et al., 2004; p.909).
Using a novel pupil dilation paradigm to tap cognitive effort, we found
that the disadvantaged did not expend greater cognitive effort in justifying high dependency systems either when their group identity was
weak in salience (Experiment 1) or when the strength of their group
identification was weak (Experiment 2). In fact, cognitive effort was
more reliably visible in the disadvantaged (relative to the advantaged)
condition, when group identity was salient (Experiment 1) or when
group identification was strong (Experiment 2), consistent with the
alternative predictions inspired by the original statements of the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962; see also Owuamalam, Rubin,
& Issmer, 2016, Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2016; Owuamalam
et al., 2018a, 2018b, 2019a). These results provide disconfirmatory
evidence for the existence of an autonomous system justification motivation, at least as currently theorized (cf. Jost et al., 2003, Jost et al.,
2004).
Furthermore, the fact that increased cognitive effort predicted
greater self-reported system justification in the disadvantaged condition
in one out of eight conditions across two experiments, suggests that
system justification might not be the ‘default’ outcome of cognitive
dissonance, and this evidence should inform future theorizing around
the system justification effect. Accordingly, it is encouraging that recent
revisions of the system justification thesis now seem to de-emphasize
the dissonance-inspired strong diagnostic version of the system justification thesis. As Jost (2019, p.282) explains:
It is important to keep in mind, however, that Jost et al. (2003)
explicitly pointed out that “economic and other theories of material
and symbolic self-interest may be said to account for the ‘baseline’”
[i.e. system justification] (p. 14) and emphasized that… [system
justification scholars] never regarded dissonance reduction as the ‘engine’ of system justification (our emphasis).
The current findings agree with the foregoing statements, showing
that social identity motives can explain system justification, if cognitive
conflict plays a role in this process at all, because the dissonance effects
that did emerge, occurred either when group identity was salient
(Experiment 1) or when group identification was strong (Experiment 2).
But, Jost's (2019) clarification raises further issues that future research could aim to resolve. Firstly, assuming the dissonance-inspired
system justification thesis is no longer the ‘engine’ or litmus test for the
existence of the system justification motive, then how can the existence
of this new and autonomous motive be determined? Secondly, a
number of processes assumed to underlie the system justification motive are also linked to cognitive dissonance and by extension to personal
interests (e.g., the need for cognitive consistency, the need to reduce
uncertainty or even to manage threat; see Owuamalam et al., 2019b, p.
404). It is unclear what becomes of these add-ons (and consequently the
system justification theory itself) if the cognitive dissonance-inspired
thesis of SJT is discarded. Hence, a challenge for researchers is to untangle the autonomy of the system justification motivation from motives
that are rooted in personal and collective identities (see also
Owuamalam et al., 2019a, 2019b).
9.1. Limitations
Although the primary group status by identity salience/strength
interaction was conceptually replicated across the two experiments, we
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C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
It is also possible to argue that the pupil modulations in this study
represent evidence that system justification operates at the unconscious
level—even if they did not occur in the conditions proposed by
SJT—because such reflexes are essentially automatic, and theorists
have often equated nonsconcious awareness with automaticity (Jost
et al., 2004, p. 894; see also cf. Jost, 2017). Indeed, Owuamalam et al.
(2018a) have argued that a dissonance-induced system justification is
unlikely to manifest at the nonconscious level (see also Gawronski &
Strack, 2004), because this seems to contradict the classical dissonance
theory prediction that the conflicting elements should be salient (as
supported here). However, we would like to point out that although the
pupillometic methodology we use here taps into an automatic process in
key respects, this does not mean that this is unconscious in terms of
awareness, primarily because the deliberations that gave rise to this
automatic process were arguably based on a conscious awareness. As
Bargh (1994) points out, it is important to distinguish conscious
awareness (here deliberations of competing ‘salient’ realities) from responses that are efficient, unintentional and beyond control (together
the so-called four horsemen of automaticity). In short, our methodology
arguably allows for conscious awareness but rules out conscious control.
especially if there is also hope that ingroup's concerns can be addressed
within the prevailing order in the long-run (Owuamalam et al., 2018b,
2019a, 2019b). Having said that, this new hybrid illegitimacy- cum
dissonance-induced justification has not been exhaustively tested and,
the novel process tracing method that we describe here (i.e. pupillometric reflexes) could be a particularly useful tool in this endeavour.
Future probes into this hybrid proposition may also present the opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between SJT and cognitive
dissonance, if only the strong system justification thesis is relaxed
somewhat. But if the strong system justification thesis is discarded, then
there is no further basis for an autonomous system justification motivation, and then the system justification perspective would cease to
offer a unique insight into human behavior beyond existing frameworks, such as the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also
the social identity model of system attitudes, Owuamalam et al., 2018b;
Owuamalam et al., 2019a, 2019b).
10. Concluding remarks
Does an autonomous system justification motive exist in humans?
The diagnosis for this special motive lies in providing supportive evidence for the strong system justification thesis. This thesis proposes that
a dissonance-induced system rationalization will occur amongst the
disadvantaged as they contemplate their support for societal systems,
but only when the salience of their group identity is weak (e.g. nonsalient), or when their group identification is weak. However, pupillometric reflexes that are traditionally used to capture dissonance
effects were unable to detect the system motive in those conditions that
are presumed to be optimal in activating it according to SJT. If anything, the trend in pupillometric reflexes across Experiments 1 and 2,
were more consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger,
1962) and emerging interest-based accounts of system justification
(e.g., Owuamalam, Rubin, & Issmer, 2016; Owuamalam et al., 2017;
Owuamalam et al., 2018a, 2018b; Owuamalam et al., 2019a, 2019b), in
so far as the dissonance-effects were most visible when the elements
involved (the system vs. group identity) were important and salient in
people's minds. Nevertheless, that we found negative results for the
strong system justification thesis is not necessarily a bad thing, because
it underscores the need for precision and reform in social psychological
theorizing prior to an application attempt. Reforming the system justification theory in light of accumulating unsupportive evidence may
involve discarding its strong version. But, abandoning the strong system
justification thesis also removes the basis for SJT's foundational proposition that an autonomous system motive that guides human behavior
exists.
9.2. Theoretical opportunities
A strength of the system justification thesis, some might say, is the
auxiliary proposition that system justification is most likely to manifest
when the system is perceived to be legitimate because it should be
easier to confirm that people (especially the disadvantaged) accept
and/or support societal systems that are legitimate than those that are
not (Jost et al., 2012). But, assuming legitimation is a form of system
justification, as consensually accepted by researchers (e.g., Brandt,
2013; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, 2019; Sengupta, Osborne, & Sibley,
2015, then the foregoing caveat seems tautological because, it implies
that people legitimize systems that are already legitimate. A further
complication of the legitimacy caveat is that it leads to the prediction
that ‘settled’ (i.e., accepted) realities produce the greatest uncertainties
and/or dissonance than questionable/illegitimate regimes. In the current investigation, the legitimacy caveat ought to have manifested
through a dissonance-induced self-reported justification of the more legitimate transportation and healthcare systems amongst the disadvantaged. But, the evidence from Experiment 2 suggests the opposite
pattern. A dissonance-induced self-reported justification of social systems emerged only for those systems that might be perceived to be
relatively less legitimate (MARA and UMNO, see Table 5), and it would
have been difficult to demonstrate this directly without a process tracing pupillometric approach.
Indeed, the foregoing evidence makes sense, in retrospect, because
it suggests that systems that are already legitimate (or at least perceived
as such) are unlikely to provoke as much agitation about one's group's
interests as perhaps an illegitimate order might do. That such an effect
occurred in the context of systems that are less legitimate suggests that
in this situation, people may be most motivated to quell associated
uncertainties by clinging to the devil they know (i.e. regimes they are
already familiar with). This position is similar to Kay and Zanna's
(2009) system inescapability-induced rationalization argument, in the
sense that constantly dwelling on one's undervalued position in an illegitimate order can be expected to undermine the wellbeing of the
disadvantaged (Owuamalam, Paolini, & Rubin, 2017; Owuamalam &
Zagefka, 2013). A temporary fix might be to accept such regimes,
Open practices
Experiments 1 and 2 were not formally pre-registered (although the
arguments have already been presented in a prior publication
Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2016, Frontiers in Psychology). The study
materials, analysis scripts (e.g., SPSS syntax) and associated data, can
be accessed in OSF via http://tiny.cc/l4wacz. We did not collect any
more data after analysis.
All research and procedure reported received approval from the
Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee at the University
of Nottingham in Malaysia, and followed the ethical guidelines of the
British Psychological Association for the conduct of research with
human participants.
11
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 86 (2020) 103897
C.K. Owuamalam and R. Spears
Appendix A
Fig. A1-2. Confirmatory factor structure concerning pupillometric measurements for high and low dependency systems in Experiments 1 (A1) and 2 (A2).
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103897.
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