Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1998. Vol. 75. No. 4, 872-886
Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514/98/$3.00
Guilty by Association: When One's Group Has a Negative History
Bertjan Doosje
Nyla R. Branscombe
University of Amsterdam
University of Kansas
Russell Spears and Antony S. R. Manstead
University of Amsterdam
The impact of the history of one's own group's treatment of another group on feelings of collective
guilt and behavioral reactions to this guilt were examined in 2 studies. In a laboratory experiment,
it was shown that it is possible to elicit feelings of group-based guilt and that those are distinct
from feelings of personal guilt. In a 2nd study, a field experiment, low-identified group members
acknowledged the negative aspects of their own nation's history and felt more guilt compared with
high identifiers when both negative and positive aspects of their nation's history were made salient.
Perceptions of intragroup variability and out-group compensation closely paralleled the interactive
pattern on guilt. Links between social identity theory and the experience of specific emotions are
discussed.
In 1996, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen published a book entitled
Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, in which he claimed that ordinary German citizens during
the Second World War were, in part, personally responsible for
the Holocaust. He argued that on numerous occasions during
the war, German citizens made a choice either to participate in
and support the ongoing genocide or to take a stand against the
mass destruction of Jews (see also Staub, 1989). The publication of Goldhagen's book resulted in an enormous controversy
worldwide. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the responses of Germans
were the most extreme. Strong emotional reactions on the part
of Germans alive during the Second World War (most of whom,
at least passively, supported the Nazi regime and, in a way,
could be held personally responsible for the actions of Germans
during the Second World War) can be most easily seen as flowing from feelings of guilt. However, younger Germans (i.e.,
those born after 1945) also reacted quite strongly to the book.
This ongoing debate concerning their national history implies
that belonging to a particular group (i.e., Germans) is likely to
evoke emotional responses even when the individuals involved
bear no personal responsibility for their group's actions.
another group made salient, with a special emphasis on the
behavioral reactions of individual group members who could
not have personally contributed to their group's negative history.
Although the reactions of postwar Germans toward their nation's past treatment of the Jewish population during the Second
World War might be a particularly vivid example of the psychological situation of interest, other groups that could be described
as having a history of exploitation include former colonial powers such as Belgium, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. The treatment of the native populations in
the United States and Canada by European immigrants, the
enslavement of Africans in the United States and Europe, and
the treatment bestowed on the Aborigines in Australia are also
cases of historical exploitation of one group by another. In all
of these examples, we argue, thinking about the behavior of
one's forebears can lead some group members to experience
feelings of collective or group-based guilt. Yet, theories of emotion frequently imply that the experience of guilt should occur
only for actions for which the self might be construed as having
been responsible (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989;
Landman, 1993; Weiner, 1995). Therefore, before we can examine the notion of collective guilt, we first need to consider the
concept of guilt as it has been discussed at the individual level.
In the presenl article, we examine how group members react
to having different aspects of their own group's history toward
Guilt at the Individual Level
Guilt can be classified as a self-conscious emotion (Lewis,
1993; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). This classification implies
that, as with shame and embarrassment, for guilt to occur it is
necessary that people hold a set of rules or standards from
which they experience the self as having deviated (see also
Allporl, 1954; Devinc & Monteith, 1993; Higgins, 1987). This
conceptualization of guilt is intrapsychic: Guilt results from
cognitive processes occurring within an individual. Guilt is expected to occur when there is a discrepancy between how one
thinks one should have behaved and how one actually behaved.
Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991) discussed a
Bertjan Doosje, Russell Spears, and Antony S. R. Manstead, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam; Nyla R. Branscombe, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas.
This research was funded by grants from the Dutch Organization for
Scientific Research. We thank Esther Jakobs, Jolanda Jetten, Boukje
Keijzer, Annet Nienhuis, Patricia Rodriguez, Krystyna Rojahn, Michael
Schmitt, Wilco Van Dijk, and Frenk Van Harreveld for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bertjan
Doosje, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Electronic mail
may be sent to sp_doosje@macmail.psy.uva.nl.
872
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION
compelling instance of guilt that people may experience when
their own behavior is inconsistent with their personal standards.
In their research, people had to indicate how uneasy they should
feel when interacting with a stigmatized person (i.e., a gay
person), and this was contrasted with how uneasy they actually
would feel when interacting with this person. Only for people
with internalized personal standards of egalitarian!sm (i.e., lowprejudiced people) did this discrepancy between how one
should behave and how one would or actually does behave result
in feelings of guilt (see also Devine & Zuwerink, 1994).
Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994) discussed the action
tendencies or behavioral intentions that accompany specific
emotions. Theoretically, feelings of guilt result in tendencies to
make up for the wrong that an individual has done to another.
The inclination to make reparation is an action tendency that is
strongly linked with feelings of guilt (e.g., Barrett, 1995; Frijda,
1986; Frijda et al., 1989; Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1995). Thus,
at the individual level, guilt can result from an inconsistency
between people's internalized standards and their personal behavior and should be associated with action tendencies that are
aimed at compensating for the prior wrongdoing.
These views concerning emotional responses are exclusively
focused on how individuals experience guilt as a consequence
of a discrepancy between their own moral rules and their own
(imagined or actual) behavior. In the national examples that we
raised earlier, however, it is clearly impossible for some people
(e.g., postwar Germans) to have actually made any personal
contribution to the group's negative history (i.e., war atrocities),
but they may still feel guilty when the behavior of their ancestors
is made salient. We propose that guilt may also be felt as a
reflection of the past behavior of other members of one's ingroup.
Guilt at the Group Level
Some authors have discussed the possibility of feelings of
guilt as a consequence of the behavior of other in-group members (Baumeister& Hastings, 1997; Feagin& Vera, 1995; Landman, 1993; Skevington, 1989; Steele, 1990). For example,
Baumeister and Hastings suggested that if White Americans
today "simply identify themselves as White people and see
slavery as a White crime against African Americans, then they
are guilty" (p. 286). The sociologists Feagin and Vera interviewed people on the meaning of being White and noted that
"the taken-for-granted position of White superiority in the social
world was accompanied by feelings that ranged from hatred to
indifference to guilt" (p. 145). Similarly, in an essay entitled
"White Guilt," Steele argued that "White guilt, in its broad
sense, springs from a knowledge of ill-gotten advantage" (p.
80). Thus, whether people should or should not assume groupbased guilt as a consequence of the illegitimate advantages they
have received at the cost of another group has been discussed
previously. However, whether this does or does not occur, and
under what circumstances, has not been integrated into a theory
of intergroup behavior, nor has it been the subject of systematic
empirical research.
Social identity theory (TajfeL 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986)
and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987) offer an insight into when and why people's
873
perceptions, emotions, and behavior will be influenced by the
group to which they belong. In social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986), it is assumed that people's self-image consists
of two elements: an individual and a group component. More
specifically, social identity theory claims that people not only
have a conception of who they are as individuals but also derive
part of their self-image from the social groups to which they
belong. In self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), it is
argued that people categorize themselves and others in terms of
their group memberships and that this allows them to derive
meaning from the social environment. In other words, people
identify with social groups as a means of achieving a sense of
who they are, and there are indications that under some circumstances identification with a group and enhancement of that
group identity can increase self-esteem (e.g., Branscombe &
Wann, 1991; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980).
On the basis of these theoretical arguments, we propose that
by acknowledging their membership in a group, people may
experience specific emotional reactions as a result of the actions
of that group, even if they personally have not behaved in an
objectionable way. It is argued that people can experience feelings of guilt on behalf of their group when the behavior of other
in-group members is inconsistent with norms or values of the
group.
In the United States and most other Western countries, two
global sets of moral norms or values are dominant: (a.) individualism, in which personal freedom, self-reliance, and devotion
to work are emphasized, and (b) humanitarianism-egalitarianism, in which democratic principles, equality, social justice, and
concern for others' well-being are emphasized (e.g., Katz &
Hass, 1988; Myrdal, 1944; Schwartz, 1992; Triandis, 1994). In
the present context, the second core value, humanitarianismegalitarianism, is particularly relevant. It is argued that people
may experience guilt as a consequence of a discrepancy between
their behavior and this value when they are operating on the
basis of either their personal identity or their social identity.
Thus, people may experience guilt either as an individual or as
a group member, depending on which level of the self (personal
or social) is made salient. We argue that personal guilt can
be experienced at the personal identity level as a result of a
discrepancy between humanitarian values and one's own personal behavior, whereas group-based guilt can occur at the social
identity level as a result of a discrepancy between those values
and the behavior of other members of one's in-group.
Smith (1993) also addressed the issue of how emotions can
occur at the group level of categorization. He argued, on the
basis of self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), that
people may experience emotions as a result of group membership. For example, when their favorite team wins, people experience joy, and they may be distressed when it loses (see Cialdini
et al., 1976; Ellemers, 1993; Wann & Branscombe, 1990). Despite Smith's theoretical advance in pointing out that emotions
can be induced in intergroup contexts, he was primarily concerned with distinct emotions that group members can experience towards various negatively evaluated out-groups (e.g.,
anger, fear, jealousy; see also Dijker, 1987; Dijker, Koomen, Van
Den Heuvel, & Frijda, 1996; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993;
Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991). Our focus, however, is on how
874
DOOSJE, BRANSCOMBE, SPEARS, AND MANSTEAD
the known history of one's own group may influence emotions
reflective of feelings about the in-group.
In two studies, we examined the impact of the history of
one's group on feelings of guilt and group perception by making
salient the in-group's exploitation of another group. In these
studies, we induced differential levels of group-based guilt by
manipulating the actual past behavior of the in-group toward
an out-group in an experimentally created group (Study 1) or
by manipulating the perceptions of the past behavior of the ingroup toward an out-group, in this case a meaningful national
group (Study 2 ) . We also examined how feelings of collective
guilt about the in-group's past regulate present-day actions by
group members in terms of willingness to compensate for the
behavior of their forebears. In other words, we addressed the
question of whether feelings of guilt at the group level also
result in actions aimed at compensating the out-group in order
to alleviate feelings of collective guilt as has been observed in
the literature at the individual level (Roseman et al., 1994).
Consider the repayment dilemma faced by the Swiss today.
Because Switzerland was officially neutral during the Second
World War, Jewish people all over Europe sent large sums of
money to Swiss banks. The question that has arisen since this
situation has come to light is the extent to which the Swiss now
owe money to the children or grandchildren of Jewish people
who died in concentration camps (e.g., Fennel, 1997; McGeary,
1997). The fact that some of these Jewish people were not
allowed by Swiss officials to enter the country during the war
and were subsequently killed may activate feelings of guilt in
Swiss citizens who are reminded of their nation's past. This
situation shows how such guilt can influence present behavior
in terms of compensation towards members of the harmed
group. Steele (1990) suggested that White guilt may have, in
part, led White Americans during the 1960s to undertake actions
and policies that were aimed at improving the status of the
African Americans. In our studies, we examined empirically the
possibility that group-based guilt may lead some group members
to want to compensate members of the exploited group for the
harm that other members of their group have inflicted on them.
From a social identity perspective, identification with one's
group can have important consequences for intergroup behavior
(Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & EUemers, 1997;
Tajfel & TUrner, 1986; Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman,
1992). We therefore included degree of in-group identification
in our analysis in two different ways. In the first study, we first
ensured a minimal level of in-group identification among all
participants and then examined the effects of our past behavioral
history manipulation while holding the individual's level of subjective in-group identification constant by means of analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA). In the second study, we examined the
degree of in-group identification as an independent variable,
together with the nature of the in-group history that was made
salient. In both studies, the dependent variables are group perceptions, feelings of collective guilt, and behavioral accompaniments of these feelings of guilt.
Study 1
This first study represents an initial attempt to experimentally
manipulate a group's behavioral history toward another group
as a means of inducing feelings of group-based guilt. It was
hypothesized that presenting group members with a description
of the in-group's history in which they had systematically undervalued an out-group would induce a sense of collective guilt.
In contrast, if a group's past behavior was presented as having
been consistently fair toward another group, less intense feelings
of collective guilt should be evoked (Hypothesis l a ) .
In addition, because it is important to disentangle feelings of
guilt stemming from individual behavior and feelings of guilt
that are a consequence of the behavior of fellow in-group members, we also examined the influence of personal behavior toward another group. We predicted that group behavior and personal behavior would exert an interactive effect on feelings of
collective guilt. Specifically, we hypothesized that people who
have personally harmed an out-group are likely to experience
guilt when this is made salient to them (cf. Devine et al., 1991).
We further hypothesized that this may occur regardless of the
behavior of their fellow in-group members because, in this case,
the personal identity is implicated by the information presented.
However, the more crucial element of our hypothesis involves
those who have not personally discriminated against the outgroup and for whom the collective guilt issue is thus relevant.
For these people, their social identity is more likely to be more
salient. We therefore predicted significantly more collective guilt
among members whose group had exhibited a bias against the
out-group compared with those whose group had not been biased (Hypothesis lb). Indeed, although adding collective guilt
on top of individual guilt might imply greater guilt in some
additive sense, the "social support" of having other fellow
transgressors could equally be argued to alleviate the sum of
guilt experienced ("OK, maybe I'm guilty, but so is everyone
else in my group").
Research by Branscombe (1998) and her colleagues (Branscombe, Schiffhauer, & Valencia, 1997) has pointed out the emotional consequences that can result when the framing of one's
group's history implies that illegitimate privileges have been
obtained at the expense of another group. Branscombe measured
the self-esteem of men and women after they were instructed
to think about either the privileges or the disadvantages that
they had received as a consequence of their gender group membership. Men suffered self-esteem loss following thoughts that
reminded them that their group is a privileged one. Although
guilt was not assessed in this study, Branscombe argued that
the lowered self-esteem that was observed may have resulted
from feelings of collective guilt that were induced even in those
who were not personally responsible for the disadvantaged position of the other group (see also Branscombe, Schiffhauer, &
Valencia, 1997). In the present study, we tested this idea explicitly by measuring collective guilt.
Theoretically, it is important not only to consider the effects
of group characteristics on emotions but also to determine their
consequences for group perception. Making salient the unfavorable characteristics of one's group (e.g., that the group has
harmed another group) could be rather threatening. In social
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a number of options
open to group members for strategically dealing with unfavorable group memberships are outlined. One means involves
changing the relevant comparison dimension or focusing on a
different out-group (Lemaine, 1974; Mummendey & Simon,
GUrLTY BY ASSOCIATION
1989; Spears & Manstead, 1989). Both quantitative (Doosje,
Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, &
Koomen, 1998; Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995) and qualitative studies (Rojahn, Fischer, & Willemsen, 1997) have described another strategy, namely, that of perceiving the in-group
and the out-group as relatively heterogeneous. By stressing the
heterogeneity of the in-group and the out-group, group members
may be able to blur the distinction between the groups. In the
present study, we expected people to stress the heterogeneity of
their in-group when it was portrayed as having a history of
undervaluing another group (Hypothesis 2 ) .
With respect to behavioral reactions, Roseman et al. (1994)
demonstrated that guilt at the individual level motivates people
to make up for their perceived wrongdoing. In the present study,
it was expected that people who have personally shown a bias
against the out-group would be more inclined to compensate
than would persons who personally have not harmed another
group. When people have not personally harmed another group,
we expected that people would be more willing to engage in
compensatory behavior if their group has acted in a harmful
manner than when their group's actions toward another group
have been fair (Hypothesis 3 ) .
As argued earlier, degree of in-group identification is an important concept from a social identity perspective. We addressed
the issue of in-group identification in two different ways. Specifically, given the artificial nature of a laboratory group, we
induced a certain degree of in-group identification among all
participants (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 1997). We then examined the effects of making salient aspects of the in-group's history while controlling
for individual variation in degree of in-group identification by
means of ANCOV\s.
Method
Participants
Fifty-eight students at a large Dutch university participated in this
study. About 48% of these students were female. Participants* ages
ranged from 17 to 38 (M = 21.07). Eight to 11 students participated
in each session; sessions lasted about 60 min. Students received Fl. 15
(about $8) for their participation.
Overview and Design
All participants were categorized as a member of a minimal group,
"inductive thinkers." After an intergroup judgmental task, participants
received bogus feedback concerning their fellow in-group members' past
and present behavior toward an out-group (group bias: low or high),
as well as their own personal behavior towards that out-group (personal
bias: low or high). Subsequently, participants were asked to indicate the
extent to which they felt group-based guilt, the level of perceived group
variability, and the level of compensation that they would recommend
for members of the out-group.
Procedure
Participants received all information using a computer monitor, and
they entered their responses using a keyboard. All participants were first
categorized as a member of the group inductive thinkers, together with
three other members of the session, ostensibly on the basis of a problem-
875
solving task. The remaining participants were said to have been categorized as deductive thinkers, although all participants were in fact categorized as inductive thinkers (for further details, see Doosje, Ellemers, &
Spears, 1995; Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995). In order to create a
minimal level of identification with this newly created group, we used
a bogus pipeline procedure (Jones & Sigall, 1971), as developed by
Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) and Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje
(1997), to give all participants the idea that they identified with this group.
Three electrodes were attached to one hand of the participants, and they
were told that the computer would assess their level of arousal during the
experiment Participants were asked to answer a few general questions
with regard to groups, and they subsequently received bogus feedback,
ostensibly based on their arousal scores and their answers to these general
group questions. According to the feedback they were given, they identified
more strongly with this group than was the norm for inductive thinkers.
All participants received this group identification treatment.
Manipulation of group bias. Participants were asked to judge 12
figures that were created with "tangram" pieces, an ancient Chinese
game (see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Six of these figures were
said to have been constructed by other in-group members during an
earlier session, and the other 6 were said to have been created by outgroup members. The participants' task was to indicate (a) their overall
evaluation of each figure and (b) the perceived creativity of each figure,
ostensibly produced by either in-group members or out-group members.
They were told that we were able to compare their personal and group
scores with normative scores for these kinds of judgments. Participants
were informed that we had previously collected a considerable body of
data about their group's behavior in different settings and conditions.
In the low group bias condition, participants were told that these earlier
studies consistently showed that their group had always been fair in its
treatment of the other group. In addition, participants received feedback
that their group's score today (29) was lower than the norm for these
kinds of groups and situations (50), indicating that their group was not
biased against the out-group. In other words, participants in the low
group bias condition were told that their group had previously shown
no consistent tendency to be prejudiced against the out-group and that
this was also true in the present case. In the high group bias condition,
however, participants were told that earlier studies had consistently revealed their group to be unfair toward the other group and to have
systematically undervalued out-group products. In addition, participants
in this condition were led to believe that the score of their group today
(71) was considerably higher than the norm (50), indicating that their
group had also exhibited this bias against the out-group in the present
case.
Manipulation of personal bias. Level of personal bias was manipulated in a similar fashion. In the low personal bias condition, participants
were led to believe that their personal score (34) was below the norm
(50), indicating that they showed no consistent tendency to downgrade
the out-group's products. In contrast, participants in the high personal
bias condition received feedback that their score (66) was above the
norm (50), indicating that they were more prejudiced against the outgroup than was standard for these kinds of situations.
Dependent measures. As a check on the manipulation of group bias,
two questions were asked: (a) "To what extent has your group favored
the in-group over the out-group in the past?", answered on a scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 {very much), and (b) "To what extent
was your group's favoritism score today lower or higher than the norm
score?", answered on a scale ranging from 1 (muck tower) to 9 (much
higher). As a check on the personal bias manipulation, participants were
asked to indicate the extent to which their personal bias score was lower
or higher than the norm score, answered on a scale ranging from 1
(much lower) to 9 (much higher).
The degree to which group-based guilt was accepted by participants
was assessed using a standardized five-item measure ( " I feel guilty
876
DOOSJE, BRANSCOMBE, SPEARS, AND MANSTEAD
about the negative things inductive thinkers have done to deductive
thinkers," "I feel regret for my group's harmful past actions toward
deductive thinkers,'' ' 'I feel regret about things my group did to deductive thinkers in the past," "I believe that I should repair the damage
caused to deductive thinkers," and "I can easily feel guilty about the
bad outcomes received by deductive thinkers that were brought about
by inductive thinkers in the past"), answered on scales ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Previous research validating
this construct (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 1997) has shown that
natural groups with a history of exploitation score reliably higher on
this measure compared with groups with a history of being exploited.
The five items formed a reliable scale in the current sample ( a = .84).
In order to control for individual differences in susceptibility to feelings of personal guilt, we used 10 items that were derived from a scale
developed by Kugler and Jones (1992). These items were measured at
a general level and were not tailored to the specific inlergroup context
(e.g., ' 'I have never felt great remorse or guilt1 * and * 'Guilt and remorse
have been part of my life for as long as I can recall''; a = . 87), answers
being made on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly
agree).
Perceived group variability was measured using six items that assessed
both intragroup differences with respect to individual group members
in general (e.g., "Inductive thinkers are not all alike, they differ considerably from each other'') and intragroup differences with respect to behaviors of group members (e.g., "I think that, as well as some bad things,
inductive thinkers have also done some good things for deductive thinkers"; a = .65), all answered on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
With respect to compensatory behavior, four questions were asked,
two about how much the group should compensate (e.g.,' 'I think inductive thinkers owe something to deductive thinkers because of the things
inductive thinkers have done") and two about individual compensatory
behavior (e.g., "I think I should make more efforts to improve the
position of deductive thinkers because of the things inductive thinkers
have done"; a = .93), answers being made on a scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
Finally, in order to control for degree of identification with the experimentally created group, three questions were asked ("I identify with
other inductive thinkers," "Inductive thinkers are an important group to
me," and "Being an inductive thinker is an important part of how I see
myself at this moment"; a = .81), all answered on a scale ranging
from 1 (not at ail) to 9 (very much). This measure allowed us to assess
the effects of our manipulations after controlling for any variability in
responses due to variations in subjective level of in-group identification.
Results
the analysis of the personal bias manipulation check revealed
that, as intended, participants thought that their personal bias
score was higher than the norm score in the high-bias condition
(M = 7.48) than in the low-bias condition (M = 2.07), F(\,
54) - 507.17, p < .001. No other main or interaction effects
emerged on any of the manipulation checks, confirming the
success of the orthogonal manipulations of personal bias and
group bias.
Collective Guilt
We predicted that people would feel more group-based guilt
in the high group bias condition, in particular when they personally were not biased. An ANCOVA on the measure of collective
guilt was performed, using group bias and personal bias as
independent variables and degree of identification as a covariate.
Degree of identification was a significant covariate, F ( l , 53)
= 9.02, p < .005, and group bias exerted a significant main
effect on guilt, F ( 1 , 53) = 4.15,/? < .05. The adjusted means
show that participants in the low group bias condition (M =
2.64) felt less guilty than did participants in the high group bias
condition (M = 3.37). Also as expected, the significant twoway interaction qualified this main effect, F(1, 53) = 4.63, p
< .04. The adjusted means for the group-based guilt measure
are shown in Table 1, and the effect sizes (r/ 2 ) for this and the
other dependent variables are shown in Table 2. Simple main
effect analyses revealed that the effect of group bias was significant in the low personal bias condition, F( 1, 53) = 8.51, p
< .005, whereas the effect of group bias was not significant in
the high personal bias condition, F(l, 53) < 1. Thus, when
people have not personally harmed an out-group but belong to
a group that has acted in a harmful way toward an out-group,
they feel relatively guilty. When people have personally harmed
an out-group, they feel relatively guilty and their group's behavior does not influence these feelings of guilt.
In order to check whether the effects of our manipulations
on group-based guilt were mediated by the trait susceptibility
to personal guilt, both this measure and identification were included as covariates. The two covariates were individually and
in combination significant, combined F ( l , 52) = 8.01, p <
.001. However, the crucial interaction remained significant when
personal guilt was added as a covariate, F( 1, 52) = 3.96, p <
.05, indicating that the above-mentioned effects on group-based
Manipulation Checks
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group bias (low or
high) and personal bias (low or high) as independent variables
was conducted on the three manipulation checks. The ANOVA
of the first group bias manipulation check ("To what extent has
your group in the past favored the in-group over the outgroup?") showed that, as intended, people perceived that their
own group had favored the in-group more in the high-bias condition (M = 7.86) than in the low-bias condition (M = 1.97),
f( i ? 54) = 775.53, p < .001. The analysis of the second check,
the extent to which the group bias score of the present in-group
was lower or higher than the norm score, indicated that people
were aware that their group had displayed more in-group bias
in the high-bias condition (M = 7.79) than in the low-bias
condition (M = 2.20), F ( l , 54) - 218.36, p < .001. Finally,
Table 1
Mean Acceptance of Collective Guilt by Level of Group Bias
and Level of Personal Bias
Level of group bias against the out-group
Low
High
Level of personal bias
against the out-group
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
Low
High
2.14a
3.15b
1.11
1.22
15
15
3 •58 b
3• 1 5 b
1.53
1.57
14
14
Note. Scores could range from 1 to 7, with higher numbers reflecting
greater acceptance of collective guilt. Means that do not share subscripts
differ at p == .05.
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Table 2
Percentage of Variance Explained (With Eta Squared Given
as a Percentage) by the Covariate Identification, the
Variables Group Bias and Personal Bias, and the Interaction
Between Group Bias and Personal Bias
Variable
Collective
guilt
Intragroup
variability
Out-group
compensation
Identification
Group bias
Personal bias
Group Bias x Personal Bias
Total3
14.5
7.3
1.5
8.0
31.3
_
6.7
0.1
2.0
8.8
23.3
13.2
0.0
4.3
40.8
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher percentages explained. A dash
indicates the covariate was not included in the analysis.
a
Total amount of variance explained.
guilt were not due to individual differences in the degree of
susceptibility to personal guilt.
Perceived Intragroup Variability
An ANCOVA on the measure of perceived intragroup variability revealed that the covariate (i .e., degree of identification) was
not significant, F( 1, 53) = 1.21. Analysis without this covariate
resulted in a marginally significant main effect of group bias,
F(U 54) = 3.88, p < .054. As expected, people in the high
group bias condition (M - 6.91, SD — .91, n — 28) perceived
more in-group variability than did people in the low group bias
condition (Af = 6.46, SD = .82, n = 30).
Out-Group Compensation
An ANCOV\ on the combined measure of out-group compensation resulted in a significant effect of the covariate (degree
of identification), F(\, 53) = 16.14, p < .001, and the main
effect of group bias was significant, F{ 1, 53) = 8.07, p < .01.
The interaction between group bias and personal bias was not
significant (p < .13), although the means were in the expected
direction. As the adjusted means in Table 3 show, people in the
high group bias condition were more in favor of compensation
by the in-group than were people in the low group bias condition. Simple main effect analyses reveal that this effect was,
as expected, stronger and significant in the low personal bias
condition, F( 1, 53) = 9.41, p < .005, and nonsignificant in the
high personal bias condition, F ( l , 53) < 1.
Further Mediational Analyses
The results show that the group bias manipulation had an
effect on feelings of group-based guilt and on out-group compensatory behavior. However, an important element of our predictions involved the notion that collective guilt induced in response to the history of one's group (and not because of one's
personal behavior) is responsible for the compensatory behavior. In order to test this notion, we assessed whether the effect
of our group bias manipulation on compensation was weakened
when degree of guilt was taken into account. We therefore included collective guilt as a second covariate in the ANCOVA
(with identification as the other covariate). The two covariates
were separately and in combination highly significant, combined
f ( 2 , 52) = 46.03, p < .001. More important, the significant
main effect of group bias found in the original ANCOVA was
weakened when we included guilt as a second covariate, no
longer reaching significance, F ( l , 52) - 3.57, p < .07.
In addition, further support for the notion that feelings of
group-based guilt are linked with out-group compensation was
obtained by examining the correlations within each cell of the
design. The overall correlation between guilt and compensation
was high (r = .78, p < .001), and all the intracell correlations
were also significant, ranging from .59 to .86.
Discussion
In this first study, we attempted to induce feelings of collective
guilt by manipulating the perceived behavior of individuals and
their group's history in the treatment of members of an outgroup. As predicted, the manipulation of past behavior by one's
group had a strong impact on feelings of group-based guilt.
Group members did indeed feel more guilty when their group
had systematically undervalued another group in the past. Interestingly, there was no main effect of personal behavior on feelings of collective guilt, which makes sense given the fact that
the central measure involved tapped a group-based emotion.
However, a significant interaction revealed that people who
themselves had not systematically undervalued an out-group but
whose group had done so nevertheless felt guilty about their
group's behavior. This interaction thus demonstrates that making salient a group history of mistreatment is sufficient to make
some group members experience collective guilt.
These results are in line with the theoretical notions suggested
by Branscombe and her colleagues (Branscombe, 1998; Branscombe, Schiffhauer, et al., 1997). Specifically, Branscombe et
al. (1997) argued that low-identified Whites may be particularly
likely to experience guilt as a result of their in-group's history of
exploitation of African Americans being made salient. However,
because these investigators focused on self-esteem and did not
assess collective guilt, it is important to demonstrate the hypothesized underlying process. By explicitly measuring collective
guilt in this first experiment, we showed how making a group's
behavioral history salient can result in feelings of guilt on the
part of its members. It is important to note that the crucial
Table 3
Mean Out-Group Compensation Recommendations by Level
of Group Bias and Level of Personal Bias
Level of group bias against the out-group
Low
High
Level of personal bias
against the out-group
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
Low
High
1.83a
2.43, b
1.32
1.44
15
15
3.52,,
2.97h
1.64
1.88
14
14
Note. Scores could range from 1 to 7, with higher numbers indicating
larger out-group compensation recommendations. Means that do not
share subscripts differ at p ^ .05.
878
DOOSJE, BRANSCOMBE, SPEARS, AND MANSTEAD
interaction between personal bias and group bias remained significant when we controlled for individual differences in the
inclination to experience personal guilt. This finding lends support to the notion that what the participants experienced was
indeed group-based guilt and that the effects of our manipulations were not mediated by individual susceptibility to experience personal guilt.
The behavior of one's own group also has an effect on perceived in-group variability. Members perceived more intragroup
variability when their group had undervalued the out-group in
comparison with when their group was depicted as fair. This
result reflects a strategic use of perceptions of in-group variability (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Doosje et al., 1998;
Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995; Rojahn et al., 1997). If a
group is depicted as possessing unfavorable characteristics
(e.g., it has treated an out-group unfairly), group members may
feel threatened by this information, because part of their selfimage derives from this group membership (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). People may therefore respond to this threatening information by emphasizing a high degree of variability among group
members and the behaviors exhibited by them. In this manner,
people may downplay the relevance of the information provided.
Alternatively, it is possible to explain these findings in more
individualistic terms. People may emphasize a high degree of
in-group variability in order to be able to perceive the self as
different from the rest of the group to which they belong
(Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995).
The group's behavioral history also had an impact on compensatory behavioral tendencies. People were more willing to
compensate for their group's behavior when it had been unfair
to another group. Although the interaction was not significant,
the means indicate that the difference between the low and high
group bias condition was significant when people themselves
had not personally contributed to the unfair treatment of the
out-group but was not significant when people had personally
mistreated the out-group. Mediational analyses showed that
group members were affected by their in-group's behavior in
terms of collective guilt and that these feelings of guilt in turn
gave rise to behavioral tendencies aimed at compensating the
out-group for the in-group's prior unfair treatment. Within-cell
correlational analyses supported the notion that feelings of guilt
are connected to compensatory behavior.
In this first study, we made the participants aware of the fact
that they had (or had not) undervalued an out-group both in
the past and in the present. Tn order to strengthen the manipulation, we deliberately chose to include the past and present behavior of members of their group. However, this makes it more
difficult to attribute the collective guilt findings completely to
the past behavior of members of their group, and it is likely that
the results, at least to some extent, were dependent on the portrayal of the present behavior of in-group members. In the second study, we address this confound by focusing exclusively on
the past behavior of members of one's group.
Finally, it is worth noting that this is the first study to investigate feelings of guilt as a consequence of group characteristics
in a laboratory setting. The findings demonstrate that it is possible to observe variations as a result of manipulating a group's
past behavior, even when the group is created artificially. From
a social identity perspective, we anticipated that a minimum
level of identification with one's group would be required in
order to create a sense of belonging, and we therefore tried to
create a situation in which group members would be emotionally
affected by the behavior of other members of their in-group.
This was done by presenting all participants with feedback that
they identified with this group. At the same time, there were
still individual differences in the extent to which people had
internalized this minimal group membership. Degree of identification with the in-group had a significant impact when it was
introduced as a covariate. Because degree of in-group identification can exert an important effect on the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of group members, we decided to include
identification with one's group as an independent factor in the
second study. This enabled us to examine the way in which
level of identification can moderate the effects of making salient
different aspects of a group's historical treatment of another
group.
Study 2
In this second study, we also investigated the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions of group members when characteristics of their group's past behavior towards another group
were made salient. Again, we were interested in the effects on
feelings of guilt and on compensatory behavior. However, we
introduced three new elements. First, we paid more direct attention to the notion of identification with one's group. Second,
we refined and extended our manipulation of the in-group's
historical treatment of an out-group in order to increase our
ability to generalize to other kinds of group situations. Third,
in the interests of external validity, we focused on a natural
group, namely, the participants' nationality. In this second study,
we were interested in the reactions of people who differ in their
level of identification with their nation when different aspects
of their nation's history are made salient. We argue that identification with one's group is crucial to the understanding of reactions to the past behavior of one's group.
Social identity theory claims that people derive part of their
self-image from their group memberships (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). However, not every group member is equally affected by
a group membership. A number of researchers have stressed the
importance of degree of in-group identification, suggesting that
it is important to distinguish between low and high identifiers'
responses to group-threatening information (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman,
1993; Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears,
1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Spears et al., 1997).
For example, Branscombe and Wann showed one group of
Americans a version of a crucial fight from the film Rocky
in which the American fighter lost (i.e., the group-threatening
condition) or won (i.e., the nonthreatening condition). Americans who identified strongly with their group displayed more
out-group derogation than did low identifiers, particularly when
their group identity was threatened. Other research (see
Doosje & Ellemers, 1997) has supported the notion that the
difference between low and high identifiers becomes particularly
apparent when the image of their group is threatened.
From a social identity perspective, it might be argued that
people for whom a group is important (i.e., high identifiers)
879
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION
should experience feelings and emotions deriving from their
group membership more strongly than those who are less identified with their group. The feelings and emotions of people to
whom their group membership is less essential (i.e., low identifiers) might be expected to be less influenced by characteristics
of their group (e.g., Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Spears et al., 1997). As Wann and
Branscombe (1990) found in their study of basketball fans, the
level of enjoyment following a game involving their university's
team was higher among high identifiers than among low identifiers. Thus, low identifiers could be seen as less likely to experience group-based feelings and emotions than high identifiers.
However, we argue that this general pattern may need to be
qualified, depending on the type of emotion considered. Positive
emotions (e.g., enjoyment and happiness) are indeed more likely
to be experienced under positive circumstances by high identifiers than by low identifiers. Negative group-image-threatening
emotions such as guilt or shame, however, are only likely to be
experienced by people who are willing to admit or accept that
their group has done something wrong in the first place. We
argue that high identifiers are typically unlikely to accept a
negative interpretation of their group's history and that they
may have other defensive means of dealing with such a groupthreatening situation. Specifically, when it concerns possible immoral behavior on the part of their group, high identifiers may
either deny that the behavior occurred or, if that it is impossible,
they may try to justify it. By displaying these kinds of defensive
reactions, high identifiers may avoid experiencing group-based
guilt. Because low identifiers, in contrast, may be more willing
to accept that their group has done something wrong, they
should be less likely to display defensive reactions. Instead, low
identifiers may be more likely to experience feelings of groupbased guilt.
Indirect support for this prediction was obtained in a study
by Branscombe, Schiffhauer, et al. (1997). The self-esteem of
White Americans who differed in their degree of identification
with other Whites was examined following different types of
thoughts about their racial group. Participants were asked to
think of either the privileges or the disadvantages that they had
received as Whites. Low White identifiers suffered self-esteem
loss following thoughts reminding them of their group's privileges. Although collective guilt was not measured, the authors
argued that the lowered self-esteem of the low identifiers may
have resulted from White guilt. In the present study, this idea
was tested more explicitly by directly measuring group-based
guilt. We expected a difference in guilt between low and high
identifiers when group image was threatened by making salient
the unfavorable past behavior of the group.
We also tested a more specific hypothesis with regard to these
reactions of low and high identifiers. Stangor and Ford (1992)
suggested that although people are motivated to favor themselves or their group, they are also attuned to social reality and
do not want to make unrealistic claims (see also Doosje,
Spears, & Koomen, 1995; Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs, &
Simons, 1997; Spears & Manstead, 1989). In the present context, we hypothesized that when people are confronted with their
group's uniformly unfavorable past behavior (e.g., colonizing a
country) and the focus is exclusively on the worst aspects of
these actions (e.g., brutally murdering people), guilt and behav-
ioral reactions should not be influenced by level of identification,
because this would require denial of vivid historical evidence
(see Baumeister & Hastings, 1997). As a result, we expected
both low and high identifiers to experience a relatively high
degree of group-based guilt. Likewise, if only the favorable
aspects of a group's past behavior (e.g., creating a comprehensive legal system) are presented, low and high identifiers should
not differ from each other in terms of their reactions to this
information. Specifically, in this condition, we expected both
low and high identifiers to experience relatively low levels of
collective guilt.
However, when both favorable and unfavorable aspects of
their group's past colonial behavior are introduced, there is more
scope for low and high identifiers to focus on different aspects
of the information and thereby to respond to it differently. We
predicted that in this ambiguous situation, high identifiers would
be relatively likely to display defensive behavior. They should
be less willing to accept the negative aspects of the information
about their group and should thus perceive more intragroup
variability. In addition, in this ambiguous condition, high identifiers were expected to experience less group-based guilt than
low identifiers. We again expected that out-group compensatory
behavior would parallel feelings of collective guilt. Thus, we
predicted that in the ambiguous condition, high identifiers would
be less willing than low identifiers to compensate the out-group
for the past.
It is possible to argue that national identification is related to
political orientation, such that people whose national identity is
highly important may be more likely to endorse right-wing political views. For example, Hilton, Erb, McDermott, and Molian
(1996) found that national identification in France, Great Britain, and Germany is linked with typically right-wing political
attitudes such as "hostility to admitting foreigners" (p. 292).
In order to rule out this alternative explanation for the predicted
effects of national group identification, we also included a measure of political orientation and used this as a covariate in the
analysis of group-based guilt.
Method
Participants
One hundred ihirty-five students at a large Dutch university participated in this study. We preselected only those who identified either
relatively strongly or relatively weakly with being Dutch. About 72%
of these students were female. Participants' ages ranged from 17 to 43
(M - 21.57). Students received course credit for participation.
Design and Procedure
The design comprised two between-subjects factors: National identification (low or high) and group history (unfavorable, ambiguous, or
favorable). Participants were asked to indicate their level of national
identification with being Dutch, which was measured by eight items
selected from Branscombe, Schiffhauer, et al. (1997) and Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995). Participants were asked to indicate the extent
to which they agreed with each statement on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Examples of items are "Being
Dutch just feels natural to me," "I identify with other Dutch people,1'
and '*I see myself as Dutch." The eight items formed a highly reliable
scale (a = .94). The high-identification group consisted of the top 33%,
880
DOOSJE, BRANSCOMBE, SPEARS, AND MANSTEAD
and the low-identification group consisted of the bottom 33%. Mean
identification in the high-identification group was significantly higher
(M = 5.75) than in the low-identification group (M = 3.26), F(1, 129)
= 504.97, p < .001.
The manipulation of Dutch history consisted of a one-page summary
of the history of Dutch colonization of Indonesia, accompanied by two
pictures of Dutch people during the colonial period. In all conditions,
it was first stated that this summary was an excerpt from a highly
respected American encyclopedia written by professional historians.
This was done in order to increase the credibility of the source of the
information. In the favorable history condition, it was explained that the
Dutch had (a) improved the Indonesian infrastructure, (b) introduced a
solid legal system, and (c) initiated a good educational system. This
manipulation was strengthened by including a picture in which the Dutch
gave books to Indonesian people and another picture showing a typical
Dutch bridge spanning a river in Indonesia. In the unfavorable history
condition, it was stated that the Dutch had (a) exploited Indonesian
land, (b) abused Indonesian labor, and (c) killed a lot of Indonesians.
This manipulation was reinforced by including a picture of rather generously proportioned Dutch people alongside very thin Indonesian servants
and a picture showing Indonesian people working hard in the rice paddies. Finally, in the ambiguous history condition, people were told that
the Dutch had (a) introduced a solid legal system and (b) improved
the Indonesian infrastructure but (c) abused Indonesian labor. Pictures
showing Indonesian people working in the rice paddies and the Dutch
bridge in Indonesia were included.
Dependent Measures
In order to assess whether participants had perceived the manipulation
as intended, they were asked to indicate how the Dutch had behaved
during the colonial period according to the information presented in the
historical summary on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very negative)
to 7 (very positive). The main dependent measure of collective guilt
followed. The standard five-item measure (Branscombe, Slugoski, &
Kappen, 1997) was tailored to capture feelings of guilt about the behavior of the Dutch during the colonial period (a - .74), answered on 7point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Participants were then asked to indicate the variability of the behavior
of the Dutch during the colonial period. Four items used in the first
study were again administered (a = .69), two tapping the perceived
variability of the behavior of the Dutch and two concerning the perceived
variability among the Dutch people during the colonial period, answered
on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Next, the same four global behavioral intentions as used in the
first study were assessed by asking participants to indicate the extent to
which they felt that (a) they personally and (b) the Dutch government
should now make up for their nation's past actions (four items; a =
.77), answered on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree). In addition, two specific behavioral measures were
included, in which participants were asked an open-ended question concerning what sum in Dutch guilders (a) they themselves would give and
(b) they thought the Dutch government should give to "a good cause"
in Indonesia if there was a national Aid Campaign on radio and television. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very left wing) to 7 (very right
wing).
Results
All ANOVAs included two independent between-subjects factors: group history (unfavorable, ambiguous, or favorable) and
identification (low or high). Simple main effects analyses were
carried out to assess differences between cells.
Manipulation Check
The main effect of group history on the manipulation check
was highly significant, F(2, 122) = 348.25, p < .001. As intended, participants perceived the information about the Dutch
as relatively negative in the unfavorable condition (M = 1.30
on a 7-point scale), as intermediate in the ambiguous condition
(M = 4.49), and as relatively positive in the favorable condition
(M = 6.36). There were no other significant effects.
Collective Guilt
It was predicted that both low and high identifiers would
experience greater guilt in the unfavorable history condition
than in the favorable history condition, and that low identifiers
would experience greater guilt than high identifiers when the
information presented was ambiguous. The main effect of group
history was marginally significant, F ( 2 , 1 2 8 ) = 2.52, p < .085,
showing that participants felt more guilty in the unfavorable
history condition (M = 4.12) than in the ambiguous condition
(M = 3.76) and the favorable history condition (M = 3.60).
In addition, the predicted interaction effect between group history and identification was significant, F(2, 128) = 3.14, p <
.05. Table 4 shows the means relevant to the interaction, and
Table 5 shows the effect sizes (rf2) for this and the other dependent variables. As predicted, in the ambiguous condition, low
identifiers felt more guilty than did high identifiers, F(2, 128)
Table 4
Mean Acceptance of Collective Guilt by Level of Group History Toward the Out-Group
and Level of In-Group Identification
Level of group history toward the out-group
Level of
m-group
identification
Favorable
Ambiguous
Unfavorable
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
Low
High
3.59a
3.62,*
1.09
1.39
25
18
4.19b
3.22a
1.08
1.13
24
19
4.05b
4.17b
0.98
1.12
21
27
Note. Scores could range from 1 to 9, with higher numbers reflecting greater acceptance of collective
guilt. Means that do not share subscripts differ at p ^ .05.
881
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION
Table 5
Percentage of Variance Explained (With Eta Squared Given as a Percentage) by In-Group
Identification, Group History, and the Interaction Between In-Group Identification
and Group History
Variable
Collective
guilt
Intragroup
variability
Global
compensation
Specific
compensation
Identification
Group history
Interaction
Total8
1.5
3.8
4.7
10.0
4.1
0.3
4.3
8.7
0.8
2.0
0.7
5.3
8.6
14.6
5.4
8.2
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher percentages of variance explained.
a
Total amount of variance explained.
= 7.51, p < .01, whereas this difference was not significant in
the two other group history conditions.
We checked whether these effects were due to differences in
political orientation. The overall correlation between national
identification and political orientation was small but significant
(r = .21, p < .05), indicating that those people who identified
strongly with the Dutch were politically more right wing. However, when we included political orientation as a covariate in an
ANCOVA on group-based guilt, the covariate was not significant, F ( l , 113) = 1.05, and the interaction between identification and group history remained significant, F(2, 113) = 4.68,
p < .02.
Perceived Variability
We also predicted that high identifiers would perceive more
variability in in-group past behavior and in-group members than
would low identifiers, particularly when the information was
ambiguous. The main effect of identification was significant,
F ( l , 131) = 5.55, p < .02. High identifiers (M = 5.10) perceived more variability than did low identifiers (M ~ 4.76). The
predicted interaction between group history and identification
approached significance, F(2, 131) - 2.92,/? = .057. The relevant means are presented in Table 6. It can be seen that in
the ambiguous condition, high identifiers perceived more group
variability (M = 5.43) than did low identifiers (M = 4.76),
F ( l , 131) = 10.44, p < .005, whereas there were no significant
differences between low and high identifiers in the other two
group history conditions.
Interestingly, inspection of the within-cell correlations between perceived variability and group-based guilt showed that
none of these correlations was significant except for high identifiers in the ambiguous condition. In this condition, the correlation was negative (r — - . 5 2 , p < .05), indicating that the more
intragroup variability participants perceived, the less groupbased guilt they experienced.
Global Compensation
It was expected that participants would be differentially willing to compensate for their group's past behavior. The main
effect of group history was not significant, F(2, 128) = 1.09,
but the predicted two-way interaction was significant, F(2,128)
= 3.64, p < .03. Contrast analyses showed that only in the
ambiguous condition was there a significant difference between
low and high identifiers, F( 1, 128) = 7.88, p < .01. The means
in Table 7 show that in the ambiguous condition, low identifiers
(M — 3.82) felt more strongly than high identifiers (M = 2.97)
that both they personally and the Dutch government should compensate Indonesians, whereas in the other two conditions the
difference between low and high identifiers was not significant.
Specific Compensation
Participants were asked to indicate the amount in Dutch guilders that (a) they themselves would give and (b) they thought
the Dutch government should give if there was a national Aid
Campaign for a good cause in Indonesia on radio and television.
Table 6
Mean Perceived Intragroup Variability by Level of Group History Toward the Out-Group
and Level of In-Group Identification
Level of group history toward the out-group
Favorable
Ambiguous
Unfavorable
Level of
in-group
identification
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
Low
High
4.84a
5.03a
0.79
0.66
26
16
4.57,
5.43b
0.97
0.87
26
19
4.88,
4.90a
0.85
0.97
21
27
Note. Scores could range from 1 to 9, with higher numbers indicating more perceived intragroup variability.
Means that do not share subscripts differ at p =s .05.
882
DOOSJE, BRANSCOMBE, SPEARS, AND MANSTEAD
Table 7
Mean Global Out-Group Compensation Recommendations by Level of Group History
Toward the Out-Group and Level of In-Group Identification
Level of group history toward the out-group
Level of
Favorable
Ambiguous
Unfavorable
in-group
identification
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
Low
High
3.10,
3.28,.,
0.97
1.39
25
18
3.82b
2.97a
0.99
1.01
24
19
3.46^
3.59b
0.80
0.82
21
27
Note. Scores could range from 1 to 7, with higher numbers reflecting larger out-group compensation
recommendations. Means that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05.
Analysis of the standardized combined score revealed no main
effect of group history, F(2, 128) = 1.09, ns, but there was a
significant interaction effect between group history and identification, F(2, 82) - 3.87, p < .03. As predicted, only in the
ambiguous condition was the difference between low and high
identifiers significant, F(\, 82) = 7.67,p < .01; low identifiers
(M = 0.33) anticipated donating more than high identifiers did
(M = -0.21). The relevant means are shown in Table 8.
correlation between guilt and specific compensation was also
significant (r = .36, p < .001), although the correlation was
not significant in every cell, ranging from - . 0 4 to +.77. This
variability in strength of correlations may reflect the relatively
low numbers of participants in each cell (ranging from 12 to
17), which was due to a large number of missing values on this
more open-ended measure.
Discussion
Mediational Analyses
We hypothesized that the effects of our group history manipulation on the behavioral measures would be mediated by feelings
of collective guilt. To test this hypothesis, collective guilt scores
were used as a covariate. With respect to the global behavioral
measure, the covariate was highly significant, F{\, 127) =
75.37, p < .001, and the interaction between group history and
identification was also reduced to nonsignificance (from p <
.03 to p < .35). On the specific compensation measure, the
covariate was also significant, F(\, 81) = 7.12, p < .01, and
the interaction was also reduced to nonsignificance (from/? <
.03 top < .13). These analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that induced feelings of collective guilt mediate the interaction between group history and identification on both global
and specific compensation measures.
Guilt and global compensation were significantly correlated
with each other overall (r — .64, p < .001) and in each cell of
the design (the correlations ranged from .49 to .72). The overall
This experiment focused on the combined effects of the past
behavior of one's group in relation to another group and one's
in-group identification on feelings of group-based guilt, perceptions of intragroup variability, and recommendations for outgroup compensation. Low identifiers felt more guilty, perceived
less intragroup variability, and were more willing to compensate
the out-group than were high identifiers when both favorable
and unfavorable aspects of their nation's past behavior towards
a colonized country were simultaneously presented. Mediational
analyses demonstrated that the level of willingness to compensate the colonized country was a function of feelings of groupbased guilt. Most wifhin-cell correlational analyses also supported the notion that collective guilt is linked to out-group
compensatory behavior.
These results replicate important aspects of the first study.
Specifically, we demonstrated that members of a group can
experience guilt because of the past behavior of their in-group
toward another group, even when they personally played no role
Table 8
Mean Standardized Out-Group Compensation Scores on the Monetary Measure as a
Function of Level of Group History Toward the Out-Group
and Level of In-Group Identification
Level of group history toward the out-group
Level of
in-group
identification
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
Low
High
-.27,
-.18.
.50
.45
16
15
.33h
-.21,
.61
.39
15
13
-.10
.09
•58
12
17
Favorable
Ambiguous
Unfavorable
•62
Note. Higher numbers indicate larger monetary recommendations. Means that do not share subscripts
differ at p ^ .05.
883
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION
in harming the out-group. In addition, these feelings of guilt
apparently motivated compensation for the past behavior of their
group. However, the present study also makes other theoretical
contributions. In particular, the fact that we found interaction
effects on most of our dependent variables suggests that two
motivations may be simultaneously at work: the motivation to be
accurate and the motivation to favor one's own group (Doosje,
Spears, & Koomen, 1995; Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs, &
Simons, 1997; Spears & Manstead, 1989; Stangor & Ford,
1992). In terms of feelings of group-based guilt, it is interesting
that group members did not simply deny the evidence presented.
If the information about their group's history was unequivocally
unfavorable, both low and high identifiers felt more guilty than
when the information was unequivocally favorable. In both of
these conditions, it seems that the motivation to be accurate is
stronger than the motivation to favor one's own group. However,
if both favorable and unfavorable aspects of Dutch history are
made salient (i.e., in the ambiguous situation), there is scope
for motivation to play a role. In this condition, we argue that
high identifiers are more defensive than are low identifiers, and
the ambiguous information gave them scope to display such
behavior. As a consequence, low identifiers were more willing
to accept group-based guilt than were high identifiers.
Turning to the findings concerning perceptions of intragroup
variability, we find further support for the notion that high identifiers are more defensive in group-threatening situations than are
low identifiers. Low identifiers perceived less variability than
did high identifiers, and this effect was only significant when
the information was ambiguous. Thus high identifiers are more
likely to challenge the negative aspects of the ambiguous information than are low identifiers. A significant negative correlation
between group-based guilt and perceived variability in the high
identification-ambiguous condition also supported this notion.
Low identifiers, on the other hand, are more likely to accept the
negative aspects of their group and are therefore less likely to
defend its image by stressing its heterogeneity.
These results might, on the surface, appear to be inconsistent
with prior work assessing perceived group variability (e.g.,
Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,
1997; Kelly, 1989; Simon, 1992; Simon & Brown, 1987). In
those studies, high identifiers perceived less variability in the
in-group, especially when the identity of one's group was threatened. However, one way of integrating these two sets of findings
is to consider the possibility that there are two modes of reacting
to any intergroup situation: focusing on the relevant intergroup
comparison or preparing for the future in an ongoing intergroup
context. The former reaction is relatively passive or static,
whereas the latter has a more active element and is more focused
on the intergroup context as an ongoing process. Previous studies were concerned with an ongoing intergroup context, in which
high identifiers stress the unity of the in-group as a means of
reintegrating the group. For example, after an electoral defeat,
a political party has to reunite (Kelly, 1989). Low identifiers
are less concerned with this unified image of the in-group than
are high identifiers. In the present study, we examined the effects
of making salient the historical aspects of one's group on perceived intragroup variability, and thus the unity-for-the-future
argument is less pertinent. The heightened perception of variability by high identifiers in our study, we suggest, results more
from a reaction to the past than from an attempt to marshal
unity for future action. In support of this argument, it is also
important to note the different measures of perceived variability
used in different studies. In previous studies, measurement was
in terms of perceived differences between in-group members,
whereas in the present study we also included measures of
perceived differences in their behavior (as in the concept of
covariance discussed by Linville, Fischer, & \bon, 1996). Specifically, the measure assessed the extent to which people
thought that, apart from their bad behavior, the Dutch had also
done some good things. This makes the measure more similar
to an in-group bias measure, because perceiving variation in
generally negative group behavior implies that the group also
has some good qualities. In summary, we believe that, whereas
earlier studies were more focused on strategic approaches to
the future, our study is more concerned with strategic reactions
to the past. This highlights the importance of determining the
nature of the threat to identity, because both heterogeneous and
homogeneous perceptions are possible, depending on what people are attempting to achieve.
National identification correlated with political orientation,
such that people for whom national identity is highly important
were most likely to have a right-wing political orientation (Hilton et al., 1996). This suggests that our national identification
measure has some overlap with a political orientation measure,
which might seem to represent a threat to the internal validity
of the results on our most important measure, collective guilt.
However, an ANCOVA demonstrated that the crucial interaction
between identification and group history remained significant
for collective guilt when political orientation was controlled
for. Therefore, these results render this alternative explanation
involving differences in political orientation as the mediator of
collective guilt effects rather unlikely.
The results again demonstrate that feelings of collective guilt
are closely related to behavioral intentions to make up for the
behavior of one's own group. In the present study, we included
global measures of compensation as well as more specific monetary measures and found similar effects. When presented with
ambiguous information, low identifiers were more willing to
compensate the out-group than were high identifiers. Again, this
demonstrates the interactive effects of information presented
and group motivation, but in this case on behavioral intentions.
We did not observe a main effect of the information presented
(i.e., more compensation when the in-group was portrayed as
having harmed the out-group), although the means were in the
predicted direction for both global and specific compensation
(i.e., more willing to compensate when the in-group was portrayed as having victimized the out-group).
General Discussion
The present studies focused on the feelings of group-based
guilt that can be evoked as a consequence of how the history
of one's group is presented. Although researchers have long
been interested in emotions at the individual level, only recently
have emotions at the intergroup level attracted attention (e.g.,
Smith, 1993; Steele, 1990). Our studies are, to our knowledge,
the first to lend empirical support to the notion that group members experience emotions as a consequence of the way their
884
DOOSJE, BRANSCOMBE, SPEARS, AND MANSTEAD
group's behavioral history is portrayed. In addition, our studies
demonstrate that people may experience collective guilt even
when they personally have not mistreated members of another
group. In other words, our studies clearly demonstrate that guilt
can arise from the behavior of fellow in-group members, rather
than from one's personal behavior, and that this group-based
guilt leads to compensatory behavior.
The present findings are of some theoretical importance.
Steele (1990) argued that "Racial guilt simply accompanies
the condition of being White in America" (p. 81). Baumeister
and Hastings (1997) also suggested that whenever Whites perceive themselves in terms of their race, they are likely to experience collective guilt Our studies do not fully support these
notions, as they show that people who identify strongly with
their group are less likely to experience collective guilt, provided
that the group's behavioral history contains some elements of
ambiguity. On the basis of our findings, it might be expected
that White Americans who identify strongly with being White
may be able to interpret even fairly extreme circumstances (e.g.,
the Jim Crow era) as having positive features. They may be
likely to suggest a relatively high degree of in-group variability
both in terms of differences between group members (e.g., "not
all White Southerners supported the Klan") and in terms of
group behavior ("slave owners also did some good things for
slaves''). As a consequence, people high in White identification
may experience less extreme levels of group-based guilt.
As argued earlier, we think it is useful to discuss more specifically the relation between group characteristics and types of
emotion. We argue that high identifiers are generally more likely
to experience positive group-based emotions. For example, if
the present studies were concerned with the past accomplishments of Americans during World War II, we would expect high
identifiers to feel more proud than low identifiers. However, if
the emotion is a consequence of a high group-image-threatening
situation, we argue that high identifiers are less willing to accept
the threatening information as objective or true and, as a result,
may be expected to display defensive strategic behavior. Such
defensive behavior may prevent high identifiers from feeling
negative group-based emotions. For example, the same high
identifiers might display a defensive strategy if America's negative past history in Vietnam were made salient. As a consequence, high identifiers may be less susceptible to guilt about
this and other historical events than are low identifiers. In future
research, it would be useful to examine more specifically the
role of salience of group membership in the experience of different kinds of emotions evoked by the behavior of one's own
group.
In Study 2, we measured identification and used it as a means
to classify people as low or high identifiers. This methodology
should not be taken as implying that we conceptualize in-group
identification as a simple and stable personality characteristic.
On the contrary, we believe that identification is highly responsive to the social context and may shift as a function of variables
such as intra- versus intergroup comparative salience, level of
group status, and the relevance of specific comparison groups.
Similarly, we do not assume that the norms or values of the
group will be stable or fixed. Drawing on self-categorization
theory (Turner et al., 1987), it can be predicted that people will
be influenced by specific group norms, rather than a general
norm such as the humanitarianism-egalitarianism mentioned
earlier. In some social groups, for example, favoring the ingroup and derogating an out-group may be more normative than
they are in other social groups. Indeed, group-specific norms
may vary across time. When at war with another nation, citizens
may be expected to kill the enemy, whereas at other times the
same behavior may be seen as violations of the more general
norms of humanitarianism. Thus, the same behavior (e.g., harming other people) can under some circumstances lead to feelings
of guilt but in other circumstances will lead to feelings of pride.
This suggests that group norms are context dependent as well
as time specific and situation specific.
It is possible to argue that, especially in a laboratory context,
people are more likely to do what they think is normal or positively evaluated by the experimenter. On the basis of this notion,
it could be argued that demand characteristics (e.g., Orne, 1962)
served to weaken the validity of our first study. However, if
demand characteristics had played an important role, one would
expect to observe main effects of the manipulation of both personal and group behavior. Yet we found an interaction effect,
indicating that the effect of the group behavioral history manipulation was only significant when people had not personally undervalued an out-group. Consequently, the interactive pattern
of results that we did obtain renders a demand-characteristics
explanation of our findings less plausible.
The present research shows it is possible to observe variations
in collective guilt without people's necessarily having contributed personally to the mistreatment of another group. This finding is in contrast to what some have claimed is the driving force
behind the experience of guilt at the individual level—namely,
a sense of personal responsibility for the discrepancy between
one's own behavior and one's values (e.g., Devine & Zuwerink,
1994; Lewis, 1993; Weiner, 1995). At the group level, our results
indicate that personal responsibility is not a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of collective guilt. For the participants in
the second study, in particular, it was impossible to be personally
responsible for the past behavior of their in-group. Dutch students did, however, experience group-based guilt when the colonial history of the Dutch was made salient. Thus, actual responsibility, in a legal sense, is not necessary for the experience of
collective guilt. Interestingly, recent legislation in the Netherlands has made it possible to charge and arrest persons simply
on the basis of membership in a criminal organization, without
evidence that a specific individual was personally involved in
committing a legal offense. This law therefore acknowledges
the possibility of collective guilt, whereby persons can be
charged purely on the grounds of the behavior of their fellow
in-group members. In effect, people may be considered to be
"guilty by association."
Some researchers of guilt at the individual level have argued
that personal guilt may be classified as a productive emotion,
because it is directly linked with willingness to make reparations. For example, Barrett (1995) argued that "Shame and
guilt serve important functions" (p. 25), and she went on to
argue that guilt motivates reparation. Similarly, Steele (1990)
suggested that White guilt was at least partly responsible for
the implementation of affirmative action programs in the 1960s
in the United States. The present research is consistent with this
notion that collective guilt can motivate compensation to the
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION
out-group for perceived in-group wrongful treatment. In both
studies, people were more willing to make reparations under
conditions in which they felt group-based guilt. In addition,
mediational analyses and within-cell correlations strengthen the
notion that collective guilt is linked to out-group reparation,
indicating that collective guilt may also be conceptualized as a
behavior-regulatory emotion. In sum, a fundamental inference
to be drawn from the present studies is that group-based emotions can be powerful determinants of behavioral intentions for
treatment of an out-group.
On the basis of our research, what can we say about the
diversity of the reactions to Goldhagen's (1996) Hitler's Willing
Executioners book? We believe that the concept of national
identification is extremely important in understanding these responses. People whose German identity is not central may somewhat be more willing to acknowledge the negative aspects of
the history of their country. Consequently, they are paradoxically
more likely to experience high levels of collective guilt. In contrast, for those people whose German identity is relatively important, defensive behavior is a more likely means of dealing
with their nation's unfavorable past. One such defensive response would be to challenge the conclusions reached by Goldhagen. As a result, such persons are unlikely to experience high
levels of collective guilt.
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Received September 10, 1997
Revision received April 14, 1998
Accepted April 16, 1998 •