University of Macedonia
Department of
Balkan, Slavic and
Oriental Studies
MA in Politics and
E c o n o mi c s o f
C o n t e mp o r a r y E a s t e r n
and Southeastern
Europe
Student’s Name:
Spyridon Giotis
Topic of Dissertation:
“Energy Security in Eastern
Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications
in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Research Supervisor:
Assistant Professor Emmanuel Karagiannis
Evaluation Committee Member:
Lecturer Nikolaos Raptopoulos
December 2012
Spyridon Giotis
2
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
I would like to express my great
appreciation to my research supervisor,
Professor Emmanuel Karagiannis, for his
valuable guidance, useful assistance and
constructive critiques of this research work.
I would also like to thank my wife Joanna,
for her support and encouragement
throughout my study. Without her, this thesis
would not have been completed.
3
Spyridon Giotis
4
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Abstract
This thesis investigates the geopolitical implications of the recent discoveries in
Eastern Mediterranean. The beginning of the paper presents an analysis of the notion
of energy security and provides a theoretical framework, according to which
international relation theories approach energy security issues. We follow the
traditional tripartite division: realism, liberalism, Marxism as this illustrates the main
analytical framework in terms of international energy politics. Then, this paper focuses
on gas energy and its prospects, scrutinizing the reasons why natural gas emerged as
an important energy source in a carbon constrained world.
In light of the new gas discoveries, we analyze the potential conflicts and opportunities
for cooperation that have been aroused. Israel, Cyprus, Turkey are key countries in this
thesis. The analysis of their interactions is grounded on the neo-realistic perspective,
which prioritizes the role of the power and highlights insecurity as a constant feature
of international system. Finally, we discuss how recent discoveries affect the political
agenda of global actors, driven by economic and security reasons and add a new
perspective in the geostrategic dimension of this unstable region.
5
Spyridon Giotis
6
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Abbreviations
AGP
Arab Gas Pipeline
AKP
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Turkish)
Justice and Development Party (English)
Bcf
Billion Cubic Feet
Bcm
Billion Cubic Meters
BP
British Petroleum
BSEC
Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Btu
British Thermal Unit
CNOOC
China National Offshore Oil Corporation
EEZ
Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA
Energy Information Administration
EMG
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Company
EU
European Union
FIR
Flight Information Region
FSRU
Floating Storage Regasification Unit
FSU
Former Soviet Union
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
IEA
International Energy Administration
IEC
Israel Electric Company
IGI
Interconnector Greece Italy
IOCs
International Oil Companies
ITG
Interconnector Turkey Greece
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
MoU
Memorandum of Understanding
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
7
Spyridon Giotis
PA
Palestinian Authority
PKK
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdish)
Kurdistan Workers' Party (English)
PLO
Palestine Liberation Organization
SCO
Shangai Cooperation Organization
SOE
State Owned Company
Tcf
Trillion Cubic Feet
Tcm
Trillion Cubic Meters
TPAO
Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklı ı (Turkish)
Turkish Petroleum Corporation (English)
TRNC
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNIFIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
US
United States
USGS
United States Geological Survey
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO
World Trade Organization
WW
World War
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“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Contents
List of Maps ................................................................................................................. 11
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. 11
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... 12
1.
Introduction......................................................................................................... 13
2.
Energy Security and the Theoretical Framework ........................................... 16
2.1. The Notion of Energy Security and its Impacts on International Security ...... 16
2.2. International Relations Theories ...................................................................... 18
2.2.1. Realism...................................................................................................... 18
2.2.2. Liberalism ................................................................................................. 20
2.2.3. Marxism .................................................................................................... 21
3.
Natural Gas: the Revolution that Goes On ...................................................... 23
3.1. The Importance of Gas Energy ........................................................................ 23
3.2. Characteristics of Gas Energy Markets ............................................................ 26
3.3. Exploration Activity in Eastern Mediterranean ............................................... 27
4.
Geopolitical Implications in Eastern Mediterranean ...................................... 33
4.1. Natural Gas as a Source of Conflict for Israel ................................................. 34
4.1.1. Israeli Energy Policy ................................................................................. 34
4.1.2. The Rising Conflict with Lebanon ............................................................ 35
4.1.3. The Revival of ‘Cold Peace’ with Egypt .................................................. 38
4.2. Natural Gas Challenges Turkish Aspirations ................................................... 41
4.2.1. Turkish Energy Policy .............................................................................. 41
4.2.2. The Regional Tension with Cyprus .......................................................... 44
4.2.3. The Deteriorating Turkish-Israeli Relations ............................................. 48
4.3. Natural Gas as an Incentive for Cooperation for Cyprus ................................. 50
4.3.1. The Cypriot Energy Policy ....................................................................... 50
4.3.2. The Cyprus-Israel Alliance ....................................................................... 53
9
Spyridon Giotis
4.3.3. The Cyprus-Greece Alliance ..................................................................... 58
5.
The Role of Global Actors .................................................................................. 61
5.1. Russian Intervention in Eastern Mediterranean ............................................... 62
5.2. United States Presence in the Middle East ....................................................... 64
5.3. European Energy Security Concerns ............................................................... 66
5.4. China: A Global Resource Competitor ............................................................ 68
6.
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 70
References .................................................................................................................... 74
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“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
List of Maps
Map 1: Recent Gas Discoveries in Levantine Basin
28
Map 2: Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean
30
Map 3: Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus
31
Map 4: Disputed Border Area Between Israel and Lebanon
36
Map 5: Egypt Natural Gas Export Pipeline
39
Map 6: International Gas Pipeline Projects
44
Map 7: The Overlapping of Turkish Cypriot Blocks with Greek Cypriot
45
Map 8: Maritime Boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus
46
Map 9: Turkish EEZ Maritime Zone
47
Map 10: Gas Export Option by Subsea Pipeline
56
Map 11: Options of Gas Export Infrastructure
57
Map 12: Options of Gas Export Infrastructure
57
Map 13: Main Existing and Planned Oil and Gas Pipelines
63
Map 14: Europe Map of Energy Terminals
66
List of Figures
Figure 1: World Electricity Generation by Fuel
24
Figure 2: Global Energy Demand by Fuel Type (Quadrillion Btu)
25
Figure 3: Share of Total Primary Energy Supply (2009)
34
Figure 4: Generation Mix by Fuel Type
35
Figure 5: Electricity Generation by Fuel
42
Figure 6: Turkeys Natural Gas Imports by Country (Share %)
43
Figure 7: Energy Imports Net (% of Energy Use)
51
Figure 8: Share of Total Primary Energy Supply (est.2009)
52
11
Spyridon Giotis
List of Tables
Table 1: Top Gas Producer Countries (Proved Gas Reserves)
27
Table 2: Natural Gas Fields in Levantine Basin
32
12
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
1. Introduction
Eastern Mediterranean was always an unstable region. The establishment of Israel in
1948 led to the militarization of the Middle East and created tensions with Arab states
(Egypt-Lebanon). In addition, concerns over the expansion of communism attracted
the attention of United States (US) and United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),
providing political support in local minorities and increasing influence in the region.
Following the end of the Cold War, Eastern Mediterranean never looked as if entering
in an era of political stability and ending peace, as Francis Fukuyama wrote.1
The increasing risks and threats that stem from the region have to do not only with
the geographical importance of Eastern Mediterranean, but also due to matters of
energy security. After the oil crisis of 1973, the concept of energy security obtained a
prominent role in international affairs. Energy interests, especially under tight
international market conditions, affected the mapping of geostrategic interests.
Jewish-Arab wars were straightly connected with the disruption of energy supplies
and the rapid increase of the oil prices. Eastern Mediterranean threatened the
international economic stability.
The fluctuation of oil prices and environmental concerns has changed significantly
the global energy consumption patterns. Diversification in sources of supply, in
access routes and in market players, has led natural gas to become an emerging
energy resource. The displacing of coal energy with natural gas in power generation
reduces the greenhouse gas emissions and encourages the role that gas can play in the
future energy mix. Furthermore, the development in production of shale gas and
innovations such as floating Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)2 have made potential
resources large enough to meet current consumption level for about a century.
Arab Spring has shifted the global interest in Eastern Mediterranean again. The
substitution of the totalitarian regimes in North Africa coincides with the deterioration
of Turkish – Israeli relations. Turkey’s greater involvement in the Middle East
reflected its desire to raise its prestige among Arab countries and gave the opportunity
to expand its foreign policy, following the neo-ottoman strategy.3 In addition, gas
1
Fukuyama, F.(1992), “ The End of History and the Last Man”, Avon Books Inc., New York.
Regan, T., “First Floating LNG Plant”, BBC News, May 22, 2011, available at: http://www. bbc.co.
uk/news/business-13465870 (accessed in 03 Dec 2012).
3
Taspinar, O., “Turkey’s Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, No 10, September 2008, pp 14-17, available at :
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf (accessed in 20 Sep 2012).
2
13
Spyridon Giotis
discoveries offshore Israel and Cyprus changed the regional balance of power and
reminded that ‘energy politics are inseparable from larger security considerations,
because produce new issues that undermine the status quo’.4
Recent gas discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean present, at one and the same time,
challenges and opportunities for cooperation.5 On one hand, these discoveries trigger
regional conflicts between states that have not demarcated their maritime borders,
before the discoveries were made. On the other, gas energy functions as an incentive
for cooperation between states, in order to satisfy their concerns over energy security.
This thesis concentrates on exploring the links between geopolitics and energy
security in Eastern Mediterranean. Key players in this analysis are Israel, Cyprus and
Turkey. Gas findings offshore Israel and Cyprus gave them access to sufficient energy
resources and provide the opportunity to become energy exporters. Turkey is
examined as a key transit state that has major strategic interests in the region. In
addition, we discuss the increasing interest of US, Russia, European countries and
China, because we consider that their policies are driven by concerns over energy
security.
In this research, we use the realistic approach to analyze the interactions between
key countries of Eastern Mediterranean. Particularly, we use the reinterpretation of
realism in the form of “structural realism” or “neo-realism”, as John Mearsheimer
theorized.6 With the assumption that conflict and insecurity are constant features of
the international system, we argue that offensive realism provides a powerful
analytical framework that explains international energy politics.
To collect our data, we leaned on recent international articles and press, because
gas discoveries are relatively recent and there is no literature. In addition, we
collected the technical data from the official sites of the oil companies that participate
in the exploitation of the discoveries. We also used statistical data from official
organizations, especially from International Energy Agency (IEA) and US Energy
Information Administration (US EIA).
The structure of this thesis is as follows: In the second chapter we explain what
energy security is referring to and how it affects international security. Then, we refer
4
Blank, S., “Turkey and Cyprus’ Gas : More Troubles Ahead in 2012”, Turkey Analyst, Vol.5, No 1
January 2011, available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120109B.html
(accessed in 25 Sep 2012).
5
Khadduri, W., “East Mediterranean Gas: Opportunities and Challenges”, Mediterranean Politics,
Routledge, London, Vol. 17, No 1, March 2012, pp. 111-117.
6
Mearsheimer, J. (2001), “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, Norton, New York.
14
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
international relations theories and we provide a theoretical framework, through
which energy security issues are interpreted. In the third chapter we focus on the role
of natural gas and its increasing importance in energy markets. We also examine the
recent exploration activity offshore Israel and Cyprus providing relative technical
information. In chapter four we explore how recent natural gas findings contribute to
a) regional tensions for Turkey and Israel with littoral states and b) the formation of
the energy axis between Israel-Cyprus and Greece. In chapter five, we discuss the
increasing interest of global actors in Eastern Mediterranean, driven by economic and
security reasons. Finally, this thesis concludes with projections about future trends
and the contributions of offshore gas discoveries in regional energy security.
15
Spyridon Giotis
2. Energy Security and the Theoretical Framework
Energy is a key factor in the development and growth of a state. Thus, often becomes
a political tool in hands of policy makers.7 The meaning of energy security is twofold:
it associates with the access to cheap energy for consumer countries, and the assuring
of stable markets for producing countries. However, the uneven distribution of energy
supplies among countries and the discoveries of energy resources trigger regional
conflicts and political implications.
In this chapter we analyze the notion of energy security and its impacts on
international security. We also examine how international relations deal with the
conflict between countries and explain the competition for energy resources. Classic
theories of international relations provide a methodological tool to approach the
emerging energy issues. As such, they help explain the political rhetoric of foreign
policy and they often provide arguments that can lead to effective policies.8
2.1. The Notion of Energy Security and its Impacts on International Security
Energy security issue has always been a fundamental problem in industrialized
countries. The incessant access to energy at stable prices was a vital requirement for
the stability and the economic growth.9 In the twentieth century, energy resources
were of major importance to military security; the invention of the internal
combustion engine led Winston Churchill to convert the British Navy from coal to oil
before the First World War (WW I), to ensure its ‘naval superiority’;10 German army
failed to reach Caucasus oil fields in WW II and deprived the victory from Rommel in
El Alamein.11 The control of energy (oil) proved its straight influence in military
operations.
In the second half of 20th century, energy was used as an economic weapon. The
oil crisis of 1973 was an answer to America’s decision to support Israel during Yom
7
For an analysis about the relations between energy and foreign policy, see Shaffer, B. (2009),
“Energy Politics”, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, pp.29-46.
8
Snyder, J.,“One World, Rival Theories”, Foreign Policy, Washington D.C., Nov/Dec 2004, Iss. 145,
p. 53.
9
Fuerth, L., “Energy, Homeland and National Security”, in Kalincki, J.H., and Goldwyn, D.L. (2005),
“Energy & Security: Towards a New Foreign Policy Strategy”, John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, p.411.
10
Singer, C., “Oil and Security”, Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, January 2008,
available at: http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/PAB08Singer.pdf (accessed in 06 Aug
2012).
11
Ibid.
16
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Kippur war. It was the first time that decision makers seriously thought about the
energy security issue, though short term.12 Iranian revolution in 1979 led to the
contract of oil production and the rise of its price. The disruption of energy supplies
(in both cases, oil) was accompanied by the rapid increase of the prices and threatened
the economic and national security.13 he relation is obvious : on one hand, economic
life is closely connected with the prices of energy supplies, a sudden raise of which
trigger unemployment, inflation, and low economic growth. On the other, national
security is threatened when countries depend on energy imports to secure their
continued operation of their economies.
Energy security in a broad definition can be defined both from consumer’s and
the provider’s perspective.14 For consumers, energy security means the access to
sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices. US, Europe, and China traditionally
import energy to meet their needs. European Union (EU) for example, has a high
proportion of imports concentrated among few partners; 79, 1% of the EU’s imports
of natural gas in 2009 came from Russia, Norway and Algeria.15 The crucial role of
energy demand is inevitably connected with foreign, economic and security policies.
However, the security needs of energy producers should also be considered.
Energy exporting countries prefer higher prices and increasing demand. Russia, the
major exporter of natural gas in European market, has invested a lot of money in
infrastructure and pipeline networks to maintain its economic benefits. Infrastructure
investment in Russia in 2010 reached $111bn, an enormous increase comparing with
the $7bn spent in 1999.16 Producer countries need stable markets to sell energy
products and obtain domestic or foreign investments.
There is therefore a form of mutual dependence between energy consumers and
energy suppliers. The interdependence in the global energy market seems to be in
12
Orttung, R. & Perovic, J., “Energy Security”, in Cavelty, M., and Mauer, V. (2010), “The Routledge
Handbook of Security Studies”, Routledge, New York, p.213.
13
Alhajji, A. F., and Williams, J. L., “The Coming Energy Crisis?” Energy and Economics
Newsletters, February 03, 2003, available at : http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyEconomist/EnergyCrisis.
pdf (accessed in 07 Aug 2012).
14
Bagwat., G., “ Energy Security” in “ The 1979 “Oil Shock:” Legacy, Lessons, and Lasting
Reverberations”, Middle East Institute Viewpoints, Washington, D.C., p.23, available at : http://www.
social-sciences-and-humanities.com/PDF/oil-shock.pdf (accessed in 07 Auf 2012).
15
“Energy Production and Imports”, Eurostat, European Commission, September 2011, available at :
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports
(accessed in 07 Aug 2012).
16
Aris, B., “Russia Makes Huge Investment in Transport Networks”, Russia Now, January 04, 2012,
available at : http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/business/8989604/Russia-investmenttransport-networks.html (accessed in 28 Aug 2012).
17
Spyridon Giotis
close relation with the type of energy product. Coal and oil trade, for example, are
traded on international markets. On the contrary, natural gas is supplied after bilateral
commitments between consumer and supplier.17 As a result, the geopolitical impacts
of a disruption in the supply of natural gas are much more different than those in case
of oil, because it is traded primarily on the global market.
2.2. International Relations Theories
International relations can offer the filter for looking to the evolving relations between
the producer countries – as Russia and Middle East - and traditional consumers, as
European countries and US. We follow the traditional tripartite division; realism,
liberalism and Marxism, as this illustrate the main analytical frameworks with regard
to international energy politics.18 In this thesis we approach the geopolitical
interactions that new gas discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean have created, through
the neo-realistic point of view, particularly through the form of offensive realism, as
we consider that it can explain the nature and underlying structures of that interaction.
2.2.1. Realism
Realism is considered to be the dominant school of thought in international relations,
drawing its popularity from deep historical traditions of thinking about international
politics.19 It roots dating to the ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides (460-406 BC),
Nikolo Machiavelli (1469-1527 AC), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 AC) and Jean
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778 AC).20 Classical realism has its roots to the human
nature and adopts the doctrine of “raison d’etat”,21 in order to pursuit their interests.
17
Shaffer, B. (2009), p.34.
Dannreuther R., “International Relations Theories: Energy, Minerals and Conflict”, EU Policy on
Natural Resources (POLINARES) Project, University of Dundee, Working Paper No 8, September
2010, p.14, available at: http://www.polinares.eu/docs/d1-1/polinares_wp1_ir_theories.pdf (accessed in
31 Aug 2012).
19
For a realistic approach of energy security and the impacts of energy resources in
International relations, see Cesnakas G., “Energy resources in Foreign Policy: A Theoretical
Approach”, Baltic Journal of Law and Politics, Vol 3. No 1 2009, available
at : http://versita.metapress.com/content/k44uh17281h8571t/fulltext.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
About a criticism of the realistic theory, see Jackson, R., and Sorensen, G. (eds), (1999),
“Introduction to International Relations”, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 96-101;
Legro, J., and Moravsic, A., “Is Anybody Still a Realist”, International Security, Vol. 24, No 2, Fall
1999, pp. 5-55, available at : http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/WCFIA_98-14.pdf
(accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
20
Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens P. (eds) (2008), “The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.92.
21
It refers to the national interest, the countries goal and ambitions, often referred to by the French
expression raison d'État (English: reason of the State).
18
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“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
It was developed during 1940’s as a reaction to ‘idealism’ that underestimated the
degree that humans are rational and believe that nations could overcome the scourge
of war.22 In recent decades, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer provided a more
‘rigorous’ model of realism (constructive realism or neorealism), according to which
the international system is anarchical and the distribution of power (the balance of
power) defines the structure of the system.23 Mearsheimer, although shares common
values of constructive realism with Waltz (defensive realism), claims that the
structure of the international system compel states to maximize their power. Thus,
lack of hegemony in the anarchical system increases the suspiciousness among states
and leads to the enduring antagonism.24 The modern realist approach issued by
Zakaria and Grieco, with the first introduce variables as the power of the state and
leadership,25 and the second argue that cooperation between states depends on the
relative cost.26
The realistic theory - as a group of theories – dealt with energy issues after the two
oil crisis in 1970’s. Realism examined the politics of North Africa through the
assumption that the conflict and insecurity are constant features of the international
system.27 The prospects of conflicts between developed countries described with the
term ‘resource war’,
28
referring to the pursuit of reduction of the dependency on
fossil fuels and the controlled energy distribution.29 The war of Iraq (2003) was
22
For an analysis about the Realist-Idealist Debate, see Ashworth, L., “Did the Realist-Idealist Great
Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations”, International Relations,
SAGE Publications, London, Vol 16, No 1, pp. 33–51, available at : http://reinhardmeyers.unimuenster.de/docs/GraduateT/Ashworth_2002_Did%20the%20Realist-Idealist%20Great%20Debate%
20Really%20Happen.pdf (accessed in 31 Aug 2012).
23
Waltz, K. (1979), “Theory of International Politics”, McGraw-Hill, New York.
24
Mearsheimer, J. (2001), p 21.
25
Zakaria, F.,“The Rise of Illiberal Democracies: The Next Wave», Foreign Affairs, Nov 1997,
available
at:http://www.fpvmv.umb.sk/kmvad/storage/File/Clenovia/tokar/T_Zakaria_1997_FA_illi
beral_democracy Fukuyama.PDF (accessed in 01 Sep 2012); Zakaria, F., “The Rise of the Rest”,
Newsweek, May 12, 2008, available at : http://ws08ec01.albion.edu/admission/images/stories
/pdfs/Fareed.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
26
Grieco, J., “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realistic Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism”, in Kegley, Ch. (1995), “Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism
and the Neoliberal Challenge”, Palgrave, London, pp. 151-171. An analysis of the term is given in
Kegley C. & Raymond G. (eds) ( 2010), “The Global Future : A Brief Introduction to World Politics”,
Wadsworth, Boston, 3rd Edition, p.207.
27
Peters, S., “Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: ‘Resource Wars” as a New Threat to
Global Security”, Geopolitics, Vol 9, Iss. 1, 2004, pp.187-212, available at : http://gis.depaul.edu/
abrownlow/Global%20Resources/Fall%202011/2011%20Readings/Peters,%20Resource%20Wars%20
and%20Global%20Security.pdf ( accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
28
For more information about ‘Resource Wars’, see Billon, P., “Geographies of War: Perspectives
on Resource Wars”, Geography Compass 1/2, 2007, pp. 163-182, available at: https://faculty.
nipissingu.ca/danw/dwhome/savepowerpshere/Le%20Billion%202007.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
29
Peters, S. (2004), p.187.
19
Spyridon Giotis
interpreted as a political decision calculated by the US state in terms of its national
interest.30 Over the last decade, hydrocarbon discoveries have increased the potential
conflicts related to the exploitation of the fields, following the realistic rational that
power influences the outcome of the conflict.31 The reason of US - Iran disputes
considered to be an American attempt to control the gas distribution network in Asia,
while “conflicts between China and Japan over the ownership of an undersea gas
field in an area of the East China Sea has grown increasingly inflammatory”.32
Furthermore, the increasing energy demand by great countries like Brazil, India and
Chile has led producer countries to control reserves by State Owned Companies
(SOEs) that gave a new dimension in the global energy market and set state the main
subject in the world politics.33
2.2.2. Liberalism
The theory of liberalism has its roots in 17th century, with Immanuel Kant and Jeremy
Bentham as the most eminent liberal political philosophers.34 Kant claimed that
perpetual peace was a matter of cooperation, democracy and a moral obligation of
human kind to produce republican forms of government.35 In 20th century, liberalism
30
Condoleezza Rice called it “uniquely American realism”, in Rice, C., “Rethinking the
National
Interest”,
Foreign
Affairs,
July/August
2008,
p.
10,
available
at:
news/news/selectednews/files/2008/08/20080801_20080701_ForeignAffairs%20_RethinkingTheNatio
nalInterest.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012). About the theory of the National Interest, see Sondermann,
F.,“The Theory of National Interest”, in Olson, C.W. (1991), “The Theory and Practice of
International Relations”, Prentice-Hall International, US, 8th edition, pp.35-43.
31
Rephrasing Thucydides, it means that those who have the power use it, while weak states make
compromises.
32
Klare, M., “The Geopolitics of Natural Gas”, The Nation, January 4, 2006, available at:
http://www.thenation.com/article/geopolitics-natural-gas (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
33
Marquina, A., “Antonio Marquina on the Deceit of Globalization, Energy Security and Challenges
to European Foreign Policy”, Theory Talks, January 13, 2009, available at : http://www.theorytalks.org/2009/01/theory-talk-25.html (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
34
Kant, I. ( 1795), “Perpetual Peace : A Philosophical Sketch”, translated with Introduction and
Notes by M. Campbell Smith, with a Preface by L. Latta, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1917
ed., available at : http://files.libertyfund.org/files/357/0075_Bk.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012). An
analysis of Kantian theory is given in Doyle, M., “Liberalism and World Politics”, in Kegley, Ch.
(1995), “Controversies in International Relations Theory : Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge”,
Palgrave, London, pp.83-106. For an analysis of Bentham’s’ liberal theory of
democracy, see Peonidis, F., “Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Unusually Liberal’ Representative
Democracy”, History of European Ideas, Vol. 37, Iss. 4, 2011, pp 446-453, available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2011.03.002 (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
For a criticism to the liberal theory, see Walt., S., “International Relations: One World, Many
Theories”, Foreign Policy, No 110, Spring, 1988, available at : http://83.143.248.39/faculty/
mtzankova/POS%20102%20Readings/Walt_International%20Relations_One%20World,%20Many%2
0Theories.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
35
For an analysis about the arguments of Emmanuel Kant, see Gaubatz,.K., “Kant, Democracy and
History”, Journal of Democracy, Vol 7, No 4, October 1996, available at : http://kktg.net/
kurt/publications/pubs/Kant,%20Democracy,%20and%20History%20I.pdf (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
20
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
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affected decision makers in Western countries, promoting international cooperation
through organizations and institutions (United Nations, International Monetary Fund
etc). The end of Cold War led Francis Fukuyama to declare that liberalism prevailed
to the political power of realism and that claim that ‘the universalization of Western
liberal democracy was the final form of human government’.36 In sum, liberal theory
argues the close relationship between democracy and peace, enhances the possibility
of achieving international security through organizations and claims that
interdependencies (commercial and military) is a key factor of stability and peace.37
Contrary to realistic school of thought, liberals gave a prominence role to the
cooperation between countries in energy issues. According to the liberal theory,
global economy alters the relative cost of transnational exchanges, creates pressures to
domestic governments and forms “appropriate foreign economic and security
policies”.38 In addition, international organizations and markets can play a dominant
role in cooperation between states and overcome situations where actors implement
policies that could led in a potential conflict.39 The EU for example established in
1952 as European Coal and Steel Community, to enhance primarily the energy
cooperation.
2.2.3. Marxism
The fall of Communism signaled the decline of the intellectual appeal of Marxist
theory and revealed its inability to interpret global political events. However, the
Marxist analysis of capitalism is still a useful tool to analyze international political
economy. Marxism established as fundamental critique of economic liberalism in 19th
century and revealed a deeper analysis of the global politics.40 According to Marxists,
the understanding of the world events presupposed the broader knowledge of the
structure and the procedures of global capitalism. Furthermore, Marxism highlighted
36
Fukuyama, F., “The End of History”, The National Interest, Summer 1989, available at:
http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
37
Zacher, M., and Matthew, R., “Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands”,
in Kegley, Ch. (1995), pp.107-150.
38
Moravcsik, A., “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations”,
International Organization, MIT Press, Vol 51, No 4, Autumn 1997, p. 530, available at : http://eedu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/129617/mod_resource/content/0/Moravcsik-liberal-theory.pdf (accessed in
01 Sep 2012).
39
Keohane, R. (1984), “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy”,
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.54; Doyle, M., “Michael W. Doyle on Markets and
Institutions”, Theory Talks, April 15, 2008, available at : http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/04/theorytalk-1.html (accessed in 01 Sep 2012).
40
For a further analysis of Marxist political theory, see Baylis, J. et al (2008), pp.
21
Spyridon Giotis
the economic dimension of international relations, explaining struggle between states
as a competition between capitalist classes.41 In other words, state conflicts
confronted as a class conflicts. Additionally, the main characteristic of capitalism seek for more profits – led to its expansion for new markets and to imperialism.42
For Marxist analysts, the increasing interest of industrialized states to energy
resources, signaled the era of energy imperialism.43 Rich states exploit the natural
resources of peripheral states by extracting cheap raw materials and by exploiting
workforce in low cost production.44 The globalization and multinational companies
are the mean of the ‘world economy’ and ‘capitalism’.45 In addition, according to the
Marxist perspective, exports of natural resources create rapid accumulation of surplus
that could erode social cohesion and magnify inequality.46 As a consequence, ‘fossil
capitalism’ is a new global problem that could led to expanding conflicts, although the
various causes of conflicts in relation to access to energy are examining under
different, social-economic criteria.47
41
Sorensen, G. and Jackson, R. (1999), p.185.
Karl Marx argues in his “Communist Manifesto” that “The need of a constantly expanding market
for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere,
settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere”, available at: http://www.classicly.com/read-thecommunist-manifesto-online-free/page/5 (accessed in 03 Sep 2012).
43
Foster, B.J., “Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism”, Monthly Review, Vol.60, Iss. 03(July-August),
2008, available at : http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism (accessed in
03 Sep 2012).
44
For a Marxist analysis of the relationship between energy resources and armed conflicts, see Billon,
P., “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts”, Political Geography,
Vol.20, 2001, pp.561-584, available at : http://ada.edu.az/uploads/file/The%20political%20ecology
%20of% 20war.pdf (accessed in 04 Sep 2012).
45
Wallerstein, I., “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for
Comparative Analysis”, Comparative Analysis in Society and History, Vol. 14, No 4, (Sep 1974),
p.393, available at : http://classes.uleth.ca/200501/anth2010a/Wallersteing.pdf (accessed in 03 Sep
2012). For an analysis of ‘Globalization Theory’ and a criticism to realistic theory, see Rosenberg, J.,
“Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem”, International Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, Vol. 42, pp.2-74,
available at: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/j.rosenberg/Uneven/Writings_files/Rosenberg% 20on%20
Globalisation%20Theory%20Post%20Mortem.pdf (accessed in 03 Sep 2012).
46
Zalik, A., “Liquified Natural Gas and Fossil Capitalism”, Monthly Review, Vol 60, Iss. 06, 2008,
available at: http://monthlyreview.org/2008/11/01/liquefied-natural-gas-and-fossil-capitalism (accessed
at 03 Sep 2012).
47
Dannreuther, R. (2010), p.14.
42
22
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
3. Natural Gas: the Revolution that Goes On
Energy discussion was dominated until the last few years by oil, as the major source
of energy. The oil crisis in 1970’s, which led to the rapid increase of the prices,
highlighted the fact that there were supply risks depending on oil production
countries. Other non-renewable sources, nuclear and coal power have been burdened
with cost and environmental concerns, especially in the case of nuclear power with
safety concerns.48
Natural gas has often been overlooked in the debate about the future of energy.
Over the past few years, this has started to change, and natural gas rapidly emerged as
an important energy resource. Gas reserves can serve the global demand for many
decades; technology improved the exploration and transportation of natural gas, while
the increasing reliance of industrialized countries on gas can diversify the monopoly
of oil production. This made natural gas the rising energy source for a carbonconstrained world.
In this chapter we focus on the role of natural gas and discuss the reasons why gas
is an emerging energy source. We refer to the main characteristics of gas markets, as
gas trade is a potential political and economic weapon. Finally, we present the
exploration activity and the technical characteristics of recent discoveries in Eastern
Mediterranean.
3.1. The Importance of Gas Energy
The fundamental characteristics of natural gas contributed to its wide expansion. It is
a clean, affordable and efficient energy source. First, it is more environmentally
friendly than oil and coal and produces less CO2.49 When used to generate electricity,
for example, natural gas can reduce CO2 emissions by up to 60 percent versus coal.50
The low greenhouse gas emissions make it attractive to industrialized countries,
48
Kaplan, S., “Displacing Coal with Generation from Existing Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants”,
Congressional Research Service, 19 January 2010, p.4, available at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
R41027_20100119.pdf (accessed in 20 July 2012)
49
There are some opponents of this view that claim that “the greenhouse-gas footprint of shale gas
over a 20-year period is at least 20 percent higher than that of coal”, in Hamilton, T., “Just How
Green is Natural Gas”, Technology Review, 15 Apr 2011, available at: http://www.technologyreview.
com/news/423661/just-how-green-is-natural-gas/ (accessed in 24 July 2012).
50
Available at : http://www.aboutnaturalgas.com/content/key-benefits/clean-and-efficient/ (accessed in
25 July 2012).
23
Spyridon Giotis
which seek to be in accordance with the Kyoto Treaty.51 Natural gas has gained
market share on an almost continuous basis after the oil crisis of 1970’s, growing
from 16 % of global energy consumption in 1973 to around 21 % today.52 According
to British Petroleum (BP) Energy Outlook, natural gas consumption will increase the
future global energy mix from 21 to 25% over the period of 2035.
Furthermore, natural gas represents a very important - and growing - part of the
global energy system. The proven global reserves are estimated over 7,360 trillion
cubic feet (tcf),53 abundant to cover the (global) energy needs for enough decades. It
provides a competitive alternative to coal for power generation, while it can be used
for industrial use, for heating and transportation. Environmental concerns and
commitments have led industrialized nations to increasingly rely on gas for electricity
generation (see figure 1).
Figure 1: World Electricity Generation by Fuel
Source: EIA, available at: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/key_world_
energy_stats-1.pdf.
Additionally, advances in natural gas production had been materialized by
hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, improved seismic exploration and other
51
Klare, M. (2006). For more information about Kyoto Protocol, see http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (accessed in 22 July 2012).
52
IEA (2012), “Key World Energy Statistics”, p. 6, available at : http://www.iea.org/publications/
freepublications/publication/kwes.pdf (accessed in 04 Oct 2012).
53
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2012), available at:
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9037203&contentId=7068626 (accessed
at 28 Aug 2012).
24
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
techniques, in order to gain access to unconventional gas reserves.54 Increasing
availability of natural gas has already led to be used on a widespread basis, when the
projections demonstrate that it will substitute coal until 2040 (see figure 2). The
development in production of unconventional gas could provide enormous benefits in
terms of economic growth, job creation, price fluctuation and environmental
protection.
The rising worldwide demand for gas has led to enormous investments in pipeline
network and infrastructure. Compressed natural gas is transported in a gaseous state
through pipelines from producing to consumer countries. Furthermore, natural gas can
be cooled in -260 degrees Fahrenheit to become liquid, known as LNG. LNG has
particular storage and transportation benefits due to the huge reduction in volume that
occurs when natural gas is transformed to a liquefied state (occupies 600 times less
space than the gaseous form).55
Figure 2: Global Energy Demand by Fuel Type (Quadrillion Btu)
Note: British thermal unit (symbol Btu or BTU) is approximately the amount of energy needed to heat
1 pound (0.454 kg) of water, from 39 °F to 40 °F (3.8 °C to 4.4 °C). The unit is most often used in the
power, steam generation, heating and air conditioning industries.
Source: Exxon Mobil, available at : http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/energy_outlook_data
center _eoglobalfueldemand.aspx.
54
The term ‘unconventional’ refers to the gas reserves that are more difficult or less economical to
extract, usually because the technology to reach it has not been developed fully, or is too expensive.
For more information about the categories of natural gas, see http://www.naturalgas.
org/overview/unconvent_ng_resource.asp (accessed at 24 July 2012).
55
Available at: http://www.ingaa.org/Topics/1330/4689/4693.aspx (accessed at 25 July 2012).
25
Spyridon Giotis
To sum up, natural gas seems to be the future energy source, in a low carbon
world. The EU energy policy - to reduce its emissions to 30% by 2020- will probably
bear down on the emitting countries in the developed and developing world to do the
same at the start of the 2013, when the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period will
have expired.56 In a world that needs more energy and fewer emissions, only natural
gas can cut greenhouse gas emissions now.57
3.2. Characteristics of Gas Energy Markets
The global demand for natural gas has created a great market. Natural gas trade has
different characteristics than those of other energy sources. First, natural gas is more
susceptible to political considerations. Most countries that are gas suppliers, have
given the management and the distribution of their gas fields in State Owned
Enterprises (SOE’s), like Gazprom (Russia) and Sonatrack (Algeria).58 Countries are
the parties that take investment decisions and sign long term contracts. Besides,
building of the trade infrastructure demands great amount of money both from the
supplier and the consumer. For example, the forecast of Russian investments in gas
industry development for the period 2010-2035 amounts to US $600 billion.59 Private
investors and countries are trying to ensure revenues through the cooperation in
political and economic level.
Furthermore, the trade of natural gas through pipelines and LNG tankers creates a
significant problem in the unplugged flow of energy. Cross border gas pipelines
involves transit countries and make the gas project more complicated. LNG trade may
avoid transit countries, but is exposed to piracy and terrorist attacks. As a result, the
cost of a natural gas project depends on the relative risk taking, while the supply may
fluctuate according to the available storage installations.
56
“What is the EU Doing on Climate Change?”, European Commission, available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm. (accessed in 27 July 2012).
57
Brinded M., “You Can Count on Gas”, Speech at the Gastech Conference and
Exhibition, Amsterdam, March 21, 2011, available at: http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/
\speeches_and_webcasts/archive/2011/brinded_amsterdam_21032011.html
(accessed in 27 July
2012).
58
Hayes, M. H., & Victor, D.G., “Introduction to the Historical Case Studies: Research Questions,
Methods and Case Selection”, in Victor, D.G., Jaffe A. & Hayes, M. H, (2006), “Natural Gas and
Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040”, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, p.28.
59
At constant prices of the year 2007, in “Energy Strategy for the Russia for the Period up to 2030”,
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2010, p.147, available at: http://www.
energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_%28Eng%29.pdf (accessed in 04 Sep 2012).
26
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Table 1: Top Gas Producer Countries (Proved Gas Reserves)
Number
Country
1.
Russia
Trillion Cubic Feet Share
(tcf)
(%)
1575,0
21,4
2.
Iran
1168,6
15,9
3.
Qatar
884,5
12
4.
Turkmenistan
858,8
11,7
5.
US
299,8
4,1
4786,7*
63,1
Total
of
total
Note: The global proved gas reserves according to the same source are 7360,9 tcf
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2012), available at: http://www.bp.com
/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9037203&contentId=7068626.
Finally, the uneven distribution of gas supplies and production capacity makes energy
security issue more complex.60 Top five gas producers hold nearly 63% of the
global reserves (see table 1) and their geographical concentration in central Asia is a
key factor in geopolitics.61 Consequently, producer countries can influence the global
flow of gas towards the consumers and control the prices. The Russian-Ukrainian gas
crisis in January 2006 led Russia to cut the supply of natural gas in the whole
Europe.62 The possession of the gas is not only an economical but also a political
weapon.
3.3. Exploration Activity in Eastern Mediterranean
The history of offshore drilling in Eastern Mediterranean goes back to the late 1960’s.
After decades of fruitless searching for hydrocarbons, countries met their needs
through imports and bilateral agreements. Israel, from the very beginning as an
independent state, imports energy because lacks of natural resources. The requirement
for foreign energy supply affected its policy with neighbor countries, particularly with
Egypt, which provided Israel with oil. The high dependency on energy supply from
60
Kenderdine, M.A., & Moniz, E. J., “Technology Development and Energy Security”, in Kalincki,
J.H., and Goldwyn, D.L. (2005), p. 427.
61
Klare, M. (2006).
62
For more information about the Russia-Ukrainian crisis in 2006, see Stern, J., “The RussianUkrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), January 16, 2006,
available at: http://www.avim.org.tr/icerik/energy-gas.pdf (accessed in 28 Aug 2012).
27
Spyridon Giotis
Egypt was to such extend, that the Peace Treaty of 1979 contained special provision
to ensure normal economic relations.63
In 1999, a joint venture between Delek Energy64 and Noble Energy,65 discovered
Noa reservoir and one year later Mari-B (see map 1), near Ashkelon, known as “Yam
Map 1: Recent Gas Discoveries in Levantine Basin
Source : Noble Energy, available at: http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/operations/international/easternmediterranean-128.html .
Tethys”.66 The gas field that had approximately 1,2 tcf/over 33.5 bcm of the highest
quality (99,9% pure methane), 67 introduce the use of natural gas in Israeli market and
reduce its dependency on imports. The foundation of Israeli gas industry initiated a
turn in the use of coal for electricity. Israeli Electric Corporation (IEC) reached two
63
“Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Office, March 26, 1979,
available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process
/Israel-Egypt%20Peace%20Treaty (accessed in 29 July 2012).
64
Delek Energy Ltd is an Israeli leading oil and gas company, subsidiary of the Delek Group, with a
market value of $2 Billion. Delek Energy has been publicly traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
since 1982. Delek Group through its subsidiaries, Delek Drilling and Avner, involve in oil
and gas exploration in the Levantine Basin. For more information, see http://www.
delekenergy.co.il/?CategoryID=163&ArticleID=77 (accessed in 29 July 2012).
65
Noble Energy is an energy company founded in 1932, based on Houston, Texas. Its assets
are totaling over $16 billion at year-end 2011. For more information, see http://www.
nobleenergyinc.com/About-Us/Our-Value-50.html (accessed in July 2012).
66
In Yam Tethys Group, Noble owns 47,059%; Delek Drilling holds 25.5%; Avner owns 23%; and
Delek Investments and Properties Ltd. holds 4.441%, available at : http://ir.delekgroup.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=160695&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1651801&highlight= (accessed in 29 July 2012)
67
Available at : http://www.delekenergy.co.il/?CategoryID=163&ArticleID=77 (accessed in 29 Jul
2012).
28
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
agreements with Yam Tethys Group (2002 and 2009),68 purchased the bulk of the
natural gas of the reservoir and covered the 67% of its gas needs.69
In the beginning of 2009, there were new gas discoveries located in northern Israeli
coast. The offshore ‘Tamar’ (January) and ‘Dalit’ (March) natural gas fields contained
9,7 tcf/275 bcm and 0,5 tcf /14 bcm respectively (see map 1).70 The ‘Tamar’ was the
largest deepwater find ever discovered in the under-explored area of the
Mediterranean Sea (at a depth of 1678m)71 and the largest discovery in the history of
Noble Energy.72 According to the company, the expected gross revenue is totaling
from $28 to 33$ billion and the first sales are expected in April 2013.73
Nonetheless, Israel’s maritime exploitation zone “held even greater potential”.
74
The ‘Leviathan’ gas field is located in 1634m depth of water offshore Israel, 130
kilometers of Haifa and 47 kilometers southwestern of the ‘Tamar’ discovery (see map
1). It was discovered in June 2010 with a gross mean of 17 tcf /480 bcm.75 The second
large deep-water discovery confirmed the assessment of United States Geological
Survey (USGS), concerning the undiscovered oil and gas potential in the Eastern
Mediterranean. According to its surveys, the Levantine Basin contains 1,68 billion
barrels of recoverable oil and 122 tcf/3.452bcm of recoverable natural gas
(see map 2).
The perceptions of natural gas potential in the Levantine Basin augmented with the
recent discoveries in Cyprus. Cyprus launched its offshore licensing round in February
2007 and gave an Exploration License for Block No 12 to Noble Energy on the
68
Available at : http://www.iec.co.il/EN/IR/Pages/Fuels.aspx (accessed in 29 Jul 2012).
Even S., “Israel’s Natural Gas Resources: Economic and Strategic Significance”, Strategic
Assesment, Vol 13, No.1, July 2010, p.9, available at: http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%
291279453466.pdf (accessed in 29 Jul 2012).
70
Delek Group, Company Presentation, July 2012, available at: http://www.delek-group.com/
Portals/0/delek/presentation/present.pdf (accessed in 30 Jul 2012).
71
Available at: http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx?project_id=459&AspxAutoDetectCookie
Support=1 (accessed in 01 Aug 2012).
72
Noble Energy operates Tamar with a 36% working interest; Isramco Negev 2 holds 28.75%; Delek
Drilling holds 15.63 %; Avner Oil Exploration holds 15.63%; and Dor Gas Exploration holds the
remaining 4%. The developing cost is available at http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx?
project_id=459&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed in 01 Aug 2012).
73
Noble Energy, “Annual Report 2011”, available at: http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/_filelib/
FileCabinet/PDFs/Presentations/2012_06_Investor_Books_%28Final%29.pdf (accessed in 01 Aug
2012).
74
Brodet, D., “The Significance Strategic Development for Israel”, Vol.10, edition 11th, March 31,
2012, available at: http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=373 (accessed
in 01 Aug 2012).
75
According to Noble Energy, that operates the license, holding a 39.7% interest; Ratio Oil
Exploration 1992 LP holds 15%; Delek Drilling LP holds 22.7%; and Avner Oil and Gas Ltd. holds
22.7% interest; available at : http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx?project_id=814 (accessed in
01 Aug 2012).
69
29
Spyridon Giotis
Map 2: Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean
Assessment by USGS
Levantine Basin
Oil : 1,68 bbl
Gas:
122 tcf
(3452 bcm)
Nile Delta Basin
Oil : 1,76 bbl
Gas: 223 tcf
(6311 bcm)
Source: Kassinnis, S., “The Status of Hydrocarbon Exploration in Cyprus”, Presentation at the First
Energy Symposium, Nicosia, Cyprus, January 26, 2012, available at : http://www.iene.gr/symposiumcyprus2012/articlefiles/2nd-session/Kasinis.pdf.
24th of October 2008.76 In Dec 2011, after the delimitation of the maritime boundaries
with Israel, Noble Energy announced that the initial evaluation work indicated an
estimated gross resource range of 5 to 8 tcf/ 142 to 227 bcm.77 The ‘Aphrodite’ natural
gas field is located in a water depth of 1689 m, south of the coast of Cyprus, in Block
12. Cyprus has already launched its second licensing round in Feb 2012 for eleven
Blocks in its maritime zone (see map 3).78
76
Available at: http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/dmlhexploration_en/dmlhexploration_en?Open
Document (accessed in 01 Aug 2012).
77
Noble Energy operates the discovery with a 70 percent working interest; while Delek Drilling and
Avner Oil Exploration each hold 15 percent stakes, available at: http://www.subseaiq.com
/data/Project.aspx?project_id=1008 (accessed in 01 August 2012).
78
“Notice Announcing the Second Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus Concerning the Authorization for
Hydrocarbons Explorations”, Official Journal of the European Union, February 11, 2012, available at:
http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/all/934821A2162C709EC22579AA0029ED64/$file/Anounceme
nt-Invitation_2012%20%28EN%29.pdf?openelement (accessed in 01 August 2012).
30
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Map 3: Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus
Source: Petroleum Geo-Services, available at: http://www.pgs.com/en/Pressroom/Calendar_of
_Events/Campaigns/2012/MultiClient-Newsletter/Middle-East-Newsletter/Cyprus-License-RoundAnnouncement/ .
Delek Group announced in 8th February 2012 the most recent discovery of natural
gas in a depth of 5551m (1773 m of water).79 The gas field ‘Tanin’ is 120 kilometers
northwest of Haifa and its resources are estimated from 0.9 to 1.4 tcf.80 (see map 1).
The total discovered mean resources in the Levantine Basin are now estimated to be
35 tcf / 1 tcm, the majority of which are in the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
(see table 2). The region is on the way to become a significant natural gas provider,
and can emerge in a lucrative energy market. Israel, not only secures its energy supply
for many decades and increased its energy security, but can also become a potential
energy exporter. Developing these resources, however, Israel and Cyprus will require
exceeding major challenges with geopolitical implications. Energy is increasingly
becoming a main component of geopolitical struggle in the Eastern Mediterranean.
79
Available at : http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx?project_id=1060 (accessed in 2012).
Noble Energy operates the license with a 47.06 percent interest; while Avner Oil and Delek Drilling
each hold a 26.47 percent stake, available at : http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx? project_id
=1060 (accessed in 02 Aug 2012).
80
31
Spyridon Giotis
Table 2: Natural Gas Fields in Levantine Basin
Gas Field
Quantity (in tcf)
Leviathan
17
Tamar (production 2013)
9
Dolphin
0.1
Dalit
0.5
Tanin
1.2
Mari B (near depletion)
1.1
Noa (production 2012)
0.04
Total
28
Total (including Cyprus)
35
Source: Henderson, S., “Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Source for
Cooperation or Fuel for Tension? The Case of Israel”, GMF, June 11, 2012, available at:
http://www.gmfus.org/wpcontent/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339083541Henderson_EnergyDiscoveries_
Jun12.pdf .
32
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
4. Geopolitical Implications in Eastern Mediterranean
Newly discovered natural gas reserves in Eastern Mediterranean provides
opportunities and, at one and the same time, challenges.81 On one hand, neighboring
countries can cooperate to ensure their energy security, to meet their growing energy
needs and improve their domestic economies. On the other, legal implications related
to the demarcation of the maritime zone and geopolitical hurdles, that have historical
roots, trigger potential conflicts to the region.
Middle East was always vulnerable to conflicts and recent discoveries make
foreign relations between countries more complicated. Israel is the key player, as the
recent offshore discoveries in its territorial waters increase its energy security and
provide it with economic and strategic advantages.82 Major actors of these disputes
are also Cyprus and Turkey, with the first performing as a potential energy exporter
and the last “taking on a more active role to provide order, stability and security in its
environment”.83 In addition, neighboring countries like Egypt and Lebanon are trying
to exploit the geopolitical changes that new source of energy created to gain domestic
benefits. The possibility of finding more gas reserves makes Middle East once again
an inflammable region.
In this chapter, we focus on the relationship between increasing energy demand
and increasing interest that Middle East countries have in order to secure their energy
supply, providing a framework for understanding their energy policies. We also
examine how recent gas developments create conflicts (Israeli-Arab countries),
challenge the Turkish aspirations to become an energy hub and become an incentive
for cooperation (Israel- Cyprus-Greece triangle). We use the neo-realistic approach to
deal with the geopolitical implications in the form of the offensive realism, to evaluate
how power, expressed as a military presence in Eastern Mediterranean, builds energy
strategies.
81
Khadduri, W.(2012), pp. 111-117.
Even, S. (2010), p.7.
83
“Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy”, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available
at : http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa (accessed in 28 Sep 2012).
82
33
Spyridon Giotis
4.1.
4.1.1.
Natural Gas as a Source of Conflict for Israel
Israeli Energy Policy
Israel has been dependent on energy imports since it became a state in 1948. The
geographical position of the new country - surrounded by Arab nations – led it to rely
only on local exploration companies with little experience.84 During 1970’s, Israel met
its energy needs completely from Sinai’s Peninsula oil reserves.85 The signing of
Camp David’s Agreement in 1979 improved the relations between Israel and Egypt
and promoted the energy cooperation. During the next decade, Jewish state tried to
diversify energy imports, contracting economic and political relations with former
Russian states, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.86 Today, Israel imports approximately 85
per cent of its energy needs.87
Israeli industry energy consumption is based on oil, coal and gas imports, while
household heating is producing almost 75 per cent from solar energy.88
The consumption of natural gas has been grown since 2003, but remains a relative
small portion of its current use (15,6 %) (see Figure 3). For all that, investments on
Figure 3: Share of Total Primary Energy Supply (2009)
Source: IEA, available at: http://www.iea.org/stats/graphresults.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=IL.
84
Khaddurie, W. (2012), p.113.
For more information, see Baghat, G., “Israel’s Energy Security: the Caspian Sea and the Middle
East”, Israel Affairs, Vol.16, No 3, July 2010, p. 408.
86
Ibid, pp. 409-411.
87
Gala, O., and Razlouk, N., “Egyptian Gas to Israel, Jordan May Halt for Two Weeks”, Bloomberg,
February 6, 2011, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-05/egypt-gas-pipelinefeeding-israel-explodes-in-sinai-desert-arabiya-says.html (accessed in 11 Sep 2012).
88
“Israel’s Experience in Sustainable Energy”, Republic of Israel, Ministry of Environment, January
2006, available at : http://www.unep.org/gc/gcss-ix/documents/israel-energy3.pdf (accessed in 11 Sep
2012).
85
34
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
infrastructure and development on natural gas sector – plant in Ashkelon, system of
transportation– has led to a rapid increase of using gas in electricity production,
reaching almost 40 per cent (see figure 4).89 Ministry of Infrastructure forecast that the
increase in natural gas consumption from 5,2 bcm in 2010 will be 18 bcm by 2030, of
which 85% will go to electricity generation and to industry.90
Figure 4: Generation Mix by Fuel Type
Source: IEC, available at: http://www.iec.co.il/EN/IR/Documents/IECs_Presentation.pdf.
Recent discoveries changed dramatically Israel’s energy perspective. The estimated
gas reserves seem to be enough for Israel to become energy exporter. Ministry of
Infrastructure is exploring the possibility to construct an underwater pipeline or power
cable to supply European markets, or build liquefaction facilities to export LNG.
However, Israeli energy policy influences its relations with neighboring countries and
raises the potential of conflict in the already turbulent region.
4.1.2.
The Rising Conflict with Lebanon
Tensions in the relation between Lebanon and Israel have been running high during
the second half of the twentieth century. Few years after the end of Arab-Israel War
(1949), the establishment of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and its
continuous armed raids into Israel, led to the Lebanon War and Israeli occupation
(1982–1985). The resistance movement of ‘Hezbollah’ provoked many assassinations
and border clashes, causing the direct response of Israeli Army in 2006.91 Since then,
isolated incidents preserve the foreign relations of neighboring countries strained.
89
“IEC’s Presentation”, Israel Electric Corporation Ltd, Feb 2012, available at: http://www.iec.co.il
/EN/IR/Documents/IECs_Presentation.pdf (accessed in 11 Sep 2012).
90
“The Natural Gas Sector in Israel : Forecast Demand”, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources,
available at : http://energy.gov.il/English/Subjects/Natural%20Gas/Pages/GxmsMniNGEconomy.aspx
(accessed in 11 Sep 2012).
91
Israel has been strictly criticized for its offensive foreign policy, indicatively: Inbar, E., “How Israel
Bungled the Second Lebanon War”, Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2007, pp.57-65, available at:
35
Spyridon Giotis
Gas discoveries in 2009 (Tamar) and 2010 (Leviathan) caused legal disputes,
concerning the demarcation of the maritime borders (see map 4).92According to
Article 74 of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
states with opposites or adjacent coasts must delimit their EEZ by applying the
international law, in order to find an equitable solution.93 Lebanon signed a bilateral
agreement with Cyprus
in
2007,
ratified
by
Cyprus
but
not
by
the
Lebanese Parliament.94
Map 4: Disputed Border Area Between Israel and Lebanon
Source: YaLIBNAN, 2012, available at: http://www.yalibnan.com/2012/03/01/lebanon-speaker-on-eezour-problem-is-with-israel-not-cyprus/.
http://www.meforum.org/1686/how-israel-bungled-the-second-lebanon-war (accessed in 12 Sep 2012),
Reinhart, T., “Israel’s ‘New Middle East’ ”, Peace and Security, July 27, 2006, available at: http://
www.tni.org/archives/archives_reinhart_newmiddleeast (accessed in 12 Sep 2012).
92
The legal term ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ (EEZ) refers to “the sovereign rights of the coastal State
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources”,
UNCLOS, Dec 10, 1982, article 55, available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements
/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed in 12 Sep 2012).
93
Ibid, article 74.
94
According to General Nizan Abdel-Kadar, political analyst for the Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut, the
agreement was never ratified due to fears that Turkish government might express reservations that
could affect their economic relations, in Wahlisch,. M., “Israel-Lebanon Offshore Oil and Gas
Dispute-Rules of International Maritime Law”, The American Society of International Law, Vol.15,
Iss. 31, December 5, 2011, available at : http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight111205.pdf (accessed
in 13 Sep 2012).
36
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
In December 2010, a unilateral demarcation of Lebanese maritime borders with Israel
deposited to UN,95 few months before Cyprus and Israel ratified their delimitation of
their maritime borders (Feb 2011). This raised a disputed area, estimated about 850
squares kilometers,96 over which Lebanon claims exploiting rights.
After the announcement of Noble energy about significant gas discoveries in
Israel’s maritime borders, Lebanon argued that natural gas fields are partially in
Lebanese EEZ. The Lebanese Foreign Minister stated that “Israel’s measures have
created a new point of tension in the region and threaten peace and security across
this region”, claiming that Israel infringe on Lebanese EEZ.97 Similarly, President
Michel Suleiman warned that “Lebanon will defend its rights and resources by any
and all legitimate means.”
98
Few weeks ago, the Israel’s Minister of National
Infrastructure, Uzi Landau, had made a provocative statement, according to which
Israel would not hesitate to use its force and strength “to protect not only the rule of
law, but the international maritime law.”99 The political rhetoric of both sides
manifests the great significance of energy resources and their close relation to national
security.100
Despite the delimitation disputes, Lebanon launched this year the first round of
bidding for exploration.101 In addition, Ministry of Energy and Water announced
invitation for expression of interest in construction and operation of a floating storage
and regasification unit (FSRU), in order to supply natural gas in 2015.102 New
discoveries in maritime borders could benefit tremendously Lebanon to overcome the
95
In 2010, Lebanon declared unilaterally its maritime borders with Cyprus and Israel that differed
from those of the bilateral agreement of 2007 with Cyprus; Ibid.
96
For additional geographic information, see Scovvazi, T., “Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea”, Policy Brief, GMF, June 2012, p.9, available at: http://www.gmfus.org/
wpcontent/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339170753Leigh_SummaryDocument_Jun12_maps.pdf (accessed in
13 Sep 2012).
97
Kessler, O., “Lebanon Warns Israel Against Sea-Border Demarcation”, The Jerusalem Post, July
11, 2011, available at: http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=228880 (accessed in
13 Sep 2012).
98
Ibid.
99
“Infrastructure Minister Warns Hezbollah: Israel Will Fight for its Gas Fields” Haaretz, June 24,
2010, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/infrastructure-minister-warnshezbollah -israel-will-fight-for-its-gas-fields-1.298077 (accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
100
According to Brenda Shaffer, the ‘Israel Card’ was used from Lebanese government to pass the
‘Petroleum Law’, by which revenues were placing in the government budget instead of a public
revenue fund, in Shaffer, B., “Israel-New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean”, Energy
Policy, Elsevier, Vol.39, Iss.9, 2011, p.5385-5386.
101
“Lebanon 1st Licensing Round”, Rebublic of Lebanon, Ministry of Energy and Water, available at:
http://www.lebanon-exploration.com/DownLoads/LIPE_2012/Leb_MEW_Flyer_16Apr12.pdf
(accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
102
“Lebanon to Join LNG Importers Club”, LNG World News, April 6, 2012, available at: http://www.
lngworldnews.com/lebanon-to-join-lng-importers-club/ (accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
37
Spyridon Giotis
bad economic situation,103 but in the same time could escalate the tensions in the
region. Stable foreign relations with Israel are a prerequisite for Lebanon to develop
its energy factor, although it seems that the resistance of Hezbollah deprives such
opportunity.104
4.1.3.
The Revival of ‘Cold Peace’ with Egypt
The state of war between both countries dated back from the Arab-Israeli War in
1948, which ended in 1979 with a Peace Treaty (Camp David Accord). The period
that followed is known as “Cold Peace”, and kept over 30 years.
105
The Egyptian
revolution (part of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’) entailed Mubarak’s resignation and
brought to power a new Islamic government that raised great concerns about the
preservation of the Peace Treaty.106 The agitation was not unjustifiable; the new
Islamist Prime Minister Mohammed Morsi, speaking in the Islamic Conference in
Mecca, stressed that “the Palestinian issue is the most urgent”.107 Furthermore, Egypt
infringed the term of Peace Treaty and sent troops to occupy Sinai Peninsula.108 The
resilience of the peace treaty was facing a serious test, and energy commitments made
the situation more complex.
Israel imports a large volume of oil from Egypt, after the Peace Treaty of 1979.
Nonetheless, gas exports were launched in 2008, after the deal between IEC and the
Egyptian Eastern Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG). EMG constructed a 90
kilometer undersea pipeline from El Arish in Egypt’s Sinai to the Israeli port of
103
Lebanese public debt is 134% of GDP (2011 est.) and public deficit -6% (2011 est.), in Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook”,available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html (accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
104
Ravid,.B., “Netanyahu: Israel Will Strike Lebanese State in Case of Hezbollah Provocation”,
Haaretz, August 27, 2012, available at : http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahuisrael-will-strike-lebanese-state-in-case-of-hezbollah-provocation.premium-1.460853 (accessed in 13
Sep 2012).
105
Kasinof, L., “An Uneasy Egyptian-Israeli Peace”, Aljazeera, June 9, 2010, available at: http://www.
aljazeera.com/focus/2010/06/20106913118995853.html (accessed in 13 Sep 2012). For the number of
realities that led to the ‘Cold’ Peace, see Aly, M. S. and Feldman, S., “Testing the Resilience of
Egyptian-Israeli Peace”, Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, No 56, Nov 2011,
available at : http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.html (accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
106
Black, I., “Egypt Protests: Israel Fears Unrest May Threaten Peace Treaty”, The Guardian, Jan 31,
2011, available at : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/israel-egypt-mubarak-peace-treatyfears (accessed in 13 Sep 2011).
107
Issacharoff, A., “At Islamic Conference, Egypt's Morsi Calls for Regime Change in Syria”, Haaretz,
August 15, 2012, available at : http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/at-islamic-conference-egypts-morsi-calls-for-regime-change-in-syria-1.458487 (accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
108
Issacharov, A., “Egypt Deployed Troops in Sinai Without Israel's Prior Approval”, Haaretz, August
16, 2012, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/egypt-deployed-troops-insinai-without-israel-s-prior-approval-1.458511 (accessed in 13 Sep 2012).
38
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Ashkelon (see map 5), providing 25 bcm of natural gas for 15 years (at an annual rate
of 1,7 bcm/y).109
Map 5: Egypt Natural Gas Export Pipeline
Source: Middle East Strategic Perspectives, available at: http://www.mestrategicperspectives.com
/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Arab-Gas-Pipeline.png.
It is estimated that Israel imports from Egypt about 2,5 bcm (2010 est.), almost 40
per cent of its total consumption.110 However, the pipeline becomes target of 13
terrorist attacks, since Hosni Mubarak was ousted from office in Egypt.111In 22 April,
Mohamed Shoeb, head of the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company, stressed that
109
Shmuel, E., “Egypt's Revocation of the Natural Gas Agreement with Israel: Strategic Implications”,
INSS Insight, No. 332, May 6, 2012, available at : http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&
incat=&read=6488 (accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
110
The total Israel’s consumption is approximately 5,2 bcm (2010 est), in Republic of Israel, Ministry
of Energy and Water Resources, “The Natural Gas Sector in Israel: Forecast Demand”, available at :
http://energy. gov.il/English/Subjects/Natural%20Gas/Pages/GxmsMniNGEconomy.aspx (accessed in
14 Sep 2012).
111
Lynch, S., “Effects of Pipeline Attacks Spread Beyond Egypt”, USA Today, March 14,2012,
available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-05/egypt-natural-gas-pipeline-jordan
-israel/535208 80/1 (accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
39
Spyridon Giotis
the company will terminate the supply of natural gas to Israel and that this termination
of the deal had to do with commercial reasons and not with the repeated attacks on the
pipeline.112
Border attacks in Sinai Peninsula during this summer made the two neighboring
countries to increase their suspiciousness. Egypt, without the Israeli approval,
deployed more ground troops in order to monitor the borders (under the terms of the
1979 Peace Treaty, which returned Sinai to Egyptian control).113 The increasing
suspiciousness has led to an arm race, both supporting by US industry.114 Israel’s
military expenditures were almost twice, 7,3 % of GDP (2006 est.) comparing with
3,4 of the Egyptian (2005 est.).115 Regionally military balance demonstrates Israel’s
superiority in conventional arms, justifying the realistic perspective of Israeli foreign
policy. 116
The new Islamic regime of Mohammed Morsi is linked to Hamas in Gaza via the
Muslim Brotherhood Party,117 while keep foreign relations with Israel high in
the political agenda, in order to preserve the electoral support during the transition
period.118 In addition, the Egyptian President seeks to militarize Sinai Peninsula and it
is obvious that Israel will react.119 However, Netanyahu’s government has adopted
policies that are meant to help Israel defend against the potential deterioration in
112
An estimation of the political reasons that led to the interruption of the agreement with Israel is
given in Bar’el, Z., “Termination of Israeli-Egyptian Natural Gas Agreement Serves Dangerous
Precedent”,Haaretz, April 23, 2012, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/
termination-of-israeli-egyptian-natural-gas-agreement-serves-dangerous-precedent-1.425942 (accessed
in 14 Sep 2012). For an economic analysis of this agreement, see Siddig, K., and Grethe, H., “ The
Natural Gas Sector in the Post Revolution Egypt”, accepted paper for presentation at the 15th GTAP
Conference "New Challenges for Global Trade and Sustainable Development", World Trade
Organization (WTO), Geneva, Switzerland, June 27–29, 2012, available at: https://www.gtap.
agecon.purdue.edu /resources/download/5980.pdf (accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
113
“Sinai: Egypt Sends Reinforcements as Offensive Builds”, BBC News, Middle East, Aug 9, 2012,
available at : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19192629 (accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
114
Cordesman, A., Burke, A. and Nerguizian, A., “The Arab-Israeli Military Balance : Conventional
Realities and Asymmetric Challenges”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 29,
2010, p.39, available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/100629_Arab-IsraeliMilBal.pdf (accessed in 14
Sep 2012).
115
“The World Factbook”, CIA.
116
See tables in Cordesman, A., Burke, A. et al, p.12, p.24.
117
Brotherhood is the Muslim political party, whose candidate, Mohamed Morsi, was the winner of
the first competitive Presidential elections in June 2012 with 51,7%, in Saman, E.,“Muslim
Brotherhood (Egypt)”, The New York Times, September 14, 2012, available at: http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/muslim_brotherhood_egypt/index.html
(accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
118
An analysis about the new challenges that Morsi’s regime faces, see Brown, N.,
“Egypt’s Ambiguous Transition”, Carnegie Endowment, September 6, 2012, available at : http://
carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi# (accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
119
Eilam, E., “Egypt : New Government, Old Challenges”, Defense and Security Analysis, Routledge,
Vol. 28, Iss. 2, May 11, 2012, p.190.
40
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
relations with Egypt. It seems that Israel prioritizes the reliability of gas supply, which
will commence from Tamar field in 2013, and the formation of pro-West alliances,
like this with Cyprus.
4.2.
4.2.1.
Natural Gas Challenges Turkish Aspirations
Turkish Energy Policy
The end of the 20th century found Turkish Republic as a growing regional power in
the Middle East.120 Turkey is located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, which
makes it of high geopolitical significance. In addition, Turkey managed to develop a
robust economy,121 while the dynamics of internal politics and its desire to ensure the
stability and regional safety in the post-Arab spring Middle East, gave Turkey a key
role in the region.122 The rise to power of the Islamic rooted Justice and Development
Party (AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in 2002, inaugurated a new secular, pro
Western policy, which would led to the Turkish liberal democracy.123 Tagip Erdogan,
the Turkish Prime Minister who enjoys for a third term great popular support,
promote a high profile diplomatic, political and economic role for Turkey in the
Middle East.
Turkish energy politics are a facet of its strategy, the neo-Ottoman strategy.124
Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Turkish Foreign Minister, is considered to be
the architect of this strategy, which lies on its location in geopolitical areas of
influence and its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire (The “Strategic Depth”).125
The Turkish energy strategy aims at the use of its location as an energy corridor,
120
There is a great literature about the political history of modern Turkey; indicatively : Zurcher,
E.(2003), “Turkey : A Modern History”, Tauris and Co Ltd., New York, 2nd ed.; Kedourie, S. (1999),
“Turkey Before and After Ataturk : Internal and External Affairs”, Frank Cass Publishers, New York;
Ahmad, F.(1993), “The Making of Modern Turkey”, Routledge, London, available at: http://psi301.
cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Feroz%20Ahmad%20Making%20of%20Modern%20TR%281%29.pdf
(accessed in 20 Sep 2012).
121
From 1999, Turkey is member of G20, which includes both developed and emerging economies,
available at: http://www.g20.org/en/members, (accessed in 20 Sep 2012).
122
Davutoglou, A.,” Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Insight Turkey, Vol 10,
No 1, 2008, p.77, available at : http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/9595.pdf (accessed in 20 Sep 2012).
123
n practice, however, the notion of liberal democracy does differ in Turkey. For an analysis of the
political Islam in Turkey, see Tank, P., “Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity”,
Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No 1, March 2005, pp.3-19, available at: http://www.prio.no/sptrans/74227839/2005pt001.pdf (accessed in 20 Sep 2012).
124
Taspinar, O., (2008), pp 14-17.
125
Walker, J., “Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine”,
Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, No 3, 2007, available at: http://files.setav.org/uploads/Pdf/insight_turkey_
vol_9_no_3_2007_joshua_walker.pdf (accessed in 21 Sep 2012).
41
Spyridon Giotis
between Eastern rich energy countries (Caspian) and European energy markets. For
Davutoglu, the control of regional energy flows can play a significant role in Turkey’s
strategy, solidifying its regional relevance and enhance its political importance. “Zero
problems with neighbors” is an operational principle that should guide the Turkish
policy makers.126
Turkey has a close geography to around 72% of the world’s natural gas and 73% of
oil reserves (Middle East and Caspian region).127 However Turkey’s proven oil and
gas reserves seem to be very low, on account of this imported in 2009 about 90% of
its total consumption.128 Natural gas demand increased almost 50% from 20062011,129 because of the significant progress in switching from coaled fired plants to
Figure 5: Electricity Generation by Fuel
GWh
Source: IEA (2011), available at: http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/TRELEC.pdf.
126
According to Ahmet Davutoglu, there are three methodological and five operational principles that
should drive the Turkish foreign policy, in Davutoglu, A, “Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy”,
Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010, available at: http://jft-newspaper.aub.edu.lb/reserve/data/
s11244/s11244.pdf (accessed in 21 Sep 2012).
127
“Turkey’s Energy Strategy”, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://
www.mfa.gov.tr /turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa (accessed in 21 Sep 2012).
128
“Turkey: Statistics”, US EIA, Feb 2011, available at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?
fips=TU (accessed in 21 Sep 2012).
129
“Statistical Review of World Energy”, BP, June 2012, p.23, available at : http://www.bp.com/
assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2
011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.pdf (accessed in
21 Sep 2012).
42
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
natural gas plants in power generation (see figure 5).130 In order to meet the
increasing demand for natural gas, Turkey has signed pure casing agreements for
twenty years period with many countries, such as the Russian Federation, Algeria,
Nigeria and Iran (see figure 6) and imports natural gas through pipelines and LNG
terminals in Izmir and Marmara (see map 14)131. Over the last decade, Turkey
Figure 6: Turkeys Natural Gas Imports by Country (Share %)
Source: Tonus, O. (2008).
has been the second country after China, in terms of natural gas and electricity
demand’s increase.132 Turkey’s energy demand is expected to grow 5.9 percent
annually until 2025.133
The close geographic proximity to energy supplier countries has made Turkey to
become a significant transit state. Many pipeline projects, realized or proposed,
provides development and investment opportunities, contributes to European’s energy
supply security and upgrades its geopolitical location (see map 6). Moreover, Turkey
aspires to become an energy hub,134 not only to meet its rising domestic energy
130
Shaffer, B., “Turkey’s Energy Policies in a Tight Global Energy Market”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 8,
No 2, April - June 2006, available at: http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/insight_turkey_shaffer
_energy.pdf (accessed in 21 Sep 2012), p.99.
131
Tonus, O., “Turkeys Future Role s a Transit Country for Central Asia and Caspian Natural Gas
Transfer to the EU : The Nabbuco Project”, 6th International Conference on Politics and International
Affairs, 23-26 June 2008, Athens, available at: http://bildiri.anadolu.edu.tr/papers/ bildirimakale
/106_901j22.pdf (accessed in 23 Sep 2012).
132
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit. For more information about bilateral
purchase agreements, see Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), “Natural Gas Sale and
Purchase Agreements”, available at : http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp (accessed in 23 Sep 2012).
133
Wietze, L., and Van Montfort, K., “Energy Consumption and GDP in Turkey: Is There a
Cointegration Relationship?”, Paper presented at EcoMod2005 International Conference on Policy
Modeling, June 29 – July 2, 2005, Istanbul, Turkey, p.10, available at : http://www.ecn.nl/
docs/library/report/2005/rx 05191.pdf (accessed in 23 Sep 2012).
134
Hub country buys another country’s gas, stores it and re-sells it as its own gas to third countries at
a higher price. A transit country, however, provides transit service through pipelines on its territory for
an agreed (cost-based) fee, enabling the producer country to enter into direct commercial relations with
the customers for its gas; for a further analysis, see Bilgin, M., “Turkey’s Energy Strategy : What
43
Spyridon Giotis
demands, but also to export natural gas to additional markets. In the era of high
energy demand, Turkey has the major advantage to use its role as leverage for close
Map 6: International Gas Pipeline Projects
Source: Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), available at:http://www.botas.gov.
tr/index.asp.
cooperation with neighboring countries and EU.135 Nevertheless, a number of risks
are inherent in the energy hub role.136
4.2.2.
The Regional Tension with Cyprus
The Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 has made Turkey the major interlocutor in
Cypriot internal political affairs. Their longstanding hostility is closely related to the
Difference Does it Make to Become an Energy Transit Corridor, Hub or Center?”, UNISI Discussion
Papers, No 23, May 2010, available at: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%
20DP%2023%20-%20 BILGIN.pdf (accessed in 23 Sep 2012).
135
Abbasov, G. F., “Turkish Natural Gas Hub and Energy Security : Theory and Practice”, Political
Reflection Magazine, Center for Strategic Research and Analysis, Vol.3, No.3, June-July-August 2012,
available at: http://cesran.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1460&Itemid=224&
lang =en (accessed in 23 Sep 2012).
136
About risk in Turkey’s role as an energy hub, see Shaffer, B. (2006), pp. 102-103.
44
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
suspicion and distrust that both sides have historically cultivated.137 In 1983, the Turk
Cypriots declare northern Cyprus as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
and recognized only by Turkey. Cypriot problem became more complicated after the
accession of the Cypriot island in EU (2004) and the decision of EU leaders to start
accession negotiations with Turkey from October 2005.138
Recent gas discoveries heightened tensions between Turkey and Cyprus and raised
legal issues over the demarcation of maritime borders. Turkey does not recognize the
Republic of Cyprus and the bilateral delimitation agreements between Cyprus and
Egypt, Israel and Lebanon, without a “comprehensive solution to the Cyprus
problem”.139 Moreover, TRNC signed a delimitation agreement with Turkey in
Map 7: The Overlapping of Turkish Cypriot Blocks with Greek Cypriot
Source: Erciyes, C., “Maritime Delimitation & Offshore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean:
Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments”, Presentation, Ankara, March 21, 2012,
available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/maritime_delimitation.pdf.
137
For a detailed review of the Cypriot problem, see Hannay, D. (2005), “Cyprus: The Search for a
Solution”, I.B.Tauris, London.
138
For more information about the relation of Turkey with EU, see “Countries Preparing to Join:
Turkey”, European Commission, August 13, 2012, available at : http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement
/countries/ detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm (accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
139
Ö ütçü M., “Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Turkish Dimension”, Policy Brief, GMF,
June 2012, p.2, available at: http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339171647
Ogutcu_EasternMedRivalry_Jun12.pdf (accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
45
Spyridon Giotis
September 2011140 and issued a license for explanatory drilling to the Turkish
Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).141 Turkish Cypriot Blocks which granted to TPAO
overlap with the Greek Cypriot Blocks that Cyprus announced in the Second
Licensing Round (see map 7).
Turkey believes that its long coastline entitles it to assert a large share of maritime
zone, and view with suspicion the common Greek – Cypriot claims. In particular,
Turkey challenge the EEZ of the small Greek island Kastellorizo (see map 8 & 9) and
argue that the conflict “should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all
the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the
interests involved to the parties…”.142 It is clear that Turkey keeps the discussion
about maritime borders open, in order to negotiate in case of future energy resource
discoveries.
Map 8: Maritime Boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus
Source: Giamouridis, A. “The Offshore Discovery in the Republic of Cyprus: Monetization Prospects
and Challenges” , The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, July 2012, p.16, available at :
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NG_65.pdf.
140
Bursch, J., “Turkey-North Cyprus Gas Deal Set to Raise Regional Tensions”, Reuters, September
21, 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/21/us-turkey-cyprus-idUSTRE78K5
AC20110921 (accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
141
“TPAO and Ministry of Economy and Energy of TRNC Partnership for Petroleum Services and
Production”, TPAO, available at : http://www.tpao.gov.tr/tp2/sub_en/sub_news.aspx?id=28 (accessed
in 24 Sep 2012).
142
UNCLOS, article 59, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
46
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Turkey is insisting on the rights of the Turk Cypriots in any energy operation in
the islands offshore. Davutoglu warned Greek Cypriot government that Ankara will
show “the appropriate reaction” in case of offshore drillings.143 In addition, the
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, threatened to turn out international oil and gas
companies, if they cooperate with Greek Cypriots on the Mediterranean
exploration.144 To underline its objections, Turkey provocatively sent warships near
the Cypriot Aphrodite field in December 2011.145 Nevertheless, the Israel-Cyprus
cooperation changes the balance of powers and illustrates the risk if escalation
arising from rival claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Turkish assertive regional behavior is based on the political realism that its
foreign policy has adopted.146 Turkey understands that their chance to join EU
decreases as much as Cyprus is free to develop. Furthermore, Northern Cyprus might
Map 9: Turkish EEZ Maritime Zone
Proclamations
Source: Ozturk, B.,& Baseren, S., “The Exclusive Economic Zone Debates in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea and Fisheries”, Journal of Black Sea/ Mediterranean Environment, Vol 14, 2008,
p. 81, available at : http://www.blackmeditjournal.org/blackmeditjournal.org/pdf/1-20bayram%20
hoca%20makale.pdf.
143
“Turkey Warns Greek Cyprus Against Hydrocarbon Drill”, Todays Zaman, August 5, 2011,
available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-252815-turkey-warns-greek-cyprus-against-hydro
carbon-drill. html (accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
144
“Turkey Ups Ante in East Med Gas Row with Greek Cyprus”, Today’s Zaman, September 22,
2011, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=257634
(accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
145
Chadjigeorgiou, S., “Turkish Warships Escalate Tension in Eastern Mediterranean, Dangerously –
Report”, Cyprusnetnewsreport.com, December 24, 2011, available at: http://www.cyprusnewsreport.
com/?q=node/5084 (accessed in 24 Sep 2012).
146
Theofylactou, D., “Geopolitics, Turkey’s EU Accession Course and Cyprus: Power Balances and
‘Soft Power’ Calculations”, South-Eastern European and Black Sea Studies, Routledge, London,
Vol.12, Iss.1, March 13, 2012, p.106.
47
Spyridon Giotis
be no longer dependent on Turkey’s subsidies, which could diminish Turkey’s
political influence and have been used as a leverage to demand concessions
regarding the Turkish population.147
Finally, the strategic alliance of Cyprus with Israel cause serious problems in
Turkish foreign policy, because has to confront traditional Israeli alliances, like US.
The prevalent zero-sum game logic of both countries and the Turkish military
structure poses a potentially serious threat to the stability and the security of Eastern
Mediterranean.
4.2.3.
The Deteriorating Turkish-Israeli Relations
The relations between the Turkey and Israel were generally positive since the
establishment of Israel. Turkey was the first Muslim country that recognized the
Jewish state. The uncertainty about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) after the end of Cold War, led Turkey search for new allies in
the Middle East.148 The strategic alliance with Israel counterbalanced Syria, Iraq and
Iran, which were supporters of the Kurdish separators (PKK) and aspired to export the
Islamist reactionism (fundamentalism).149 Furthermore, Turkey benefited from the
numerous military agreements between the two countries, that modernized the
Turkish military equipment and upgraded its intelligence and counterterrorism
capabilities.150 For Israel, forming close relations with pro Western, secular –
democratic Turkey, was an opportunity to end its regional isolation and break out of
the hostile ring of Arabic-speaking neighbors. Besides, both countries had the
common threat perception of radical Islam. The government of the Muslim leader
147
Blank, S. (2011).
Turkey paid particular attention in regional cooperation and multilateralism in foreign affairs, like
the involvement in the Gulf War and implementing regional arrangements as Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC), in Karaosmanoglu, A., “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the
Military in Turkey”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No 1, Fall 2000, p.210, available at :
http://www.sbu.yildiz.edu.tr/~faksu/Fuatyayinlar/TDPIIdocs/alikaraosmanoglu.pdf (accessed in 26 Sep
2012).
149
Alterman, J., and Malka H., “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Geometry”, The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 35, No 3, Summer 2012, p.114, available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12
SummerAltermanMalka.pdf (accessed in 26 Sep 2012); Bir, C. and Sherman, M., “Formula for
Stability : Turkey Plus Israel”, The Middle East Quarterly, Vol.9, No 4, Fall 2002, pp. 23-32, available
at : http://www.meforum.org/511/formula-for-stability-turkey-plus-israel (accessed in 26 Sep 2012).
150
The military exports from Israel to Turkey (1992-2009) amounts to $722 m, see Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: Arm Exports from
Israel”, available at: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php (accessed in 26 Sep
2012).
148
48
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Necmettin Erbakan (1996-1997) did not hindered the growing cooperation, which
expanded until 2009.151
In the Turkish Presidential elections of 2002, the Islamic rooted AKP become the
party of government. Despite its pro-EU orientation, it showed its Islamic sensitivity
with respect to the Palestinian problem.152 However, both countries maintained their
strategic, political and economic relations until 2009, though there was a growing
tension in the diplomatic level.153 Two major incidents considered to be milestones in
the radical change of their relations: first, the harsh criticism to Simon Peres, the
Israeli President, about Gaza, during the World Economic Forum in Switzerland
(January 29, 2009), when Prime Minister Erdogan left the panel saying that he would
never return to Davos;154 second, the ‘Mavi Marmara’ flotilla incident (May 2010),
when Israeli soldiers killed nine Turkish activists aboard, when the flotilla attempt to
break the Israel’s blockage of Gaza.155 Turkey recalled its ambassador and demanded
the end of Gaza blockage as a condition for restoring their diplomatic relations.
The escalation of the tension between the two countries also expanded in military
level. In Aug 2009, few months after the Davos incident, Turkey, Israel and US
executed a joint military exercise called ‘Reliant Mermaid’, focusing on search and
rescue operations involving naval ships and aircrafts.156 However, in October 2009,
Ankara excluded Israel from the Exercise ‘Anatolian Eagle’, which included NATO
and Italian forces, claiming that the government acted as a ‘spokesman for the
conscience of the people’ and that the Turkish people did not want Israel to participate
151
Erbakan considered Israel as a "timeless enemy" and "a cancer in the heart of the Arab and Muslim
world.", in Pipes, D., “A New Axis : The Emerging Turkish – Israeli Endente”, National Interest,
Winter 1997-1998, available at: http://www.meforum.org/pipes/293/a-new-axis-the-emerging-turkishisraeli-entente (accessed in 26 Sep 2012).
152
About the Turkish diplomacy and the Palestine question, see Aras, B., “Turkey and the Palestine
Question”, Policy Brief, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Economi ve
Tuplum Arastirmalari Vakfi, SETA), January 2009, No 29, available at: http://www.bulentaras.com/
fp/files/policy_brief27.pdf (accessed in 26 Sep 2012).
153
For a detailed analysis of the escalation of the crisis in the relations between Turkey and Israel, see
Eligur, B., “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to
Enmity”, Middle East Studies, Routledge, London Vol.48, No 3, May 2012, pp.429-459.
154
Erdogan said to Peres: “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill”, in Bennhold, K.,
“Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash on Davos Panel”, The New York Times, January 29, 2009,
available at : http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html?_r=0 (accessed in 26
Sep 2012).
155
“Israel Attacks Gaza Aid Fleet”, Aljazeera, May 31, 2010, available at: http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2010/05/201053133047995359.html (accessed in 26 Sep 2012).
156
Curtis, N., “Israeli, Turkish, U.S. Forces Gather to Begin Exercise Reliant Mermaid 2009”, US
European Command, August 18, 2009, available at : http://www.eucom.mil/article/20172/israeliturkish-us-forces-gather-begin-exercise (accessed in 29 Sep 2012).
49
Spyridon Giotis
in the exercise.157 The stoppage of their military cooperation was followed by the
strengthening of Turkish ties with Syria and Iran: Turkey and Syria began their firstever joint land force exercise in April 2009,158 while Iran supported the Turkish –
Chinese covertly drill, by allowing its airbases to be used for refueling of Chinese SU27 warplanes.159 Turkish foreign policy changed the regional balance of power and
creates a new strategic, anti-Israel, environment, where Turkey has a prime role in
Middle East.
The expansion of Turkish military power and the shift of Turkey’s foreign policy
with Eastern Mediterranean countries are closely connected with the militarization of
energy geopolitics. Gas discoveries in Israel weaken the position of Turkey as the
major energy player in the region. Ankara knows that the cheapest solution for the
exploitation of newly found gas reserves is through its pipeline network (see map 12)
and that capital intensive energy projects are difficult to materialize, because of the
economic crisis. For that, Turkey is trying to force the Cypriot-Israeli energy
prospects, based on two key elements: first, on a zero sum logic, that it is difficult for
a state to improve its prospects for survival without threatening the survival of the
other state, and second on a realistic perspective, according to which energy resources
are maximize the power of a state and, as such, become main objective for military
action. Nevertheless, the Turkish aspiration meets the opposition of global actors,
which see with skepticism the new role of Turkey in the broader region of the Middle
East.
4.3.
4.3.1.
Natural Gas as an Incentive for Cooperation for Cyprus
The Cypriot Energy Policy
Cyprus has historically been a point of conflict between ancient enemies, Greece and
Turkey. The island has been divided since Turkey invaded in 1974 and seized the
157
Statement of Tayyip Erdogan in al-Arabija television station, in Karabat, A.,“Turkey's Relations
with Syria and Israel: Fatal Renunciation of the West”, Qantara.de, October 23, 2009, available at:
http://en.qantara.de/Fatal-Renunciation-of-the-West/6933c155/index.html (accessed in 29 Sep 2012);
Borger, J., “Turkey Confirms it Barred Israel from Military Exercise Because of Gaza War”, The
Guardian, October 12, 2009, available at : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/12/turkey-israelmilitary-gaza (accessed in 29 Sep 2012).
158
“Turkey and Syria to stage joint military exercise”, Today’s Zaman, April 26, 2009, available at:
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=173556 (accessed
in 29 Sep 2012).
159
Pfeffer, A., “Growing ties between Turkey, China, Iran worry Israel and US”, Haaretz, October 7,
2010, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/growing-ties-between-turkey-china-iranworry-israel-and-u-s-1.317583 (accessed in 29 Sep 2012).
50
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
northern sector, roughly 37% or the island. The occupied sector declared as Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) recognized only by Ankara. On the contrary,
the government of the Greek Cypriot south in Nicosia is recognized internationally.
The economy of the island is defined about the fact that it had no significant
natural resources and its all energy needs is supplied through imports (see figure 7).
Energy supply is totally dependent on oil (see figure 8), while market share for 2000
was about 40 % for commercial use and 35% for domestic household sector.160 As a
consequence, Cyprus faces serious problems during the tourist period, with excessive
load growth because of the peak demand. The development of Cypriot tourist industry
entail the increasing of energy consumption by an average 7,5 % annually,161 when
the final consumption of electricity increased approximately 80 % in the period 19952005.162 In 2004, Cyprus accessed in European Union (EU) as a full member state and
its energy activities are governed by the EU legislation. 163
Figure 7: Energy Imports Net (% of Energy Use)
98,5
98
E 97,5
G
A
T
97
N
E
C
R
E
P 96,5
VALUE
96
95,5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
DATE
Source: Data collected from Index Mundi, available at : http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/cyprus/
energy-imports.
160
Koroneos, C., Fokaidis, P. and Moussiopoulos, N., “Cyprus Energy System and the Use of
Renewable Energy Resources”, Energy, Elsevier Ltd., June 27, 2003, p.1891, available at:
http://www2.archimedes.ee/teadus/File/kasulikku_koostoo/2008/energia_cyprus_overwiev_2005_2801
08.pdf (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
161
According to Eurostat, the number of tourists from 2002 to 2011has increased approximately 70 %,
in “Statistics”, Eurostat, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=
1&language=en&pcode=tin00045&plugin=1 (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
162
“National Energy Efficiency Action Plan”, Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Commerce, Industry
and Tourism, Nicosia, June 27,2007, available at : http://ec.europa.eu/energy/demand/legislation/
doc/neeap/ cyprus_en.pdf (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
163
For a background of the Cypriot and EU legislation about oil and gas activities, see “The Oil and
Gas Regime in the Republic of Cyprus”, Energy Briefing, Ashurst, March 2012.
51
Spyridon Giotis
Cyprus implemented its sovereign rights to explore for hydrocarbons,164
announcing the first Licensing Round offshore Cyprus in 15 February 2007.165
Cypriots had already made bilateral agreements on the delimitation of its EEZ with
neighboring countries (see map 9). In 2007, signed an EEZ delimitation agreement
with Lebanon, albeit it has not been ratified by Lebanese government and is therefore
Figure 8: Share of Total Primary Energy Supply (est.2009)
Source: IEA, available at: http://www.iea.org/stats/graphresults.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=CY.
not currently in force. On December 2010, Cyprus signed a delimitation agreement
with Israel.166 Although ratified and in force (since February 2011), the Cyprus-Israel
agreement is disputed by Turkey and Lebanon.
On 28 December 2011, Cypriot President Demetris Christofias announced that
Noble Energy Company estimated that the gas field “Aphrodite” in Block 12,
amounted 5-8 tcf.167 The discovery came few months later after the destruction of its
main power station in Vasilikos on July 2011, which killed 12 Cypriots.168 In
addition, Cypriot authorities request financial support through International
164
According to Directive 94/22/EC, in European Parliament, “Directive 94/22/EC”, Official Journal, L
164, June 30, 1994, pp. 3-8, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX: 31994L0022:EN:HTML (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
165
“Hydrocarbon Exploration: First Licensing Round (2007)”, Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of
Commerce, Industry and Tourism, available at: http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/ mcit.nsf/All/
FE3EB5707ADA0E6EC225771B0035B0D2?Open Document (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
166
United Nations (UN), “Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation”, UN, Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/cyp_isr_eez_2010.pdf (accessed in 15 Sep
2012).
167
Lee, M. and Orphanidis, S., “Noble’s Cyprus Gas Find May Be Complicated by Turkey”,
Bloomberg, December 29, 2011, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-28/noble-scyprus-gas-discovery-may-be-complicated-by-turkey-2-.html (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
168
“Massive Explosion at Cyprus Naval Base”, The Independent, July 2011, available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/massive-explosion-at-cyprus-naval-bas -2311827.
html (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
52
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Monetary Fund (IMF),169 because the contagion from the uncontrollable economic
crisis of the Eurozone hit Greek Cypriot Banks, highly exposed to the Greek banking
system.170 Gas discoveries give Cyprus a great opportunity to develop its energy
offshore resources and boost investments in the island.
In February 2012, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, announced the
second Licensing Round offshore Cyprus,171 in which participated group of
companies “with financial capacities and technical-commercial skills”, like the
French Total and the Italian ENI.172 New discoveries could make the island potential
natural gas exporter, modernize its economy and enhance energy outlook. Significant
benefits could also forgo, if Cyprus realize economies of scale through the energy
cooperation with Israel and International Oil Companies (IOC).
4.3.2.
The Cyprus-Israel Alliance
Foreign relations between the two countries dated from their establishment as
independent states. Cyprus was a host for thousands of Jewish refugees from Europe
that they could not arrive to Palestine. In 1974, the Turkish invasion brought the de
facto partition of the island, while the close defense relationship of Israel with Turkey
led Cyprus to back Palestinians during the Arab-Israel War. Recent gas discoveries
came at the same time that foreign relation between Israel and Turkey deteriorated,
after the World Economic Forum in Davos.173 The fundamental changes in the
relations with Israel were triggered from the potential exploitation of gas reserves as
well as the explosion that destroyed the power plant of Vasilikos.
Both countries greeted the announcement of Cypriot gas discoveries with
enthusiasm. Besides, Cypriot-Israel approach had officially initiated in March 2011,
169
“Statement by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde on Cyprus”, IMF, Press Release No.
12/240, June 27, 2012, available at: http://www.imf.org/external /np/sec/pr/2012/pr12240.htm
(accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
170
The exposure of Cypriot banks to Greek banks is estimated to be in the range of €7-10 billion, in
Emerson, M., “Fishing for Gas and More in Cypriot Waters”, Policy Brief , The Center for European
and Policy Studies (CEPS), July 2012, p.2, available at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/fishing-gas-andmore-cypriot-waters (accessed in 15 Sep 2012).
171
“Notice Announcing the Second Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus Concerning the Authorization
for Hydrocarbons Exploration”, Official Journal of the European Union, February 11, 2012, available
at : http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/all/934821A2162C709EC22579AA0029ED64/$file/Anoun
cement-Invitation_2012%20%28EN%29.pdf?openelement (accessed in 15 Sep 2012)
172
Giamouridis, A.(2012), p. 24.
173
“Recep Erdogan Storms Out of Davos After Clash With Israeli President over Gaza”, The Guardian,
January 30, 2009, available at : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/30/turkish-prime-ministergaza-davos (accessed in 14 Sep 2012).
53
Spyridon Giotis
with the first visit of the President of the Republic of Cyprus in Israel.174 The
meetings with the political leadership heralded the beginning of a new cooperation
between the two countries at a political and economic level, especially in the
exploitation of hydrocarbons in broader region. However, the communist President
did not ignore to visit Ramallah, laid a wreath at the grave of Yasser Arafat and sign
bilateral agreements with Palestinian Authority (PA).175
Cypriot energy policy is based primarily on practical considerations rather than
ideological and historical premises. On one side, the alliance with Israel seeks for
support against Turkish reactions and admits the validity of Israeli military forces to
protect the energy resources of the island. In October 2011, Israeli Air-Force
conducted military exercises over Nicosia’s Flight Information Region (FIR) in
cooperation with Cypriot government, while special Israeli airplanes collect data from
airports and determined potential landing points for all types of airplanes.176 In
addition, Israeli military helicopter flew over the Turkish research ship ‘Piri Reis’,
during its sailing near the ‘Aphrodite’ gas field.177 According to Anatolia News
Agency, Israel seeks to deploy military troops in Cyprus to protect its energy
projects.178 Speaking with military terms, the strategic realignment with Israel can
ensure a safe environment for infrastructure investments.179
On the other side, Israel anticipates a closer cooperation with Cyprus in energy
sector, which coincide with the decline in the Turkish-Israel ties and the termination
of gas supply arrangement with Egypt. Simon Peres, the President of the Jewish state,
visited Cyprus in November 2011 and stated that joint natural gas project could have
174
Golan, A., “Friends on the East-West Seam”, Haaretz, March 11, 2011, available at :
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/friends-on-the-east-west-seam-1.348565 (accessed in 15
Sep 2012).
175
“Cypriot President Arrives in Ramallah” Palestinian News and Info Agency, March 15, 2011,
available at: http://english.wafa.ps/index.php?action=detail&id=15506 (accessed in 16 Sep 2012),
Morley, A., “Cyprus Donates 1 Mln USD to Palestinians”, Cyprusnewsreport,com, March 16, 2011,
available at : http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/?q=node/3887 (accessed in 16 Sep 2012)
176
“Israeli Exercises in Cyprus”, Defencegreece.com, October 11, 2011, available at: http://www.
defencegreece.com/index.php/2011/10/closer-military-cooperation-between-israel-and-cyprus/
(accessed in 16 Sep 2011).
177
“Turkey Denies Israeli Jets Harassed Turkish Shop Off East Mediterranean” Today’s Zaman,
September 30, 2011, available at : http://www.todayszaman.com/news-258413-turkey-denies-israelijets-harassed-turkish-ship-off-east-mediterranean.html (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
178
“Israel Seeks to Deploy 20,000 Commandos in Greek Cyprus”, Hurriyet, May 20, 2012, available
at:http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/israel-seeks-to-deploy-20000-commandos-in-greekcyprus.aspx?
pageID=238&nid=21160 (accessed in 17 Sep 2012).
179
Israel hold 22 times more weapons than Cyprus and has 7 times more manpower availability, in
“Military Statistics : Cyprus vs Israel”, Nationmaster.com, available at: http://www.nationmaster.
com/compare/Cyprus/Israel/Military (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
54
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
positive effects in both economies.180 Few months later, during the first-ever visit of
Israeli Prime Minister to the island of Cyprus, Benjamin Netanyahu signed a
cooperation agreement for the protection of natural gas drilling platforms.181 The
prospect of further cooperation between the countries, counterbalances the TurkeyArab recent Islamic alliance, and creates a positive dynamic of cooperation with
Greece and EU, not only in economic but also in political level.
The export of the energy findings depends on the commercial viability and
investment requirements. Lawson Freeman, vice president for the Eastern
Mediterranean at Texas-based Noble Energy, argued that “there is a really
compelling case for natural gas exports”,182 while Bini Zomer, director of corporate
affairs at Noble Energy Mediterranean, claimed that Leviathan gas field “should
largely be exported”.183 In spite of Noble officials’ declarations, the available
volumes for exports depend on political decisions which will produce different levels
on demand in Israel and Cyprus.184
The raising question about export perspective is twofold: where to export and how.
One way is by building pipelines infrastructure to supply regional market - like
Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon - and connect it with the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP)
(see map 5). In this case, Israel has to invest in infrastructure to accommodate the
domestic and the foreign supply. However, according to Zomer, “the market is just
not big enough to monetize your gas in a way that makes the investment
worthwhile”.185
Another alternative is to construct a subsea pipeline (about 1200 kilometers) to
Greece from Cyprus, if combined with the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy
180
Cashman, G., “Peres, Cypriot Counterpart Discuss Gas Cooperation”, The Jerusalem Post,
November 3, 2011, available at : http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=244297
(accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
181
Kambas, M., and Rabinovitz, A., “Netanyahu Discusses Energy Cooperation in Cyprus”, Reuters,
February 16, 2012, available at : http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/israel-netanyahu-cyprusidUSL5E8DG3PS20120216 (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
182
Rabinovitz, A., “Natural Gas Fields Call on Israel to Allow Exports”, Reuters, November 29,
2011, available at : http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/29/idUKL5E7MT21K20111129 (accessed in
16 Sep 2012).
183
Udasin, S., “New Natural Gas Wealth Means Historic Change for Israel”, National Geographic
News, July 3, 2012, available at : http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/07/120703israel-new-natural-gas/ (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
184
Shaffer, B.(2011), p. 5383.
185
On the contrary, few months ago the Israeli Minister of Energy and Water Uzi Landau claimed that
“the immediate export of natural gas will be to our neighbors the Palestinians and the Jordanians (…)
an important step in building trust and peace in the region”, in “Natural Gas Exports Will First Go to
Arab Neighbors”, Cyprusgasnews, March 30, 2012, available at : http://www.cyprusgasnews.com/
id/?p=325 (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
55
Spyridon Giotis
(ITGI),186 supplying with natural gas the South Eastern European countries (see
map 10).187 This project would be technically difficult and demand additional
Map 10: Gas Export Option by Subsea Pipeline
Source: Karbuz, S., Presentation in the 12th Annual CIS Oil & Gas Summit,14-16 May, 2012,
Paris, available at: http://core.theenergyexchange.co.uk/agile_assets/1729/03_Sohbet_Karbuz_ OME
_ENG.1.pdf.
investment, which seems not possible at this stage due to funding constraints. In
addition, European markets would prefer to import natural gas without involving
transit countries, due to the obligatory dependence that may have.
Building an LNG plant in Cyprus, Israel or offshore would be another
alternative to export great volumes of natural gas (see map 11). Such an infrastructure
in Cyprus would transport large quantities of gas to European and global markets.188
Definitely, this project would be profitable, but needs extra
186
The pipeline between Turkey and Greece is known as Interconnector Turkey Greece (ITG), while
the pipeline between Greece and Italy is known as Interconnector Greece Italy (IGI). For more
technical information about ITGI, see “Interconnection Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI) Pipeline”,
Hydrocarbons-tecnology.com, available at : http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/turkey
greeceitalypip/ (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
187
“Eastern Mediterranean Gas: Source for Cooperation or Fuel for Conflict?” Turkish Weekly, June
25, 2012, available at : http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2985/-eastern-mediterranean-gas-sourcefor-cooperation-or-fuel-for-conflict.html (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
188
Christofias, D., Speech at “The 2nd Gulf Intelligence Levant Energy Forum” under the title: “The
Future of Cyprus as an Energy Producer”, Nicosia, June 26, 2012, available at:
http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/1382D5A66191F2EBC2257A29004950EB?Opendocumen
t (accessed in 16 Sep 2012). Deutsce Bank and Credit Agricole have already expressed a preliminary
interest in investing this project, in “Decision Already Taken for LNG Terminal”, Cyprus Gas News,
June 8, 2012, available at : http://www.cyprusgasnews.com/id/?p=589 (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
56
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
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volumes from Israel and stable geopolitical environment.189
Liquefaction plant in Ashkelon, in Eilat (onshore) or offshore, would be a
challenge due to environmental, security, and suitable space grounds.190 However, the
inter ministerial Committee led by Shaul Tzemach, director-general of the Energy
Ministry, recommended “that export facilities should be located in Israeli territory”,
Map 11, 12: Options of Gas Export Infrastructure
Source: Karbuz, S. (2012).
if not, they will be allowed only “in the framework of bilateral agreements between
the two countries.”191 Domestic political support will play a key role in the
development of multi-lateral cooperation and new gas resources exploitation.192
189
“Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?”, Crisis Group Europe Report N°216,
April 2, 2012, p. , available at : http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/cyprus
/216-aphrodites-gift-can-cypriot-gas-power-a-new-dialogue.pdf (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
190
See Natali, D.,“The East Mediterranean Basin: A New Energy Corridor?”, Institute for National
Strategic Studies (INSS), July 17, 2012, p.3, available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/East%
20Med%20Report-%20Nathali.pdf (accessed in 16 Sep 2012), Barkat, A., “Gas to Go”, Globes, May
16, 2012, available at: http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did= 1000749636
&fid=1724 (accessed in 16 Sep 2012).
191
“The Inter-ministerial Committee – Main Recommendations”, Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of
Energy and Water Resources, available at: http://energy.gov.il/Subjects/NG/Documents/Main
Recommendations. pdf (accessed in 17 Sep 2012).
192
Natali, D. (2012).
57
Spyridon Giotis
Both countries should provide the regulatory framework to attract foreign
investments, expertise and technological assets. On one hand, building pipelines
includes geopolitical interests of the various parties (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon) that are
involved and presuppose stable political environment. A pipeline route is often a
subject of political arrangements and not the most economic route. On the other, LNG
trade provides diversification and flexibility in cargo movements, but involves a chain
of infrastructure (liquefaction, tankers, storage facilities, pipelines) that makes the
investment capital intensive. The formation of further alliances, like this with Greece,
could play a crucial role in the future gas exploitation plans.
4.3.3.
The Cyprus-Greece Alliance
After the independence of Cyprus, its relations between the two countries were not
stable, because of the divergent approaches that Greek governments had on the
‘Cypriot Problem’.193 The Western orientation of Greek government led Athens to
stay away from 1963-1964 troubles in the island. During the military seized power in
Athens, relations deteriorated further. Cypriot President Makarios became anathema
to anticommunist regime in Greece and when he openly challenged junta’s
intervention in 1974, the coup led by Greek officers, ultimately resulted in the Turkish
invasion.194 After the restoration of civilian Greek government, Athens and Nicosia
had different priorities in terms of Cypriot problem and its link to Greek-Turkish
disputes in Aegean. Since the last two decades, their bilateral relations become closer.
Cyprus' accession to the European community constituted new trade possibilities
by exporting and importing goods and services without customs boundaries, thus
boosting imports and exports from both sides. Greece was the biggest supplier of
products to Cyprus in 2010, with exports reaching 1.21 billion euros, or a quarter of
all Cypriot imports. In the same year, imports from Cyprus to Greece came to 243.9
billion Euros, 18 % of all Cypriot exports. 195 The bilateral cooperation expands to
military level; since 1994, Greece and Cyprus have adopted the Doctrine of the Joint
193
For a historical background of the ‘Cypriot Problem’, see Hannay, D.(2005), “Cyprus: The Search
for a Solution”, Tauris, New York, pp.1-47.
194
Barkey, H. and Gordon, P, “Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis”, The National Interest, Winter 20012002, available at : http://www.brookings.edu/views/Articles/Gordon/2002cyprus.pdf (accessed in 08
Dec 2012).
195
Cyprus ranks in third behind Germany and Italy in terms of Greek exports, in “Cypriot Investment
in Greece is on the Slide”, e-kathimerini.com, August 28, 2011, available at: http://www. ekathimerini.
com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_28/08/2011_403803 (accessed in 10 Dec 2012).
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Defense Area, improving cooperation and common training between armed forces.196
Few months ago, in Aug 2012, Minister of National Defense of Greece Panos
Panagiotopoulos visited Cyprus and stated that both Ministries should ensure “first of
all the great deterrent capability of Hellenism”.197 The close military relations
between Athens and Nicosia are verified by the number of Cypriot cadets that study in
the Hellenic Military Academy and the permanent Hellenic (Greek) Force in Cyprus
(ELDYK) that exists in the island.
The confirmation of natural gas reserves in Cyprus’s EEZ offered a great
opportunity in terms of energy security and economic prosperity. Greece is the closest
ally of Cyprus that could promote, as a corridor, Cyprus’s natural gas in European
countries. Greece has also a regasification plant in Revithousa (see map 14) that can
make possible LNG imports from Cyprus. Although the Greek Government is still
reluctant to delineate its EEZ, as a direct result of disputes with Turkey in Kastelorizo
(see map 8 & 9), Athens issued a call for interested companies to submit offers for
hydrocarbons research offshore Western coast of Greece.198 If these researches
demonstrate the existence of sufficient reserves of hydrocarbons, combined with the
potential gas reserves offshore Crete,199 both countries could develop a financially
viable project that could change the geostrategic conversation.
The trilateral alliance of Cyprus, Greece and Israel has shaped a new energy
triangle that has inevitably affected the regional balance of power.200 This energy
cooperation is of great importance, due to the bad economic conditions that Greece
and Cyprus face, while for Israel is a matter of national security. On 4th of March
2012 already signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Israel, Cyprus
196
In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would constitute a casus belli for Greece,
in Dokos, T., “Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era”, A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues,
1998, available at : http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer98/security.html (accessed in 10 Dec 2012).
197
“Greece and Cyprus Commit to Closer Cooperation on Defense Issues”, Hellenic Republic,
Ministry of National Defense, August 31, 2012, available at : http://www.mod.mil.gr/en/newssection/press-releases/6114-diloseis-yetha-panagiotopoulou-meta-to-peras-tis-sunadisis-tou-me-toupam-kuprou-iliadi.html (accessed in 10 Dec 2012).
198
“Procedure for Granting Exploration and Exploitation Licenses of Areas, on Permanent Basis”,
Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, http://www.
ypeka.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=766&locale=en-US&language=el-GR (accessed in 13 Dec 2012).
199
Macridis, K., “ Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Crete – a Review of the Facts”, Hellenic
Center for European and International Analysis (HELCEIA), May 26, 2011, available at :
http://www.elkeda.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=914:26052011-off-shorehydrocarbon-exploration-in-crete-a-review-of-the-facts&catid=46:english&Itemid=96 (accessed in 12
Dec 2012).
200
Stavris G., “The New Energy Triangle of Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Casting a Net for Turkey?”,
Turkish
Policy
Quarterly,
Vol.11,
No
2,
Summer
2012,
available
at:
http://turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/ 2012-02stavris.pdf (accessed in 11 Dec 2012).
59
Spyridon Giotis
and Greece to launch a trilateral cable project (“Euroasia Interconnector”) that will
link Israel’s electricity supply with that of the European Union, through Cyprus and
Crete.201 Further natural gas findings in Greek EEZ could enhance the trilateral
energy cooperation, protect Cyprus’ sovereign rights and provide Greece the
opportunity to upgrade its geostrategic position in regard to Turkey. However, global
actors are inevitably affected by the events in Eastern Mediterranean, which are
directly linked to their interests.
.
201
The project will have a capacity of 2,000 megawatts at a depth of more than 2,000 meters, in Udasin
S., “Israel, Cyprus, Greece Sign Electric Cable Deal”, Jerusalem Post, April 03, 2012 available at
http:// www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=260410 (accessed in 11 Dec 2012).
60
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
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5. The Role of Global Actors
Middle East is defined not only by Islam and Arab culture, but also by the tradition of
external interventions.202 After the WW II, Great Powers penetrated in Middle East
countries for commercial, cultural, or strategic influence and established close
relations with selective local minorities. The creation of Israel contributed to the
militarization of the region and encouraged external powers into “a variety of formal
and informal military alliances”.203 The end of the colonial era in the region has been
marked by the Suez crisis, when Britain and France left Middle East under the
influence of the dominant powers, US and USSR. The growing US-Soviet rivalries
during the Cold War era separated local states in two juxtapose sides, pro US (Israel,
Greece and Turkey) and pro USSR (Libya and Syria).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War changed the regional
balances. Libya, under Kaddafi and Syria, under Assad regime, lost the Russian
support and found isolated in a pro US Middle East. Washington enjoyed more
influence in the region than any other outside power, especially in the area of energy
and security. However, during the last decade, US policy was challenged by the
foreign policy of other outsiders.204 Russian foreign policy looks for opportunities to
increase its influence in the region, while European countries like Germany, France
and UK seek to promote their national interests in the broader Middle East.
In this chapter we examine the role of global actors in light of the newly
discovered natural gas reserves in Eastern Mediterranean. We focus on the
changeover of the relations among Great Powers and the key energy players of the
Middle East. In addition, we scrutinize how gas reserves offshore Israel add a new
perspective in geostrategic dimension.
202
Henry, M. C., and Springborg, R.(2001), “Globalization of the Politics of Development in the
Middle East”, Cambridge University Press, UK, p.8. For a historical background in the external
interventions in the Middle East, see Hourani, A.(1981), “The Emergence of the Modern Middle East”,
University of California Press, Los Angeles, available at: http://www.google.gr/books?
hl=el&lr=&id=j70zP5MyHO8C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=the+emergence+of+the+modern+middle+east
&ots=TQyJExzQcg&sig=jLAXFlVZnVZnX_WlTwQXw5C5YfI&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=the%2
0emergence%20of%20the%20modern%20middle%20east&f=false (accesed in 04 Oct 2012).
203
Ibid., p.10.
204
For more information about the emerging of new actors in the Middle East, see Haas, R., “The New
Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006, available at : http://gees.org/documentos
/Documen-01865.pdf (accessed in 04 Oct 2012).
61
Spyridon Giotis
5.1. Russian Intervention in Eastern Mediterranean
The Middle East has always been a market for Russian interests. Until the end of the
Cold War, Soviet regime was steadily increasing its influence over the Middle East by
supporting Arab states (Syria, Egypt, Libya) politically and militarily. After 2001, the
government of Vladimir Putin intensified Russian involvement in the region,
supporting Iran’s nuclear program and forgiving Syria 73% of its 13 billion dept, in
2005.205 The discovery of natural gas reserves gives Russia the opportunity to
intervene actively on the latest geopolitical developments of the region.
Russian policy in Syria resulted in the steadily deterioration of Soviet – Israeli
relations.206 However, after the Israel-Gaza conflict in 2008-2009, Moscow and Tel
Aviv seem to come closer. Russian immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU),
that amount about one million, have form a pro-Russian lobby in Israel. The
ascension of Avigdor Lieberman, an FSU immigrant, to the position of foreign
minister, reveals the Russian influence in the Israeli domestic policy. In June 2012
President Putin visited Tel Aviv in an attempt to reinforce the Russian presence on the
emerging gas market that could enhance Russian leverage in bilateral energy dealings.
207
Russia has also developed close economic and trade relations with the Middle East
countries, particularly with Turkey. The number of Turkish companies active in
Russia is about 2,000 with a total investment of $7 billion, while the trade volume
between the two countries reached $26.6 billion in 2010.208 Both countries also share
a common interest in terms of energy; Russia supplied over 45% of Turkish gas
205
Putin said that the resolving of the debt was “the basis for long-term cooperation in the future” as
Putin said, available at “Russia, Syria sign agreement for major arms deal”, World Tribune.com,
January 26, 2005. For more information see, see Freedman, O., R., : “Russia, Israel and the Arab –
Israeli Conflict: The Putin Years”, Middle East Policy Council, Vol. 17, Issue 3, pages 51–63, Autumn
2010.
206
For the political reasons of the deteriorating bilateral relations, see Epstein, D., A., “Russia and
Israel: A Romance Aborted?”, Russia in Global Affairs, Vol.5, No 4, Oct-Dec 2007, available at:
http://www.openu.ac.il/Personal_sites/download/Alek/34%20Russia%20and%20Israel%20%20RFA%
20%282007%29.pdf (accessed in 25 Nov 2012).
207
However, President Putin, before leaving Tel Aviv, met with the leader of Palestinian authority
Mahmoud Abbas, in Kershenr I. “Just Passing Through, Putin Consults With Israeli Leaders on Syria
and Iran”, The New York Times, June 25, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/26/world/middleeast/putin-visits-with-israeli-leaders.html (accesed in 25 Nov 2012)
208
“Turkey, Russia Eye Increased Cooperation in Business, Trade”, Today’s Zaman, March 14,
2011, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=238105
(accessed in 06 Oct 2012).
62
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
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energy in 2010209 and cooperates in energy projects like Samsum-Ceyhan pipeline
(see map 13), that would pump Russian oil from Black Sea to Mediterranean.
Furthermore in December 2011, Turkey allowed the execution of the construction and
operation of South Stream project (see map 13), a gas pipeline which runs from
Russia via the Turkish EEZ.210 However, Turkish aspirations to become energy hub
undermine a Russian energy interest, which sees itself as being the main supplier of
European gas, and opposed to the Turkish assertiveness in case of Cyprus.
Map 13: Main Existing and Planned Oil and Gas Pipelines
Source: Kandiyioti R., “Pipeline Chess Across the Black Sea”, Le Monde Diplomatique, January
2011, available at: http://mondediplo.com/blogs/pipeline-chess-across-the-black-sea.
Cyprus is of great strategic significance for Russian interests, not only for its
location but also for its participation to EU. Russia counts on the geostrategic location
of the island of Cyprus because of the insecure future of Assad regime in Syria that
imperils its major naval base in Tartus. The cooperation with Cyprus, which is
209
“Country Gas Profiles: Turkey”, Energy Delta Institute, 2011, available at: http://www.energydelta.
org/mainmenu/energy-knowledge/country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-turkey (accessed in 06 Oct
2012).
210
“Turkey Grants Permit for South Stream Construction”, Gazprom Release, December 28, 2011,
available at : http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2011/december/article126759/ (accessed in 06 Oct
2012).
63
Spyridon Giotis
member of EU, makes easier for Russia to promote gas volumes for transportation
and reselling via Gazprom in European market. In the second phase of licensing for
hydrocarbon exploitation in the EEZ of Cyprus, two Russian companies express their
willingness to participate.211
The cooperation between Moscow and Nicossia extends to economical,
commercial and military level. The Russian loan to the Cyprus government in 2011,
amounted €2.5 billion, helped Cyprus to sustain against a crisis if Greece defaults.212
In addition, a large number of Russian entrepreneurs use Cyprus as a base for their
business and investment activities.213 Moreover, the longstanding military cooperation
between the two countries is confirmed not only by the possession of Russian high
technology military systems, but also by the Russian support to Cyprus to develop the
gas fields in its EEZ, that led Nicossia label Moscow “a shield against any threats by
Turkey”.214
5.2. United States Presence in the Middle East
US had traditionally strategic interests in the Middle East. After the WW II, US
supported economically and politically countries like Greece, Turkey, Israel and
Egypt to expel communist expansion. At the end of Cold War, US increased its
influence in the area, because of its increasing dependence on imported energy and
the geopolitical competition with Russia, over the control of foreign energy resources.
The US-Israel alliance is stable since the creation of Jewish state. The support that
US provide to Israel is reinforced by the presence of a very powerful Jewish lobby.
Thus, they maintain common policy on the final outcome in Syria, regarding the post211
These companies are Novatec Overseas Exploration and Production in consortium with the French
Total and GRB Global Resources BV, which is linked to Gazprom Bank, in “Two Russian Companies
Expressed Interest in Cyprus Hydrocarbons”, Famagusta Gazette, July 26, 2012, available at :
http://famagusta-gazette.com/two-russian-companies-express-interest-in-cyprus-hydrocarbons-p1619269.htm (accessed in 06 Oct 2012).
212
Hadjipapas A. and Hope K., “Cyprus Nears €2.5bn Russian Loan Deal”, Financial Times, Sep 14,
2011, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/655a3fd2-de31-11e0-9fb7-00144feabdc0 .html#axzz
2D49mHKuK (accessed in 24 Nov 2012).
213
According to the Russian Statistical Office (Rosstat), 39% of all Russian investments into Europe
were concentrated in Cyprus in 2007. Exports grew moderately from €7 million in 2000 to €17 million
in 2006, “The Bilateral Relations of EU Member States with Russia”, European Affairs, December
2008, available at: http://www.heraldofeurope.co.uk/Issues/5/European%20Affairs/THE_BILATERAL
_ Relations/THE_BILATERAL_Relations.pdf , (accessed in 25 Nov 2012).
214
Ö ütçü M., “Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Turkish Dimension”, Policy Brief, GMF,
June 2012, available at: http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339171647Ogutcu_
EasternMedRivalry_Jun12.pdf (accessed in 25 Nov 2012).
64
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Assad era and nuclear proliferation of Iran. Americans always thought Hamas as a
terrorist organization and deny officially discussing with them. The deeply routed
relations between the two countries confirmed by the newly elected president Barack
Obama, when he fully supported the Israel's right to defend itself,215 although
Netanyahu supported the Republican candidate Mitt Romney216.
US has cultivated close relations with Turkey, especially when in 1952 became a
NATO member, as a mound against communism. In January 2012, a NATO missile
defense radar deployed in Malatya, manned by both Turkish and US personnel.217 In
addition, US uses Turkey as a leverage of pressure to Russian monopoly distribution
network of natural gas, supporting Nabucco pipeline (see map 13), which would
bypass the Russian distribution network. After recent findings of massive reserves
offshore Cyprus, US State Department clearly defended Cyprus’ sovereign rights to
explore for energy in its maritime zone. Having a US company (Noble Energy)
involved in developing the energy resources of Cyprus, Washington desires the deescalating of regional tensions in order to benefit from the construction of the
distribution network offshore Cyprus. 218
Moreover, Cyprus, after its independence in 1960, became a base for US to
promote its strategic interests.
In 1974, US had been involved in the Cyprus’s
partition, supporting Turkish invasion. Since then, Washington welcomed United
Nations (UN) role as a mediator for a long term resolution to age old Cyprus problem
(Anan Plan). US State Department backs up a some sort of “revenue-sharing” model
in case of the hydrocarbon exploitation issue, which could benefit both communities
in the context of an overall settlement. 219
215
“Obama: Israel Has "Right to Defend Itself", CBS News, Nov 18, 2012, available at: http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57551535/obama-israel-has-right-to-defend-itself/ (accessed in 27 Nov
2012).
216
Sherwood H., “Binyamin Netanyahu Gambles on Mitt Romney Victory”, The Gurdian, 20 Sep
2012, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/20/binyamin-netanyahu-gambles-onmitt-romney (accessed in 27 Nov 2012).
217
“NATO Anti-Missile Radar in Turkey Put Into Operation”, RIA Novosti, January 17, 2012,
available at: http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120117/170796159.html (accessed in Nov 27 2012).
218
According to Mark C. Toner, deputy spokesperson of State Department, “The United States
continues to support strongly the Cypriot-led negotiation process, conducted under UN good offices, to
reunify the island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation”, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC,
September 29, 2011, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/09/174815.htm#CYPRUS
(accessed in 27 Nov 2012).
219
“US Supports Revenue-Sharing Agreement in Cyprus for Natural Gas”, Today’s Zaman, 29 Sep
2011, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=258364
(accessed in 27 Nov2012).
65
Spyridon Giotis
5.3. European Energy Security Concerns
European countries never worried much about their dependence on Russian gas, until
January 2006, when political disputes between Russia and Ukraine temporarily cut off
gas supply.220 The diversification of suppliers became a priority of European energy
policy makers, although in 2010, European reliance on Russian gas amounted to
31.8%.221 In order to reduce the over-reliance on Russian monopoly, European
countries support new pipeline projects (e.g. Nabucco) and construct LNG terminals
to ensure energy security (see map 14). Europeans are interested in recent gas
discoveries as a potential southern corridor that could help significantly the
diversification of gas supplies. However, EU lacks of a common energy policy in
Eastern Mediterranean. European countries particularly England, France and
Germany have developed bilateral alliances with Middle East countries based on their
national interests.
Map 14: Europe Map of Energy erminals
Source: Natural Gas Vehicle Association (NGVA), available at: http://www.ngva.cz/ngva-europe/25lng-blue-corridors-the-right-solution-for-a-more-economical-long-distance-road-transport.html.
220
Stern, J., “Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe: the Russian–Ukrainian Crisis of 2006”, AsiaPacific Review, Routledge, London, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006, pp. 39-56.
221
“… Russia’s share of EU-27 imports of natural gas declined from 45.1 % to 31.8 % between 2003
and 2010, while Qatar’s share rose from less than 1 % to 8.6 %.”, in Eurostat, “Energy Production
and Imports”, European Commission, August 2012, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Imports (accessed in 28 Nov 2012).
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England has traditionally close relations with Cyprus. Following Cyprus gaining
independence in 1960, UK retained two Sovereign Base Areas in Akrotiri and
Dhekelia. The United Kingdom retains a military presence on the island in order to
keep a strategic location at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, for use as a staging
point for forces sent to locations in the Middle East and Asia. In addition, three
British gas companies were bidders at the second round of licensing in May 2012,222
while the UK giant petroleum company, BP, is actively involved in Nile Delta
Basin.223 The British Minister for Europe David Lidington has said that “the
discovery of oil and gas resources in Cyprus` EEZ has the potential to bring greater
prosperity and energy security to the region”, indicating the British positive attitude
towards the future gas exploitation projects.
France, as a former colonial power, enjoys friendly relations with Lebanon, thus
follows closely the regional developments. It has played an active role in the
stabilization of Lebanese government after the war with Israel in 2006, contributing
with a force of 1,600 personnel to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL).
224
In addition, French government promotes its energy interests through
military cooperation with Cyprus. In January 2012, Cyprus and France have signed an
agreement between their armed forces,225 while few months later they joint
aeronautical search, rescue and unconventional threats exercise, at the sea area south
of Limassol. 226
Germany, since the end of Cold War, had no active interference in Eastern
Mediterranean. The decrease of Russian influence in the region, led Berlin to
undertake a more active role. First, Germany preserves close economic and trade
222
The three UK companies are Premier Oil, Vitol and Capricorn Oil, in Hydrocarbon Exploration &
Production in the Eastern Mediterranean, “Bidders in Cyprus 2nd Round”, Near East Energy Associates
(NEEA), available at: http://neeas.net/blog/files/f856d395d08a7c13346a546dd3853801-2.html
(accessed in 29 Nov 2012).
223
For more information about BP activities in Nile Delta Basin, see http://www.bp.com/sectio ngener
icarticle.do?categoryId=457&contentId=2000608 (accessed in Nov 29, 2012).
224
“France stresses its support for Lebanon government”, Yalibnan, December 31, 2006, available at:
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/12/france_stresses_1.php (accessed in 29 Nov 2012).
225
“Cooperation between Cypriot and French Armed Forces”, February 4, 2012 available at:
http://www.defencegreece.com/index.php/2012/02/cooperation-between-cypriot-and-french-armedforces/ (accessed in 29 Nov 2012).
226
“France and Cyprus Wrap up Joint Exercise” Famagusta Gazette, August 01, 2012 available at:
http://famagusta-gazette.com/france-and-cyprus-wrap-up-joint-exercise-p16268-69.htm (accessed in 29
Nov 2012).
67
Spyridon Giotis
relations with Turkey227, while there is a great Turkish minority that affects German
domestic policy. In addition, Germany has developed a political cooperation with
Israel, especially after the election of chancellor Merkel, in 2005: she accused
(Lebanon’s) Hezbollah and (Gaza’s) Hamas respectively for responsibility of the wars
of 2006-2008 and supported Israeli action after the storming of the Turkish Mavi
Marmara ship by Israeli commandos in May 2010. Furthermore, Germany supported
Cypriot sovereign rights for exploration in its EEZ. The Merkel’s visit in January
2011 - the first ever by a German head of government - can be considered as an effort
to increase its influence in Eastern Mediterranean. Besides, Germany has also military
presence in Eastern Mediterranean, cooperating with Cypriot army and executing
joint military exercises in Cypriot EEZ.228
5.4. China: A Global Resource Competitor
The economic rise of China has made substantial changes to the world energy
balance, which has led to a geographical shift of consumption on natural gas. While
China’s market share of the global energy consumption was only 8% in 1990, is
expected to dominate in 2035 at 24%, compare to US’s expected 16% share.229
Although coal will make up an estimated 62 % of China's net energy supply in 2035,
only slightly less than at present, China desires to diversify its energy supplies and to
reduce its oil dependence from OPEC countries. In its struggle over energy, especially
the control over the flow of gas from the Caspian region, has developed an intensive
diplomatic activity.230 In addition, China cooperates with Russia under the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), providing arms and technical assistance to the
227
Turkish exportation to Germany, in 2008, was $ (10% of all its exports), while Turkish imports
from Germany were $18.7bn, in Wilson, J., “Turkey and Germany: a close relationship”, Financial
Times, December 01, 2010, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5727eec8-fbd8-11df-b7e900144feab49a.html#axzz2 DbCa5HZa (accessed in 29 Nov 2012).
228
Three German ships were involved in the exercises, along with search and rescuers from Cyprus in
Fenwick, S., “Cyprus-Germany Sea Exercises 'Perfectly Coordinated'”, April 11, 2012 available at :
http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/index.php?q=node/5595 (accessed in 29 Nov 2012).
229
Cvijic G., “The Changing Geopolitics of Energy”, Journal of the Geographical Institute, Vol. 62,
No 1, 2012, pp. 126-127, available at: http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0350-7599/2012/035075991201125M. pdf (accessed in 12 Dec 2012).
230
For more information, see “China’s Pipeline Gas Imports: Current Situation and Outlook to
2025” in PetroMin Pipeliner, January - March 2011, available at: http://www.pm-pipeliner.safan.
com/mag/ppl0311/r06.pdf (accessed in 13 Dec 2012).
68
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Central Asian countries.231 China’s energy-driven initiatives appear to move the
energy security up its political agenda.
The demand of the going out strategy has led China toward deeper engagement
with the energy producing states of the Middle East.232 Beijing showed interest in the
exploitation of the recent gas findings offshore Cyprus, when China's state-owned oil
and gas company Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) expressed
strong desire to be involved directly and substantially in the development and
commercialization of natural gas offshore Cyprus in eastern Mediterranean.233 In
addition, China has developed close trade and economic relations with Israel; the
trade levels reached US $6.7 and it has become Israel's third largest export market (in
2010).234 It is likely that China will bolster its ties with energy producer countries in
the region – as its reliance on overseas suppliers grows - producing further strains in
the political environment of Eastern Mediterranean.
231
Klare, M., “The New Geopolitics of Energy”, The Nation, May 01, 2008, available at: http://
www.thenation.com/article/new-geopolitics-energy (accessed in 12 Dec 2012).
232
The Middle East now provides about 60 percent of China’s oil, in Leverett F. & Bader, J.,
“Managing China-US Competition in the Middle East”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 20052006, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2005/1/winter%20energy
%20leverett/20051216_leverett_bader.pdf (accessed in 01 Dec 2012).
233
Hall, S., “CNOOC Interested in Cyprus Offshore GTas: Report”, The Wall Street Journal, March
04, 2012 available at: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cnooc-interested-in-cyprus-offshore-gasreport-2012-03-04 (accessed in 01 Dec, 2012).
234
“China-Israel Bilateral Trade”,Embassy of Israel, Beijing, available at: http://www.israeltrade.
org.cn/english/doing_business_with_china/bilateral_trade/000052/ (accessed in 01 Dec 2012).
69
Spyridon Giotis
6. Conclusion
The importance of energy as a new geostrategic dimension adds more perspectives at
the complex relations among Eastern Mediterranean countries. The world’s growing
demand for energy plays even more significant role in shaping the relations between
supplying and consuming countries. Energy exporting states change the regional
balance for their benefit and improve their position in international system. Qatar, for
example, holds 12% of total gas reserves, it is the first LNG exporter and its influence
in international system is disproportionate to its size.
The rapid increase in the availability of natural gas through technology and
innovations has made gas energy a significant and reliable component of the lowcarbon energy future. Natural gas, as an emerging energy source, allows a cheaper
and cleaner transition to more cost effective renewable sources post 2030.235 Its
significant increasing consumption has led to the expansion of physical ties between
states through energy infrastructure. However, we anticipate that the use of LNG will
reduce gas supply vulnerability in short-term situations.
Gas discoveries offshore Israel and Cyprus have already become an incentive for
alliances and, at the same time, created regional tensions with Turkey and Arab
countries. Tensions have always negative commercial implications. Major
international energy companies are reluctant to invest in unstable and disputed areas.
Despite that, their participation in the Cypriot second licensing round for offshore
hydrocarbon reserves indicates Western interest in Eastern Mediterranean.
Europe is probably most interested in recent gas discoveries in the region. The
current production levels is a drop of the ocean to EU’s gas consumption (18,4 tcf/522
bcm),236 but additional discoveries could provide a ‘southern corridor’ for European
energy demand and reduce its dependency from Russian gas supply. Besides,
European Commission first published its energy policy package few months after the
Russian-Ukraine dispute (December 2006) and put the diversification of sources at
the top of the priority list.237 LNG consumption could be an alternative to permanent
pipelines and could allow Europe to import its natural gas from wider range of
sources.
235
Brinded, M. (2011).
Crisis Group Europe Report No 216, p. 9.
237
“An Energy Policy for Europe”, European Commission, January 10, 2007, p.10, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf (accessed in 04
Dec 2012).
236
70
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
Eastern Mediterranean is becoming a field of geopolitical antagonism of US,
Russia and China. Military exercises in the region indicate that global actors would
not stay aloof from further gas developments. It is not the first time that great powers
intervene in energy issues; US expressed their geopolitical interest in Caspian region,
when Turkey and Russia opposed to the extension of NATO’s Operation Active
Endeavor from the Mediterranean to Black Sea.238 Similarly, Clinton’s administration
supported Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project as a key component of the American
policy to develop a new East-West energy corridor that would bypass Russia.239 In
addition, China has shown an assertive policy in the energy-rich South China Sea,
with six states claiming part of the region.240 Its interference in Eastern Mediterranean
is closely related to Israeli-Iran deteriorating relations, as Iran is the main energy
exporter of Chinese gas energy. Beijing is interested to work more closely with
Washington and its allies, all of which would like to see stable energy markets, to
prevent such price increases in energy.241 Global actors will play more or less a
catalyst role of the further gas developments in Eastern Mediterranean.
The fundamental question that this thesis should answer is whether gas findings
exploitation could further destabilize the region or contribute to the improvement of
the relations. In case of Israel, we should consider that its relations with Arab
countries will be increasingly deteriorating, in proportion with the discovered gas
volumes, without excluding terrorist attacks. Maritime disputes with Lebanon have
already led Hezbollah to warn Israel that will protect its sovereign rights.242
Furthermore, the unstable political situation in Egypt could lead in an escalation of the
relations between the two countries, in order President Morsi to gain domestic
political support during the transition period.
Another variable that Israel should take into consideration in gas exploitation plan,
is Palestinian’s Authority (PA) energy needs. Palestine’s de facto recognition as a
238
Winrow, G., “Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region”, Southern European
and Black Sea Studies, Routledge, London,Vol.7, No 2, June 2007, p.224.
239
Ibid, p 230.
240
Buszynski L. and Sazlan I., “Maritime Claims and Energy Cooperation in the South China Sea”,
Contemporary Southeastern Asia, Vol.29, No 1, 2007, available at : http://tailieu.tapchithoidai.
org/Maritime_South_China_Sea_CSEA.pdf (accessed in 05 Dec 2012).
241
Christensen., T., “The Advantages of an Assertive China”, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2011, p.9,
available at : http://www.afoutreach.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110414-066.pdf (accessed in
06 Dec 2012).
242
“Hezbollah: Lebanon Will Not Let Israel Seize Its Natural Gas”, Haaretz, July 14, 2011, available
at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hezbollah-lebanon-will-not-let-israel-seize-its-nat
ural-gas-1.373201 (accessed in 06 Dec 2012).
71
Spyridon Giotis
sovereign state from UN has strengthened its position in the region.
243
Gaza gas
fields, that contains approximately 1,2 tcf/35 bcm, could be integrated into Israel's
offshore installations. The aim would be double: On one hand, it could reduce the
burden of Israel, by helping PA to overcome its severe economic problems and by
creating jobs for the residents of West Bank and Gaza Strip.244 On the other, it could
provide a reason for coexistence among the peoples of the region that will ensure
Israel’s security.
Turkey’s achievement of its energy vision is central to its foreign policy. Ankara
has capitalized on Europe’s significant energy demand and aspires to position itself as
prominent interlocutor in the regional system. Based on its realistic foreign policy,
Turkey has made huge investments in infrastructure to become an energy hub. As a
result, we consider that Ankara aims at a stable environment to promote its energy
interests. In addition, Turkey shares common interests with US in Syria and is the
major transit state of Russian gas from East to West. Due to the fact that these two
great powers have supported sovereign rights of Cyprus in Eastern Mediterranean, an
escalation in Turkey’s relations with Cyprus or Greece, as a major ally of Cyprus, is
rather difficult.
Cyprus, which faces severe economic difficulties (applied for a rescue program
from EU and IMF with onerous commitments),245 has to be realistic about how
natural gas reserves can benefit the island and improve its position in the region.
President Christofias has declared that the revenues will be shared with Turkish
Cypriots, as a step forward to a permanent and viable solution to the “Cypriot
Problem”.246 However, this could bring Turkey’s involvement with natural gas
reserves exploitation through the back door, something that the recommendations of
Zemach’s Committee seem to block.247
243
Charbonneau L., “Palestinians Win Implicit UN Recognition of Sovereign State", Reuters,
November 29, 2012, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/us-palestinians-statehoodidUSBR E8AR0EG20121129 (accessed in 06 Dec 2012).
244
Shaffer, B., (2011) p. 5383.
245
Smith, H., “Once-Vibrant Cyprus Strikes EU-IMF Bailout Deal”, The Guardian, November 23,
2012, available at : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/23/cyprus-asks-for-bailout (accessed in
06 Dec 2012).
246
“Speech of the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr Demetris Christofias at the 66th Session of
the United Nations General Assembly in New York”, Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus, September
22, 2011, available at : http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/33BF6BDC
085EF373C2257917001B9962?OpenDocument (accessed in 06 Dec 2012).
247
Henderson, S., “Israel’s Natural Gas Challenges”, The Washington Institute, September 07, 2012,
available at : http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israels-natural-gas-challenges
(accessed in 06 Sep 2012).
72
“Energy Security in Eastern Mediterranean;
Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
In terms of the exploitation of gas discoveries, there is a neoliberal aspect which
argues that energy cooperation could lead to the improving relations between Turkey
and Cyprus. US expressed interest in supporting an export route through Turkey as a
profitable “confidence building” measure.248 The example of Iran-Pakistan-India
pipeline that never materialized because India alleged security reasons,249 or the case
of Georgia and Azerbaijan, that would promote the improvement of bilateral relations
never happened. The liberal aspect which claims that appropriate economic policies
could play a dominate role in cooperation between states, proved to have failed.
Undoubtedly, in case of unilateral exploitation of Cyprus’ gas reserves, the
revenues will benefit the Republic of Cyprus and improve the Cypriots citizens’
standard of living. But, at the same time, the economic gap between Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots will become bigger and the possibility of a re-unified island state
will diminish. In countries where hydrocarbon has been discovered, like Russia,
economic nationalism has emerged as a powerful theory which can lead to
fragmentation and eventual political and, hence, economic instability within a state.250
Cypriot government should consider gas findings as a great opportunity to implement
energy policies, to the benefit of both communities through mutual compromises.
To sum up, it appears that natural gas will create distance among those that will
exploit gas reserves and those who will stay depended on imports. However, we
should consider that alliances will be created, which will ensure the distribution
network. In addition, a further militarization of the region will be a reality. Global
actors will play a significant role in regional relationships and dynamics will greatly
determine how revenues of gas findings will be distributed. Energy security matters in
Eastern Mediterranean are inextricably interlinked and appear to remain so for at least
the unforeseeable future.
248
Crisis Group Europe Report No 216, op.cit. p.8.
Cohen A., Curtis L., and Graham O., “The Proposed Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline: An
Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security”, Executive Summary Backgrounder, The Herittage
Foundation, May 30, 2008,p.14, available at: http://mail.gees.org/documentos/Documen-03020.pdf
(accessed in 06 Dec 2012).
250
Szakonyi D., “The Rise of Economic Nationalism Under Globalization and the Case of Post –
Communist Russia”, Vestnik, The Journal of Russian and Asian Studies, Iss. 6,
Vol. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 30-44, available at: http://www.sras.org/vestnik (accessed 14 Dec 2012).
249
73
Spyridon Giotis
74
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Gas Discoveries and Implications in Israel–Cyprus-Turkey Region”
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