Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976)

REACHING THE DISTANT COMRADE: CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ABROAD (1949-1976) BY CAGDAS UNGOR B.Sc. International Relations, Middle East Technical University, 1998 MA. Cultural Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University, 2004 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Binghamton University State University of New York 2009 © Copyright by Cagdas Ungor 2009 All Rights Reserved Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Binghamton University State University of New York 2009 May 21, 2009 Fan Fa-Ti, Department of History, Binghamton University John Chaffee, Department of History, Binghamton University Wulf Kansteiner, Department of History, Binghamton University Chen Zuyan, Department of Asian and Asian American Studies, Binghamton University iii ABSTRACT This dissertation analyzes People's Republic of China's foreign propaganda work in the period 1949-1976 with regard to its organization, cadres, principles, content, circulation and audience. Main focus will be on the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking –two key content providers within the larger foreign propaganda network in China. Based on the recently declassified official records and secondary sources, this study challenges the earlier portrayal of the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus as a highly efficient body with huge financial sources and manpower. Aimed at warning their audiences against the dangers of communist propaganda, Cold War era studies emphasized the quantitative growth in China's propaganda output and exaggerated the PRC regime's successes in this realm. This study complicates the picture with regard to the efficiency of the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus by illustrating the inherent problems plaguing China's external propaganda work. The structural weaknesses in the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus in the period 19491976 included administrative instability, heavy bureaucracy, staff shortages, overstocking, etc. Besides these long-lasting problems, the FLP and Radio Peking also underwent temporary disruptions during the domestic political campaigns. Throughout the Maoist decades, several restrictions imposed by foreign governments over the circulation of Chinese foreign propaganda media added to the PRC regime's challenges in reaching overseas audiences. Likewise, negative and irrelevant audience responses suggest that China had only limited success in convincing its foreign readers/listeners. Besides challenging the conventional wisdom on Chinese communist propaganda, this study also contributes to the available literature on China's foreign affairs by highlighting the previously neglected aspects of soft power. The role played by Radio Peking and the FLP within the larger foreign affairs framework illustrates the dynamic relationship between diplomacy and propaganda in the Chinese context. In a global framework, the study situates China on the map of the 'Cultural Cold War' literature, which focuses on the role of persuasion in the waging of this ideological battle. By documenting China's specific experiences in this realm, the study broadens our understanding with regard to the Cold War history. iv Dedicated to my Family İrfan, Ege, Simge Üngör for their unending support and encouragement & Melek Titiz, Seniha Ilgaz for life-time inspiration v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study owes its greatest intellectual debt to my principal advisor Fa-ti Fan who has guided me in this quest ever since I started the project in 2006. This dissertation could not have materialized without his invaluable insights, comments and criticisms. Along with Prof. Fan, I'd like to thank John Chaffee for providing me with the necessary academic guidance and support throughout this research. As Turkey offered few opportunities in the field of China studies by 2004, it was Fa-ti Fan and John Chaffee who have opened this path for me. I can not thank them enough for the support and encouragement they extended to me in the last five years. I am also indebted to Wulf Kansteiner for providing me with critical feedback in my doctoral committees, let alone his assistance as my interim mentor during my first year as a graduate student. Chen Zuyan, likewise, deserves special thanks for being my outside observer, helping me improve my Chinese language skills and providing assistance in several other ways. During my doctoral years in Binghamton, I benefited from the knowledge and guidance of several other professors, for which I am thankful. Donald and Jean Quataert broadened my horizons in the history field and provided support and assistance on several occasions. Nancy Appelbaum took a personal interest in helping graduate students, including myself, when she was the Head of Graduate Studies in 2007. Ravi Palat has been an invaluable mentor and a friend, who extended support in all my academic endeavours. In the initial phase of this project, I also received help and assistance from a number of prominent scholars outside Binghamton. Special thanks go vi to Timothy Cheek for his invaluable comments on my prospectus and his guidance in my quest for sources and contacts in China. Likewise, I am indebted to Anne-Marie Brady, David Shambaugh, Chen Jian, and Shen Zhihua for their helpful suggestions on research sites and historical sources. I'd also like to thank the faculty of Marmara University's Political Science and International Relations Department for their continuous understanding during my long years of doctoral studies in the US. Special thanks go to Günay Göksu Ozdogan, Busra Ersanli, Yüksel Taskin and Erhan Dogan for their assistance and encouragement at different times. This project also owes great debt to a number of organizations which provided me with the financial sources necessary to continue my studies in the US and China. I am grateful for the generous funding by Turkish Higher Education Board (YÖK) in the period 2004-2006, which enabled me to launch my doctoral studies abroad. In the period 2006-2009, I was honored by the teaching and research awards extended to me by the History Department at SUNY, Binghamton. This department's Kramer Award and Graduate Students Employee Union's Professional Development Fund covered my research expenses at Stanford, California in the summer of 2007. My extensive research in the Beijing archives and libraries from July, 2007 until March, 2008 likewise, was made possible by History Department's Dissertation Year Fellowship and the Association for Asian Studies' China and Inner Asia Council Small Grant. I am indebted to all of the above organizations for helping and easing the completion of this project. I'd also like to thank the staff at the Binghamton University Library, Hoover Library of War and Peace at Stanford, National Archives II, Library of Congress, vii National Library of China, PRC Foreign Ministry Archives and Beijing University Library for their considerable assistance in locating and copying relevant documents. With regard to my research in the US, I'd like to thank Margareta Noyes and Sidney Rittenberg for sharing their unique insights on Chinese foreign propaganda organs. In China, Kiraz Perincek's friendly assistance has been crucial. Being a foreign expert herself, Kiraz introduced me to several working and retired cadres affiliated with China Radio International. Thanks to her, I was able to conduct interviews with a number of excadres. I am indebted to Chen Rinong, Zhang Jinyu, Rukiye Hacı and Wang Shenzhong for participating in these interviews and sharing their invaluable experiences on China's past foreign propaganda work. I am also thankful to Xia Yongmin and Mao Lanting for bringing to my attention the recently published compilations of FLP and Radio Peking. Angelina Ouyang, Lu Mingjun, Jarod Zhang, among others, have provided assistance in deciphering the unclear and hand-written Foreign Ministry documents. In Beijing and abroad, I also received substantial guidance from my colleagues, Ceren Ergenc and Zan Tao. Ever since we met, I greatly benefited from their knowledge and insights on China and Turkey, let alone their warm friendship. Ivana Gubic and Karolina Svencbir, likewise, have extended both practical assistance and emotional support throughout my stay in Beijing. Throughout my doctoral years, many good friends kept me company. Binghamton's "twilight zone" was certainly much more bearable with the presence of Mehmet Mert Sunar, Selim Karahasanoglu, Hivren & Hakan Atay, Ayse Serdar, Kivanc Kilinc, Gul Karagoz, Gulhan Balsoy, Elif Cagis, Dikmen Bezmez, Albert Fu, Hande Öğütçü, Sinan Gülhan, Nikolay Karkov, Nurçin İleri and İrfan Kökdaş, among others. viii During my several "change of air" visits to the NYC, I was kindly hosted by my old friend Sinan Hosadam and his wife Laia. What I know about the city's famous surroundings, intellectual environment and gourmet culture, I've learned from them. Another old friend, Elcin Arabaci hosted me both in Washington DC (where I conducted research in the city's libraries and archives) and Boston. Our days spent together (enriched by the excellent dishes she cooked for me) are among my most cherished memories. Throughout my years abroad, my "good old" friends in Turkey, Emel Varlık Arıksoy, Zeynep Arikanli, Defne Orhun and Ümran Akçay Akbulut have always been there for me. They kept me within their circle of close friends, although I didn’t have much to offer in return–except for a couple of odd jokes and stories shared over longdistance phone lines. My doctoral studies would have greatly suffered without the emotional support they extended to me. Last but not least, it was my family, Irfan, Ege, and Simge Ungor who made this long and challenging journey possible. I can not possibly thank them enough for their unending faith in me. This study is dedicated to them, as well as my grandmothers, Seniha Ilgaz and Melek Titiz (May God rest her soul) for being my role models and sources of inspiration throughout my life… ix TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 ORIGINS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA 26 1.1. EARLY YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA: 1921-1937 1.2. ORIGINS OF CHINESE FOREIGN PROPAGANDA: 1937-1949 1.3. MAO ZEDONG'S IDEAS ON JOURNALISM AND PROPAGANDA 1.4. POST-1949 FOREIGN PROPAGANDA, DIPLOMACY AND JOURNALISM 28 37 52 60 CHAPTER 2 ORGANIZATION, CADRES, PRINCIPLES 72 2.1. GENERAL STRUCTURE 2.1.1. GUIDANCE AND LEADERSHIP 2.1.2. PRODUCTION OF CONTENT 2.1.3. CIRCULATION 74 76 86 88 2.2. FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS AND RADIO PEKING: AN OVERVIEW 2.2.1. TIMELINE AND ORGANIZATION 2.2.2. CADRES 2.2.3. WORK ROUTINE AND TASKS 2.2.4. PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN PROPAGANDA WORK 90 91 98 106 112 2.3. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AT THE FOREIGN PROPAGANDA AGENCIES 2.3.1. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNICAL SETBACKS 2.3.2. HEAVY BUREAUCRACY 2.3.3. STAFF SHORTAGES 2.3.4. IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 121 121 125 128 134 CHAPTER 3 EDITORIAL POLICY and DISCOURSE 149 3.1. FOREIGN PROPAGANDA TASKS and EDITORIAL POLICY 151 3.2. PROPAGANDA DISCOURSE IN THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE MAGAZINES 3.2.1. GREAT LEAP FORWARD 3.2.2. SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 3.2.3. GREAT PROLATERIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION 3.2.4. SINO-US RAPPROACHMENT 159 163 169 174 180 CHAPTER 4 CHANNELS of DISTRIBUTION 196 4.1. RANGE OF ITEMS 4.1.1. RADIO BROADCASTS 198 199 x 4.1.2. PUBLISHED MATERIAL: BOOKS, PERIODICALS, PAMPHLETS AND PICTURE ALBUMS 4.1.3. SOUVENIRS: POSTERS, STAMPS, PAPER-CUTS, CALENDARS, SCROLLS, BADGES 201 204 4.2. CHANNELS OF DISSEMINATION: CHALLENGES AND SETBACKS 4.2.1. RADIO PEKING BROADCASTS 4.2.2. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS 4.2.2.1. DISTRIBUTION VIA INTERNATIONAL BOOKSTORE 4.2.2.2. DISTRIBUTION VIA EMBASSIES, CONSULATES AND OTHER REPRESENTATIONS 4.2.2.3. OTHER CHANNELS 204 204 206 206 4.3. CASE STUDY: CHINA BOOKS AND PERIODICALS 240 CHAPTER 5 AUDIENCE and RECEPTION 262 5.1. TARGETING 264 5.2. AUDIENCE LIAISON 5.2.1. AUDIENCE SIZE 5.2.2. GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF THE AUDIENCE 5.2.2.1. ASIAN AUDIENCES 5.2.2.2. AUDIENCES IN AFRICA 5.2.2.3. WESTERN AUDIENCE 5.2.2.4. AUDIENCES IN SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN BLOC 5.2.2.5. INSIGNIFICANT AUDIENCES: MIDDLE EAST AND LATIN AMERICA 272 275 278 278 284 287 291 5.3. ASSESMENT OF FEEDBACK 5.3.1. POSITIVE FEEDBACK 5.3.2. NEGATIVE FEEDBACK 5.3.3. IRRELEVANT FEEDBACK 296 297 298 303 CONCLUSION 314 BIBLIOGRAPHY 321 221 235 293 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Chinese Communist Party publications (1919-1949) 70 Table 2 Leadership in the CCP propaganda organs (1921-1945) 71 Table 3 Domestic Propaganda apparatus in the PRC 146 Table 4 Radio Peking organizational chart, 1962 147 xi Table 5 Radio Peking organizational chart, 1973 148 Table 6 International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) annual distribution figures (1949-1976) 254 Table 7 International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) distribution centers abroad 255 Table 8 Radio Peking broadcasting languages and launch dates (1947-1976) 258 Table 9 Letter from International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) circa 1950s 259 Table 10 Principle non-indigenous communist publications in Western Europe (1960) 260 Table 11 Radio Peking's annual listener letters statistics (1949-1976) 306 Table 12 China Reconstructs magazine reader survey, 1961 308 Table 13 China Reconstructs magazine reader occupation statistics, 1966 308 Table 14 Listener letter statistics (Indonesian) 309 Table 15 Listener letter statistics (Hindi) 309 Table 16 Listener letter statistics (Swahili) 310 Table 17 Listener letter statistics (Hausa) 310 Table 18 Listener letter statistics (French) 311 Table 19 Listener letter statistics (German) 311 Table 20 Listener letter statistics (Turkish) 312 Table 21 Listener letter statistics (Persian) 312 Table 22 Listener letter statistics (Arabic) 313 Table 23 Listener letter statistics (Spanish) 313 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 People's China (China's first foreign language magazine) 188 Figure 2 Peking Review (Great Leap Forward era) 189 Figure 3 China Pictorial (Great Leap Forward era) 190 Figure 4 China Pictorial (after the Great Leap's end) 191 Figure 5 Peking Review (Sino-Soviet split) 192 Figure 6 China Reconstructs (Cultural Revolution era) 193 Figure 7 China Reconstructs (Cultural Revolution era-II) 194 Figure 8 Peking Review (Cultural Revolution era) 195 Figure 9 Showroom of China Books and Periodicals, San Francisco circa 1960s 261 xii INTRODUCTION This study aims to analyze the foreign propaganda work conducted by the People's Republic of China during the period 1949-1976 with regard to its organization, cadres, guiding principles, content, channels of dissemination and audience. During the Maoist decades, the PRC regime pursued extensive and multi-faceted foreign propaganda activities to reach overseas audiences. These include exhibitions, movie screenings, theatrical plays, delegation visits, and student exchanges, among others. This study, however, limits itself to the PRC regime's foreign propaganda effort through the use of mass media. In this sense, the core agencies within the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus were the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking. These agencies were responsible for producing the bulk of China's foreign propaganda content i.e., books, pamphlets, magazines and broadcasts in several foreign languages. While these two organizations constituted the heart of China's foreign language media, the PRC regime's larger foreign propaganda machine brought together several other organizations, such as the Central Committee (CC) Propaganda Department, the Foreign Ministry, the State Council Foreign Affairs Office, the CC Liaison Department, and the New China News Agency. Although Chinese communist foreign propaganda has become a subject of scholarly attention since the 1950s, the working of this apparatus has remained largely obscure in the previous studies. 1 The historical sources which provide 1 It is important to note that China's foreign propaganda agencies did not find their place even in the most recent reference sources on propaganda. See, the parts on "international broadcasting", "China", "cultural propaganda" and "Mao Zedong" in Nicholas Cull, David Culbert, David Welch eds., Propaganda and 1 new insight into its working appeared only after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Although this declassification process is still far from complete, Chinese authorities have released substantial amounts of official records in the recent decades. Throughout the 1990s, general relaxation in China concerning the Maoist period also enabled the publication of several secondary sources on this topic. Based on these recently released primary and secondary sources, this study aims to complicate the picture presented by the Cold War era scholarship on Chinese foreign propaganda. As we will see below, Western (as well as Taiwanese) studies on Chinese communist propaganda were deeply biased with the ideological concerns of their own era. China's growing presence in the external propaganda race during the Cold War alarmed many scholars in the West. In an attempt to warn their respective audiences on the dangers of communist propaganda, these scholars tended to emphasize the strengths of the PRC foreign propaganda machine by pointing out its size, efficiency and geographical outreach. According to this approach, China has dedicated huge financial and human resources to this purpose. It was not only the extent of this apparatus that was "fearsome" but the Chinese communists also had enormous convincing ability. Therefore, foreign propaganda, as understood and presented by the conventional propaganda analysts, was a one-way flow. At the end of the reception line, there stood the listener/reader who perceived the message just as it was intended by its sender.2 Hence by denying agency to their local audiences, these studies reduced them to passive agents, Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to present, ABC Clio: Santa Barbara,CA, 2003, 72, 332, 100, 236 2 See Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002, 39 2 which in turn reinforced the perception of China's communist propaganda apparatus as an omnipotent force. In sharp contrast with the common wisdom outlined above, this study argues that influencing foreign audiences during the Cold War was a difficult and costly task for the PRC leadership –and not always destined for success. Based on new evidence concerning China's foreign propaganda organization that was in operation during the Maoist period (1949-1976) this dissertation aims to challenge the premises of the conventional propaganda studies in a number of aspects. Before I outline my specific arguments, however, I'd like to clarify my definition of "propaganda", which has proved to be a problematic term for social scientists throughout the 20th century. 3 The ambiguity of this term, first of all, is related to its negative connotations in the Western languages. As it is perceived in the West, "propaganda" either implies the "incorrectness of the information itself or its sender's intention to manipulate its receiver".4 A further ambiguity is caused by the common notions that have surrounded this term throughout the Cold War, which led various scholars to employ this term only with reference to the activities conducted by the opposite side of the ideological spectrum. For instance, there was a widely-held conviction among the Western scholars that "propaganda" was something done exclusively by the communists: 3 See Oliver Thomson, Easily Led: A history of Propaganda, Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Pub., 1999; Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002 ; Philip Deery, “Propaganda in the Cold War”, Social Alternatives, Vol.23, Third Quarter, 2004 15-21; Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: the formation of men's attitudes. (Trans.: Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner) New York, Knopf, 1965; Alfred M. Lee, “Whatever happened to propaganda analysis?”, Humanity and Society, 10 (Feb. 1981), 11-24; Randal Marlin, Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2002; Ted J. Smith, Propaganda: A pluralistic perspective, NY: Praeger, 1989 4 See, Barry Allen, “On the definition of propaganda” The Canadian Journal of Rhetorical Studies, 3 (1993) ,1 3 It is not that we in the United States are unfamiliar with propaganda. We are familiar with propaganda in many forms: the advertiser trying to influence the buying habits of consumers, the politician trying to influence the voting habits of citizens, (…) the list is long. But propaganda on an international scale, conducted on behalf of the nation by the government, represents something which is, in some sense, foreign to our way of life and our way of thinking.5 It is important to remember, of course, that when this piece was published, the Voice of America has been broadcasting to overseas audiences for over a decade. Hence equating "propaganda" with lies, deception and outright manipulation would be problematic. 6 Besides, in the Chinese setting, the word propaganda (xuanchuan) is more or less a neutral term, which stands for the dissemination of information or publicizing. 7 Therefore, throughout this research, the term “propaganda” will not be used necessarily in a negative sense. As the broader definition of the term may potentially include all types of persuasion activities, such as education or advertisement, a more specific definition is necessary for practical purposes. For this reason, throughout this study, "propaganda" will simply refer to a set of activities conducted by a political entity (mostly governments) to influence public opinion in order to realize certain goals or create a favorable environment for itself.8 As governments in the past (as well as present) mostly relied on mass media channels in disseminating propaganda, the availability of modern technology 5 See, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, ed. Target: The World: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955 New York: Macmillan Company, 1956, xvii 6 More recent propaganda studies employ this term as a neutral category. See, Timothy Cheek, "Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao China," in King-yuh Chang, ed., Mainland China After the Thirteenth Party Congress, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 422 7 Timothy Cheek further points out that truthfulness and credibility were crucial in Chinese propaganda. See, Timothy Cheek, "Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao China," in King-yuh Chang, ed., Mainland China After the Thirteenth Party Congress, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 424-425 8 This is similar to Jowett's and O'Donnel's definition: "the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandists". See Garth Jowett, Victoria O'Donnel eds.Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic essays, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2006, 63 4 is central to this definition. Now let us turn to identify the central issues which will be addressed in this study. Throughout the dissertation, the question concerning the effectiveness of the PRC foreign propaganda work during the Cold War will be approached from a number of angles. It is clear that during the period 1949-1976 the PRC leadership used foreign propaganda as a supplement to its diplomacy in realizing the country's foreign policy goals.9 Especially after the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, when the country was isolated from the socialist bloc as well as the West, China was left with few other options to exert its influence abroad. 10 Therefore the rise in the foreign propaganda output was very much related to the PRC regime's desire to compensate for the unavailability of official connections. The radicalization of foreign propaganda content during the 1960s, likewise, owed to China's sense of insecurity, which was resonated in Mao Zedong's repeated emphasis on the "anti-China" tide in the world. As Chen Jian correctly observed, China's 'victim mentality' has been critical in shaping the country's foreign policy during the Maoist era.11 In this sense, this study interprets China's growing presence in the external propaganda field as a sign of weakness rather then strength. Secondly, the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus was hardly the wellfunctioning, efficient body that was portrayed by the Cold War era scholarship. Nor did it have huge financial sources or manpower at its disposal. As I will try to provide evidence 9 The close relationship between foreign policy and propaganda in China is acknowledged by many scholars. See, for instance, James C.Y. Chu, "People's republic of China" in John A. Lent, ed., Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific: A continental survey of radio and television, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 39 10 Chinese sources admit that the PRC's lack of diplomatic connections made "people's diplomacy" an integral element of China's foreign relations. See Han Xu, quoted in Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 89 11 See, Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, University of North Carolina Press, 2001, 12 5 throughout this study, by contrast, the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus lacked a stable leadership and administrative framework during the Maoist decades. The core foreign propaganda agencies, the FLP and Radio Peking were likewise plagued with several problems, including a weak technical infrastructure, heavy bureaucracy and shortage of trained personnel. Alongside these structural problems, there were also major disruptions during the political campaigns, i.e., the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). During these episodes, both the staff and the working environment at the foreign propaganda agencies suffered greatly. Based on the recently available sources, this study also complicates the picture with regard to the global outreach of China's foreign language media. The new evidence highlights the severe limitations experienced by the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus in terms of reaching its overseas readers/listeners. Among the problems that complicated the circulation process were the restrictions imposed by host governments, mainly due to the subversive nature of Chinese foreign language media. Other problems were caused by the inherent weaknesses of the PRC propaganda apparatus itself, such as heavy bureaucracy, overstocking, lack of communication with the client bookstores, etc. Another argument which challenges the findings of the previous studies is on the reception issue. Against the common wisdom held by Western scholars during the Cold War, this study argues that communist propaganda was not a one-way flow which succeeded in converting its audiences at the time/place of its reception. 12 Based on 12 Here, I am particularly inspired by the critical audience studies, which challenged previous reception models, such as 'uses and gratifications' and 'media effects'. These new studies use Stuart Hall's encodingdecoding model to illustrate the complexity of the reception process, which involves creative interpretation on the part of the audience. David Morley's ethnographic study The "Nationwide" Audience is an important 6 various audience responses, among them especially the negative and irrelevant feedback, this study argues that the PRC foreign language organization had only partial success in convincing its overseas audiences, whose creative reception clearly shows that they were not easy to win over. The re-assessment of the PRC regime's foreign propaganda work during the Maoist period is not only necessary to make adjustments in the conventional propaganda historiography but can also broaden our understanding in a number of topics. First of all, the study highlights the previously neglected aspects of soft-power in the Chinese foreign policy-making. In this sense, it will contribute to the available literature on China's foreign affairs, which mainly focuses on the decision-making structures, state-to-state relations, official diplomacy, or coercive measures.13 The story of the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking, on the other hand, help us recognize the role of persuasion, public diplomacy, and propaganda in China's international relations. As this study aims to demonstrate, these agencies have become crucial components of the country's foreign affairs apparatus in the period 1949-1976. Their role in reaching and convincing overseas audiences has received much attention from the PRC leadership, which closely guided and monitored their activities throughout this entire period. Therefore, documenting their example. See the discussion of this work and its implications for audience research in Ien Ang, "On the politics of empirical audience research" in Meenakshi Gigi Durham, Douglas M. Kellner eds. Media and Cultural Studies Key works, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006 13 See, for instance, Michael H. Hunt, Niu Jun, Toward a history of Chinese communist foreign relations:1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1992, Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, University of North Carolina Press, 2001, Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2004. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. Barbara Barnouin, Yu Changgen eds., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution, London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998 7 previously neglected role in the country's foreign affairs system is needed in order to get a clearer picture of China's Cold War diplomacy. Secondly, this study will contribute to the emerging "Cultural Cold War" literature, which focuses on the non-traditional themes of international relations, such as cultural exchanges, public/people's/informal diplomacy, persuasion, psychological warfare, etc. These studies make a re-assesment of the Cold War history by utilizing official sources, which has become available to scholars only in the 1990s.14 Many of these new titles focus on the Western governments' involvement in propaganda and persuasion activities. 15 To a lesser extent, the Soviet Union's cultural exchanges also drew scholarly attention. 16 As recently observed by Asia specialists, however, this perspective has not yet reshaped the Cold War scholarship on East Asia.17 Few notable works on propaganda and informal diplomacy so far are centered on Taiwan and Japan.18 14 See, Philip Deery, “Propaganda in the Cold War”, Social Alternatives, Vol.23, Third Quarter, 2004, 15 See, Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, New York: The New Press, 1999; Daniel L. Lykins, From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising council and the construction of the Cold War consensus, Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2003; Leo Bogart (abridged by Agnes Bogart), Cool Words, Cold War: A new look at USIA's premises for propaganda, Washington DC: The American University Press, 1995, Giles Scott Smith and Hans Krabbendam eds., The cultural Cold War in Western Europe: 1945-1960, London: Frank Cass, 2003; James R. Vaughan, The failure of American and British propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Nancy Bernhard, U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947–1960. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War behind the Iron Curtain. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000, Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union. Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1999, Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947––1956. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000. 16 See Yale Richmond, Cultural exchange and the Cold War: raising the iron curtain, University Park: Pensylvania State University Press, 2003; Everette E.Dennis et al. Beyond the Cold War: Soviet and American Media Images, Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991 17 Armstrong, who is a contributor to this emerging field, indicates that East Asia has been almost entirely neglected in the emerging literature on the cultural Cold War with few exceptions. See, Charles K. Armstrong, "The cultural cold war in Korea: 1945-1950", The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.62, No.1 (Feb.2003), 71 18 See Gary Rawnsley, Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda, Basingstoke: Macmillan,2000. Chizuru Saeki, US cultural propaganda in Cold War Japan: Promoting democracy 1948-1960, Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2007; Catherine Forslund, Anna Chennaut: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations, Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 2002 15 8 The People's Republic of China and its propaganda agencies did not yet receive scholarly attention. The Chinese foreign propaganda media failed to become an issue even in the most recent academic conferences which specifically focused on the cultural aspects of Cold War in Asia.19 This major gap in the "Cultural Cold War" literature can be remedied with this study, which takes the propaganda activities of the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking as a departure point to elaborate on the PRC regime's use of soft power to exert its influence abroad. Thirdly, this study aims to contribute to the literature on contemporary Chinese propaganda by providing a comparative historical framework for scholars working in this field. Since the 1990s, post-reform propaganda work in the PRC has attracted scholarly interest in the Western academia. Most of these studies analyze China's domestic propaganda with a critical focus on the CCP's monopoly over thought work and the Chinese media's legitimizing role in sustaining the regime. 20 Studies on foreign propaganda, likewise, focus on the official propaganda organs' role in downplaying China's human rights problems abroad. 21 In both cases, a critical assessment of the Maoist period is necessary to situate China's current thought work in its historical context. 19 See the panel program of "Conference on The Cold War in Asia: The Cultural Dimension" (24-25 March 2008) hosted by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore; Also, See the program of "The Cold War in Asia: Beyond Geopolitics and Diplomacy" (1-2 November, 2007) hosted by Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, PRC 20 See, for instance, Ching-Chang Hsiao; Timothy Cheek “Open and closed media: external and internal newspapers in the propaganda system” in Hamrin, Carol Lee; Shuisheng Zhao eds. Decision-making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, Armonk, N.Y.; London, M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 76-87; Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and “Thought Work” in Reformed China, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999; Timothy Cheek “Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao mainland China”, Issues and Studies (Taipei) 25, no.2 (Feb. 1989) 47-74; AnneMarie Brady, “Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Issue 3.1, Spring 2006, 29; Michael Schoenhals, Selections from Propaganda Trends Organ of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992 21 See David Shambaugh, ed. The Making of the Big Lie: Content and Process in the CCP Propaganda System, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992, Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008 9 After all, the foreign propaganda agencies which waged China's battle of persuasion during the Cold War years are still in operation. The changes and continuities in the propaganda system (with regard to its mindset, objectives, working principles and cadres) could only be understood by assessing the legacy of the Maoist period. Therefore, this study should also be regarded as a contribution to the field of contemporary propaganda studies. State of the Field Cold War was a battle of persuasion as well as coercion. Throughout this ideological battle, mass media channels such as shortwave radio broadcasts, films, books and magazines have become critical means to reach the peoples of the opposite bloc. In terms of total foreign propaganda output, the major players in this game since the 1950s were the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. Being a latecomer in the propaganda competition, the People's Republic of China soon became a formidable enemy for the capitalist bloc countries to contend with. Before we start analyzing the works produced in this political climate, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the popular perceptions of the PRC regime in the Western countries. Soon after its involvement in the Korean War by 1950, Communist China has become an integral part of the "Red scare" discourse in the U.S. When a number of American POWs rejected repatriation and decided to stay in the communist territories after the war, Chinese ‘brainwashing’ techniques gained legendary reputation in the US.22 In the popular art works produced during the 1960s, China would gradually replace the 22 See, Garth Jowett, "Brainwashing: The Korean POW controversy and the origins of a myth" in Jowett, Garth, Victoria O'Donnel eds. Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic essays, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2006, 201 10 Soviet Union as the most dangerous enemy of the U.S. government.23 The "totalitarian and ruthless nature" of the PRC regime constituted the major theme in several anti-China publications circulating in North America during the Cold War. 24 It is clear that the American newspapers helped this effort by drawing attention to the subversive nature of China's foreign propaganda media.25 The PRC regime's foreign propaganda activities also received attention from the US Congress.26 During the 1960s, in order to understand this country's "unique" persuasion techniques, many scholars studied China's domestic propaganda establishment.27 The conviction that the communists had great success in persuasion and brainwashing became the underlying premise of the Cold War era propaganda studies. As the communists' success in the propaganda field (read brainwashing, lying or deception) 23 See, Cyndy Hendershot, "The Bear and the Dragon: Representations of Communism in Early Sixties American Culture", Journal of American & Comparative Cultures, 23 (4) Winter 2000, 67-74 24 For a significant example, See, “Blood Money for Mao” (USIA Propaganda country files (1953-1981) Entry, A1-1068 Rg. 306 Stacks 350:84/4/1-84/5/2 Box 2 (National Archives II, Maryland) This pamphlet argues that the Chinese communist officials are keeping several Chinese in the mainland in order to blackmail their relatives in the U.S.: "One estimate states that 60 percent of the Chinese families in America have received extortion letters. These threatened reprisals against relatives, unless huge ransoms were paid. Terrified for their safetyof their families, the Chinese-Americans sent money to the blackmailers. But the result was typical –more letters, more demands, more threats." Also see the supplement "Red China", Look, Dec. 1, 1964, Vol. 28, No.24; Edward Hunter, The black book on Red China: the continuing revolt, New York: The Bookmailer, 1958 25 See John Hughes “Peking applauds campus turmoil”, Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 1969, (Hoover Institution, Preliminary Inventory of International Communist Affairs Yearbook, Box 8, file: China/USA) ; Frank Ching, “Red China Strives to Sway World Opinion”, New York Times, 14 March 1969, Sec.1, 3; Jack Gould, “Radio Peking beams Shortwave Programs to US” New York Times, 21 October 1966, Sec.1, 83 26 See, Robert Loh, “How the Chinese Reds hoodwink visiting foreigners: Consultation with Mr. Robert Loh.” United States Congress House Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960 27 See, George P. Jan, “Radio Propaganda in Chinese Villages”, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1967), 305-315; Alan P.L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1971; Franklin W. Houn, “Publications as a Propaganda Medium in Communist China”, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 12 (Dec., 1960), 177-186; Franklin W. Houn, “The Stage as a Medium of Propaganda in Communist China”, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1959), 223-235; Franklin W. Houn, To Change a Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961; James W. Markham, Voices of the Red Giants: communications in Russia and China, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967; Frederick T.C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1964 11 was explained with their authoritarian tendencies, the narrative of these studies was selfcongratulatory in nature. Many Western analysts felt it necessary to put an emphasis on the fundamental differences between their "better" societies and the totalitarian systems in the Soviet Union and China.28 According to some authors, excelling in propaganda skills was a necessary sacrifice that the West had to make, against its better judgement: We dare not hide our heads in the clouds. We live in a world in which our peace and security and that of the other free nations is threatened by a ruthless and powerful aggressor; an aggressor ready to put very large resources of money, energy, effort, and manpower into achieving a goal that if achieved would change our whole way of life and include us in his totalitarian control. Thus, no matter how we feel about the use of instruments propaganda by the state, we are virtually forced to combat the weapon the enemy uses day after day to undermine our policies, alienate our friends, and mobilize hostility to our very existence.29 Throughout the Cold War years, communist propaganda analysis became a prominent sub-field in the Western political science and communication disciplines. Western propaganda literature of this period should be considered as an integral part of the anticommunist struggle. Not surprisingly, most typical propaganda analysis was conducted for strategic purposes by the governments or pro-government research institutes. Some of these works were printed anonymously as research backgrounders as they did not aim for wider readership than those few in the government circles. 30 Many scholars, likewise, acknowledged the help and assistance they received from official figures.31 28 See, James W. Markham, Voices of the Red Giants: communications in Russia and China, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967 29 See, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, ed. Target: The World: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955 New York: Macmillan Company, 1956, xix 30 One such work was conducted under the auspices of the Western Michigan University and it deals with a specific propaganda campaign in the People's Republic of China by using the English-language sources published by the regime. This research backgrounder employs a descriptive rather than an analytical framework to elaborate on the propaganda system in China through the single example of “people’s communes” mass campaign. ‘People’s Communes’ as Presented in Communist China’s English Language Propaganda (Research Backgrounder: Institute of Regional Studies, Western Michigan University). For other anonymous publications, See "Chinese communist propaganda activities re Indonesia (research backgrounder),Djakarta, 195?", “Chinese Interference Abroad: Continuous revolution as major objective” [n.p.l], 1966 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 43, File 1 (Chinese Interference Abroad) 12 These studies, by and large, relied on the data provided by the Western governments, which carefully monitored the communist media content. In the US, the Foreign Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS) which was tied to the CIA framework, followed both domestic and international broadcasts in the communist countries.32 By 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA) which operated within the executive branch of the U.S. government became critical in gathering information on the communist propaganda activities. Throughout the Cold War, the USIA analysts prepared several reports documenting China's efforts in this field.33 In 1973, this agency published and “Communist External Propaganda” B(L) 217, February 1974 (n.p.l) (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 46) 31 For a significant example, See F. Bowen Evans, Worldwide communist propaganda activities, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. The book was dedicated by its author to the "group of Americans who serve their country in the worldwide battle against communist propaganda, whose vigilance, insight and hard work have made this book possible." 32 A summary of the FBIS reports on the Soviet and Chinese propaganda over the years can be found in Trends and Highlights of Peking Broadcasts (1 October 1952-18 June 1958) in Survey of Communist Bloc Propaganda Broadcasts 1947-1979 (Microfilm) Box 2-Reel No.14) Rg: 263 190/22/29/5, Control No: DCA1(73), Series designate: A1(73) Boxes 1-5 (National Archives II, Maryland): "Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart twopage PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later. In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world. In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche." "SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS (22 April 1947-19 June 1958); SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS (5 October 1950-18 June 1958); TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS (1 October 1952-18 June 1958); TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS (25 June 1958-29 March 1967); SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS (3 July 1958-20 March 1967); SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA (13 April 1967-23 April 1970); TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA (5 April 1967-six months prior to current date) " 33 See, “Communist China’s Worldwide Propaganda Offensive 1959” (Box 2 R-29); “Developments in Communist Bloc International Broadcasting 1960”( Box 4 R-7); “Communist Propaganda Activities in West Europe 1960” (Box 4 R-12); “Communist Propaganda Activities in Africa, January 1960- May 1961” (Box 5 R-42); “Chinese Communist Policy and Propaganda 1960” (Box 6 R-64); “Developments in 13 The External Information and Cultural Relations Programs of the People's Republic of China, whose detailed content was illustrative of the American concerns on China's growing presence in the foreign propaganda field.34 Other China-related official publications include the British Embassy's periodical China Topics: Documentation on specific current topics taken mainly from the press and radio of the Chinese People's Republic .35 There are also more obscure bulletins, such as Developments in China: A brief record of Chinese communist official reports and propaganda 36 and Communism and Africa. 37 Likewise, the South East Asia Treaty Organization found it necessary to publish leaflets to reveal China's real intentions behind its sponsoring of various international exchanges.38 A typical propaganda analysis was often conducted with the purpose of decreasing the impact of propaganda in the country of reception. This is easily discernible Communist Bloc International Broadcasting 1961” (Box 7 R-7); “Chinese Communist Propaganda 1961” (Box 8 R-41); “The Passing Show: Political Satire in Chinese Communist Propaganda” (Box 9 R-55); “Developments in Communist Bloc International Broadcasting” (Box 10 R-87); “The Broadcasting Industry in Communist China” (Box 10 R-92); “Peking Propaganda on the Sino-Indian Border Affair” (Box 11 R-141) Records of the US Information Agency Research Reports 1960-82, Research ( R ) Reports of the Office of Research 1960-63; Rg. 306 250/67/08/05-07 Entry: A1 (1013A) Boxes 1-18 34 See The External Information and Cultural Relations Programs of the People's Republic of China, United States Information Agency, Research Service, 1973 35 China Topics had a thematic content. Topics were often related to China's foreign relations, especially with Asian and African nations. For specific examples, See, “China’s scheme to dominate Africa: Burundi and Congo are the stepping stones” [YB 276 (Int. Rels -Africa-5)] China Topics, August 28, 1964 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 2 (China Topics 1964 April-August); “China and the Third Afro Asian People’s Solidarity Conference at Moshi Feb. 4-11” [YB 177 (Africa-2)] China Topics, March 14, 1963 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 38, File 3 (China Topics 1963 JanMarch); “The N.P.C. Delegation to Africa” [YB 315 (M.T.W -27)] China Topics, March 25, 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 4 (China Topics Jan-March 1965); “Current Chinese Interest in the Arab World” [YB 317 (Int. Rels M.E. -2)] China Topics, April 7, 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 5 (China Topics April-August 1965) 36 The content of Developments in China was based on NCNA news dispatches as well as Radio Peking broadcasts. Routine themes included: "Chinese propaganda about external affairs", "Chinese propaganda about internal affairs", "Russian Propaganda themes", etc. See, Developments in China, April 16-30, 1958 37 See, “Chinese sponsored front activities” Communism and Africa: Part Two: China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, August 1966 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 45, File: Communism and Africa, June 1962-Nov 1966) 38 See “Destination Peking” [Pamphlet] Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Bangkok: 1958? (Hoover Institution, Chinese Subject Collection, Box 4) 14 from the scholars’ treatment of the subject, which often manifests itself through a sharp focus on the erroneous nature of the communist propaganda and an anxiety over the likelihood that it will be positively received by the local audiences. China's foreign propaganda was often analyzed under such exaggerated notions of fear. Some argued that Chinese communists were even more convincing than their Soviet counterparts: The Chinese, on the other hand, are so reasonable, so intelligent and well-educated, so modest, so courteous (but not with the enemy), so ethical in their arguments and presentations, so democratic in their language of persuasion, so progressive in their educational methods when teaching their information theory, so cautious in imposing communist dogma upon what they obviously believe to be unwilling ears, there is the very great danger of the USA audience believing too much, and what is more important, "the peoples" of Asia believing too much. Even when the Chinese attack the USA in the Korean War and for "imperialism" in the Far East, this seems preferable to the Soviet performing of playing a symphony of "peace" with the USA audience while waging a "hate America" campaign elsewhere in the world. The Chinese propaganda is more above ground in this study then the Soviets; the Chinese give the impression of fearlessness in letting the world to know where they stand on any subject. This has to be balanced against their "bamboo curtain" and censorship practices, but they are astonishingly persuasive. 39 Therefore, conventional propaganda analyses reflected the anxiety over the perceived success and effectiveness of the communist propaganda establishments. This perception led many scholars to inquire the methods to limit its dissemination.40 While conventional propaganda analysis equated propaganda with deception, falsity and disinformation, it also denied agency to the propaganda audience. The relatively small literature on Chinese propaganda did not offer any exception to this general rule. The authors of the consulted works on both domestic and external propaganda almost always believed that the audience would fail to notice the “secret agenda” behind these messages. Being a work which brought together several translated 39 See, Martha Jane Smith, Key Symbols in the USSR and Chinese Propaganda to the USA, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), New York University, 1958, 213 40 See, John L. Martin, International Propaganda: Its legal and diplomatic control, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. For another concerned scholar See John C. Clews, Communist propaganda techniques, London: Methuen Co Ltd., 1964 15 items from various Chinese news sources, Voice of Peking: The Road to Paris provides an excellent example in this sense. Although the volume does not attempt to analyze the excerpts, the editors make their objective absolutely clear in the preface when they caution their readers against the dangers of Chinese propaganda: Communist China is the greatest single threat to peace and freedom throughout the world, and particularly in Asia […] The Chinese Communist leadership has certain advantages not enjoyed by such past world conquerors such as Adolf Hitler. The Nazi Fuhrer did not have an effective international machinery to support him in the countries with which the Third Reich was at war. His “fifth columnists” were far less effective than the worldwide net of sympathizers the Communists have today.41 Scholarly works on Radio Peking's propaganda discourse shared this conviction. The authors of these studies, by and large, use an alarming language with regard to the quantitative increase in the number of languages and broadcasting hours.42 Their analyses are often limited to the examination of recurrent themes in China's short-wave broadcasts. While they assess the PRC regime's propaganda objectives and its potential influence abroad, their ultimate aim is to make policy suggestions to their local governments. 43 Similar to their counterparts in the West, Taiwanese propaganda analysis were typically conducted under the auspices of governmental institutions. 44 An important example for this category is Chin Tsai’s Peiping’s International Propaganda Activities, 41 See, Daniel Lyons and Stephen Pan, Voice of Peking: The Road to Paris, NY: Twin Circle Publishing, 1967, v 42 See John Lan Jang, Radio Peking and its international broadcasts, unpublished masters thesis, Journalism Dep, Los Angeles: University of California, 1961; See, John A. Lent, ed., Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific: A continental survey of radio and television, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, See, John Sheridan Morgan, A descriptive analysis of the North American Service of Radio Peking from the fifth of December 1966 to the second of February 1967, unpublished masters thesis, Speech Arts, San Diego State College, 1968 43 See the conclusion part of Lang's study, titled "What can the United States do?", John Lan Jang, Radio Peking and its international broadcasts, unpublished masters thesis, Journalism Dep, Los Angeles: University of California, 1961 44 See, Mao gong dui haiwai de hu dong. [The Overseas Activities of Mao’s Party] Taibei: Zhongguo Guangbo Gongsi Haiwai guangbo bu, 1961. Also See, Gongfei duiwai xuanchuan huodong zhi yanjiu, [Research on the publicly funded propaganda activities] Taipei: Xingzheng yuan xinwen ju diqing yan jiu shi (Executive Yuan News Department Enemy Situation Research Office), 1965 16 which was published by the World Anti-Communist League located in the Republic of China (Taiwan). This organization was established in 1966 under Chiang Kai-Shek's initiative to provide financial and psychological support for the global anti-communist movement.45 Not surprisingly, Chin Tsai’s study is an effort to curb down the Chinese communist propaganda activities, especially those aimed at gaining international recognition for the PRC regime's territorial claims over Taiwan. As the book was published in 1973, one should note that this rivalry had become increasingly intense after the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972, subsequent to which many Western governments officially recognized the PRC as the sole representative of the Chinese nation. China's foreign propaganda media continued to attract scholarly attention during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these later studies examine China's English language magazines, such as China Reconstructs, Peking Review, and China Pictorial, with regard to the PRC regime's foreign propaganda discourse during the Cold War. 46 These works, by and large, employ quantitative techniques such as content analysis to decipher the ideological content of the magazines. As the quantitative methods like text sampling and 45 During the Cold War, the Republic of China had an extensive propaganda network of its own. See, Xuanchuan gongzuo shouce [Handbook of Propaganda work] Taibei: Zhongguo guomin dang zhongyang weiyuanhui di si zu bianyin, 1958 46 The majority of such studies are in the communications field and they utilize quantitative techniques such as content analysis. See, Wang, Chi-rong, Communist China’s External Propaganda, 1966-1981: a content analysis of China Reconstructs, (Master’s thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1982); Holbrook, Bruce, Mainland China’s External Propaganda Values 1958-1974: A Content Analysis of the Peking Review (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1976); Holbrook, Bruce, Themes and Geographical Referents of Red China's Propagandist Peking Review: 1965-1967 (Master’s thesis in journalism and communications, University of Florida, 1969); Wu Hsiao-ming, The image of the United States projected by the Beijing Review, 1972-1989: a content analysis, (Master’s thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1989); Liang Lih-kae, Magazine Propaganda Of The People’s Republican Of China: A Content Analysis Of Peking Review, China Pictorial, And China Reconstructs, 1969, 1974, and 1978 (Master’s thesis in journalism, Mount Pleasant, Mich.: Central Michigan University, 1979); Tseng, Huaichung, The Shortwave Broadcasts of the Two National Stations Representing China: A Content Analysis of Radio Peking and the Voice of Free China, unpublished masters thesis, University of Georgia, Athens, 1983. 17 content analysis focus on the words and concepts in an isolated fashion, studies conducted with this methodology offer little explanation beyond specifying a number of recurrent themes in the Chinese propaganda media. 47 With regard to the studies on discourse, Lazarick's recent work on China's foreign language magazines is an exception.48 This study not only makes a qualitative analysis of the propaganda discourse but also utilizes the insights and experiences of the retired propagandists. Due to the lack of Chinese language sources, however, the study is unable to situate the magazines within the larger foreign propaganda framework.49 There are also many recent studies which examine China's domestic and foreign propaganda organs in the post-1978 period. Recently published scholarly studies in this field, Daniel C. Lynch's After the Propaganda State and Anne-Marie Brady's Marketing Dictatorship assess the efficiency of the contemporary propaganda system in the midst of market reforms.50 David Shambaugh, Timothy Cheek, Michael Schoenhals and AnneMarie Brady focus on various aspects of the propaganda and journalism work in China.51 47 One such example is Bruce Holbrook’s Mainland China’s External Propaganda Values 1958-1974: A Content Analysis of the Peking Review. Based on the content analysis of the Peking Review issues covering almost twenty years, Holbrook puts forward the external propaganda values of the PRC regime as follows: “Chinese ethnocentricity, ideology, leadership, conflict and internationalism.” Based on the content analysis of Peking Review, Holbrook hastily concludes that there was no distinction between what is told inside and outside of China. See Bruce Holbrook Mainland China’s External Propaganda Values 19581974: A Content Analysis of the Peking Review (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1976), 296 48 This study is mainly focused on the magazines' depiction of social and cultural issues during the 1950s. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 23. 49 This limitation is admitted by the author. See his remarks on the 'opaqueness' of the organizational structure surrounding the magazines. Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 23. 50 While Lynch concludes that CCP's hold on propaganda and journalism field is weaker in the post-reform period, Anne-Marie Brady argues that the propaganda system is intact and adaptive to new challenges. See, Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and “Thought Work” in Reformed China, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008 51 Ching-Chang Hsiao; Timothy Cheek “Open and closed media: external and internal newspapers in the propaganda system” in Hamrin, Carol Lee; Zhao, Suisheng eds. Decision-making in Deng’s China: 18 Brady's Making the Foreign Serve China analyzes China's cultural exchanges with foreigners in multiple dimensions but the study has little focus on the country's foreign language media.52 Even in China, where historical sources have become increasingly accessible, scholars note that systematic research is lacking in this field.53 The available works do not place China's foreign language media within the larger context of foreign affairs and the Cold War history. Often, the period 1949-1976 is assessed only in terms of its relation to the post-reform foreign propaganda work in China. 54 Drawing lessons and experiences from the past in order to improve the country's current foreign propaganda work appears to be the major objective in these studies. 55 By and large, mainland scholars employ a Perspectives from Insiders, Armonk, N.Y.; London, M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 76-87; Timothy Cheek, "Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao China," in King-yuh Chang, ed., Mainland China After the Thirteenth Party Congress, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 419-446; David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes, and Efficacy", The China Journal, No.57, January 2007; Michael Schoenhals, Selections from Propaganda Trends Organ of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992; David Shambaugh ed. The Making of the Big Lie: Content and Process in the CCP Propaganda System, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992; Anne-Marie Brady, “Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Issue 3.1, Spring 2006, Anne-Marie Brady, “Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of Propaganda in the PRC (revised version),” in Edwina Palmer (ed.), Asian Futures Asian Traditions, Pool , UK : Global Oriental Publishers, 2005, 157-175 52 Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. Brady's other works focus on the post-reform period. See, Anne- Marie Brady, “Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently: The Use and Control of Foreigners in the PRC”, The China Quarterly, No. 164 (Dec., 2000), 943-964 53 See, Yang Ying, Yao Yuan, "Zhongguo waiwen duiwai xuanchuan qikan de lishi kaocha"(The historical review about China's foreign-language periodicals that are aiming for introducing China to foreigners), Xianyang Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao, (Journal of Xianyang Normal University), Vol.21, No.6, December, 2006, 98; Also See the preface of Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004. 54 See, for instance, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006; Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004; Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002; Zhang Kun, Guojia xingxiang chuanbo [Disseminating the Image of the Country], Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2005; Zhang Kun, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha, [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997 55 The authors make this explicit in their prefaces. Zhang Kun, for instance, aims to contribute to the efforts for the country's image construction in the globalization period. See, "neirong tiyao", Zhang Kun, Guojia 19 nationalistic perspective and focus on the ways to improve China's image in the eyes of overseas audiences.56 Research Sites, Sources and Limitations This dissertation has been the result of a research conducted from November, 2006 until March, 2008 at several archives and libraries in the United States and the People's Republic of China. While I accessed English language backgrounders, research papers, bulletins, etc. at the Hoover Institution of War and Peace, the National Archives II in Maryland has been instrumental in supplying the USIA reports on Chinese foreign propaganda. Likewise, the Library of Congress in Washington DC supplied a number of government-related sources, which all helped to document the extent of the U.S. involvement in monitoring China's foreign propaganda media. During my research trip to Stanford, California, I also visited the China Books & Periodicals (located in San Francisco) which became China's only wholesale distributor in the U.S. during the 1960s and 1970s. There, I was able to interview Margareta Noyes, a retired staff who worked for the CB&P in those years. Ms. Noyes was kind enough to provide me with invaluable xingxiang chuanbo [Disseminating the Image of the Country], Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2005, Shen Suru likewise aims to emphasize the central importance of foreign propaganda and its effectiveness. See "zongxü" in Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo de lilun he shixian, [Theory and Practice of Foreign Broadcasts], Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2004. In a similar fashion, Gan Xianfeng states his aim as "to summarize the 60-70 years of experience in foreign propaganda and to draw lessons from the past mistakes. See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 4; Huang Zecun, on the other hand, aims to make a theoretical contribution to the current propaganda work. See, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002. Zhang Yongde's aim is to systematically summarize past experiences and successes in the propaganda field. See "Abstract" in Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003 56 See, Duan Liancheng, Zenyang duiwai jieshao zhongguo: Duiwai chuanboxue chutan, (How to introduce China to Foreigners) Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi, 1993, Chen Guanglin, Xuanchuan lun (Propaganda Theory), Jinan: Shandong Renmin Chu Ban Shi, 2002, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi (History of China’s foreign news broadcasts), Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004 20 information on the CB&P's relations with Beijing at the time, let alone handing me several documents from the family's unique collection. Another such interview was conducted with Sidney Rittenberg, an influential foreign expert who assumed leading positions at Radio Peking's English language section in the 1960s. Rittenberg was kind enough to offer many of his insights on China's foreign propaganda structure in our e-mail correspondence. His memoirs, along with the accounts written by other foreign experts (Israel Epstein, Wills Morris, Sidney Shapiro) became invaluable sources to decipher the inner-workings of this apparatus. Other Englishlanguage sources used in the dissertation include China's foreign language magazines, Peking Review, China Reconstructs, China Pictorial, most of which were accessed at the Beijing University Library. These magazines have become instrumental in understanding the changes in China's foreign propaganda discourse throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The historical sources which have contributed enormously to the central thesis of this dissertation were the Chinese language sources, most of which have become available in the 1990s or later. Among these, the primary sources accessed at the PRC Foreign Ministry archives in Beijing were critical in understanding the setbacks encountered by the regime in distributing its propaganda items. Official documents issued by the Foreign Ministry concerning the country's foreign propaganda work, telegrams sent by the PRC official representations abroad, leading cadres' directives on specific propaganda topics, etc. have shed new light on the working of the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus. Here, it is important to note that these sources have become accessible for researchers only in 2002 and their declassification was an ongoing process even by 2008. Although I have extended my stay in Beijing, with the hope that the files 21 from the 1960s will soon become available, I was informed by the archival staff that it was not going to be the case. Therefore, the FM archival sources I used in the dissertation are exclusively from the 1950s, which is a limitation that deserves mentioning. Most of the other Chinese language sources, such as the biographies and recollections of the ex-propagandists, official compilations of the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking, meeting summaries and document collections of the CC Propaganda Department, were accessed at the Chinese National Library and the Beijing University Library. These sources include various historical documents concerning the development of foreign propaganda agencies, their guiding principles, directions from the leadership, staff, working environment and audience liaison. Many of these sources have become available in the post-reform era hence they should be regarded as secondary sources. But they were no less critical than primary sources in terms of highlighting the setbacks in the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus. During my stay in Beijing, I was also lucky enough to conduct a number of interviews with the ex-personnel who worked for China's foreign language magazines and broadcasts during the Maoist decades. If it was not for a couple of obstacles, such as my lack of right connections, there could have been many more interviews. One should also account for the general lack of enthusiasm in China towards foreign researchers. For instance, on-duty personnel at the Foreign Language Press bookstore quickly informed me that they had no knowledge whatsoever on the whereabouts of the older cadres. My other initiatives to meet retired cadres were rejected by the Foreign Languages Department on the grounds of old age, sickness, lack of time or simple unwillingness (such as, Sidney Shapiro). I was also informed by the China Radio International staff that 22 the listener letters archive was not organized and therefore accessible to researchers (or anyone else, for that matter). Hence on the audience-reception issue, I had to rely on the overall statistics and the assessment of the retired cadres, who often mentioned single or aggregate listener/reader reactions. The value of these sources in highlighting the previously obscure nature of the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus is indisputable. However, it is also clear that all historical sources come with their own biases. For instance, memoir is a problematic genre because it is a subjective account that prioritizes its author's perspective. In this sense, the English language memoirs I used were problematic because their authors, (foreign experts, who worked at the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking57) had tremendous difficulties during the Cultural Revolution. Hence, these authors tend to remember the latter part (their loss of confidence in the CCP) better than the time that they willingly chose to live in China to serve the revolution. Therefore, their accounts reflect their disappointment in the system and they tend to emphasize the negative. By contrast, memoirs written by the Chinese staff are often more positive toward their past experiences, although they are also critical of the political campaigns which have disrupted the cadre structure and the working environment at the foreign propaganda agencies. Throughout the study, I tried to strike a balance between these two perspectives by comparing and contrasting Chinese cadres' recollections with those of the foreign experts. 57 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, (1993) 2001, Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: Thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980. Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and Journalist. San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005. Morris R., J. Wills, Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966 23 The dissertation's chapter outline is as follows: First chapter, "Origins of Chinese Communist Propaganda", deals with the evolution of the Chinese communist propaganda ideology and the CCP's propaganda experience before the socialist revolution in 1949. The origins of the Chinese communist foreign propaganda organs will be discussed in relation to Mao Zedong’s early ideas on propaganda and journalism. This chapter will provide a framework to understand China's foreign propaganda work in the 1950s and 1960s, in terms of its continuities with the Yanan period. This chapter will also deal with the main trends/events in the post-1949 foreign policy, propaganda and journalism, in order to lay the background for the core chapters on foreign propaganda work in the period 1949-1976. Second chapter, "Organization, Cadres and Principles" will identify the leading and subsidiary organs of the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus; examine the principles of foreign propaganda work and how they shifted during the political campaigns. The mechanics of the editing and translation work will be discussed in relation to the role of the foreign experts, Overseas Chinese and junior Chinese cadres working at Radio Peking and the FLP. This chapter will also analyze the challenges faced by the Chinese foreign propagandists over the years. These setbacks will be analyzed under four headings: technical and physical infrastructure, heavy bureaucracy, staff shortages and the impact of the political campaigns. Third chapter, "Editorial Policy and Discourse" will analyze China's foreign propaganda content in relation to the PRC regime's changing foreign policy goals. The FLP magazines' propaganda discourse will be analyzed under four themes, which also 24 coincide with the four important episodes in Chinese history: The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), the Sino-Soviet split (1960-1964), the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) and the Sino-US rapprochement (1971-1972). Several excerpts from the foreign propaganda magazines, China Pictorial, China Reconstructs, Peking Review will be used to analyze the interplay between the production of content and the adoption of foreign propaganda principles, such as "not forcing oneself on others" (bu qiangjia yu ren), observing "inside and outside is different" (neiwai youbie) and "truthfulness" (shishi qiushi). Fourth chapter, "Channels of Distribution", will examine the means available to the PRC regime in reaching its global audiences. This chapter will deal with the direct methods of dissemination, such as shortwave broadcasts, book sales and the free distribution of publications. Here, the external and internal problems concerning the International Bookstore's commercial distribution work will be discussed. The case of the China Books and Periodicals, International Bookstore's only client distributor in the U.S., will further illustrate the distribution problems at the local context. Likewise, this chapter will examine the setbacks in the non-commercial distribution, which was handled by the PRC regime's embassies, consulates and other official representations. Fifth chapter, "Audience and Reception", will focus on the PRC regime's targeting policies and audience liaison work. Based on the official listener/reader letter data, this chapter will assess the geographical extent as well as the size of China's foreign propaganda audience. The chapter will also assess multiple audience reactions, among them negative and irrelevant feedback, in order to display the challenges faced by the Chinese propagandists in their attempt to win the hearts and minds of foreign audiences. 25 CHAPTER 1 ORIGINS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA The foreign propaganda apparatus which was in operation in the People's Republic of China during the Cold War years inherited considerably from the experiences of the preliberation era. This continuity manifests itself especially with regard to the cadres and principles of propaganda work (xuanchuan gongzuo). This chapter will examine the origins of the Chinese communist propaganda organization as it developed in the 1920s; CCP's foreign propaganda experience in the revolutionary base areas (1935-45) and during the Civil War period (1945-49); and the initial propaganda guidelines and principles which were heavily influenced by Mao Zedong’s ideas on propaganda and journalism. In order to lay the groundwork for the following chapters and situate China's foreign propaganda effort within its historical context, the last section will briefly discuss the important events which shaped Chinese foreign policy, propaganda and journalism work throughout the period 1949-76. CCP was engaged in propaganda work right from its foundation in 1921. However, because CCP cadres joined the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) ranks by 1923 in accordance with Comintern's "united front" strategy, it is difficult to assess the communists' unique contributions to the propaganda field in the early 1920s. During this period both nationalists and communists were under the influence of Soviet advisors, who substantially contributed to the shaping of their early propaganda system. After the infamous Shanghai Massacre of 1927, when Guomindang under Chiang Kaishek 26 expelled the party's left wing and forced the communists out of the urban centers, CCP cadres gradually retreated to the countryside. During the Nanjing decade (1927-37), when the country was nominally unified under nationalist rule, communist propaganda organs operated secretly. In this period, CCP propagandists had to struggle with the censorship laws and various other pressures imposed by the Guomindang regime. In the meantime there was an ongoing factional strife within the CCP, which paralyzed its leadership with regard to its decisions concerning the next course of revolutionary action. CCP's central propaganda establishment, although broadly inspired by its Soviet counterpart, gained its distinct color by the mid-1930s due to the party's compulsory move away from the urban centers to the rural areas.58 The communist cadres, who had established a soviet base area in the southern province of Jiangxi in 1931 under Mao Zedong's leadership, were forced out in 1934 –not able to counter the Guomindang encirclement. This led to the legendary Long March, which ultimately brought the communists to the northern base areas in Yanan and united them under Mao's leadership. During the Anti-Japanese struggle (1937-1945) and the Civil War (1945-1949), CCP propagandists gained experience in the revolutionary base areas in Northern China. In addition to the domestic mobilization campaigns, the Yanan period also saw the first systematic efforts to reach foreign audiences.59 In the midst of tremendous difficulties, CCP's initial foreign language publications and broadcasts sought to spin world public 58 For a comparative analysis of the structures, channels and cadres of propaganda work in China and the Soviet Union, See, Julian Chang, “The mechanics of state propaganda: The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s” in Timothy Cheek et al. New Perspectives on State Socialism in China, Armonk, NY: London, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 76-124 59 See Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 35, Also See Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 11 27 opinion in the party's favor. Likewise, the leading cadres that served in the post-1949 external propaganda establishment were trained in these base areas. Also in this era, communists made contact with foreign journalists like Edgar Snow and Anna Louise Strong, who served as CCP's messengers of publicity in the subsequent decades. Another continuity present itself with regard to the core principles of propaganda, which were formulated by Mao Zedong during the 1930s and continued to influence the post-1949 propaganda apparatus. These principles include consideration for target audiences, truthful news, a simple and concrete writing style, importance of the context (time and space) among others. But before we move on to the communists' experiences in the 1930s and 1940s, let us focus on the early 1920s, when the Chinese Communist Party established its central propaganda organization. 1.1. Early Years of Chinese Communist Propaganda: 1921-1937 At the time of the Chinese Communist Party's establishment in 1921, China was in the midst of a social and political crisis. The founder of the republic, Sun Yatsen, and his Nationalist Party (Guomindang) had failed to unify the country after the abolishment of the monarchy in 1911. China was split between warlord factions, which, sometimes with foreign backing, fought amongst themselves and against the nationalist forces. In the meantime, urban youth was growing angry with the weak Beiping government for its inability to exert influence over the decisions made by Western powers. On May 4th 1919, after it became clear that the Beiping government could not prevent the transfer of Shandong province (a former German concession) to Japan –a provision of the Versailles Treaty signed by major European powers- thousands gathered in Beijing to protest. The 28 anti-imperialistic sentiment expressed in this demonstration was shared by several groups in China –among them, nationalists, feminists, anarchists, and socialists. The earliest members of the CCP were also part of the May Fourth Movement, and like their contemporaries, sought an alternative route for their country's future. Not surprisingly, the October Revolution, which had only recently succeeded in Russia, provided a model for many in the May Fourth generation -and amongst them, the communists in particular. The first Congress of the Chinese Communist Party convened in Shanghai in 1921. Rather than a strictly centralized apparatus, the earliest communist organization in China was a diffuse network of party cells and study societies operating all over the country.60 Starting in the early 1920s, the Soviet Union acted as a mentor to the young communist movement in China. As the Soviet Union is considered by many to be the first modern nation to make systematic use of mass propaganda techniques,61 this relationship was especially important in the realm of mass mobilization and publicity. Although the central propaganda organs in the Soviet and Chinese party machines were contemporaries62, it is clear that the Soviet side had already accumulated a great deal of experience before and during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and therefore, was in a position to guide their Chinese counterparts. 60 For a detailed study of this period, See Hans J. Van de Ven, From friend to comrade: the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1991 61 For a detailed analysis of the Soviet propaganda experience in the early years of the socialist republic, See Peter Kenez, The birth of the propaganda state: Soviet methods of mass mobilization, 1917-1929, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 62 According to Bastid-Bruguiere, while the Soviet party created a special organ for propaganda only in August,1920, Chinese Communist Party had "a specialized propaganda organization right from its foundation at the time of its First Congress in July 1921." Although the author indicates that this date is debated by party historians, some of whom trace the establishment of the CCP's propaganda department to the Third Congress, 1923, it is clear that there was not a substantial amount of time in between the creation of these two official propaganda organs. See Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the national-revolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Leutner, Mechthild, et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 5 and 8. 29 Chinese communists' understanding of propaganda was deeply influenced by Vladimir I. Lenin's What is to be Done?, which defined the task of the revolutionary propagandist as injecting the correct class consciousness into the minds of the laboring masses from outside. In this piece, Lenin defined the role of the party newspaper "not only as a collective propagandist and an agitator, but also as a collective organizer". The Leninist principle on the party nature of the news and publication work (dangxing yuanze) constituted the core of Chinese communist propaganda.63 The spread of print media in the late 19th and early 20th centuries has enabled the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist concepts among communist circles and laid the ground work for a "text-centered" party in China by the 1920s. 64 In this early period, that is before Mao established his intellectual hegemony inside the CCP, most influential figures in the party's journalism and propaganda work were Qu Qiubai, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), and Zhang Wentian.65 The earliest party publications in this era were the Guide (Xiangdao) which appeared from 1922 until 1927, followed by Stuggle (Fendou) during the period 1927-1936. 66 Meanwhile, in Europe, Youth (Shaonian) - later renamed Red Glory (Chiguang) began its publication life under the guidance of young Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.67 These 63 This term is often translated as "party principle". See, for instance, Zhao Yuezhi., Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998, 19 64 Hans J. Van de Ven, "The emergence of the text-centered party" in Tony Saich and Hans Van de Ven eds., New Perspectives on the Chinese communist revolution, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 5 65 For the particular contributions of Qu Qiubai, Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian, See Liu Jiangchuan, Jianguo qian zhongguo gongchandang xinwen guanli sixiang yanjiu [Studies on the News Management Thoughts of the Chinese Communist Party before the foundation of the People's Republic of China], Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 2006, 161-189 66 See, James W. Markham, Voices of the Red Giants: communications in Russia and China, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967, 348 67 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004. 2 30 periodicals were the forerunners of a long list of party publications that continued to appear until 1949.68 In 1923, following Comintern's "united front strategy", which advised the newlyestablished, weak communist parties to collaborate with the bourgeois- nationalist parties against the imperialist forces, members of the CCP joined the Guomindang ranks. The CCP's individual propaganda organization ceased to exist as an autonomous entity during this period69 although the communist cadres remained as an identifiable group inside the Guomindang and tried to steer the party towards a leftist agenda. But for all practical purposes, the CCP cadres used the channels provided by the nationalists in their propaganda work, i.e., "publishing, lecturing, and organizing demonstrations or action".70 The propaganda work in this era had an urban character and was primarily aimed at industrial workers. CCP propaganda in this period attacked warlords and supported the Sun Yatsen line inside the party against the rightist elements71. Soon, however, the May Thirtieth incident of 1925 changed the course of events for the communists. This incident was triggered by British authorities' forceful repression of a demonstration in Shanghai, following the death of a Chinese worker in a Japaneseowned mill. In a short period of time, the protests turned into a nationwide campaign directed against the foreign presence in China. Following this unexpected outburst of anti-imperialistic fervor, it was understood that CCP was not ready to lead such a mass 68 See the full list of the CCP official publications in the 1919-1949 era on Table 1. See Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the national-revolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Mechthild Leutner et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 12 70 See Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the national-revolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Leutner, Mechthild, et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 12 71 See, Lin Zhida, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi, (Chinese Communist Party Propaganda History) Sichuan renmin chubanshi, 1990, 106 69 31 movement because of its organizational weaknesses.72 Shortly after this incident, Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party advised the CCP to consolidate its own party apparatus.73 Although the CCP propaganda organs gained a degree of autonomy from the Guomindang with this decision, Soviet advisors continued to assist the CCP in all of its major plans and activities. 74 In the period 1925-27, CCP built a centralized party apparatus based on Marxist-Leninist principles and enlarged its membership. 75 After Chiang Kaishek's rise to leadership position in the Guomindang, the earlier emphasis on social justice (Sun Yatsen line) gradually declined and the party leaned towards a more militarist agenda. As part of his plans to unify the country under the nationalist rule, Chiang Kaishek expelled the leftist cadres out of the party in the infamous Shanghai Massacre of 1927. While this incident proved the bankruptcy of Comintern's "united front" strategy in China, it also made it clear that, so far, the communist ideology had failed to penetrate the masses. According to Hans Van de Ven: In the 1925-27 period CCP members attempted to mobilize China's population by establishing mass organizations in several major cities and the countryside first of Guangdong province (…)But these efforts failed to create a reliable mass base for the 72 See Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the national-revolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Leutner, Mechthild, et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 14 73 Bastid-Bruguiere's analysis of the Comintern decision is as follows: "The decision of the Comintern in the summer of 1925 to allow the CCP to work for its own aims may well have been motivated by the recognition that the GMD was unable and unwilling to conduct mass propaganda work, but it was also a tacit acknowledgement that communist methods, which were not simply a copy of Soviet practices, but had their own ways and styles brought over from former Chinese intellectual activist traditions, had their own virtues." See, Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the nationalrevolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Leutner, Mechthild, et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 23 74 See Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the national-revolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Leutner, Mechthild, et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 15 75 While before May 30th the party had less then 1,000 members, in the subsequent two years, party membership grew to almost 60,000 people. See, Hans J. Van de Ven, "The emergence of the text-centered party" in Tony Saich and Hans Van de Ven eds., New Perspectives on the Chinese communist revolution, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 20 32 CCP, and when in the spring and summer of 1927 the KMT attacked the CCP to seize power, it was in no position to defend itself.76 Hence this incident can be regarded as a manifestation of the limited success enjoyed by the communists in their propaganda activities during the 1920s. The CCP leadership had recognized the party's drawbacks in this realm well before the Shanghai incident. For instance, a circular issued by the Central Bureau in April, 1926 criticized the propaganda cadres for an "excessive display of their ideology, and rude behavior in their dealings with ordinary people".77 Lessons from these experiences would be used in the 1930s in a whole different setting. After the nominal unification of the country under Chiang Kaishek's rule in 1927, CCP members had to leave the cities. The Shanghai incident was followed by a period of disillusionment within the party, which was split among the advocates of different revolutionary strategies78. The dominant (pro-Soviet) line called for armed uprisings in the cities. Soon after the abrupt end of the "first united front", CCP cadres staged an uprising in Nanchang, the capital city of Jiangxi province. Despite its failure, Nanchang Uprising became a major theme in "CCP mythology", and the date of the incident (August, 1927) marked the symbolic birth of the Red Army.79 Similarly, Mao Zedong's attempts to organize a peasant rebellion in the countryside by September, 1927 resulted in the communists' failure vis-à-vis the nationalist troops. Regardless of its consequence, the 76 See Hans J. Van de Ven, From friend to comrade: the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 19201927, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1991, 148 77 See, Van de Ven's discussion of the party circular "How should we work from now on?" (Women jinhou yingdang zenmeyang gongzuo?), which admitted that CCP not only failed to penetrate the masses but sometimes actually divorced themselves from them on purpose. See, Hans J. Van de Ven, From friend to comrade: the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1991, 178 78 Rapid changes in the leadership position of CCP's propaganda organs during this period illustrate the extent of this instability. In 1927 and 1928 alone, the leadership of the CCP Central Bureau Propaganda Department changed hands several times. See Table 2. 79 See, Colin Mackerras, China in Transformation 1900-1949, London and New York: Longman, 1998, 57 33 Autumn Harvest Uprising, too, would be considered by the Chinese communists as a significant event, which changed the course of events in the long-run. The period that lasted from August 1927 until the Japanese occupation in July 1937 (which is called the "second national revolutionary war period" in the official Chinese historiography and the "Nanjing Decade" in Western scholarship) turned out to be a critical juncture for the communist party. On the propaganda front, due to Guomindang repression in the cities, mobilizing industrial workers was no longer a viable option. The resolution on propaganda work, which was adopted in the Sixth CCP Congress held in Moscow in 1928, reflects the concerns of the communist party leadership in this realm: The conditions of our difficult and clandestine work naturally affect the nature of our agitation among the masses. The convening of large mass meetings has become a difficult task in the agitation of the masses. What we can do is to call the workers to outdoor meetings outside factories during their off-duty hours or during strikes, utilize clubs in the cities, as well as workers dormitories, night schools, fellow provincial associations, common people's schools ( p'ing min hsüeh-hsiao) , fraternal societies of the workers, markets and festivities in the villages, religious meetings, public games on forest grounds, etc80. Hence there was an imminent need to enlarge the propaganda front and reach broader segments of the society. The communist leadership was in disarray, however, and unable to reach a consensus on the party's next course of action. In the early 1930s, the dominant line in the party was still focused on capturing the cities, although the communist forces, several times, have failed to uphold their positions against nationalist troops. The Chinese official historiography, which naturally tends to agree with Mao's version of events, blames this period of disillusionment on the mistaken (pro-Soviet) line in the party leadership. Likewise, on the propaganda front, the failure of this era is regarded as a 80 See “Sixth CCP Congress Resolution on Propaganda Work”, Chinese Studies in History (White Plains, NY) 4, no.4 (Summer 1971), 215 34 consequence of the "leftist" mistakes committed by Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan and Wang Ming.81 In 1935, when Mao Zedong gained a prominent status in the party, his rise was accompanied by a shift of emphasis from the cities to the countryside. Mao made his early formulations on Chinese society and revolutionary struggle in Jiangxi Soviet Republic established in 1931. 82 This experience proved short-lived, however, as the Jiangxi soviet fell to Guomindang pressures in 1934. Hence began the famous Long March, which brought the CCP cadres from the south to the revolutionary base areas in North China by 1935. Although the party could not conduct any systematic propaganda during the Long March83, the positive interaction of CCP cadres and Red Army soldiers with the rural masses proved to be a successful propaganda campaign in itself. The Jiangxi period is important because it saw the formation of the first specialized communist propaganda organs. The Red China News Agency was established in Jiangxi by 1931 and evolved into Xinhua News Agency by 193784. This agency was not only functional in sending reports to the outside world but also in collecting outside news (mainly the dispatches of the Nationalist government's Central News Agency) with the help of the army radio85. This era is also important in terms of the proliferation of 81 See, Lin Zhida, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi [Chinese communist party propaganda history] Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001, 123-129 82 According to William Wei, the isolation of the countryside gave Mao enough room to devise his own methodology i.e. dependence on the army and peasants –which was contrary to the principles of orthodox Marxism. See, his Counterrevolution in China: The Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet period, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985, 10 83 During the Long March, propaganda work was undertaken by the Red Army units, provincial party committees and political departments. See, Lin Zhida, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi [Chinese communist party propaganda history] Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001, 135 84 Red China News Agency later had to stop its operation due to the Guomindang encirclement and the subsequent Long March. The journalism work recovered only in 1936 after its re-establishment in Shanbei area. 85 See, Zhao Yuezhi., Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998, 14 35 communist publications. By the fall of 1933, there were thirty-four newspapers and journals in the Jiangxi Soviet, of which the most influential was Red China (Hongse Zhonghua)86. Another significant development was the transfer of journalism work from urban centers to the countryside. Before this period, publishing for rural readership was unprecedented in China and it came with its own challenges.87 In this sense, the Jiangxi Soviet became the predecessor of Yanan era, when Chinese propagandists excelled in their skills and devised new methods to penetrate into the countryside. In terms of CCP's propaganda activities abroad, Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 became a major theme in communist publications. A series of overseas publications that appeared during the mid-1930s sought to gather outside support for the Chinese cause vis-à-vis the Japanese occupation.88 These publications include the San Francisco-US based Vanguard (Xianfeng Bao) dated 1934; Paris-France based Save the Nation (Jiuguo Bao, later named Jiuguo Shibao) dated 1935; and All-People's Monthly (Quanmin Yuekan) dated 1936.89 However, it is difficult to categorize these journals as foreign propaganda items because they were published in Chinese language and were not aimed at foreign audiences per se. The systematic attempt to influence foreign audiences 86 See, Zhao Yuezhi., Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998, 15 87 Most important of these challenges was the high illeteracy rates in the countryside. The rate of illiteracy was almost 90% in the Chinese countryside. Southern base areas had the better average of 40% literacy women being almost always illiterate. See, Liu Jiangchuan, Jianguo qian zhongguo gongchandang xinwen guanli sixiang yanjiu (Studies on the News Management Thoughts of the Chinese Communist Party before the foundation of the PRC), Changchun: Jilin Daxue Chubanshe, 2006, 32. One way to combat illeteracy was the organization of newspaper reading groups, where the propagandists would read aloud various news items. This method gained prominence in the 1930s, with the move into the countryside, although CCP also used it during the 1920 to connect with the illeterate workers in the urban areas. See, “Sixth CCP Congress Resolution on Propaganda Work”, Chinese Studies in History (White Plains, NY) 4, no.4 (Summer 1971), 220 88 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004. 2 89 See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 67 36 only started towards the end of the 1930s, when the communists reached their relatively stable base areas in the north and formed the "second united front" with Guomindang in 1937 against the wholesale invasion of the country by the Japanese troops. 1.2. Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Propaganda: 1937-1949 Ever since the end of the first united front in 1927, the CCP organization had been in disarray due to factional divisions inside the party and continuous Guomindang pressure. During the Long March, the rural characteristics of the Chinese revolution gained prominence and the communist party became re-unified under Mao Zedong's leadership. The tumultuous period of escape from the nationalist forces ended in 1937, when the CCP and Guomindang formed the "second united front" against the invading Japanese troops. In their new base areas in North China 90 , communist cadres enjoyed relative stability and had time to re-organize the party structure and reinforce ideological training. Here, communist cadres became proficient in Marxist-Leninist terminology through endless political study sessions, lectures and discussions. 91 The social and economic policies employed in Yanan, most important of which was land reform, served as a model for the leadership after 1949. As compared to the late 1920s and early 1930s when the communists had to operate secretly under the yoke of Guomindang censorship, the "second united front" era provided the communists with more freedom in their propaganda work.92 In fact, CCP propaganda organs were so efficient in raising support 90 There were three communist base areas in the north: Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (simply referred as Yanan), Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar (Jin-Cha-Ji) and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu). 91 See Ji Fengyuan, Linguistic engineering:language and politics in Mao's China, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, 48-49 92 Anne-Marie Brady states that in this period CCP cadres had more freedom to move and operate in the government-controlled areas. See her Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the 37 against the Japanese troops that some communist publications were allowed to circulate in the nationalist-controlled areas.93 The years of the Anti-Japanese struggle (1937-1945) also provided new opportunities for the communists to establish their own international contacts and autonomous foreign affairs structure94. Subsequent to the agreement to form a joint front against the Japanese, Zhou Enlai established the International Propaganda Bureau in the temporary nationalist capital, Wuhan.95 This was the party's earliest foreign affairs organ and one of its primary responsibilities was to translate and disseminate Mao Zedong's writings. The desire to cultivate favorable international opinion was reflected in Zhou's own heavy schedule of meetings with Western journalists and celebrities…Zhou emphasized 'independence and self-reliance' in foreign affairs and urged his Wuhan subordinates to break the Guomindang's monopoly over foreign affairs…'Diplomacy' especially as it addressed US public opinion, incorporated the 'policy of propagandizing our Party' (xuanchuan wodangde zhengce). The latter was the precursor to Zhou's post-1949 'people's diplomacy'.96 In the remaining part of the war, Zhou Enlai's foreign networking continued in Chongqing, which became the Guomindang's permanent war-time capital. Here, Zhou Enlai established the External Propaganda Small Group (Duiwai Xuanchuan Xiaozu) in People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 49 93 One such publication was Red China cited in Oliver Thomson, Easily Led: A history of Propaganda, Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Pub., 1999, 289 94 Before this period, CCP foreign policy organs were almost exclusively dealing with the Comintern and Soviet Union. In between the first and second united fronts, CCP's foreign affairs organs were of temporary nature and hardly significant. See, for example, the Foreign Affairs Commissariat in Guangzhou (1927) and People's Commisariat of Foreign Affairs in Jiangxi Soviet (1931) in Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. 45-46 95 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 86 96 See, Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989, 24 38 1939.97 This new organization had two major tasks: "1) to propagate CCP policies, the situation in the revolutionary base areas and Mao Zedong's writings in foreign languages in order to gain support and sympathy abroad; 2) to conduct research on the global economic and political situation, particularly the situation of the countries which were friendly to the communists, in order to improve the Chinese people's understanding on these matters." 98 In the meantime, China's countryside became the hot bed of an evolving culture of resistance -enriched by the contributions of urban intellectuals who fled the coastal cities under Japanese occupation. This new culture disseminated in various forms, including newspapers, cartoons, folk songs, and spoken drama. 99 Throughout the Anti-Japanese struggle, communist base areas received their fair share of these urban intellectuals. A number of these people worked in the communist propaganda organizations –an assignment, which was commonly referred to at the time as an "honorable vocation."100 The fundamental aim of communist propaganda in this period was to recruit soldiers and raise support to the fight against the Japanese occupation.101 Another major task for the communists was to propagate the land reform and favorable social conditions in the revolutionary base areas. 97 In 1940, this organization was renamed Southern Bureau International Affairs Group (Nanfang Ju Waishi zu). See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 86 98 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 86 99 For a detailed analysis of this period and popular art works, See, Chang-Tai Hung, War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. 100 See Timothy Cheek, “The honorable vocation: Intellectual service in CCP Propaganda institutions in Jin-Cha Ji, 1937-1945” in Tony Saich; Van de Ven, Hans J., eds. New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution Armonk, N.Y; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 235-262 101 CCP cadres constantly emphasized the issue of anti-Japanese struggle in their dealings with foreign journalists. See, Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003,53 39 In terms of specialized propaganda media, communists started publishing Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao), which became the predecessor of the PRC's official newspaper, People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) in the post-1949 period. Notwithstanding the few urban intellectuals who guided the editorial content, the bulk of the newspaper work in Yanan was conducted by amateur journalists. 102 This was in accordance with Mao's mass-line in journalism, which dictated that newspaper work should not be undertaken by a few specialists but be regarded as everyone's responsibility. In the subsequent years, Liberation Daily not only became a famous model of mass-line journalism, but also provided an early example for party's strict control over propaganda work.103 After the publication of an article by its journalist Wang Shiwei, who criticized the privileged status of the leading communist party leaders in Yanan, Liberation Daily became the center of party rectification in 1942. Wang Shiwei's purge displayed the limitations of tolerance towards critics and became an early lesson for the journalists affiliated with the party.104 Hence the rectification of 1942 was a symbolic event that marked the party's permanent hold and indisputable authority over propaganda and journalism work105. As noted above, the Yanan period also saw the first systematic attempts by the CCP to influence foreign audiences. 106 During the Anti-Japanese struggle, the main 102 In 1944, there were 2,000 amateur correspondants in the Yanan area. See, Zhao Yuezhi., Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998. 31 103 While this is criticized in the Western literature, Chinese analysts describe it as the "correction of individualist tendencies" in propaganda. See Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 50 104 See, Timothy Cheek, "The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong's Yan'an Talks in the First CPC Rectification Movement", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 11 (Jan., 1984), 25-58 105 See, Timothy Cheek, "Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao China," in King-yuh Chang, ed., Mainland China After the Thirteenth Party Congress, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 426 106 According to Anne Marie Brady, "the early prominence given to foreign propaganda demonstrates its importance in CCP foreign affairs". See her Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the 40 emphasis in foreign propaganda shifted to gaining international legitimacy and raising support for China's war effort. In terms of foreign language publications, the CCP Propaganda Department published English, French and Russian editions of Report from China (Zhongguo Tongxun), and the English language Jin Cha Ji Magazine (Jinchaji Zazhi) at the Jin-Cha-Ji revolutionary base area.107 The early 1940s saw the publication of the first communist pictorial (Resistance Pictorial), which had English captions and articles alongside Chinese.108 Another breakthrough in the foreign propaganda realm was the launch of the English language telegraphic news dispatches by the Xinhua Agency in 1944109. The communist efforts to gather support for the Anti-Japanese struggle was hardly confined to the mainland. While the foreign language periodicals published in the revolutionary base areas aimed at foreign journalists living in China, communists sought to reach broader overseas audiences through their base in Hong Kong. For instance, until the fall of Hong Kong in 1941, China Defense League was instrumental in raising material as well as moral support for the communists110. The League was founded by the widow of the republican leader Sun Yatsen, Song Qingling, who had left the mainland in People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 49 107 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 2-3 108 According to Timothy Cheek, "The editors' intent to influence European and American public opinion was highlighted by the inclusion of letters praising Jin-Cha-Ji by Michael Lindsay and William Band, along with Lindsay's "Reminiscences of Dr. Bethune" none of which appeared in Chinese." According to Cheek, "this was an impressive piece of international propaganda." See Timothy Cheek, “The honorable vocation: Intellectual service in CCP Propaganda institutions in Jin-Cha Ji, 1937-1945” in Tony Saich; Van de Ven, Hans J., eds. New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution Armonk, N.Y; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 245 109 These dispatches were directed at San Francisco, USA. See, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo xue gaiyao, [China's international communication –A theoretical study] Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1999, 6970 110 According to Israel Epstein, main function of the China Defense League was to provide medical and other relief aid to the mainland, especially the guerilla areas set up by the communists. See, Israel Epstein, Woman in World History: Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yatsen), Beijing: New World Press, 1993, 324 41 1937 upon the recommendation of the Central Committee in Yanan.111 Besides her manysided activities in Hong Kong, she was in charge of the Chinese-English bilingual China Defense League Newsletter from 1939 until the fall of Hong Kong to the Japanese in 1941. 112 The journal employed Chinese as well as foreign staff 113 , some of whom continued to work for the new regime's foreign language publications in the post-1949 period. Song Qingling became a major figure in the post-liberation foreign propaganda network, as her experiences in Hong Kong became instrumental in her assignment as the chief editor of the new foreign language periodical China Reconstructs in 1952.114 In addition to these initial publications, Chinese communists' first foreign language radio transmissions can also be traced back to the Yanan days with the launch of Japanese broadcasts in 1941.115 Wen Jize, a veteran cadre, states that it was only in 111 Along the way to Hong Kong, Song Qingling was accompanied by a Communist Party liaison, who did not make contact with her until they both reached safety. See, Israel Epstein, Woman in World History: Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yatsen), Beijing: New World Press, 1993, 323 112 See, Song Qingling's role in the foreign propaganda realm in Leonard Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 30-38 113 This was an unpaid job conducted on a voluntary basis. Israel Epstein, worked for the Defense League as an editor of the English-language newsletter. After the liberation Epstein continued to work in the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus thanks to his services during the Anti Japanese war and his old acquintance with Song Qingling. For an account of his days in Hong Kong, See Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and Journalist. San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005. 110-123 114 The name of the magazine (China Reconstructs –Zhongguo Jianshe) was inspired by a republican era periodical called "Reconstruction" (Jianshe) which was published in 1919 under the auspices of Sun Yat Sen. This point is noted in Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s Englishlanguage magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 34. For information on "Reconstruction" (Jianshe) magazine, See Liu Jiangchuan, Jianguo qian zhongguo gongchandang xinwen guanli sixiang yanjiu [Studies on the News Management Thoughts of the Chinese Communist Party before the foundation of the People's Republic of China], Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 2006,47 115 This is a relatively recent finding, which has led into a minor change in the historiography of Chinese foreign propaganda and radio work. When the radio's 35th anniversary activities was organized in the 1980s, the launch date of the broadcasts was taken to be September 11,1947–date for the launch of English broadcasts. Hence China Radio International celebrated its 35th, 40th and 45th anniversaries in 1982, 1987 and 1992. However, some old comrades who had participated in the broadcasting work during the Yanan days raised disagreements as they recalled that the Japanese broadcasts had already started before 1947. In early 1992, Wen Jize suggested that the launch date of foreign language broadcasts be brought back to December 3, 1941. His reference was Chinese People's Liberation Army's News Dispatch Department edition "Account of Major events"(Da shiji). Upon further research it was accepted that the new launch date 42 Yanan that the communists were able to meet the requirements needed to engage in radio propaganda. According to him, there were three prerequisites for the communists to launch their first foreign language broadcasts: "relative stability in the revolutionary base areas, ownership of a transmitter, and the availability of technical men."116 However, the conditions in the base areas were far from ideal. For one thing, the radio station was located in the caves. The transmitter, which has been brought by Zhou Enlai from Soviet Union in 1940, worked with the electricity that came from car engines and burning gasoline. When this transmitter broke down in 1943, Japanese broadcasts came to a stop. The communist base areas lacked the technical expertise to repair the transmitter and didn’t have access to the necessary spare parts117. Sadly for the communists, by the time the Japanese army surrendered in August 1945, their radio station could not broadcast this long-awaited event118. Given these poor conditions, however, it is a significant achievement that the communists were able to launch their first foreign language broadcasts. The Japanese language broadcasts were being transmitted under the name, Yanan New China Radio for foreign broadcasts should be December 3, 1941. See Hu Yaoting "Zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo tan yuan ji" (Record of discussion on the origins of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996, 25-35 116 See, Hu Yaoting genju luyin zhengli (Arranged by Hu Yaoting based on sound recording) "Jinian zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo chuangban 54 zhounian zuotanhui jilü (zhaiyao)" (Record of the Meeting Commemorating the 54th anniversary of the establishment of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts (summary)" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 17 117 This was partly because the technical men in the base areas had received their training on American equipment and were unfamiliar with Soviet technology. See, Hu Yaoting genju luyin zhengli (Arranged by Hu Yaoting based on sound recording) "Jinian zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo chuangban 54 zhounian zuotanhui jilü (zhaiyao)" (Record of the Meeting Commemorating the 54th anniversary of the establishment of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts (summary)" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 21 118 The communists, unfortunately, had to tune in to Guomindang radios to get the most recent news. See, Fu Yinghao, "Chuangjian Yanan Xinhua Guangbo Diantai de huigu" (Memories from the establishment of Yanan New China Radio), Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyue [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 5 43 Station (Yanan Xinhua Guangbo Diantai), with the call sign XNCR 119 . Although the sound was weak and there were few programs, Japanese broadcasting is regarded as being instrumental in "overcoming the isolation imposed by the enemy"120. Yuan Qingzhi, who was affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party and Japan's Anti-War League, became the first foreign expert (although this term was not coined at the time) who worked for the Chinese communists in their foreign language broadcasts. Apparently, she was chosen for the job not because of her particular experience or training in this field, but because of her ideological standing and her native language skills121. The broadcast content was composed of the current news items on the Anti-Japanese struggle, music, lectures given by important figures, and revolutionary stories. 122 Japanese broadcasts propagated party policy and attacked the enemy123. The CCP's main objective here was to win over Japanese troops, especially junior soldiers i.e., privates, by showing them the real agenda of the Japanese militarists and imperialists in pursuing this war. The news items emphasized the number of casualties (i.e., how many children were left fatherless, 119 See, Hu Yaoting, "Guanyu zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo kaibo shijian de diaocha baogao" (Investigation report concerning the launch date of the foreign broadcasts of the Chinese People) Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 4 120 See, Hu Yaoting, "Guanyu zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo kaibo shijian de diaocha baogao" (Investigation report concerning the launch date of the foreign broadcasts of the Chinese People) Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 4 121 Yuan Qingzhi recalls that she had to practice reading the scripts several times before announcing. She received little formal education in Japan and for this reason, she often failed to read the text without first checking the dictionary. See, Hu Yaoting genju luyin zhengli (Arranged by Hu Yaoting based on sound recording) "Jinian zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo chuangban 54 zhounian zuotanhui jilü (zhaiyao)" (Record of the Meeting Commemorating the 54th anniversary of the establishment of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts (summary)" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 17 122 See, Hu Yaoting, "Guanyu zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo kaibo shijian de diaocha baogao" (Investigation report concerning the launch date of the foreign broadcasts of the Chinese People) Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 7 123 See, Tang Dan, "Guanyu Yanan shiqi riyu guangbo de huiyi" (Memories of the Japanese broadcasts in Yanan period), Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 14 44 how many mothers lost their sons, etc.) to instigate hate for the ongoing war124. Relying on the accounts of the Japanese POWs, Chinese sources indicate that these broadcasts had some influence among enemy soldiers –although an accurate assessment of its effectiveness is beyond reach. Many cadres who became influential figures in the post-1949 foreign policy and propaganda apparatus had been recruited and trained in Yanan.125 Personal relationships established and reinforced during the Yanan years proved to be critical for the communists in terms of selecting the ideologically-fit personnel for these tasks after the socialist revolution. One such figure was Zhou Enlai, who became a leading figure in foreign policy and external propaganda during the Maoist decades.126 As we have seen above, Zhou's contributions in the foreign propaganda field went back to his Yanan days, when he took personal interest in guiding and helping radio broadcasts127. Besides, his foreign affairs team in Chongqing became the backbone of the PRC's diplomatic corps. 128 Likewise, Lu Dingyi, who became the Head of the CC Propaganda Department in the 124 See, Hu Yaoting genju luyin zhengli (Arranged by Hu Yaoting according to the sound recording) "Jinian zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo chuangban 54 zhounian zuotanhui jilü (zhaiyao)" (Record of the Meeting Commemorating the 54. anniversary of the establishment of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts (summary)" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 23 125 Yananites also became influential in all domestic propaganda activities, i.e., "vast program of linguistic engineering" See, Ji Fengyuan, Linguistic engineering:language and politics in Mao's China, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003. 51 126 As Anne-Marie Brady correctly observes: "Zhou has been widely credited with being one of the most important influences on establishing China's foreign affairs traditions", See Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 51 127 Israel Epstein notes: "A tiny transmitter was then beginning to send out the first English language New China (Xinhua) sponsored newscasts. Not only did Zhou give attention to the content, but when I asked how some of the radio equipment was obtained, I was told that he had brought it from Chongqing in a personal suitcase." See Israel Epstein My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and Journalist. San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005, 199 128 The PRC's initial diplomatic corps were the veterans from the Anti-Japanese War, who had rallied around Zhou Enlai in the Nationalist-occupied areas and formed CCP's first foreign affairs organization in the late 1930s. See, Liu, Xiaohong, Chinese ambassadors: the rise of diplomatic professionalism since 1949, Seattle : University of Washington Press, 2001, 12 45 1950s, was an important propagandist in Yanan. One might add Wu Lengxi to this list, who was involved in the journalism and propaganda work in Yanan, and continued to serve in the People's Republic after 1949 as the head of the New China (Xinhua) News Agency. In Yanan, the Chinese communists also established links with a number of foreign intellectuals who sympathized with their cause. Starting in the 1930s, works written by American journalists, such as Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley and Anna Louis Strong provided an opportunity for the communists to influence world public opinion.129 Mao's long interviews with the American journalist Edgar Snow, later compiled into Red Star over China (1937) is considered to be the communists' first international propaganda success.130 This work challenged the popular perception of the Chinese Communist Party in the West, which pictured them "either as a group of bandits or simply as a Soviet satellite"131. Many foreign experts who worked in the foreign language media after 1949 also had contacts with the Chinese communists before the liberation. One such figure was Israel Epstein, whose acquaintance with Song Qingling at the China Defense League in Hong Kong led into his employment in China Reconstructs after the liberation. 132 Likewise, Sidney Rittenberg, who served as a leading figure at the English section of Radio Peking, until his fall from grace during the Cultural Revolution, worked as a propagandist in Yanan. 129 For these and other "foreign friends" of China in Yanan, See Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 42-58 130 For a detailed discussion of this publication, See, Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 43-48 131 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 48 132 See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 27-30 46 In 1945, the Second World War ended with the Allies' victory. Subsequent to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, age-old suspicions and hostilities between the nationalists and communists revived. American efforts to mediate between the CCP and the Guomindang proved no results and the negotiations broke off in 1946. The Chinese Communist Party's official historiography regards the Civil War as a consequence of Chiang Kaishek's reactionary plot to provoke war. Before the start of the Civil War, communist propaganda content emphasized the CCP's policy of peaceful reconstruction over Guomindang's warmongering. 133 Likewise, during the Civil War years, the communists propagandized the social and economic reforms in the liberated areas, particularly the land reform movement, as opposed to the poverty and inequality in the areas under nationalist rule.134 Besides the constant theme of social equality in the base areas, the domestic propaganda content of the Civil War period was dominated by military affairs135. While domestic propaganda in this period mainly aimed at gaining mass support and recruiting soldiers for the communist armies against the Guomindang, the CCP's external propaganda organs sought to create a positive image for the communists and shift the world public opinion in their favor. There were a series of attempts during the Civil War period to further centralize the party propaganda organs136 and improve their work by correcting false tendencies. As 133 See, Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 267 134 See, Liu Jiangchuan, Jianguo qian zhongguo gongchandang xinwen guanli sixiang yanjiu [Studies on the News Management Thoughts of the Chinese Communist Party before the foundation of the People's Republic of China], Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 2006, 36 135 See, Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 270-271 136 For instance, CCP Central Committee decided that the broadcasting work in different areas (including broadcasts in Mandarin, dialects, and English) should be centralized. See, Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 270 47 part of the centralization drive, Chongqing and Yanan groups joined together to establish the Foreign Affairs Group of the Central Committee in 1947 137 . However, when the communists had to leave Yanan same year due to the nationalist encirclement, this had a destabilizing effect on the incipient foreign policy and propaganda organizations: In 1947 Chiang's armies attacked the Yan'an, forcing the Politbureau to seek temporary refuge in northern Shaanxi. At that time the Party's Central Foreign Affairs Bureau (zhongyang waishizu) was established, but Zhou and Mao were much too heavily involved in military affairs to devote attention to its operations until the Central Committee apparatus was re-established at a stable location at Xibaipo in May, 1948.138 As the CCP was moving back to the cities after a decade of mass campaigns in the countryside, propaganda work had to change in terms of its content and target audiences. This transformation process did not occur overnight and it necessitated new disciplinary measures on the part of the party leadership. 139 In this period, Xinhua News Agency assumed leadership position in both domestic and foreign propaganda –and continued to hold these posts until the early 1950s, when it started to specialize in its tasks as the regime's central press agency. 140 In the foreign propaganda realm, one major breakthrough of the Civil War period was the launch of English language broadcasts. This was related to the CCP attempts to influence the US government policy and public opinion, which weighed more heavy on the party's agenda since the Dixie mission of 1944. 141 Although China Radio International publications cite the official launch date of the English broadcasts as 137 See, Liu Xiaohong, Chinese ambassadors: the rise of diplomatic professionalism since 1949, Seattle : University of Washington Press, 2001, 12 138 See, Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989, 31 139 For the challenges of this era, See, Lin Zhida, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi [Chinese communist party propaganda history] Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001, 260-263 140 See, Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 270 141 For a detailed discussion of the Dixie mission, See Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 58 48 September 1947142, earlier efforts in this realm can be traced back to 1945 when Xinhua Radio located at Zhangjiakou had started broadcasting news items in English.143 Likewise, in 1946, a specialized group of propagandists in Yanan was assigned the task of preparing English language broadcasts144. Sidney Rittenberg, who was among the first foreigners to work at the Chinese communists' incipient external propaganda machine, describes the work routine in Yanan as: Our voice casts from Yanan would carry only as far as Nanjing and Beijing. Our audience therefore was the foreign press there, and our hope was that reporters would pick up our news items and opinions and use them in their stories. Our Morse code transmissions, however, reached all over the world (…) We got dispatches from American wire services by Morse code. We read the New York Times regularly, The Wall Street Journal, The Christian Science Monitor, The Washington Post and The Baltimore Sun. Even in the remote caves of Yanan, we were in touch with America and the rest of the world. 145 Despite its relative success in breaking the isolation imposed by Guomindang and reaching outside audiences, however, these earlier English broadcasts had an unstable character. Besides the obvious technical difficulties in the base areas, the Civil War conditions brought new challenges into the radio propaganda work. With the departure of the communists from Yanan in March 1947, radio broadcasts, as well as other propaganda media was once again disrupted. English broadcasts resumed only in 142 See, for instance, Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai Tai shi bian bianzu (Editorial Board for the History of China Radio International) Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo shiliao jianbian (1947-1987) [Short Edition of China Radio International Historical Materials (1947-1987)] , Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1987 and Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyue [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 143 See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 68 144 Wen Jize, in his memoirs, confirms that the communists had already launched English broadcasts by 1946. See, Hu Yaoting genju luyin zhengli (Arranged by Hu Yaoting based on sound recording) "Jinian zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo chuangban 54 zhounian zuotanhui jilü (zhaiyao)" (Record of the Meeting Commemorating the 54th anniversary of the establishment of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts (summary)" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 18 145 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 82 49 September 1947 when the communists found temporary refuge in Hebei province. Here, the communist radio station was named Shan-Bei New China Radio. In March 1949, upon Beiping's (Beijing) takeover by communist troops, the radio station moved to this city and was re-named Beiping New China Radio (Beiping Xinhua Guangbo Diantai)146. While the Japanese language broadcasts served the Anti-Japanese struggle, English broadcasts became functional in terms of propagating the communist cause during the Civil War. 147 Shanbei Xinhua Radio's English language broadcasts, which lasted only 20 minutes a day, began with the opening theme of "Triumphal March" from Verdi's "Aida" Opera. 148 The program content was similar to the earlier Japanese broadcasts: items that propagated party policy related to domestic and international affairs, military successes of the Liberation Army, and favorable aspects of social life in the liberated areas 149 . In addition to these broadcasts, two new English language publications appeared in 1946: The Shanghai based The New China Weekly (Xinhua Zhoukan), and the Hong Kong based China Digest (Zhongguo Wenzhai). 150 The 146 See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 68 147 As compared to the Japanese broadcasts, the impact of the English broadcasts is considered to be greater. See, Hu Yaoting genju luyin zhengli (Arranged by Hu Yaoting based on sound recording) "Jinian zhongguo renmin duiwai guangbo chuangban 54 zhounian zuotanhui jilü (zhaiyao)" (Record of the Meeting Commemorating the 54th anniversary of the establishment of Chinese People's foreign broadcasts (summary)" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 18 148 See, "Ge zhong waiyu guangbo de kaiban he fazhan" (The launch and development of various kinds of foreign language broadcasts) in Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai Tai shi bian bianzu (Editorial Board for the History of the China Radio International) Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo shiliao jianbian (1947-1987) [Short edition of China Radio International Historical Materials (1947-1987)] , Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1987, 26 149 See, Hu Yaoting, "Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai de 40 nian" (40 years of China radio International), in Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai Tai shi bian bianzu (Editorial Board for the History of China Radio International) Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo shiliao jianbian (1947-1987) [Short edition of China Radio International Historical Materials (1947-1987)] , Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1987, 1 150 See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi (A History of International News Communicaton of China) Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 68. Also See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 12 50 publication of Israel Epstein's book The Unfinished Revolution in China in 1947 should also be regarded as a propaganda success of the Civil War period.151 After the establishment of the People's Republic in October, 1949, Chinese communist foreign language media, with its roots in the Jiangxi Soviet and Yanan period, moved to the new capital of Beijing. Based upon the experiences of the Anti-Japanese struggle and the Civil War, veteran propagandists would lead the newly created foreign propaganda institutions, Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking (China Central Broadcasting Station). In the post-1949 period, the CCP Politburo's monopoly over the propaganda organs in Yanan evolved into the Soviet-style dual authority scheme.152According to this administrative division, the specialized foreign propaganda organs were placed under the authority of the State Council, while the CCP Central Committee determined the fundamental guidelines of propaganda work through its Propaganda Department. While Yanan veterans became influential in the postrevolutionary foreign propaganda apparatus, the exponential growth in the volume of foreign propaganda in the 1950s and 1960s necessitated more expertise and increasing division of labor within the apparatus. Various disruptions in the foreign propaganda machine in the post-1949 period, which will be analyzed in the next chapter, were also related to the tensions between the older and younger generation, in terms of their differing emphasis on ideology and professionalism. Yet, in order to grasp the nature of 151 See Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and Journalist. San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005, 230 152 See Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, 35 51 these tensions, one should first focus on the core principles and guidelines of Chinese propaganda, which were deeply influenced by Mao Zedong's own experience in this field. 1.3. Mao Zedong's Ideas on Journalism and Propaganda The principles which guided China's domestic and foreign propaganda work in the period 1949-76 were greatly shaped by Mao Zedong's thoughts on journalism and propaganda. Mao's involvement in the Communist Party since its foundation and his subsequent leadership position enabled him to gain experience in various fields of party organization, of which propaganda was an integral part.153 During the First United Front, Mao was the acting director of the Guomindang Propaganda Department and the editor-in-chief of its publication Political Weekly (Zhengzhi Zhoukan) 154 . Mao Zedong's talks with the American journalist Edgar Snow in Yanan, which he valued as a direct channel to break the isolation of the CCP in the base areas and make its voice heard abroad, was his earliest foreign propaganda success155. During the Civil War years (from August, 1945 until September 1949) he wrote over forty pieces for Xinhua News Agency, including news, dispatches and reviews.156 Mao's Selected Works, the first volume of which was compiled by the Xinhua News Agency in the Jin-Cha-Ji base area by mid-1944157, was translated into various languages in the post-1949 era and became a popular foreign 153 According to Zhang Kun, Mao was both a theoretician and a practitioner of propaganda. See, his Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha, [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997, 243 154 See Julian Chang, “The mechanics of state propaganda: The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s” in Cheek, Timothy et al. New Perspectives on State Socialism in China, Armonk, NY: London, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 79 155 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 63 156 See, Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 292. 157 See Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 237 52 propaganda item. In his own writings and directives regarding the conduct of the propaganda work158, Mao emphasized several issues and laid down numerous principles aimed to increase the success and effectiveness of communist propaganda. First, and most important of these principles, was the party nature of propaganda (dangxing yuanze) i.e., unconditional dependence of propaganda work on the central party policy and guidance. 159 Mao was in favor of strong party discipline to avoid individualist tendencies among the propagandists, which might potentially harm the party in the long run. In Mao's understanding, as the party was the representative of the people there could be no conflict of interest between the party and the people160. By the same token, while he emphasized the need for unified party leadership in journalism and propaganda work, his mass-line politics envisaged that this work was everyone's responsibility.161 This was reflected in the principle of "whole party as well as the masses should participate in the newspaper work" (quandang banbao, qunzhong banbao)162. In the foreign propaganda realm, Mao's ideas on mass-line journalism were not practical. Indeed even in the field of domestic journalism there was a gradual specialization of 158 Brady states that some of the CCP Propaganda Department directives were written by Mao himself. See, Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, 37 159 This principle is discussed in many Chinese language publications. See, Zhang Kun, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha, [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997; Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002; Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003 160 See, Zhang Kun, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997, 240 161 For the development of mass line journalism in China, See Timothy Cheek, "Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao China," in King-yuh Chang, ed., Mainland China After the Thirteenth Party Congress, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 425-426 162 For the discussion of this principle See, Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 293. Also See Zhang Kun, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997, 242 53 labor throughout the 1950s, which Liu Shaoqi has encouraged much to the dislike of Mao Zedong. 163 Due to its specialized status within the larger propaganda machine and primarily because it was conducted in foreign languages, external propaganda, was by nature beyond the reach of the masses. Hence the mass-line policy was represented in the foreign propaganda realm only in an indirect way, such as the selection of news items and content of the reviews. However, much similar to the domestic journalism field, foreign propaganda content has always been guided and closely monitored by the CCP leaderhip. In the post-1949 period, although the specific leadership over the specialized foreign propaganda organs in China changed over time, the party nature of propaganda (dangxing yuanze) persisted as its core principle. Another principle emphasized by Mao was that propaganda had to take context into consideration, that is the changing conditions of time and space.164 In other words, propaganda had to be dynamic and flexibile to suit the changes in party policy dictated by different requirements at a given time or location.165 For instance, the Long March, AntiJapanese struggle and the Civil War, all necessitated different propaganda tasks. Likewise, propaganda in the countryside and the urban centers had different characteristics166. Hence the same propaganda content could not possibly be valid and 163 This became a major issue during the Cultural Revolution. See James C.Y. Chu, "People's republic of China" in John A. Lent, ed., Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific: A continental survey of radio and television, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 31 164 Zhang Kun indicates that Mao's propaganda policy was based on understanding the mood of the masses, also the changes in time and place. See, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997, 243; Huang Zecun, likewise notes Mao's emphasis on the need of foreign propaganda to adopt to the continuously changing international environment. See Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 75 165 See Zheng Baowei ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen sixiang shi [History of Chinese Communist Party’s Journalism Thought], Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, 297; 305 166 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 55 54 adoptable everywhere. Mao had systematized these ideas as early as the Gutian Conference of December, 1929. During this conference, Mao Zedong submitted a report, which summarized various problems that paralyzed the communist propaganda work at the time: These shortcomings, attributed to a lack of attention paid to propaganda work, included the neglect of propaganda work among specific audiences, such as the urban poor, women and the youth and a lack of timeliness (shijianxing) and local character (difangxing). Lack of priority for propaganda work meant the use of unqualified personnel, who did not have the respect of other soldiers; it meant that the Red Army was not winning the "hearts and minds" of the masses…Aside from general calls for increased propaganda work within audience sectors, he specifically invested responsibility in the propaganda sections (ke) of the army's Political Departments for "wall newspapers" (bibao) and training sessions. The guidelines for propaganda work that resulted from the Gutian Conference "remained the basis of propaganda policy well into 167 the 1940s". As seen in the above example, Mao placed high emphasis on the target audiences and the problem of reception. According to him, in order for propaganda to convince anyone, the content and format should be appropriate for the audience. In 1942, at the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Meeting, he criticized the stereotypical writing style in the party's propaganda work. His speech titled "Oppose party's eight-legged essays" (Fandui Dang Bagu) laid down the characteristics of this inappropriate writing style. 168 According to Mao, the cadres wrote long articles with empty verbiage. These articles were pretentious, intimidating and inconsiderate of its audience. They used poor and monotonous language and arranged items in a complicated way. According to Mao, this type of writing should be avoided at all costs and the propaganda items should be written in an easily 167 See Julian Chang, “The mechanics of state propaganda: The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s” in Timothy Cheek et al. New Perspectives on State Socialism in China, Armonk, NY: London, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 79 168 See "Fandui dang bagu", Feb. 8, 1942 in Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong Works on journalism] Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1983, 70-89 55 understandable manner. 169 In the post-1949 period, the "eight-legged essay" metaphor was also used in the foreign propaganda realm, to emphasize the need to write in a simple and clear style that would be appreciated by foreign audiences.170 Yet, most of the time, foreign language media relied on excessive usage of Marxist-Leninist phrases, which made its messages understandable only by those who were already familiar with this terminology. This was a major problem because the PRC's foreign propaganda media mainly targeted "middle elements"171 abroad rather than leftist circles –at least until the tumultous Cultural Revolution period. Another principle was the need to avoid forcing oneself on the target audiences (bu qiangjia yu ren). In the domestic sphere, the dissemination of Marxism, which was the primary goal of party propaganda, could only be achieved gradually and through persuasion.172 Therefore, if the propaganda tone was too strong and obvious, this would decrease its convincing ability. 173 In a national propaganda conference convened in March 1957, soon before the end of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Mao warned his fellow propagandists on the long-term nature of this work: Our comrades must understand that ideological remolding involves long-term, patient and painstaking work, and they must not attempt to change people’s ideology, which has been shaped over decades of life, by giving a few lectures or by holding a few meetings. 169 This principle is sometimes called "liaojie di yi" (understanding comes first). See, Zhang Yongde's discussion of this principle in Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 25-26 170 See for instance Shen Suru's discussion of Mao's "eight-legged essay" concept in relation to the neiwai youbie principle in his Duiwai chuanbo xue gaiyao, [China's international communication –A theoretical study] Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1999, 68 171 The translation of zhongjian qunzhong as "middle-of-the-road masses"/"middle elements" appears first in Michael Schoenhals ed. Selections from Propaganda Trends Organ of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992, 60. This volume includes one of the few English language texts that comments on China's foreign propaganda audience (Hu Yaobang's "Speech at the External Propaganda Conference"). 172 See, Mao Tse-Tung, Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966 6 173 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 53 56 Persuasion, not compulsion, is the only way to convince them. Compulsion will never result in convincing them. 174 However, it is clear that this was easier said than done –given the party's monopoly over the correct ideological tendency at all times and the propagandists' willingness to put this authority into practice. Although this principle was initially formulated for domestic propaganda, it was (in theory) applicable in the external propaganda realm at least until the Cultural Revolution.175 During this period, Mao Zedong had to repeat his warnings against not imposing oneself on others in relation to the foreign propaganda machine: On 17 March 1968, he [Mao] issued an instruction postulating a 'resolute and systematic reform in external propaganda'. In a number of written statements throughout the year, he forbade the printing of his 'quotations' on the packages of goods destined as foreign aid and the distribution of Mao badges to foreigners. He emphasized that the focus of Beijing as the 'centre of the world revolution' was self-styled and mistaken and he repeatedly warned against the imposition of Chinese ideology on outsiders. After reviewing a document of the international liaison department, he issued an instruction that 'from now on, such self-praising terms as "Mao Zedong Thought" should be omitted from all documents and articles related to foreign affairs'. 176 Throughout 1968, Mao issued various warnings against the dominant tendency in the foreign propaganda realm, which found its expresion in slogans, such as "export of the revolution" or "arming foreigners with Mao Zedong Thought"177. The Cultural Revolution shattered the "inside and outside of the country is different" (neiwai youbie) principle178, which has inspired China's foreign propaganda 174 See, Mao Zedong, Speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Work, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966, 23 175 During this period "bu qiangjia yu ren" was set aside. See Gan Xianfeng's discussion of Cultural Revolution propaganda under the title "qianjia yu ren" (imposing oneself on others), Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004., 196-204 176 See, Barbara Barnouin, Yu Changgen eds., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution, London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998, 78 177 See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 71 178 Anne-Marie Brady translates neiwai youbie as "treating insiders and outsiders differently" in her article “Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently: The Use and Control of Foreigners in the PRC”, The China 57 work since the early 1950s. This principle relied on the basic idea that because foreign listeners and readers lived in a different cultural and political setting, propaganda aimed at foreigners should carry different characteristics than domestic propaganda.179 Neiwai youbie was inspired by the Maoist emphasis on the specific needs of different target audiences. Although this term was not coined by Mao Zedong himself, it is clear that his ideas on the non-dogmatic treatment of audiences became influential in this formulation.180 Yet, as it will be discussed in Chapter 2, observance of this principle was problematic throughout the Maoist decades. This was especially the case during the ideologically charged atmosphere of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution. 181 During these periods, external propaganda staff who advocated the distinct status of the foreign language media within the larger propaganda apparatus were targeted and labeled as "petty bourgeois reactionaries". "Truthfulness" (shishi qiushi) was another important principle which was emphasized by Mao long before the socialist revolution of 1949. According to this principle, propaganda must rely on materialist philosophy and be based on solid evidence. Quarterly, No. 164 (Dec., 2000), 943-964. While Brady finds this principle as chauvinistic, Chinese propagandists use neiwai youbie in order to point out the need to respect foreigners' tastes/cultural backgrounds, etc. 179 See, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo xue gaiyao, [China's international communication –A theoretical study] Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1999. 71-72 180 For Mao's emphasis on target oriented propaganda, See, Zhang Kun, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha, [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997, 261-263 181 Although Chinese scholars and retired cadres unanimously agree on the disruptive impact of these two campaigns on foreign propaganda work, they tend to see the first half of the 1950s and the early 1960s under better light. See, for instance, Gan Xianfeng's narration of the earlier period (1949-1966) as a success story compared to the Cultural Revolution period. See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 160 and 196204. Also see, Zhang Kun's discussion of the party guidance in foreign propaganda as a positive influence with the exception of these two episodes. Zhang Kun, Guojia xingxiang chuanbo [Disseminating the Image of the Country], Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2005. 58 182 Mao believed that false reporting, lies, exaggerations and bragging would ultimately damage the party. 183 According to him, once the confidence of the masses is lost, no propaganda effort could be successful. Hence propaganda cadres were encouraged to write their articles based on correct information. There is evidence that this principle was observed by the propagandists in Yanan days. 184 Its influence was also felt in the post1949 foreign propaganda apparatus. For instance, in 1958, Mao praised China Reconstructs magazine with regard to its editorial policy of truthful news (shishi shuohua). 185 However, all along, this principle was difficult to uphold when it contradicted with other tasks of propaganda, such as "keeping state secrets" or 182 This term is sometimes translated as "seek the truth from the facts". Lazarick correctly observes that Mao's emphasis on this principle has been an important influence on the magazines. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 37-38. For the discussion of this principle, See Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 54, Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 26-27. 183 See, Zhang Kun, Chuanbo guannian de lishi kaocha, [Historical analysis of propaganda concepts] Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1997, 244 184 According to Sidney Rittenberg, who was a member of the propaganda organization in Yanan, the communist policy of truth was taken quite seriously: "Gross exaggeration was common, out-right conscious lies were not. I witnessed a clear example of the truth-telling policy in Yanan, in late 1946 or early 1947. An over-zealous editor (not a Party member) named Hu Muode took the results of a study of alleged atrocities committed by US military personnel in China over a one-month period. The editor multiplied this figure by 12 (for one year) and “elevated” the term “atrocities” to “bestialities.” The American newspaper in Shanghai, “China Weekly Review,” immediately challenged this Xin Hua story, and stated that if a list of these happenings were provided them, they would publish the full text. This unanswerable challenge elicited a phone call from Mao Zedong to Liao Chengzhi, who was directly in charge of all propaganda. (He was vice minister of propaganda.) I was present at this call, with Liao, and I heard Mao say, testily, when Liao answered the phone, “Is this the Central (Nationalist) News Agency? They live on rumors and lies, while Xin Hua News Agency is supposed to tell the truth!” The next morning, Zhou Enlai, at that time Party vice chairman, came to our organization and delivered an address to all Party members that lasted for several hours. He gave many illustrations of how harmful inaccurate reporting was for the Party’s work to win support from middle-of-the-road elements in the KMT-held cities. I know that, during the civil war years after that, battle reports were generally carefully vetted for accuracy, and the military commanders shared responsibility for this. KMT battle reports, on the other hand, were routinely unreliable. One night in 1947, while traveling, I was in Hebei Province’s Ding Xian county town, when I heard the broadcast from Nanjing describing a brilliant battle that resulted that very day in wresting Ding Xian from Communist hands. And here I was, right in Ding Xian, and all was quiet as a mouse". (Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, January 9, 2007) 185 See, Zhang Kun, Guojia xingxiang chuanbo [Disseminating the Image of the Country], Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2005, 54 59 "publicizing China's successes in economic and social reconstruction". During the Cold War, there were many occasions, when the foreign language media dropped shishi qiushi principle in order to maintain a higher goal. This was especially true during the political campaigns. As Chinese sources unanimously acknowledge, the radical political atmosphere of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution facilitated the fabrication of fake, empty, and exaggerated (jia, kong, kua) news items.186 As we will see in Chapter 3, however, Chinese foreign propaganda media's poor record of truthful news was not exclusive to these periods. Although the propaganda agencies were spared from radical influences during the early 1960s, China's foreign language magazines continued to stretch realities. In order to maintain the country's favorable image, shishi qiushi was often sacrificed during the Maoist decades. 1.4. Post-1949 Foreign Propaganda, Diplomacy, and Journalism Throughout the Maoist decades, foreign propaganda work in the PRC was deeply influenced by the changes in the domestic and international environment. In order to understand the tasks performed by the foreign propaganda organizations in this period, there is need to mention a number of important events that shaped Chinese foreign policy, propaganda, and journalism work. New China started off in a hostile international environment where the country had few diplomatic connections. On the diplomatic front, while the establishment of the 186 For the discussions on the negative impact of the Anti-Rightist campaign, See, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 70-71. Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 193-195; For both campaigns, See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 77-80 60 republic in 1949 caused applause in the socialist bloc led by Soviet Union187, it triggered accusation campaigns in the US as to "who lost China". With still fresh memories of the Civil War, when Americans extended substantial material aid to the nationalists, the PRC regime regarded the US government as its biggest enemy. In its stead, the new regime depended on her northern neighbor for material and ideological assistance in accordance with the policy of "leaning on one side". 188 Soviet experts, who came to China subsequent to the signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in February, 1950 had a tremendous influence on the shaping of China's new propaganda apparatus. Likewise, Chinese propagandists were encouraged to study Soviet experiences in the journalism field189. China's participation in the Korean War against the US-led United Nations troops exacerbated the anti-American sentiment in the country and strengthened its ties with the Soviets. In the early 1950s, both domestic and foreign propaganda content was dominated by the "Resist America-Aid Korea" campaign.190 After the liberation, central propaganda organs were institutionalized in Beijing. The first foreign language magazines published by the new regime were the English language People’s China (1950), China Pictorial 187 Within three months after its foundation, PRC was recognized by all socialist countries except for Yugoslavia. See, Liu Xiaohong, Chinese ambassadors: the rise of diplomatic professionalism since 1949, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, 7 188 Accompanying the anti-American sentiment was the domestic pro-Soviet propaganda campaign in China. See, Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 86 189 See Ding Ganlin ed., Zhongguo xinwen shiye shi (History of China’s journalism work), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002, 405-406 190 See Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004., 183; Also See, Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 84-88 and Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 8-9. 61 (1950) and China Reconstructs (1952). 191 These magazines were put under the authority of the News General Department (Xinwen zongshu) which was established in 1949. In the early years, radio broadcasts were led by the Xinhua Agency, which had not yet specialized in its tasks as a press agency. Although there was little specialization of labor at the outset, foreign propaganda organs gradually evolved and gained their particular characteristics. In the meantime, domestic journalism was monopolized by the communist party.192 Geneva Conference, which convened after the end of the Korean War in 1954, provided the first opportunity for the PRC regime to display its new diplomacy. The Chinese delegation led by Zhou Enlai gained worldwide acclaim for its concern over the peaceful resolution of Asian conflicts. This conference is regarded by many as the PRC's first international propaganda success.193 Geneva Conference also provided the regime with the opportunity to create the image of a "peace-loving" country. This was especially emphasized toward the country's Asian neighbors, in order to win them over in the 191 For the early 1950s, in addition to these magazines, there is the case of China Weekly Review (1923-1950) which was later renamed as China Monthly Review (1950-1953) published by the Millard Publication House in Shanghai. This magazine continued its publication life until 1953. Although not an official magazine published by the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies, one Western observer described it as "a clever and an effective instrument of foreign propaganda". See, "Note on China Weekly Review" by Alfred Kohlberg, (Hoover Institution, Alfred Kohlberg Collection, Box 30, file: China Weekly Review-later known as China Monthly Review). According to Epstein, although none of the editors had been a member of the communist party, they were –in their own experience- disgusted with the Guomindang regime. After they left China and arrived in the United States in 1953, they were publicly accused for treason because of their anti-US stance in the Korean War. See, Israel Epstein, Woman in World History: Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yatsen), Beijing: New World Press, 1993, 517 192 At the All-China Journalism Work conference convened in March 29 to April 16, 1950 Hu Qiaomu, the Head of the News General Department announced that the reform in journalism work had three aspects: relating to the truth, relating to the masses, criticism and self-criticism. See, Ding Ganlin ed., Zhongguo xinwen shiye shi (History of China’s journalism work), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002, 400 193 See, for instance, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 187 62 propaganda race against the US, who was responsible for the globally dominant "aggressive Red China" image. 194 Another opportunity for showing off the PRC regime's new diplomacy presented itself in 1955 with the Bandung Conference (First Asia-Africa Conference). 195 This conference was the beginning of a new era, when the PRC regime would assign itself a leadership status over the developing countries in Asia and Africa. The border agreements signed with a number of neighboring countries aimed to show the world that China was seeking stability and peace in its bilateral relations.196 In the following years, "Bandung spirit" enabled China to establish several links with the newly independent Asian and African countries. China's financial, cultural, technological and military assistance to these countries laid the groundwork for its diplomatic influence, especially in Africa. In fact, this relationship pattern became the main reason behind the success of Chinese external propaganda in countries like Tanzania. In places where China was widely recognized as a technological and financial donor, the reception for the Chinese foreign propaganda media was clearly more positive, as these items reached their audience in an already favorable setting. 197 In 1956, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers campaign to encourage Chinese intellectuals to voice different opinions on the future of the new regime. Much to the 194 This period is described by Huang Zecun as "breaking the international isolation and entering the international propaganda stage" (chongchu fengsuo, zou xiang guoji waixuan wutai" in his Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 69 195 See Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004.190 196 China signed border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Outer Mongolia. Borders with India and Soviet Union remained unsettled and caused problems in the subsequent years. See, Liu Xiaohong, Chinese ambassadors: the rise of diplomatic professionalism since 1949, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, 57. 197 See Jan Prybyla, “Communist China's Economic Relations with Africa 1960-1964”, Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 11 (Nov., 1964), 1135-1143 63 chagrin of Mao, however, the movement soon turned into a full-fledged criticism of the party. During the campaign, journalists' demand for professional autonomy from the party also proved to be something beyond the Chairman's limits of tolerance198. Many journalists became victims of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, which was launched in 1957. This period was followed by Mao's utopic economic development plan, called the Great Leap Forward. The Leap sought to catch up with the West in industrial development in a relatively short period of time; but rather than relying on a rational economic plan, it depended on the voluntarism of the Chinese people. The negative impact of the Leap on both domestic and external propaganda media manifested itself in exaggerated statistics, half-truths, fabricated reports, etc.199 In the meantime, China's agricultural communes and economic reconstruction became the center of attention for foreign audiences although many remained highly skeptical. The late 1950s proved to be a problematic era for the Chinese communist regime, both domestically and internationally. The country had to tackle with the adverse economic consequences of the Great Leap Forward attempt alongside the worsening relations with the Soviet Union. In 1958, the Chinese regime launched the Peking Review, a new English language publication with political content, aimed at a rather select overseas audience, composed mainly of intellectuals, diplomats and leftists. 200 The publication of this new magazine coincided with the radicalized atmosphere of Great Leap Forward, which put pressure on all publications to become highly politicized. In 198 Guangming Daily and Wenhui Bao in Shanghai became the initial victims of the anti-rightist campaign in the journalism field. See, Hugo De Burgh, The Chinese Journalist: mediating information in the world's most populous country, London New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, 52 199 For the rise of "militaristic language" in China during this period, See Ji Fengyuan, Linguistic engineering:language and politics in Mao's China, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003.87-93 200 The launch of the magazine necessitated a long and careful planning process. See, Leonard W. Lazarick's China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 147-155 64 terms of neglecting the earlier principles concerning target audiences and producing exaggerated, fake and empty reports, this period became the forerunner of the Cultural Revolution. 201 By the late 1950s, when China was under the spell of this political campaign domestically, the country faced several difficulties on the international front too. In 1958, the Taiwan Straits Crisis provoked hostilities between the Chinese government and the US on the status of this island. American support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan had been a major problem for the PRC since its establishment. On the propaganda front, the foremost contender for the Chinese communist regime since the early 1950s has been the Guomindang government, which had worldwide international contacts and a huge propaganda organization of its own.202 In the recent crisis, the Soviet Union's lack of substantial support for China added to the series of problems, which had already weakened Sino-Soviet relations. Another foreign policy crisis was caused by the Tibetan rebellion, which, despite the Chinese efforts to present it as a domestic matter, ultimately harmed its image as a "peace-loving" country. In the midst of these crises, it became more difficult to project a positive image of China on foreign audiences. The major shift in China's foreign policy came in the early 1960s, when the SinoSoviet differences on foreign policy and ideological issues became public. Mao was strongly against Nikita Khrushchev's defamation of Stalin and his promotion of the "peaceful co-existence" as the new line of Soviet foreign policy. Following the split, 201 See Ding Ganlin ed., Zhongguo xinwen shiye shi (History of China’s journalism work), Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002, 445 202 For the worldwide organization chart of the Chinese Information Service in Taiwan by the year 1958, see Xuanchuan gongzuo shouce [Handbook of Propaganda work] Taibei: Zhongguo guomin dang zhongyang weiyuanhui di si zu bianyin, 1958. For the competition between Taiwan and Communist China outside Asia, See George T. Yu, “Peking versus Taipei in the World Arena: Chinese Competition in Africa” Asian Survey, Vol.3, No.9, (Se1963) 439-453 65 Soviet experts left China. Departure of Soviet experts by the summer of 1960 had a huge impact on the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus. Many other foreign experts, who sided themselves with the Soviet Union after the split, also resigned. By 1964, Chinese domestic journals and foreign propaganda media made "revisionism" their new target. Bashing Soviet revisionism gave China the opportunity to present itself as the only remaining revolutionary stronghold in the world.203 This line of propaganda stressed that China, in sharp contrast with the Soviet Union, had no intention of compromising with American imperialism. However attractive this image might be for the dissident youth abroad, the practical consequence of this move would be the complete isolation of the PRC regime in the international arena. Having few friends in the Western bloc, China turned towards the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. In the foreign propaganda realm, this was reflected in the increasing number of indigenous languages in radio broadcasts throughout the 1960s. 204 Extending financial and military support for the guerillas fighting against their Western colonizers, China posed itself as a revolutionary model. At the same time, there was a growing pressure on the foreign propaganda cadres to catch up with their Soviet counterparts 205 . Throughout the 1960s, the languages used in publications and broadcasts grew considerably. However, the difficulties experienced 203 John Sheridan Morgan's findings on Radio Peking content in the mid-1960s confirm this point. According to Morgan, Radio Peking had two main objectives: "1) to tell the world of China's greatness and achievements 2) that, they, Chinese communists under Chairman Mao have the only correct interpretation of Marx." See John Sheridan Morgan, A descriptive analysis of the North American Service of Radio Peking from the fifth of December 1966 to the second of February 1967, unpublished masters thesis, Speech Arts, San Diego State College, 1968, 273 204 See Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 192 205 Central Committee ordered the speedy growth in foreign language broadcasts in this period –in order to place China right after the US and USSR. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 7 66 after the departure of the foreign experts ensued. Now it was more difficult to find foreign experts who previously came through the socialist bloc connnections made possible by Sino-Soviet solidarity. In the long run, however, this split gave the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus an opportunity to develop its own strenghts and find alternative ways to train its own cadres. In 1966, the launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had a great impact both in China and abroad. After Mao's call to the young radicals to "smash the party headquarters", many governmental organs became dysfunctional. Both the CC Propaganda Department and Foreign Ministry received their fair share from the destruction. The PRC regime's regular diplomatic routine was shattered by the revolutionaries. According to Ronald C. Keith: Chinese diplomats underwent 'revolutionization' as 'red diplomatic fighters' (hongse waijiao zhanshi) responsible for propagating 'Mao Zedong Thought' around the world. This diplomatic style was incompatible with 'seek common ground while reserving differences' (qiutong cunyi). With the increasing political differentiation between the two class lines of capitalism and socialism, Chinese radical diplomacy explicitly challenged 'bourgeois' international law in the struggle to make China the 'center of world revolution' and the propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought' became the single most important issue in foreign policy.206 In the meantime, appointees of the Cultural Revolution Small Group took over the tasks relating to diplomacy and foreign propaganda. Although the individual foreign propaganda organs such as Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking did not cease their operation, their regular work routine was completely disrupted by the political meetings, criticism campaigns and demonstrations.207 There were also staff shortages because many 206 See, Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989, 150 Chinese language publications and memoirs unanimously refer to this period as the "era of leftist mistakes". See for instance, Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 70 207 67 cadres were sent to the countryside to engage in physical labor for political re-education purposes. During this period, the regular editorial staff was replaced by the Cultural Revolution Leading Military Small Group, whose editorial policy aimed at the "export of Chinese revolution to other countries." The new leading cadres who had no experience in this field were unable to grasp the intricate details of the foreign propaganda work.208 Throughout the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) foreign propaganda content in the magazines and radio broadcasts reflected the Mao worship already abundant in the domestic journals.209 On the diplomatic front, China encountered a lot of crises in its bilateral relations. 210 Similar to its blurring the distinctions between domestic and foreign propaganda content, Cultural Revolution Small Group did not see differentiate between diplomacy and propaganda either: Kang Sheng and other CCRG members frequently interfered in foreign affairs by instructing Chinese embassies, trade missions and individuals working on foreign relations to contribute to the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought, and to distribute Mao badges and his quotations wherever possible. The profuse and indiscriminate disribution of these items became a major part of Chinese activities abroad. Chinese revolutionary activities in foreign countries provoked negative reactions from their governments. Within a year, from mid-1966 to mid-1967, China had disputes with more than thirty out of roughly fourty countries with which it had diplomatic relations.211 208 According to Chen Rinong, the military committee members who took over China Reconstructs magazine in 1967 did not have any editorial experience. Besides, two factions continously fought over leadership. (Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign publications personnel training center, Beijing) 209 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 198 210 Cultural Revolution strained China's relations with India, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, Kenya, Tunisia, among others. See Barnouin, Barbara, Yu Changgen eds., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution, London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998, 72-78 211 See Barbara Barnouin, Yu Changgen eds., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution, London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998, 66 68 Before this tumultous period came to an end, however, with Mao Zedong's death and the subsequent persecution of the Cultural Revolution Small Group (later, branded as Gang of Four) in 1976, China reconsidered its hostile foreign policy towards the US. With Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, Sino-US relations entered a new era. Both sides knew that the ultimate objective for this rapproachment was to counter the Soviet threat but China had much to gain from easing tensions with the US. The new relationship was a huge blow to the Guomindang regime in Taiwan, as the American side agreed on the "One China" principle. In the early 1970s, the People's Republic finally broke off its diplomatic isolation; established relations with the Western bloc countries besides gaining its long-awaited seat in the United Nations. As Mao has told Nixon during their frank discussion, however, it would take longer time for the Chinese propaganda media to adapt to these changes.212 212 See, Anne Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 181 69 TABLE 1 Chinese Communist Party Publications (1919-1949) Source: Lin Zhida, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi [Chinese communist party propaganda history] Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001, 305 Name Publication dates Short explanation CCP CC organ periodical from New Youth (Xin Qingnian) Sep.1919-July 1926 1921 until 1922 Journal of CCP's public political Guide (Xiangdao) Sep.1922-July 1927 organ Vanguard (Qianfeng ) July 1923-Feb. 1924 CCP CC organ periodical Party newspaper(Dangbao) July 1927-? CCP party newspaper Bolshevik (Buershenweike) Oct.1927-July 1932 CCP CC organ newspaper CCP newspaper in White (KMT Red Flag (Hongqi) Nov. 1928-Aug. 1930 led) areas (first weekly, then published every three days) Red Flag daily (Hongqi Ribao) Aug.1930-March 1931 Daily version of Red Flag March 1931-March 1934 Weekly version of Red Flag Red Flag weekly (Hongqi Zhoubao) Newspaper of CCP CC, CC Red China (Hongse Zhonghua) Democratic government of Dec. 1931-Jan.1937 laborers and peasants, All-China trade union, federation of communist youth. New China CCP CC's organ newspaper (Xin Zhonghua Bao) Jan. 1937-May 1941 after Feb. 1939. Liberation (Jiefang) April 1937-Aug.1941 CCP CC's organ periodical Masses (Qunzhong) CCP's party periodical, open to Dec.1937-Oct.1949 New China Daily (Xinhua Ribao) CCP's party periodical, open to Jan 1938-Feb.1947 Communist (Gongchandang Ren) public CCP's internal party theoretical Jan. 1939-May 1941 Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao) public periodical CCP CC's organ newspaper May 1941-March 1947 CCP CC'S organ newspaper People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) June 1948-- after Aug. 1949 70 TABLE 2 Leadership in the CCP Propaganda Organs (1921-1945) Source: Lin Zhida, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan shi [Chinese communist party propaganda history] Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001, 306-307 Period Era of CCP's foundation First domestic revolution war period Name of the organ CCP Central Bureau Propaganda Head CCP Central Bureau Propaganda Department Head CCP CC Education and Propaganda Committee Secretary CCP Central Bureau Propaganda Department Head CCP CC Propaganda Department Head Second domestic revolution war period CCP CC Propaganda and Agitation Dep. Head CCP CC Propaganda Department Head CCP Temporary Political Dep. Central Propaganda Dep. Head CCP Soviet District Central Bureau Propaganda Dep. Head CCP Central Bureau Propaganda Department Head CCP CC Propaganda Department Head Anti-Japanese War Liberation War CCP CC Propaganda Department Head CCP CC Propaganda Department Acting Head CCP CC Propaganda Committee secretary CCP CC Education Department Acting Head Department Head CCP CC Propaganda Department Head 71 Leading cadre Li Da Date of office July 1921-July 1921 Cai Hesen July 1922-June 1923 Cai Hesen Nov. 1923-Jan. 1925 Luo Zhanglong May 1924-Jan.1925 Peng Shuzhi Qiu Qiubai Cai Hesen Jan 1925-April 1927 April 1927-May 1927 May 1927-Aug.1927 Qiu Qiubai Aug.1927-Nov. 1927 Luo Qiyuan Cai Hesen Nov.1927-July 1928 July 1928-Nov.1928 Li Lisan Shen Zemin Nov. 1928-Jan. 1931 Jan.1931-April 1931 Zhang Wentian Yang Shangkun April 1931-1932 1932-Jan.1933 Gu Zuomu April 1931-Jan.1933 Zhang Wentian Pan Hannian Jan.1933 ? Zhang Wentian Jan 1934-Jan.1935 Wu Liangping Zhang Wentian Zhang Wentian Jan 1935-Oct.1936 Oct. 1936-1937 1937-Jan.1943 Kai Feng Jan.1942 - Jan.1943 Mao Zedong Jan.1943 - Aug.1945 Kai Feng Jan.1943-? Lu Dingyi Lu Dingyi ? Aug. 1945-1952 CHAPTER 2 ORGANIZATION, CADRES AND PRINCIPLES The foreign propaganda apparatus which was in operation in the People's Republic of China during the period 1949-76 was a complex network which brought together several organizations. The party and governmental agencies that will be discussed in this chapter, however, are limited to those involved in the Chinese foreign propaganda work (duiwai xuachuan gongzuo) conducted through the use of mass media. When "foreign propaganda" is defined more broadly to include other types of activities aimed at overseas audiences (e.g., exhibitions, delegation visits, student exchanges, artistic troupes, movie screenings, etc.) it is clear that the PRC regime had an even larger organization at hand. 213 This chapter, however, is focused on the Chinese communist effort to reach audiences through its foreign language media, i.e., publications and radio broadcasts. In this sense, the core agencies within the foreign propaganda apparatus were Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Press. Based on recently published memoirs of ex-staff, as well as official records of the party and government agencies, the fundamental aim of this chapter is to challenge the common assumptions held by the Cold War propaganda analysts who portrayed the PRC external propaganda apparatus as an efficient body with huge financial sources at its disposal. By contrast, these newly available documents suggest that the Chinese foreign 213 For the discussion of mass organizations involved in "unofficial diplomacy" See Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 89. For delegation and other international visits, See Herbert Passin, China’s cultural diplomacy, New York, Praeger, 1963 72 propaganda system during the Maoist decades was inflicted with various problems. For instance, the foreign propaganda leadership was in constant flux due to the frequent changes in the administrative roles of the supervisory organs, which provided ideological guidance. Likewise, the FLP and Radio Peking had to overcome several challenges in their daily routine, among them, a lack of trained personnel and advanced equipment. There were also many instances when domestic politics disrupted the working environment at these agencies. More precisely, Chinese foreign propaganda organs underwent two major episodes of destabilization. First, in the late 1950s, during the AntiRightist Campaign, which was closely followed by the Great Leap Forward; second, during the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969).214 These new historical sources, by and large, complicate the picture presented by Western scholars during the Cold War era. In order to provide an alternative perspective, this chapter will analyze the PRC regime's foreign propaganda network with an emphasis on the structural problems that plagued the apparatus. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will analyze the general structure of the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus with regard to the roles played by the leading organs, as well as those responsible for content and circulation. The second section will analyze Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Press in terms of their organizational evolution, cadres, work routine, and principles guiding foreign propaganda work. The third section will focus on the structural problems at the FLP and Radio Peking under four headings: 214 This negative impact is unanimously acknowledged in the Chinese sources, including the works of Shen Suru, Gan Xianfeng, Zhang Kun, and Tong Zhixia. While Western studies portrayed PRC foreign propaganda as an omnipotent force, Chinese authors tend to blame the problems on the episodes of "leftist mistakes". This chapter, however, argues that problems plaguing the system were more structural and longlasting. 73 physical infrastructure and technical setbacks, heavy bureaucracy, staff shortages, and specific impact of the political campaigns. 2.1. General Structure The Chinese Communist Party regarded propaganda work as an integral part of its party machine ever since the 1920s.215 Although broadly based on the Soviet model, Chinese communist propaganda apparatus gained its special characteristics in the subsequent periods.216 During the Anti-Japanese Struggle (1937-1945) and the Civil War (1945-1949) CCP propagandists used old and popular local forms to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese masses. After the socialist revolution in 1949, the party's propaganda machine grew further in size and importance as the legitimacy of the new regime largely depended on the public support it generated through its various journalistic and educational activities.217 Not surprisingly, in its initial years, the Chinese communist regime assigned the top positions in its domestic propaganda organs to trustworthy cadres from the Yanan days. 218 Likewise, the PRC's foreign propaganda organs, which had now moved to the 215 See, Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, “Patterns of Propaganda organization in the national-revolutionary movement in China in the 1920s” in Mechthild Leutner et al., eds. The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster. London: New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, 23 216 For an in-depth analysis of differences between the Chinese and Soviet domestic propaganda work, See Julian Chang, “The mechanics of state propaganda: The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s” in Timothy Cheek et al. New Perspectives on State Socialism in China, Armonk, NY: London, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 76-124 217 This is commonly ackowledged in the Western studies on Chinese domestic propaganda. See, Frederick T.C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1964, Franklin W. Houn, To Change a Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, Alan P.L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1971 218 As the Yanan cadres gradually took hold of the PRC foreign propaganda agencies, their old acquaintances were also presented with new job opportunities. Sidney Rittenberg's recruitment by the Central Broadcasting Administration illustrates a major example: "Over the next few days I was courted by the news agency's Deng Tuo, who in Yanan had been in charge of handling my party affairs, and by Mei Yi, another old friend from the news office in Yanan, who now headed the Broadcast Administration. Ding Tuo played on my former friendship. My old acquintance Wu Lengxi was the new director at Xinhua. My old friends Chen Long, Peng Di, and Qian Xing were all at the news agency, he said. There was no one I knew at the Broadcast Administration –no one, that is, but Wei Lin (...)Mei Yi, when he arrived to talk to me, spoke to my sense of duty. The Broadcast Administration was the cabinet-level body that managed 74 new capital, Beijing, inherited considerably from the experiences of the revolutionary base areas. Therefore, in terms of its general mindset and organization, foreign propaganda work should be considered as an offshoot of the domestic propaganda scheme in the PRC. However, because Chinese foreign propagandists aimed at overseas audiences and used foreign languages to transmit propaganda messages, foreign propaganda work also had a distinct status within the larger apparatus. In terms of the tasks they performed, individual organs within the Chinese foreign propaganda network could be classified into three groups: leading organs, which provided ideological guidance and administrative supervision; content providers, and the organs responsible for the circulation of foreign propaganda items. In the first category, the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department (Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu), Central Committee Liaison Department (Zhongyang Lianlu Bu), State Council Foreign Affairs Office (Guowuyuan Waiban Shi) and Foreign Ministry (Waijiao Bu) deserve the most attention, although foreign propaganda leadership was hardly stable and involved several other official organs over time. Working under the leading party and governmental organs, were the key producers of foreign propaganda content: Foreign Languages Press (Waiwen Chubanshe) and Central Broadcasting Administration, known shortly as Radio Peking (Beijing Guangbo Diantai). One could add the New China News Agency (Xinhua Tongxun She) and the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) to the list, as the content of radio broadcasts (and to a lesser extent, periodicals) mostly originated from China's nationwide network of radio stations and the international station called Radio Beijing. "You are more badly needed to polish English scripts and train announcers and editors" he said. "The news agency has foreign comrades working there already. Lu Dingyi himself has taken an interest in your case and wants you to be happily settled." I remembered Lu Dingyi, the dour propaganda chief I had met in Yanan. Now he was not just minister of propaganda, but also a political bureau member and a vice premier." See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 176 75 these two media organs. In the third category, the International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) which was closely affiliated with the Foreign Languages Press was responsible for managing the bulk of commercial circulation. PRC embassies and consulates abroad also helped with the distribution of books, magazines and pamphlets, mostly through noncommercial means, such as gift-giving and sending of free samples. 2.1.1. Guidance and Leadership The post-1949 propaganda system in China functioned under the dual supervision of party and governmental agencies. Among all the organizations that were directly or indirectly involved in the decisions concerning foreign propaganda, the most important was the CCP Central Committee's Propaganda Department219. This department was an umbrella organization responsible for the preparation and dissemination of general propaganda guidelines as well as overseeing the general operation of propaganda work in China. This department convened periodic meetings with the central and provincial cadres to announce the party's latest instructions on propaganda work and discuss its problems.220 The department was headed by the revolutionary veteran Lu Dingyi until the 219 As the Propaganda Department was directly tied to the Party Secreteriat, most of the time, it only acted as an intermediary between the Central Committee and China's huge propaganda bureaucracy. Hence, some observers consider the role of this department in propaganda decision-making processes as secondary. See, Anne-Marie Brady, “Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of Propaganda in the PRC (revised version),” in Edwina Palmer (ed.), Asian Futures Asian Traditions, Pool, UK: Global Oriental Publishers, 2005, 159 220 All-China Propaganda Work Conference which convened in May 7, 1951 was the first of its kind. This conference gathered members of the Central Committee, Propaganda Department, provincial and municipal propaganda officials, members of mass organizations (youth, women, workers etc.), cultural and educational organizations. The number of total participants was 273, among them 68 observers and 205 attendants. See Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting ed., Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian (1951-1992 nian) (Meeting Summary and Documents of the Party Propaganda Work: 1951-1992), Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dang xiao chubanshi, 1994, 1. No meetings were held between 1965 until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. For detailed information on the CC Propaganda Department's guidance in the domestic propaganda field, Also see Zhongyang xuanchuan bu bangongting, ed., Dang de 76 Cultural Revolution, when the CC Propaganda Department ceased to exist, with its head, Lu, imprisoned for thirteen years.221 As every true communist was also expected to be a good propagandist, CCP members were not supposed to rely solely on the efforts of the Propaganda Department. In 1951 Liu Shaoqi described the tasks of this department as follows: Its main task is to investigate the current situation, make plans, issue directives, supply propaganda materials, summarize propaganda experiences, examine whether or not the propaganda content fits Marxist Leninist principles, whether its methods are suitable for the needs of the masses, whether the propaganda organization is sound.222 In the field of domestic propaganda, the CC Propaganda Department's authority extended to all types of educational and cultural activity. There was a strict hierarchy under the Propaganda Department and the day-to-day work was being conducted by the rural party organizations.223 The CC Propaganda Department's role in the external propaganda field, however, was slightly different. Here, the department acted as a general supervisor which determined the correct ideological line, while the day-to-day work at the FLP and Radio Peking was overseen by the government agencies. 224 CC Propaganda Department xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (1949-1966) (Selected Documents from the Party Propaganda Work: 1949-1966), Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu ban shi, 1994. 221 For a brief discussion of this period, Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, 38 222 See Liu Shaoqi "Dang zai xuanchuan zhanxian shang de renwu (Tasks of the party on the propaganda front) in Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting ed., Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian (1951-1992 nian) [Meeting Summary and Documents of the Party Propaganda Work: 1951-1992), Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu ban shi, 1994, 10 223 For Alan Liu's organizational chart of PRC domestic propaganda apparatus, See Table 3. 224 Sidney Rittenberg explains this complex relationship as follows: "China’s external propaganda during the period in which I was associated with it (…) was completely and openly controlled and directed by the Chinese Communist Party. The main external propaganda organs (the Xin Hua News Agency, Radio Peking, and the Foreign Languages Press publications) were all under dual supervision from above: For administrative supervision, including personnel management; general policy direction; and approval of especially important scripts, they were under the Propaganda Bureau of the Party’s Central Propaganda Ministry. This was not a government office, but a division under the Party Central Commission. For policy guidance on external propaganda, they were under the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office (Wai Shih Ban Shi Chu, or Wai Ban). High-ranking propaganda leaders would attend briefings from top Party leaders 77 exercised its power in foreign language media through a series of interventions: issuing periodical circulars and directives, as well as gathering work reports and summary experiences. 225 Besides its critical leadership role over the core foreign propaganda agencies, the department also oversaw the provincial party organs' interactions with foreigners in China.226 Another important organ, through which the CCP leadership exercised its direct influence over the foreign propaganda work, was the Central Committee Liaison Department (Zhongyang Lianluo Bu). As the regime's central organ responsible for conducting relations with communist parties all over the world, the CC Liaison Department had a well-established position inside the foreign propaganda decisionmaking circle. Throughout the 1950s this department was instrumental in facilitating the distribution of China's foreign language media in socialist countries through official links. In the non-socialists countries, CC Liaison Department oversaw the distribution of Chinese foreign propaganda media through local communist parties, front organizations and bilateral friendship associations. 227 Hence this department's role extended to both for education on policy lines, and would also read daily classified documents from the Center. (Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, January 9, 2007.) 225 For significant examples on the CC Propaganda Department's directions on foreign language publications, See "Zhong xuan bu fuze tongzhi dui waiwen kanwu baodao jinian Mao zhuxi 'zai yanan wen yi zuo tanhui shang de jianghua' fabiao ershi zhounian de yijian: 1962 nian 2 yue 2 ri" (Ideas of the comrades at the Propaganda Department concerning the foreign language magazines’ reporting of the twentieth anniversary of the publication of “Chairman Mao’s speech at the Yanan Conference on Art” (1962, February 2) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 207-208. Also See, "Zhong xuan bu fuze tongzhi dui waiwen chubanshe chuban 'diguo zhuyi he yi qie fandong pai dou shi zhi laohu' deng san ben shu de pifu yijian: 1958 nian 11 yue" (Official reply on the thoughts of the comrades at the Central Propaganda Department concerning three books published by the Foreign Languages Press under the heading “Imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers” (November, 1958) in ibid. 148 226 See, for instance, CC Propaganda Department's directive on the handling of foreign guests by the provincial propaganda bureaus. Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan zonrenwu de zhishi (Directives concering the general task of foreign propaganda) Archive No ; 102-00215-12˄1˅Release Date ; 1954.5.1 \1954.5.1 227 China's overseas embassies addressed CC Liaison Department, besides Foreign Ministry and other related organs, in their dealings with the local communist parties. See, for instance the letter of Swiss 78 ideological blocs. Although the CC Liaison Department's particular role in the foreign propaganda apparatus has changed over time, it continued to be an influential organization until the end of the Maoist decades. On the government side, the State Council's several ministries and offices enjoyed supervisory functions over the FLP and Radio Peking. The Head of the State Council, Premier Zhou Enlai paid special attention to the day-to-day work at both agencies. Although Zhou was an unquestionable believer in Marxist-Leninist principles and an ardent follower of Chairman Mao Zedong, many saw him as a pragmatic leader in the foreign propaganda field. 228 For instance, he always emphasized the need to reach broader audiences, whether they were "ideologically advanced" or not. Several sources suggest that Premier Zhou did not change this pragmatic attitude even during the AntiRightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution. 229 During both episodes, when the FLP Embassy to the Liaison Department, regarding the French Communist Party's material requests for the celebration activities of PRC's 10th foundation anniversary in France. See, Faguo gongchandang dui wo wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo de yaoqiu he qingzhu wo jianguo shi zhounian huodong de qingkuang (French Communist Party’s demands from our cultural propaganda work and the situation concerning the celebration activities for the tenth year anniversary of our country’s establishment) Archive No : 11000834-03˄1˅Release Date ; 1959.2.4 \1959.10.29 228 Many ex-cadres think that Zhou's guidance in the foreign propaganda field helped ease the orthodox influences. This is observed not only by the Chinese cadres but also the foreign experts, among them the author of a rather hostile account, Morris Wills: "From my own meeting with him and people I know who are very close to him, I believe he is intelligent and one of the leaders most well-read in foreign literature and foreign newspapers. He is, if we can use the word, more liberal than any of the others as far as foreign relations go." See Morris R. Wills, J., Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 134-135. Another good example is provided by a Chinese cadre, Pu Shiyu. According to his recollections, upon the instructions of Premier Zhou Enlai, Korean broadcasts section at Radio Peking started monitoring South Korean radio. Before then, this was not regarded as appropriate as it was the "enemy station." Zhou Enlai believed that the foreign propagandists needed to know their enemy thoroughly in order to counter the threat. See, Pu Shiyu, "Chaoyu guangbo chuangjian shiqi de diandi huiyi" (Bits of memories from the time of the establishment of Korean language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996, 339 229 For instance, during the Cultural Revolution, Japanese section at Radio Peking was ordered to read Mao Zedong's name in Chinese, which was against the listening habits of Japanese audiences. When the staff filed a complaint to Premier Zhou Enlai he resolved the matter simply by saying that "Japanese people's habits should be respected". See Li Songling, "Mingji zongli jiaodao nuli banhao duiwai guangbo" (Always remembering Premier's instructions on the good handling of international broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. 79 and Radio Peking underwent major turmoil, he acted as a moderating figure against leftist extremism. In a directive dated May 29, 1966, he warned the comrades at Radio Peking "not to let Cultural Revolution interfere with their work; not to let broadcasts stop even for one second".230 There are also various examples to his assistance on practical matters, such as his use of personal connections to bring the most-needed foreign experts from abroad. 231 Therefore, Zhou Enlai's major influence on the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus should be accounted for. While Radio Peking worked under the State Council since 1950, it was only towards the end of the 1950s that the FLP was decidedly tied to the central government. Before the State Council Foreign Affairs Office (Guowu Yuan Waiban) was established in 1958, the government had exerted its influence over the FLP through its News General Department (Xinwen Zongshu) and Ministry of Culture, whose roles in the foreign propaganda field proved to be temporary. Among all the ministries working under the State Council, the Foreign Ministry was undoubtedly the most important for the functioning of the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus. In the first decade following the establishment of the PRC, the Foreign Ministry was headed by Zhou Enlai himself. In 1958, Chen Yi was assigned to the top position as foreign minister, which he resumed until his purge during the Cultural Revolution. Subsequent to his purge in 1967, violent ideological struggles ensued at the ministry. Unable to function properly under extreme Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996, 39 230 Quoted in Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 203 231 For instance, in 1956 he notified the Syrian Communist Party Secretary of the dire need of foreign experts at the Arabic section of Radio Peking. See, Liu Yuanpei, "Alabo yu guangbo sanshi jiu nian" (Thirtynine years at the Arabic language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 218 80 leftist influences, the ministry terminated most of its overseas representations, calling diplomats back home to participate in the political struggle. 232 It was only in the early 1970s that the ministry went back to its relatively peaceful work routine. Except for the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution, though, the Foreign Ministry exerted direct influence on the PRC regime's foreign propaganda work. Its officials took part in the meetings regarding foreign propaganda content and were consulted several times before important decisions were made. Especially in times of international crisis, Foreign Ministry became directly involved in the shaping of the general foreign propaganda line. The Foreign Ministry issued several directives to communicate its suggestions and criticisms. 233 The ministry's supervisory role was especially critical for the cultural propaganda work conducted by China's embassies, consulates and other representatives abroad. The embassies were formulating their annual plans based on the country's general foreign propaganda policy objectives and financial resources. 234 These plans would then receive suggestions from the center, be revised, confirmed and only then put into practice. Another role played by the embassies and consulates was in choosing and recruiting foreign experts; providing them with travel assistance and making the necessary arrangements before their arrival in China.235 232 For a detailed study of this era, See, Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2004. 233 See, for instance, Waijiaobu guanyu muqian Taiwan jushi duiwai xuanchuan wenti gei zhu waishiguan de zhishi dian. (Telegram on the instructions of the Foreign Ministry to the embassies abroad concerning the question of foreign propaganda on the current situation in Taiwan) Archive No ; 102-00006-03˄1˅ Release Date ; 1958.9.2 \1958.9.2 234 See, for instance, Zhu jia shiguan dui yijiuliuyi nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo kaolü (Ghana embassy’s thoughts about the cultural propaganda work in the year 1961) Archive No : 108-00093-02 ˄1˅Release Date ; 1960.11.17 \1960.11.30 235 See, for instance, Foreign Ministry's order directed at the Swiss Embassy to help assist the FLP foreign expert Auorora. Guanyu wei waiwen chubanshe zhiliwen zhuanjia aniao wuluola zhifu lüfei shi (About the payment of trip expenditure to the Foreign Languages Press’s Chilean language expert Auorora) Archive No: 118-00787-12 ˄ 1 ˅ Release Date: 1959.2.20 \1959.2.20. Also see, for the recruitment of Hausa 81 In the period 1949-1976, the leadership over the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus remained in constant flux. No single organization, including the umbrella organizations such as the CC Propaganda Department, was able to exert full control over the diversity of the tasks performed by the FLP and Radio Peking. This was partly due to the ambiguous nature of foreign propaganda work, which necessitated expertise in various fields: foreign policy issues, military affairs, political theory, journalism and broadcasting, economics, culture and arts, etc. Partly due to this ambiguity, several government organizations got involved in the foreign propaganda decision-making process since the early 1950s.236 The inspection of foreign propaganda items, likewise, lied beyond the abilities of a single organization.237 By the late 1950s, the adverse impact of the diffuse leadership in the foreign propaganda realm was noticed by senior party members. 238 Throughout this period, there was a continuous emphasis on the need to language expert (from Niger) by the Chinese embassy in Guinea, Guanyu wo guangbo shiyeju pinyong haosayu guangboyuan shi (Concerning the matter of the recruitment of Hausa language broadcasting personnel by our Broadcasting Bureau) Archive No: 108 -00194-02 ˄ 1 ˅ Release Date: 1960.11.16 \1960.11.30 236 For instance, in a meeting that convened in 1950 for the purpose of discussing the problems in the foreign propaganda realm, there were participants from Education and Culture Committee, Cultural Ministry, Film Department, Publications General Office, All-Country Trade Union, Central Committee of Youth Associations, among others. See, Zhang Hanfu fuwaizhang zhaoji taolun youguan zhongguo zhuwai shi jieji daibiao tuandeng duiwai xuanchuan wenti huiyi jilu zhaiyao (Summary record of the meeting organized by Secretary Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu to discuss the foreign propaganda problem with the relevant diplomatic envoys and delegations located abroad) Archive No : 102-00129-01˄1˅Release Date ; 1950.4.7 \1950.4.7 237 For instance, a temporary regulation issued in 1954 deemed five organizations directly responsible for the inspection of foreign propaganda items relating to their particular fields: Besides CC Propaganda Department and Foreign Ministry, these organs were Cultural and Educational Committee (Wenhua Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui), Finance and Economy Committee (Caizheng Jingji Weiyuanhui) and People's Revolutionary Military Committee (Renmin Geming Junshi Weiyuanhui). See, Guanyu duiwai xuanchuanpin shencha shouxu de zanxing guiding (Temporary regulation on the inspection formalities of foreign propaganda items ) Archive No ; 102-00157-05˄1˅Release Date ; 1954.4.23 \1954.4.23 238 See, for instance, Zhang Tianming's observations on the Shanghai provincial party organization, which had frequent contact with foreigners but was unable to make foreign propaganda due to its lack of knowledge and policy guidance in this field. It is significant that Zhang's call for unified leadership in the foreign propaganda realm was realized in August, 1958 with the establishment of State Council Foreign Affairs Office. See, Zhang Tianming tongzhi guanyu jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan de juti lingdao de yijian 82 unify the leadership and guidance over foreign propaganda work. But the growth in the size of the apparatus (as well as total propaganda output) added to these challenges. In the period 1949-1976, the PRC leadership took various measures to facilitate cooperation between different work units, which also resulted in numerous changes in the administrative roles played by the leading organs. The case of Foreign Languages Press is perhaps the most striking example in this sense. Right after its foundation in 1952, the FLP was tied to the CC Propaganda Department for ideological guidance, while the executive leadership over this department was entrusted with the Publications General Department (Chuban Zongshu).239 In 1954, the Ministry of Culture's Publication Work Administrative Bureau (Wenhua Bu Chuban Shiye Guanli Ju) replaced Publications General Department as the executive supervisor.240 Two years later, the CC Propaganda Department's ideological leadership role was given to the CC Liaison Department, while Ministry of Culture continued with its executive authority over the FLP. 241 In 1958, in an attempt to link its foreign propaganda organs to the larger foreign policy network, the PRC regime established the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Small Group (Zhongyang Waishi Xiaozu) with its executive body State Council Foreign Affairs Office (Guowu Yuan Waiban).242 This new organ would be responsible for formulating China's foreign propaganda policy based on the current domestic and international affairs, improving the overall planning and (Comrade Zhang Tianming’s ideas concerning the strengthening of particular leadership of foreign propaganda) Archive No : 102-00074-02˄1˅Release Date ; 1958.4.9 \1958.4.9 239 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi j i1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 25 240 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 49 241 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 64 242 See, Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 12 83 facilitating the co-operation between different work units. 243 Henceforth, the leadership of the FLP was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office, whereas CC Liaison Department's ideological guidance role was reassigned to the International Culture Committee (Duiwai Wenhua Weiyuanhui).244 The establishment of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office was a conscious attempt to solve the problems caused by diffuse leadership in the foreign propaganda realm.245 The Politburo's final say on foreign propaganda decisions continued, however, with the CC Central Committee's establishment of the International Propaganda Leadership Small Group (Guoji Xuanchuan Lingdao Xiaozu) in 1961. This new entity was composed of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CC Liaison Department, the CC Propaganda Department, International Culture Committee, People's Daily, the Xinhua Agency, the FLP and Radio Peking.246 Its main task was to make suggestions on foreign propaganda work twice a month (or upon the occurrence of an important international event), coordinate the work conducted by foreign propaganda work units, and submit proposals to the CCP Central Committee to solve problems encountered in the foreign propaganda field in matters of principles and strategy247. 243 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 81 244 This directive was called the "Report concerning the adjustment and strengthening of the foreign propaganda work leadership" (Guanyu tiaozheng he jiaqiang waixuan gongzuo lingdao wenti de baogao). See Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 142 245 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 142 246 Before the establishment of this entity, several weaknesses of propaganda work were discussed in the All-China Propaganda Work Meeting of Dec.1960. See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 143 247 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 143 84 The FLP's leadership ordeal continued even after these two critical decisions to stabilize the apparatus. In 1963, the FLP was put under the direct authority of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office while the same decree ended the supervisory role of the International Culture Committee, which was assigned to the latter only in 1958.248 To complicate things further, the FLP was to receive editorial direction from the CC Propaganda Department and the CC Liaison Department when publishing political theory books. 249 Similar to the previous cases, this scheme too proved to be a short-term arrangement. Only three years later, the foreign propaganda apparatus, along with the whole party establishment in China, would undergo tumultous changes with the launch of the Cultural Revolution. In May 1966, Mao Zedong made his famous call to the revolutionary youth to smash the party headquarters. In the subsequent period, the CCP organization as a whole, including several government offices, came under attack by leftist radicals. As a result, the CC Propaganda Department ceased to function during the whole Cultural Revolution decade (1966-1976). Although Zhou Enlai retained his position as premier, there was serious erosion in the powers of the State Council. The Foreign Ministry was likewise paralyzed with its head Chen Yi purged. In their stead, appointees of the Cultural Revolution Small Group, which became the new powerhouse in Chinese politics, filled the vacuum in the foreign propaganda leadership. In December 1967, the CCP Central Committee approved the formation of a military small group to run the day-to-day 248 See, "Zhongguo waiwen ju lishi gaikuang" (Chinese Foreign Languages Department historical synopsis) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 643 249 See,"Guowu Yuan wai ban 'guanyu jiaqiang waiwen shukan chuban faxing gongzuo de baogao' -1963 nian 2 yue 16 ri" (State Council Foreign office report concerning the strenghtening of the publication and distribution work for foreign languages books and periodicals –February 16, 1963) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 291 85 business at Radio Peking. A similar transfer of executive authority to the military officials took place at the FLP by June, 1968. 250 By the early 1970s, with the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution over, there was a gradual return to normalcy in the foreign propaganda field. The assignment of supervisory roles to a number of party and government offices signaled the move towards regular work routine at the FLP. During this time, a re-organized Foreign Ministry (19701971) and CC Liaison Department (1972-1979) acted as ideological leaders to the FLP. Although both Radio Peking and the FLP returned to civilian rule in 1973, the lack of coordination among different work units remained a persistent problem for the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus well until the end of the Maoist decades.251 2.1.2. Production of Content In the period 1949-1976, the key producers of the foreign propaganda content for the PRC regime was the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking. (The role of these agencies within the foreign propaganda system and their specific tasks will be discussed in great detail in the following sections.) However, it should be noted that FLP and Radio Peking enjoyed only limited editorial capacity. For instance, bulk of the news items broadcasted by Radio Peking originated from the PRC regime's press agency, the New China News Agency (Xinhua Tongxun She), and the official newspaper, People's Daily (Renmin Ribao). 250 See, "Zhongguo waiwen ju lishi gaikuang" (Chinese Foreign Languages Department historical synopsis) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 643 251 See, for instance, CC Liaison Department's report to the CC Political Department in 1974, which indicated that the information flow between Foreign Languages Press and relevant government organs was slow and insufficient in Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 287 86 Throughout the Maoist years, the New China News Agency was the main content provider for all media institutions on the Chinese mainland. This press agency officially worked under the State Council, although it also received directions from the CC Propaganda Department. It was headed by Wu Lengxi, a veteran cadre from the revolutionary base areas.252 Xinhua maintained a huge network of local offices in China, as well as several overseas branches. Over the years, there were various efforts to reform this agency, which was not able to catch up with its Western counterparts.253 In 1955, Mao Zedong criticized Xinhua for having too few journalists abroad and for producing too few news items on their own.254 In the foreign propaganda realm, Xinhua provided the bulk of the news content for Radio Peking broadcasts.255 The PRC regime's official newspaper People's Daily was another reliable content provider for the country's foreign propaganda media. This newspaper often published articles and reviews authored by the party leaders and other senior figures. People's Daily editorials signaled the latest changes in the domestic and international politics and made this newspaper an official guide for deciphering the current state of affairs in China. 252 For a self-authored publication on his work at the Xinhua News Agency, See, Wu Lengxi, Wu Lengxi lun xinwen baodao [Wu Lengxi discusses news reports] Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2005 253 One of its ardent critics was Liu Shaoqi. In May, 1956, he recommended that Xinhua should study capitalist journalists to improve its objectivity, impartiality, factuality and comprehensiveness while at the same time maintaining its position. See, Shen Suru, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu [Fundamentals of foreign reporting work] Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chubanshe, 1989, 53 254 See, Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 20 255 The temporary work guideline issued by the Central Broadcasting Administration's Editorial Department (Bianji bu zanxing gongzuo zhidu) in September 1953 helps to explain the link between Xinhua News Agency and Radio Peking. According to this guideline, approval of the department heads was sufficient for the dissemination of the propaganda content originating from the Xinhua and People's Daily. The guideline, however, described a more careful review of content originating from other sources: For instance, content from domestic magazines should be approved by the department head and if important, by the editor-in-chief; self-edited items should be approved by the editor-in-chief and if important, by the Propaganda Department; self conducted interviews should be approved by the editor-in-chief and if concerning foreign policy, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,608 87 Many of these articles were used in China's foreign language magazines as well as Radio Peking broadcasts. Especially during the Cultural Revolution, when every other news source became suspect, People's Daily articles constituted a significant portion of the PRC regime's foreign propaganda content. To a lesser extent, China's overseas representations were also involved in the production of foreign propaganda content. Most embassies and consulates published public bulletins (gongbao) and other periodicals, which they circulated among the influential figures in the host county. However, these publications should be regarded as a derivative of the actual foreign propaganda content, as they mostly relied on Xinhua news dispatches, foreign language magazines and Radio Peking broadcasts.256 2.1.3. Circulation The International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) was the core agency which was responsible for the commercial distribution of China's foreign language publications. The bokstore was established in December, 1949 under the authority of the Xinhua Bookstore Administrative Office.257 At the very outset, the International Bookstore was responsible for both the import and export of foreign language publications. In organizational terms, this organ was closely affiliated with the FLP; hence its leadership changed hands –along 256 In 1957-1958, there was a short-lived attempt to start specialized broadcasting for the overseas representations. Embassies had to establish units for monitoring these broadcasts, which aimed to help them to catch up with the domestic developments and enrich their foreign propaganda content. However, except for the Indian embassy, broadcasts were poorly received. Besides, news items were not timely enough and the editorial quality appeared to be low. Another problem was that many representations did not have sufficient numbers of staff to assign for this job. See, Guanyu zhongyang renmin guagbo diantai jianli yingwen jilu guangbo xinwen he jiance zhanshi (Concerning the Central Committee People’s Broadcasting Organization’s establishment of recording and monitoring station for English broadcasts) Archive No: 116-00219-10˄1˅Release Date: 1957.1.23 \1958.1.18 257 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 2 88 the lines of the latter agency. The International Bookstore was decidedly linked to the State Council Foreign Affairs Office only in 1964 after it received supervision from the Publications General Department, Ministry of Culture, CC Liaison Department, and various others. Also in 1964, due to the need for more efficient division of labor within the propaganda apparatus, the International Bookstore started specializing only in exports.258 Thereafter, this agency used the name "China Publications Center" in all its international dealings. 259 In order to facilitate the commercial distribution of Chinese foreign language books, pamphlets and periodicals, this agency maintained a global distribution network abroad, mostly of small-sized bookstores with leftist leanings. Of equal importance in the distribution work, was the role played by the country's overseas representations. Under the Foreign Ministry's guidance, Chinese embassies and consulates became important outlets for foreign propaganda media. They were especially instrumental in the non-commercial distribution (gift giving, free samples, etc.) of China's foreign language publications. When the circulation of Chinese foreign propaganda materials was restricted in the host country, it fell on the shoulders of the embassy staff to negotiate a compromise with the local officials. Besides the FLP products, these representations also circulated their own periodical bulletins. They were also instrumental in gathering audience feedback in the host country and reporting it back to the central foreign propaganda agencies.260 258 See, Shao Gongwen, "Huiyi wangshi" (Remembering the Past) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 560 259 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 176 260 The role of the International Bookstore and China's overseas representations in the circulation of foreign propaganda materials will be discussed in great detail in Chapter 4. 89 2.2. Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking: An Overview In the period under discussion, the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking were the key content providers in the Chinese foreign propaganda system. While the FLP was responsible for preparing China's foreign language publications (books, pamphlets, and periodicals), Radio Peking aimed at overseas listeners with its program content (news, reviews, and to a lesser extent, entertainment). Both agencies were located in Beijing, which had become the center of foreign propaganda work after the socialist revolution in 1949. During the Cold War years, both agencies worked under the dual supervision of relevant party and government organs. Each was hierarchically organized and was composed of several administrative divisions tied up to the top management. Throughout this period, Chinese foreign propaganda grew exponentially in terms of its total output and geographical outreach. Being the core agencies in the foreign propaganda system, the FLP and Radio Peking likewise grew in size and importance. The growth in the number of staff employed at these agencies is illustrative of this point. While the FLP had only 110 people in 1949, this number grew to 443 in 1953 and 1,104 in 1963.261 Likewise, while Radio Peking started off with only 34 people in 1949, this agency employed 58 people in 1950, 84 in 1952, 214 in 1956 and 685 in 1966.262 In the conventional propaganda studies, the growth in the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus is generally interpreted as a sign of strength. A closer look at the actual working of these agencies, however, reveals that this growth was also a major source of 261 See, "Zhongguo waiwen ju lishi gaikuang" (Chinese Foreign Languages Department historical synopsis), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 640-643 262 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 23-26 90 instability. 263 During the period 1949-1976, the administrative structure of FLP and Radio Peking changed regularly. Every couple of years, new departments were added to the present scheme, others were eliminated, split or re-united. This continuous transformation changed the order of accountability and caused administrative instability.264 But compared to the disruptions caused by the political campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s, its impact was probably minor. The impact of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, was grave for the majority of working cadres, as well as the administrative structures of Radio Peking and FLP. Before we move on to discuss these and other problems, however, there is need to provide some background information on the working of these two foreign propaganda agencies. In the following section, I will provide this information under four sub-headings: 1) timeline and organizational development; 2) cadres; 3) work routine and tasks; 4) principles of foreign propaganda work. 2.2.1. Timeline and Organization In 1949, before the regular foreign propaganda organs (Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking) were assigned their specific tasks, all propaganda content was supervised 263 This problem is duly acknowledged by the ex-cadres. See, for instance, Luo Jun's remarks on the lack of administrative stability in the FLP. Luo Jun "Huigu sishi nian zhong de shiwu nian" (Remembering the fifteen years out of forty years), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 66 264 The case of Radio Peking illustrates a major example. In 1952, domestic and international news editorial groups split. In 1956, a Central Editorial Department was established to oversee the newly created departments of news, music, domestic life and listener letters. In 1960, Domestic News Department was put under Domestic Life Department. In 1964, Domestic Life Department was upgraded to Domestic News Bureau. In 1967, Domestic News Office, International News Office, Music Office and Listeners Work Office were combined under the "United Office" (Lianhe Bangong) which was composed of five groups: News Group, Group for Propagandizing Mao Zedong's Works, Group for Propagandizing Cultural Revolution, Music Group plus Investigation and Research Group. Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 76-77 91 by the General News Department (Xinwen Zongshu). This umbrella organization, which worked under the Central People's Government Administrative Council, oversaw the functioning of several agencies in the journalism and propaganda fields –such as the Xinhua News Agency, Broadcasting Administration, International News Department, News and Film Department, and Journalism School265. Among these, the International News Department (Guoji Xinwen Ju) was responsible for performing a series of foreign propaganda tasks, which included preparing drafts for radio broadcasts, publishing Mao's works for foreign audiences, editing PRC's first English language magazines, as well as handling foreign journalists in China.266 Therefore, the PRC regime's publication of its first foreign language periodicals preceded the establishment of FLP as a specialized foreign propaganda agency. Among these, the People's China (1950) and China Pictorial (1951) in English were general readership magazines which aimed to introduce New China's social and economic progress to overseas audiences. 267 There were also specialized periodicals with fewer circulation, such as People's China Report (El Popola Cinio) in Esperanto268 (1950) and Chinese Literature (1951) in English. Because its tasks were so broadly defined, the 265 See, "Xinwen Zongshu san ge yue gongzuo: yijiu si jiu nian shiyi yue zhi yi jiu wu ling nian yi yue", (News General Department's three months of work " (November, 1949 –January 1950), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 1 266 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 1 267 For the magazines' depiction of the issues relating to women, marriage and children, See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 39- 78 268 According to Gan Xianfeng, Esperanto was regarded as a language which was globally studied by the progressive people. However, Soviet Union and the bloc countries changed their attitude towards Esperanto by 1953. This changing attitude is reflected in Democratic Germany's definition of Esperanto as a product of "cosmopolitan" ideology and its rejection to receive China's Esperanto publications. Although El Popola Cinio resumed its publication in 1963, its circulation was meager (grew from 5,000 to 12,000 in five years) as compared to China's general readership magazines. See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 152 92 International News Department proved to be a short-lived organization: it was soon realized by the central authorities that a higher degree of specialization was needed in the foreign propaganda field269. As a result, the International News Department was replaced in 1952 by Foreign Languages Press (Waiwen Chubanshe), which thereafter specialized in its functions as a publication house. Radio Peking underwent a similar division of labor process before it assumed its task in international broadcasting. In 1949, before the Xinhua News Agency specialized in its role as the country's official press agency, it exercised a leadership role over the Central Broadcasting Administration. The radio station, which was responsible for both domestic and foreign language broadcasts, was called Beiping Xinhua Radio (Beiping Xinhua Guangbo Diantai). In the immediate aftermath of the socialist revolution, the PRC regime was only broadcasting in the Chinese dialects, English and Japanese.270 In 1950, Central Broadcasting Administration divided between the tasks of domestic and international broadcasting.271 Thereafter, "Radio Peking" would become the new call sign for China's foreign language broadcasts, which saw its first expansion same year with the launch of Korean, Burmese, Thai, Indonesian and Vietnamese broadcasts. 272 In 1952, Mei Yi, a Yanan veteran and an experienced propagandist, became the Head of Radio 269 See the Central Government Administrative Council's report on International News Department (Guanyu Guoji xinwen ju gai zu wei waiwen chubanshe de baogao) in April 1952 which ackowledged that the tasks of this department were too broad. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 23 270 See the organizational chart for 1949, in Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 853 271 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 5 272 The launch of these new languages led to the establishment of the Eastern Languages Department. See the organizational chart for 1950, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 854 93 Peking. Like many of his contemporaries who became leading figures in the Chinese foreign propaganda field, he retained this position only until his fall from grace during the Cultural Revolution.273 Many of his subordinates remember Mei Yi as a father-like figure, respected and well-liked by the staff at Radio Peking.274 Hence the Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking became the key content producers in the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus by the early 1950s. Once their specific tasks were assigned, both the FLP and Radio Peking showed initial signs of growth. For instance, in 1952, thanks mostly to Premier Zhou Enlai's suggestion and encouragement, a new English language periodical called China Reconstructs started its publication life. This magazine was published by the China Welfare Institute (Zhongguo Fuli Hui), led by Song Qingling, the respected widow of the deceased republican leader, Sun Yatsen. Although not officially tied to the FLP scheme, China Reconstructs belonged to the same foreign propaganda network for all practical purposes.275 In 1953, another development was the launch of People's China's Japanese language edition. 273 USIA analysts closely observed Mei Yi's rise and fall: "Until he was branded as a “counterrevolutionary revisionist” in May 1967, Mei Yi had been the dominant figure in Chinese Communist Broadcasting affairs.(…)In September 1952, he was promoted to the Directorship, a position he held until the adverse criticism during the Cultural Revolution led to his downfall. " See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 92 274 Wang Shanzhong, who was a young Overseas Chinese working at the Burmese broadcasts, is one of the cadres who had a favorable impression of Mei Yi: "At the radio, the working hours were very long and the weather was hot. We had the liberty of playing basketball given that it would not hinder our job. Leaders would let us do it. After we played we wanted to take a shower but the northerners' custom is to shower with hot water…There were only three days of hot water so the other days they would not let us into the bathroom. We went to Mei Yi to complain about this. He resolved this matter by saying: “Let the southern youngsters have bath. They are accustomed to taking shower with cold water.” Other leaders might not have been interested in this kind of thing but Mei Yi was not such a strict guy. We could go into his office freely and ask about something. A secretary-general today would not concern himself with such things…That time, things were different. " Interview with Wang Shanzhong, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing 275 Having its roots in the 1930s, China Welfare Institute did not officially belong to the FLP scheme until the early 1960s. However, in terms of its editorial guidelines and objectives, it should be considered as part of the same foreign propaganda network. 94 Following the Geneva and Bandung conferences in the mid-1950s, the PRC regime's growing interest in the Third World resulted in a major growth in foreign propaganda output. Not surprisingly, this was followed by an expansion in the administrative organizations of the foreign propaganda agencies. 276 In the second half of the 1950s, Radio Peking added Lao, Spanish, Turkish, Persian, Arabic, French, Malay and Hindi to its foreign language broadcasts. A similar growth trend was visible at the FLP. By 1958, China Pictorial magazine already had twelve foreign language editions: English, Russian, Korean, French, German, Japanese, Vietnamese, Hindi, Indonesian, Spanish, Arabic and Burmese.277 Another important development was the publication of the Peking Review, which was a new weekly magazine specializing in foreign affairs and high politics. In 1958, this magazine replaced the People's China's English edition, whose content tended to overlap with that of China Reconstructs. 278 In its stead, the People's China launched new versions in French (1958-1963) and Indonesian (1958-1964). While the FLP and Radio Peking underwent this continuous growth trend, the working environment at the foreign propaganda agencies was disrupted by the AntiRightist Campaign. This campaign was launched by Mao in 1957, in order to suppress the anti-party elements in China, who had raised dissenting voices during the Hundred 276 In 1956, there were five departments operating under Radio Peking's international department (duiwai bu): 1) Editorial Department (Bianji Bu) which oversaw the secretariat; news; reception bulletin; and domestic life departments; 2) Europe-US (Dui Oumei Guangbo Bu) which oversaw Spanish, English and French broadcasts; 3) Overseas Chinese (Qiao Bo Zu) which oversaw Hakka, Chaozhou, Xiamen and Cantonese 4) Asia (Dui Yazhou Guangbo Bu) which oversaw Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Cambodian, Japanese, Korean, Burmese and Indonesian; 5) Soviet Union-Eastern Bloc Countries (Dui Sudong Guangbo Bu) which oversaw Russian broadcasts. See the organizational chart for 1956, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 855 277 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 153 278 Another reason was to reach overseas audiences in a more timely manner. See Leonard W. Lazarick's discussion of this issue in China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 147 95 Flowers Campaign only a year earlier. This campaign took its toll on several foreign propagandists, some of whom were falsely accused, reprimanded and sent to the countryside for re-education. In 1958, just before the negative impact of the Anti-Rightist Campaign subsided from the FLP and Radio Peking, Mao launched his Great Leap Forward. This ambitious campaign was designed to mobilize Chinese masses to increase production in order to catch up with the advanced capitalist countries. During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), foreign propagandists faced several pressures affecting the principles, methods and content of their work let alone the adverse impact of the famine following this failed campaign. (The specific impact of political campaigns on the foreign propaganda agencies will be discussed later in this chapter). In the early 1960s things got even harder due to the Sino-Soviet split. Now facing complete isolation in the international scene, the PRC regime further intensified its attempt to reach overseas audiences. In an attempt to counter Khrushchev "revisionism", Chinese leadership has made it a major goal to catch up with the Soviet foreign propaganda output. In 1963, the French and Spanish editions of Peking Review started their publication life. Similarly, China Reconstructs launched its new editions in Spanish (1962), French (1963) and Arabic (1964). In the meantime, Radio Peking added several languages to its broadcasts, which, in the first half of the 1960s, included Italian, Portuguese, Serbo-Croatian, Swahili, Hausa, Tamil, Esperanto, and Filipino. 279 Likewise, with the launch of Russian, German, Esperanto and Mongolian broadcasts, the Soviet Union and other bloc countries ceased to be off-limits in Chinese foreign propaganda. In 1965, China became the third largest broadcaster (after the Soviet Union and the US) in 279 For the expansion in the administrative structure of Radio Peking in the early 1960s, See Table 4 96 terms of total broadcasting hours and number of foreign languages.280 This and similar developments led to soaring concerns in the West. Little known behind this story of linear growth, however, was the hardships experienced at the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies. Subsequent to the departure of the Soviet, as well as other foreign experts from the FLP and Radio Peking in 1960, severe staff shortages plagued both agencies. While the lack of trained personnel put extra burden on the available cadres, it threatened the foreign propaganda flow especially in lesser known language groups. (The reasons and consequences of staff shortages at the foreign propaganda agencies will be discussed later in this chapter.) In the years following the end of the Great Leap Forward until the launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the FLP and Radio Peking had a relatively stable working environment. Although this administrative stability was completely shattered during the Cultural Revolution, it is significant that the FLP and Radio Peking continued their operation albeit under the authority of military committees. In the meantime, export of Chinese revolution and Mao Zedong Thought became the primary goals in the foreign propaganda apparatus. In an attempt to guide revolutionaries all around the world, the FLP published various language editions of Mao's works, foremost among them the bestseller, Little Red Book. Likewise, Radio Peking added several languages to its broadcasts: Urdu, Czech, Polish, Romanian, Bangladesh, Albanian, Pashto, Bulgarian, Nepalese, and Hungarian.281 Amidst this growth, however, the FLP and Radio Peking underwent major turmoil. Similar to the late 1950s, the Cultural Revolution disrupted the work routine and 280 See, Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 167 281 In 1973, Radio Peking had thirteen departments operating under the radio leadership and more then thirty sub-departments. See Table 5 for Radio Peking's organizational chart for 1973. 97 shifted the methods of foreign propaganda work. In the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) Mao worship was so abundant in foreign propaganda that even the Chairman himself felt obliged to call for modesty. 282 During this period, endless criticism campaigns were held at these agencies, most of which resulted in the elimination and punishment of several able comrades. (The disruptive impact of the Cultural Revolution on the foreign propaganda agencies will be discussed later in this chapter). Although the Cultural Revolution did not come to an official end until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, there was a gradual relaxation in the working environment of the foreign propaganda agencies by the early 1970s. It is noteworthy that the elimination of extreme leftist tendencies in the foreign propaganda apparatus coincided with China's United Nations membership in 1971 and rapprochement with the US in 1972 –two significant events which ended the country's international isolation. 2.2.2. Cadres Within Radio Peking and Foreign Languages Press, the staff was organized around a twofold responsibility framework: maintaining the correct ideological line and the preparation of specific propaganda content. While the former task was assigned to the senior cadres (department, section and subsection heads) the translation, proofreading, announcing and minor editing tasks were undertaken by junior cadres. Old veterans who 282 Mao was especially furious with the repetitive use of adjectives to describe his importance, like great leader, great helmsmen, etc. See, "Mao Zedong tongzhi dui chuguo renyuan tanhua shi tan dao dui 'beijing zhoubao' deng danwei duiwai xuanchuan de yijian: 1967 nian 6 yue 18 ri" (Comrade Mao Zedong's ideas on foreign propaganda made by Peking Review and other work units, which he expressed during his talk with the staff going abroad –dated June, 18 1967) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 416 98 had proven their trustworthiness during the pre-liberation days constituted a large number of the leading cadres at Radio Peking and FLP. Generally speaking, the PRC regime regarded these cadres' ideological standing more important then their expertise. For instance, unlike the junior cadres, foreign language proficiency was not a prerequisite for their employment. Some of the senior staff, among them editors, could not speak any foreign languages and guided the staff only in terms of permissible propaganda content. However, it is important to note that even the senior cadres had little personal freedom in this regard. When a senior cadre was not certain about a specific propaganda topic, he had to ask above: Within each of the propaganda organs, like Radio Peking and Xin Hua, where I worked, the director was the supreme authority on what was allowed to go out. The director would refer to the Propaganda Ministry on anything for which policy guidelines were not clear. The various department heads (Europe/America, Latin-America, Asia, etc), as well as the central news and features departments for external propaganda) each had approval rights for broadcast scripts that followed clearly established policy lines. Otherwise, they referred the scripts to the director. The leaders of the language groups within each department (English, Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, etc) could clear scripts within established policy lines – if they were in doubt, they would refer scripts to the department head. Every leader with clearance rights over scripts was certain to be a trusted and experienced Party member.283 As this example illustrates, there was a strict hierarchy within each foreign propaganda agency. The ranking of a leading cadre would also determine his clearance level at the organization, that is, how much classified material he/she could access on sensitive topics. Being at the top of Radio Peking's administrative hierarchy, Mei Yi enjoyed the highest among the four clearance levels –marked by the Chinese ordinals, Jia, Yi, Bing, and Ding (the equivalent of A, B, C, and D.): 283 Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007 99 Only one person (…) was cleared to read Level D dispatches, and that was Mei Yi. He was at a ministerial level, with the only people above him being the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo, among whom a selected few got reports of military and diplomatic intelligence. Because of the sensitivity of the materials Mei Yi was cleared to read –which often included minutes of Central Committee meetings- they were delivered to him by classified motorcycle messenger. Such elite messengers were often ex-army officials. (…) Level A readers were party leaders from each subsection, like the head of the French section at the Broadcast Administration. These ratings were geared to administrative level, which, like ordinary civil service rankings, also determined pay and privileges (…) Level B, which was my level, included the heads of bigger departments, the lowest tier of high-ranking cadres. Level C included deputy chiefs and higher. 284 In addition to this privilege, senior cadres also enjoyed other luxuries, such as better food or more convenient arrangements in housing and transportation.285 However, it would be wrong to see the leading cadres altogether as a distinct group. According to the recollections of ex-propagandists –at least until the political disruptions of the late 1950sthe relationship between senior and junior cadres was not strictly hierarchical. 286 Moreover, in the conduct of their work, both senior and junior cadres were moved by a common sentiment (a combination of patriotic and revolutionary pride). Most believed that they were contributing, however modestly, to the greater effort of introducing New China to foreign audiences and improving the country's image abroad. Under the ideological guidance of senior cadres, the daily tasks of translation, editing and proof-reading were undertaken by junior staff, which can be divided into three major groups: Foreign experts, who had native linguistic skills and were few in number; Returned Overseas Chinese, most of whom also had native language skills; 284 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 194-195 285 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 179 286 Wang Shanzhong, a retired cadre from Burmese language section at Radio Peking elaborates this point as follows: "That time’s leaders were not like officers. We would all work together and they wouldn’t act like they were senior to us. But we would also respect them very much. It was a very intimate working environment. We were like a family, as if we were junior and older brothers. In the 1950s it was all like this. Even when we did not understand something, we were not afraid. Until the Anti-Rightist Campaign and Cultural Revolution it was all like this." Interview with Wang Shanzhong, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing. 100 Chinese staff, who were raised and educated in the motherland. Normally the junior staff employed at the foreign propaganda agencies was expected to be proficient in at least one foreign language. Among all the junior cadres, foreign experts were the most valuable to the Chinese external propaganda machine. Being native speakers, foreign experts provided help in polishing and proof-reading work "for rendering translations done by the Chinese employees in the best colloquial style of the language in which the publication was to appear". 287 They were also expected to help their Chinese colleagues to improve their language skills. In exchange for their invaluable contribution to the propaganda work, they were assigned a privileged position within the apparatus.288 The privileges included higher salaries and better apartments as compared to their Chinese colleagues. According to Sidney Shapiro, this was the official party policy: They said it was Communist Party policy to respect the customs and habits and customs of different nationalities. Didn’t they have special kitchens for Muslim Chinese? (...)A person from a foreign country had more expenses then the Chinese. Foreign-style meals cost more, he might want to buy books and magazines from abroad, he sometimes was supporting dependents in his home country.289 Combined with other social benefits provided by the Chinese government, their salaries enabled foreign experts to live financially care-free lives in China.290 There was a social 287 See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 6 288 These priviliges included social outings like Saturday night movie entertainment. An ex foreign expert notes: "For foreigners they had pictures from Japan, the Soviet Union, various parts of Europe and even England, but not from the United States". See Morris R. Wills, J. Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 148 289 See, Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 214 290 Sidney Shapiro recalls: "Financially we were secure. Our combined salaries, high by Chinese standards, enabled us to eat and dress well, and put money in the bank. Medicare was virtually free, as was education, rent was low. We had no mortgage to amortize, no insurance premiums to meet, retirement pay was guaranteed." Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 84 101 network that brought together these foreign experts.291 However, some–especially those who did not have a Chinese spouse or those who had poor Chinese language skills could not help but feel isolated. 292 Cultural differences also caused occasional frictions. Especially for those who had come from Western countries, there were times when getting things done in the Chinese way proved to be a real challenge.293 Besides linguistic skills, the most important criterion in the recruitment of foreign experts was their correct ideological standing and political consciousness. In the 1950s foreign experts came either directly from the Soviet Union or through the channels provided by the Soviet Communist Party. Subsequent to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, many foreign experts followed the example of their Soviet colleagues and left China. In the initial aftermath of their departure, the scarcity of foreign experts became a huge problem for the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies. Gradually, the PRC regime found alternative ways to recruit foreign experts but their numbers fluctuated well until 1976. (This issue will be discussed later in this chapter under the sub-heading "staff shortages".) 291 Some of the English-speaking foreign experts were Michael Shapiro, Sidney Rittenberg, George Hatem, Anna Louise Strong, Julian Schuman and Sidney Shapiro. Morris Wills recalls his days of socialization as follows: Over the years, I became familiar with this elite group of English speaking foreigners, including maybe fifteen Americans, who have thrown their lives with the Chinese…The members of this group is are used as sort of a front. They attend conferences, they have been sent abroad many times. They help with foreign visitors, drafting documents, getting experts into China and influencing their views. See Morris R. Wills, J. Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 148 292 See Rashid Butt, "My days in China" in Living in China: by twenty authors from abroad, Beijing: New World Press, 1979. 89 293 Sidney Shapiro provides an excellent example: "Though on the whole we got along fine, we did have points of friction. I was inclined to be blunt and had a "let the chips fall where they may" attitude. It took me a long while to learn the custom of starting with a little polite palaver, then sidling up to the problem and circumlocuting all around it, before actually identifying it and diffidently suggesting a solution.(…) But gradually I realized it's not a bad approach at all. You get the question solved just the same, with a minimum ruffling of feathers. A strong objection by a translator to one of the editors might go something like this (I'm exaggerating of course): "You've done a marvelous job of editing this short story. I really admire you. I have so little talent in these things myself. The tenant farmer is particularly well done. There's just one small question. It's hardly worth mentioning. But could it be a tiny bit out of character to have him longing for a de luxe fully automated car the day after he's acquired the bicycle he's never been able to afford before? It's simply a thought. I mention it in the passing-for your reference." Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 78 102 Another group, which had prominent language skills and made huge contributions to the translation, editing and announcing tasks was the returned Overseas Chinese. Most came back to China right after the socialist revolution in 1949 with patriotic feelings willing to help reconstruct the country.294 Besides their language abilities, foreign-born Chinese also had insider's knowledge of the countries they came from, in terms of their lifestyle, customs and political situation. Many of these cadres came from Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Philippines. A considerable number of Overseas Chinese also returned from the US, France, Japan and Soviet Union295. As the Overseas Chinese had native or close-to-native linguistic skills, certain departments did not have to employ foreign experts. Throughout this period, the Overseas Chinese became influential members of the translation, editing and announcing teams. 296 Their participation in the foreign propaganda work was encouraged and awarded by the PRC regime. 297 Perhaps the biggest exception in this sense was the Cultural Revolution period, when all sorts of international contact had become suspect. Unable to bear the impact of the leftist tendencies in the foreign 294 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, p.3 295 See, Xu Yongsheng, "Zui nanwang de san zhi duiwu" (Three most unforgettable ranks), Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 88 296 See, Xu Yongsheng, "Zui nanwang de san zhi duiwu" (Three most unforgettable ranks), Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 88 297 Zou Shouleng, who worked at the French broadcasts section, was among the awarded cadres: "I have worked as a translator in the International Radio for 34 years, worked as an ordinary man (…) without an outstanding achievement. But the country honored me on many occasions. By the end of 1962 and the spring of 1963 I was received by the dear and respectable Premier Zhou Enlai and elected as the “All country’s most outstanding returned Overseas Chinese intellectual”. See Zou Shuleng, “Wo de shengming he zuguo, he guoji diantai xixi xianglian” (My life is closely connected with motherland and international radio”) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996 402 103 propaganda agencies during this era, many foreign-born Chinese had to flee the country.298 The regular Chinese staff constituted the largest group of junior cadres. Some of these cadres had previous journalistic experience working at the provincial newspapers and radios. In the ideal case, these cadres had to have good command of at least one foreign language. However, it was also possible for those who had rudimentary linguistic skills to be employed in the translation, editing and announcing work, to receive on-duty training and further academic education. At the outset, the Chinese cadres who had good command of foreign languages mostly came from well-off families and urban surroundings. In pre-revolutionary China, foreign language education was commonly taught by the missionary schools and other Western-style colleges in the cities.299 This "bourgeois" educational background did not serve these cadres well during the political campaigns when everyone was in search for an international spy or a capitalist-roader: Those who worked with their minds instead of their muscles; those who had been educated abroad; those who regularly read or subscribed to foreign publications; those who hadn’t been born in China and those who exhibited independent patterns of thought and behavior were subjected to particularly intense criticism. Thus the academic credentials and professional skills which had constituted assets for Beijing Review staff members when they were initially selected to work for the magazine became dangerous liabilities.300 In the later years, junior cadres were trained in the Chinese educational facilities which specialized in foreign languages, broadcasting and journalism work. Among the facilities 298 See, Ge Yuli, "Guanyu duiwai guangbo de ba dian huiyi"(Eight recollections concerning the international broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 260. 299 Head of the English translation team at FLP is a good example: "The head of the our translators section was a young woman from a wealthy family who attended Shanghai schools run by American missionaries, and who had served for a few years as a translator in the UN. She spoke flawlessly colloquial American and one of those geniuses known as "simultaneous" interpreter". See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980. 76 300 See, Robert L. Terrell “The First 25 Years of the Beijing Review, an Official Propaganda Organ of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China.” Gazette, 37, (1986), 208 104 which trained journalists and propagandists, the oldest were the Beijing Journalism School, (Beijing Xinwen Xuexiao), Central Propaganda Cadres Training Class (Zhongyang Xuanxhuan Ganbu Xunlian Ban) and Journalism Training Class of Central Marxism-Leninism School (Zhongyang Ma-Lie Zhuyi Xueyuan) later renamed Central Party School.301 At the college level, the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (Beijing Waiguo Yu Xueyuan) was an important institution, which provided the FLP and Radio Peking with personnel. 302 In 1959, a significant development in this field was the establishment of the Beijing Broadcasting Institute (Beijing Guangbo Xueyuan), which specialized in training radio personnel for foreign language broadcasts. 303 In the first half of the 1960s, the academic scope of these educational institutions broadened as several foreign languages were added to their curricula. This was related to a greater effort aimed at filling the void left by the departure of the foreign experts in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split.304 However, due to the tumultuous impact of the Cultural Revolution on education, their success in meeting the staff requirements at the Chinese foreign propaganda 301 See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 275 302 For instance, in the 1960s, almost all the graduates of the Serbian language department at this university started working at the Serbian broadcasts section at Radio Peking. See, Zhu Keli, "Sayu jiemu de kaibo yu fazhan" (The launch and development of Serbian programs) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 243 303 Among the staff who received educaton at the Beijing Broadcasting Institute (also called the Radio University) was Rukiye Haci of Uyghur ethnicity. She had initially started at the domestic broadcasts section of Radio Peking. Upon the reccomendation of the Soviet experts, who pointed out the similarities between Uyghur and modern Turkish, Rukiye Haci was re-assigned to the recently founded Turkish broadcasts section and started attending classes at this institute. At the beginning, Haci did not know anything about Turkey, had no interest whatsoever in pursuing this training and had a hard time learning this language. (Interview with Rukiye Hacı, retired announcer in Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, October, 26, 2007 at her home in Beijing.) 304 USIA analysts note that 'self-reliance' policy of the late 1950s led Radio Peking to replace foreign experts with Chinese personnel. The report is optimistic, however, in stating that Chinese linguists became increasingly available throughout the 1960s. See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 99 105 agencies remained limited. 305 Resuming their regular work routine only in the early 1970s, their positive influence on the country's foreign propaganda work would only be felt towards the end of this period in 1976. 2.2.3. Work Routine and Tasks A typical workload at the core foreign propaganda agencies included translation, editing, proof-reading and polishing tasks. The staff at Radio Peking was additionally burdened with announcing, recording and other technical duties. Replying listener/reader letters and conducting audience research were among other important tasks handled by the junior cadres. (Audience liaison, which was an important means to measure the effectiveness of Chinese foreign propaganda media, will be discussed separately in Chapter 5). A majority of the memoirs describe the daily work routine at the foreign propaganda agencies to be heavy and tiring. Especially at the radio, where the cadres were under extra pressure of time work load was more demanding. However, it is clear that the number of personnel, technical infrastructure and the availability of resources in a specific language department played a huge role in determining the daily work load. Therefore, the heaviness of the work routine was related less to the demanding nature of the job then, staff shortages, a lack of sufficient expertise, or technical setbacks. For instance, while the staff at the English language broadcasts –the biggest and most probably an over-staffed department at Radio Peking had a rather relaxed working 305 At Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, no classes were held in the period 1966-1971. Likewise, Beijing Broadcasting Institute ceased its operation in between 1969 and 1973. See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 277 106 environment 306 , cadres at the French broadcasts section usually worked until after midnight both weekdays and weekends. 307 The average work day at the foreign propaganda agencies lasted at least eight hours, although working overtime was a common practice, which seemingly few, if any, complained. The staff worked six days a week and as the foreign propaganda agencies never ceased their operation there were few vacations. This was especially hard for the cadres whose hometowns were far away from Beijing. For instance, Rukiye Hacı, who was indispensable to the Turkish broadcasts section because she was the only announcer, had to wait a decade before she could visit her family in Xinjiang.308 Any interruption in the foreign propaganda flow, especially due to the neglect or shortcomings of the staff, was inexcusable and met with serious repercussions from the leadership.309 306 According to Sidney Rittenberg, who was working at the English section of Radio Peking, the net work load was around four hours after subtracting all the time spent on various distractions such as physical exercise, political studies, lunch, noontime nap, etc. See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 224-225 307 Zhou Shouleng of the French broadcasts section recalls: "That time we had few staff and our experience was not enough. Plus we had to spend long time on (not shaken by thunder: strict) political classes and sports. Tasks were very important, and work time was delayed for very long. We were not able to rest during the weekends and holidays. All the staff came to work, including the experts who had to come for a couple of hours. I can say that by the end of 1950s and the beginning of 1960s, me as well as the other comrades, did not rest even one day. At that time Xinhua News Agency did not have telegraphic dispatches in French and neither a French telex, all there is was the domestically produced (published) French edition of “People’s China” magazine. Hence most of the drafts were translated by us. Time arrangement was roughly as such: having a rest in the morning, attending physical exercises or political classes in the afternoon, start working at 8 o’clock at night until 3 or 4 in the morning (…) In that time period, this type of stressful work was common. At the time, everyone was sincere in their work, they treated everyday’s work as part of the struggle against imperialism, revisionism and reactionaries". See Zou Shouleng, “Wo de shengming he zuguo, he guoji diantai xixi xianglian” (My life is closely connected with motherland and international radio) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996, 400-401 308 This family reunion became a controversy at Radio Peking, however. Because Mei Yi took the initiative to send her home for the weekend by airplane, he was criticized during the Cultural Revolution by the fellow radio staff for making such a proposal on the grounds that air travel was too expensive. Rukiye Hacı herself was also criticized for wanting to go home and visit her family. (Interview with Rukiye Hacı, retired announcer in Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, October, 26, 2007 at her home in Beijing.) 309 For instance when a staff working for the morning shift at Korean broadcasts section showed up 45 minutes late for work, he was investigated and punished. According to the author, this measure alarmed the whole department. See, Pu Shiyu, "Chaoyu guangbo chuangjian shiqi de diandi huiyi" (Bits of memories 107 On the motivational side, the rewards did not have monetary but rather symbolic value. There was a custom of encouraging the most productive cadres with awards presented by their peers. For instance, by the end of each year, the Radio Peking staff selected an "advanced worker" (xianjin gongzuozhe) and organized activities to congratulate the winner of this award.310 Another motivation for the junior cadres was getting acquainted with senior party figures during the activities organized by the foreign propaganda agencies. In 1963, Premier Zhou Enlai joined such an event at the FLP for the fifth anniversary of the Peking Review magazine, where he praised the staff for their success in opposing American imperialism and Soviet revisionism.311 There were also other leisurely activities, such as the performances of the FLP dance band at the Peking Hotel and the National Minorities Building. This band was well-known for its musical excellence in Beijing's social circles and its performances were followed by top party officials, including Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi.312 from the time of the establishment of Korean language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996, 340 310 Although one should add that this award and the surrounding activities did not survive the Cultural Revolution. Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 591 311 As Morris Wills recalls: "At the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Peking Review magazine, in the spring of 1963, I met Chou En-lai. A lot of top echelon leaders came out to the Foreign Languages Press for celebration (…) At the end of the celebration that day, he gave a little speech saying that the Peking Review had done good work in opposing American imperialism and exposing the defeat of the revisionists-the Russians. See Morrise R. Wills, J. Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 134-135. For the original text of Zhou Enlai's speech, See, "Zhou Enlai tongzhi zai 'Beijing zhoubao' yingwen ban chuangkan wu zhounian, fa, xi wen ban chuban qingzhu jiuhui shang de jianghua 1963 nian 3 yue 5 ri" (Comrade Zhou Enlai's speech at the cocktail for the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the publication of Peking Review's English edition and the launch of its French and Spanish editions –dated March 5, 1963) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 297-298 312 See, Robert L. Terrell “The First 25 Years of the Beijing Review, an Official Propaganda Organ of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China.” Gazette, 37, (1986), 197 108 A regular break from the work routine at the FLP and Radio Peking was the fifteen minute physical exercise practiced twice a day. The physical exercise was seemingly not compulsory and some cadres used the break for other activities: Then at ten o'clock sharp, the loudspeakers in the courtyard outside blared forth with the overture to the official calisthenics music, and everyone dropped whatver he or she was doing and we all poured out of the office to do our daily exercise. Except that very few actually did the exercises. Most of the women made a beeline for the neighboring staterun store to get an early place in line and buy whatever vegetables they needed at home.313 While some regarded the physical exercise as an unnecessary distraction, others enjoyed a break from the workload. At lunch time, food was provided at the buildings and hot water thermoses were available for tea drinkers at all times. In the afternoons, another routine kind of break from daily routine was the political study sessions, which were held twice a week on the average.314 Foreign experts were also bound to participate in these sessions in order to improve their political-ideological knowledge.315 The only difference was that their political study was conducted in foreign languages. The hours and intensity of these sessions varied. During the important political campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, 313 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 224-225 314 Sidney Shapiro notes: "For a number of years the first hour was devoted to reading fundamental political theory. You could choose your author –Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, as you preferred. Two full afternoons a week, and sometimes an evening as well, were devoted to discussion of domestic and international political affairs, usually with people of your own office, in groups of five to ten. Occasionally talks were given on some important topics during office hours by a senior offical of the Foreign Languages Press or higher organization." See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 75 315 Morris Wills recalls: "Once I got to the Press, I found that these people more or less controlled everything connected with foreigners there. As soon as I arrived, Sid Shapiro came to visit me and he indicated politely that it was advisable if I joined their study group. English speaking foreigners at the Foreign Languages Press and in Peking had two study group, one of the English and one of the Americans…We met once a week during office hours and went out to a restaurant and discussed current problems." See Morris R. Wills, J. Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 150 109 political studies gained extra significance. Similar to the case of physical exercise break, some viewed political study meetings as a waste of precious work time.316 The translation and editorial work was taken very seriously at the foreign propaganda agencies. The propaganda text was bound to pass many stages before it was officially made public. At the very outset, when the foreign propaganda output was at its minimum, the propagandists working at the FLP wrote magazine articles in the English original. Even after the launch of People's China's Russian edition, propagandists continued to prepare the magazine in English only later to be translated into Russian. Soon, however, it was understood that technical translation was not sufficient to make this periodical attractive to Soviet readers. In the first half of the 1950s, in order to accommodate the tastes of different target audiences, foreign propaganda agencies adopted the "generally the same, with minor differences" (datong xiaoyi) principle.317 This meant that different language editions would reflect the same content with added nuances to satisfy the needs of local audiences. In 1955, the CC Propaganda Department approved FLP's practice of datong xiaoyi with regard to the English, Russian and Japanese editions of People's China.318 The same decree, however, dictated that the drafts for all magazines should be prepared in Chinese, with only minor variances allowed in each edition. At Radio Peking too, individual sections used an approved Chinese draft 316 A foreign expert at the FLP, Sidney Shapiro felt exactly this way: "We seemed to spend an awful lot of time in meetings. Often we did more discussion than work." See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980. 76 317 Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 151. 318 See, "Zhong xuan bu jiu guanyu 'Renmin Zhongguo' bianji fagzhen zhong ge ban neirong yingfou wanquan yi zheng deng wenti de fuhan: Zhong xuan bu fa wen di 1147 hao: 1955 nian 8 yue 23 hao" (Reply of the Propaganda Department on the problem of whether or not the editorial policy and content of “People’s China” will be exactly same in different editions" (Propaganda Department documents No 1147, dated August 23, 1955) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 118. 110 which they translated into different foreign languages with only small changes in emphasis. The most important aspect of content production at the foreign propaganda agencies was to determine if the draft was plausible in political terms, i.e., whether it was in accordance with the latest party policies, instructions and guidelines.319 In order to avoid mistakes, drafts were bound to be checked and confirmed by the leading cadres. 320 It is clear that the external propaganda agencies did not rely on individual creativity and initiative. As a foreign expert at Radio Peking duly noticed, everything had to be planned in advance: I had approached another dignitary on the stands, a young woman named Hao Jianxiu, who was being honored for her model work as a spinner in a factory. I had asked her to do an interview with the English group for broadcast abroad. I expected praise for my initiative. Instead, I met with dead silence. Nobody moved. Then, gently, Mei Yi explained to the group that since this was my first day at work I was not familiar with how things were done at Radio. Interviews were planned in advance, he said, and approved by the proper authorities. They couldn’t be set up just on the whim of one person. 321 At Radio Peking, it was customary for the editor-in-chief to disseminate the main points of propaganda to be conducted in the subsequent month. This was done each month 319 Even for party members who had access to clssified information, this was an ardous task. Sidney Rittenberg had to go through a careful review of documents to understand the appropriate propaganda tone: "It was there in the documents room that I found the information essential for the correct handling of my job. In a message about a visit from a head of state like President Sukarno of Indonesia, there would be the issues which prompted his visit, what he was likely to ask for from China, and what China was likely to give him. There were also instructions about the propaganda tone for reports of the visit: enthusiastic, neutral, cool. I always studied such documents carefully so that I would know how to handle broadcasts of the story, and how to coach reporters, for example, when they were sent to the China/Indonesia Friendship People's Commune in the outskirts of Beijing to interview an ordinary farm family on their deep, warm feelings of friendship for the Indonesian people." See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 195 320 A retired official at the Burmese broadcasts section, Wang Shanzhong describes this "natural" routine as follows: "Our reports’ content mostly came from Xinhua agency. We also had our own journalists’ news. But in China, we do things differently. That person wrote that article, this person wrote this article…this is not acceptable. It always has to fit into some standard, a demand. There is a principle behind this, one can not write chaotically. The leading cadre knows this principle and he corrects it accordingly. " Interview with Wang Shanzhong, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing 321 See, Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 181 111 through the editorial meetings during which the department heads discussed these main points. Not later than the 27th of each month, these main points would be distributed to the individual language departments, which in turn prepared their monthly reports and submitted it to the editor-in-chief for approval by the 2nd day of each month. 322 The departments were also responsible for submitting a summary work report by the end of each month, which the editor-in-chief compiled and read in order to prepare the yearly editorial plan. During the period 1949-1976, the appropriateness of propaganda content was also determined by a broad set of principles which governed the foreign propaganda work in China. Hence, the process of content production was closely tied to these principles. Now let us focus on the principles of foreign propaganda work and how they evolved over time. 2.2.4. Principles of Foreign Propaganda Work The Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking adopted a series of working principles, whose origins can be traced back to the early days of the Chinese Communist Party. As discussed in Chapter 1, the CCP accumulated a lot of experience in the propaganda realm ever since its foundation in 1921 and especially in the revolutionary base areas during the 1930s and 1940s. Evolved around the fundamental question of "how to do propaganda" at different junctures of the CCP's history were a number of propaganda principles formulated under Mao Zedong's guidance and influence. Among these, the party character of propaganda, suitability of propaganda content toward target audiences, 322 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,608 112 truthfulness policy, adopting a simple writing style, etc., became critical in shaping the development of foreign propaganda agencies in the post-1949 period. This continuity is also manifest in the expression of "seven harmfuls" (qi hai) which was used by the Chinese foreign propaganda organs to refer to a series of mistakes to be avoided in their work: political mistakes, untruthful content, leaking state secrets, long/dull content, incoherent writing, non-colloquial language, and technical errors. 323 All of these points were in accordance with Mao's previous formulations in propaganda work and had their roots in the Yanan days. Among all the principles which guided Chinese communist foreign propaganda work, the party nature of propaganda work (dangxing yuanze), was undoubtedly the most critical. This principle highlighted the indispensable authority (i.e., monopoly) of the party in the propaganda realm. In the domestic arena, it was reflected in the close relationship between the government and media institutions in China. In the foreign propaganda field, its direct implication was that the content produced by the FLP and Radio Peking had to be conducive to the country's foreign policy. Hence what was considered to be permissible propaganda content, changed frequently along the lines of party policy during the Maoist decades. A circular issued in 1954 by a Central Committee organ is illustrative of the restrictions over the production of Chinese foreign propaganda content. According to this document, the following items must not be allowed to circulate abroad: "any item that contains a state secret (party secret, national defense secret, foreign affairs secret); those whose content relate to domestic events which is not easily understandable (or easy to be 323 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 141 113 misunderstood) by foreigners and cause reactionaries to plot against China or start rumors (e.g., suppression of the counter-revolutionaries, struggle against the local bully landlords, natural calamities, backward (luohou) phenomena among the masses; those whose content reflect the historical events in the reactionary system (e.g., invasion of one's country or other negative events); those whose content may raise international disputes; those with shoddy quality, or against party/national policy; those that do not represent the country's cultural-artistic products."324 As the above example illustrates, restrictions over the Chinese foreign propaganda content covered a broad range of topics. These restrictions were so vaguely defined that, depending on one's perspective, any noteworthy news item could have been interpreted as inappropriate for foreign audiences. By the same token, the foreign propaganda content always had to emphasize the successes of the PRC regime in economic and social reconstruction, as well as international relations. To maintain a balance in this sense was especially difficult when China faced a major domestic or international crisis. As we will see in Chapter 3, during the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet split, foreign propagandists were forced to stretch, if not falsify, facts. Against the common wisdom held in the West during the Cold War years, however, outright falsification or fabrication was not an acceptable norm in the Chinese foreign propaganda establishment. Since the pre-liberation days, Chinese propagandists were encouraged to uphold the principle of truthful news, or truthfulness policy (shishi qiushi). Mao Zedong himself believed that the most effective propaganda was the one that is based on facts. According 324 This document was circulated by the CCP CC International Activities Guidance Committee (Zhongyang guoji huodong zhidao weiyuanhui). See, Guanyu duiwai xuanchuanpin shencha shouxu de zanxing guiding, (Temporary regulation on the inspection formalities of foreign propaganda items) Archive No: 102-0015705˄1˅: Release Date: 1954.4.23 \1954.4.23 114 to him, published and broadcasted items should be based on solid evidence as exaggerations and lies could only have short-term success. Once the audiences found out about the lies, they would lose confidence in the propagandists and the communist cause would be forever lost. As the objective of China's Cold War foreign propaganda media was to improve the country's image in the eyes of the overseas audiences, shishi qiushi principle had limited application. However, there is evidence that, the leading cadres at Radio Peking and the FLP made an effort to uphold this principle throughout the era. As Sidney Rittenberg observed: I believe that relatively few stories were pure fabrications, but exaggeration of achievements and of the effectiveness of Party policy were prevalent. Stories were written to make points about the correctness and achievements of Party policy – that was the clearly stated purpose of the propaganda. (…) But the chief editors/directors of the major external propaganda bodies would often reject feature stories that made important statements which they knew to be untrue. I, myself, around 1962, changed the lead of a feature that I was polishing (correcting the English). I made it say that in China of that day everyone had enough to eat – there was no more starvation. I honestly believed that to be true, but I was astounded when Vice Director of the External Broadcast Division, Hu Ruomu, rejected that statement, telling me flatly that it wasn’t true.325 Although Chinese foreign propaganda agencies struggled to uphold this principle in the course of 1950s and 1960s, retired cadres unanimously agree that shishi qiushi was not observable during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the violent stage of the Cultural Revolution. During these periods cadres under the pressure of leftist radicalism tended to exaggerate the regime's successes at an unprecedented scale. However, despite its limited application, the emphasis on the shishi qiushi principle did not fade altogether even during these tumultuous periods. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, on several occasions, encouraged the attempts of foreign language media to reinstate this principle. Mao's praising of China Reconstructs and its editor Song Qingling in 1958 for 325 Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007 115 the magazine's continued adherence to the tradition of truthful news, is an important example. 326 Although she was pressurized during the late 1950s to enlarge China Reconstructs' political content, Song Qingling made substantial effort to maintain this magazine's own style.327 Another important principle which (unlike truthfulness policy or party nature of propaganda) was exclusive to the foreign propaganda system was neiwai youbie (literally, inside and outside of the country is different). This principle relied on the recognition of fundamental differences between domestic and foreign audiences, in terms of their cultural background, political knowledge, tastes, areas of interest, etc. Although this phrase was not a communist invention per se328, the origins of this principle went back to the 1940s, when Xinhua News Agency first launched its first English language news dispatches. Targeting overseas audiences, earliest foreign propagandists at Xinhua have devised three principles: "1) transmitting the most important and internationally meaningful news 2) using truthful facts 3) considering the readers' limited knowledge and making the news items easily understandable to them."329 Being a derivative of Mao's formulation of target-oriented propaganda, neiwai youbie became a well-established principle governing China's foreign propaganda apparatus in the early 1950s. This principle observed that foreign propaganda work was 326 In order to spare Mao the blame with regard to the political campaigns, Chinese authors often quote this and other cautionary remarks from Mao Zedong. See, for instance, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo de lilun he shixian, [Theory and Practice of Foreign Broadcasts], Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2004, 96 327 See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 265. Also See Leonard Lazarick's discussion of the political pressures on this magazine in China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 145-147 328 This term was a common phrase already in use before the communists' ascendancy to power in China. See, Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 14 329 See, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo xue gaiyao, [China's international communication –A theoretical study] Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1999, 69-70 116 fundamentally different from domestic propaganda in a number of aspects: "1) its target audience was different; 2) its propaganda objective was different, 3) its propaganda content was different, 4) its propaganda method was different, 5) its language was different." 330 Therefore, while preparing the propaganda content aimed at overseas audiences, propagandists were supposed to keep in mind the context at the place of reception; that target audiences had a different social system, historical background, cultural traditions, values and concepts, religious beliefs, life-style, ways of thinking, linguistic customs, audience psychology, etc.331 Hence neiwai youbie primarily opposed the idea of bringing domestic propaganda content one-to-one to foreign audiences. For most of the 1950s and 1960s, the main target audience for China's foreign language magazines and broadcasts were the middle-of-the-road masses (zhongjian qunzhong) with petty bourgeois backgrounds.332 They were not fluent in Marxist-Leninist terminology but neither were they anti-communist; they had limited knowledge on China but they wanted to learn more about it by tuning into the regime's foreign language broadcasts and buying its publications. Therefore, in accordance with the preferences of these middle elements, foreign propaganda content had to be easily understandable (clear and concise), lively and attractive. Likewise, the tone of the propaganda media had to be 330 See, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo de lilun he shixian, [Theory and Practice of Foreign Broadcasts], Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2004, 81 331 See, Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 46 332 There are many Chinese language documents, which indicate that the country's foreign propaganda media was aimed at the most populous segment of the society (middle audiences). Among many others, See "Waiwen chuban faxing shiye ju gongzuo tiaoli" (Foreign Languages Press distribution office work regulation) in Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 359. This policy is also mentioned in the Chinese secondary literature, such as the works of Shen Suru and Duan Liancheng. 117 watched, as best propaganda was implicit and subtle.333 Therefore, the main problem was the difficulty to balance between the political nature and the artistic quality of the foreign propaganda content. Here, it should be noted that the superiority of politics over artistry was not made subject to debate by anyone including the advocates of neiwai youbie.334 Rather then challenging the primary status of politics, pro-neiwai youbie cadres argued that, artistic quality was also indispensable to foreign propaganda work because it enabled the audience to continue consuming these items. A similar argument was made with regard to the quantity vs. quality debate. Neiwai youbie advocates believed that quality came first.335 According to them, although circulation figures were also important, foreign propaganda agencies should refrain from chasing numbers and focus more on raising the quality of their final product. The first systematic attack against neiwai youbie principle took place during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, which was launched in 1957. According to the party hardliners, no foreign propaganda principle could match the importance of Marxism-Leninism.336 By the same token, any advocacy of this principle or attempt to modify the content according 333 According to Jiang Zhonghua, one of the editors of China Reconstructs magazine, propaganda was an art. Best propaganda was the one which was not recognized as such by the audiences. (zui hao de xuanchuan shi shi ren kan bu chu shi zai xuanchuan). See, Tong Zhixia, Zhongguo guoji xinwen chuanbo shi [A History of International News Communicaton of China] Beijing: Zhongguo chuanbo daxue chubanshe, 2006, 266 334 For instance, a leading advocate of this principle at the FLP, Luo Jun, used a metaphor to describe the relationship of politics and artistry. According to him, artistry was the "soldier" whereas politics was the "commander-in-chief". See, Luo Jun, "Duiwai xuanchuan zhong de ji ge wenti" (A couple of problems in international propaganda), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 33 335 See, Luo Jun, "Duiwai xuanchuan zhong de ji ge wenti" (A couple of problems in international propaganda), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 36 336 See, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo xue gaiyao, [China's international communication –A theoretical study] Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1999, 71 118 to audience tastes was considered as making allowances to petty-bourgeois demands.337 The subsequent Great Leap Forward era fared no better in the observance of this principle. It was only in the early 1960s, when the negative impact of these political campaigns subsided from the foreign propaganda agencies that neiwai youbie principle could be reinstated. According to Shen Suru, a series of meetings held by the FLP cadres in July 1961 has been crucial in terms of re-instating this principle. The FLP workshop, called the "clarification of ideas concerning the task" (chengqing yewu sixiang) made a critique of the recent disruptions inside the foreign propaganda agencies. The summary resolutions of the workshop indicate that the cadres were critical of the previous mistakes: -) Our main aim should be reaching the foreign readers in different localities. Their revolutions are their task. All we can do is to enlighten and assist them; not teach them or force them or interfere with their domestic politics. -) Foreign propaganda is a long-term process, which we should try to exert a subtle influence over time and not be hasty. -) The form and content of our publications should be able to attract foreign readers. Publications should be based on solid evidence, be truthful and raise confidence.338 The return to neiwai youbie principle in the early 1960s helped build a favorable environment in the foreign propaganda organizations. The stability and growth achieved in the early 1960s (as opposed to the disruptions of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap era) led some old cadres to think of this period as the "golden era" of the Chinese foreign propaganda establishment.339 However, as we will see in Chapter 3, this 337 Sidney Rittenberg, a senior cadre at the Radio Peking English broadcasts explains: "There was quite a degree of overlap between domestic and external content, but the focus was different. Explaining CCP policy to Chinese was a very different matter from trying to explain it to foreigners. But the extent to which external propaganda workers were allowed to cater to the tastes and needs of foreign recipients was very limited. This was mainly due to concerns on the part of responsible leaders for straying from Party policy (…)Often, mid-level leaders would be criticized, or penalized, for succumbing to the ways of “Western bourgeois journalism” when they tried to improve the program to suit the tastes of foreign consumers". (Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, January 9, 2007) 338 See, Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo de lilun he shixian, [Theory and Practice of Foreign Broadcasts], Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2004, 81-82 339 See, Robert L. Terrell, “The First 25 Years of the Beijing Review: an Official Propaganda Organ of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China.” Gazette, 37, (1986), 204. Sometimes the early 1950s are also recalled as the 'golden age' due to the friendly atmosphere at the foreign propaganda agencies. See, 119 and other principles had limited application even in the early 1960s. Besides, the relative peace in the foreign propaganda agencies would only be temporary. During the Cultural Revolution era, the neiwai youbie principle was put aside once again as the "export of the revolution" became the major foreign propaganda objective. As observed by the staff, the foreign propaganda content during this period was very much similar to the domestic media content in its Mao worship and revolutionary zeal. Although Premier Zhou Enlai, one of the ardent followers of neiwai youbie principle, 340 warned against excesses, he had only limited influence over the revolutionaries during the violent phase of Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). His moderating influence became more decisive in the 1970s, when there was a return to relative normalcy at the foreign propaganda agencies. In July, 1972, a set of regulations issued by Radio Peking signaled the re-instatement of neiwai youbie principle. This regulation instructed the radio staff to pay attention to the following: "maintaining a modest tone and using easily-understandable language, refraining from pressurizing the audiences, avoiding one-sidedness and remaining faithful to the facts". 341 For improvements in content, however, China's foreign propaganda agencies had to wait for the elimination of Cultural Revolution Small Group in 1976 and the subsequent openingup reforms. Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 140 340 Zhou Enlai's positive role is ackowledged in many Chinese sources. See, for instance, Huang Zecun's analysis of Zhou Enlai's contributions to "propaganda art" in Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 97-100 341 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 20 120 2.3. Structural Problems at the Chinese Foreign Propaganda Agencies During the Cold War, Western propaganda analysts made every effort to portray the communist propaganda organizations as efficient bodies commanding unlimited manpower and financial sources. Studies on China, similarly, based their narratives on exaggerated notions of threat by emphasizing the strengths of the PRC foreign propaganda establishment. Today, newly available historical records enable us to take a closer look at the working of the core external propaganda agencies in China during the Maoist years. By highlighting a series of problems that decreased work efficiency and administrative stability, these sources, by and large, complicate the picture presented by Cold War era scholars. In the following section, I will discuss the structural problems which plagued the foreign propaganda agencies under four sub-headings: 1) physical infrastructure and technical setbacks; 2) heavy bureaucracy; 3) staff shortages and 4) impact of the political campaigns. 2.3.1. Physical Infrastructure and Technical Setbacks During the Cold War years, PRC regime fully subsidized its foreign language media, which was regarded as an important channel to reach overseas audiences. However, the physical and technical infrastructure made available to the cadres at FLP and Radio Peking suggests that the foreign propaganda agencies had only modest financial means at their disposal. For instance, the majority of the staff stayed in small apartments within dormitory-like compounds provided by the work unit.342 The apartments were close to the office buildings hence most people either rode bicycles or walked to work. Yet, for 342 An ex-foreign expert notes that sometimes there were not enough apartments for everyone. See Morris R. Wills, Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 126 121 many, the housing arrangement was probably not that convenient. Radio Peking's influential foreign expert Sidney Rittenberg once cited "poor housing, bad sleeping conditions, overcrowding, no hot water, too much noise" among the reasons behind the Chinese cadres' low productivity.343 The working environment was not attractive either. The FLP building, which was ready for occupancy in 1953, is described by an ex-foreign expert as "gloomy, neglected, unwhitewashed, and very dimly lit, giving off an unpleasant smell". 344 Due to poor insulation and deliberate economy measures to save coal, the FLP building was not sufficiently warm in winters, causing cadres to wear as many clothes indoors as they did outside. 345 Besides, the cadres had to work ten hours a day in rather small offices.346 Things were no different at Radio Peking. Before the radio staff started working in their new, modern building at Fuxingmen Street in 1959, five or six cadres had to squeeze into 12-square meter rooms each of which had four or five desks, cupboards and newspaper shelves.347 Another problem was the lack of necessary equipment and sources in foreign languages. Most departments lacked enough materials which would enable the foreign propaganda cadres to work in an efficient way. The scarcity of reference materials was a 343 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 224-225 344 See Rashid Butt, "My days in China" in Living in China: by twenty authors from abroad, Beijing: New World Press, 1979, 93 345 See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 74 346 Robert L. Terrell “The First 25 Years of the Beijing Review, an Official Propaganda Organ of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China”, Gazette, 37, (1986), 197. Lazarick makes a similar observation for China Reconstructs staff, who seemingly worked at a traditional courtyard house by 1957. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 79 347 This old building was located at Fuwai Ertiao No.302. See, Yu Zongyan, "Guoji tai huiyi pianduan" ( Memory Fragments of International radio) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 60 122 persistent problem even in the sections that specialized in more familiar Asian languages. For instance, Radio Peking's Thai broadcasts section did not have a single subscription for newspapers and periodicals published in this language.348 The Burmese section also lacked basic reference works and other sources.349 However, the greatest burden fell on the shoulders of those who worked in the lesser known language groups. For instance, Radio Peking's Hausa language staff was quite disappointed when they discovered that Beijing libraries did not have a single book written in this indigenous African language. 350 Among all reference works, the lack of dictionaries probably posed the most difficult challenge for translators and editors. Because foreign language education was still in its infancy in the PRC, several foreign language groups lacked dictionaries prepared in Chinese.351 For many, the next best option was using dictionaries prepared in Russian.352 Russian had become a popular foreign language among party cadres in the post-1949 era. Some comrades have learned this language during their studies at the Soviet universities. Others acquired communication skills at the Chinese foreign 348 See Ma Qingxiong, "Wo yu duiwai guangbo"(Me and international broadcasting) in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,17 349 See, Wang Baoshi, "Fujin juixi hua mianyu guangbo" (Evoking the memories of the past by talking about Burmese language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 187 350 See, Li Xuan, "Haosa yu guangbo chuangban shi de nanwang suiyue" (Unforgettable days from the foundation of Hausa language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 236 351 For instance, there was no Chinese-Lao dictionary until the 1980s. See, Cao Yufeng, "Wei bian laoluo wen 'cidian' qingzhu xinli jishi nian" in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 264 352 Serbian and Turkish broadcasts are prominent examples. For Serbian broadcasts, See, Zhu Keli, "Sayu jiemu de kaibo yu fazhan" (The launch and development of Serbian programs) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 241 123 propaganda agencies in their multiple exchanges with Soviet colleagues. However, few had the Russian proficiency to rely solely on this language in their translating and editing duties. The language employed in the Chinese foreign propaganda content was so complex that few could perform these tasks without difficulty. 353 At Radio Peking, the lack of modern technology often put a great burden upon the staff and caused a less efficient working routine. For instance, there was a scarcity of typewriters in non-Latin scripts.354 In 1950, because there was no recording technology at the English section, all programs had to be broadcast live. Hence when there was a mistake, the ones who were monitoring the broadcasts would hint the announcer of his mistake so that he/she could make the correction live on air.355 In the subsequent years, when recording technology became available, the situation improved only slightly. For instance, deformation of tapes was a frequent problem, whose solution rested on the shoulders of the staff.356 353 Zhang Jinyu at the Turkish broadcasts section describes his experience: "They were handing us the full articles (usually very long) or excerpts from domestic journals like Red Flag (Hong Qi). The idioms and long expressions were very hard to translate. Sometimes we broadcasted them in parts, not as a whole. I was using a Russian-Turkish dictionary, there was nothing else available." Interview with Zhang Jinyu, retired translator and director in the Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, November 5, 2007 at his home in Beijing 354 See the case of Serbian broadcasts: Zhu Keli, "40 Nian fengyu zhong de huiyi", in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 302 355 See, Han Yuejing, "50 Niandai de yingyu zu"(English section of the 1950s) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 128 356 For instance, Chu Yiping of the Romanian broadcasts remembers hearing his friends' shouting from downstairs, when he was in deep sleep at the dormitory: "Romanian broadcasts department! Come to the announcement section immediately! The broadcast has a problem". The problem was due to the deformation of the recording tape and when the problem was solved, Chu noticed that one of the cadres had only one shoe. Apparently the shoe got lost on the way as the cadre was running from his dorm to the radio. See Chu Yiping, "Cong paodiao yi zhi xie shuoqi", in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 264 124 2.3.2. Heavy Bureaucracy One of the major problems which plagued the Chinese external propaganda establishment was heavy bureaucracy, which resulted in job delays and an inefficient work routine. The fundamental reason behind this problem was the excessive importance attached to the centralization of tasks, partly due to the PRC regime's distrust of individual initiative. This made even the simplest tasks subject to numerous approvals by the senior cadres. For instance, rather then letting individual language groups prepare their own drafts according to the relevant propaganda guidelines, the center prepared the drafts in Chinese to make sure that every single department had the same content. This routine was further complicated by the foreign propaganda leadership's favor of ideological fitness over professional expertise in the selection of its senior cadres. At Radio Peking, for instance, translation was an arduous task simply because some editors did not have foreign language skills. The individual sections were getting the Chinese draft and translating these items into the relevant language, then explaining (also in Chinese) the contents of the translated draft to the editor, who then either approved the translation or sent it back for revisions.357 A similar routine was followed at the FLP in the preparation of drafts for its foreign language periodicals.358 357 Although it caused considerable waste of time, this long translation process also had some benefits for the Overseas Chinese staff. Those who had rudimentary knowledge of Chinese grammar before they came to the mainland had the chance to improve their linguistic skills through the arduous task of translation.Wang Shanzhong in Burmese language section of Radio Peking is one such example. He describes the translation mechanism as follows: "Our leaders would instruct us on the translation of material (for instance, some important article from People’s Daily.). They would ask us if we finished translating and we would say “finished”. Then he would say “bring it” and I’d go with the translated document. He would say “this is not correct”, “bring the Chinese version”, I’d go and bring the Chinese version. Hence he would check our translation, although he would not understand Thai or Burmese. I’d retranslate it into Chinese and then he would say “this part is not very clear”. Then he would explain what that part really means in the original (Chinese) version. After understanding it, you’d go and correct the 125 The translation and proofreading tasks were even more difficult to handle when foreign experts with no proficiency in Chinese were involved in the process. For instance, at the Arabic section of Radio Peking, because Chinese staff did not have advanced Arabic knowledge and foreign experts lacked Chinese skills, items had to be translated first from Chinese to English, then from English to Arabic. 359 Similarly, Tanzanian experts working at the Swahili language broadcasts used English as a medium in their translation work.360 The fact that the drafts were prepared in Chinese was sometimes used as a justification to minimize the role of foreign experts in proofreading. 361 As foreign experts knew that the final version would be awkward for overseas readers, some wanted to change the final draft into a readable form but convincing the leading cadres was not an easy task. Morris Wills, a foreign expert at the FLP, recalls his frustration with the senior staff as follows: Frequently I would get some silly thing written up in Chinese. In Chinese it might sound all right, and I, as the translator, had to stick rigidly to the text. I would not be allowed to make additions or leave omissions on my own. So when I got it translated into English, it sounded like a child had written it, full of slogans, dates omitted, figures given as “about a hundred or about two hundred”, even “about two people”. It was ridiculous…Repeatedly I would take the copy over to the Party leader of our section and say “Now look here. It sounds like a two-year old wrote it. Can’t we change this, strike out that, get a figure here? Why don’t you take this down to the editors and make these changes and reorganize the article?” He would say to me, “If I go down there, you know how it’s going to come back. Go ahead and translate it.”…I’d say “it might be all right translation. Working in this fashion, our Chinese got better in time." Interview with Wang Shanzhong, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing 358 See Morris R., J. Wills, Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 124 359 See, Liu Yuanpei, "Alabo yu guangbo sanshi jiu nian" (Thirtynine years at the Arabic language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 218 360 See, Siwaxili yu bu (Swahili language department) "Women zai dongfei xiangyou shengyu" (We enjoyed fame in East Africa) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 231 361 A former foreign expert recalls his experience: "Instead of working collectively, every group compares the translated material with the Chinese text and brings forth its own findings. Thus it happens often that the translation of a single Chinese word is changed four or five times, and if the "expert" offers any difference of opinion in this regard, the final argument is always "In Chinese it is like this." See Rashid Butt, "My days in China" in Living in China: by twenty authors from abroad, Beijing: New World Press, 1979, 88 126 for a Chinese but foreigner wouldn’t read this sort of trash. Foreigners don’t speak this way, and that’s who it was written for.” The whole object was to get mass readership…Sometimes I’d finally convince him to go down. He’d take the copy down and argue for maybe an hour or more. He was technically competent; he knew it didn’t read well. None of the editors knew English. Then he would come back, fuming, throw the article down and say, “Of course they won’t agree with any changes.” He grew 362 increasingly angry with me for pushing him to go down in the first place. At the FLP, many agreed that the translations were sometimes inadequate but at a time when there were few available foreign language sources on China, these publications were the only means to publicize the country's new image abroad.363 The preference of ideology over expertise resulted in lesser productivity but the senior figures clearly had other set priorities besides efficiency and speed. For instance, whether it caused job delays or not, egalitarianism was a fundamental work ethic at Radio Peking: Side by side with elitism was a leaden egalitarianism. If sixteen pages in Chinese came in to be translated, I had to divide the job up, two pages to each of eight people. Of those eight, maybe four had less than minimal translation ability. So the translations that came back were unusable. I couldn’t throw them out; that would be considered undemocratic. But when I finished correcting them, there were so many balloons and lines, fixes and margin notes that the translators were hurt, complaining that only a word or two of their original text was left. "Give the work to the good translators." I argued to the department heads. "It will be faster. The work will get done better." But it never happened. Their argument was that they needed to train new people, but they also did it to keep harmony in the office, not to be seen to favor one person over another. So we were always bogged down doing stupid work, trying to take something unusable and pretend that it was usable. I saw people around me- talented, enthusiastic people-trying to write interesting radio scripts. One after another they were shot down. "This is a sensitive subject", they would be told. Or, "This is something the foreigners won't understand." Or, "we don’t know the proper line on this. 364 As the above example shows, extreme caution for the ideological appropriateness of the foreign propaganda items took its toll on individual creativity and initiative. The heavy bureaucracy was perhaps a less noticeable problem for the FLP, which published most of 362 See Morris R., J. Wills, Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966 124 363 Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 200 364 Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 259 127 its foreign language periodicals on a monthly basis. However, timeliness was much more critical in radio broadcasting and the slow work routine proved detrimental for Radio Peking. Here, the items originating from Xinhua News Agency and People's Daily had to go through a long translation and approval process, which lasted one or two days. Hence most of the time Radio Peking announced the news items three to four days later then the actual event.365 This situation, needless to say, gave tremendous advantages to Western radio stations over Radio Peking in international broadcasting. Even in the news items covering China's domestic and foreign affairs, Radio Peking lagged far behind its rivals in the capitalist countries.366 2.3.3. Staff Shortages In the period 1949-1976, Chinese foreign propaganda agencies had various difficulties in recruiting and maintaining able staff. One major reason behind the staff shortages was the incorporation of several new languages into the original foreign propaganda scheme towards the end of the 1950s. This was also the period when the Anti-Rightist Campaign became a destabilizing influence on the staff size at FLP and Radio Peking. In the period 1957-1960, because many cadres were sent to the countryside for political education, the number of personnel was unable to satisfy the need.367 In order to close this gap, the CC 365 Rukiye Haci remembers her frustration upon hearing news items on Western radio stations way before the same topic was broadcasted on Radio Peking. (Interview with Rukiye Hacı, retired announcer in Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, October, 26, 2007 at her home in Beijing. 366 For instance Japanese listeners learned the current news about China faster from Voice of America and NHK. See, Ge Yuli, "Guanyu duiwai guangbo de ba dian huiyi"(Eight recollections concerning the international broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 254 367 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,568. Also See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 164 128 Propaganda Department demanded domestic propagandists from the provincial level and the army. Needless to say, these new recruits did not have the expertise to serve at the foreign propaganda agencies, for which they had to undergo extra training.368 In the early 1960s, things became even more worrisome due to the Sino-Soviet split. Throughout the 1950s, Chinese foreign propaganda organizations had relied on the help of foreign experts who either came directly from the Soviet Union or through the Soviet network of client communist parties in other countries. Soviet assistance was also critical in the educational field. Since the early 1950s, China had been sending students and junior propagandists to attend Soviet universities to receive training in foreign languages and other technical fields. Even by the end of the 1960s, Chinese higher education institutions were not able to match their Soviet counterparts in their expertise in foreign languages, especially in rare ones. The departure of the Soviet experts by the summer of 1960 was a huge blow to the Chinese foreign propaganda establishment. But many probably saw it coming. Since the late 1950s, ideological differences between the Soviet and Chinese cadres had led to numerous disagreements in translation and editing work. During this period, Chinese staff had to devise creative methods in order to bypass their Soviet colleagues' unwanted linguistic interventions. 369 According to the recollections of Sidney Rittenberg, there 368 Du Fu was one of the military cadres who started working in the foreign propaganda field during this period. After he was assigned to Radio Peking he had to receive training on the handling of foreign propaganda broadcasts work as well as English language. See, Du Fu "Wo shi zenyang jiaru duiwai guangbo hanglie de" (How I joined the ranks of international broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 389-390 369 For instance, Zhang Jinyu at the Turkish broadcasts, used to omit words (like revisionism) which he thought might offend the Soviet experts from the rough drafts and put them back in the final draft after the translation. Interview with Zhang Jinyu, retired translator and director in the Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, November 5, 2007 at his home in Beijing 129 were also other sources of displeasure at the foreign propaganda agencies concerning the Soviet experts: Some of their distaste was because of the special privileges exacted by the Soviets, far outstripping those accorded to other foreigners. The work units hosting Soviet experts had to supply each one with a Russian interpreter, and they had to be served by cooks trained to prepare such Russian delicacies as borscht, beef Stroganof, chicken Kiev, and Blini Imperial. Not only their housing but their offices were plush. At the Broadcast Administration, Comrade Babinko held court in the only room in the entire building that had a carpet. Not even Mei Yi's office could match it. (…) The behavior of the Soviets themselves caused anger. While other foreigners, like me, had access to motor pool cars, Americans and Europeans tended to be more democratic, sharing cars, sitting up front and chatting with the driver, and using our privileges to do favors for our colleagues. The Soviets on the other hand, swept about town, each riding in the back of his or her own chauffeured car, black curtains drawn against the prying eyes of the Chinese.370 Therefore, when the Soviet experts resigned from their jobs in the summer of 1960, there were probably some who were glad to see them leave. However, this departure had longterm consequences for the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies. As the majority of foreign experts sided with the Soviet Communist Party in the ideological split, Soviet experts' departure triggered a wave of resignations at the FLP and Radio Peking. As Sidney Rittenberg recalls: Those with the closest ties to the Soviets, like the East Germans and the Spaniards, went home when the Soviets did. The Jordanian Arabs pulled out, forcing the Broadcast Administration's Arabic section to scramble to find out a mullah from China's northwest to take over the job of polishing and translating. But others were on the fence. The Canadians and Australians wavered, some going with the Chinese, some the Soviets.(…) It was my job to nurture the loyalty of the foreigners who chose to stay in China, whatever their nationality371. But it is clear that not that many were convinced to stay. For those who disagreed with China's position, it has indeed become very difficult to continue working at the foreign propaganda agencies. Some were dismissed because of their resistance to translate and 370 Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 241-242 371 Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 262 130 edit the propaganda content which articulated China's case vis-à-vis the Soviets.372 Hence by the early 1960s, Chinese foreign propaganda agencies were left with few experts, whose contribution to translation and editing work was still critical. The shortage of foreign experts was not an equally dramatic problem for all departments though. Least affected by this transition were the sections that specialized in Asian languages. For instance, the Burmese broadcasts section at Radio Peking did not employ any foreign experts and relied entirely on the returned Overseas Chinese staff since its foundation. 373 However, with regard to the lesser known language groups, this was a serious problem. In 1962, 14 out of the total 23 language sections at Radio Peking did not have sufficient linguistic skills to operate independently and either entirely or partly relied on foreign experts' help. 374 During this period, although individual departments notified the leadership of their staff requirements, the center was not able to satisfy these demands.375 The persisting problem of staff shortages made it necessary for the foreign propaganda agencies to modify their recruitment policies. Before the split, an important 372 See for example, dismissed Spanish experts' criticism of the Chinese regime. Ceng zai wo diantai gongzuoguo de xibanren dui wo you yijian (Thoughts of a Spanish (about us) who once worked in our radio) Archive No : 110-01007-08˄1˅Release Date:1960.11.29 \1960.11.29 373 A retired member of the Burmese broadcasts section explains: "Our department did not have any foreign experts for 38 years. All of us were Overseas Chinese. Some of the departments had foreign experts, some one, some two…Vietnamese had two foreign cadres. That time we had the principle of “depending on ourselves”. In the Burmese broadcasts we did not have any problems because our language skills were as if we were natives; the audience could not understand we were Chinese." Interview with Wang Shanzhong, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing 374 The language sections which could not at all work independently were: Portuguese, Italian, Swahili, Hausa, Serbian and Malay. Those who had only partial linguistic skills were: Arabic, Persian, Turkish, French,German, Hindu, Spanish, Lao. Among the 9 languages that could work without foreign expert help and guidance, most were Asian languages: English, Japanese, Burmese, Indonesian, Korean, Russian, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Thai. See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 569 375 See, for instance the case of Serbian broadcasts which was launched in 1961. The staff requirement of the department was not met until 1965. See, Zhu Keli, "Sayu jiemu de kaibo yu fazhan" (The launch and development of Serbian programs) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 242 131 criterion for the selection of a foreign expert was the correct ideological line. After the departure of the foreign experts in the early 1960s, this criterion had to be emphasized less, if not altogether left aside: The Chinese changed their policy and started getting in young university graduates, many of whom were not Communists; they were experts- technicians-rather than ideologists. When I worked there, that was the policy: to get people who did not care politically. Many of the British had been helped by Joseph Needham of Cambridge University. Approaches to the States had to be done through England where it was not illegal. A couple of years before I left, they sent Israel Epstein there to recruit people in England. Most of the people the Chinese recruited were young, in their twenties or thirties. 376 The period of severe staff shortages overlapped with the PRC leadership's demands to catch up with the Soviet Union in foreign propaganda output.377 This put extra pressure on China's foreign propaganda agencies, which had to get creative to close this gap. The most common solution was to encourage the available cadres to work over time. Unable to get enough rest, 66 of the total 329 cadres working at Radio Peking fell sick during this period. 378 Other types of temporary fixes were numerous. One method was the reassignment of personnel from relatively well-staffed language groups to lesser known ones. This re-assignment, needless to say, was done without that particular person's prior knowledge or consent. It was not uncommon for the junior cadres to find themselves assigned to posts against their will. 379 An editor or a translator who had advanced skills 376 See, Morris R., J. Wills, Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 126 377 The leadership was concerned that the Soviet publications caught up with the most recent developments while the Chinese lagged behind. Another cause for concern was the weak quality of Chinese foreign language publications especially in little known languages such as Urdu, Tamil, Portugese, Hausa, Swahili, etc. See,"Guowu Yuan wai ban 'guanyu jiaqiang waiwen shukan chuban faxing gongzuo de baogao' -1963 nian 2 yue 16 ri" (State Council Foreign office report concerning the strenghtening of the publication and distribution work for foreign languages books and periodicals –February 16, 1963) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 286-287 378 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,569 379 Zhang Jinyu, who started working at the Turkish broadcasts section in the early 1960s is a good example. Zhang was educated in Moscow Law and International Relations Institute on government scholarship and 132 in one foreign language could easily find him/herself in an altogether different language department.380 As need arose, foreign language agencies also sought help from outside organizations located in Beijing.381 In 1964, Radio Peking asked the Ministry of Higher Education for students who could work part-time in the foreign language broadcasts.382 Likewise, during the Cultural Revolution, the shortage of skilled personnel led into the recruitment of college students on a part-time basis.383 In the long-run, the unexpected departure of foreign experts made a deep impact on the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies. In order to minimize the reliance on foreigners in translation and proof-reading jobs, on-the job training and academic education received more attention from the regime. Throughout the 1960s, there was a growing emphasis on the improvement of Chinese cadres' foreign language proficiency. aspired to a diplomatic career in the Foreign Ministry. However, due to the staff shortages experienced after the departure of the Soviet experts and regardless of his minimal Turkish skills, he was assigned a job at Radio Peking. Interview with Zhang Jinyu, retired translator and director at the Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, November 5, 2007 at his home in Beijing. 380 Several examples can be provided. See, for example, the case of Ma Qingxiong, who was working in Thai broadcasts but assigned to the Vietnamese section due to staff shortages. Although he was told that this was a temporary assignment he never returned to the Thai section again. Ma Qingxiong, "Wo yu duiwai guangbo" (Me and international broadcasts), Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,19. Also, see the case of Yao Yuexiu, who was appointed to the Portugese broadcasts department just when he was learning the fundamentals of Spanish language. Yao Yuexiu, "Mei Yi juzhang zai women zhongjian" (Department Head Mei Yi among us), Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,80. Also see the case of Li Xuan, who was determined to excel his skills in French language, when he was appointed to Hausa language section. See, Li Xuan, "Haosa yu guangbo chuangban shi de nanwang suiyue" (Unforgettable days from the foundation of Hausa language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 239 381 Most common was the educational institutions. When foreign experts at the Arabic section of Radio Peking stopped translating in 1960 due to political disputes, Beijing University sent a professor to help with the translation and announcing work. However, because there was not enough time, the items had to be broadcasted one day later. See, Liu Yuanpei, "Alabo yu guangbo sanshi jiu nian" (Thirtynine years at the Arabic language broadcasts) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 227 382 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,569 383 See Rashid Butt, "My days in China" in Living in China: by twenty authors from abroad, Beijing: New World Press, 1979, 87 133 Starting in 1960, Chinese higher education institutions, especially in the field of foreign language and media studies, broadened their scope. Several lesser known languages were added to their curricula.384 However, with the launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, these academic institutions were not able to maintain their regular operation. With several cadres imprisoned, sent to the countryside for re-education and engaged in physical labor, there was another surge of personnel shortages at FLP and Radio Peking during the Cultural Revolution. 385 This period also took its toll on the Overseas Chinese, who have tremendously contributed to the translation and editing work since 1949. Many had to flee the country after falling victims to unfounded spy charges, and other types of accusations.386 2.3.4. Impact of the Political Campaigns Since the early 1950s, foreign propaganda cadres were influenced by every major political campaign that took place in the PRC.387 However, the disruptive impact of the 384 For instance, Beijing Broadcasting Institute established a Swahili language specialty in 1960. See, Siwaxili yu bu (Swahili language department) "Women zai dongfei xiangyou shengyu" (We enjoyed fame in East Africa) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 231. 385 According to Gan Xianfeng, during this period, these agencies were filled with non-able staff with avarage cultural level. Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 205. This is also confirmed by several ex-cadres, among them, Chen Rinong, editor of the China Reconstructs magazine. Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign Publications Personnel Training Center, Beijing 386 Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 205 387 The Anti-Rightist Campaign was indeed not the first of its type. Sidney Rittenberg was experienced in this process since the party rectification in the early 1950s. At that time too, there was a witch hunt in the foreign propaganda agencies: "We were looking for people with bad political histories, who, for example, had once joined the KMT's Three People's Principles Youth Corps when they were in college. We were looking for people whose parents had been big landlords or major pro-KMT capitalists, or whose friends included that sort, or who had contacts in Taiwan or abroad. We were looking for people who harbored counterrevolutionary thoughts or had been heard to utter counterrevolutionary slogans. The list of intellectuals with suspect political backgrounds included most of the English section's key personnel, since they had all come from universities under the old regime and many had "complicated" connections. So the Broadcast Administration leadership and the security department made a preliminary scan and handed me 134 Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution proved to be more extensive. During these episodes, the leftist radicals challenged the distinct status of the foreign language media within the larger propaganda apparatus. The guiding principles, such as "truthfulness" (shishi qiushi) and "inside and outside of the country is different" (neiwai youbie), which already had limited application, were altogether set aside. Likewise, target audiences shifted from the middle elements to leftist audiences, along with the changes in the Chinese foreign propaganda content. The cadres were forced to participate in numerous criticism campaigns, which resulted in serious accusations and subsequent penalties. In July 1957, shortly after the end of the Hundred Flowers movement, which had invited Chinese intellectuals to raise critical opinions on party policy, Mao Zedong launched a nationwide campaign to eliminate the "rightist" elements in the country. The foreign propaganda cadres working at the FLP and Radio Peking received their fair share from these purges. In 1957, 307 out of the total 313 staff working at Radio Peking participated in the Anti-Rightist Campaign and 14 were labeled as "rightists". 388 According to Sidney Rittenberg, these accusations were hardly based on substantial evidence: Party critics were dubbed rightists, and each organization was to choose its own rightists for the Great Debate (…) A few days later Zhang Hua, the former schoolteacher who had become the head of the party in the English section, asked me to stay late to help him sort through the English section dossiers to find out rightists. The criteria for naming rightists had been clearly laid out. They had to be people who had challenged the monopoly of Communist Party leadership, attacked the party's foreign policy, advocated Western style democracy, or who were against the party's farm policies or the movement against hidden counterrevolutionaries. Not only did they have to have these views, they had to have formulated them into a political program and actively proselytized them in an organized way. Zhang Hua and I spread the dossiers over the table in an unused conference two dossiers to review." See, Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 191 388 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 633 135 room.(…) After carefully looking through all of them, we both came the same clear conclusion: no one in the English section at the Broadcast Administration met the party's criteria for a rightist. "Well" I said to Zhang Hua. "If we don’t have one so much the better. We can just watch what other organizations are doing and learn from them." Zhang Hua shook his head. "We have to have a rightist" he said. "This process is about reforming and remolding the bourgeois intellectuals. We hit hard at one target, completely discredit him so that he stinks to high heaven, then the others will distance themselves ideologically from the target. That's the point of mass political struggles. There must be a live target." My heart felt like cold ashes. I suddenly understood. This wasn’t going to be a democratic debate at all. This was class struggle all over again389. The above example illustrates the arbitrary process used by the leadership to pick the "rightist" elements at the foreign propaganda agencies. Although many cadres felt that the accusations were unjustified, few dared to stand up for their colleagues. 390 The Anti-Rightist Campaign at the FLP and Radio Peking resulted in direct attacks against the specialized nature of foreign propaganda work within the larger propaganda machine and particularly, its neiwai youbie principle. Those who advocated otherwise were accused of forming an "anti-party small clique", a "separate kingdom" within the party apparatus.391 In terms of target audiences, emphasis shifted from the middle elements to leftists. Under this campaign's influence, political content became much more important then social and cultural issues. During this period, the already 389 See, Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 215-216 390 Huang Aling recalls that although he had great respect and admiration for Wen Jize and other comrades who were labeled as members of the "anti-party small clique" at Radio Peking, he kept silent for the fear of being accused likewise. See Huang Aling, "Wo de huiyi yu sikao"( My memories and thoughts), in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 329 391 Wen Jize was one of the cadres at Radio Peking who was accused of being a member of the "anti-party small clique". Apparantly, his belief on the four distinctions between domestic and foreign propaganda (target is diferent/content is different/task is different/method is different) was the only justification behind this charge. See, Wen Jize, "Zai dui guowai guangbo gonzuo zhong de tansuo he zaoyu" (Probes and experiences inside the international broadcasting work) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 53 136 limited editorial autonomy enjoyed by Radio Peking staff was completely lost.392 The cadres were not allowed to revise drafts or pick songs to play and expected only to announce the items that were pre-approved for them.393 As an offshoot of this campaign, the FLP cadres conducted large-scale book inspections in 1959-1960. The goal was to eliminate the books edited and translated by the "rightist" elements. According to some, the investigation campaign was the nullification of FLP's ten years of experience in this field.394 Before the negative impact of the Anti-Rightist Campaign subsided from the foreign propaganda agencies, Mao announced his ambitious economic plan to catch up with the developed countries. The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) was a nationwide campaign aimed at mobilizing the Chinese masses to increase agricultural and industrial production. This campaign has influenced the foreign propaganda work in a number of ways. In its initial stages, it seemingly became a motivating influence on the cadres, who quickly embraced the campaign's ethos. Many saw it as an opportunity to increase the productivity of the foreign propaganda agencies. Sidney Rittenberg describes the positive changes at Radio Peking as follows: There was a handful of people –"active elements" they were called-who were busy every minute. The whole operation of getting the programs out every day really rested on their shoulders. They worked long hours, thoroughly enjoyed their work, were proud of what they were doing, and had the élan and the conquering spirit that it took to put programs together and get them out in time. We had always had that problem-a few overworked volunteers surrounded by a sea of plodgers. The Great Leap changed all that. Everyone became an active element. We felt we were unstoppable. We planned grand, exciting 392 See, Zhang Yan's remarks quoted in Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 143 393 See Huang Aling, "Wo de huiyi yu sikao"( My memories and thoughts), in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 329 394 See, Luo Jun, "Duiwai xuanchuan zhong de ji ge wenti" (A couple of problems in international propaganda), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 32 137 projects. We would start up transmission in a batch of new languages that we had originally planned to begin over the next five or ten years. We would answer every listener's letter within twenty-four hours. We would start new, lively drama programs. We would train translators to write, writers to produce programs, and offer vocational studies in language, journalism, and in the politics, culture and customs of each country we broadcast to. 395 During the Great Leap Forward, the cadres at Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Press participated in the nationwide campaign to produce iron and steel.396 For many, this was an opportunity to bridge the gap between manual and mental labor. Although the steel produced in the backyard furnaces had little industrial use, it had substantial symbolic value, for it enabled the intellectuals to identify strongly with the masses.397 Despite its seemingly positive impact at the start, taken as a whole, the Great Leap period proved little benefits for the Chinese foreign propaganda work. The work routine was disrupted not only by steel-production but also due to the long-lasting political studies. In 1959, Radio Peking personnel had to join nine hours of political study sessions on a weekly average, which, combined with the meetings, consumed half of the work time. During this campaign, it became customary for the cadres to work more than ten hours to compensate for the lost work time.398 The Great Leap is also regarded by many retired cadres as a continuation of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in its deviation from the 395 See, Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 225 396 During the summer everyone at Radio Peking: editors, translators, announcers, writers became steelworkers. See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 229. There was a similar activity at the Foreign Languages Press, See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 173. Even Song Qingling participated in this drive. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 162 397 See, Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 173 398 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,633 138 foreign propaganda principles such as shishi qiushi. 399 In this period, the nationwide enthusiasm over the country's economic advances caused foreign propaganda cadres to fabricate news items with inflated statistics. Although by late 1958, food shortages around the country signaled the failure of the Great Leap attempt, foreign propaganda media continued with this kind of reporting. (Foreign propaganda discourse during the Great Leap Forward will be discussed in Chapter 3.) When the nationwide famine hit Beijing, foreign propagandists at Radio Peking and the FLP had to share the burden without letting it interfere with their work. During this period, because cadres were provided with small food rations, many cadres suffered from malnutrition. According to Sidney Rittenberg: More than two thirds of the people at the Broadcast Administration were afflicted by the swelling caused by protein deprivation. Shortly after I returned, many had grown so sick that they could work only every other day. As people began showing up with dark puffy patches on their legs and around their faces, and feeling faint and nauseated, they would be sent home to rest.400 Things were no different at the FLP. Although the leadership adopted certain measures to minimize the impact of the nationwide famine, it is hard to say if these provided any real comfort for the undernourished cadres: Several large vats were set up in the back yard of the Foreign Languages Press. They were raising algae –served in daily soup to fill in the protein deficiency. Calisthenics and sports were out, and we were advised to rest when possible and go to bed early. But we kept the same office hours and did the same amount of work. Matronly ladies laughed and said they were wearing clothes they hadn’t been able to get into for years401. 399 This period is also discussed in secondary sources in the same fashion. Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004., 193-195 and Huang Zecun, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao [Draft discussion of the foreign propaganda in the new era] Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002, 70-71 400 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 258 401 See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 183 139 On the positive side, these difficulties created a strong sense of solidarity among the Chinese cadres, foreign experts and Overseas Chinese. In the midst of economic crisis, foreign experts, who received higher salaries and favorable rations, helped out their Chinese colleagues.402 Despite the hardships, few complained publicly. Against all odds, there was a lingering optimism among foreign propagandists, that the hardships could be overcome with revolutionary patriotism. 403 By the early 1960s, after the disrupting influences of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward has faded, the foreign propaganda organizations gradually went back to their normal working routine. Several language sections held meetings with the purpose of defying leftist intrusions, making self-criticisms and re-instating the neiwai youbie principle.404 However, this relatively stable period lasted only for a couple of years. Foreign propaganda agencies underwent an even greater turmoil with the launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the spring of 1966. Given the fact that many other official government agencies ceased to function during the Cultural Revolution years, it is significant that the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies resumed their operation. This was related to the symbolic value attached by the PRC regime to its foreign propaganda establishment, whose dysfunction was associated 402 Interview with Zhang Jinyu, November 5, 2007 at his home in Beijing Zhang Jinyu, retired translator and director in the Turkish broadcasts section of Radio Peking describes this spirit as follows: "In the beginning of the 1960s, there was economic hardship (…) but generally speaking this did not badly influence our work. (…) When we had to work overnight, we were given 2 maos, with which you could not really buy anything. But everyone was proud of what they were doing. We thought that our future was really bright and we could definitely overcome the hardships." Interview with Zhang Jinyu, November 5, 2007 at his home in Beijing 404 In 1962, Deputy Head of the State Council Foreign Affairs Department Zhang Yan, summarized the drawbacks of the Japanese broadcasts as follows: tone was too high, deep (not easily understandable), stiff (putting a stern expression, not exerting a subtle influence), narrow (unable to satisfy the needs of larger audiences), and had too much emphasis on attacking and struggle. See, Li Shunran, "Jianchi shishi qiushi: Banhao riyu guangbo" (Maintaining truthful news: Successfully Handling Japanese broadcasts) in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 55 403 140 with the demise of the regime.405 This symbolic importance was recognized even by the appointees of the Cultural Revolution Small Group, who held executive powers over the foreign propaganda agencies in the period 1966-1972. Therefore, a degree of pragmatism persisted even among these radicals with regard to the continuity of foreign propaganda flow. For instance, while everyone was made subject to criticisms and purges, these measures took a lesser toll on the cadres whose role was indispensable for the foreign propaganda work.406 However, this pragmatism should not be overemphasized as there were indeed very few cadres who remained untouched by the disruptions of this era. Right after the start of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese foreign propaganda agencies became the centers of attack by the young revolutionaries who saw everything foreign-affiliated as politically suspect. This chauvinistic tendency was encouraged by the leading figures of the Cultural Revolution era, like Chen Boda, who called Radio Peking the "united nations of spies" (tewu lianheguo).407 As a result, several foreign experts, among them those who served 405 According to the recollections of Zhang Jinyu, "The lives of the staff and the working organization at Radio Peking were totally disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. Yet, everybody knew that radio work was so important that its stop might have meant a coup d’état of some kind. So everyone was really careful about not interrupting the flow of the broadcasts." Interview with Zhang Jinyu, retired translator and director in the Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, November 5, 2007 at his home in Beijing 406 An interesting example is the case of Rukiye Hacı, who worked as the only announcer in the Turkish broadcasts section. While many of her friends went to the countryside to re-educate themselves based on such trivial accusations she was never forced to quit working because the revolutionary committee knew that otherwise Turkish broadcasts would have to come to a stop. Interview with Rukiye Hacı, retired announcer in Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, October, 26, 2007 at her home in Beijing 407 See, Li Shunran, "Jianchi shishi qiushi: Banhao riyu guangbo" (Maintaining truthful news: Successfully Handling Japanese broadcasts) in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 56 141 foreign propaganda media since the 1940s, faced spy charges and served prison sentences.408 The Cultural Revolution took its greatest toll among the senior cadres who held leading positions at the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies since the 1950s. Rising tide of criticism against the leading cadres at the propaganda agencies were expressed in bigcharacter posters hanged on walls. The accusations were often based on trivial matters such as one's literary taste, a statement or comment made in the past, or even eating habits. 409 Those who were found guilty of past mistakes were labeled as "anti-party" elements: Almost every person in authority in the Foreign Languages Press was accused of "taking the capitalist road", and almost all were suspended from their duties. They were compelled to write detailed summaries of their pasts and analyze their "mistakes". Some were not allowed to go home and lived under guard in a special section known as the 'monsters' enclosure".410 Hence former leading cadres were unable to perform their previous tasks and they frequented the foreign propaganda agencies only to write their self-criticisms in isolation.411 But it is clear that the zealous revolutionaries who initiated these campaigns were more interested in degrading and embarrassing these cadres than in criticizing their past mistakes. Mei Yi, the former head of Radio Peking, who has served in the Chinese 408 Israel Epstein from China Reconstructs magazine and Sidney Rittenberg from the Radio Beijing are prominent examples. Not only themselves but anyone who was associated with them at the time- including their families and co-workers fell under suspicion. See Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and Journalist. San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005,299 409 Rukiye Hacı is an example. One big character poster criticized her eating sweet and chocolates which was regarded as a bourgeois habit. 410 See Sidney Shapiro, An American in China: thirty years in the People's Republic, New York: New American Library, 1980, 230 411 Radio Peking's former head Mei Yi was one such figure: "Ever since Mei Yi had been removed from power, we saw him every day, sadly coming into the building, settling into an empty conference room and working on the self-criticisms he had been ordered to write. (...) Ever since the old cadres had been deposed, these old revolutionaries had spent their time quietly writing self-criticisms and going to meetings. Some had been allowed to continue working." See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 322 142 foreign propaganda establishment since Yanan days, was victimized by these extreme measures. When the criticism campaigns took a violent turn, he was publicly humiliated at the agency's courtyard. As Sidney Rittenberg recalls: Among the group in the courtyard were Mei Yi and my old friend Ding Yilan. Their heads had been shaved. Meyi Yi had only half of his gray hair left; Ding Yilan had half of her soft black hair dangling down over her face, which was white and frightened, every line stretched taut. Was this truly revolutionary action? Among the young people in the courtyard I recognized a recording engineer, someone I knew was gruntled with Mei Yi. She had taken one of his cloth shoes and was beating him about the head. His glasses had been knocked to the ground. Pale and terrified, he was quievering violently from head to foot. 412 Many of the former cadres were thus humiliated, purged, sent to the countryside or imprisoned.413 In their stead, the revolutionary committee members, who did not have any experience in the editorial and translation work, took leading posts at the foreign propaganda agencies.414 Due to the ongoing factional strife, numerous political meetings and Mao worship rituals, work deadlines were often not met. Those who prioritized work over political meetings risked being labeled as "bourgeois-liners".415 Another impact of the Cultural Revolution was the disappearance of the neiwai youbie principle from the foreign propaganda field. Under the leftist influences, neiwai youbie was once again cast aside as a petty-bourgeois ideology. Cultural Revolution leadership replaced this principle with its exact opposite: neiwai wubie (inside and 412 See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 323 413 For the predicament of Zhang Yan, Jack Chen, Lin Wusun, Song Qingling, and others, See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 179-182 414 For a specific example See, Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 303 415 Wang Shanzhong at the Burmese broadcasts section was criticized for this reason. He describes his experience as follows: "I wanted to do my work and I did not want to participate in the political meetings. Not only did I not want to participate, but I wanted to do my work better. Some people would say “you don’t care about politics, you only care about work.” They did not understand that our work is also related to politics, these two can not be separated from one another." Interview with Wang Shanzhong, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing 143 outside of the country is no different) or neiwai bufen (inside and outside of the country is inseparable). During this time, editorial policy in the foreign propaganda organizations became completely inconsiderate of audience tastes. 416 In the meanwhile, there was nothing but Mao worship in the foreign propaganda content. The exaggerations in the foreign language media was so abundant that in 1967 Chairman Mao himself felt the need to call for restraint and modesty. 417 Mao's criticism continued in a Central Committee meeting which convened in September, 1968, where he expressed distaste over the foreign language magazines' lack of creativity. 418 His instructions were transmitted to the individual foreign propaganda agencies by Premier Zhou Enlai who himself detested the type of propaganda which forced itself on outside audiences. According to him, bringing domestic issues one-to-one into the foreign propaganda realm was a simple display of mindlessness (budong naojin).419 The examples illustrated above suggest that this chaotic period greatly disrupted the organizational structure and working environment of the foreign propaganda agencies. The radical changes in content during the Cultural Revolution (which will be discussed in 416 According to Zhang Yongde, this meant "I will propagandize whatever I need to propagate; I will propagandize whatever I think is important to propagate". See, Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 41. See his discussion of neiwai bufen in 44-45 417 This is also noted in Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s Englishlanguage magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 170 and Anne- Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 158 418 In this piece, Mao compared Peking Review with China Reconstructs and severely criticized the former for copying others' reports and news; not creating anything on its own. See "Mao Zedong tongzhi dui 'Beijing zhoubao' he 'zhongguo jianshe' de yijian: 1968 nian 9 yue" (Comrade Mao Zedong’s thoughts on “Beijing review” and “China reconstructs” (September, 1968) in Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 418 419 See Li Songling, "Mingji zongli jiaodao nuli banhao duiwai guangbo" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyi lu (Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting), Beijing Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe, 1996, 38 144 Chapter 3) also did not resonate well with the largest segment of China's foreign audiences (i.e., middle elements). As we will see in Chapter 5, the number of audience letters, which was a means to measure the success of foreign propaganda, substantially decreased during the Cultural Revolution. These and other examples, by and large, complicate the picture presented in the Cold War era studies. By basing their narratives on the quantitative growth in the Chinese foreign propaganda output, conventional propaganda analysts saw this apparatus as an omnipotent force with abundant financial sources and manpower. However, the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus showed little signs of stability in between 1949-1976, in terms of its leadership, administrative organization, cadres and principles. 145 TABLE 3 Domestic propaganda apparatus in the PRC Source: Alan P.L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1971, 36-37 (Note: policy control is shown by arrow) State New China News Agency Party Broadcasting Administration Central Committee Propaganda Department Ministry of Culture Party fraction People's Daily 146 NCNA area branches NCNA Provincial branches Provincial Broadcasting Stations Wired radio stations in communes and production brigades Film Adm. Bureau Bureau of Publications Drama Reform Committee Specific newspapers Provincial cultural bureau Propaganda Dep. provincial party committee Special district cultural bureau Propaganda Dep. of special district party committee County Cultural education section Propaganda Dep. of county party committee Commune cultural hall Commune Party Propaganda commissioner Production brigade cultural hall Brigade party propaganda commission Provincial newspapers Rural Wall newspapers TABLE 4 Radio Peking Organizational Chart, 1962 Tai wan Europe US News ed. dep News Dep. 147 Eng. German Party branch office Internati onal Liasion Dep. Asia Domestic Dep. Secret eriat Experts work officee Office Cadres dep. Ed. dep Fre nch Music dep Africa Arabic Swahili Sent Programs Dep. Italian Soviet Eastern Bloc Hausa Translated broadcasts Portuguese Spanish Listener Letters Overseas Chinese Latin America Serbian Editorial Dep. News Ed. Dep Fujianese Southern Dialects Dispatched Troops Dep. Research Investiga tion Dep Persian Turkish Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(xia) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 2.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 856 Viet Thai Cambod Lao Hindi Ma lay Burmese Indon esian Korean Jap. Listener Letters Dep. TABLE 5 Radio Peking Organizational Chart, 1973 Political Dep. Research Office Domestic News Dep Internati onal News Dep. Soviet Eastern bloc Dep. Asian Dep. 1 Propa ganda work office Africa Dep. Latin America Dep Europe US Dep Asia Dep II Overseas Chinese Experts work Dep. Spani sh 148 Portu guese Filipi no Indon esian Cambod ian Viet. Jap . Korea n Thai Lao Malay Editorial dep Eng. I Eng. II Announcing Editori al dep Albanian Serbian Roma nian Polish Czech Editorial Dep. Russian Mongolian Tamil Persian Turkish Swahili Esperanto Urdu Pashto French Arabic Hungarian Burmese Hindi Cengjia luo Bengal CHAPTER 3 EDITORIAL POLICY and DISCOURSE During the Cold War period, the PRC regime regarded foreign propaganda work as an important means to realize the country's foreign policy objectives. Being the core content providers within the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus, Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Press were guided by the relevant party and governmental organs in their editorial tasks. Hence when drastic changes in China's domestic and international environment necessitated shifts in the official party policy, these were immediately reflected in the foreign language media content. In Chapter 2, we have analyzed the mechanics of the editing process, which was facilitated by the close coordination between the leading organizations and the content providers (Radio Peking and the FLP) of the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus. In order to display the impact of the regime's changing priorities on the foreign language media, this chapter will focus on the editorial guidelines and discourse. I will analyze this topic under two sections. While the first section will focus on the interplay between the PRC's changing foreign policy objectives and the editorial tasks of Radio Peking and the FLP; the second section will deal with concrete foreign propaganda content in relation to the shifting foreign propaganda principles between 1949 and 1976. Throughout this period there were various changes in China's domestic situation and foreign policy that caused shifts in the official foreign propaganda discourse. While the Chinese foreign propaganda media had the relatively modest task of propagating the young regime's successes in the early 1950s, domestic campaigns like Great Leap Forward put a radical spin on the discourse by the end of the decade. 149 During the 1950s, Chinese foreign propaganda media continuously attacked American imperialism while it expressed solidarity with the socialist bloc countries led by the Soviet Union. This came to an end during the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, when the Chinese foreign language media started criticizing Soviet revisionism in addition to US imperialism. The launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 caused even further radicalization in this discourse, as the foreign propaganda agencies were now assigned the task of presenting China as the "revolutionary center of the world". In an attempt to "export Maoism", Chinese foreign language media borrowed heavily from the domestic media and copied the latter in its revolutionary zeal and Mao worship. It was only in the early 1970s, after the Sino-US rapprochement and China's subsequent United Nations membership that there was a return to relative normalcy in the foreign propaganda discourse. Throughout the period 1949-1976, there were many instances when the Chinese foreign propagandists found it difficult to fulfill the PRC leadership's demands without sacrificing the principles that inspired foreign propaganda work. During these episodes, upholding "treating insiders and outsiders differently" (neiwai youbie), "not forcing oneself upon others" (bu qiangjia yu ren) and "truthfulness policy" (shishi qiushi) became increasingly difficult. In order to elaborate this point, foreign propaganda discourse employed by China Reconstructs, the Peking Review and the China Pictorial during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), Sino-Soviet split (1960-1964), the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), and the Sino-US rapprochement (1971-1972), will be used as an example. The depiction of these four historical episodes will display the challenges faced by China's foreign propagandists in balancing between the tasks assigned to them by the PRC leadership and the principles which have governed foreign propaganda work since the early 1950s. 150 3.1. Foreign Propaganda Tasks and Editorial policy As discussed in Chapter 2, both Radio Peking and the FLP had to follow the guidelines and regulations issued by the relevant party and governmental organs with regard to their editorial policy. These editorial guidelines reflected the PRC regime's changing priorities with regard to its domestic and international environment. Hence the selection of items at a given time in Radio Peking broadcasts (news, reviews, and a few entertainment programs) and FLP publications (books, pamphlets, and foreign language magazines) was determined by this general editorial line. In the early 1950s, Chinese foreign policy aimed at creating a favorable international environment for the young PRC regime and sustained its territorial integrity, political stability and economic welfare. Initially, the work units responsible for Chinese foreign language broadcasts and periodicals were given the task of "introducing New China to the world, reinforcing socialist bloc solidarity, countering imperialist slanders and breaking the international isolation imposed on it by Western countries".420 With regard to the Korean War, which the PRC regime has joined in 1950, foreign language media blamed American imperialism and presented China as a peace-loving country acting only in self-defense. After the Geneva Conference that ended the Korean War in 1954, China's peace advocacy became a constant theme in 420 Summary work reports prepared by individual departments at Radio Peking and FLP illustrate that these guidelines were closely followed in the selection of propaganda content. In February 1950, work report prepared by the editorial department of International Broadcasts at Radio Peking summarized their aims under four headings: 1. propagating the victorious liberation struggle of the Chinese people; 2. propagating China's revolutionary experience; 3. propagating the strength and development of the peaceful revolutionary front led by the Soviet Union; 4. revealing US-led anti-democratic front's threats and plots. See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 16-17. Similar objectives were cited in the annual work report of International News Department (forerunner of FLP) dated December, 1950. See, Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 10 151 the Asian language broadcasts 421 . In order to refute the claims that China was an aggressive country which posed imminent threat to its neighbors, Chinese foreign propaganda content made "peace" one of its central themes throughout the 1950s.422 Given the ideological nature of this general editorial line, the content of Radio Peking broadcasts and FLP publications were bound to emphasize high politics. Hence, the broadcasting content was dominated by news items and reviews dealing with China's domestic situation and foreign policy. 423 As discussed in Chapter 2, the bulk of this content was provided by the Xinhua News Agency and official newspapers like the People's Daily. Likewise, most of the FLP books were on political and ideological topics, such as the works of Mao Zedong and other senior party figures, government decisions and party resolutions, pamphlets on certain foreign policy issues, etc. Secondary to the news items and commentaries on domestic politics and foreign policy was the content dealing with socio-economic progress in China. In 1955, Radio Peking launched specialized programs like "China in Construction", 421 In 1954, editorial policy in the broadcasts aimed at Japan, South Korea, Phillipines and Thailand was modified to emphasize the five principles of peaceful co-existence, Anti-US sentiment, US hegemony and militarism and that Taiwan is Chinese territory. See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 17-18 422 A quantitative analysis on the key symbols of communist propaganda directed at the US in the early 1950s, found out that "peace" was a fundamental theme in both Soviet and Chinese propaganda. See, Smith, Martha Jane, Key Symbols in the USSR and Chinese Propaganda to the USA, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), New York University, 1958,49 423 Based on the analysis of the US Information Agency, which closely monitored the Chinese broadcasts: "A representative program of Radio Peking consists of an item or two dealing with domestic developments in China –the general economic situation, crop conditions, a new development in industry, accomplishments in public health and medicine, achievements of model workers and model labor units; an editorial or article dealing with foreign policy; brief reports of the movement of PRC cultural and other delegations abroad; brief accounts of receptions of PRC leaders of foreign visitors to China; summaries of a few editorials and articles taken from the foreign press, Communist and nonCommunist, that support Peking policies or detail activities of revolutionary movements supported by Peking; and when the situation arises, reports on special developments. On ceremonial occasions, such as May Day and October 1, and on the occasion of special functions, such as a Party congress or the visit of a foreign head of state, programs are heavily weighted by material dealing with these events. Radio Peking broadcasts musical interludes but carries no program which can strictly be described as entertainment." See, The External Information and Cultural Relations Programs of the People's Republic of China, United States Information Agency, Research Service, 1973, 102 152 "Chinese Countryside", "Cultural Life", "Chinese Scenery", "New China, New Atmosphere" and "New People, New Things".424 There were also a few non-fixed programs aimed at selected geographical audiences, such as "Muslim life in China" which was broadcasted in Persian and Turkish. 425 Likewise, foreign language magazines like People's China 426 (1950), China Reconstructs (1952) and China Pictorial (1950) aimed at informing the overseas readers of China's speedy reconstruction in social, economic and cultural fields. 427 In addition to these magazines, the FLP also published general knowledge books on Chinese arts, culture, and history, as well as contemporary Chinese novels, pictorials and philately books. Therefore, ever since the 1950s, Chinese foreign propaganda agencies spared little, if any, energy to produce content with the sole aim of entertaining their audiences. Even the few specialized programs which were designed to serve this purpose, such as Radio Peking's "Listeners' Letter Box" and "Knowledge Contest", were not mere fun. 428 Likewise, music programs introduced modern Chinese composers to foreign listeners and sought to display the PRC regime's recent achievements in this field. To a lesser extent, Chinese traditional music and ethnic songs from the national minority areas were also used. Occasionally, Radio Peking 424 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 100 425 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 61, 322 426 See Figure 1 for a typical cover of People's China magazine. 427 For China Pictorial magazine's initial editorial guideline, See, "Zhong xuanbu shending de 'Renmin Huabao' de renwu, neirong ji bianji fangzhen: 1952 nian 6 yue" (Central propaganda department’s examination and approval of China Pictorial’s task, content and editorial policy” June, 1952) in Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 49 428 According to USIA analysts, while the former program aimed to clarify the propaganda messages by addressing audience inquiries on specific topics, the latter sought to broaden listeners' general knowledge on China. See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 106-107 153 played Western classical music pieces or foreign folk songs too but rock'n roll was seemingly out of the question429. Chinese foreign propaganda agencies saw the first major change in their editorial guidelines towards the end of the 1950s. During the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 and the Great Leap Forward in 1958, FLP publications and Radio Peking broadcasts had to leave their relatively modest propaganda tone. This was a prelude to the era when the PRC regime would present itself as a model for the developing countries of the world. In this period, China found new self-confidence in its unique revolutionary experiences, such as the ongoing Great Leap Forward campaign. This emphasis is discernible from a directive issued in June, 1958 by the Foreign Ministry, which made the "propagation of the people's communes" a top priority. 430 Radio Peking quickly responded by adding specialized programs such as "In the People's Communes" into its regular schedule431. Throughout the Great Leap Forward, Chinese foreign language media emphasized the country's fast economic development by exaggerating the statistics in agricultural and industrial output. Also during this period, the old emphasis on "peace" was replaced by the new theme of "struggle".432 Radio Peking's launch of "Arab brothers, we support you!" program in defiance of the Western intrusion in the Middle East by 1958 served this 429 Interview with Wang Shanzhong, retired member of the Burmese broadcasts section, China Radio International, December 11, 2007 at his home in Beijing. 430 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001,18 431 See Radio Peking English language program schedule advertised on Peking Review, October 11, 1960 No.41 (New Schedule beginning October 15, 1960) : Tune in to Radio Peking's Regular Features: Tuesday: China in Construction, Wednesday: Culture in China, Thursday: In the People's Communes, Friday: In the socialist countries, Saturday: Opinion in Peking, Quiz, Sunday: Listeners' Letter Box, Sunday Concert. Also See Peking Review advertisement, October 27, 1961 No.43 (New Schedule beginning October 30, 1961) Tuesday: China in Construction, Wednesday: Culture in China , Thursday: In the People's Communes, Friday: In the socialist countries, Saturday: Opinion in Peking, Music from China,(added) Quiz; Sunday: Listeners' Letter Box, Greeting Africa(added) Sunday Concert. 432 Wen Jize notes that under the influence of leftist extremism phrases like "peaceful co-existence" and "friendly co-operation" were either less emphasized or not mentioned at all. See, Wen Jize, "Zai dui guowai guangbo gonzuo zhong de tansuo he zaoyu" (Probes and experiences inside the international broadcasting work) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 56 154 purpose.433 A similar vision was employed in "Irresistible Tide" (the title referring to the rising independence movements in Africa) that was launched by the French language section in 1960.434 During this period, while the social and cultural issues were downplayed, revolutionary ideology got the center stage. For instance, China Reconstructs, a magazine which had previously specialized in social and cultural progress, was pressurized to increase its political content. 435 The launch of Peking Review 436 a new weekly magazine aimed at reaching worldwide elites and communists with its highly abstract language also reflected the growing emphasis on high politics. By the early 1960s, when the impact of domestic campaigns was fading from the foreign propaganda agencies, the PRC regime faced a new political crisis. Inside, the Great Leap attempt failed with the ensuing nationwide famine. Outside, China became completely isolated after the worsening of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In 1960, Mao warned his colleagues about the "anti-China" (fanhua) tide in the world. 437 Although not immediately made public, Sino-Soviet split would cause a 433 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 442 434 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 517 435 According to Song Qingling, whose editorial authority was sidestepped during this period, cultural matters also had political significance. She believed that this magazine should maintain its own style and communicated her ideas to more radical cadres. See, "Song Qingling tongzhi gei 'Zhongguo jianshe' bianweihui fuzhuren Tang Mingzhao de xin: 1958 nian 9 yue 30 ri" (Letter by Comrade Song Qingling to the “China reconstructs” editorial committee deputy head Tang Mingzhao: September 30, 1958) in Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 145 436 By the mid-1950s, PRC leadership had acknowledged that there was a need to reach the overseas audiences in a timely manner. There was also the concern that the content of China Reconstructs and People's China has been overlapping for some time. This led to the replacement of People's China by the new English-language journal Peking Review in 1958. Peking Review's editorial policy was tied to the higher organs of the CCP Central Committee: Foreign Affairs Small Group (zhongyang waishi xiaozu) and Theory Small Sroup (zhongyang lilun xiaozu). 437 Mao believed that the reason for the rise of the “international anti-China tide” was that China insisted on the purity of Marxist and Leninist principles. In a comment made in a telegram concerning a Chinese exhibition in Pakistan, Mao reminded his colleagues that they had to understand “the nature and meaning of the so-called great anti-China issue, and be thoroughly prepared psychologically.” See 155 drastic shift in China's foreign propaganda discourse. In 1964, in addition to the original task of informing the overseas audiences on China's political situation and foreign policy, foreign propaganda agencies were assigned the new tasks of "propagandizing Mao Zedong Thought, anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism". 438 The rising emphasis on Third World struggles could be discerned from the new programs added to Radio Peking schedule in this period: "Vietnam in Struggle" (May 1965) and "Aid Vietnam Resist America" (February 1966).439 After the launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the editorial guideline which emphasized the propagation of Mao Zedong thought and anti-revisionism pushed China's foreign propaganda discourse to its extreme. During this period, the regular programming and editing routine was no longer applicable. For instance, Radio Peking's specialized programs such as "China in Construction", "Inside the People's Communes" and "Chinese Scenery" ceased their operation in between 19661973.440 All cultural-artistic items and especially music programs suffered from the growing emphasis on revolutionary struggle. 441 No songs were allowed except for model revolutionary art pieces, such as the "Yellow River" or "The Legend of the Red Lantern".442 Likewise, regular editorial columns in the foreign language magazines were replaced with revolutionary slogans, Mao Zedong pictures and articles. (The Niu Jun “1962: The Eve of a Left turn in China’s Foreign Policy” (Wilson Institute Working Papers) Working Paper #48 (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NiuJunWP481.pdf) 54 438 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 17-19 439 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 233 440 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 102, 108; 116 441 See, Zhang Zhigen, "Yinyue bansui zhi xingjin de zuji" (Footsteps marching forward in the pursuit of music), Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 110 442 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 166 156 content of China Reconstructs, China Pictorial, and Peking Review during the Cultural Revolution years will be discussed in the next section.) Throughout the 1960s, China's fight against revisionism became a persistent theme in the country's foreign language media. 443 "Revealing the real face of Soviet social imperialism" (the title of a new program launched by Radio Peking in 1969) has become a major foreign propaganda objective.444 According to this line of thought, China under Chairman Mao's leadership has replaced the "revisionist" Soviet Union as the revolutionary center of the world. During the Cultural Revolution, programs aimed at propagating Mao Zedong Thought dominated the schedule 445 . It became customary to read quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong before the start of each program. In August 1966, Radio Peking launched "Imperialism and Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" to introduce its overseas listeners to Mao's works. 446 "Selected Readings from Mao Zedong's Works"(1968) also served the purpose of exporting China's revolutionary experience and Maoism. 447 Likewise, books and pamphlets 443 See Radio Peking's English language transmissions advertisement on Peking Review, No.5, January 31, 1969: "Radio Peking has 18 one-hour daily transmissions in English beamed to the five continents, in which you can hear: "Selected readings from Mao Tse-Tung's works (on the air every Sunday and rebroadcast every Wednesday) and "Quotations from Mao Tse-Tung (every Saturday)….Radio Peking has the following special series:"Long live the victory of people's war"(every Monday) tells you how the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, integrating Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-Tung's thought, with the practical conditions in their own countries, are victoriously carrying out armed struggle.; "The Soviet Union under revisionist rule" (every Tuesday) exposes the crimes of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique in restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union: "Music Programme" (every Thursday) presents China's model revolutionary theatrical works, songs based on poems written by chairman Mao and quotations from him, and other revolutionary songs and melodies. 444 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 234 445 See Radio Peking's English language transmissions advertisement on Peking Review, No.2, January 12, 1968: "Radio Peking broadcasts: Selected Readings from Mao Tse-Tung's works –On Sunday (rebroadcast on Wednesdays), Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung –On Saturday, Other special series on RADIO PEKING: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, Long Live the victory of people's war, The Soviet Union under revisionist rule 446 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 233-234 447 See Radio Peking's English language transmissions advertisment on Peking Review, No.38, September 20, 1968: "Radio Peking: Starting on October, Radio Peking in its regular programme "Selected Readings from Mao Tse-Tung's works" will broadcast in installments, "On Protracted War", a work of genius by our great leader Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, published in 1938. "On protracted war" 157 produced by the FLP during this period were highly concentrated on ideological topics. A 120-page FLP book catalog circulating abroad in the early 1970s had 99 pages of listings under the following headings: "The Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin", "The Works of Mao Tse-Tung" (in book and pamphlet format), "Documents and Theoretical Works", "Books on Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and "Books on the International Communist Movement"448 Although verbal attacks against Soviet revisionism continued well into the 1980s, it is clear that China's foreign propaganda discourse lost much of its radical touch by the early 1970s. The return to relative normalcy was related to the ending of China's diplomatic isolation with the country's acceptance into the United Nations and the Sino-US rapprochement. In this period, foreign propaganda agencies studied Mao's directions on how to avoid the "self-glorifying, patronizing style in propaganda which imposed itself on others".449 At Radio Peking, a directive circulating in July 1972 invited foreign propaganda cadres to adopt a modest propaganda tone: "pay attention to truthfulness, respect foreign propaganda principles, avoid one-sidedness and write easily understandable propaganda pieces." 450 While the revolutionary discourse did not altogether disappear from the Chinese foreign propaganda media in the 1970s, it was the domestic events which made the headlines. For instance, is a great Marxist Leninist work of military theory. Chairman Mao's analysis of the laws of war, his concept of people's war, his theory on the strategic role of guerilla warfare and the whole range of strategic and tactical principles drawn up by him, as expounded in this work, have immensely enriched and creatively developed Marxist-Leninist theory. "Selected readings from Mao Tse-Tung's works" is on the air every Sunday and rebroadcast every Wednesday. 448 See, "Book Catalogue", distributed by Guozi Shudian, Peking, n.d. (Hoover Institution, Arne Swabeck Collection, Box 14) 449 In 1971, Foreign Languages Press Military Small Committee implemented Mao's directions and attacked leftist tendencies in the organization. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 271 450 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 1, 2001, 20 158 "Criticizing Lin Biao, Criticizing Confucius" campaign became a central theme in the foreign language magazines during the period 1974-1975.451 Subsequent to Mao Zedong's death in 1976, which brought an official end to the Cultural Revolution, the International Bookstore announced its decision to destroy 28 types of publications relating to the Cultural Revolution Small Group (Gang of Four). 452 In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, China entered a new period when its revolutionary ideology would become much less critical in shaping the country's foreign policy. By the same token, Chinese foreign propaganda media would reflect the fundamental changes brought by the "opening-up" reforms, which has made the country's economic modernization a top priority in the post-1978 period. 3.2. Propaganda Discourse in the Foreign Language Magazines In this section, I will make use of three foreign language magazines, China Reconstructs, Peking Review and China Pictorial to illustrate the challenges faced by Chinese foreign propagandists in maintaining foreign propaganda principles in the production of content. 453 There are two fundamental reasons why these magazines are selected as a reference point in analyzing China's foreign propaganda discourse during the period 1949-1976. Firstly, they were categorized as synthetic, general readership magazines by the PRC foreign propaganda leadership. Hence they covered a wider 451 See, Peking Review's work plan for the year 1975 in Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 292 452 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 302 453 For studies discussing the general content of the magazines, See Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004; Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005); Liang Lihkae, Magazine Propaganda Of The People’s Republican Of China: A Content Analysis Of Peking Review, China Pictorial, And China Reconstructs, 1969, 1974, and 1978 (Master’s thesis in journalism, Mount Pleasant, Mich.: Central Michigan University, 1979) 159 range of issues, had broader circulation and a larger readership, then say, specialized magazines such as Women of China or Chinese Medicine. Secondly, all three magazines have survived the Cultural Revolution years, unlike most of the specialized periodicals, whose publication came to a halt during this tumultuous period. 454 As they had an uninterrupted publication life during the Maoist decades, China Pictorial, China Reconstructs and Peking Review are invaluable sources to highlight the continuities and changes in the Chinese foreign propaganda discourse. Although all three periodicals fell under the category of general readership magazines, they were aimed at slightly different target audiences. (An in-depth discussion of targeting policies and target audiences will be provided in Chapter 5) As such they had slightly different editorial policies and content. For instance, China Pictorial was intended as a mass publication aimed at overseas audiences with average education. Its content offered a lot of colorful pictures, which depicted the social and economic changes in New China, alongside very little textual material. China Pictorial was very much influenced by its Soviet counterpart in terms of selection of its pictures and themes.455 Among all three periodicals, it was the easiest to read and hence, for many readers, also the most attractive. It had the widest circulation and most number of issues. By the early 1970s, the China Pictorial was 454 Before the Cultural Revolution, China had many other foreign language magazines specializing in sports, medicine, literature, children, women and youth. USIA analysts cite the discontinued periodicals as: “Women of China” organ of the All-China Democratic women’s federation, first a quarterly but from 1956 a bimonthly in English, published (at the latest) between 1952 and 1967. “Evergreen” a bimonthly in English and French, organ of the All-China Youth Federation and the All-China Students’ Federation dropped in 1966. “China’s Screen” a quarterly in English and Spanish founded in 1964. “Chinese Photography” a bi-monthly in Chinese with a table of contents in English, French, Russian and Spanish; “Children of China” which apparently ceased publication some time before the Cultural Revolution; “Chinese Medicine” which ceased publication in 1968; and “”China’s Foreign Trade” a bimonthly in English and French last published in 1967. See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 190 455 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 45 160 published in English, Arabic, French, German, Hindi, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish, Urdu, and Vietnamese. China Reconstructs had a similar focus on society, economy and culture, only with more articles and fewer pictures. 456 As compared to the China Pictorial, this monthly magazine aimed at readers with a slightly better educational background but did not exclusively target leftists or intellectuals. In the early 1960s, China Reconstructs offered its readers several articles and columns, as well as a color pictorial in its 45-pages of content. This magazine intended to attract the average reader's attention with its special features, such as a "Children's Page", "Arts and Theater", "Chinese Cuisine", "Philately Section", "Language Corner" and a "Readers' Letters Column". Similar to China Pictorial, China Reconstructs was followed by a broad range of "middle-of-the road" readers who were interested in the economic and social developments in the PRC. The Peking Review, on the other hand, was a black-and-white weekly with serious political content and very few pictures. 457 This magazine published policy documents, theoretical articles, news and reviews about China's domestic political 456 For studies on or related to China Reconstructs magazine, See Shen Suru, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu [Fundamentals of foreign reporting work] Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chubanshe, 1989, “Voice: A legendary international communications medium”, China Today, Vol 51, Issue 1, January 2002, 16-23, China in Transition: Selected Articles 1952-1956 by Writers for China Reconstructs, China Reconstructs, Peking, 1957, Israel Epstein, Woman in World History: Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yatsen), Beijing: New World Press, 1993, Israel Epstein. My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and Journalist. San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005, Wang Chi-rong, Communist China’s External Propaganda, 1966-1981: A content analysis of China Reconstructs, (Master’s thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1982) 457 Several scholarly works used Peking Review as their primary source to analyze China's foreign propaganda discourse. Most of these studies are in the field of communication and media studies. See Wu Hsiao-ming, The image of the United States projected by the Beijing Review, 1972-1989: a content analysis, (unpublished masters thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1989), Bruce Holbrook, Mainland China’s External Propaganda Values 1958-1974: A Content Analysis of the Peking Review (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1976), Bruce Holbrook, Themes and Geographical Referents of Red China's Propagandist Peking Review: 1965-1967 (Master’s thesis in journalism and communications, University of Florida, 1969), Robert L. Terrell “The First 25 Years of the Beijing Review, an Official Propaganda Organ of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China.” Gazette, 37, (1986), 191-219, Chi-chung Chang, Communist China’s External Propaganda to the United States of America, 1968-1981 A Content Analysis of Peking Review (unpublished masters thesis, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1982) 161 situation and foreign policy.458 It was aimed at readers who had the highest political awareness and educational level. The Peking Review had approximately 50 pages of content under several headings, such as "Round the Week" which summarized important domestic events; "China and the World" which commented on China's relations with other countries; "Chinese Press Opinion" which used excerpts from domestic newspapers, and "Document", which published important policy decisions. The magazine also offered small sections on archeology and cinema, as well as cartoons used mostly to satirize the capitalist countries. 459 Because of its highly abstract language, Peking Review was readable only by the intellectual elite abroad, among them government officials, journalists, China experts, and college youth.460 Throughout the Cold War years, the Peking Review became an important source of information for these groups as well as dissidents who closely followed the developments in China. This magazine had Spanish, French and German editions in addition to the original English. In order to illustrate how China Pictorial, China Reconstructs and Peking Review put the editorial guidelines into practice, there is a need to take a closer look at the concrete content of these magazines. As these periodicals produced an enormous amount of content during the period 1949-1976, a complete analysis of their discourse is obviously beyond reach. Hence I will analyze this content by using examples from four important episodes in the history of the PRC: The Great Leap Forward (1958- 458 For a detailed discussion of the Peking Review content, See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 155-162 459 See USIA analysts' interpretation of these cartoons in the “The Passing Show: Political Satire in Chinese Communist Propaganda” Records of the USIA Research reports 1960-82, Research (R) Reports of the Office of Research 1960-63, Rg. 306 250/67/08/05-07 Entry: A1 (1013A) Box 9 R-55, (National Archives II, Maryland) 460 According to Lazarick's interviewees, Nehru, Sukarno and Kennedy were among Peking Review's readers. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 153 162 1961); the Sino-Soviet Split (1960-1964); the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) and the Sino-US Rapprochement (1971-1972). These examples will highlight the inherent dilemmas of the Chinese foreign propagandists in balancing their political tasks and the established principles of foreign propaganda work such as "treating insiders and outsiders differently" (neiwai youbie), "truthfulness policy" (shishi qiushi), or "not imposing oneself on others" (bu qiangjia yu ren). 3.2.1. Great Leap Forward In 1958, Chairman Mao Zedong launched a social mobilization campaign which largely relied on the Chinese masses' voluntarism to produce "faster, more and better". The ultimate aim of the Great Leap Forward was to catch up with the industrial world in material production. Today, both in China and abroad, the Great Leap Forward is regarded as an unrealistic enterprise, which resulted in the greatest man-made famine in history. Notwithstanding the role of unfavorable weather conditions, the biggest reason behind the Great Leap's failure is considered to be the communist cadres' lack of co-ordination and management as well as their tendency to inflate the actual production figures. 461 During the Great Leap, following in the footsteps of the domestic media, the Chinese foreign language magazines exaggerated the country's economic successes at an unprecedented level and ignored the failings of the campaign for a long time. This was possible only by undermining the truthfulness (shishi qiushi) principle, which had guided China's propaganda organs since the Yanan days. During the Great Leap Forward, the growth in China's material production constituted the major theme for the country's foreign language magazines. Most news 461 For a detailed study on the famine, See, Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao's secret famine, NY: The Free Press, 1996 163 items dealt with the development of heavy industry and the rising production of coal, steel, petroleum and electric power. 462 The magazines propagated the backyard furnaces set up in every locality where the Chinese masses joined the task of producing steel. This was presented as a mighty achievement- although it was soon understood that the final product was of poor quality and had little industrial value. Peking Review proudly indicated in its articles that "the outstanding feature of China's development this year is SPEED –a tempo unknown in the entire history of mankind."463 In order to substantiate the story of growth, China Pictorial made great effort to use pictures from the countryside, particularly from the national minority areas.464 Foreign language magazines were obsessed with the idea of catching up with the Western countries in agricultural output. 465 The main theme of the big-size photographs were the industrious peasants, bountiful harvests, self-help and mutual assistance teams in the Chinese countryside.466 As early as 1959, there were already rumors in the West about the hardships caused by the Great Leap in Chinese communes. These rumors were defined by the editors of Peking Review merely as a "slander campaign" in the magazine's March 3, 1959 issue. Hereby, Peking Review editorial team reconfirmed its fixed policy of "presenting the truth about China" and announced that the socialist construction in 462 See, for instance, Chu Chu Lin, "Doubling Steel output in one year" Peking Review, No.31 September 30, 1958, Tang Ming-Chao, "The leap forward continues", China Reconstructs, November 1959; "The national exhbition of industry and communications", China Pictorial, No.100, 1958; See, "Forging iron and steel, tempering a new people", China Pictorial, No.101, 1958; Frank Coe, "A leap that has made history", China Reconstructs, January 1959 10-13 463 See, Lu Chao-chi "The big Leap in Industry: How and Why", Peking Review, October 14, 1958 15 464 See, "A Moslem village", China Pictorial, No.90, Feb., 1958; See, "A visit to the Ningsia Hui Autonomous region", China Pictorial, No.101, 1958 465 See "China outstrips U.S. in wheat", Peking Review, July 8, 1958; "China's cotton output highest in the world", China Pictorial, No.101, 1958; "China's world records in rice production ", China Pictorial, No.99, 1958; "China surpasses USA in wheat production", China Pictorial, No.98, 1958. Also See Figure 2. 466 See, "A bigger leap forward next year", China Pictorial, No.89, Jan., 1958 164 China was expected to forge ahead at a still greater tempo that year.467 The periodicals continued to publish stories of success from the rural areas, in such matters as irrigation work, women's liberation, religious tolerance, and improvements in production methods.468 In July, 1959 the PRC leadership convened the Lushan Conference, where Mao Zedong was criticized for the negative consequences of the Great Leap Forward. Although it did not bring the campaign to an end, this conference was a watershed event which signaled the initial recognition among senior cadres that something was going wrong with the Great Leap. By August, 1959, foreign propaganda magazines too started to show the first signs of this recognition. For instance, the Peking Review acknowledged that certain regions were under the spell of drought and flood. This was done carefully by putting the emphasis on the strength of man over nature while the magazine took the opportunity to praise the communes' self-help mechanism (i.e., "under the inspiring banner of the people's commune the Chinese people will assuredly carry the battle to a successful conclusion").469 On September 22, Peking Review published another article to counter US Information Service's commentary on the Lushan Conference. Americans' announcement of the failure of the Great Leap was dismissed by the Peking Review as another slander campaign. While the Peking Review harshly criticized the American claims, it also discredited the domestic critics of the Great Leap by pointing out that the "right opportunists" in China shared similar views with the American imperialists. 470 467 See "Our first anniversary", Peking Review, No.9, March 3, 1959. Note that the same issue had another article dealing with the expanding chemical industry in China. Also See "A story of growth", Peking Review, April 21, 1959 468 See "Hai River Transformed", Peking Review, No.11, March 17, 1959; Li Teh Chuan "People's communes and the emancipation of women", Peking Review, No.13, March 31, 1959; "United for a New Tibet", Peking Review, No.15, April 14, 1959; "The simultaneous use of modern and indigineous production methods", Peking Review, No.23, June 9, 1959 6 469 See "People's communes are good", Peking Review, No.34, August 25, 1959 470 See "Stupid Slanders ", Peking Review, No.38, September 22, 1959 165 At the tenth anniversary of the socialist republic in October, 1959, the Peking Review continued with its praise of the Great Leap. The magazine proudly stated that China has achieved high rates of industrial growth during 1958 and "the whole nation is now working with supreme confidence to reach within this year the major targets fixed in the Second Five-Year Plan for 1962". 471 Although the hardships in the countryside were much clearer by the end of 1959, the Peking Review still had optimistic prospects. An article dated November 1959 asserted that despite the most unfavorable weather conditions "it was expected that the output of food crops and cotton will grow significantly." 472 This was achieved thanks to "all-out efforts of the people guided by the Communist Party, and the collective strength and concerted work in the people's communes" which was able to beat back all these natural calamities and keep up the leap forward in agriculture. Even though the food shortages caused by the failed Great Leap attempt was felt nationwide by 1960, the Chinese foreign language magazines still showed no signs of caution. On the contrary, the Peking Review announced that the target of the five year plan was fulfilled three years ahead of time. 473 Successful leap stories continued to appear in the foreign language media throughout 1960. 474 The periodicals used examples from individual communes to show the bountiful harvests 471 See "Ten victorious years ", Peking Review, No.39, October 1, 1959 The article stated that: "Recent estimates indicate that the output of food crops will be about 275 million tons, around 10 per cent higher than in 1958; cotton output will probably be more than 10 per cent higher than it was last year. The outputs of tobacco, hemp, and jute, tea, sugar –and oil-bearing crops are all bigger than in 1958." See "Good harvest, better prospects", Peking Review, No.46, November 17,1959 473 Peking Review's new year message demonstrates the extent of this denial: "Welcoming 1960, the Chinese people have more "happy things" before them than ever. Reports of the record output and new achievements keep pouring in steadily from the factories, mines, people's communes and every field of endeavor." See "A Happy 1960", Peking Review, No.1, January 5,1960 474 See "Industry leaps into the sixties" and "Oil output up", Peking Review, January 12,1960; "A year of brilliant achievement", Peking Review, No.4, January 26,1960; (Round the Week column) "Steel output: further rise", Peking Review, August 16,1960 3; (Round the Week Column) "National Day", Peking Review, October 4, 1960 3; See Chi Ssu, "The continued leap forward", China Reconstructs, November 1960 472 166 reaped against all odds.475 Pictures of Chinese department stores, likewise, displayed the abundant goods available to city dwellers476. According to these periodicals, the production targets were met despite harsh weather conditions: extreme heat, heavy rains, drought, etc. In 1961, Peking Review presented the Spring Festival as a holiday of abundance, when "stores in the city and countryside alike were well stocked with consumer goods for the Festival, and factories, communes and families were well provided with what was especially needed for the occasion.477 Likewise, the China Pictorial proudly stated that there was "all-round prosperity in production and daily life."478 In order to substantiate the official Chinese position which considered the news about the ongoing famine as false and deceitful Western propaganda, magazines used public speeches made by the leading party cadres. Foreign Minister Chen Yi's remarks during an interview conducted by Canadian journalists in 1961 offers a good example: Of course, owing to the natural calamities, there has generally been some strain on the living conditions of the people of New China. But we wish to point out that to have averted famine in the face of such serious natural calamities is something old China never succeeded in doing in the past thousands of years.479 As this example illustrates, any admission of hardship was always accompanied with the emphasis on Chinese people's determination to overcome it. These hardships were not only temporary in nature but they also resulted in the strengthening of the relief 475 See (Round the Week column) "Pig breeding in the communes", Peking Review, No.28, September 1, 1961, 3, Chen Han-Seng, "From grain shortage to grain surplus", China Reconstructs, July 1960., Kuo Chung Yi, "Peking's harvest of fruit", China Reconstructs, December 1962. 476 See Hsimen Lu-Sha, "100,000 varieties of goods", China Reconstructs, May 1960; "All for the customers", China Pictorial, No.3, 1960. Also See Figure 3. 477 See (Round the Week column) "Spring Festival 1961", Peking Review, February 19,1961 3 478 See the piece with the same title in China Pictorial, No.2, 1961, 10 479 See "Chen Yi's television interview with Canadian newsmen", Peking Review, No.28, July 14, 1961, 10 167 organization and mutual aid teams in the communes. 480 The achievements against droughts and floods had the positive consequence of communes' accumulating vast experiences in this field.481 Hence the news reports on natural calamities appeared only under a positive light in order to illustrate the heroism of the people to fight against these conditions.482 Therefore, throughout this entire period, denying the seriousness of the famines and blaming the hardships on the extreme weather conditions remained as the official propaganda line: In 1960 news of victories on the industrial front came in a steady stream as production targets, one after another, were fulfilled ahead of schedule and then overfulfilled. In agriculture, we have had for two years the worst natural calamities in decades. But thanks to the leadership given by the Communist Party, the tremendous power inspired by the General Line for Socialist Construction, and the greatest collective effort made possible by the people's communes, bumper harvests were reaped in many areas.483 The overseas readers were led into believing that bulk of the failed Great Leap stories was fabricated by Western propagandists to undermine China's achievements. In a retrospective article summarizing the Great Leap Forward attempt in 1962, Peking Review quoted Po-I Po, the Vice Premier and the Chairman of the State Economic Commission, who described the present situation as "very good" and the prospects "extremely bright". According to this article, "it was the resounding victory of the three years' Great Leap Forward that provided the most basic material and technical conditions, as well as the extremely valuable experience, for the new achievements 480 See "Confident forward march", China Reconstructs, March 1961; Yung Lung Kwei, "The socialist economy moves ahead", China Reconstructs, December 1962 481 See "From a commune leader's notebook ", China Reconstructs, June 1961. 32, Also see "After natural calamities-A good start", China Reconstructs, June 1962. Also See, "Outstanding achievements in the fight against natural calamities", China Pictorial, No.3, 1961 482 See (Report from Hopei column) "Making floods relieve droughts", Peking Review, No.6,February 9, 1962, 14-15 483 "Great Times, Noble Ideals", China Reconstructs, January 1961. 168 made in 1961". 484 All in all, the CCP cadres' responsibility in the making of the greatest famine in modern history and the human casualties accompanying this failure slipped China's foreign language media. In the initial phase of the Great Leap Forward, Western reports on rural hardships were simply dismissed as slanders. Later it was admitted (in passing) that there were indeed a couple of hardships but only due to foul weather conditions and other natural calamities. 485 Picturing China as the land of abundance in the midst of food shortages the Peking Review, China Pictorial and China Reconstructs hardly lived up to Mao Zedong's criteria of basing news items on solid evidence and truthfulness (shishi qiushi). 3.2.2. Sino-Soviet Split Throughout the 1950s, China received material assistance and diplomatic backing from the Soviet Union as part of the country's "leaning on one side" policy. By the late 1950s, however, there were a number of issues which plagued Sino-Soviet relations. For instance, Khrushchev's critique of the Stalin era and his advocacy of "peaceful co-existence" policy (avoiding military confrontation with the capitalist bloc) estranged Chinese communists. On the international front, the Chinese felt they were betrayed by their ally during the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Sino-Indian border conflict of the late 1950s, as the Soviet side extended little support for China's position. Likewise, the Soviet side found China's chosen revolutionary path, exemplified by the launch of the Great Leap Forward, as experimental and adventurous. In the summer of 1960, the disagreements which have piled up during 484 See (Retrospects and Prospects column) "China's industrial gains in 1961 and tasks for 1962", Peking Review, No.28, January 5, 1962, 9-10 485 This point is also observed by Lazarick in his analysis of Peking Review content during the Great Leap. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 163 169 the second half of the 1950s resulted in the Soviet withdrawal of its most needed experts from China. Although the foreign language media was itself directly affected by the departure of the Soviet experts, the Peking Review, China Pictorial and China Reconstructs made every effort to hide it from its foreign readers. Similar to the case of the Great Leap Forward, fulfilling the propaganda tasks (i.e., guarding what was considered a state secret at the time) was in direct conflict with the truthfulness (shishi qiushi) principle. Hence, Chinese foreign language media acknowledged the split three years after its Western counterparts, which had started to report Sino-Soviet ideological differences as early as 1960. Before the split came to the fore in the summer of 1960, the Chinese foreign propaganda media was employed a dual strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets. On the one hand, there were several items which celebrated the longevity of Sino-Soviet friendship and alliance.486 On the other, there were articles which criticized Soviet government's stance towards the US in very subtle ways -such as praising Leninism. 487 Judging from the Chinese foreign propaganda media, however, the seriousness of this dispute was not visible at all. By contrast, there was a great effort to maintain the image of warm friendship in the early 1960s. The news coverage on the celebration activities of important days, like the National Day (October 1st) and May Day were 486 These pieces praised Soviet material assistance. See for instance, Li Fu-Chun, "Report on the Draft 1960 National Economic Plan" Peking Review, No.14, April 5, 1960; Also See "Sino Soviet Alliance is the Mighty Bulwark of World Peace", Peking Review, No.40, February 2, 1960, "Ten years of the Sino-Soviet Treaty", China Reconstructs, February 1960; "Chinese and Soviet Leaders greet Treaty Anniversary" and Soong Ching Ling "The basis for eternal friendship" Peking Review, No.7, February 16, 1960; "Provocation against the Soviet Union is provocation against the entire socialist camp" Peking Review, May 17,1960; "All out support for the soviet struggle against US aggression and provocation", "Three million demonstrate in Peking", "Chinese and Soviet peoples stand in close unity against US aggression", Peking Review, May 24,1960; "Long live the great Sino-Soviet alliance", China Pictorial, No.5, 1960 487 It is significant that on April 22, 1960, CCP Central Committee held a meeting in Beijing to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the birth of Lenin. See Lu Ting Yi, "Unite under Lenin's revolutionary banner" Peking Review, April 26,1960. This article and others from the commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the birth of Lenin were later brought together in the FLP book "Long Live Leninism" (108 pages) and several editions were published, including Russian, Spanish, Japanese, French and German. 170 especially functional. These days became symbolic occasions to hail the Soviet Union and disseminate the image that the bloc solidarity was as strong as ever.488 In order to further convince their readers, Chinese foreign language magazines quoted leading party and government figures in the PRC. For instance, in an interview conducted by the British correspondent Felix Green, Premier Zhou Enlai denied the charges that China was having problems with the Soviet leadership on the question of "peaceful co-existence" and asserted that "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union is today more powerful than ever before"489. Chinese foreign language periodicals continued to publish articles on eternal Sino-Soviet alliance well into 1961. 490 Soviet achievements in space, the primary example of which was Yuri Gagarin's journey to the outer space, were praised by the 488 See, for example the narration of the October 1 National day parade in 1960: "International Solidarity stood out in bold relief in the Peking celebrations. Some 2,000 foreign guests from more than 70 countries and regions of all five continents took their place in the reviewing stands. Recurrent in the parade were the vibrant shouts of "Long live the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union!" See "National Day, 1960", Peking Review, October 4, 1960. A similar pattern emerges during the May Day celebrations in 1961. See "China celebrates the May Day", Peking Review, May 5, 1961.3-5 and "May Day 1962" Peking Review, May 4, 1962, 3-5 489 Zhou Enlai was very convincing and straightforward in his remarks: "The solidarity among all the countries of the socialist camp is unbreakable. What is more, the solidarity between the two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, is the bulwark of the defense of the world peace. What the imperialists and all reactionaries fear the most is the solidarity of the socialist countries. They seek by every means to sow discord and break up this solidarity. But they will never succeed in these despicable designs." See "Television Interview given by Premier Chou En-lai to British Correspondant Felix Greene", Peking Review, November 8, 1960 490 Peking Review published Liu Shao-chi's visit to the Soviet Union in December 13, 1960 under the title of "eternal, indestructible Sino-Soviet friendship". See "Chairman Liu Shao chi in the Soviet Union" Peking Review, December 13, 1960; Also See the exchange of new-year greetings between the Chinese and Soviet leaders was on the cover of Peking Review in January, 1961,"Sino-Soviet Solidarity", Peking Review, January 6, 1961. Peking Review's February 1961 edition was celebrating the signing of Sino-Soviet cultural co-operation Plan, with the Vice-Premier Chen Yi's expressions of gratitude for "Soviet assistance in the fields of science, culture and art" and praise for "the Soviet Union's achievements in science and culture as well as her important role in safeguarding world peace, See "Sino Soviet Cultural Co-operation", Peking Review, February 10, 1961, 20. See Song Qingling, "The solidarity of the socialist camp is the hope of mankind", China Reconstructs, January 1961. Also See (Sino-Soviet Alliance) "The great unity, eternal friendship" and "Celebrating a mighty alliance" 7, Peking Review, February 19, 1961, 5-7. Also see "Sino Soviet talks on economic and trade relations", Peking Review, No.10, March 10, 1961, "Successful conclusion of Sino Soviet Trade Talks", Peking Review, No.15, April 14, 1961 and "Sino Soviet economic, scientific and technical co-operation" Peking Review, No.26-27, July 7, 1961 171 magazines. 491 Likewise, Chinese magazines applauded the riches created by the Soviet seven-year economic plan. 492 In July, 1961, the Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi denied the existence of any ideological cleavages between the PRC and the Soviet Union. Chen Yi convincingly told the Canadian journalists that this was outright Western propaganda, produced by people who were annoyed by the solid friendship between these countries. According to Chen Yi, "the consistent mutual support between China and the Soviet Union is an eloquent proof of this unity". 493 Despite the unilateral withdrawal of experts from China a year prior, foreign language magazines published various items to celebrate the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.494 However, the cover-up of the dispute was not sustainable in the long run. By mid 1963, the PRC regime launched its official campaign against the Soviet Union and its so-called revisionism. In June 1963, the CCP published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, which the Soviet side responded with Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By early 1964, the Soviet Union was explicitly targeted in the Chinese foreign language media. The Peking Review started publishing "Comments on the Open Letter of the Central Committe of the C.P.S.U".495 This piece was later published as a pamphlet by the Foreign Languages Press in different languages. As a response to the publication of the documents of the February Plenum 491 See, "A new era of Man's entry into space has begun", Peking Review, No.16, April 21, 1961,5, "Brilliant new Soviet success in Space" Peking Review, No.34, August 24, 1962, 7-8; Also see, "Hail the successful return of the Soviet spaceship Vostok II", China Pictorial, No. 9,1961 492 See, "Over the vast, rich lands of the Soviet Union", China Pictorial, No. 4, 1961 493 See "Chen Yi's television interview with Canadian newsmen", Peking Review, No.28, July 14, 1961 494 See, "A great day of friendship", Peking Review, No.7, February 16, 1962,6; "Great Unity, Eternal Friendship", China Pictorial, No.4, 1961 495 The text was prepared by the editorial departments of People's Daily and Red Flag. 172 of the Central Committee of the CPSU on April 3, 1964,496 the Peking Review republished the exchanged letters in order to clear the air from the "distortions" made by the Soviet side. After the dispute became public, now it was time to gather supporters for the PRC regime and the propaganda media made every effort to win the hearts and minds of the third parties. Polemical titles such as "What right have Soviet leaders to issue orders to Asian and African countries?" served this purpose497. The Soviet Union was attacked both directly and indirectly via its attitude towards the solution of international problems. Chinese external propaganda content also expressed concerns over the "anti-China" current in the Soviet Union.498 This was followed by a brief period of wishful thinking after Khrushchev's fall in 1964, when the magazines softened their tone, vis-à-vis the Soviets.499 Soon after, the truce came to an end with the acknowledgment that the "Khrushchev revisionism lingered on". 500 Thereafter Chinese foreign language media launched an all-out propaganda offensive directed against the "anti-China" current in the USSR.501 One strategy to overcome the psychology of international isolation was to show the world that China was still on good terms with many countries. Indeed, "having friends all over the world" became a constant phrase used in the foreign 496 See, "Seven Letters exchanged between the central committees of the CPC and the CPSU" Peking Review, May 8, 1964. 7-27. Foreign Languages Press published the same title as a pamphlet. 497 See Peking Review, No.23, June 5, 1964. 9. Also See Figure 5. 498 See "CPSU Leadership's tricks in calling for "an end to the polemics", Peking Review, No.5, January 31, 1964,6. ; "Anti-China material from the Soviet Press" 23-24 and "Why Mislead? –Article by "pravda" commentator, Peking Review, No.6, February 7, 1964, 25; "Anti-Chinese report at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee" Peking Review, No.18, May 1, 1964; "TASS' AntiChina rumour mongering", Peking Review, No.26, June 26, 1964; "Has Pravda no sense of shame?" Peking Review, No.39, September 25, 1964 499 See "Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary: Message of greetings from Chinese leaders" and "Struggle to safeguard Sino-Soviet Unity", Peking Review, No.8, February 19, 1965, See "Why Khrushchov Fell" , Peking Review, No.48, November 27, 1964 500 See "The evils of Khrushchovian revisionism linger on ", Peking Review, No.10, March 5, 1965. 501 See "What the Soviet press is preaching", Peking Review, No.11, March 12, 1965. The persecution of the Chinese students in Moscow who have participated in the March 4th Anti-US demonstrations was also criticized harshly. See "Protests against soviet suppression of demonstration and persecution of Chinese students", Peking Review, No.12, March 19, 1965. 7 173 propaganda journals throughout the 1960s502. By the mid-1960s, when the Chinese regime was losing friends in Indonesia, Cuba and the Soviet Union, 503 it was important to have friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Pictures of several foreign statesmen from developing countries who came to Beijing to participate in the 1964 national day celebrations intended to give the impression that China was not alone in the world.504 For this purpose, magazines put great emphasis on the foreign delegations visiting China, foreign friends received by Mao Zedong, etc. 505 This strategy was also employed after the successful conduct of China's first nuclear test in 1964. Amidst international isolation the Peking Review published greetings from many countries to show the extent of popularity that the PRC regime enjoyed among Asian and African countries.506 3.2.3. Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution As we have seen in the previous two examples, Chinese foreign propaganda media had limited success in upholding foreign propaganda principles even before the launch of the Cultural Revolution. However, in the light of the drastic content changes brought in the early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) it is clear that magazines had relatively rich content before this period.507 Although Peking Review, China Reconstructs and China Pictorial continued their operation, the revolutionary zeal at the FLP apparatus disrupted the previous emphasis on the "inside and outside 502 See Chu Tu-Nan, "We have friends all over the world", Peking Review, February 10, 1960 9-11 See "Anti-China hysteria in Cuba", Peking Review, No.9, February 25, 1966. 22, "Hsinhua statement concerning Indonesian army paper's anti-China fabrication", Peking Review, No.43, October 22, 1965, "Pravda's anti-Chinese article", Peking Review, No.48, November 26, 1965 504 See "National Day 1964", Peking Review, No.40, October 2, 1964. 4 505 See (The Week column) "Chairman Mao receives foreign friends", Peking Review, No.49, December 3, 1965 3; "China has friends all over the world", Peking Review, No.20, May 13, 1966. 47 506 See "Great Victory of First Nuclear Test", Peking Review, No.43, October 23, 1964 6; "Worldwide acclaim" Peking Review, No.44, October 30, 1964 507 See, for instance, the picture of two nicely-dressed actresses (one Chinese, one Burmese) on the cover of China Pictorial in Figure 4. Such depictions dissappeared from the magazines with the launch of the Cultural Revolution. 503 174 of the country is different" (neiwai youbie) principle. As this principle was replaced by its exact opposite during the Cultural Revolution years (i.e., "inside and outside of the country is the same": neiwai bufen or neiwai wubie), this led to an indiscriminate use of domestic items in the foreign language magazines. As a result, foreign propaganda content produced during the Cultural Revolution was dominated by items on China's revolutionary politics, characterized by repetitive slogans and Mao worship. This kind of reporting was later labeled by the ex-propagandists as "exaggerated, fake and empty" (da, jia, kong). As early as June 1966, news and commentaries on the Cultural Revolution became the dominant theme for the Peking Review, China Reconstructs and China Pictorial.508 As the editors were left with little liberty to choose content, most of the previous columns disappeared from the foreign language magazines. For instance, by the summer of 1966, China Reconstructs no longer had an editorial column on its first page.509 By the same token, this magazine's regular "articles" and "features" columns, which have previously focused on economic and social progress, were now heavily politicized.510 Likewise, China Pictorial, which normally only published pictures with little comment, all of a sudden started publishing important party documents.511 Even the advertisements published in China's foreign propaganda media adopted a more 508 Some of the titles that appeared in June 1966 issue of Peking Review were: "Put Mao Tse-Tung's thought in the forefront, cadres give the lead at every level";"Long live the grat prolaterian Cultural Revolution"; "Capture the positions in the field of historical studies seized by the bourgeoisie"; "China in the midst of High tide of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution"; "Mao Tse-Tung's thoughtbeacon of revolution for the wolrd's people"; "Workers,peasants and soldiers creatively study and apply Mao Tse Tung's philosophical thinking". See Peking Review, No.25, June 17, 1966 509 See Figure 7. 510 In the October and November 1966 issues, almost half of all the article titles is on Mao Zedong. For the politization of "language corner" feature, which teaches foreigners about revolutionary phraseology See, China Reconstructs, February 1967 and September, 1967 issues. Likewise "children's page" feature offers titles like "Red guards on a trolley bus", China Reconstructs, January 1967 511 See "Communique of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eigth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", China Pictorial, Special issue, No.9, 1966, 3-5 175 militant language.512 The content was filled with news on Red Guards and articles dealing with the why's and how's of the Cultural Revolution.513 In terms of cultural topics, presentation of traditional art forms, such as ancient paintings, was no longer appropriate. These pieces were replaced by examples of model revolutionary theater, songs and movies. 514 Although Mao Zedong praise was not entirely novel for the Chinese foreign propaganda media 515 , the Chairman's visibility during this period was clearly unprecedented. Starting in the summer of 1966, Mao's pictures and writings occupied the central stage in the foreign language magazines. 516 The Peking Review started using the fixed honorific title "great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander 512 See Radio Peking English language transmissions advertisement on Peking Review, July 8, 1966, No.28: "In response to the militant call of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, the high tide of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution has been sweeping through the whole of China in the last few months with tempestuous force. Armed with Mao Tse-Tung's Thought the several hundred million workers, peasants, and soldiers and the masses of revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals are clearing out the many monsters and demons entrenched in ideological and cultural positions. The so-called "Three family village" or "Four Family Inn", the bourgeois "experts", "scholars", "authorities" and "respected monsters" and their like have been routed and their whole prestige has been scattered to the winds. This great Cultural Revolution has no parallel in scale, in sweep, in strength or in momentum. It is already spurring the socialist cause in China forward with great vigor and undoubtedly is having and will continue to have an immeasurably profound and farreaching impact on the world revolution. Listeners who wish to know more about this GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION, tune in to RADIO PEKING." 513 See, "We will always be Chairman Mao's red guards" China Reconstructs, July 1969, "Father's dear, mother's dear, but not as dear as Chairman Mao", China Reconstructs,December 1967; "Chairman Mao receieved us Red Guards!", "I put a Red Guard arm band on Chairman Mao", China Reconstructs, October, 1966; "Chairman Mao receives red guards and revolutionary teachers and students", China Reconstructs, November, 1966. Also See the inside front picture of Red guards from Hubei province "chatting happily" with Mao Zedong, China Reconstructs, March, 1967 514 See the music feature of China Reconstructs, October, 1966: "Song with words: Rely on the helmsman when sailing the seas"; "Paean of the great era of Mao Tse-Tung: The Seventh "Shanghai Spring" Music Festival", China Pictorial, August, 1966; "The working class is most loyal to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in literature", China Reconstructs, January 1969, "Prolaterian art blossoms on socialist stage", China Reconstructs, January 1967. Also see the front cover of China Reconstructs, September 1967 issue for a picture taken from the revolutionary Peking opera piece "Taking the bandits' Stronghold" and the script of "Taking tiger mountain by strategy" in the special issue of China Reconstructs, February 1970; Similarly, "The Red Lantern" synopsis and stage pictures were displayed in China Reconstructs, September 1970 515 Since the early 1950s, Mao was referred in the Chinese foreign language media as "great leader and teacher", "brilliant leader", "China's greatest son", etc. See, Smith, Martha Jane, Key Symbols in the USSR and Chinese Propaganda to the USA, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), New York University, 1958, 121 516 See Figure 6. 176 and great helmsmen" on its first page, under a big-size Mao picture. 517 Other magazines too, frequently used photos of Mao Zedong on their cover and inside the magazines.518 Mao's new image as a healthy and efficient leader, who is fit and able to guide the global revolutionary struggle was reinforced with the pictures showing his famous swim in the Yangzi River.519 With the Little Red Book fresh off the press, it became customary for the magazines to display Mao quotations on their first page, back cover, and sometimes above each title.520 Likewise, images of Chinese masses' studying Mao quotations and holding high the copies of Little Red Book were abundant.521 One of the main pillars of this era was the internationalization of Mao Zedong Thought. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao's contribution to the Marxist-Leninist theory was stated in an over-confident manner, which was not characteristic of the earlier propaganda media. Slogans like "Chairman Mao is the Red Sun in the Hearts of the People of the World" 522 or "The Brilliance of Mao Tse-Tung's Thought 517 See Peking Review, No.44, October 28, 1966. Also see Peking Review, No.48, November 25, 1966; Peking Review, No.49, December 2, 1966; Peking Review, No.50, December 9, 1966; Peking Review, No.51, December 16, 1966; Peking Review, No.4, January 20, 1967; Peking Review, No.7, February 10, 1967 518 See the cover of China Reconstructs, October,1966; China Pictorial, Special issue, No.9, 1966; In the year 1967, China Pictorial magazine consecutively used Mao Zedong pictures on its cover. See the covers of China Pictorial, No.2, 1967; China Pictorial, No.3, 1967; China Pictorial, No.4, 1967; China Pictorial, No.6, 1967; China Pictorial, No.7, 1967; China Pictorial, No.10, 1967, China Pictorial, No.11, 1967 519 See "Chairman Mao swims in the Yangtse", Peking Review, No.31, July 29, 1966; "Chairman Mao swims in the Yangtze", China Reconstructs, No.9, September 1966 520 See the first page of China Reconstructs 1969 issues. See the Mao quotations at the top of the article "Seize new victories", Peking Review, No.31, December 16, 1966. See the long quotation in the inside cover of China Pictorial, Special issue, No.9, 1966. 521 See, "On the Tulung river", China Reconstructs, August, 1969; "Widespread popularization of Mao Tse-Tung's thought" China Reconstructs, April, 1969;"Mao Tse-Tung's thought inspired them to fight", China Reconstructs, March, 1967; "Good Harvest in the midst of revolution", China Reconstructs, October, 1967; For Kazakh herdsmen studying Mao's works, See "Travels through Ili", China Reconstructs, February, 1969; For Yao people, See "The Yao Mountains today", China Reconstructs, March, 1970; For barefoot doctor's study of Little Red Book, See "The barefoot doctors", China Reconstructs, March, 1969 522 See, "Chairman Mao, red sun in the hearts of world's people", China Pictorial,No.8, 1968 177 Illuminates the Whole World" are representative of this new mood. 523 Chinese foreign language media was no longer settled with Mao Zedong's image as a national leader. The magazines promoted him as a global revolutionary leader, whose guidance was critical for the dissident groups all around the world. To this purpose, Peking Review established a steady column called "Mao Tse-Tung's Thought- Beacon of Revolution for the World's People"524. Another such column was "The World's People Love Chairman Mao", under which the Peking Review published positive comments of foreign readers on Mao's works.525 Other magazines, too, participated in this drive. 526 In their praise of Mao Zedong Thought, Chinese foreign language magazines frequently quoted members of the bilateral friendship organizations, dissident groups, left-wing parties as well as revolutionary leaders from the Third World.527 There were various stories on guerilla fighters studying Mao's military writings.528 Positive comments made by foreigners 523 See "The brilliance of Mao Tse Tung's thought ilumminates the whole world" Peking Review, No.26, June 24, 1966.11 524 See Peking Review, No.23, June 3, 1966. 6 525 The editors were paying attention to the extent of the geographical disparity in this column. Among the admiring commentators, there were people from Japan, Congo, Laos, Cuba and Germany. See Peking Review, No.8, February 17, 1967.24-25 526 See, "Friends of five continents highly praise revolutionary performances", China Reconstructs, April, 1969; "World's people love most to read Chairman Mao's works", China Reconstructs, April 1967; Also see the pictures depicting Laotian People's Liberation Army soldiers' studying Little Red Book, and the photos of interested readers in Zanzibar, Albania, Congo, Britain checking Mao's works. See, China Pictorial, No.8, 1966, 3-5. 527 See "In praise of Mao Tse-Tung's Thought", Peking Review, No.23, June 3, 1966, 9, "The world's revolutionary people hail China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Peking Review, No.40, September 30, 1966, 24. Also see "Long life to Chairman Mao, the leader of the revolutionary people" 24 and "Revolutionary People of the world over love studying Chairman Mao's works", Peking Review, No.41, October 7, 1966. 26. "Mao Tse-Tung's thought shines far and wide" Peking Review, No.46, November 11, 1966. "Mao Tse-tung's thought Enlightens Africa", Peking Review, No.12, March 17, 1967. "The attitude towards Mao Tse-Tung's thought is the touchstone for testing weather one is really revolutionary or not –editorial from L'Humanite Nouvelle, organ of the central committee of the french Communist Movement (Marxist-Leninist)" Peking Review, No.40, September 29, 1967.22; "The most powerful weapon, the greatest assistance" by Win Aung-Burma, Peking Review, No.43,October 20, 1967.32. For articles and statements released by the Burmese, Australian, Ceylonese communist parties, See Peking Review, No.47, November 17, 1967.13-15 528 See the picture of Vietnamese guerilla fighters studying Mao's works: "Vietnamese people cherish great love for Chairman Mao", Peking Review, No.7, February 16, 1968; Also see "Latin American revolutionary forces grow under illumination of Mao Tse-tung's thought", Peking Review, No. 8, February 23, 1968, 26; For the studies of Japanese youth, See "All-illuminating Mao Tse-Tung's thought guides Japanese people advancing victoriously along revolutionary course", Peking Review, 178 living in the leading capitalist and "revisionist" countries had even better propaganda value.529 China's popularity among the Soviet and North American audiences made headlines in the magazines. 530 Throughout this period, the Peking Review, China Pictorial and China Reconstructs went to emotional extremes, such as arguing that Mao Zedong's works were critical necessities for foreign comrades.531 As the Little Red Book (Quotations from Chairman Mao) and Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung appeared in different languages, propaganda magazines paid close attention to reflect foreign readers' love and admiration for Mao's works. 532 The magazines closely followed the new translations of these works as well as their circulation figures. 533 In the meantime, Mao badges and posters became popular foreign propaganda items. Peking Review proudly announced that in the July 1966May 1967 period, more than 840 million copies of Chairman Mao portraits (over five times the number produced in the preceding 16 years) were printed in order to meet No.9, March 1, 1968, pp 22-24. "Comrade V.G. Wilcox calls on all members of Communist Party of New Zealand to study Chairman Mao's works" Peking Review, No.31, August 1, 1969 20 529 See Figure 8. 530 See "Soviet people acclaim: "We ardently Love Mao Tse Tung!", Peking Review, No.36, September 2, 1966. For the Moscovites requesting Mao badges, See "Mao Tse-Tung is our Lenin!", Peking Review, No.24, June 9, 1967. "Revolutionary Soviet people ardently love Chairman Mao", Peking Review, No.14, April 4, 1969 21-22; "Mao Tse-Tung's thought is their guide: The black Americans's struggle", China Reconstructs, November 1967, 34. 531 See for example the story of two Indian sailors in Guangzhou who presumably had brought with them a letter written in blood. Apparently the letter was written by imprisoned Indian revolutionaries and read "We are anxious to obtain a volume of Mao Tse-Tung's work, the most treasured in the world." See "A Letter from Jailed Indian Revolutionaries written in Blood", Peking Review, No.14, March 31, 1967, 26 532 See "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung : The treasure book of the revolutionary people", China Reconstructs, July, 1967; "New copies of "Selected works of Mao Tse Tung Reach readers", Peking Review, No.31, July 29, 1966See "Chairman Mao's works published abroad", Peking Review, No.50, December 9, 1966. "The -Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung- lights the whole world" Peking Review, No.10, March 3, 1967; "Publication of Burmese and Indonesian editions of Selected works of Mao Tse Tung Hailed" Peking Review, No.48, November 24, 1967.(cover page); "86,400,000 sets of Selected works of Mao Tse Tung Published in 1967" Peking Review, No.1, January 3, 1968 14 533 See the cover page of Peking Review, No.25, June 16, 1967, which reads "Mass Publication of Chairman Mao's works". Alse see "10th anniversary of the publication of chairman Mao's Brilliant work greeted", Peking Review, No.27, June 30, 1967 37; "Chairman Mao's Military writings published in more foreign languages", Peking Review, No.32, August 6, 1969 27; "World's revolutionary people enthusiastically translate and publish chairman Mao's works", Peking Review, No.40, October 3, 1969, 31; "Chairman Mao's works printed in large quantities in Malayan Revolutionary Bases" Peking Review, No.24, January 16, 1970 179 the "pressing demands from revolutionary people all over the world."534 Likewise, it published stories of foreigners wearing Mao badges.535 The public displays of China's popularity among fellow foreigners provided a sense of legitimacy for the government in the international arena. Little was achievable through diplomatic channels at a time when the PRC regime was very much distressed with the ongoing "Anti-China tide" in the world, and particularly in Soviet Union. 536 Hence throughout the Cultural Revolution, foreign propaganda media further emphasized "people's diplomacy" with slogans like "China has friends all over the world".537 Amidst China's self-imposed international isolation reinforced by its radical Cultural Revolution era foreign policy, the propaganda discourse reflected wishful thinking more then truth. Besides, as we will see in Chapter 5, the nullification of neiwai youbie principle through the repetitive and ideologically-charged content produced by the foreign language magazines did not resonate well with these items' long time subscribers abroad –the so-called "middle elements". 3.2.4. Sino-US Rapprochement It is a great irony that the Sino-US rapprochement occurred during the Cultural Revolution, when the PRC foreign propaganda media was at its peak in terms of its anti-American rhetoric. Shortly before Richard Nixon paid his historic visit to China in 1972, Chinese foreign language media was showing no indications of softening its 534 See "Chairman Mao's portraits distributed all over the world", Peking Review, No.31, July 28, 1967 5 535 See "Stories about Chairman Mao badges", Peking Review, No.43, October 20, 1967.33. Also see Peking Review, No.40, September 29, 1967.25 536 See "Despicable Anti-China Rumours" 24 and "Why do Imperialism and revisionism unite in wildly attacking the Chinese Communist Party and China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution?" 25 in Peking Review, No.5, January 27,1967. 537 "We have friends all over the world", Peking Review, No.35, August 25,1967 18 180 tone towards the US government. 538 Throughout 1970 and 1971, Chinese foreign language magazines were harshly criticizing American policy towards Indochina.539 Likewise, dissident masses in the US, especially African-American groups who fought against racism, were praised in the magazines. 540 As late as January 1972, Chinese periodicals were applauding the rising anti-Nixon sentiment in the US: The inextricable economic crisis and the reactionary external and internal policies pursued by the US monopoly capitalist groups for obtaining super-profits have increasingly impoverished the working class and the laboring people in the United States, and have thereby accelerated their political awakening and aroused them to constant struggles. It is precisely the raging revolutionary struggles of the American people that have badly battered and weakened the US imperialist colossus. U.S. imperialism's decline clearly shows that the capitalist system will certainly be buried.541 Being accustomed to such language, a regular reader of the Peking Review must have been shocked one month later upon seeing Nixon's visit to Beijing as the cover story.542 In 1971, when the American ping-pong team visited China as a prelude to Richard Nixon's formal visit, Chinese foreign propaganda media made every effort to downplay the significance of this event. For instance, a China Reconstructs article depicting Premier Zhou Enlai's greetings of foreign ping-pong team members mentioned the US team only after Canada, Columbia, England, and Nigeria.543 In an 538 See, "Mao Tsetung: People of the world, unite and defeat the US aggressors and all their running dogs", China Reconstructs, extra issue, May, 1970 539 See "US imperialism means wars and aggression", China Reconstructs, May, 1971; "US imperialism's defeat in Vietnam", China Reconstructs, April, 1971; "The world's people will win", China Reconstructs, January 1971; "Drive the yankees out of Asia", China Reconstructs, September, 1970; "The Indo-Chinese people hit hard at US Imperialism", China Reconstructs, August, 1970. Also See "Nixon again comes out with his –Troop withdrawal-hoax" and "Nixon, Chief Butcher in the Son My Massacre", Peking Review, No.16, April 16,1971. US Imperialism doomed to defeat 540 See "Revolutionary mass movement in the US on the upsurge", China Reconstructs, May, 1970 541 See "Year of decline for US Imperialism", Peking Review, No.3, January 21, 1972 17 542 See, "Chairman Mao meets President Nixon", Peking Review, No.7-8, February 25,1972 543 Zhou Enlai's greeting of the US team members is also far from highlighting the significance of the event: "Contacts between the people of China and the United States had been very frequent in the past but later they were broken off for a long time. Your visit to China on invitation has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of two countries. We believe that such friendly contacts will be favored and supported by the majority of two peoples." See, "Ping pong and friendship", China Reconstructs, July 1971. 181 attempt to underemphasize its symbolic value, Chinese foreign language media buried the ping-pong team's unprecedented visit between the lines. This was accompanied by an effort to display the contact between Chinese and American players as an exemplary case of "people's diplomacy" not much to do with bilateral relations at the official level. Similarly when the magazines published stories on the Chinese pingpong team's visit to Japan to participate in the 31st World Table Tennis championship in the autumn of 1971, a careful distinction was made between the American government and its people. 544 In a similar effort, China Reconstructs supplement "Table tennis and friendship" mentioned Chinese and American players' friendly exchange of game tactics. 545 The underlying message was that regardless of the imperialist character of the American government, Chinese people were capable of enjoying friendly relations with fellow Americans. Towards February 1972, the announced date for President Nixon's visit to Beijing, world attention on this issue made it impossible for the Chinese foreign language media to continue ignoring this event. However, this visit seems to have arisen more caution then optimism. For instance, when Song Qingling announced "the beginning of a new era" in the January, 1972 issue of China Reconstructs, she opted for a revanchist language: The announced visit of the US President to Peking has aroused excitement throughout the entire world. During the Korean War he urged the bombing of China, but now he is ready to open a dialogue with the Chinese leaders. A year before his election President Nixon asserted in an article: "Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China". The reality of China during the past twenty years has brought about this realization, and this must be true for many others. 546 544 The author of this piece, who is also a member of the Chinese ping pong team, quoted an American player who said that although the US government is hostile to China, the people wants to be friendly. See, Chuang Tse-Tung, "Friendship first, competition second", China Reconstructs, September, 1971 545 See, Supplement to China Reconstructs, October, 1971 546 See, Song Qingling, "The beginning of a new era", China Reconstructs, January, 1972. 182 It was hard for the Chinese foreign propaganda media to acknowledge the benefits of softening Sino-US bilateral relations and change its long-established propaganda tone vis-à-vis the American government. However once the Shanghai communiqué was signed, the magazines responded by issuing supplements dedicated to this issue. For instance, China Pictorial supplement titled "President Nixon Visits China" displayed on its cover a cordially handshaking Mao and Nixon. 547 While this supplement displayed a series of pictures from Nixon's short stay, including his sightseeing visits to the Great Wall and the Palace Museum, it maintained a neutral and somewhat ambiguous language (e.g. "friendly exchanges") to describe the visit. Overall, there was more emphasis on the Chinese hospitality then anything else. The magazine refrained from noting the ideological hostility between the two countries and put no emphasis on the US being a super-power. The supplement to China Reconstructs too used a rather formal language, explaining both sides' position with briefly noting their differences alongside agreements.548 Likewise, the Peking Review reported this visit in rich detail but formal language, such as Premier Zhou Enlai's toast and his expression of warm feelings for the American people to the banquet given in President Nixon's honor. Rather then applauding this diplomatic breakthrough, which would have been a very abrupt shift in the ordinary propaganda discourse, Chinese foreign language magazines used an indirect method to comment on the Sino-US rapprochement. For instance, in 1972, the China Pictorial and China Reconstructs reminded their readers of Edgar Snow, China's old American friend since the Yanan days.549 Chinese foreign 547 See "President Nixon visits China", Supplement to China Pictorial, No.4, 1972 See "Communique", Supplement to China Reconstructs, March, 1972. 549 In March, 1972 China Pictorial asked Zhou Enlai's permission to use a picture of Mao with Edgar Snow in Yanan on its May, 1972 issue. Permission was granted. Likewise, June 1972 issue of China Reconstructs had a piece on the Sino-US friendship written by Song Qingling, using the Edgar Snow example. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China 548 183 language media also used more obscure Americans those sympathetic to China's cause- to re-build bilateral relations at the discursive level.550 However, during 1972, there was no dramatic change in the conventional discourse employed by the Chinese foreign propaganda media towards the domestic and international policies of the US government. 551 Nixon's policies in Vietnam continued to be the center of attacks and the American financial crisis was likewise interpreted as a sign of the imminent collapse of the capitalist system.552 By 1973, there were signs of gradual softening in the propaganda discourse regarding Americans. For instance, a travel anecdote published in the Peking Review although critical of American social values and in full realization of the problems plaguing capitalist economy (i.e., unemployment, drugs, etc.) still had an optimistic tone concerning the future of Sino-American relations. 553 A similar travel account published in China Reconstructs depicted the friendliness of the American people and described the riches of this highly modernized country, without failing to mention its Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 274-275. Also See, Soong Chingling, "Edgar Snow-In memoriam", Rewi Alley "Edgar SnowPoem", Dr. George Hatem "A tribute", Talitha Gerlatch "He saw the red star over China" in China Reconstructs, June 1972 550 See "Seventeen Americans and four baskets of millet", China Reconstructs, August, 1972. 551 A quantitative study on the New China News Agency's English news dispatches before and after Nixon's visit confirms this perception. According to the analysts, although there was seemingly a decline in the hostility towards the US, this was not decisive. Propaganda language fluctuated during this time. See Kai Wang, Kenneth Stark, “Red China’s Propaganda during Sino-US Rapprochement”, Journalism Quarterly, (Winter 1972), 674-678 552 See "The Third world's struggle against imperialistic plunder", China Reconstructs, September,1972. See "Dollar devaluation and capitalist world's monetary crisis", Peking Review, No.13, March 31,1972; "Independent Taiwan Scheme" Peking Review, No.15, April 14,1972; "United to defeat U.S. imperialist aggression –celebrating second anniversary of Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples, Peking Review, No.18, May 5,1972; "U.S. imperialism's new war escalation denounced", Peking Review, No.20, May 19,1972 ; "US servicemen's anti-war movement", Peking Review, No.25, June 23,1972; "No war escalation can save US imperialism from the defeat in Viet nam" and "New US Imperialist crimes against vietnamese people", Peking Review, No.27, July 7,1972; "Dollar crisis-Sign of US Imperialism's decline", Peking Review, No.29, July 21,1972; "US bombing of dykes in North Viet nam can not be denied" Peking Review, No.33, August 18,1972; "Laos: US Imperialism obstructs peaceful settlement", Peking Review, No.47, November 24,1972 553 "From Manhattan to Honolulu –A trip through the USA" Peking Review, No.35-36, September 7,1973, 43-45 184 problems.554 Likewise, Henry Kissinger's visit in 1973, which was narrated in a way to reflect the new era of mutual confidence between the governments, strengthened this new optimism. 555 However, there was no drastic change in the foreign propaganda discourse with regard to the US government per se. Pieces condemning American imperialism continued to appear in the Chinese foreign language media as late as the mid-1970s. 556 Overall, the Peking Review, China Pictorial and China Reconstructs were not able to inform their foreign readers on the extent of this transformation. Sino-US rapprochement officially ended China's decade long international isolation with several Western countries extending official recognition to the PRC instead of Taiwan. But it was not credited as such by the Chinese foreign propaganda media. The examples from these four important episodes suggest that fulfilling certain foreign propaganda tasks (creating a favorable image for China, guarding state secrets, etc.) often made it impossible for the Chinese foreign propagandists to uphold working principles such as "truthfulness" (shishi qiushi) and "treating inside and outside differently" (neiwai youbie). In the period 1949-1976, there were many instances when the Chinese foreign propaganda media had to forgo these principles which, despite its limited use, had inspired foreign propaganda work since the early 1950s.557 As I tried to illustrate in this chapter, important problems which plagued the Chinese economy in the late 1950s were not discernible from the Chinese foreign language media. Nor was the Sino-Soviet split visible until 1964, when the PRC 554 See, Li Po-ti, "Impressions of the USA", China Reconstructs, November, 1973. "Chairman Mao meets Secretary of State Kissinger", Peking Review, No.46, November 16, 1973 556 For instance, See, "The third world is a great motive force of history", China Reconstructs, January, 1975 557 Lazarick's study demonstrates that Chinese foreign language magazines did not fare better in terms of truthful representation in the 1950s. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 168 555 185 regime decided to launch its official campaign against revisionism. Likewise, there was only sketchy information on the Sino-US talks and although the Chinese foreign policy was completely transformed by 1972, one could hardly notice it by reading China Reconstructs, Peking Review or China Pictorial. Although it is clear that the late 1950s and early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) were peak points of what is recalled by the propaganda staff as "exaggerated, fake, empty" (da jia kong) reporting, the above examples show that foreign propaganda media did not observe the principles of foreign propaganda work in the early 1960s or early 1970s either. This was not necessarily because the propagandists in the PRC had an irresistible tendency to exaggerate or fabricate news but because there were inherent contradictions among the foreign propaganda principles and the tasks dictated by the general editorial line in the PRC. For instance, "guarding state secrets" meant saving face in the international arena and it often proved to be more important then providing an accurate story based on solid facts. Often it was difficult to adhere to the truthfulness policy and produce content that would serve the long-term interests of the PRC regime or maintain its positive image abroad. The natural disasters and famines which followed the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet split were such secrets, that the PRC regime could hope little to gain from. 558 Likewise, under the leftist pressures, it was difficult to uphold the "treating insiders and outsiders differently" (neiwai youbie) principle because those who did so risked being accused of prioritizing petty bourgeois demands vis-à-vis Marxist558 This is duly observed by Sidney Rittenberg: "An important aspect of the problems in CCP external propaganda in the old days is that there were many stories that told only half-truths, not reporting the negative side or the politically sensitive side of the story. Or not reporting the story at all. This is what made the CCP propaganda so unreliable, in terms of giving the whole picture of what was going on. They rarely reported difficulties, disasters, failures of Party policy, or anything else that they considered politically sensitive. The result was a parade of "sunshine stories" in the propaganda organs." (Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007) 186 Leninist orthodoxy. As we have seen in the depictions during the Cultural Revolution, domestic issues were carried one-to-one to the foreign propaganda realm, regardless of the poor knowledge of foreign readers on China's internal politics. Likewise "not forcing oneself upon others" (bu qiangjia yu ren) was unobservable when the general editorial line dictated the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought and anti-revisionism. Chinese sources treat the political campaigns as exceptional disruptions with regard to the observance of these principles. This chapter, however, shows that these principles were non-observable even in the periods of relative normalcy i.e., early 1960s and early 1970s. Therefore, Chinese foreign propagandists' real ordeal in the period 1949-1976 was to balance the inherent contradictions between political priorities and working principles, which they had little success in the end. Maintaining the correct editorial line and pleasing their overseas readers and listeners was another such challenge. We will turn to this topic in Chapter 5, which focuses on the issue of audience and feedback. 187 FIGURE 1 People's China -China's first foreign-language magazine People's China, Feb.1, 1950, No.3 188 FIGURE 2 –Peking Review (Great Leap Forward era) Peking Review, No.98, 1958 189 FIGURE 3- China Pictorial (Great Leap Forward era) China Pictorial, 1960, No.9 190 FIGURE 4 –China Pictorial cover (after the Great Leap's end) China Pictorial, March 1961, No.3 191 FIGURE 5–Peking Review (Sino-Soviet split) Peking Review, July 17, 1964, No.29 192 FIGURE 6–China Reconstructs (Cultural Revolution era) China Reconstructs, October 1966, No.10 193 FIGURE 7 China Reconstructs (Cultural Revolution era -II) China Reconstructs, October 1971, No.10 194 FIGURE 8 Peking Review (Cultural Revolution era) Peking Review, April 4, 1969, No.14 195 CHAPTER 4 CHANNELS of DISTRIBUTION During the Cold War, the People's Republic of China adopted various methods to disseminate its world view abroad. Delegation visits, movie screenings and picture exhibitions were some of the channels used by the PRC regime to circulate its foreign propaganda items (duiwai xuanchuan pin). All of these activities were aimed at displaying New China's successes in economic reconstruction, social change and foreign policy. Hence they were integral to the PRC regime's foreign propaganda work. This chapter, however, limits itself to the circulation of Chinese foreign propaganda mass media, i.e., Radio Peking's shortwave broadcasts and Foreign Language Press publications. As noted in Chapter 2, the bulk of commercial circulation was handled by the International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) through its wholesale and retail distributors abroad. Another major channel was provided by the PRC regime's embassies and consulates, which circulated these items via noncommercial means, such as gift-giving or free samples.559 Where direct links were not available to the PRC regime or when ad hoc situations made it necessary, other channels were also used. The circulation of China's foreign propaganda materials during the Cold War years was directly related to the PRC regime's foreign policy objectives. In the early 1950s, the main emphasis was on propagating that New China was better then Old China, with its economy in rapid development and society in the course of progressive 559 PRC Foreign Ministry archival data displays the extent of embassies' and consulates' involvement in the foreign propaganda work. Unfortunately the archival sources used in this study are limited to the 1950s. Archival data on the 1960s, which would have been very valuable for this research, was not yet declassified at the time of my stay in Beijing (July 2007- March 2008). 196 change. During this period, the main target audiences were in nearby Asian countries, most of which needed immediate reassurance to ease their (mostly US-induced) concerns over the prospects of an unpredictable communist neighbor. After the Geneva and Bandung conferences of the mid-1950s, the Chinese propaganda machine sought to reach larger audiences in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s gave another boost to the distribution of foreign propaganda media, which now emphasized anti-revisionism in addition to its continued attacks against American imperialism. Ever since the early 1950s, the Chinese propaganda machine aimed to reach the middle-of the road readers/listeners, who, theoretically, were curious and perhaps a little sympathetic towards China but also ignorant about it, as they did not have a thorough understanding of this country's realities. The emphasis on this target group was criticized as a petty bourgeois idea during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s but it was re-instated by early 1960s only to be attacked again during the Cultural Revolution. In the period 1966-1969, China was portrayed as the global revolutionary center, whose unique experiences could be used by militants all around the world. Now the target audiences were leftist groups, among them college youth and Third World revolutionaries. Throughout the 1960s, China's foreign language media assisted the PRC regime in carving up its own sphere of influence within the predominantly pro-Soviet communist circles. But how did the PRC regime reach its overseas audiences in the first place? This chapter aims to examine the methods of dissemination and distribution that were available to the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus to reach its distant audiences in the period 1949-1976. The main objective pursued here is to display the extent of setbacks that affected China's foreign propaganda circulation, a critical issue 197 which was either neglected or downplayed in the conventional propaganda scholarship. Most of these setbacks, such as Radio Peking's timeliness problem or the International Bookstore's problems of overstocking and lack of co-ordination were caused by the inherent inadequacies of the Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus. There were also important external factors, such as the restrictions employed by host governments, which, due to several reasons, did not welcome Chinese foreign language media in their territory. The PRC foreign propaganda apparatus took various measures to amend these problems –albeit with limited success. This chapter will discuss the regime's foreign propaganda distribution work under three sections: The first section will briefly describe the range of foreign propaganda items available to the PRC regime in the period 1949-1976. The second section will outline the channels of dissemination and discuss the problems of distribution work under three sub-headings: 1) Radio Peking broadcasts; 2) FLP publications, whose commercial distribution was done by the International Bookstore and non-commercial distribution by the PRC's overseas representations and other miscellaneous channels. The third section will examine the case of China Books and Periodicals, which became the PRC regime's only wholesale outlet in the US by the 1960s. 4.1. Range of Items The volume of Chinese propaganda items aimed for foreign consumption followed a linear growth rate from the establishment of the regime in 1949 until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. Right after the establishment of the People's Republic propaganda items became a necessity for China's official representations, although 198 those items were rather scarce by then. 560 In a meeting convened by the Foreign Ministry in 1950 to discuss the question of external propaganda, some members of China's overseas embassies complained about the difficulty of fulfilling the propaganda tasks with so few and such low-quality items at their disposal.561 As we have seen in Chapter 2, the division of labor among various foreign propaganda organizations has gradually improved throughout the 1950s. By the mid-1960s, PRC foreign propaganda machine was producing a wide variety of items for foreign audiences562. These items can be analyzed under three categories: radio broadcasts, published material, souvenirs and other sideline items. 4.1.1. Radio Broadcasts Radio Peking was responsible for the transmission of China's radio broadcasts in foreign languages. The number of foreign languages used in Radio Peking broadcasts grew substantially over the years. The selection of broadcasting languages reflected PRC regime's preference over "who to influence and when". A brief analysis of these languages and their launch dates is necessary to understand PRC regime's foreign 560 According to one Foreign Ministry document, available items were limited to: films on the liberation of Northeast China, feature movies on Chinese women and pictures from the battles in the war of liberation, economic reconstruction, and people's lives –such as trade union meetings, land reform etc. See, "Waijiao bu guanyu waijiao xuanchuan wenti de baogao" (Report of the Foreign Ministry on the question of foreign propaganda) Archive No ; 113-00055-03 1 Release Date ; 1950.3.23 \1950.3.23 561 In the early 1950s, China's overseas representations lacked even the most basic items to use for decoration purposes in their offices, let alone having extra items to distribute in the host country. For the specific complaints of China's ambassador in India, See, "Zhang Hanfu fuwaizhang zhaoji taolun youguan zhongguo zhuwai shi jieji daibiao tuandeng duiwai xuanchuan wenti huiyi jilu zhaiyao" (Summary record of the meeting organized by Secretary Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu to discuss the foreign propaganda problem with the relevant diplomatic envoys and delegations located abroad) Archive No: 102-00129-01 1 Release Date ; 1950.4.7 \1950.4.7 562 An advertisement which appeared on a foreign propaganda magazine in 1964 is illustrative of the broad extent of these items. See, advertisement on Peking Review, May 8, 1964: "Guozi Shudian: We export to all parts of the world: books and periodicals in Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian, German, Japanese, Italian, Arabic, Hindi, Esperanto and other languages; prints, picture albums, scrolls and postcards; Chinese and wood-block paintings, on separate mounts, on scrolls and in albums; papercuts, long-playing records, color slides, etc. Special advantageous terms to dealers. Our subscription department and mail order department also give direct service to readers in all countries. Catalogues available. " 199 policy priorities. 563 In the first five years after its establishment, the communist Chinese regime was preoccupied with its attempt to create a friendly image for her Asian neighbors. In 1950, China launched four languages in addition to the original English and Japanese. These languages were specifically aimed at her closest neighbors: Indonesian, Vietnamese, Thai and Burmese. Not surprisingly, Korean language broadcasts immediately followed the start of the Korean War in 1950. Radio Peking broadcasts saw its first noticeable expansion in 1956, not much later than the Bandung Conference, when China displayed a willingness to lead the Third World countries. While Spanish language broadcasts (1956) became a direct channel to reach Latin American audiences, the launch of Arabic (1957), Persian (1957) and Turkish (1957) was intended to reach Middle Eastern audiences. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s Radio Peking launched Russian language broadcasts, through which China sought to win Soviet comrades to her side in the recent dispute. 564 Likewise, Chinese cadres launched Serbo-Croatian broadcasts to influence the Yugoslav comrades under the spell of "Tito revisionism" in 1961. A similar pattern emerged with the broadcasts directed at India. As the SinoIndian relations worsened during the early 1960s, Radio Peking added to the number of indigenous languages in the broadcasts aimed at Indian audiences. 565 In 1968, 563 See, Table 8 Radio Peking Broadcasting Languages and Launch Dates (1947-1976) The link between the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations and increase in broadcasting hours is observed in many earlier studies. See James C.Y. Chu, "People's republic of China" in John A. Lent, ed., Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific: A continental survey of radio and television, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 40. Also See, USIA's explanation: "Before the public surfacing of the Sino-Soviet controversy, Radio Peking broadcast directly to neither the Soviet Union nor any Eastern European country ( …) By 1969, Radio Peking was broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in six indigenous languages of the area –Albanian, Czech, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Serbo-Croatian." See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 50 565 As USIA analysts observed: "In 1956, Radio Peking began to broadcast to the area. The initial effort, a program in English, was directed to South Asia. Not until the border controversy soured relations of Peking with New Delhi, however, did Radio Peking broadcast to South Asia in any indigenous language. Hindi was introduced in 1959, followed by Tamil, Urdu, and Bengali in 1963, 1966 and 1969 respectively. Thus it appears that during the period of Peking-New Delhi harmony, Peking relied on people’s diplomacy to cement relations between the two countries but as bilateral relations deteriorated 564 200 during the Prague Spring, China launched its Czech broadcasts this time to support Czechoslovakian comrades against the Soviet invasion. 566 Radio Peking's typical program content was composed of news items on domestic and international events (especially China-related foreign policy issues), reviews, specialized items and music. Although program content slightly changed over time, news and reviews always dominated the content, which made China's radio broadcasts a source of political opinion rather than entertainment. Radio Peking program reflected slight differences in emphasis with regard to the particularities of target audiences along linguistic, geographical and religious divisions. 4.1.2. Published Material: Books, Periodicals, Pamphlets, and Picture Albums The bulk of China's foreign language books, pamphlets and periodicals were published by the Foreign Languages Press. Similar to Radio Peking, the editorial policy of the Foreign Languages Press was determined by the changes in the international situation. As many items were produced in the form of booklets and pamphlets, it was not too difficult for the Chinese propagandists to catch up with current political trends. There are many items that demonstrate this flexibility, such as the publication of "Oppose U.S. Military provocations in the Taiwan Straits Area" in 1958, soon after the outbreak of Taiwan Straits crisis and the "Documents on the SinoIndian Boundary Question" in 1960. On such important topics, the Foreign Languages Press put up a translation team which would work in secrecy under the Peking found it important to present its case over Radio Peking in Indian vernacular languages. This became particularly important from Peking’s point of view after India embargoed the importation of Chinese printed materials and prohibited the distribution of propaganda materials by the PRC Embassy in New Delhi." See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 43 566 See James C.Y. Chu, "People's republic of China" in John A. Lent, ed., Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific: A continental survey of radio and television, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 40. 201 Central Committee's guidance. One such editorial team was gathered during the SinoSoviet split: After the split, the Communist Party began issuing a numbered series of polemics attacking Khrushchev for toadying to the West for revisionism, for expansionism, and for imperialism. But the Chinese leaders, quite rightly, didn’t trust their own press, or the press in other countries, to translate such sensitive materials accurately. So they put together another elite team. (…) these polemics were being sent to us directly from the drafters. (…) One early polemic was called "On Nehru's Philosophy". It was about the Sino-Indian border conflict, and was written to demonstrate that the Chinese road –not the Soviet one, which was becoming too revisionist –was the right one for the Third World. (…)The polemic went through more than two dozen drafts. (…) Through successive drafts, more and more of the document was covered with Mao's florid calligraphy until, in its final version, to my eye it was all Mao.567 Unlike the pamphlets and booklets which dealt with specific topics and hence were short, the publication of regular books required a long-term editorial policy. Not surprisingly, most of the books translated for foreign audiences had already been published in China for domestic readers. 568 Undoubtedly, most were on politicalideological topics, such as important policy documents and the works of leading party members. Most permanent publications were Marxist classics, works authored by Mao Zedong and other leading CCP figures. 569 Among these, Mao's own works gradually moved to the center stage. In 1960, an elite team was gathered in Beijing to make the English translation of the fourth volume of the Selected Works of Mao TseTung and revise the old translations which were published throughout the 1950s.570 567 Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. 262-264 568 See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 180 569 See, for instance, the advertisement on Peking Review, February 23, 1973: "Guozi Shudian: (China publications center): We export books (in Chinese and other languages) by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; Mao Tse-Tung's works; political and theoretical books; literature and art; and books on education, history, geography and other subjects. Periodicals and newspapers in Chinese and other languages; woven silk and printed pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Chairman Mao; scrolls and albums; pictures, prints and other reproductions, picture postcards and book-marks, Chinese folk scissor-cuts, long playing Chinese records. Orders are welcome. Catalogues upon request. Guozi Shudian PO Box 399, Peking China." 570 Sidney Rittenberg –who worked at the English broadcasts section of Radio Peking, became part of this elite team, which he describes as follows: "We were truly an elite group: the foremost scholars, economists, and English speakers in China. There were fourteen members of the team, nine Chinese and four foreigners. Our leader was C.Y.W. Meng, the veteran economist with whom I had walked 202 Except for the Selected Works, which became a permanent item for external distribution during the Cold War years, the Foreign Languages Press also published the Little Red Book (Quotations from Chairman Mao-Tse Tung) in various languages. 571 This compilation proved to be the FLP's only best-seller during the period 1949-1976. Other than political works, the Foreign Languages Press also published exemplary works from Chinese literature. Selected works for translation included contemporary (socialist) novels, May Fourth literature (Lu Xun and Ba Jin's works being major examples) and at least until the Cultural Revolution, exemplary works of traditional Chinese literature. Books written by foreign friends of China, such as Edgar Snow and Anna Louis Strong, 572 also became popular items. The Foreign Languages Press also published picture albums, cartoons and children's books, all of which, needless to say, had a revolutionary message. Works on the history, geography, and culture of China constituted a smaller category in the overall list. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the PRC regime also had various foreign language periodicals, the most important among them, the China Pictorial, China Reconstructs and the Peking Review. In addition to these synthetic magazines, which aimed at general readership, there were also several specialized periodicals such as Evergreen, Women of China and Chinese Medicine, as well as magazines aimed at specific language groups, such as the Indonesian and Japanese editions of People's much of the way from Kalgan to Yanan in the fall of 1946." Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. 251 571 “Quotations of Mao Tse-tung” has been issued in 36 languages. See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, xiii 572 Anna Louis Strong also published a series of personal notes under the heading of "Letter from China", which she began writing for a few friends. Soon, however, the letters became popular and foreign readers wanted to subscribe. For the US readers, subscription was not even an option due to the official restrictions over trade with China. See “Personal Notes”, Letter From China, April 12, 1963 (Hoover Institution, Arne Swabeck Collection, Box 15) 203 China and People's China Report in Esperanto. 573 Although moderate in circulation figures, these periodicals were published in various languages and they were designed to reach different segments of foreign readers. 4.1.3. Souvenirs: Posters, Stamps, Paper-cuts, Calendars, Scrolls, Badges As compared to publications, souvenirs were of secondary importance within the total propaganda output. Whereas publications and broadcasts were able to communicate political ideas in great detail, souvenirs and other sideline items only had symbolic value. These items included, among other things, posters, calendars, postage stamps, paper-cuts, and scrolls. One significant souvenir item was the Mao badge, which was mass produced in China during the Cultural Revolution.574 These badges were also made available in foreign languages and sent abroad. 575 Throughout the Cold War years, badges and other sideline items were circulated abroad by the International Bookstore to promote its relations with client bookstores and individual subscribers. 4.2. Channels of Dissemination: Challenges and Setbacks 4.2.1. Radio Peking Broadcasts The impressive statistics on Radio Peking's total broadcasting hours (which by the mid-1960s placed China a close third behind the USSR and the US in the propaganda 573 For the great variety of Chinese periodicals circulating in Europe by 1960s, See Table 100. For a detailed study on Mao badges and its use in China, See Melissa Schrift, Biography of A Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2001 575 According to Bill Bishop, who owns a collection of these badges: "The most common theme depicted in badge sets was that of the "holy sites of the revolution". In late 1968 badges made for foreigners also appeared. Some were made for sale at the Canton Trade Fair and some for consumption by foreign experts and foreign guests in China. Most were in English, with slogans such as "Long Live Chairman Mao" or "Long Live Mao Zedong Thought!", but I have collected two that were directed towards a French audience. They both carry the slogan "Vive la Pensee de Mao Tse-tung!" I have collected two sets whose slogans are in English. One contains six badges that depict holy sites of the revolution and carry the slogan "Long Live the Victory of Chairman Mao's Proletarian Revolutionary Line!" Another has nine badges that show various milestones along the Long March." See, Bill Bishop, "Badges of Chairman Mao Zedong", (http://museums.cnd.org/CR/old/maobadge/) 574 204 race) can be misleading if one considers the various problems embedded in the radio transmission work. First, Chinese broadcasts did not always have a clear reception at the target localities. 576 Besides, there was the problem of jamming and other restrictions employed by non-friendly governments.577 Secondly, the lack of timely broadcasts made the program content irrelevant even in the localities where Radio Peking could be heard. This problem was very much due to the working of the Chinese propaganda apparatus itself. As discussed in Chapter 2, news items broadcasted by Radio Peking mostly originated from the Xinhua New Agency and every item was subject to approval several times before it was broadcasted. As Xinhua's speed was good only for the newspapers, Radio Peking would often broadcast news two or three days later then that of foreign radio stations. This was partly because the broadcast content was taken very seriously by the PRC leadership. If a problem occurred, junior cadres would have to take individual responsibility, which clearly, nobody wanted. There were also delays caused by the central editorial department's overstocking the news items and not timely releasing them to the individual departments, prolonged by further delays in the translation process.578 Hence it was not uncommon that a Western radio station would broadcast the same news item before Radio Peking did. In fact, thanks to the Western governments' monitoring of China's domestic broadcasts and their timely intelligence 576 Jin Chugao notes that Radio Peking's broadcasts could not be heard clearly (or not heard at all) in many localities. According to him, the US government deliberately exaggertated the statistics on Chinese broadcasts in order to legitimize the growth of its own propaganda organization. See, Jin Chugao, "Wo guo duiwai guangbo fazhan shi shang guanghui de yi ye" (A magnificent page from the history of our international broadcasts' development" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 353 577 For instance, Indonesia, once a major target, has been closed to the PRC in 1966 for virtually all but covert radio contact. See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 34 578 See Ma Qingxiong, "Wo yu duiwai guangbo" (Me and foreign broadcasts) in Gao Jiming ed. Nanwang suiyui [Unforgettable Years], Guoji guangbo diantai (guoji guangbo congshu) bianweihui bian, Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,21-22 205 reports, foreign radio stations were faster then Radio Peking even on topics concerning China's internal affairs. 579 This was a source of displeasure even for China's own propagandists580 let alone its unfavorable impact for overseas listeners. 4.2. 2. Foreign Language Publications 4.2.2. 1. Distribution via International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) The International Bookstore was the core agency responsible for the commercial distribution of Chinese foreign language media abroad. To this purpose, the International Bookstore maintained a worldwide network of wholesale and retail distributors. However, as the fundamental aim of China's foreign propaganda apparatus was to disseminate as much material to the widest possible audience, there were ambiguities with regard to the commercial outlook of this work unit. Because cost analysis was regarded as secondary to the political task, the International Bookstore also engaged in the free distribution of publications.581 The International Bookstore's official circulation figures show the extent of linear growth in the distribution work in the period 1949-1976. Although no circulation figures are available for the first two years of the Chinese regime, it is clear that distribution was minimal with 8 types of propaganda items in 4 foreign languages. It should also be noted that, mainly owing to the impact of the Korean War, 579 One such instance was the Voice of America broadcast on the arrest of Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, and Luo Ruoqing's at the start of the Cultural Revolution. The news came as a shock even to a party member like Sidney Rittenberg at the time: "I stayed calm because I didn't believe it. "That's impossible", I said. "You know how Voice of America is. Every ten minutes they are reporting that Mao has died. This is just another one of their little games." The room quieted down and everyone listened to me. After all, I was a member of the party, the one with the inside contacts. I was the one who knew what was going on." Yet, to the surprise of Rittenberg and other propaganda personnel, Mao soon announced the launch of the Great Prolaterian Cultural Revolution. See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. 298 580 Interview with Rukiye Hacı, retired announcer in Turkish broadcasts section, China Radio International, October, 26, 2007 at her home in Beijing. 581 See, Wang Fushi, "Wo canjia gongzuo de qianhou" (The period when I joined the work), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 580. 206 the International Bookstore was in financial distress in 1950. 582 According to the International Bookstore's official data, annual circulation of books grew from a mere 40,000 volumes in 1951 to 4,555,000 in 1976, while the annual circulation of periodicals grew from 670,000 in 1951 to 14,760,000 in 1976.583 In the first decade of the PRC rule (1949-1959) the International Bookstore distributed 1,493 types of books in 20 different languages (including Chinese) abroad with a total publication figure above 12 million volumes. 584 Throughout the period 1949-76, Mao's works were the most popular items. By 1963, International Bookstore has distributed fifty times as many Mao Zedong-authored books then in 1950 –a total of 3,240,000 volumes in fifteen languages and in 133 countries.585 1968 was a peak year for the circulation of books, a figure close to 8 million, which owed mostly to the Little Red Book factor, China's only best-seller propaganda item during the Cold War years. By contrast, the circulation of foreign language magazines dropped significantly during the Cultural Revolution –a seemingly inconsistent pattern, which can be explained with the shift in the readership profile586. As the middle-of-the-road subscribers of Chinese foreign language periodicals have been buying these items over an extended period of time, they became increasingly uncomfortable with the radical shifts in editorial policy and excessively ideological content during the Cultural Revolution. 587 By contrast, customers for China's 582 See, Zhu Xi, "International Bookstore caochuang ji" (Record of the establishment of International Bookstore), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 556 583 See Table 6. 584 See Shi nian lai duiwai xuanchuan he wenhua ziliao jiaoliu tongji biao 1949-1959 [Statistical chart for foreign propaganda and cultural exchange sources in a decade: 1949-1959] Beijing: Wenhua bu duiwai wenhua lianluo wei yuan hui si si (bian), 1960 1 585 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 174 586 See the 1965-69 interval on Table 6. 587 Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign Publications Personnel Training Center, Beijing 207 political/theoretical books were mostly young dissidents whose interest was limited to the ideological issues. During the Maoist decades, while the International Bookstore was encouraged to reach customers (readers) through whatever means possible (including the intermediaries, brotherly political parties, progressive individuals, etc.) bulk of the distribution work was conducted via its commercial distribution network abroad. China's initial distribution network consisted of bookstores which have been distributing Soviet publications. 588 In the course of the 1950s the International Bookstore gradually established a larger overseas network which consisted of individual bookstores and wholesale buyers. 589 Its mailing department would also receive orders directly from individual subscribers.590 The International Bookstore had three types of partners abroad that acted as direct channels of distribution: capitalist bookstores, progressive bookstores and a group of voluntary individual distributors (also readers) whose effectiveness was limited but still got support and encouragement by the PRC regime. In 1962, the International Bookstore's worldwide distribution network constituted of 120 left-wing bookstores (affiliated with the communist parties or progressive organizations), 200 capitalist bookstores (not selling political items), 20 Overseas Chinese bookstores and several tens of individual sellers. 591 Although the PRC regime preferred left-wing 588 See, Wang Fushi, "Wo canjia gongzuo de qianhou" (The period when I joined the work), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 580. Although Soviet assistance was substantial in this realm, relying solely on the Soviet network was no longer a possible option by the early 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet dispute came to the fore. The case of China Books and Periodicals in the US, which is discussed below, illustrates the difficulties in a local context. 589 See Table 7. 590 See “China and Africa Part II (1962-1964)”, Background brief [YB 351 (Int. Rels. Africa 6)] China Topics, October 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 6 (China Topics September-December 1965) 4 591 See, "Duiwai wenwei dangzu guanyu gaijin waiwen shukan duiwai faxing gongzuo de baogao" (caogao) (International Culture Committee party organization's report concerning the reform of the distribution work for foreign languages publications), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao 208 bookstores at the time of entry into the local market, it also acknowledged that the capitalist bookstores had advantages in terms of providing a wider access to the market. However, in most countries, bookstores which agreed to sell China's political items were small to medium-size enterprises that controlled relatively weak delivery networks in the host country. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the International Bookstore tried to reach agreements with large-scale distributors in the capitalist countries but did not succeed in its attempts.592 The International Bookstore's summary report on the development of its distribution work in Africa is illustrative of China's gradual penetration into regional markets. 593 According to this report, while the International Bookstore could only utilize indirect methods between 1950 and 1951 (sending publications from Europe and Hong Kong) and had only narrow access in the period 1952-1956, its distribution work entered a new era after 1957. This was due to the establishment of an operational base in Egypt by the same year, which brought the book circulation in Africa up to 210,000 copies, a figure one and a half times greater then the previous four years. The same report also indicated that China's establishment of diplomatic relations with Guinea, Ghana and Mali in 1959 led to further growth in distribution, especially in West Africa. In Asia, the Peace Bookstore in Hong Kong started to play a major role in this distribution network by the early 1960s, especially in reaching countries which imposed mailing restrictions over publications sent directly from xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 263 592 See, Cao Jianfei "Duiwai faxing de huigu yu sikao" (Memories and thoughts on distribution abroad), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 658 593 The report "Wo guo chuban wu zai feizhou faxing de chubu zongjie" (Preliminary summary for the distribution of our country's publications in Africa) was prepared in 1962. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 138 209 China.594 But the most important breakthrough in terms of deeper market penetration in the capitalist world came only after the easing of Sino-US bilateral relations in 1972. The subsequent period brought a significant increase in the export volume of Chinese foreign language publications into the American and Japanese market.595 China's foreign propaganda publications were made available to overseas readers at affordable prices.596 The periodicals and books were heavily subsidized by the government and hence their prices were less demanding than rival publications.597 There were also special discounts for readers who lived in poorer countries.598 This 594 For a detailed discussion of the Peace Bookstore, See Xiao Zi, "Zai xianggang heping shudian de rizi" (Life in the Peace Bookstore in Hong Kong), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 571-574 595 In 1972, besides its improved status in the US market, International Bookstore also established relations with the biggest publication monopoly in Japan –with whom the relations had come to a stop in 1958. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 276 596 For instance, see the price list for China Reconstructs for the year 1958. "China Reconstructs Subscription rates (postage included) Single copy One year Two year Australia, New Zealand A£-/1/A£-/10/A£-/18/Burma 50 pya 5.00 kyat 9.00 kyat France 50 fr. 500 fr. 900 fr. Hong Kong HK $1.00 HK $10.00 $HK 18.00 India, Ceylon, Pakistan Rs.0.30 Rs.3.00 Rs.5.40 Indonesia Rp.3.00 Rp. 30.00 Rp.54.00 Israel 100 prut 1,000 prut 1,800 prut Italy Lire 100 Lire 1,000 Lire 1,800 Japan Yen 65 Yen 650 Yen 1,70 Switzerland Sw. fr.0.50 Sw.fr.5.00 Sw.fr.9.00 UK & sterling countries £-/1£-/10/£/18/USA, Canada & American countries US $0.30 US$3.00 US$5.40 Subscriptions may be placed through our dealers. (See partial list on subscription flap.) If you have remittance problems or other questions, write to our Business Office, 40-A Tung Huangcheng Ken, Peking, China.", China Reconstructs, January 1958 597 See “China and the Middle East and North Africa”, Background brief [YB 354 (Int. Rels. M.E.-3)] China Topics, November 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 6 (China Topics September-December 1965) 4 598 One observer notes: "Peking Review, for example, including airmail costs, is sent to subscribers at different rates: in the UK it costs ₤1.0.0 for 52 issues a year but in the developing territories it is sent by airmail to subscribers for anything from 1s6d or 21s. upwards for a year’s supply according to the Chinese evaluation of the means of the peoples in the countries concerned, and the CPR’s degree of interest in that territory". See “The Press and the Cultural Revolution” (China’s Publications), [YB 530(Rectification 41)] China Topics, July 4, 1969, (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 42, File 1 (China Topics 1969) 4 210 was especially true in the least developed regions, such as Africa.599 But the PRC regime also paid attention not to set the price much lower then the affordable line. This was mainly because the regime did not want foreign readers to be attracted to China's publications only due to their extraordinarily cheap price (lianjia qingxiao). For instance, when in 1959, leading cadres noticed that the China Pictorial was being sold for a rather cheap price in India, Burma, France, Japan, and Iraq, they called for an adjustment of the price according to local market conditions.600 Besides keeping the price of publications at affordable rates, the International Bookstore also used other promotion methods, similar to those used by commercial companies in capitalist countries. These included, among other things, the use of advertisements, offerings of special discounts, and the sending of free samples and gifts. The International Bookstore promoted its publications by placing ads in China's foreign language magazines and FLP book catalogues. Radio Peking broadcasts, likewise, mentioned China's most recent propaganda items. Because most books were low priced, the International Bookstore was not able to spend extravagantly on promotion, which made buying commercials in foreign newspapers and magazines a rare event601. However, the PRC regime spared extra amounts for promotion activities during special occasions. For instance, in order to celebrate the tenth anniversary of PRC's establishment, International Bookstore started a huge promotion campaign in 599 See, for instance, the case of Zanzibar: "The New China News Agency in Zanzibar is run by Shaikh Abdurrahman Mohamed Babu. His mobile bookshop sells communist literature at low prices – newspapers, magazines and books. Air mail editions of Moscow News selling at 20 cents, and Peking Review at 25 cents, while Keep the Red Flag flying by Liang Pin (525 pages, Foreign Languages Press, Peking) costs four shillings. (East African Standard, May 11)." See “Communist relations with Africa”, Communism and Africa, June 1962 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 45, File: 6, Communism and Africa, June 1962-Nov 1966) 16 600 See International Culture Committee's report to State Council Foreign Office "Guanyu 1960 nian waiwen qikan faxing gongzuo he qikan zhonglei de baogao" (Report on the foreign language periodicals' distribution work and types of periodicals for the year 1960) in Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 99 601 See, Cao Jianfei "Duiwai faxing de huigu yu sikao" (Memories and thoughts on overseas distribution), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 662. 211 1959, which included "placing of 212 advertisements in 64 foreign newspapers; organizing 61 book exhibits; distribution of 1,000,000 promotion items for 33 types of books, and 160,000 calendars"602. The individual reader subscriptions accounted for one third of all distribution in foreign language magazines.603 Hence the International Bookstore worked hard to satisfy the needs of its existing subscribers. For instance, when an individual subscription expired, the International Bookstore promptly sent a letter to its readers reminding them to renew their subscription. The cordial language used in these renewal letters suggests that the payment of subscription fees was of secondary importance as compared to maintaining the loyalty of the subscriber.604 In order to enlarge the subscriber base, various promotional methods were used, including the sending of free items, such as calendars.605 Towards the end of each year, various advertisements would appear in the Chinese foreign language periodicals that offered generous gifts for their long-time subscribers. 606 Another reliable method for enlarging the distribution network was utilizing the existing readers' personal contacts. 602 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 93 603 In 1962, while one third of the periodicals was distributed via subscriptions, the remaining two thirds was distributed by International Bookstore's partner bookstores abroad. See, "Duiwai wenwei dangzu guanyu gaijin waiwen shukan duiwai faxing gongzuo de baogao" (caogao) (International Culture Committee party organization's report concerning the reform of the distribution work for foreign languages publications), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shi liao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 264 604 See Table 9, "Letter from Guozi Shudian" 605 See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973 185 606 See the advertisement on Peking Review, Sep.16, 1958: "Subscribe or renew NOW and you will receive: A 1959 wall calendar with 6 reproductions of classical Chinese paintings in colour…with every 6-month subscription to Peking Review. A copy of the newly published AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF CHINA, an indispensable reference book of over 400 pages in English, and the wall calendar…with every 1-year subscription to Peking Review). Also See, See, Peking Review, Dec.1, 1959, No.48: "Special gift offer for subscribers to Peking Review: the weekly of Chinese news and views in English –A copy of the newly published HISTORY OF THE MODERN CHINESE REVOLUTION, an indispensable reference book of 628 pages in English, will be sent free to every subscriber who takes out a one-year subscription or renewal for 1960. This offer is open till the end of February 1960.—every subscription or renewal placed before the end of this year will receive a free calendar for 1960." 212 This was done through the issuance of free sample coupons. The existing subscriber would fill in those coupons with the name and contact information of a friend or an acquaintance, who they thought might be interested in these publications.607 In the period 1949-1976 the International Bookstore followed a number of principles in its distribution work. During this period, China's foreign language media was disseminated both in socialist and capitalist bloc countries, albeit via different channels. At least in the 1950s, the PRC regime used official channels in the socialist countries and mostly aimed at reaching the party elite, rather than the people at large. In the capitalist-colonial settings, by contrast, China opted for commercial distribution, third party links or clandestine channels. Throughout the 1950s, an important principle which guided distribution work was the "treatment with regard to differences" (qubie duidai) concerning the socialist and capitalist/colonial countries. According to this principle, in the capitalist-colonial settings, the International Bookstore had to follow the spirit of a "long-term policy" (xishui changliu), which had to be reflected in both the circulation figures and the nature of propaganda items. This policy was put to use in the early 1950s and was respected until the end of the decade, when it came under attack during the Great Leap Forward, and later completely disregarded during the Cultural Revolution. The long-term policy (xishui changliu) concerning the distribution in the capitalist-colonial countries meant: "1. avoiding arousal of political suspicions, 2. avoiding hasty, rushed distribution, 3. maintaining long-term planning, 4. treating with respect to differences (qubie duidai), 5. continuing distribution even when there is a favorable situation, 6. moving gradually from soft to hard items (cong ruan dao 607 See, the "Coupon" on Peking Review, August 31, 1962, No.35: "Sample Copies for overseas readers: we shall be pleased to mail free sample copies of Peking Review to your friends. Just clip this coupon and fill in the names and addresses of people who you think will be interested. Send it to: Peking Review Pai Wan Chuang, Peking (37) China; Name/address (2) Your name/address" 213 ying), 7. building trust with partner bookstores, get to know them and draw lessons from previous experience, 8. not forcing yourselves on people (bu qiang jia yu ren)."608 Hence the International Bookstore had to strike a difficult balance between enlarging the market for Chinese publications in a capitalist/colonial setting and refraining from provoking reactions by distributing too many or excessively political publications.609 In the early 1960s, following the Sino-Soviet split, the distribution in the socialist countries through official party contacts and embassies was no longer possible. Due to the changes in the editorial content of China's foreign language magazines, host governments imposed various restrictions. As a response, China started targeting masses in the socialist countries with the launch of its direct radio broadcasts. Likewise, in the capitalist-colonial countries, the International Bookstore enlarged its commercial distribution network during the 1960s. As compared to the 1950s, the PRC regime was much less cautious in its foreign propaganda circulation. Amidst international isolation, the older emphasis on "long-term policy" (xishui changliu) was seemingly gone. Over the period 1949-1976, the distribution work was negatively affected by several problems inherent in the PRC propaganda apparatus. One persistent problem was related to the ambiguous relationship between the commercial distribution (maoyi faxing) and non-commercial distribution (fei maoyi faxing). In the early 1950s, the leadership that had defined the International Bookstore as a work unit, which, in principle, was responsible for the commercial distribution of China's foreign language 608 See, Shao Gongwen, "Huiyi wangshi" (Remembering the Past), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 562 609 See the Publications General Department's (Chuban zongshu) report on International Bookstore. Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 40 214 publications.610 Although there was a general emphasis on the commercial nature of this organization, the International Bookstore was advised from time to time to take part in the non-commercial distribution of publications.611 It is clear that there was some resistance from the International Bookstore in this matter, as the limited capacity of this agency restrained its ability to cope with the intricacies of noncommercial distribution. 612 But the confusion ensued. The fact that the same propaganda items were used for both commercial and non-commercial distribution caused displeasure among the overseas bookstore owners and made the sale of the items more difficult. 613 In 1958, the International Bookstore informed the leading organs that due to the lack of clear-cut boundaries between commercial and noncommercial distribution, some bookstores did not see the International Bookstore as a commercial enterprise. 614 Yet, although there was continuous emphasis on the commercial nature of the International Bookstore, this work unit was not allowed to concentrate exclusively on the commercial distribution and it was constantly 610 See, for example, General Publications Department (Chuban Zongshu) regulation of 1954 on the character of International Bookstore. Cao Jianfei "Duiwai faxing de huigu yu sikao" (Memories and thoughts on distribution abroad), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 654 611 Mass organizations under the Central Committee were partly responsible for the non-commercial distribution of publications in the capitalist and colonized countries. One of the duties entrusted with the International Bookstore was to supply these work units with publications. The mailing had to be done by these work units themselves, although International Bookstore was often asked by these work units to assist the mailing work too. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 37-38 612 In 1953, International Bookstore's summary work report indicated that this organization's workload constituted 82% of commercial distribution and 18% of non-commercial distribution. The report pointed out various drawbacks in International Bookstore's sharing the burden of non commercial distribution and suggested that a specialized agency established for this purpose. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 40 613 See, Cao Jianfei "Duiwai faxing de huigu yu sikao" (Memories and thoughts on distribution abroad), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 656 614 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 89 215 reminded of the ideological nature of propaganda work. 615 Towards the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1975, the need to clarify the relationship between propaganda and commerce was still on the International Bookstore's agenda as a lingering, unresolved problem.616 There was also the issue of other work units' involvement in the distribution process, which made the overall planning difficult for the International Bookstore and its affiliate organization, the Foreign Languages Press. 617 In a similar fashion, autonomous work units such as the China Welfare Institute, which published the China Reconstructs magazine was not content with the International Bookstore's monopoly over distribution work. Song Qingling, head of this institute, believed that the editing and distribution should be handled together and pointed out various problems associated with the International Bookstore's handling of this task in their name.618 Another problem was the occurance of supply shortages and delays in mailing. The subscriptions were advertised to be airmailed619 but multiple sources indicate that 615 See, for example, International Culture Committee's 1958 and 1962 directives suggesting that the distribution work should be in line with the international struggle. Cao Jianfei "Duiwai faxing de huigu yu sikao" (Memories and thoughts on distribution abroad), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999. 654-655. The International Bookstore's annual plan for the distribution of anti-revisionist works in 1963 suggests that this point was internalized by this work unit. The text referred to the planned improvements in synthesising the tasks of commercial and non-commerical distribution. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 160. 616 In August 27-September 2, 1975, this issue was debated in the "Duiwai shukan faxing gongzuo de fangzhen, renwu zuotanhui" (Foreign publications' distribution work, task and policy meeting). Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 295 617 See, for instance, Foreign Languages Press report submitted in 1954 to the CC Propaganda Department pointing out the unclarity in the division of labor between mass organizations and the FLP on the distribution of salable propaganda items. In this report, FLP states the necessity for the mass organizations to consult with the FLP before making annual plans. Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 50 618 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 116-117 619 See the advertisement of FLP and Guozi Shudian Peking Review No.33, October 14, 1958 216 there were delays in the sending of propaganda items. It is clear that the late or nonarrival of Chinese propaganda items was sometimes caused by the restrictions imposed by the host governments over mailing, which the International Bookstore only gradually learned how to cope with or bypass.620 But sometimes the problem was due to the insufficient book/magazine supplies owing either to the political upheavals or production difficulties. Delays caused by the problem of supply, as they were reported by foreign observers, coincided with the periods when the PRC propaganda apparatus was undergoing domestic political campaigns: Until the autumn of 1959, there was a steady flow of printed material out of Communist China in Chinese as well as in foreign languages. In November 1959, there was a sudden and sharp curtailment of this flow, the precise reason for which has never become fully apparent although it was probably related to the newsprint shortage ad to a decision to protect national secrets. The Cultural Revolution resulted in further curtailment of export materials but an announcement by Guozi Shudian towards the end of 1971 of new publications that would be available through Guozi Shudian suggested some relaxation.621 Hence major supply problems erupted during the Great Leap Forward and the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. This situation is also discernible from the official correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and China's overseas representations.622 The setbacks during the Great Leap were also related to the shortage of foreign currency. When the monthly China Pictorial magazine was transformed into a biweekly in 1959, the International Bookstore was not able to make the global distribution of the magazine due to the enormous increase in the transportation 620 In order to overcome these restrictions: "International Bookstore… has developed commercial outlets in many countries, including the United States. To countries which prohibit the import of Chinese communist publications—India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and some African countries –the Chinese mail material from distribution centers abroad, such as Hong Kong and Switzerland. " See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973 7 621 See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973 179 622 For instance, in 1959, Chinese representation in Holland was denied further supplies of propaganda items published in the homeland on the grounds that the Foreign Ministry had difficulties in getting these items. See, "Zhu helan daibanchu guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo" (Our Holland Representation’s propaganda work concerning the celebrations of our country’s tenth anniversary) Archive No : 116-00243-12 1 Release Date ; 1959.6.10 \1959.7.20 217 volume. During this time, China Post Office wouldn’t accept cargos due to a lack of sufficient foreign exchange reserves.623 The Chinese regime was not able to increase the country's air mail capacity, nor was it able to cover the huge expenses (amounting to 500,000 Yuan a month) it created.624 When the magazine returned to its original monthly edition in January 1961, a lot of subscriptions had been suspended due to its readers' complaints about the late arrival of the magazines. Under the leftist influences of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the non-commercial distribution method resulted in huge amounts of waste, as the work units tended to emphasize quantity over effectiveness. 625 The Chinese leadership was aware of the inefficiencies embedded in the non-commercial distribution work and took specific precautions to avoid waste. For instance, a notice issued in 1959 by the foreign propaganda leadership called for limitations on the free sending of propaganda items to nationalist and capitalist countries. Precise measures included the limitation of free sending to important individuals and friendly organizations, lowered the numbers, shortened the time period (max. one-year) and restricted the items to books and periodicals only.626 However, it is not clear how effective these measures were in the long run. Especially at the height of the Cultural Revolution, as the propaganda objectives shifted from "introducing New China to foreigners" to "exporting revolution", seeking higher circulation numbers became a 623 See, Shao Gongwen, "Huiyi wangshi" (Remembering the Past), Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian huiyi lu (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Recollections) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 561 624 See, the International Culture Committee's report to the State Council. Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999,110 625 See, Cao Jianfei "Duiwai faxing de huigu yu sikao" (Memories and thoughts on distribution abroad), Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 656 626 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999,96 218 goal in and of itself, which both resulted in considerable waste (i.e., "sending ten items to someone who wanted only one") and highly inflated circulation figures.627 The supply problems could also arise due to various book inspection campaigns conducted in the period 1949-1976. For instance, in 1955, the Ministry of Culture informed all the relevant work units, among them the Foreign Languages Press, that the books translated by Hu Feng or his friends ("Hu Feng clique") -a literary figure who opposed the party's socialist realist paradigm in works of art –must be withdrawn from circulation and re-translated.628 In 1960, another book inspection campaign resulted in the discovery of serious translation mistakes of a political nature and brought the circulation of Long Live Leninism's English, French, German and Spanish editions to a standstill. 629 During the Cultural Revolution, an additional supply problem occurred due to the leftist radicals' decision to discontinue a number of periodicals aimed at specialized audiences.630 For the continued publications too, delays and other setbacks were in full play during the Cultural Revolution.631 In 1975, a month-long investigation on the working of the International Bookstore, found out that order forms were being sent in 19 days at the fastest and 80 days the latest. This 627 See, Zhang Shichun, "Duanzheng waiwen chuban faxing yewu de zhidao sixiang" (Correcting the thinking of instruction in the foreign languages publications distribution work) Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999,148 628 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999,55 629 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999,108 630 Among the discontinued periodicals, there was China's Medicine (bi-monthly in English), China’s Sports (a monthly in English) China’s Foreign Trade (bi-monthly in English and French), Evergreen (bi-monthly in English and French) former organ of the All China Youth Federation and All China Students’ Federation, and Women of China (English). See “The Press and the Cultural Revolution” (China’s Publications), [YB 530(Rectification 41)] China Topics, July 4, 1969, (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 42, File 1 (China Topics 1969) 4 631 For instance, China Pictorial magazine appeared late and some editions were withdrawn from circulation, which, for some observers, was a sign of uncertainty. In the case of Chinese Literature, Mao Dun's dismissal from the editorship of the magazine, which he continued for twelve years, was also seen as a source of instability. See, “The Press and the Cultural Revolution” (China’s Publications), [YB 530(Rectification 41)] China Topics, July 4, 1969, (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 42, File 1 (China Topics 1969) 4. 219 report concluded that the slow working of this organization was due to several structural problems, including: "1) unclear division of work responsibility and diffuse authority; 2) excessively large and overstaffed organization; 3) numerous formalities/procedures (i.e., not simple and concentrated as they ought to be)."632 Other then the setbacks owing to the challenges within the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus itself, the International Bookstore also had to deal with various restrictions imposed by governments abroad. For instance, in 1955, the Indonesian government announced bans on the entry of 67 types of publications into its borders, of which most were Chinese propaganda items.633 When the United Arab Republic banned the import of Mao's Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers pamphlet in 1958, UAR's reaction was blamed by the leadership on the International Bookstore's "over-heated" (tounao fare) distribution policy.634 By the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet ideological split caused further setbacks in the circulation of Chinese media in socialist countries. As early as 1960, the Soviet Union notified the International Bookstore via their official book company in Beijing that they would no longer import publications from China, as they were perfectly capable of satisfying Soviet readers' demands for books about China. 635 In 1961, Democratic Germany followed suit and criticized the International Bookstore for its export of six pamphlets 632 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 296-297 633 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999,58 634 Foreign propaganda leadership called for immediate decrease in the circulation figures. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 85 635 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 110 220 titled Leninism Opposes Revisionism.636 Problems in China's bilateral relations also caused temporary or permanent setbacks for the regime, for which India is a major example. After the Sino-Indian border clash, legal distribution in India, which constituted the biggest market for China's English language periodicals, was no longer a possible option.637 4.2.2.2. Distribution via Embassies, Consulates and Other Representations Until the early 1970s, the PRC regime had a relatively small number of diplomatic missions around the world. For the few embassies, consulates and other representations that worked in non-communist countries, conducting propaganda work was an arduous task, which often triggered reactions in the host country. Despite difficulties, most PRC representations engaged in cultural propaganda work, although each in different forms and density. In the 1950s the main agenda of China's foreign propaganda work was to introduce foreign audiences to the successes of the People's Republic of China, its fast economic development and social transformation. In the West this task was achievable only by refuting the claims of the "reactionaries" in the host country, whose Anti-China propaganda had a deep influence over local people.638 Therefore, "correcting" the "fallacious" ideas with regard to China, overcoming the 636 CC Liaison Department regarded this as "unreasonable entanglement" (wuli jiuchan). See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 124 637 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 149 638 In this sense, that is, with regard to the practical application of this task, Yugoslavia was also treated like a country outside the socialist bloc. Following the "anti-revisionism" tide in China, Yugoslav public opinion became quite anti-China in the late 1950s. Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia reported that local press frivolously attacked China and the embassy tried to shift the public opinion in China's favor by publishing news dispatches and other items. But the audience inevitably shrank as most government units refused to receive these items. See, "Zhu nansilafu shiguan guanyu zengfa xuanchuanpin de jianyi dui nan xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang baogao" (Report on Yugoslavia embassy’s proposal to increase the dissemination of foreign propaganda items in Yugoslavia and the situation of propaganda work in Yugoslavia) Archive No : 109-02016-02 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.26 \1959.9.7 221 prejudices and biases in the host country was an integral part of the propaganda work conducted by the PRC's overseas missions.639 One common channel to reach the official circles and influential figures in the host country was through the publication of a periodical bulletin (gongbao), although bulletin work was reliant upon the availability of manpower spared for this job at each outpost.640 Where available, bulletins' content would primarily be based on Xinhua news dispatches, People's Daily reviews and Radio Peking broadcasts.641 The bulletin work was encouraged in order to make possible the timely dissemination of information about China abroad, but it is also clear that the representations were not sufficiently guided in this area and bulletins lacked a unified, persistent editorial policy. 642 Bulletins in local languages would often have grammatical mistakes 639 For instance, Danish people had a number of "false" beliefs with regard to communes, Tibet problem, Taiwan issue etc. See, "Zhu danmai shiguan guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo" (Our Denmark Embassy’s propaganda work concerning the celebrations of our country’s tenth anniversary) Archive No : 116-00243-11 1 Release Date: 1959.6.11 \1959.7.22 640 Some representations could not engage in the bulletin work due to scarce human resources. To overcome this problem, most embassies and consulates were publishing non-periodical bulletins or news dispatches. Chinese Embassy in Sweden is one such example. See, "Zhu ruidian shiguan 1956 nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang yu 1957 nian gongzuo jihua" (The cultural propaganda situation of our embassy in Sweden in 1956 and work plans for 1957) Archive No : 110-00648-05 1 Release Date: 1957.2.1 \1957.2.12. For a similar case, See "Zhu helan daibanchu guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo (xinwen gongbao, chujie yingpian) de yijian he qingshi" (Instructions and thoughts of our representation based in Holland about foreign propaganda work (news bulletin and lent films) Archive No : 110-01039-03 1 Release Date ; 1960.2.1 \1960.11.1 641 In order to facilitate foreign propaganda work, Radio Peking launched English-language broadcasts directed at the Chinese embassies abroad in 1957. Embassies abroad were notified by the Foreign Ministry that the sole purpose of the English language broadcasts was to enrich the sources to be used in the propaganda work, especially the bulletins. It is also noted that the Chinese embassy in India has already started using the broadcast content to publish and distribute bulletins in India. Besides saving the embassy a lot of editorial work, this would also enable them to catch up with the domestic events in China. But soon after it was launched, it was understood that the reception of the English language broadcasts is a major problem for most of the other embassies. Besides, as noted by the Chinese embassy in Holland, preparation of bulletins and other periodicals by the embassies had less to do with the lack of sources and more with the insufficient manpower. See, "Guanyu zhongyang renmin guagbo diantai jianli yingwen jilu guangbo xinwen he jiance zhanshi" (Concerning the Central Committee People’s Broadcasting Organization’s establishment of recording and monitoring station for English broadcasts) Archive No ; 116-00219-10 1 Release Date ; 1957.1.23 \1958.1.18 642 Beijing was aware of this problem. In order to improve the bulletin (gongbao) work, representations were advised: 1) to maintain the official nature of gongbao, 2) to reflect important events in New China, cultural activities, trade relations and China's position on important international events, 3) In the absence of timely news dispatches from homeland, Xinhua News Agency dispatch, content from People's China, China Reconstructs, and Russian Druzba(Friendship) magazine should be used. See, "Waijiaobu guanyu zhu wai shiguan xinwen gongbao de fagao gongzuo, chuguo xuanchuan pin 222 because the embassy staff was not trained in the tasks of translation and proofreading.643 Besides the bulletins and news dispatches, official Chinese representations were also instrumental in disseminating the regular propaganda items such as books, pamphlets, pictures, magazines and artistic items: Most PRC embassies include either a cultural or information officer, or both, who distribute Chinese communist publications, provided there are no local restrictions against such activities. Most commonly distributed by the embassies are mimeographed NCNA daily bulletins, pamphlets containing PRC statements on issues and politics, and the standard export periodicals.—Peking Review, China Pictorial and China Reconstructs.644 The distribution of propaganda items were often made free of charge as presents, although commercial distribution was also available via embassies and consulates, as long as there existed a number of willing subscribers in the host country.645 Increasing the number of regular readers for the Chinese foreign language magazines was an shencha de zuzhi gongzuo he gongying guowai baokan yuegao de zuzhi gongzuo de zanxing guiding" (Foreign Ministry’s temporary provision concerning the news dispatches distribution work for the embassies abroad, inspection work organization for the exported propaganda items and work organization for supplying foreign newspapers and magazines with invitations to write articles) Archive No: 116-00166-02 1 Release Date ; 1955.5.4 \1955.9.27 643 See, "Waijiaobu guanyu zhu wai shiguan xinwen gongbao de fagao gongzuo, chuguo xuanchuan pin shencha de zuzhi gongzuo he gongying guowai baokan yuegao de zuzhi gongzuo de zanxing guiding" (Foreign Ministry’s temporary provision concerning the news dispatches distribution work for the embassies abroad, inspection work organization for the exported propaganda items and work organization for supplying foreign newspapers and magazines with invitations to write articles) Archive No : 116-00166-02 1 Release Date: 1955.5.4 \1955.9.27 644 See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 179 645 The case of Sweden shows, however, that these self-paying subscribers had a marginal role in the overall distribution work. The increase in the number of self-paying subscribers in the 1956-1957 period was reported by the Embassy in Sweden as follows: China Reconstructs (335 to 350 subscribers), People's China (Zero to 2 subscribers), China Pictorial (Zero to 4 subscribers). See, "Zhu ruidian shiguan 1956 nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang yu 1957 nian gongzuo jihua" (The cultural propaganda situation of our embassy in Sweden in 1956 and work plans for 1957) Archive No : 110-00648-05 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.1 \1957.2.1. Sales figures for Chinese periodicals in Holland offer a similar case. In the year 1956, a client bookstore sold 375 issues of China Reconstructs, 148 issues of China Pictorial, 20 issues of Chinese Literature, 54 issues of People's China, 10 issues of Chinese Women. See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No : 110-00692-04 1 Release Date ; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8 223 important goal.646 Most embassies would have fixed name-address lists, which they used for the periodical mailing of relevant propaganda publications. They were also supposed to satisfy the individual requests of locals asking for sources on China647 It also fell on the shoulders of the embassy/consulate staff to continue favorable relations with International Bookstore's client bookstores in the host country, to solve problems when need arose, as well as help collect the circulation figures and audience responses. 648 Also, when there were misunderstandings or any negative reactions related to China's publications, it was the overseas representations' task to bring it to the attention of the central foreign propaganda agencies in Beijing.649 646 Chinese Embassy in Finland's work plan for 1959, besides many other activities, included raising the distribution figures of China Pictorial to 3,000 copies and China Reconstructs to 2,000 copies. See, "Zhongguo tong fenlan wenhua jiaoliu wunian guihua yaodian ji yijiuwujiu nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo jihua" (Summary of Sino-Finland cultural relations in the last five years and the plans for cultural propaganda work in the year 1959) Archive No : 110-00738-07 1 Release Date ; 1958.4.22 \1958.10.23 647 In 1959, Chinese Representation in Britain received 6 daily requests (on avarage) by mail, each asking for sources on China. See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu 1960 nian di yi jidu wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo zongjie" (Summary of our British representation’s cultural propaganda work in the first part of 1960) Archive No: 110-00905-03 1 Release Date ; 1960.3.17 \1960.3.17. Dutch representation on the other hand was receiving around 100 such requests each month. (3 to 4 every day). See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No : 110-00692-04 1 Release Date ; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8 648 This task was summarized in the "1957 cultural propaganda work plan" of the Chinese Embassy in Sweden as follows: Grasp a better understanding of the situation regarding International Bookstore's current client bookstores, introduce new relations/contacts; assist their work and reccommend new items. Assist them better." See "Zhu ruidian shiguan 1956 nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang yu 1957 nian gongzuo jihua" (The cultural propaganda situation of our embassy in Sweden in 1956 and work plans for 1957) Archive No: 110-00648-05 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.1 \1957.2.12. Also see, for a list of Chinese books sold in Burma in the 1950s, "Zhongguo shukan zai miandian" (Chinese publications in Myanmar), Archive No ; 105-00974-07 1 Release Date ; 1959.9.1 \1959.9.30; For the Dutch representation's relationship with the client bookstores, See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No : 110-00692-04 1 Release Date ; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8 649 For instance, in 1958, Chinese Embassy in Syria reported locals' reaction to the China Reconstructs magazine. Apparently, the problem was that the magazine published an address in the Hebrew script on the "distribution districts chart". The embassy was warned by the Sino-Syrian Friendship Association that, given the hostility between Israelis and Arabs, this might cause envy amongst the Arab people. After the relevant work units were notified by the Foreign Ministry, it was decided that Hebrew script would not be used in the magazines distributed in the Arab countries. Yet, the FM also made it clear that PRC will continue to distribute these magazines in Israel –as the magazines were basically for the people to read and China will continue to have cultural relations with Israeli people, regardless of the Israel government's acts as a tool of British-French imperialism. See, "Xuliya dui zhongguojianshe zazhi yin you yiselie ziyang de fanying" (Syria’s reaction to the usage of Hebrew in the “China Reconstructs” magazine) Archive No ; 107-00151-07 1 Release Date ; 1958.1.7 \1958.2.6 224 One other related role was to report back China-related news, broadcasts, and publications in the host country.650 As long as there was an opportunity, the embassies would also organize film screenings and picture exhibitions to introduce the foreign audiences to the improvements in New China651. Some embassies also had reading rooms where the visitors could access these publications.652 It was also customary for the Chinese envoys to carry along quantities of propaganda items with them, as they traveled inside the host country.653 Similar to the commercial distribution work, PRC embassies respected the "treatment with respect to differences" (qubie duidai) principle during the 1950s. Hence it was acknowledged that the distribution in socialist and capitalist countries should be different in terms of content and quantity.654 For instance, to suit the needs 650 The number of references to the PRC media as they appeared in foreign newspapers was an important means to measure the success of Chinese foreign propaganda. A similar measure of success was the favorable accounts written or told by the foreign visitors to China after their return to their home country. In this sense, the case of Swiss radio journalist Heiner Gautschy proved to be a disappointment. Right after his departure from PRC, upon his arrival in Hong Kong, he said: "Now that I breath the air of freedom, I am already relaxed". When he broadcasted his memoirs of the China visit (economic backwardness, primitive machinery, everyone in blue uniforms, etc.) it caused additional negative publicity for China. See, "Ruishi guangbo gongsi jizhe gaoqi shehua baodao qingkuang" (The situation concerning the Swiss Broadcasting Company reporter Gautschy’s news report on China.) Archive No: 116-00256-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.3.15 \1960.7.16. One other example to this type of material is a routine report by the Chinese embassy in Guinea to the Foreign Ministry on Guinea radio's broadcasting of news relating to China; one on Sino-Indian note exchange on the border issue, and the other on Sino-Burmese co-operation. See, "Guanyu jineiya guangbo guanyu woguo de xıaoxi" (Concerning Guinea’s news broadcasts about our country) Archive No ; 108-000087-05 1 Release Date ; 1960.1.4 \1960.2.3 651 Films and other propaganda items screening abroad had to be inspected and approved beforehand by the Foreign Ministry. See, "Guanyu duiwai xuanchuanpin shencha shouxu de zanxing guiding" (Temporary regulation on the inspection formalities of foreign propoganda items) Archive No ; 10200157-05 1 Release Date ; 1954.4.23 \1954.4.23 652 In the absence of official diplomatic channels, New China News Agency branches served a similar purpose. See, for example, the NCNA office in Ottowa, Canada. “Sino-Canadian Relations”, background brief [BY 514-International Relations –Canada 1] China Topics, February 10, 1969 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 42, File 1 (China Topics 1969) 653 Members of the Chinese mission in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad were known to do a considerable amount of travelling and leave propaganda materials behind them wherever they went. See “China and the Middle East and North Africa”, Background brief [YB 354 (Int. Rels. M.E.-3)] China Topics, November 1965 2 654 This aspect is stated clearly in a 1954 directive. See, "Guanyu duiwai xuanchuanpin shencha shouxu de zanxing guiding" (Temporary regulation on the inspection formalities of foreign propoganda items) Archive No ; 102-00157-05 1 Release Date ; 1954.4.23 \1954.4.23. Also See "Waijiaobu guanyu zhu wai shiguan xinwen gongbao de fagao gongzuo, chuguo xuanchuan pin shencha de zuzhi gongzuo he gongying guowai baokan yuegao de zuzhi gongzuo de zanxing guiding" (Foreign Ministry’s 225 of the foreign audiences in capitalist countries, one should avoid using theoretical language and the political nature of the distributed items should not be too strong.655 In terms of quantity, it was noted that, most capitalist countries were already suspicious of Chinese intentions, therefore, circulation figures should not add to the worries of the host government.656 It is clear that the PRC regime did not prefer to organize big events in the non-socialist countries, perhaps partly due to financial constraints, but mostly because it would create displeasure on the part of the host country.657 In this sense neutral countries fared better in the eyes of the PRC regime as compared to the "capitalist-imperialist" countries.658 temporary provision concerning the news dispatches distribution work for the embassies abroad, inspection work organization for the exported propaganda items and work organization for supplying foreign newspapers and magazines with invitations to write articles) Archive No : 116-00166-02 1 Release Date ; 1955.5.4 \1955.9.27 655 Although the idea was not to disseminate highly theoretical/ideological works in the capitalist countries, the representations still received many of those. Chinese representation's office in Britain had overstocked theoretical books, because they could not distribute these works to the general public in Britain but only a selected few. See "Zhu yingguo daibanchu yijiuwujiu nian yanjiushi he waisong shukan gongzuo zongjie" (Work summary of our english representation’s research office and foreign dissemination of our publications in the year 1959) 14; Archive No; 110-00905-01 1 , Release Date ; 1960.1.7 \1960.1.19. Chinese Embassy in Sweden had a similar situation. According to one report, Swedish people's requests from the embassy were mainly in topics like: Chinese history, geography, traditions, tourism, etc. Hence the embassy could not find an outlet for the overstocked theoretical books and did not have in its stocks the sort of materials that was in demand in Sweden. See "Zhu ruidian shiguan 1956 nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang yu 1957 nian gongzuo jihua" (The cultural propaganda situation of our embassy in Sweden in 1956 and work plans for 1957) Archive No: 110-00648-05 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.1 \1957.2.12. Dutch readers, too, were more interested in books on Chinese history, customs, geography and economy, whereas they were not particularly moved by contemporary Chinese literature. See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No : 110-00692-04 1 Release Date ; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8 656 Besides, Chinese envoys in countries like Britain were aware of the fact that Chinese propaganda could not compete with the Western Anti-China propaganda items in quantitative terms, and to increase quality instead. According to this account, doing propaganda in this country was difficult as British people already had too much of reactionary propaganda. See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu 1954-1959 nian wenhua xuanchuan he shangwu gongzuo zongjie" (Summary of our British representation’s cultural propaganda and commercial work in the years 1954-1959) Archive No : 110-00905-04 1 , Release Date ; 1960.1.19 \1960.1.19 657 The case of China's Danish Embassy illustrates an example. The Foreign Ministry warned the embassy that their plans for the 10th year anniversary celebration activities were too large to handle. The embassy was advised to join hands with the Danish Communist Party in this respect: "Propaganda through friends might be better than propaganda by ourselves. Its effectiveness might be greater." See, "Zhu danmai shiguan guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo" (Our Denmark Embassy’s propaganda work concerning the celebrations of our country’s tenth anniversary) Archive No : 11600243-11 1 Release Date: 1959.6.11 \1959.7.22 658 See, for instance, Foreign Culture Liaison Committee's proposal to increase propaganda work in the neutral countries (Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Denmark, Norway) while keeping it at its 226 By contrast, in most of the "brotherly" socialist countries, there was not much need for concern over the content of propaganda, at least in the 1950s. A major difference here was that the main target was the party cadres, not the masses. Hence, in a socialist country, it was customary for several governmental organizations to receive periodical bulletins and other publications sent by the local Chinese representation.659 Often the host country's government would provide a name-list in order to facilitate easy and speedy circulation. The audience could only appreciate China's effort to inform other comrades of its experiences and successes in the realms of economic construction, social transformation and foreign policy. This "brotherly" state of affairs in the realm of propaganda exchange would continue until the SinoSoviet split in the early 1960s. The propaganda output increased during the important dates for the communist regime, such as the anniversary of the founding of the PRC (October 1st) 660 or May Day. For instance, the handling of propaganda activities during the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC in 1959 was taken quite seriously by 1959 levels in "imperialist" countries such as England, Holland, France, Italy, Belgium, West Germany. See, "Duiwai wenhua lianluo weiyuanhui yijiuliuling nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo guihua de yijian" (Foreign Cultural Liaison Committee’s thoughts on the cultural propaganda work plan in the year 1960) Archive No : 110-00902-02 1 Release Date ; 1959.11.10 \1959.11.10 659 See, for instance the case of "China Today" --a periodical published by the Chinese embassy in Hungary. Hungarian authorities welcomed the move and gave the embassy a name list of 564 people. There were continuous demands to increase the circulation and broaden the content. Soon the circulation figures raised from 2000 to 4000, although some of the readers found the political nature too strong and the language not lively enough. "Guanyu zhu xiongyali shiguan kaizhan duiwai xuanchuan qingkuang de wendian" (Telegram concerning the situtation of foreign propaganda launched by the Chinese Embassy in Hungary) Archive No; 109-01857-05 1 Release Date ; 1958.1.29 \1958.12.28. Also see the case of the Romanian language "People's China" published by the Chinese Embassy in Romania: "Zhu luomaniya shiguan guanyu luowen ban renmin zhongguo 1956 nian bianfa qingkuang zongjie" (The Summary of the situation concerning the publication of the Romanian language “People’s China” by our embassy located in Romania in 1956) Archive No ; 10901702-02 1 Release Date ; 1957.1.24 \1957.1.24 660 Chinese embassy in Hungary which chose the national day (October 1st) to start a new periodical (China Today: Jinri Zhongguo) in 1958. See, "Guanyu zhu xiongyali shiguan kaizhan duiwai xuanchuan qingkuang de wendian" (Telegram concerning the situtation of foreign propaganda launched by the Chinese Embassy in Hungary) Archive No: 109-01857-05 1 Release Date; 1958.1.29 \1958.12.28. Also See "Zhu yilake shiguan guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo shiyi" (Propaganda work of our Iraq embassy on the tenth anniversary of our country’s foundation) Archive No : 110-00243-08 1 Release Date ; 1959.8.18 \1959.9.8 227 the Foreign Ministry. 661 Likewise, many Chinese embassies made preparations months in advance to mark this special occasion.662 The demand for circulation also tended to grow during the domestic political campaigns or international incidents which China became a part. The intensification of the so-called "Anti-China" tide in one country also raised the emphasis on cultural propaganda work.663 On important foreign policy issues, the Foreign Ministry would issue special directives to the Chinese diplomatic missions abroad, guiding them on the content and volume of propaganda output. These directives would provide the cadres with specific measures to follow on a particular foreign policy issue. By the late 1950s, the Tibet question664 661 FM issued a special directive for this purpose. According to the directive, drafts supplied for foreign newspapers should emphasize the following subjects: 1) peaceful foreign policy of China. 2) our friends are all over the world 3) China's contributions to the peace movement. 4) five principles of peaceful co-existence. 5) China's support for national autonomy/independence movements. 6) China's co-operation with other countries in commerce and economy. 7) friendly bilateral ties and communication. 8) Editor-generals of the magazines (China Reconstructs, People's China, Peking Review, etc.) can write a piece on China's successes in foreign policy and distribute. The directive also emphasized the separate treatment of socialist countries and capitalist-nationalist countries according to the needs of their target audiences. See, "Guanyu guoqing shi zhounian dui wai xuan chuan gongzuo de chubu yijian" (Preliminary ideas on the foreign propaganda work concerning the tenth anniversary of the country’s foundation) Archive No ; 116-00239-14 1 Release Date ; 1959.5.22 \1959.7.9 662 For instance, See, "Guanyu guoqing shi zhounian dui wai xuan chuan gongzuo de chubu yijian" (Preliminary ideas on the foreign propaganda work concerning the tenth anniversary of the country’s foundation); Archive No; 116-00239-14 1 ; Release date: 1959.5.22 \1959.7.9; "Zhu yilake shiguan guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo shiyi" (Propaganda work of our Iraq embassy on the tenth anniversary of our country’s foundation) Archive No: 110-00243-08 1 Release Date: 1959.8.18 \1959.9.8; "Zhu helan daibanchu guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo" (Our Holland Representation’s propaganda work concerning the celebrations of our country’s tenth anniversary), Archive No: 116-00243-12 1 Release Date ; 1959.6.10 \1959.7.20; "Zhu danmai shiguan guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo" (Our Denmark Embassy’s propaganda work concerning the celebrations of our country’s tenth anniversary), Archive No : 116-00243-11 1 , Release Date ; 1959.6.11 \1959.7.22. 663 See, for instance, China's Dutch Embassy's added emphasis on the bulletin work within the context of "unfriendly" bilateral relations and Dutch government's "anti-China" stance. "Zhu helan daibanchu guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo (xinwen gongbao, chujie yingpian) de yijian he qingshi" (Instructions and thoughts of our representation based in Holland about foreign propaganda work (news bulletin and lent films) Archive No : 110-01039-03 1 Release Date ; 1960.2.1 \1960.11.1 664 One directive on the Tibetan issue aimed at accelerating the foreign propaganda work in the socialist countries to "enable the brotherly countries to fully understand the Tibetan question and its peaceful resolution." The directive ordered each embassy to issue timely bulletins whose content should include pieces from Xinhua Agency's English and Russian news dispatches, People's Daily reviews and the speeches given by the Premier and other high officials on the Tibetan issue. The directive also asked representations to report back the responses in the socialist countries on China's policy of pacification of the rebellion in Tibet. See, "Guanyu xizang wenti duiwai xuanchuan shi" (Concerning the foreign propaganda work on Tibet question) Archive No ; 116-00249-08 1 Release Date: 1959.4.28 \1959.4.28 228 and the Taiwan Straits Crisis 665 were among the critical issues which called for special directives. When such foreign policy crises occurred, these events also led to a soaring interest among foreign readers on China-related matters. For instance, PRC representation in Britain reported in 1960 that (despite the intensification of antiChina propaganda in Britain at that time) the circulation of propaganda items grew as the British people were more and more curious on the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of people's communes. 666 Tibetan issue, Sino-Indian border dispute, communes, Anti-Rightist Campaign and Great Leap Forward (common topics of antiChina propaganda in the West) raised the most attention among the British people, some of whom requested sources to hear the Chinese side of the story.667 After the 665 The directive on the Taiwan Straits crisis asked the embassies to enlarge the foreign propaganda activities on this issue. The propaganda guideline was as follows: In order to reveal the US-Jiang Kaishek clique's "Two Chinas" plot, we need to emphasize the contradictions between US and Taiwan. It should also be emphasized that Taiwan and the surrounding islands is an integral part of the Chinese territory; US military presence in Taiwan Straits region is an invasion and an intrusion to our domestic politics; Chinese people can liberate Taiwan whenever they want and with whatever means at hand. No outside interference is acceptable. Our Defense Minister Peng Dehuai already suggested a peaceful resolution to this conflict. We resist US attempts to use the UN platform to interfere with this issue. If any Asian-African countries try to raise this issue in the UN, we should convince them, in the spirit of the Bandung conference that we will not let them interfere with our domestic politics. If they raise this issue to demand the UN to call for an immediate withdrawal of the US troops from the island, we can display our agreement. See, "Zhonglianbu, waijiaobu, duiwai wenwei guanyu zai duiwai xuanchuan he guoji huodong zhongjie luohe daji meiguo zai taian xia diqu wenti shang zhizao xinyinmou de tongzhi" (The Announcement of CC Liaison Office; Foreign Ministry, International Culture Committee concerning the restriction of United States new plot on the Taiwan Straits region) Archive No ; 10200006-06 1 Release Date ; 1958.10.6 \1958.10.6. Also See, "Waijiaobu guanyu muqian Taiwan jushi duiwai xuanchuan wenti gei zhu waishiguan de zhishi dian" (Telegram on the instructions of the Foreign Ministry to the embassies abroad concerning the question of foreign propaganda on the current situation in Taiwan) Archive No ; 102-00006-03 1 Release Date ; 1958.9.2 \1958.9.2 666 These propaganda items were composed of books, pamphlets and pictures. The embassy noted that circulation in Britain grew by 8,672 in between 1958 and 1959. See "Zhu yingguo daibanchu yijiuwujiu nian yanjiushi he waisong shukan gongzuo zongjie" (Work summary of our english representation’s research office and foreign dissemination of our publications in the year 1959); Archive No ; 110-00905-01 1 , Release Date ; 1960.1.7 \1960.1.19 667 Not all the members of the audience were sympathetic towards the Chinese cause, though. For instance, on the Tibetan question, the representation received two groups of letters. First, from a group of people who didn't know much about the Tibet issue, but having a nice attitude. Second, from people who are prejudiced against China, some seeing Tibet as a seperate country and ask the Chinese side to treat them as an independent state. See "Zhu yingguo daibanchu yijiuwujiu nian yanjiushi he waisong shukan gongzuo zongjie" (Work summary of our english representation’s research office and foreign dissemination of our publications in the year 1959); Archive No ; 110-00905-01 1 , Release Date ; 1960.1.7 \1960.1.19 229 Tibet issue, Burmese readers too started asking more about the religious freedoms and ethnic minority rights in China. Life and problems in China's people's communes, social welfare, educational curriculum, living standards, and salary figures were among the other topics which the Burmese readers sought information.668 Despite the continuous warnings from the Foreign Ministry to keep a low profile in the conduct of cultural propaganda work and respect international norms of conduct as well as local laws and customs, China's overseas missions, would often come across several restrictions in their attempt to distribute foreign propaganda items. This was not exclusive to the capitalist bloc countries. Following the anti-revisionism tide in China by the end of the 1950s, the Yugoslav government became increasingly uncomfortable with the content of the Chinese periodicals disseminated in Yugoslavia through the Chinese embassy. 669 The United Arab Republic also imposed several restrictions on the Chinese propaganda items in late 1950s due to the subversive content of the imported magazines670 and Chinese embassy's news bulletins.671 The 668 See "Zhongguo shukan zai miandian" (Chinese publications in Myanmar) 62 Archive No: 10500974-07 1 Release Date ; 1959.9.1 \1959.9.30 669 The propaganda items in question were the Russian language Druzba (Friendship) magazine and Peking Review, whose articles were found by the Yugoslav side to be "anti-Yugoslav" in essence. See, "Guanyu zhu nansilafu shiguan tingzhi zai nan sanfa ewen “youhaobao” he “beijing zhoubao” de wenbao" (Telegram concerning the cease of distribution of the Russian language “Frienship magazine” and “Peking Review” in Yugoslavia by our Embassy located in Yugoslavia.) Archive No: 109-0131601 1 ; Release Date ; 1958.7.30 \1958.9.3. Also See, "Zhu nansilafu shiguan suoji beijing zhoubao de dian" (Telegram about the demand of our Embassy in Yugoslavia to send “Peking Review”) Archive No : 109-01316-04 1 ,Release Date ; 1958.7.2 \1958.7.2 670 PRC Foreign Ministry noted that the banned issues of Peking Review magazine (No's: 12, 15, 16, 17 of 1958) all reported China's support for the Arab's people just struggle against imperialism. The UAR officials refused to make explanations to the Chinese side and said this is government policy. The same document also mentions the restrictions on the sale of Mao's Imperialism and Reactionaries are Paper Tigers and the raising of import duties on the China Pictorial magazine. See "Alian jin wo shukan shi" (The issue of United Arab Republic’s prohibition of our publications) Archive No ; 107-00280-03 1 Release Date ; 1958.7.14 \1958.12.19 671 Besides the warning on the "war-like" language employed in the bulletins, Chinese embassy in the UAR also received directives from the local government concerning the restrictions over mailing of propaganda items to the educational institutions. Foreign Ministry's reply concerning these restrictions emphasized that the UAR embassy in China is not working under similar regulations and that the Chinese side would not like to burden the UAR government offices (News Department) with this kind of extra work. See, "Alian xianzhi wo shiguan sanfa xuanchuanpin bing kouya wo yinshua pin youjian shi (zhongwen, fawen, alabowen)" (Issue of United Arab Republic’s limiting our embassy’s 230 UAR officials further accused the Chinese side for disseminating the Iraqi Communist Party's propaganda items. What made this accusation more serious was that the UAR insisted that this act was undertaken not by mailing or other means outside the premises but inside the embassy via officials handing published items to visitors. Although this charge was refused as groundless and it was contested by the PRC Foreign Ministry through diplomatic channels, frictions continued. 672 By the late 1950s, Indonesia's ban on the import of China's Indonesian language books and magazines also alarmed Chinese communists, although the PRC Foreign Ministry acted with caution and warned the embassy not to make allowances to the demands of the local bookstores in Indonesia.673 In 1960, the Indonesian government expressed its regrets to the Chinese side over China Pictorial's reports concerning the problem of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Although the Chinese side argued that these reports were truthful records of events and conducive to the friendly relations between two countries (as the accounts aimed at getting the Indonesian government's attention to the Anti-China activities in their country) the Indonesian side took further steps to distribution of propaganda items and detaining our mail containing printed items: Chinese, French, Arabic.) Archive No : 116-00501-01 1 ; Release Date ; 1959.8.3 \1960.8.16 672 See, "Alian zaoyao wo sanfa fana xuanchuan pin" (United Arab Republic starts a rumor about us disseminating Anti-Arabic propaganda items) Archive No: 116-00493-03 1 Release Date: 1960.10.5 \1960.10.5. Also see, "Guanyu alian wumie wo sanfa yilake gongchan dang xuanchuan pin wenti" (Problem concerning the United Arab Republic’s slander about our disseminating the Iraqi Communist Party’s propaganda items) Archive No : 107-00204-08 1 Release Date ; 1960.10.5 \1960.10.10 673 PRC Foreign Ministry saw this problem as a temporary one and warned that the Chinese embassy in Indonesia should act according to the Bandung spirit and five principles of mutual existence. FM also stated that the Chinese side could not completely abide by the wishes of progressive powers in Indonesia. The most important thing was to avoid getting trapped into the domestic political struggle in Indonesia. Hence the FM decided to temporarily stop the distribution of Indonesian language items, to let the subscribers know the reason behind this decision and return their fees. Instead of continuing export of Indonesian language propaganda items, Chinese side would now extend material and financial assistance to the local press houses in Indonesia to publish works on China. See, "Guanyu zai yindunixiya sanfa xuanchuan pin shi" (Concerning the dissemination of propaganda items in Indonesia) Archive No : 116-00447-04 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.21 \1959.4.7 231 restrict the flow of Chinese propaganda items.674 Guinea was another country which the Chinese propaganda publications had to pass through various government regulations before their entry finally became legal. The sole consolation for the Chinese side was that these restrictions did not specifically aim at China, but rather all countries that engaged in direct methods of propaganda. The PRC regime was convinced that it was a benevolent measure to ensure the conduct of cultural propaganda work through the proper government channels, which in practice, meant that the PRC embassy in Guinea could only mail propaganda items to a name list approved by the Guinea News Department.675 In 1959, the negative impact of Chinese foreign propaganda was also discussed by members of parliament in India. The Indian politicians stressed that it was easier to handle the dissemination of published propaganda items, because it could be resolved through diplomatic channels, by asking for limitations from the Chinese side. What was more difficult, however, was to decrease the impact of oral propaganda conducted by the Chinese special agents (tewu) under the disguise of tradesmen, laundry owners, etc. in the Colombo district.676 Local Indian media and various political party leaders were calling for a ban on Chinese propaganda items, which they deemed as direct attacks against the government. Maps inside the Chinese foreign language publications which showed the contested side of the Sino-Indian border as Chinese territory were especially hard 674 See, "Yindunixiya jinzhi wo zai yinni chuban faxing xuanchuan pin qingkuang (Indonesia’s prohibiting our propaganda items’ publication and distribution in Indonesia). Archive No : 105-0098602 1 , Release Date ; 1960.7.12 \1960.9.8 675 Once again, PRC Foreign Ministry accepted the terms of the host country not to cause dilomatic frictions with Guinea in the long term. See, "Jineiya jingcha mei shou wo shiguan xuanchuan pin shi (Guinea police didn’t accept our embassy’s propaganda items) Archive No: 108-00185-06 1 , Release Date ; 1960.11.9 \1960.11.30. Also See, "Jineiya xianzhi waijiao shituan sanfa xuanchuan cailiao shi" (The matter of Guinea’s limitation of the propaganda materials distributed by the foreign affairs diplomatic mission) Archive No : 116-00493-04 1 Release Date ; 1960.11.9 \1960.12.27 676 See, "Yindu xianzhi wo zhu yindu shiguan xuanchuan gongzuo" (India restricts the propaganda work of our embassy in India) Archive No : 116-00247-03 1 Release Date ; 1959.11.20 \1959.11.30 232 to take. Import restrictions on Chinese publications soon followed.677 In a similar case, Indian Consulate in Lhasa (Tibet) refused to receive the China Reconstructs magazine, whose sending was regarded by the PRC as a genuine effort to continue friendly bilateral relations. Upon this "unfriendly" act of refusal, it was decided that Indian Consulate would only be sent China Pictorial whose content was far less political than the Peking Review or China Reconstructs.678 By the end of the 1950s, the restrictions in the Asian and African countries became so widespread that the PRC foreign propaganda leadership took steps to reorganize and improve the command over the distribution of China's propaganda publications, films and exhibitions. In 1959 it was decided that the distribution work abroad had to respect the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" and employ the policy of long-term benefits (xishui changliu). 679 Hence, due to the tense political atmosphere, the PRC regime had to sacrifice short-term gains and impose restrictions upon itself in terms of total foreign propaganda output and circulation. As seen from this example, and throughout the 1950s, the PRC Foreign Ministry acted reasonably in matters relating to the distribution of foreign propaganda items. 680 If certain 677 See, letter to the Foreign Ministry dated November, 30. "Yindu xianzhi wo zhu yindu shiguan xuanchuan gongzuo" (India restricts the propaganda work of our embassy in India) Archive No : 11600247-03 1 Release Date ; 1959.11.20 \1959.11.30 678 See, "Xizang waijshichu guanyu yindu zhu lasa zonglingguan tuihui wo zengsong yingwen zhongguo jianshe an yu waijiaobu wanglai dianbao" (Tibet Foreign Affairs Office’s correspondance with the Foreign Ministry concerning the return of our English language edition “China Reconstructs” by the Indian Consulate General at Lhasa) Archive No : 118-00819-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.8.2 \1960.9.24 679 Foreign Ministry and International Culture Committee's directive cited the restrictions in UAR, Indonesia, Burma as cause for serious concern. It called for a limitation or an overall stop to the distribution of theoretical and party policy documents in the Asian African countries; lower circulation for the embassy bulletins. It also asked the embassies, consulates and other representations to report the situation in their respective host country, improve the supervision over foreign propaganda work and correct the inappropriate methods in distribution work. See, "Yijiuwuba nian duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang" (State of the foreign propaganda work in the year 1958) .Archive No ; 116-0044708 1 Release Date: 1959.1.14 \1959.1.14 680 This was so, even towards Yugoslavia, which the PRC regarded as a revisionist power. Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia was warned by the Foreign Ministry to keep the relations within the boundaries of international norm and conduct, even though Yugoslavia's restriction on Chinese propaganda items was seen as an unequivocal sign of hostility. See, "Guanyu zhu nansilafu shiguan tingzhi zai nan sanfa 233 restrictions were imposed by the host government, most of the time, the Chinese side lowered the propaganda tone, which could either mean that publications which carried the most serious ideological content (e.g. Peking Review) would be sacrificed681 or that all items would be temporarily put out of circulation. Alternatively, the Chinese side would explain her side of the story to the officials in the host government and try to strike a bargain. This state of affairs changed drastically by the early 1960s due to the transformation of foreign propaganda content subsequent to the Sino-Soviet dispute. After the split, the Soviet Union expressed concerns with regard to the circulation of China's foreign propaganda items.682 This move was soon followed by other socialist countries.683 By 1966, this situation only exacerbated with the launch of the Cultural Revolution, which shattered the regular operation of the leading organs that ewen “youhaobao” he “beijing zhoubao” de wenbao" (Telegram concerning the cease of distribution of the Russian language “Frienship magazine” and “Peking Review” in Yugoslavia by our Embassy located in Yugoslavia.) Archive No : 109-01316-01 1 Release Date ; 1958.7.30 \1958.9.3 681 See the proposal to temporarily stop the circulation of Druzba (Friendship) and Peking Review, whose content, a Chinese official agrees, was too political to disseminate in Yugoslavia at the time. The Foreign Ministry's reply, on the other hand, offered less circulation for both Druzba (Friendship) and Peking Review rather than a temporary stop for the dissemination of either magazine. See "Guanyu xiang nansilafu sanfa xuanchuan pin wenti" (Concerning the problem of sending propaganda items to Yugoslavia) 10-11; Archive No: 116-00240-01 1 , Release Date: 1959.3.23 \1959.9.8. For a similar document limiting the dissemination of the above magazines, See, "Zhu nansilafu shiguan guanyu zengfa xuanchuanpin de jianyi dui nan xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang baogao" (Report on Yugoslavia embassy’s proposal to increase the dissemination of foreign propaganda items in Yugoslavia and the situation of propaganda work in Yugoslavia) Archive No : 109-02016-02 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.26 \1959.9.7 682 As early as 1960, Soviet Union warned the Chinese not to disseminate publications which is not in line with the party policy of the CPSU. Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union was particulary held responsible for disseminating these non-allowed items, whose ideological line was descibed as "false" and "anti-Leninist" by the Soviet side. See, "Sulian waijiao bu yaoqiu wo tingzhi sanfa xuanchuan cailiao shi zhaohui zhu sulian shiguan fuzhao" (Note of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to our embassy in the Soviet Union demanding us to stop distributing propaganda items and our embassy’s reply) Archive No : 109-00921-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.7.21 \1960.9.11 683 Democratic Germany was one of the socialist bloc countries which started to impose restrictions on the Chinese propaganda items in 1960. According to this new measure, Chinese items should be approved by the German News Department before they could be disseminated in Democratic Germany. Chinese side was informed that the reason behind this measure was that recently certain Chinese publications triggered disputes among German comrades, which was both undesirable and difficult to handle. See "Youguan minzhu deguo yaoqiu wo shiguan gongbao he xuanchuan cailiao song shen de laiwang dian" (Telegraph correspondance with regard to the Democratic Germany’s demand from our embassy to to submit the news dispatch and propaganda materials for approval.) Archive No ; 10901500-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.5.18 \1960.9.19 234 previously had a guiding role in Chinese foreign propaganda. As the Foreign Ministry was not properly functioning during this period, the already subtle difference between diplomacy and propaganda completely disappeared. Hence, during the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), more and more governments got distressed by the subversive nature of Chinese foreign propaganda materials. The display of Mao posters and pictures outside the embassies, as well as handing Mao badges to foreign individuals, became a diplomatic routine which caused frictions with several host countries.684 In 1967, Burmese government strongly reacted against the wearing of Mao badges by Overseas Chinese students. When students resisted the government, violent anti-China riots erupted in Burma. Upon such disturbing incidents, Chairman Mao Zedong issued a warning in July 1968, on the need to fight against formalism and the self-glorification in propaganda to foreign countries. 685 However, it was difficult to adopt measures of modesty and self-restriction at a time when Mao worship seemed to be the only guarantee of good political standing.686 In this sense, the situation for Chinese foreign propagandists hardly constituted an exception. 4.2.2.3. Other Channels Except for the International Bookstore, which enabled the commercial distribution of Chinese propaganda publications through the worldwide network of client bookstores and individual subscribers, and China's overseas representations which sent these 684 For instance, in Kenya, the showcase including Mao's portrait outside of the Chinese Embassy was smashed. See, “China’s Chauvinistic Behavior in its Relations with Foreign Countries” [YB 435 (Int. Rels. General-10)] China Topics, July 12, 1967 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 40, File 5 (China Topics May August 1967). Similar events occurred in Mongolia and Nepal, both of which cases involved violent attacks against China's propaganda items. See, ibid, 4, 6. Also, See the case of China's Zambian (Lusaka) embassy distributing Mao badges before an exhibit. The embassy staff was warned by Zambia's ruling party UNIP officials that no UNIP member should wear those badges because “wearing of any kind of foreign badges by Zambians is a sign of disrespect to our President and our country". See, “China’s Chauvinistic Behavior in its Relations with Foreign Countries” [YB 435 (Int. Rels. General-10)] China Topics, July 12, 1967 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 40, File 5 (China Topics May August 1967) 4. 685 See, Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2004.310 686 See ibid.310 235 publications free of charge to the influential figures and organizations in the host country, there were many other channels available to the PRC regime to disseminate its propaganda items. A report prepared by the Foreign Languages Press and approved by the State Council in 1962, on dissemination of The Sino-Indian Border Question illustrates these alternative channels. This report indicated that "in addition to the regular distribution channels, this publication could be circulated via mass organizations; directly handed to foreign guests, overseas students, and foreign experts by the relevant work units, disseminated through the overseas Chinese networks, or official Chinese delegations sent abroad."687 China's mass organizations were instrumental in the non-commercial distribution of publications in capitalist and colonized countries. This channel was used as a supplement to the mainstream distribution channels, because International Bookstore's penetration into these markets was insufficient. Likewise, in the 1950s and 1960s, China had few official representations in these countries. Hence, in order to help with the distribution work, mass organizations were provided with name/address lists of progressive individuals and organizations abroad. For instance, in 1953, a list of 1,200 names were given to various mass organizations, among them, the Committee of Chinese People Safeguarding World Peace (Zhongguo Renmin Baowei Shijie Heping Weiyuanhui), the Overseas Affairs Committee (Huaqiao Shiwu Weiyuanhui), as well as youth, women, labor organizations. 688 Each mass organization was expected to send items to their respective counterparts abroad, and 687 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 149 688 See, "Guanyu waiwen chubanshe chuban de shukan fei maoyi faxing gongzuo de jianyi" (Proposal concerning the non-commercial distribution work of publications published by the FLP), July 29, 1953 in Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 82 236 do the mailing on their own–seeking help from the International Bookstore only if they did not have the manpower or a mailing organization. It was also decided that in order to avoid overlaps and update the list with prospective names suggested by the readers and the foreign delegations, a meeting would be convened every six months. The free sending of items by the mass organizations to progressive associations abroad is a good example for the common use of intermediaries by the PRC regime in its distribution work. Other intermediaries included Overseas Chinese networks, bilateral friendship associations and brotherly (communist) parties. 689 These intermediaries were used in cases where there were serious restrictions in the host country and/or where the PRC regime was not officially represented. 690 Before the unfolding of the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union also acted as such an intermediary to distribute Chinese propaganda materials. For instance, in 1956, upon the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, it was arranged that the distribution of Chinese propaganda items in North America would be done through the Soviet Embassy located in the U.S. 691 In the absence of any legal commercial channels 689 See, for example, CC Foreign Affairs Small Committee's proposal in 1960 that the distribution of Mao Zedong's Selected Works should be done, in addition to regular commercial channels, via brotherly parties, progressive organizations and Overseas Chinese. See, "Zhongyang waishi xiaozu jiu Mao Zedong Xuanji di si juan zhongwen ban dui wai faxing de wenti xiang zhongyang de qingshi" (CC Foreign Affairs Small Committee's asking for instructions from the central committee on the problems related to the external distribution of the Chinese edition of Mao Zedong's Selected Works Vol.4) October 20, 1960 in Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 176. 690 Some of these indirect methods are mentioned in “China and the Middle East and North Africa”, Background brief [YB 354 (Int. Rels. M.E.-3)] China Topics, November 1965, 5: "If a nation bans the Chinese publication as subversive, Peking tries to introduce them from non-Communist countries where postmarks are not likely to excite the interest of the authorities; for instance, Moscow Radio on June 23, 1964 quoted the West African Pilot as saying that the Chinese literature intended for Africa was being sent from Paris…The Chinese also send magazines, unsolicited, to a variety of influential people in non-communist countries, and, in order that their net may be spread further, are increasing the number of languages in which their magazines are published. 691 See, "Tongguo sulian zhu meiguo shiguan sanfa zhongguo xuanchuan pin shi" (Issue of distributing Chinese propaganda items through the Soviet Embassy in America) Archive No: 116-00208-14 1 Release Date: 1956.2.22 \1956.6.28 237 between China and U.S., this was a rare opportunity for the PRC regime, although it was soon realized that this was not going to be an easy task.692 In the capitalist countries, where China was officially represented, bilateral friendship associations were sometimes used to avoid direct contact with official circles. In such cases, the role of the PRC embassies would be limited to supplying the bilateral friendship organizations with the necessary propaganda materials and encouraging their work in that particular country. 693 In return, bilateral friendship associations organized lectures, meetings, film screenings, delegation visits, and other sorts of bilateral contact.694 Some of these associations, not surprisingly, were led by members of a local communist party.695 Indeed, regardless of their organic links to bilateral organizations, some local communist parties functioned as voluntary propaganda outlets for the Chinese regime.696 It is clear that some of these parties also 692 PRC Embassy in the Soviet Union notified the center that Soviet Embassy in the US was having difficulties in the distribution of Chinese foreign language magazines, hence asked for a decrease in the number of volumes supplied by the Chinese side. See, "Wo zhu waishi lingguan xinwen gongzuo (zhongwen, yingwen)" (Journalistic propaganda of our embassies abroad (Chinese, English) Archive No : 116-00372-03 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.5 \1957.10.16 693 There were also cases where the distribution of Chinese propaganda items was completely undertaken by the bilateral friendship organizations, such as in the case of Sino-Swedish Friendship Organization. The PRC Embassy in Sweden reported that they will continue to entrust the distribution work with this organization. The embassy's main role was to examine and solve problems related to this process, to collect reader responses and report back to the homeland. "Zhu ruidian shiguan 1956 nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang yu 1957 nian gongzuo jihua" (The cultural propaganda situation of our embassy in Sweden in 1956 and work plans for 1957) Archive No : 110-00648-05 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.1 \1957.2.12 694 See, “Sino-Belgian Relations”, background brief [YB 558-Int. Rels.-Belgium] China Topics, December 1, 1970 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 42, File 2 (China Topics 1970). For the activities of bilateral friendship associations in India, whose local branches all over the country organized events, visits to China and made available the free flow of the Chinese propaganda publications into India, See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 42 695 For instance, the Italian Association for cultural and friendly relations with China. See “Sino-Italian relations", YB 542 (Int. Rels.- Italy 11) (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 42, File: 2, China Topics, January 29, 1970) 696 For instance, French Communist Party decided to organize celebration activities for the 10th anniversary of the PRC's foundation in 1959. FCP demanded movies and publications from the Chinese representation for screening and distribution during the festivities. FCP declared the main purpose of the activities as: attacking De Gaulle's siding with the Chiang Kaishek regime and demanding recognition for PRC, as well as improving the understanding of French people towards China and promoting the friendly relations between two communist parties. See, "Faguo gongchandang dui wo wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo de yaoqiu he qingzhu wo jianguo shi zhounian huodong de qingkuang" (French Communist Party’s demands from our cultural propaganda work and the situation 238 enjoyed a special relationship with China's overseas outposts and had a privileged status in their access to China's propaganda items.697 Other ad hoc venues where one might come across a Chinese foreign language propaganda item would be international exhibitions. 698 Throughout the Cold War years, fairs were important arenas for the PRC regime, not only to counter the widely held perception of China as a backward, agrarian country and promote its commercial links, but also as critical venues for the distribution of printed propaganda.699 Inside China, the Canton (Guangdong) International Fair which was held twice a year served concerning the celebration activities for the tenth year anniversary of our country’s establishment) Archive No: 110-00834-03 1 Release Date: 1959.2.4 \1959.10.29. Also See Denmark Communist Party's preperations for the 10th anniversary of the PRC's foundation in "Zhu danmai shiguan guoqing shi zhounian xuanchuan gongzuo" (Our Denmark Embassy’s propaganda work concerning the celebrations of our country’s tenth anniversary) Archive No: 116-00243-11 1 Release Date: 1959.6.11 \1959.7.22 697 For instance, members of the Holland Communist Party could borrow Chinese movies from the PRC's Dutch Embassy whereas avarage individuals were tactically denied that right. See, "Zhu helan daibanchu guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo (xinwen gongbao, chujie yingpian) de yijian he qingshi" (Instructions and thoughts of our representation based in Holland about foreign propaganda work (news bulletin and lent films) Archive No : 110-01039-03 1 Release Date ; 1960.2.1 \1960.11.1 698 For instance, see the example of Algiers Fair: "In a dispatch headed "Algerian people warmly welcome Chairman Mao's works and sing praises of Chairman Mao", NCNA said that within the first four hours of opening more volumes of Mao's Selected Works had been sold than during the whole of last year's Fair, and that 170 entries had been made into the visitor's book on the first evening." See “Communist relations with Africa”, Communism and Africa, June 1962 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 45, File: 6, Communism and Africa, June 1962-Nov 1966) It was also customary for the PRC leadership to organize exhibitions abroad (especially in developing countries of Asia and Africa, but also in the neutral Scandinavian countries) to display China's economic succeses. One such exhibition was held in Baghdad in 1960. For the official statement of appreciation by Iraqi government, See "Yilake shiguan songlai qi lingdaoren chuxi wo jingji jianshe chengjiu zhanlanhui zhaopian he tici ji wo fangfuzhao" (Zhongwen, Yingwen) (Pictures and insciptions sent by the Iraq Embassy showing their leaders attending our exhibition (of our economic successes) and our reply note (Chinese, English) Archive No ; 107-00396-03 1 Release Date ; 1960.12. 8 \1960.12.16 Some of these exhibitions were organized by the embassies themselves. One such exhibition (agriculture and industry) was held in Ghana in September 1961. See "Zhu jia shiguan dui yijiuliuyi nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo kaolü" (Our Ghana embassy’s thoughts about the cultural propaganda work in the year 1961) Archive No : 108-00093-02 1 Release Date ; 1960.11.17 \1960.11.30. Also see the "Pictures and Artistic Items/Handicrafts" exhibition organized in Oslo, Norway in May, 1960 in "Wo zai nuo wei juxing tupian he gonyi meishupin zhanlan de zongjie" (Summary of the picture and fine arts items exhibition we have organized in Norway) Archive No ; 110-00967-04 1 Release Date ; 1960.1.7 \1960.8.10 699 At the bookstall, Mao's books were sold "in no time", and doubtless there were considerable opportunities for extending the circulation of the magazines among those whose presence indicated an initial interest in China. “China and Africa: 1955-1962” Background note No 5 [YB No 118(Int. Rels – Africa 1] China Topics, June, 1962 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 38, File 1 (China Topics 1962 March-August) 20 239 the same purpose. Here, foreign visitors could find recent editions of China's foreign language materials alongside the country's industrial products. The PRC regime used international meetings as another venue to circulate its propaganda media. A significant example is the Bandung Conference of 1955, for which the PRC Foreign Ministry decided days in advance what to bring along.700 The list of propaganda items included books, periodicals, pictures, postcards, stamps and song records. Chinese foreign language publications were also distributed domestically through the work units which had direct contact with foreigners such as friendship stores, hotels, guest houses, or tourism offices. Foreign guests, students and members of an international delegation were often handed a magazine, book or pamphlet in the appropriate language. A directive issued in 1963 by the State Council Foreign Office ordered that "anti-revisionist" publications should be displayed and distributed domestically as a means to overcome restrictions abroad. Hotels, airports, seaports, travel agencies and various other work units which had contact with foreigners had to display these publications.701 4.3. Case Study: China Books and Periodicals During the 1950s, due to the anti-communist frenzy exacerbated with the Korean War, the US government imposed various restrictions on leftist publications, especially those imported from communist countries. 702 Despite these measures, Chinese propaganda items found its way to the American market by 1951, through the 700 See "Yafei huiyi xiedai xuanchuan pin wenti" (The problem of propaganda items to be brought to the Asia-Africa Conference) Archive No : 116-00138-03 1 Release Date: 1955.2.21 \1955.3.24 701 See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 160 702 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Shwartz, Murray L., James C.N. Paul, “Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A report on some problems of Federal Censorship”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.107, No.5 (March 1959) 621-666 240 Imported Publications and Products in New York, an organization affiliated with the American Communist Party. 703 However, it is hard to determine whether China's foreign propaganda items reached anyone beyond the small circle of leftists living on the East Coast during the 1950s, as the circulation figures for Chinese foreign language publications in the US remained minimal (close to 500 for each item).704 It was not until 1960, when Henry Noyes established China Books and Periodicals, that the reading public in North America had relatively easier access to the Chinese foreign language media.705 Noyes' bookstore remained as the only outlet for Chinese foreign language magazines and books in the US throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s.706 Henry Noyes, who is still remembered in contemporary China as a progressive personality (jinbu renshi),707 was born in China to a Presbyterian missionary family. Throughout his life he cherished his personal memories of this country, which led him to take upon himself the task of introducing New China to American readers in 1960. Initially, China Books and Periodicals, was located in Chicago, Illinois. It started as a family business run by Henry Noyes, his wife Gertrude Noyes, daughter Nicky, son 703 Imported Publications and Products, run by Margaret Cowls and her husband Jack Krumbein had the distribution base of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its eight affiliated bookstores. See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 1 704 For the circulation figure, See, Gong Jiefu, "Meiguo tushu shichang he zhongguo shukan zai mei de faxing" (American book market and Chinese books' distribution in the US) in Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 677. 705 There was indeed continuity between Imported Publications & Products and China Books & Periodicals. Margaret Cowl, who was heading the former company was about to retire. In the meanwhile, she was looking for a convenient person to transfer her business links with China. Paul Romaine, owner of an independent bookstore in Chicago, who knew both Margaret Cowl and Henry Noyes acted as an intermediary for their initial contact. After a brief period of hesitation due to his lack of experience, Henry Noyes decided to get into this business. See, Noyes, Henry, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989 66-69 706 Even by the early 1980s, CB&P had a market share of 95 percent in the US in the sale of various items originating from China. See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 6 707 See, Gong Jiefu, "Meiguo tushu shichang he zhongguo shukan zai mei de faxing" (American book market and Chinese books' distribution in the US) in Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 677 241 Christopher Noyes and daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes.708 Yet, it was such a small business in the beginning that it was not able to sustain the family's livelihood: In its first year China Books did a meager $2,000 in business, operating out of the family bungalow in Chicago with staff of four….and selling mainly to professors and bookstores with a left-wing orientation. At the time the business could in no way support the basic necessities for the family, so, in addition, Henry worked as a mechanist and set up examinations for the catholic school systems, Gertrude worked as a medical secretary during the day and a legal secretary at night and Chris worked at the supermarket. Nicky had not yet finished high school.709 In its initial years, except for the family members, only volunteers worked at the store. CB&P was able to hire other people only after the growth in wholesale business.710 But setting up a business of importing publications from China was not an easy task. As there was a US Treasury ban on the export of capital to communist countries ("Trading with the Enemy Act") making payments to the distributor in China, the International Bookstore, was not an option.711 Hence the founders of the CB & P had to get creative: Under the First Amendment of the Constitution, Americans were guaranteed the right to read even publications originating in a communist country. But all trade with China had been cut off in 1951 and import of publications was possible only under Treasury license. The Treasury kept us on hold for several months before finally responding favorably to our application, but its conditions were onerous. Since we were forbidden to pay International Bookstore, we were required to deposit funds owing in a blocked account in a US bank712. Therefore, Henry Noyes was supposed to pay his debts to the International Bookstore via a bank account, which the Chinese side could not have access to. The difficulties, however, were not limited to the financial transactions. The book orders usually took 708 Margareta Noyes (daughter-in-law of Henry Noyes and widow of Christopher Noyes) was interviewed at China Books and Periodicals in South San Francisco in June 18, 2007. Margareta Noyes had retired in from Cypress Press in January 2007. 709 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 710 Among the long-term staff, who worked at CB & P over the years (performing different tasks including subscriptions and mailing) were Chi Chin, Richard Robles, Greg Jones, Shu Min Zhang, Shao Yan, Lin Zongren and Annie Zhang. Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007. 711 See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 69 712 See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 72 242 two or three months to arrive.713 Shipments and clearance of the imported items at the US customs also proved to be problematic.714 As there were no official diplomatic ties between the two countries, there was no certainty over the handling of formalities regarding customs regulations, which resulted in penalties for the CB&P. 715 But clearly, for both ends of this partnership, financial gain was of secondary importance.716 Besides the problems caused by government bureaucracy, there were also problems relating to the CB & P's client base, which originally consisted of eight bookstores affiliated with the Communist Party of the USA. As the early 1960s were the years of the Sino-Soviet split, the CB &P, which has just entered the North American book market, found it very difficult to sell Chinese publications to these pro-Soviet bookstores. Moreover, there were attempts to discourage Henry Noyes from disseminating Chinese publications, among them Long Live Leninism, a major theoretical piece in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 717 According to Noyes, although a number of political groups in the US sided with China in the Sino-Soviet controversy, they were not able to fill the vacuum in book sales caused by the departure of the 713 See, D.M, "Books and China" (sub-heading: Selling Chinese books in America), Publishers Weekly”, March 15, 1976 714 Chi Chin describes the challenges as follows: "No sooner were the initial problems with the government and banks over the US Customs and post office started new troubles. Customs officials seized the first shipment from China and would not release the books until Noyes obtained a court order and then the post office decided to charge $1.00 on each small parcel. Henry, by then in his fifties, literally ran up and down the customs building for several days to solve the problems". See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 2 715 International Bookstore notified Henry Noyes that it was not appropriate for them to fill out US customs declaration forms. The US Customs then declared a fine of $1,200 on CB&P for failing to comply with the US regulations. Luckily for Henry Noyes this fine was later reduced to $12 after long conversations with the customs officials to convince them it was not logical for a foreign country not recognized by the US to fill out its official documents. See, Henry Noyes China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 74 716 This point was well understood by Margaret Cowl, Noyes' predecessor in the American market. When transferring her business to Henry Noyes, Margaret Cowl explained that money transaction was secondary. "This is not only a commercial business, it's building a bridge of friendship between two great peoples". See, Henry Noyes China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 70 717 See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 76-77 243 communist bookstores.718 This led him to look for new opportunities all around the country. He was soon able to line up forty three newsstands in major cities willing to sell the Peking Review, China Pictorial, and China Reconstructs.719 This venture also convinced Noyes that San Francisco, California would be a better place to re-locate his business.720 Yet, even in the relatively liberal West Coast region, selling Chinese publications was not an easy task at the time: …one business had its show windows smashed and was driven out of San Francisco's Chinatown because it tried to sell publications from China. Another man who tried to sell China's magazines on the streets disappeared, never to be heard of again.721 Likewise, marketing publications from China in the conservative South had its own challenges: The going, though, was generally tougher in the South and admittedly sales were slimmer. One bookbuyer at the University of Kentucky bookstore told Henry he would like to send an A-bomb in a suitcase addressed personally to Mao Tse-Tung aimed to explode on arrival, but even he ended up ordering two Little Red Books and one each of five of Mao's pamphlets. In Birmingham, Alabama, Henry spent five hours at the leading downtown store persuading the owner, a retired schoolteacher, to stock books from China. Finally she began to place an order including a dozen copies of the Quotations. When Henry returned a year later, she told him the Ku Klux Klan had moved in on her and were threatening her, so, she concluded: "I still handle your books for interested customers, but I do have to keep them back here under the counter." When the University of Texas Co-op buyer refused to order books from China, three young Texans, one black, two white, drove all the way to China Books in San Francisco. They bought a big collection of books and went off with a triumphant smile in their beatup old Volkswagon camper back to their home state to distribute the material.722 But in the end, the CB&P succeeded in broadening its clientele base and becoming a wholesale distributor in the US rather then settling with a small number of left-wing 718 The groups siding with China were Provisional Organizing Committee, Hammer and Steel, Progressive Labor Party. See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 77 719 See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 78. 720 CB& P's new location was at the heart of San Francisco's Mission District, 24th Street. See, Henry Noyes China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 80 721 See, Chi Chin "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 722 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 3-4 244 bookstores. 723 This also called for broader content and a wider range of items to distribute, which is reflected in the CB& P's "1965-66 Catalogue".724 The bookstore now offered a variety of Chinese foreign language publications, stamps, calendars, posters and pictorials. 725 There were also other sideline items such as woodblock prints, bookmarks, hand-painted greeting cards, records including children's music and operas.726 Although we have no conclusive sale records for the CB & P, China's official statistics indicate that in the year 1970, China was exporting 350,000 publications to the US via the CB&P.727 A former employee and a family member, Margareta Noyes recalls that they had around 3,000 subscribers for the China Reconstructs magazine. Another source, CB&P's New York store manager, K.C. Foung, indicated that, as of 1976, except the retail and wholesale figures, they were selling to a mailing list of 70,000 customers. 728 In order to increase sales, the CB&P had promotional discounts for long time subscribers. For instance, the Peking Review was sent to permanent subscribers for 723 Chris Noyes described this process as follows: "Selling at wholesale required taking sales trips from coast to coast, showing samples and taking orders, though small in quantity at that time, from hundreds of bookstores. Our business therefore enlarged from a small store with local sales, into a wholesale distributor of publications from China on a nationwide basis. We were thus able to sell the books and periodicals we imported through Guozi Shudian to readers who were not our direct customers but the customers of hundreds of other bookstores." See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 2 724 This 18 pages-long catalog had several sub-sections, displaying the variety of items available to American readers before the start of the Cultural Revolution. Except for the publications of strictly political and ideological content, there was a wide range of books available on Chinese classical literature, Peking Opera, Chinese agriculture, medicine, science and mathematics, sports and hobbies, family relations, archeology-arts and crafts, children's books, picture stories (for all ages). See, Imported Books from China 1965-1966 Catalog No:16 (in English), China Books and Periodicals, San Francisco, CA 725 These items were exhibited in the CB&P showroom. See Table 11. 726 See, D.M, "Books and China" (subheading: Selling Chinese books in America) Publishers Weekly”, March 15, 1976 727 See, Gong Jiefu, "Meiguo tushu shichang he zhongguo shukan zai mei de faxing" (American book market and Chinese books' distribution in the US) in Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999, 677. 728 See, D.M, "Books and China" (subheading: Selling Chinese books in America) Publishers Weekly”, March 15, 1976 245 half of its price. 729 Free sending of other items was also a common promotional method, also in accordance with the International Bookstore policy: Since we had little money for promotion, especially for advertising, we had to rely on personal contact, mailing of catalogs, and sale through other bookstores to reach a fairly wide readership interested in international affairs and cultures of other countries. We were also able to reach most sections of university and college field interested in China and the Far East through annual exhibits with the Association of Asian Studies and their radical offshoot, the Concerned Asian Scholars. 730 According to Margareta Noyes, art books were not popular with readers, as they were too expensive and not terribly interesting.731 Other books, though, were surprisingly "low-priced" in comparison to American books.732 CB&P set its own prices for the books sold in the US, with special discounts to wholesalers, retailers and libraries.733 Chinese foreign language publications sold in the US were mostly translated by British-Australian translators and some readers found the usage of British-English cause for less pleasant reading. Although the CB&P periodically sent questionnaires to subscribers inquiring their preferences, it is not clear whether the International Bookstore made note of these responses. Margareta Noyes' impression was that, overall, the International Bookstore was not responsive to CB &P's demands and the staff in Beijing knew little of the peculiarities of the US market. For instance, although CB & P staff informed their Chinese colleagues that the calendars sent by International Bookstore did not really suit the taste of American readers, calendars continued to pour in. 734 Such practices seem to have added to the problem of overstocking: 729 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 2 731 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007. 732 For instance, the price of 588 pages-long "Travels Inside China" (paperback) was $3,95 in 1976. See, D.M, "Books and China" (subheading: Selling Chinese books in America) Publishers Weekly”, March 15, 1976 733 See, D.M, "Books and China" (subheading: Selling Chinese books in America) Publishers Weekly”, March 15, 1976. Also See, China Books and Periodicals Order Form (n.d.) 734 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 730 246 Our orders for books and sidelines were often over-ambitious. In addition GS (Guoji Shudian) supplied us with quantities of their own initiative. The result was overstocking and needless expense, also considerable waste. This did not seem serious at a time when the main emphasis by both firms was placed on politics. But as our warehouse space began to fill and overfill, we had problems of mounting expense in an inflationary economy.735 Likewise, during the Cultural Revolution, International Bookstore made it clear that only orders for political publications would continue to be served, whereas other orders would be kept in file "for the time being", which in the end lasted for a decade.736 This was problematic for the CB & P which now had to satisfy the needs of a broader clientele base in the U.S. As Chris Noyes explains: This meant that our imports from China were narrowed down to political documents, including the works of Mao Tse-Tung, reprints of Marxist-Leninist classics, and heroic stories and dramas of the Chinese revolutionary period, also a few children's books. Since our distribution has broadened out greatly from the narrow base we had inherited from Imported Publications and Products in 1960, we were taken by surprise. Fortunately from our point of view, we had substantial stock of the China Knowledge Series with titles in history, geography, economics and literary criticism to maintain a certain breadth of distribution for publications from China, in spite of the fact that we were not re-supplied with books in these categories. To meet the needs of our customers in these fields we reprinted the Selected Storied of Lu Hsun and The Family by Pa Chin and we also began selectively to handle publications about China by Edgar Snow, Felix Greene, Maud Russell, Han Suyin and other good friends of China737. The narrowing of the content during the Cultural Revolution is also reflected in the 1970-1971 Catalog of the CB& P.738 As correctly understood by the CB & P staff, International Bookstore was part of a huge bureaucracy, which made it difficult to accommodate its publication-distribution policy according to the needs of American 735 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 7 736 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 4 737 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 4-5 738 As different from the pre-Cultural Revolution catalogues, 1970-1971 catalogue had few offerings on non-political topics. Bulk of the content was related to the Cultural Revolution, Sino-Soviet relations, modern revisionism, international relatons, etc. Mao Zedong's writings were given special emphasis, as well as other symbolic items, such as the Mao badge. See, Imported Books from China 1970-1971 Catalog No:24 (in English), China Books and Periodicals Inc., San Franciso, CA 247 readers. Seemingly, various suggestions by the CB&P staff on how to make better sales in the U.S. went unheard on the Chinese end of this partnership.739 As the International Bookstore staff did not sign their names under the letters sent to the CB&P, a practice which was completely against the business norms in the U.S., it was difficult for this business correspondence to go beyond official lines.740 Over the years, through their correspondence with International Bookstore, CB & P staff was more and more convinced that it was not easy to change their Chinese colleagues' perception of the American market. 741 Even in the early 1980s, many materials from China failed to compete successfully in the US market because they were "not geared towards a Western audience". 742 Due to the International Bookstore's lack of understanding of the local market conditions and audience preferences in the U.S., many unsaleable items continued to crowd the shelves in both China and the US.743 By the mid-1980s, CB& P no longer had a monopoly of Chinese publications in the U.S., as the International Bookstore established the Cypress Press to have deeper penetration into this market for its overstocked items.744 739 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 741 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 742 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 6 743 See, for instance the draft letter by Chris Noyes to the International Bookstore circa 1980s. This letter indicates that relations between the partners were strained due to International Bookstore's insistence on sending the unsalable items without consulting with CB&P. There are also indications that International Bookstore was looking for alternative channels of distribution via university libraries. Noyes, on the other hand, is suggesting that International Bookstore share in the advertisement and promotion expenses, as advertising in American media is not affordable by CB& P –a medium size distributor with underpaid staff. The nature of this letter, overall, reflects the lack of mutual ground for understanding generally found in international business dealings. This is strange especially after 23 years of partnership. See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 744 Apparently, the CB&P staff took this initiative quite personally. A draft letter designed to be sent to their Chinese partners on this issue, reads: "We think that there should be no competition, only mutual support between our two firms, now that CIBTC is setting up a base in our home territory, distinct from CB&P. In return for all the benefits we have received from CIBTC in the past 25 years, we are happy to open the front door wide to your new enterprise. But to be perfectly frank, we see you entering by the side door. The type of discussions we would have expected in the planning stage of your operation in the US did not take place." See, Memorandum to: Fan Jingyi, Wang Qingyun, Ma Canxiong, Yang 740 248 Of all the publications which came from China and sold by the CB&P in the US, there was only one mass market item745. That, undoubtedly, was the Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (or, Little Red Book), which Henry Noyes was hesitant to order a thousand copies in the beginning, but ended up selling 600,000 copies during the Cultural Revolution:746 In spring 1967, we received an airmail sample of the Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung. We had no notion at the time that this Little Red Book was to give a powerful boost to all the young liberation movements and our sales a great leap forward. We thought we were taking a big chance in ordering a thousand copies, the largest order for a single title we had ever placed with International Bookstore. Two days after we received airmail shipment all thousand were sold. The Little Red Book became a status symbol for anybody opposing bureaucratic authority…Our store was flooded with status seekers from all over the country. We cabled Peking to loft 25,000 more Quotations to us by air freight. They were gone in a month…By the end of 1968 we had distributed over 250,000 and in the following fifteen years we were to sell over one million.747 In the second half of the 1960s, the Little Red Book radically transformed CB&P's sales statistics. Before the landing of the first airmail shipment of Quotations from China in 1967, only 35% of the sales were in political items, whereas in that year the percentage rose to 90%.748 Besides the Little Red Book, general interest among the leftist groups in guerilla warfare, the Vietnam War, and the Chinese revolution resulted in large circulation for Mao's other works, such as On Protracted War, Selected Military Writings, and Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung I to IV.749 Although Jie, Chen Tingsun (1985, not sent, 7 pages) (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes, at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 2 745 See, Memorandum to: Fan Jingyi, Wang Qingyun, Ma Canxiong, Yang Jie, Chen Tingsun (1985, not sent, 7 pages) (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes, at the courtesy of his daughterin-law Margareta Noyes) 5 746 This number rolled over to one million in the subsequent years, which made Little Red Book a bestseller even in the US booktrade standards. See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 6 747 See Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 82 748 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 6 749 Among other popular works which were distributed in thousands, there were pamphlets on Taiwan, Vietnam and revisionism, Lin Biao's Long Live the Victory of People's War, Liu Saoqi's How to be a good communist; On Chinese history and geography, From Emperor to Citizen, the constitutions of both PRC and CCP, The rise of Chinese people's communes. See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., 249 the best selling books were mostly of a political nature, there were also non-political items which had a fairly wide audience. Examples include Lu Hsun's Selected Works, Arts and Crafts of China, Paintings of the Sung Dynasty and 50 Chinese Recipes.750 With the anti-war sentiment at its height, Marxists, hippies, Black Panthers became regular customers of Chinese foreign language media. 751 Prominent members of these dissident groups frequented the bookstore in San Francisco.752 Clearly, the majority of the people who spent dollars to buy Chinese books and magazines were students: A new incentive to change the old academic world brought students from all over the Bay area to browse at CB&P and find ideological support for their campaigns- even the extremists who found in Mao's attack on stereotyped writing a justification for launching a free speech movement753. American splinter groups which claimed lineage to Mao Zedong Thought, such as Progressive Labor Party (PL), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), The Black Panthers, and the Revolutionary Union (RU) became voluntary distributors of political documents, Mao badges, posters, revolutionary song records, which they were supplied with from the CB &P. 754 But the reading public for China's publications was not exclusive to these groups. Chinese import publications attracted people from all walks of life. Amongst the audience, there were "longshoremen, exmembers of the armed forces, overseas Chinese, students and teachers-who had a (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 3-4 750 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 3 751 Henry Noyes mentions another marginal group called "seven diggers": "They were ultra democratic in practicing brotherhood and sisterhood of the Buddhist as distinct from the Christian orders, and they believed in smoking dope and baking brownies laced with marijuana. In their more sober moments they read books on the Chinese revolution, guerilla warfare and communism, sitting in lotus positions on the floors of CB&P.." See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 81 752 Margareta Noyes remembers the famous Black Panther leader Huey Newton coming with his entourage. Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 753 See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 81 754 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 5 250 personal or academic interest in People's Republic".755 The lead that CB& P has taken in importing books from China brought unexpected attention from tradesmen too: We also received orders, chiefly on the telephone or by post, from merchants, bankers and civic leaders who favored opening trade channels. Before World War II, 40 percent of the docks in San Francisco Harbored serviced China trade; a whole dockside area was still called the China Basin.(…) We received calls from textile importers, paint and varnish exporters, wheat merchants, travel agents, all asking what our magic formula was for opening trade with China.756 There were also Overseas Chinese, who were scared to import these publications themselves, and found it more convenient to buy them from the CB&P to sell it later in San Francisco's Chinatown.757 Other bookstores (such as the Revolution Bookstore) ordered posters. 758 Not surprisingly, the CB&P had a clientele among government officials who wanted to learn about the recent developments in China. The Noyes family gradually grew accustomed to occasional visits by FBI officials. According to Margareta Noyes' recollection, FBI officials generally came in pairs, wore trench coats and took a glance at the stamps. Apparently, Henry Noyes was not intimidated by these visits except that he urged the personnel not to answer personal questions.759 There were also paying subscribers among the governmental organizations who received Chinese items by mail on a regular basis760. American educational institutes, libraries and scholars were among other subscribers. University libraries such as the Hoover Institution, Getty Research Institute and the Hawaii University Library were regularly sent copies, as well as teachers, academics and other individual subscribers. 755 See Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 80 756 See Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 80 757 Margareta Noyes remembers a Jimmy Lee, owner of the New China Books in San Francisco's Chinatown, who bought items from China Books and Periodicals Inc. Before he left the bookstore, Jimmy Lee would put the books and magazines in big, brown bags –scared that somebody might notice them outside. Later, these books were sold at several corners in Chinatown. Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 758 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 759 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 760 Margareta Noyes remembers sending two copies of People's Daily to a government organization on a periodical basis. Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 251 Catalogs were sent to professors whose research interests lay in Asia. Prominent China scholars, needless to say, were among the most loyal customers.761 By the early 1970s, with the gradual relaxation of Sino-US relations, the CB & P customer base grew. The licensing restrictions by the US Treasury were terminated and CB & P was able to make direct payments to the International Bookstore.762 In the new era of Sino-US rapprochement, the CB & P became an attraction for the mainstream media, which eventually led to an increase in sales.763 By 1971, Chris Noyes became the first American businessman to attend the Canton Trade Fair and Henry Noyes was one of the three founders of the US-China People's Friendship Association.764 In 1976 there was a brief period, when the business was negatively influenced by the disillusionment created by Mao Zedong's death and Gang of Four's persecution. During this period, sections of US left-wing exerted pressure on the CB&P not to import publications from China. 765 There was even one incident of violence outside the premises of the CB&P which caused considerable headache for the staff.766 But the hardships relating to the political change in China proved to be short-term. In less than a decade following Nixon's visit, CB & P's distribution went 761 Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 See, Chris Noyes, No title, Dec. 198.., (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 7. The accumulated blocked accounts, however, were not released until 1980. See Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 94 763 In the summer of 1970, Henry Noyes was interviewed by Chronicle and later by CBS. He desribes the impact of media on his business as follows: "And for the next ten years, people dropped into the store because they have read his article –especially after the Nixon visit to China, when they could at least feel 'legit' if they bought a book or periodical imported direct from the People's Republic." See Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 86 764 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 5 765 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 6 766 After Mao's death in 1976, Margareta Noyes recalls, there would be discussion meetings in the store every Thursday morning, where the staff discussed Peking Review articles. In this period, Gang of Four divide resulted in the resignation of some of the regular staff. As Henry Noyes was regarded as proMao, one of the groups who became Anti-Gang of Four after the split, i.e., RCP in Seattle, harassed the CB&P by writing on the windows, walls, asphalt and sidewalks of the store: "Mao makes Five". During this unpredictable period, some of the staff started sleeping inside the store, for they feared CB&P might be attacked again. Interview with Margareta Noyes, June 18, 2007 762 252 up 1,200 per cent.767 The number of the staff also grew from five to thirty between 1971 and 1975.768 In 1975, Henry Noyes visited China and met his co-workers at the International Bookstore for the first time. By the end of the 1970s China was no longer a mystical place for American audiences. Following the reforms in China, the content of Chinese foreign language publications broadened and the CP & B acquired a whole new range of items on Chinese geography, culture and society. Maps and travel guides became popular sale items. In the early 1980s, language texts, books on acupuncture, and China's trade laws were amongst the best-sellers.769 In the first half of the 1980s, even high school textbooks were quoting Chinese foreign language materials and crediting the CB & P for making these materials available in the US.770 767 See, Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 86 768 Henry Noyes, China Born: Adventures of a Maverick Bookman, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 98 769 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes) 7 770 See, Chi Chin, "Feet on the ground, eyes on the stars", 1984 (Item from the personal collection of Henry Noyes at the courtesy of his daughter-in-law Margareta Noyes), 4. 253 TABLE 6 International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) Annual Distribution Figures (1949-1976) Source: Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999 Year 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Languages 4 4 6 7 8 8 8 11 13 15 17 16 14 15 21 21 22 21 25 32 32 28 27 30 26 22 26 25 type of books 8 21 30 26 50 76 129 191 182 384 399 388 202 155 388 644 491 394 301 767 815 533 245 371 209 247 308 232 annual circulation (books) NA NA 40,000 170,000 330,000 470,000 370,000 440,000 330,000 920,000 510,000 1,210,000 1,050,000 580,000 3,260,000 2,660,000 2,840,000 3,580,000 6,170,000 7,730,000 6,130,000 5,820,000 4,440,000 3,710,000 2,280,000 3,290,000 6,270,000 4,550,000 16000000 14000000 languages 12000000 10000000 type of books 8000000 books annual circulation 6000000 periodicals annual circulation 4000000 2000000 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 254 annual circulation (periodicals) NA NA 670,000 1,670,000 1,900,000 2,580,000 3,140,000 4,020,000 5,400,000 4,930,000 7,550,000 6,510,000 4,450,000 4,650,000 7,520,000 12,270,000 14,270,000 9,990,000 10,110,000 9,550,000 9,430,000 10,520,000 10,730,000 11,430,000 11,840,000 13,440,000 14,270,000 14,760,000 TABLE 7 International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) distribution centers abroad Source: “English Language Periodicals published in China” (n.d.) advertisement: Guozi Shudian Australia: Current Book Distributers, 40 Market Street Sydney A.Keesing GPO 4886 Sydney Belgium: Du Monde Entier, 5 Place St. Jean Bruxelles Burma: Nan Chio Book Supplier, 178 Fraser Street Rangoon. Kyaw Linn Booksellers and Publishers 180, 51st Street Rangoon Central Publishing House, No 181 Sule Pagoda Road Rangoon Canada: Progress Books, 740 Bathurst Street Toronto, Ontario Ceylon: People’s Publishing House 91 Cotta Road Borello, Colombo-8 Cyprus: People’s Bookshop Po Box 588 Nicosia Denmark: A/S Land og Folks Boghandel Bredgade 37 Kobenhavn K. France: Librarie du Globe, 21 Rue des Carmes, Paris Véme S.E.R.P 42 Rue de Chemin-Vert Paris 11e Great Britain: Collett’s Holdings Ltd. 45 Museum Street London W.C.1 Central Book Ltd. 2 Parton Street London W.C.1 Hong Kong: Sin Min Chu Publishing Co. 175 Queen’s Rd. Central India: People’s Publishing House 190-b Khetwadi Main Road Bombay 4 National Book Agency 12 Bankim Chatterjee Street Calcutta 12 Delhi Book Center 1923 Champa Kutir Multani Dhandha Paharganj New Delhi New Century Book House 199 Mount Road Madras 2 Prabbath Book House Chittoor Rorad Ernakulam Travancore South India People’s Book House Opp. B.N. College Patna 4 Bihar. Indonesia: O.K. Sports 214 Dj. Gadjah Mada Djakarta Kota Djawa Israel: Moshkevich POB 4550 Tel Aviv Italy: Libreria Rinascita SRL Via Dele Botteghe Oscura 2-Roma Editori Distributori Associati S.A. Via Mauro Macchi 40 Milano Japan: Far Eastern Booksellers, 15 3-chome Kanda-Jinbocho Chiyadaku Tokyo Mexico: FondodeCultura, Popular A.C. Av Hidalgo 404(Antes 75) Despacho107 Mexico D.F. Netherlands: Uitgeverij Pegasus, Boekhandel, Leidsestraat 25, Amsterdam New Zealand: Progressive Books, PO Box 151 W.Wellesley Street, Auckland. Norway: Johan Grundt Tanum, Tidligere Aschehougs, Boghandel, Karl Johans Gt. 43 Oslo Sweden: Forlagsaktiebolaget, Arbetarkultur, Kungsgatan 84, Stockholm Switzerland: Librarie Nouvelle, 18 Rue de Carouge, Geneve Outlets in Africa Source: China Topics, YB 351 October 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection Box 39 File 6) Burundi Horlogerie du Progres national Muhayana André Juvénal B.P.535, 20 Rue de’l Industrie, Bujumbura Ethiopia International Pres Agency, George P. Giannopoulos, PO Box 120 Addis Ababa Ghana Ghana Books and Periodicals Distributors, PO Box 2311 Accra Presbyterian Book Depot Ltd. PO Box 195 Accra The People’s Publications and Stationary Suppliers, PO Box 176 Kaneshie Accra Party Bookshop PO BOx 821 Accra 255 The Simpson Book Service PO Box 1216 Lutteradt Street Accra Kenya Pan African Pres Ltd. PO Box 8064 Nairobi Mali Librarie Populaire du Mali, B.P.28 Bamako ou a Kayes, Gao, Mopti, Sikasso et Segou Samou Touré Depositaire de la Litterature Democratique Boute de Sotuba, Bamako Djakité Bakery Depositaire a Koutiala L’etoile Noir Libraririe Papeterie-Journaux, Rue Soundiata Keito Angle 115, Bolibana-Bamako Mauritius Students’ Book Club PO Box 433 34 Jummah Mosque Street Port Louis Nigeria Abdul Aziis Trading and Sons GPO Box 1291 Ibadan Journal Commercial Institute and Technical Works No 70 Gunning Road Abakaliki UNAKPAN 16a France Road Sabon Gari Kano South Africa H.A.U.M 303 Monarch House 58 Long Street Cape Town Tanzania Tangankiya Bookshop PO Box 2720 Dar es Salam Revolutionary Bookshop Po Box 1146 Zanzibar The Tukuyu Bookshop Tukuyu S.H. Region Tanganyika Stationary Books and Newspaper Agent, PO Box 280 Mwanza Oriental Printing Pres Street No 13 PO Box 280 Tanga Karogwe Bookshop PO Box 122 Karogwe Togo Francis Booker Tychus Lawson, Commercant, Quarter dAdjido, Anecho-Togo. North African Agents Source: “China and the Middle East and North Africa”, Background brief [YB 354 (Int. Rels. M.E.-3)] China Topics, November 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 6 (China Topics September-December 1965) Algeria: Les massegaries Algeriéennes, 20 Rue de la Liberté 20, B.P. 41 Alger Librarie Dominique, Rue Charras 9 (3e) Alger Librarie Haschette, 49 bis Rue Mehidi Ben Larbi, Alger Agence Ech-Chihab “Le Metéore” 17 Boulevard Zabana 17, Oran Librarie “En Nahdha El Jadida” 20 Avenue de l’Indepedence, Batna Musé Oriental, Avenue Margueritte, Laghouat Oasis Maison de la Press, Ouargla Oasis Librarie des Oasis, Essemiani Boualem, B.P 24 Ouargla Oasis Rouabhi-Ahmed Fawzi 1 et 5 Rue Bouzarein, Bone. Morocco: “Sochepress” 1 Place de Bandoeng B.P. 683 Casablanca “Sochepress”Avenue Mohd Zerktouni Marrakesh “Sochepress”8 Place Alaoutite, Rabat “Sochepress”22, Rue Liberté No. 9 Ees “Sochepress”Rue de la Corse (Vn.) Meknes “Sochepress”R.Moulay Abdellah, Kenitra “Sochepress”19-23, Rue Sijimassa, Oujda Librarie-Papeterie “Del Hoscense” 66 Rue Augustin Surzac(R.M.) Casablanca Librarie “le Livre” 2, Rue de President Berge, Rabat Sudan: Al Mowatin Bookshop, PO Box 1130, Khartoum New Thoughts Library, PO Box 169, Atbara El-Salam Library, Abdel El Rahman, Ali Ibrahim, Station Road, Wad Halfa El Fajr Library PO Box 351 Wad Medani Abdel Hayoum Bookshop PO Box 480 Port Sudan Tunisia: Librairie En-Najah, Hedi Ben Abdel Gheni, 58 Rue Djamaa Ez-Zitouna, Tunis. (Branch: Succursake Sousse 6 Rue Ali Bellahouane) 256 M. Rachid Bechir Affes, Avenue Farhat Hached, Sfax Agents in the Middle East Source: “China and the Middle East and North Africa”, Background brief [YB 354 (Int. Rels. M.E.-3)] China Topics, November 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 6 (China Topics September-December 1965) Iran: Bookstore Saka Hovsepian, 48 Ave. Marshal Stalin, Teheran Iraq: Baghdad Publishing House, Al Jihad Street, Baghdad Press and Publishing Corporation Wathba Square –Naji-El Khedary Blda, 2nd floor Flat No.17 Baghdad Darul Ahali Rashid Street Abid Ali Hindi Building Rasul-Qaryah Baghdad Israel: “Lepac” Ltd. 20, Brenner Street PO Box 1136 Tel Aviv “Haiflepac” 11 Arlosarov Street PO Box 1794 Haifa Sifriat Poalim Ltd. 73, Allenby Street, PO Box 526 Tel Aviv Popular Bookshop El Khanonq Street PO Box 167 Nazareth Lotus, 25 Achad-Haam Street (Corner Allenby) Tel Aviv Lebanon: Dar el Farabi, B.P. 3181 Beyrouth Farajallah Press Agency George Picot Street –Milky Lane, PO Box 1012, Beirut Ibn Sina Publishing House, Beirut Syria: Damascus Publishing House, Adib, Tounbakji, Port Said Street, Damascus Omar Tounbakji, Avenue Saad Allah Djabri, Damascus Farajallah Nizam and Roumani Press Agency, PO Box 2366, Damascus UAR: Trans World Press Agency, PO Box 2254, 29 Ernad El Dine Street, Cairo Dar El Shark Bookshop, 8 Soliman Pasha Street PO Box 842, Cairo 257 TABLE 8 Radio Peking broadcasting languages and launch dates (1947-1976) Source: Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai Tai shi bian bianzu (editorial board for the history of the China Radio International) Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo shiliao jianbian (1947-1987) [Short edition of China Radio International Historical Materials (1947-1987)], Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1987, 395-396 1. English 2. Japanese 3. Indonesian 4. Vietnamese 5. Thai 6. Burmese 7. Korean 8. Spanish 9. Lao 10. Cambodian 11. Persian 12. Turkish 13. Arabic 14. French 15. Malay 16. Hindi 17. German 18. Portugese 19. Italian 20. Serbo-Croatian 21. Swahili 22. Russian 23. Hausa 24. Tamil 25. Mongolian 26. Esperanto 27. Filipino 28. Urdu 29. Czech 30. Polish 31. Romanian 32. Bangladesh 33. Albanian 34. Pashto 35. Bulgarian 36. Cengjialuo 37. Nepalese 38. Hungarian 1947.9.11 1949.6.20 (This list was prepared before the discovery of the new historical documents which indicate that the Japanese broadcasts started during the Anti-Japanese war, in 1941 *C.U.) 1950.4.10 1950.4.10 1950.4.10 1950.4.10 1950.7.2 1956.9.3 1956.12.15 1956.12.15 1957.10.15 1957.10.21 1957.11.3 1958.6.5 1959.3.1 1959.3.15 1960.4.15 1960.4.15 1960.4.29 1961.6.2 1961.9.1 1962.2.25 1963.6.1 1963.8.1 1964.12.1 1964.12.19 1965.10.30 1966.8.2 1968.8.25 1968.8.27 1968.8.30 1969.1.1 1969.6.6 1973.7.15 1974.4.19 1975.1.1 1975.6.25 1976.7.26 258 TABLE 9 Letter from International Bookstore (Guoji Shudian) circa 1950s Source: Ref. 33/EC-15 (Hoover Institution, Alfred Kohlberg Collection, Box 29, file: China) (dated. April 28, 1954) “Dear Reader, The wealth of information supplied by PEOPLE’S CHINA is perhaps unnecessary of further introduction to you –a former subscriber. This has now been accentuated by the many all-around improvements made recently. But you have missed these, because they took place after your subscription ended. To enable to see it yourself, we take pleasure in sending you a free specimen of the latest issue. We do not know the reason for the discontinuance of your subscription but it may be because, like some of our other subscribers, you are not sure where and how to renew. In this case the following may be of help to you. To subscribe, you have only to fill in the enclosed subscription form, place it in the enclosed envelope and mail it to us. That is all you have to do, and we shall see to it that your subscription copies start coming to you regularly. Payment can be made in this easy way: Send in International Reply Coupons (any post office sells these) to us; or, send in the money order or checks made payable to GUOZI SHUDIAN –nothing more needed be written. If you find the above not so easy as it really is, push the matter aside for the time being, and send in only your order; the bill could be settled later on. In addition to PEOPLE’S CHINA we distribute a number of other periodicals published in China, and amongst these CHINA PICTORIAL and CHINESE LITERATURE are the ones most favorably received by the reading public. We are sending you under separate cover a specimen of the latest issue of each to let you find out yourself the reasons why they have been so well-received. Your subscription orders for those will be most welcome also. The annual subscription rates for these three periodicals are as shown on the enclosed subscription form. We shall be glad to send introductory gift copies of PEOPLE’S CHINA, CHINA PICTORIAL or CHINESE LITERATURE to any one who would be interested in the present and future developments in China. There are no obligations whatsoever, but only we must have the correct mailing address. In ending, please accept our sincerest thanks for sparing so much of your precious time to this letter. Will you kindly let us have your reply as speedily as you can manage? Very truly yours, GUOZI SHUDIAN Director, Export Department (no name signed) Attached to the above letter: “Subscription form addressed to Guozi Shudian” (Hoover Institution, Alfred Kohlberg Collection, Box 29, file: China) Address: Guozi Shudian Export Department 38 Suchou Hutong Peking China Please accept the sum of 3.50 USD in payment of my subscription to PEOPLE’S CHINA for one year beginning with issue No…… Name/Address Please accept the sum of 2.20 USD in payment of my subscription to CHINA PICTORIAL for one year beginning with issue No…… Name/Address Please accept the sum of 1 USD in payment of my subscription to CHINA PICTORIAL for one year beginning with issue No…… Name/Address 259 TABLE 10 Principle non-indigenous communist publications in Western Europe (1960) Source: “Communist Propaganda Activities in West Europe 1960: A brief survey” Records of the US Information Agency Research Reports 1960-82, Research ( R ) Reports of the Office of Research 1960-63, Rg. 306 250/67/08/05-07 Entry: A1 (1013A) Box 4 R-12, National Archives II, Maryland. Country/Organization and Publication China: Bulletin D'information (BM) News review published by Chinese Embassy in Switzerland (English) Bulletin Fra den Kinesiske Folkerepublics Ambassade I Danmark (BW) News review published by Chinese Embassy in Denmark China Pictorial (FN) Prestige pictorial magazine (English, French, German and Spanish) China Reconstructs (M) Prestige pictorial (English and Spanish) China Sports (BM) (English) Chinese Literature (M) Literary journal (English) Chinese Medical Journal (BM) (English) Chinese Physical Culture (BM) (English) Chinese Youth Bulletin (BW) Survey of youth and student life (English and French) Daily news release Edited by foreign language institute Peking (English) English Study (M) Youth magazine (English) Evergreen (BM) (English) Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of China (M) (English) Information Bulletin (SM) All China federation of democratic youth (English) NCNA China Newsletter News review published by Chinese press agency in the United Kingdom Peking Review (W) News review magazine (English and French) People's China (M) Esparanto Scienta Sinca (M) Scientific journal (English, French and German) Science Record (M) Scientific journal (English, French and German) The Chinese trade unions (BM) (English) Women of China (BM) Prestige pictorial magazine (English) 260 FIGURE 9 Showroom of China Books and Periodicals Inc., San Francisco circa 1960s Source: Henry Noyes personal collection, at the courtesy of Margareta Noyes Henry Noyes and his daughter 261 CHAPTER 5 AUDIENCE AND RECEPTION As noted in the introduction part of this study, the reception issue proved to be a problematic theme in conventional propaganda studies produced during the Cold War era. Besides their ideological bias, which led them into believing in the dangerous and subversive impact of communist propaganda, Western propaganda studies also lacked the necessary methodological tools that could have otherwise enabled them to assess the complexities of China's propaganda audience.771 In their attempt to exaggerate the effectiveness of external communist propaganda, Western propaganda analysts treated their local audiences as passive agents "prone to being easily convinced and manipulated by foreign governments"772. Another major factor behind this drawback was undoubtedly the lack of Chinese language sources at the time, which gradually became available to scholars after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Based on the recently published memoirs and compilations of the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies, this chapter will attempt to assess the size and characteristics of China's foreign propaganda audience. Here, one of my principle aims is to demonstrate that the PRC propaganda establishment was not an omnipotent force that could easily win over selected target audiences. In contrast to the conventional argument outlined above, propaganda was not a one-way street, through 771 During this era, the dominant model in media and propaganda studies was the 'media effects' approach, which did not attribute any agency to the audience. The critical reception studies, on the other hand, challenges this model by focusing on the creative input of the audience in the process of reception. David Morley's ethnographic study The "Nationwide" Audience is an important example. See the discussion of this work and its implications for audience research in Ien Ang, "On the politics of empirical audience research" in Meenakshi Gigi Durham, Douglas M. Kellner eds. Media and Cultural Studies Key works, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006 772 See, Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002, 39 262 which the communist media successfully transmitted its intended message at the time/place of reception. Indeed, reception was very much determined by the political and cultural atmosphere in the local setting, propaganda content, as well as the educational background and ideological leanings of individual audience members. During the period 1949-1976, Chinese foreign propaganda organizations targeted a large and heterogeneous audience at various geographical locations. Given the enormous propaganda content produced by Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Press over three decades, and the wide range of listener/reader responses, it is clear that an accurate assessment of China's global propaganda impact is beyond reach. Besides, my interpretation is limited to the overall listener/reader statistics and recollections of the staff on audience feedback, as the letters themselves were not accessible.773 However, recently available official and personal accounts provide us with substantial information on the size of this audience, as well as the diversity of propaganda reception reflected in the listener/reader feedback. As I will try to elaborate below, depending upon the context, as well as the specific propaganda content, these propaganda messages were sometimes well-received and at other times, totally ignored or rejected by its audience. This chapter is composed of three sections. The first section will lay out the differences between targeting domestic and foreign audiences; and discuss the larger political framework, rationale and principles which determined the "targeting" policies in the PRC foreign propaganda agencies. The second section will examine the audience liaison work undertaken by the staff at Radio Peking and the FLP. Listener/reader letters work will be discussed in relation to the size and general characteristics of China's foreign propaganda audience along geographical lines (i.e., 773 During my research trip, I was told by the current staff working at China Radio International and the FLP that these old letters were not kept in an organized archive. 263 Asia, Africa, Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, West, Middle East and Latin America). Finally, the third section will analyze the question of reception, based on the positive, negative and irrelevant listener/reader feedback received by the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies. But before we move on to discuss the size and characteristics of this audience, it is necessary to examine the policy of "targeting" employed by the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies as it would reflect on why, when and whom the PRC regime tried to influence in the period 1949-1976. 5.1. Targeting Before we analyze how the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus formulated its policy of targeting, or target-orienting (zhenduixing), it is important to make a brief comparison between the tasks of domestic and foreign propagandists. This is important in order to illustrate the specific challenges faced by the latter in targeting overseas audiences. In this regard, perhaps the most fundamental difference was the PRC regime's indisputable authority over the education, journalism and propaganda work inside the country. Since the early 1950s the party had established control over the information flow and made it difficult, if not impossible, for the majority of Chinese people to access alternative sources of information. Domestic propagandists reached the masses directly through the educational and cultural committees at the provincial level. The party also had full control in the publication field, as wee see in the wide dissemination of appropriate literary works774 and official newspapers like the People's Daily. Due to the low literacy levels in the Chinese countryside propagandists often opted for audio-visual techniques, such as newspaper reading groups, where a cadre would read the newspaper loudly and guide his audience in the 774 These publications included famous novels by Soviet writers, and various magazines. See, Franklin W. Houn, “Publications as a Propaganda Medium in Communist China”, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 12 (Dec., 1960), 177-186 264 subsequent discussions. 775 In terms of reaching the illiterate masses, radio broadcasts776, movie screenings and theatrical plays777 also became important mass media channels. Although the PRC regime employed similar methods to reach overseas audiences, it is clear that in a foreign setting the number and variety of Chinese propaganda activities had to remain incomparably modest. Indeed, Chinese foreign language publications, radio broadcasts, movie screenings and artistic troupes constituted only a marginal percentage within the overall cultural experiences of overseas audiences. It was not only that the foreign listeners/readers had access to all sorts of information about China, but worse still, they were often subjected to negative news coverage on China-related issues in their local media, interwoven with widespread "anti-China"/"anti-communist" rhetoric. 778 Domestic propagandists, needless to say, did not have to bother with the impact of negative publicity. Another advantage enjoyed by domestic propagandists, vis-à-vis their counterparts in the foreign propaganda realm, was the usage of their native language in the production and dissemination of propaganda content. 779 As domestic propagandists communicated the message in their native tongue, which they used skillfully and with references to a familiar setting, they enjoyed better chance at convincing their audience. Besides, even the least commonly known, ideologicallycharged phrases were made familiar to the domestic audiences through repetitive 775 See Franklin Houn, To Change a Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, 121 776 For the domestic use of radio, See George P. Jan, “Radio Propaganda in Chinese Villages”, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1967), 305-315 777 Theatrical troupes disseminated party ideology through plays with revolutionary hero and heroines. See, Franklin W. Houn, “The Stage as a Medium of Propaganda in Communist China”, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1959), 223-235 778 This concern is often visible in the embassies' correspondance with the PRC Foreign Ministry. Chinese propagandists are aware that convincing foreigners who received "Anti-China" propaganda is a direct challenge. 779 Note that the Chinese propagandists cited the "use of foreign language" among the five pillars which make foreign propaganda different from domestic propaganda. (neiwai youbie) 265 political campaigns in the PRC. 780 By contrast, the cadres working at the foreign propaganda agencies had to transmit their message in a language, which they themselves were not sufficiently familiar with at least not as much as their native language. Hence, in order to reach foreign audiences, a translation process was needed. This process was not limited to the technical translation of Chinese words into another language within the correct grammar pattern but also necessitated a cultural translation, which proved to be more complex than the former.781 Through this cultural translation process, foreign propagandists had to make a variety of otherwise awkward Chinese phrases and concepts comprehensible to foreign audiences. As the language used in the Chinese foreign propaganda publications and broadcasts often borrowed extensively from the local setting, (i.e., political terminology, as well as local phrases with several connotations and layers of meaning) getting the message across was a challenging task for the foreign propagandist. Although not always carefully observed, Chinese foreign propaganda apparatus had the well-established norm of distinguishing foreign audiences from domestic audiences since the early 1950s.782 The selection of target audiences by the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies (both along geographical and ideological lines) was realized under the close supervision of the party leadership and its relevant government organs. The general principles which guided the foreign propaganda 780 See, for instance, Ji Fengyuan's discussion of the slogans used in public criticism meetings in Linguistic engineering:language and politics in Mao's China, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, 167-168 781 For in-depth discussion of the challenges in this translation process, See Duan Liancheng, Zenyang duiwai jieshao zhongguo: duiwai chuanboxue chutan, [How to introduce China to foreigners] Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi, 1993 and Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo de lilun he shixian, [Theory and Practice of Foreign Broadcasts], Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2004 782 CC Propaganda Department's directive in 1954 clarifies the different tasks of foreign and domestic propagandists. According to this document, when aiming at foreigners, the cadres should not make use of abstract phrases or too much theory, and limit their talk with regard to the future prospects. When addressing foreigners, real examples should be used and the focus should be on explaining the socialist construction of the country. See, "Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan zonrenwu de zhishi" (Directives concering the general task of foreign propaganda) Archive No ; 102-00215-12 1 Release Date ; 1954.5.1 \1954.5.1 266 work, such as "inside and outside of the country is different" (neiwai youbie); "not forcing oneself upon people" (bu qiangjia yu ren); "seeking long-term benefits" (xishui changliu) also inspired and guided the listener/readers work. While completely submitting to the reader/listener demands was an unacceptable policy and regarded as a rightist mistake, ignoring the audience was equally unacceptable and labeled a leftist mistake. In principle, foreign propaganda cadres had to observe the long-term benefits of the PRC regime in their relations with the target audiences.783 The PRC regime's changing preoccupations in foreign policy and domestic politics was directly related to the shifting focus on target audiences. During the 1950s the main foreign propaganda audience for the young PRC regime was in the neighboring countries of East and Southeast Asia. 784 Subsequent to the Bandung Conference in 1955, foreign propaganda media gradually aimed at broader audiences in the Third World. In the early 1960s, after the ideological competition with the Soviet Union became a preoccupation for the PRC foreign propaganda media, Eastern bloc countries became a target as well.785 In the 1960s, the newly-arisen need to catch up with the Soviet propaganda output gave a major boost to the number of foreign languages used in Chinese broadcasts and publications. Throughout this period, China competed against both super powers in order to gain influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, regions regarded as the hotbed of world revolutionary struggle. This competition was further deepened with the launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, 783 For instance, if the circulation of Chinese foreign language media would have a negative influence over the bilateral relations, foreign propaganda authorities advised bringing dissemination to a halt, regardless of the readers' demands. By the end of 1950s, when several Asian-African countries imposed restrictions, China abided by the host governments' wishes. See, "1958 nian duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang" (State of the foreign propaganda work in the year 1958.) Archive No ; 116-0044708 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.14 \1959.1.14 784 See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 3 785 It was only after the Sino Soviet split that the PRC regime started broadcasting to East Europe. See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 100 267 when Chinese foreign propaganda media's main preoccupation became the export of Mao Zedong Thought to the Third World. During this period, China has become an inspiration, and to a lesser extent, a model, for many dissident groups. One could find young consumers of Chinese foreign propaganda media not only in the Asian and African countryside but also at the college campuses in Western metropolises.786 In the period 1949-1976, Chinese foreign propaganda publications and broadcasts were consumed by a very large and heterogeneous group of people. 787 While scholars, diplomats, journalists and China experts accessed these publications to get otherwise unavailable information on the internal developments and political atmosphere in China788, several businessmen were attracted to the prospects of trade with this huge country.789 While teachers were interested in enriching their course content with original sources on China's history, language, and culture 790 , several young radio enthusiasts tuned in to Radio Peking just to satisfy their curiosity. Undoubtedly, the youth, and particularly students constituted a significant portion of this heterogeneous audience. Especially in the 1960s, when China presented itself as 786 See Robert Alexander, Maoism in the Developed World, Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, London, 2001 and his Maoism in the Developing World, Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, London, 1999 787 USIA analysts categorized these target groups into five different groupings: a) the elite in friendly and unfriendly countries, b) students, c) dissenters, d) foreign communists, e) Overseas Chinese. See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 34 788 Lazarick correctly observes that while the circulation of the magazines was small, they were being read by influential academics, journalists and government officials. See Leonard W. Lazarick,, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005) 7 789 See, “Communist China's worldwide propaganda offensive 1959” (Records of the US Information Agency Research Reports 1960-82: Research ( R ) Reports of the Office of Research 1960-63: Rg. 306 250/67/08/05-07 Entry: A1 (1013A) : "1960 reports", Box 2 R-29) 4 790 PRC's overseas representations received several requests from teachers demanding sources in these topics. Among various examples, See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu yijiuwujiu nian yanjiushi he waisong shukan gongzuo zongjie" (Work summary of our British representation’s research office and foreign dissemination of our publications in the year 1959) Archive No: 110-00905-01 1 Release Date: 1960.1.7 \1960.1.19. Also See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No: 11000692-04 1 Release Date; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8. and "Zhu ruidian shiguan 1956 nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang yu 1957 nian gongzuo jihua" (The cultural propaganda situation of our embassy in Sweden in 1956 and work plans for 1957) Archive No : 110-00648-05 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.1 \1957.2.12 268 the center of "revolutionary youthfulness" as opposed to the "stagnant" Soviet leadership, many dissident groups used these publications to justify or reinforce their ideological values. 791 But who did the Chinese communists intend their foreign propaganda to reach, in the first place? In the period 1949-76, decision-makers at the Chinese foreign propaganda establishment did not only target audiences via geographical divisions. Especially in the non-socialist countries, which the bulk of foreign language propaganda was aimed at, the ideological leaning of the readers/listeners was also taken into account. In terms of political standing, the main target audience for Foreign Languages Press and Radio Peking was the "middle-of-the road masses" (zhongjian qunzhong).792 In theory, "middle elements" constituted the largest segment of the audience; they did not have "advanced" (read, Marxist) ideological standing; were of average cultural-educational background, and therefore did not have substantial knowledge on China, but were supposedly curious and willing to learn. Surveys confirm that the average reader for China's foreign language magazines was of a petty-bourgeois background, mainly students, teachers, doctors, engineers, journalists with very few peasants or laborers.793 Although during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the initial years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) "middle elements" as a target group were set 791 See, for instance, the Progressive Party (US) pamphlet; `Since the one time revolutionary Soviet party degenerated into a pro-capitalist party the Chinese communist party has become the leading force for the revolution of the world` See,`Students and Revolution`: What is the Progressive Labor Party? (Hoover Institution, Arne Swabeck collection Box 14) 22 792 This is unanimously acknowledged in the recollections as well as official documents. See Yin Zi, `Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan de yishuxing wenti` (The problem of artistry in foreign propaganda) See, Shukan duiwai xuanchuan de lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of foreign propaganda publications) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe,1999. 45, Duan Liancheng, Zenyang duiwai jieshao zhongguo: duiwai chuanboxue chutan, [How to introduce China to foreigners] Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi, 1993, 52 793 According to the surveys conducted by the magazine staff in 1961 and 1966, two thirds of the readers were composed of students, scientists, teachers and other types of white-collar workers. Shen Suru makes use of these otherwise unavailable surveys in his work to showcase the occupational background of China's target audiences. See the reader statistics for China Reconstructs magazine on Table 12 and Table 13. 269 aside at the expense of "ideologically more conscious" groups794, their central role was somewhat re-instated once the foreign propaganda system went back to its regular operation. The target-orienting policy of China's foreign language media necessitated a further division through the content of propaganda items. 795 For instance, Foreign Languages Press magazines all had their slightly different target audiences. The Peking Review magazine, with its highly political language and emphasis on foreign affairs, was aimed at capturing the attention of China experts, diplomats, journalists and foreign communists.796 The magazine was never intended for a mass audience because it was known that the selected few who read this magazine had great influence in their own societies. 797 The China Pictorial, on the other hand, was aimed at a middle-of-the road masses with its easy-to-read content which was filled with colorful pictures.798 In between these two periodicals was China Reconstructs, also aimed at middle elements, perhaps with a slightly better cultural-educational level.799 The magazine's content focused on China's socio-economic progress, with little emphasis on politics. For many, the content of the China Pictorial and China 794 During these episodes leftist audiences (zoupai shouzhong) were targeted. See Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004., 196 795 This point was reinforced by Zhou Enlai who believed that each magazine should have its own characteristics and target audience. Shen Suru, Duiwai chuanbo xue gaiyao, [China's international communication –A theoretical study] Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1999. 79 796 According to USIA analysts, Peking Review material was poor fare for the literate non-communist audiences and its only success was in extending and speeding China's communication with foreign communists. See, “Chinese Communist Policy and Propaganda 1960” (Records of the US Information Agency Research Reports 1960-82: Research ( R ) Reports of the Office of Research 1960-63: Rg. 306 250/67/08/05-07 Entry: A1 (1013A) : "1961 reports", Box 6 R-64) 23 797 This issue was pointed out right at the beginning of Peking Review's publication life in 1958. See, "Dui 'beijing zhoubao' (yingwen ban) de jidian yijian" (A couple of thoughts on Beijing Review (English edition) Archive No : 116-00233-02 1 Release Date ; 1958.11.1 \1958.12.26 798 See, "Waiwen chuban faxing shiye ju gongzuo tiaoli" (Foreign Languages Press distribution office work regulation) in Zhou Dongyuan, Qi Wengong eds., Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian shiliao xuanbian –yi 1950-1981 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Selected Historical Materials Vol.1 1950-1981) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 362 799 According to Chen Rinong, China Reconstructs' target audience and management was very different from Peking Review. The magazine was aiming at politically not very progressive people sympathising with China, whereas Peking Review aimed at the leftists. Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign Publications Personnel Training Center, Beijing 270 Reconstructs was much more attractive then that of the Peking Review, whose content was dominated by long and complex articles. A more nuanced way of audience targeting was done by accommodating the content according to the tastes and preferences of readers/listeners. But China's foreign propagandists did not have much liberty in this regard. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the midst of administrative expansion, one way to maintain orderliness and central authority in the foreign propaganda system was the use of Chinese in the preparation of all article/news drafts at Radio Peking and the FLP. All individual language departments had to remain faithful to the original draft while translating items to different foreign languages. In order to overcome the rigidity of this regulation and satisfy the needs of their specific target audiences, however, foreign propaganda cadres also used a method known as "generally the same with small differences" (datong xiaoyi). Hence, different editions of foreign language periodicals could use slightly different items according to the needs and preferences of that linguistic target group.800 Likewise, Radio Peking's different language sections paid attention to their audience's specific cultural and religious traits, making a genuine effort not to offend their listeners. According to the recollections of Sidney Rittenberg, this was especially important when Radio Peking addressed politically sensitive issues: Program content did differ according to the target area. Some major political content was the same for everyone, but the selection of news and preparation of features was sharply different. I recall, for example, that the Persian Language Section (with foreign experts who were Persian Communists in exile) were not allowed to attack the Shah by name – in the 50s and 60s, the Shah didn’t recognize the PRC, but neither did he recognize Taiwan, so there was some sort of relationship and mutual accommodation there.801 800 Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi [History of China’s foreign news broadcasts], Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004, 151 801 Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007 271 This example suggests that, despite its heavy ideological luggage, the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus employed a degree of pragmatism in terms of targeting foreign audiences. However, by and large, individual language departments at the FLP and Radio Peking enjoyed little freedom in appropriating the content towards different localities. This was especially hard during political campaigns, when the cadres were easily blamed for diverging from the correct ideological line in order to make allowances to listener/reader demands. As the debates throughout the 1950s and 1960s over the issue of targeting illustrate802, foreign propagandists had a hard time trying to balance between two important tasks: maintaining the centrally-ordered ideological line and accommodating audience demands. This dilemma was probably most obvious to the cadres who were engaged in the listener-reader liaison (tingzhong-duzhi lianxi), which was regarded as an integral part of the Chinese communist foreign propaganda work. 5.2. Audience Liaison An important aspect of the target-orienting policy (zhenduixing) was the assessment of the audience for China's foreign language publications and broadcasts, in terms of its size, characteristics, and reception. In this sense, reader and listener letters were seen as invaluable sources to measure the extent and effectiveness of the PRC foreign propaganda work. While the number of letters gave a rough estimate about the size of a particular audience, the content of the letters provided valuable data for analyzing feedback. Another method to accumulate audience data was the listener-reader surveys, which were occasionally sent by the Chinese foreign propaganda staff to the 802 `Lack of targetliness` in propaganda media during the Maoist decades is discussed in the Chinese secondary literature. These studies, however, do not attempt to make an asessment of the reception. See Zhang Yongde, Jianguo yilai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan de fansi, [Examination of the foreign propaganda of our country since its foundation] Wuhan: Wuhan University Journalism department, unpublished masters thesis, 2003, 40 272 subscribers in different localities. 803 As a means to measure their success and effectiveness, the PRC foreign propaganda agencies also relied on the number of references to (or direct quotations from) Chinese foreign language publications and broadcasts as they appeared in foreign newspapers. As this is a more complex method to measure the extent and impact of China's foreign propaganda (and there is only scattered information in this regard) this section will confine itself to the listenerreader liaison work. Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Department attached great importance to audience feedback. From the early 1950s onwards, both foreign propaganda agencies assigned a number of people to the task of replying listener/reader letters.804 In order to attract responses from its listeners, Radio Peking's special programs, such as "Knowledge Contest" and "Listeners Letterbox",805 offered small prizes for its listeners. Likewise, Chinese foreign language magazines had special columns where readers' mail got published 806 . Besides being an important means to measure the size of the audience and effectiveness of propaganda media, letters were also seen critical for making improvements in the propaganda content. 803 For Radio Peking’s listener surveys, See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 344 804 The earliest listener liaison department at Radio Peking was established in 1950. Following the specialization of labor between domestic and foreign broadcasts, a listener letters department (tingzhong laixin zu) responsible only for overseas audience liaison was established in August, 1953. By late 1950s, due to increasing number of languages, individual language sections set up their own listener liaison offices. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 306 805 For a specific example of Listeners' Letter Box content, See Radio Peking English language program schedule advertised on Peking Review, October 1, 1965, No.40: "On the air every Sunday, Answers to the listeners' questions in October include: October 3: Tibet's new achievements, October 10: The history of broadcasting in China, October 17: The people's commune; trends in Chinese painting, October 24: More about the Chinese textile industry; television in China, October 31: Stockbreeding in China; the protection of China's art treasures, Listeners are invited to tune in every Sunday to LISTENERS' LETTER BOX, Write to us: Your comments and questions are always welcome 806 See, for instance, "Our Postbag" column in China Reconstructs. 273 Audience liaison was not seen as a trivial job a mere accessory to the actual propaganda tasks of editing and translation but as a task with political significance. Responding listener-reader letters was more like a group activity, where individual initiative was minimal -partly because it was feared that the junior cadres might fall under the intellectual influence of foreigners.807 These letters would first be translated into Chinese so that the senior cadres could see the content and supervise the preparation of an appropriate reply. Sometimes it would become necessary for the repliers to consult with other work units to get updated information on a specific topic in order to formulate a suitable answer. Finally, the approved draft would be translated into the relevant foreign language and mailed to the individual reader/listener. Most of the time, a souvenir (a paper-cut, a picture, a free issue of a Chinese foreign language magazine, etc.) would accompany the reply letter with the hopes that the reader/listener would continue his/her interest in the Chinese media.808 By the end of each year, it was also customary for audience liaison departments to send a New Year card and a calendar to their subscribers.809 Replying listener/reader letters was a long and arduous task, which required much attention. It was seen as an important channel to clarify the propaganda message, correct misunderstandings, and establish one-to-one contact with individual members of the audience. Senior cadres paid close attention to the conduct of audience liaison, and occasionally issued rules and warnings to regulate its operation. In 1963, the Head of Radio Peking Mei Yi convened two meetings for this purpose, where he 807 In a former propaganda cadre's words: "In those days, there was such concern about being taken in or influenced by foreigners that no real persons signed the responses to listeners’ letters." Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007 808 For instance, one Richard H.Miller from Birmingham, England received many issues of magazines and several calendars sent to him by the Radio Peking staff. See Zhimei Ye, “Radio Peking and its listeners”, China Reconstructs, February 1981, 57 809 See, Han Yuejing, "1958 nian-1969 nian yingyu guangbo laixin gongzuo diandi" (A bit of English broadcasts listener letters work in 1958-1969) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 133 274 advised the cadres to correspond with as many listeners as possible, not to break off relations easily "even with the ones that disagree with us", not to write too long replies (putting 99 letters aside just to reply one), hence avoid overstocking”.810 In 1964, Radio Peking cadres issued, albeit short-lived, periodical "Listener Work Reference" (Tingzhong Gongzuo Cankao) to summarize their experiences in this field.811 5.2.1. Audience Size: One drawback inherent in the Cold War era conventional propaganda scholarship was its tendency to exaggerate the size of the audience for communist foreign propaganda media. For instance, an analyst studying the Chinese case in the 1970s went so far as to claim that the PRC regime did not have to make an effort to recruit overseas audiences: In the dissemination of its propaganda PRC enjoys an advantage shared by few countries involved in such activity. Because of worldwide interest in developments in China and in matters relating to PRC policies, and because of the dearth of news and information coming from the closed society maintained by the Peking regime, the international press and news agencies…have been forced to exploit to the fullest the product of the PRC media in the reporting and analyzing of developments in mainland China. Thus, instead of the PRC media seeking to cultivate target audiences, the audiences seek out the media, and the international press and scholars then give the media’s output further dissemination. 812 However, the groups mentioned above (China experts, diplomats, journalists, etc.) constituted a very insignificant group within the overall audience for Chinese foreign language media. Maintaining long-term subscribers for its external propaganda items was indeed a very challenging task for the PRC regime. By and large, it was the 810 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 307 811 This periodical's publication life ended in 1965 after only 34 issues. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 307 812 See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 1 275 Chinese propaganda agencies that spent time, money and energy to reach foreign audiences, not vice versa. Today, based on recently available sources, a more realistic assessment on the size of the audience for China's foreign language media is possible. Although not completely unbiased themselves 813 , the FLP's sales and distribution records, overall listener letter statistics of Radio Peking as well as the staff's discussions of individual listener/reader feedback provide us with important details. The circulation figures for FLP publications in the period 1949-1976 814 suggest that there was a gradual, but not necessarily linear, growth in the size of the reading audience. According to these sources, FLP periodicals reached their widest circulation in 1965 and 1975-76, when the monthly distribution of magazines was a little more than 1 million copies (all magazines combined, including several language editions, some of which were weekly.) 815 In the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, however, magazines reached one third of this audience. The circulation for magazines also plummeted during the initial years of the Cultural Revolution. Among the three synthetic general readership magazines, the China Pictorial, whose content was dominated with pictures and minimum writing, had the most number of language issues as well as the largest circulation. 816 In terms of circulation, it was followed by China Reconstructs, a magazine with more articles on economic and social life in China.817 The Peking Review had far less circulation as it 813 Among the biases in these records, most probable is the foreign propaganda staff's tendency to inflate the figures –for obvious reasons. With regard to FLP distribution data, another problematic aspect is that some of these publications were distributed freely (not bought or subscribed by the readers themselves). Hence we have no way of knowing if the mailed and distributed items were consumed by their receivers. 814 See, Table 6 815 As Peking Review was a weekly magazine, the overall circulation figure stands for 4 issues per month, which should put the number of readers down. See Table 6. 816 According to USIA analysts, a CNS report of September 1958 claimed as of that date, monthly circulation for China Pictorial was 400,000 in all languages. See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 187 817 According to Chen Rinong, a former editor of China Reconstructs, this magazine's maximum circulation (all different language editions combined) was 200,000 during the period 1956-65. 276 was aimed at a selected few. The circulation of books in the period 1949-1976 presents a slightly different picture. While during much of the 1960s, the FLP distribution average per year ranged around 2 to 5 million volumes of books, circulation reached its peak approaching 8 million volumes in 1968.818 This leap was most probably related to the Little Red Book factor, which became an instant bestseller in the world.819 As compared to the decline in magazine readership, the rise in book circulation in 1968 confirms the idea that the FLP's audience shifted from middle elements to leftist groups during the Cultural Revolution.820 Similar to the FLP circulation figures, the gradual rise in the number of listener letters received by Radio Peking suggests growth in the audience size over the period 1949-1976. 821 In between 1951 and 1955, the number of listener letters received by Radio Peking staff grew from 650 to 7,000.822 However, it is important to note that in this initial period the vast majority of listener letters came from only three countries: Japan, Indonesia and Sweden. 823 Radio Peking experienced its first significant growth in listener letters by the year 1957, subsequent to the rise in total broadcasting hours and languages. In the period 1957-1965, the number of listener (Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign publications personnel training center, Beijing) Also See, the distribution statistics for China Reconstructs in 1949-1959.(Shi nian lai duiwai xuanchuan he wenhua ziliao jiaoliu tongji biao 1949-1959 [Statistical chart for foreign propaganda and cultural exchange sources in a decade: 1949-1959] Beijing: Wenhua bu duiwai wenhua lianluo wei yuan hui si si (bian), 1960 818 Table 6. 819 5,650,000 out of 7,730,000 books sold this year was Mao authored. See, Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong eds. Zhongguo waiwen ju wushi nian da shi ji 1 (China Foreign Languages Department 50th Anniversary Historical Record Vol. 1) Beijing: Xinxing chubanshe, 1999, 249 820 Chen Rinong, for instance, points out that the readers of China Reconstructs were middle aged people who paid for the subscriptions from their own pocket. Many bought the magazine ever since the the 1950s. According to him, those who bought the Little Red Book were not the same group of people. (students, dissident youth,etc.) (Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign publications personnel training center, Beijing) 821 See, Table 11 822 See, Table 11 823 Most Swedish listeners were radio enthusiasts asking for QSL listener cards. Overwhelming majority of listeners in Indonesia was the Overseas Chinese. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 312. 277 letters grew tenfold from 29,398 to 286,163. However, similar to the case of the FLP publications, this was hardly a linear growth. The sharp decrease in the overall listener letters during the Cultural Revolution is the most significant example illustrating the unstable character of this audience. This drop is often interpreted in the Chinese language sources as a sign of listeners' growing displeasure with the radicalization of content.824 Whereas the audience for China's foreign language media was considerable in its size, it is important to note that it was still smaller then the audience for the American and Soviet propaganda media.825 Moreover, as the shifting numbers in sales figures and listener letters suggest, the size of this audience was not stable. Likewise, in terms of its geographical extent, it is hard to say that China succeeded in recruiting audiences all over the world. In other words, despite its global outlook in targeting strategies, PRC media fell short of penetrating audiences everywhere that it was disseminated. For instance, while it had its largest audience in East and Southeast Asia, it seemingly had no significant reception in the Middle East and Latin America. 5.2.2. Geographical Extent of the Audience 5.2.2.1. Asian Audiences Among all the regions where the PRC regime directed its broadcasts and exported its publications, Asia was undoubtedly the most important. Due to its geographical and cultural proximity to the mainland, this region has received the most attention by the 824 It is difficult to establish the major cause behind this sharp drop. Given the extent of the upheavals in China at the time, one might also explain this with the disorganized state of the China Post Office. Also, during the Cultural Revolution, some countries started to inspect mails sent to China –a serious measure that might have discouraged many of Radio Peking listeners. 825 In the early 1960s, American and Soviet short-wave radio broadcasters were receiving 250,000 letters from listeners, as compared to Radio Peking's 150,000. See, Jin Chugao, "Wo guo duiwai guangbo fazhan shi shang guanghui de yi ye" (A magnificent page from the history of our international broadcasts' development" in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 345 278 PRC regime ever since the establishment of its centralized foreign propaganda agencies in the early 1950s. 826 As noted in Chapter 3, projecting a peaceful and friendly country image to its Asian neighbors had been an important goal for the PRC regime in the 1950s.827 China's relative success in Asia was also related to the fact that both Radio Peking and the FLP had their best trained personnel (mostly returned Overseas Chinese with native proficiency) in Asian languages.828 PRC media's interest in the region was reciprocated. Several sources on audience feedback suggest that, as compared to other regions, Asian audiences had more interest in the domestic and foreign policies of their communist neighbor. According to Radio Peking listener data, subsequent to the Sino-Soviet split, 94% of the listener letters demanding further materials on the dispute came from the listeners in Asian countries.829 One of the most significant audiences in Asia for the Chinese publications and broadcasts was in Japan. The considerable size of the Japanese audience830 illustrates that, even in the absence of official ties, Chinese propaganda media was able to establish contact with the peoples living in a seemingly hostile country. In this period, China reached this audience with the Japanese editions of People's China, China 826 This is reflected in the size of total foreign propaganda output produced for Asian audiences, which continued in the subsequent decades. As of 1971, half of all the broadcasts were aimed at East and Southeast Asia. See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 100 827 Especially in its initial years, most important target audience for the Chinese foreign propaganda media was the Overseas Chinese population in Asia. As the PRC regime's aims and methods in reaching the diaspora Chinese was substantially different, it lies beyond the scope of this study. 828 See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 100 829 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,321 830 Audience for Radio Peking broadcasts illustrates a major example. Japanese listener audience was not only signicant in numbers but it also grew considerably over the years -- at least until the Cultural Revolution period. The listener letters data indicate that Japanese Broadcasts Section at Radio Peking received 6324 letters in 1960; 10,798 letters in 1961; 8513 letters in 1962; 18,015 letters in 1963; 36,344 in 1964; 77,648 letters in 1965. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,322 279 Pictorial, and Radio Peking broadcasts in this language. Several surveys conducted during the 1960s among Japanese listeners suggest that Radio Peking's audience in this country was overwhelmingly young.831 The majority was composed of students (often with leftist tendencies) but there were also middle-aged professionals, peasants, tradesmen, language enthusiasts, housewives, etc.832 Japanese listeners' programming preferences suggest that this was not a monolithic audience who tuned in to these broadcasts only for ideological reasons. 833 It is clear that, in the absence of any diplomatic ties, many saw Radio Peking as the only window that enabled the Japanese people to learn about China.834 By the early 1960s, Radio Peking listener clubs and associations sprang up all over Japan.835 While these associations provided a platform for those who wanted to share ideas on China, study Chinese language, and organize activities to promote bilateral friendship, they were also instrumental in providing feedback to Radio Peking by conducting listener surveys and making suggestions for improvements in 831 A survey conducted by mail in October 1959-March 1960 among a sample of 530 Japanese listeners found out that 360 were students, 38 workers, 2 technicians, 12 peasants, 66 office workers, 27 housewives and 5 tradesmen. A survey dating December 1961 and February 1962 among 1086 Japanese listeners confirmed this data with 760 students, 72 workers, 18 peasants and fishers, 106 office workers, 8 technicians, 18 teachers, 10 unemployed and 94 from other occupations. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 344-345 832 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 311. 833 In a 1961-1962 mail survey conducted by Radio Peking among 1086 listeners, 391 people said they liked music programs, 112 voted for sightseeing, 98 for culture-arts and 97 for daily life and economic reconstruction (as compared to 136 who liked news and reviews). See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 345 834 See, "Shanxia Huiyan, "Beijing guangbo he hanyu xuexi " (Radio Peking and Chinese language study) in Zhang Guoqing, Fu Ying , Xie Hongyu eds. Wo yu zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai [Me and China Radio International] (Japanese-Chinese bilingual edition) Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 2006,94 835 In the 1961-1963 period, the number of "Radio Peking listener associations" (beijing guangbo shoutinghui) in different parts of Japan reached 110. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,322 280 content. 836 These clubs also functioned as direct channels that facilitated contact between the two countries. In 1964, the first of the Japanese listener delegations visited China.837 In 1973, subsequent to the establishment of diplomatic ties, another delegation of Japanese Radio Peking listeners visited Beijing, where they were hosted by the radio staff.838 Throughout the period 1949-1976, despite having reservations about the dull, repetitive, political content, a significant portion of Japanese people showed continued interest in the PRC media content. Another important target audience for Chinese broadcasts and publications was India. Due to friendly Sino-Indian relations since the early 1950s, domestic developments in the People's Republic concerned many in this neighboring country. China reached Indian audiences through the English editions of China Reconstructs and the Peking Review, English and Hindi editions of the China Pictorial, as well as Radio Peking broadcasts in English, Hindi and Bengali. In the 1950s, India constituted the largest audience for China's English language publications. It was the Tibetan rebellion and more significantly, the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, which strained bilateral relations and put pressure on the dissemination of Chinese media. 839 By the early 1960s, the Indian government started to become increasingly 836 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 340 837 This was hardly a short visit. One member of this group, Mi Shantui spent 43 days in China. See, "Mi Shantui, "Guanyu Beijing guangbo de huiyi" (Memories concerning Radio Peking) in Zhang Guoqing, Fu Ying , Xie Hongyu eds. Wo yu zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai [Me and China Radio International] (Japanese-Chinese bilingual edition) Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 2006,126 838 See, "Shengong Sijing, "Wo de zhongguo nüermen" (My Chinese daughters) in Zhang Guoqing, Fu Ying , Xie Hongyu eds. Wo yu zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai [Me and China Radio International] (Japanese-Chinese bilingual edition) Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 2006,42 839 Starting in 1960, Indian official posts refused to receive Chinese foreign language media. For a significant example See, "Xizang waijshichu guanyu yindu zhu lasa zonglingguan tuihui wo zengsong yingwen zhongguo jianshe an yu waijiaobu wanglai dianbao" (Tibet Foreign Affairs Office’s correspondance with the Foreign Ministry concerning the return of our English language edition “China Reconstructs” by the Indian Consulate General at Lhasa) Archive No : 118-00819-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.8.2 \1960.9.24 281 distressed by the subversive content of the Chinese media.840 However, although the government-induced restrictions hindered the flow of Chinese publications into India, they were not able to bring it to a complete stop. By the mid-1960s, Indian dissidents who adhered to Maoism to solve the problems of the Indian countryside still had access to these items. Charu Majumdar, the leader of the Naxalite uprising that took place in West Bengal in 1967, was highly inspired by Mao's teachings. Indian revolutionaries in this region closely followed Radio Peking broadcasts, Chinese foreign language magazines like the Peking Review, Mao Zedong's own writings, especially his Little Red Book. 841 Their deep distrust of the Indian national newspapers and radio stations in both local and international news seemed to have drawn them closer to their Chinese alternatives.842 After the rebellion, Indian government was further alarmed by Chinese media's praise of the uprising as the "front paw of the revolutionary armed struggle launched by the Indian people under the guidance of Mao Zedong's teachings"843. The sharp decrease in the number of listener letters in Hindi language broadcasts by 1967844 should be understood in terms of this new political sensitivity, followed by increasing local restrictions. However, one should also note that Radio 840 One measure employed by the Indian government, according to Chinese sources, was the restrictions over mail. This had a negative impact on the listener letters for Radio Peking's broadcasts aimed at India. Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 383 841 See, Sreemati Chakrabarti, “The Naxalite-Chinese Linkage: Dissemination of Propaganda and Direct Contacts”, China Report (New Delhi) 22, no.3 (1986), 215 842 Some of the informants told Chakrabarti that they completely relied on Peking Review to discover what was happening in the world, and 'even in India'. When asked why this was so, they said they believed that in India both the government and non-governmental media were spreading lies and indulging in 'counter-revolutionary propaganda'. See, Chakrabarti, Sreemati, “The Naxalite-Chinese Linkage: Dissemination of Propaganda and Direct Contacts”, China Report (New Delhi) 22, no.3 (1986) 216 843 See, Sreemati Chakrabarti, “The Naxalite-Chinese Linkage: Dissemination of Propaganda and Direct Contacts”, China Report (New Delhi) 22, no.3 (1986) 221 844 See Table 16. 282 Peking's global listener audience was already shrinking during the Cultural Revolution, owing to the dull, repetitive and extremely ideological broadcast content. Indonesia was another important target country for the PRC foreign language media in the period 1949-1976. China reached Indonesian audiences through the Indonesian edition of People's China, China Pictorial and Radio Peking broadcasts in this language. As the PRC regime enjoyed favorable bilateral relations with Indonesia's Sukarno government, China's foreign propaganda flow into this country was not disturbed during the 1950s. Both Radio Peking listener letters data845 and the circulation figures for FLP periodicals846 indicate that China had a sizeable audience in Indonesia. However, it should also be kept in mind that most of the listeners were the Indonesian Chinese. 847 By the end of the 1950s, with the rise of inter-ethnic tensions in Indonesia, the PRC regime's influence over the country's Chinese minority became problematic. As a result, the Indonesian government started imposing restrictions on the import of China's Indonesian language publications, which made their commercial distribution unlikely. In order to safeguard friendly relations with the Indonesian government in the long term, PRC officials seemed to have observed these restrictions, regardless of the readers' huge demand. 848 However, further shrinkage of the Indonesian audience became inevitable after General Suharto's military coup in October, 1965 and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. 845 In the 1963-1965 period, Radio Peking's Indonesian broadcasts section was receiving 2,000 letters per month. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 24. 846 In 1959, China Pictorial had a circulation figure of 4,000; while People's China had 2,000 and China Reconstructs had 300. See, "Guanyu zai yindunixiya sanfa xuanchuan pin shi" (Concerning the dissemination of propaganda items in Indonesia) Archive No : 116-00447-04 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.21 \1959.4.7 847 In 1955, 94.5% of all letters originating from Indonesia were written by the Overseas Chinese. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 312. 848 See, "Guanyu zai yindunixiya sanfa xuanchuan pin shi"(Concerning the dissemination of propaganda items in Indonesia) Archive No : 116-00447-04 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.21 \1959.4.7 283 The sharp drop in the number of Radio Peking listener letters849 was mostly related to the new government's overly suspicious attitude towards the country's Chinese minority, as well as the PRC regime. The PRC foreign propaganda media also attracted audiences from other Asian countries. In Burma, Chinese foreign language publications were circulating in large numbers and they seemingly enjoyed favorable reception.850 Pakistan and Afghanistan also received some attention from the PRC regime, which reached this region in its local languages: Tamil, Urdu and Pashto. Given the low literacy levels it is speculative to say that China had no audience in this region. But listener statistics indicate that Radio Peking did not enjoy much popularity.851 5.2.2.2. Audiences in Africa African people residing in the previous colonies, newly independent states, countries in the midst of anti-colonial wars became an important target audience for the PRC regime. It was not only that the PRC regime regarded Africa as the hotbed of world revolution, but its propaganda media also made continuous emphasis on the solidarity of "non-white" peoples of the world. Tanzania in East Africa, Ghana, Guinea and Mali in the West, became strongholds of Chinese influence in Africa. The PRC regime established and reinforced its relations with young African states through multiple channels, such as extending material, technological and humanitarian aid, sending and receiving delegations, organizing industrial exhibitions, arranging student 849 See Table 15. Based on Chinese sources, 54 types of books; 62 editions in political theory and 11 types of books in cultural and artistic topics circulated in Burma, in the 1949-1959 period. Each issue was printed around 3,000. See, "Zhongguo shukan zai miandian" (Chinese publications in Myanmar) Archive No ; 105-00974-07 1 ; Release Date ; 1959.9.1 \1959.9.30, Archive No ；105-D0505 851 Although it is noteworthy that a listener club (Beijing Diantai Guoji Julebu) was established in Pakistan in 1970. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 340 850 284 exchanges, facilitating trade, etc. As observed by a skeptic scholar, Chinese propaganda in the region included a broad range of activities: Somewhere in the African bush a tribesman smeared with red camwood paint, wearing animal skins, bends over a transistor radio. A Radio Peking speaker exhorts him in his own language to throw out the white colonialists who are robbing his country. In a nearby town an African schoolteacher listens to a Peking broadcast in French, English, Swahili or Lingala on political economy, telling him how Africans must shake loose the domination of the monopolists and imperialists, "with the United States at their head." In his classroom, because no other materials are available, he uses books and magazines from Peking for teaching English. One of his students has just received an airplane ticket for Peking from the Chinese embassy; he is going on a grant for a year's study in China. In another farming community, a village policeman is startled to find a manual on guerilla warfare tactics sandwiched between innocent-looking textbooks on how to repair tractors. 852 PRC foreign propaganda media was much more favorably received in the countries, in which China was regarded as a financial donor or a model country for industrial development. Chinese assistance in building telecommunications infrastructure in several countries, besides facilitating the communication flow between China and Africa, helped build this favorable atmosphere.853 In friendly countries local media was also instrumental in boosting China's positive image.854 In Africa, there was a widespread belief that Chinese experts were modest and friendly, as opposed to patronizing and arrogant Westerners. Even hostile accounts had to admit that: …Chinese technicians in Africa are praised because they are not demanding and know how to acelunatize quickly to African conditions; because they live and work with Africans for the same salary.855 Chinese foreign language publications reached African readers at the "friendship bookshops" or by air mail from Beijing.856 As literacy rates were rather low in Africa, 852 See, John Cooley, East Wind over Africa: Red China’s African Offensive, New York: Walker, 1965, 193 853 China constructed or strenghtened short-wave transmitters in Somalia, Tanzania, Congo-Brazaville and Mali; established direct telecommunication links with Guinea, signed a telecommunications agreement with Algeria, etc. See, Alan Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, 99 854 In Somalia, for example, a succesful hole-in the heart operation performed by a Chinese surgeon was widely publicized. See, Alan Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, 91 855 See, Chinese Propaganda and Africa, Supplement of « Afrique Nouvelle » No 1161, n.d., 22 285 the most important channel was Radio Peking's broadcasts in English857, French and Portuguese, as well as in indigenous languages858. The use of Swahili and Hausa in Chinese publications and broadcasts had a broader significance then increasing the propaganda impact by reaching Africans in their native tongue. In the colonial times, Africa's local languages, among them Swahili, had been considered "less respectable than English or Arabic".859 Hence, China's promotion of indigenous languages in its propaganda media helped reinforce a break with the colonial past. In terms of broadcasts directed at this region, Radio Peking program content was slightly geared towards the needs of African audiences.860 China's support for national independence movements probably made its media attractive to the regional audiences. Even the skeptics acknowledged that the Chinese foreign language publications and broadcasts had some positive impact on its audience in terms of boosting morale.861 However, some sources also suggest that the impact of Chinese foreign language media in Africa was limited to a number of countries which had 856 See, Alan Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, 99 In October 1963 the following towns were known to be receiving English language broadcasts transmitted by Radio Peking: Dar-es-Salaam, Cape Town, Salisbury, Monrovia, Accra, Freetown, Lagos, and Cairo. See “China and Africa Part II (1962-1964)”, Background brief [YB 351 (Int. Rels. Africa 6)] China Topics, October 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 6 (China Topics September-December 1965),3 858 China's penetration to Africa via radio broadcasts was found particularly dangerous by countries unfriendly to the PRC regime: "In August 1963, the Minister of Information of the Ivory Coast spoke of the danger which increased broadcasting from China held for Africa. He pointed out that most Africans did not read newspapers, but they were very keen on listening to the radio." See, “China and Africa Part II (1962-1964)”, Background brief [YB 351 (Int. Rels. Africa 6)] China Topics, October 1965 (Hoover Institution, Lovestone Jay Collection, Box 39, File 6 (China Topics SeptemberDecember 1965),3 859 See, John Cooley, East Wind over Africa: Red China’s African Offensive, New York: Walker, 1965, 46 860 Radio Peking had a fixed program content which was broadcasted globally. These slight changes were visible only at the weekend schedule, such as the program "Listener's Letterbox". See, for instance, the advertisement on Peking Review, January 7, 1966, No.2: "Tune in to Radio Peking's daily one-hour programmes in English; News, commentaries and other regular features ; Sunday: Sunday programme for African listeners, listeners' letterbox; Monday: lessons in spoken Chinese (broadcast in transmissions marked in schedule below); Tuesday: China in Construction; Wednesday: Culture in China; Lessons in spoken Chinese (broadcast in transmissions marked in schedule below); Thursday: In the People's Communes; Song of the Week; Friday: Fighting Vietnam; Saturday: Opinion in Peking; Music at your request; Quiz programme –What do you know about China? (Every fortnight, special to Asia) 861 See, Alan Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, 245 857 286 friendly relations with the PRC regime. For instance, a survey conducted in Nigeria showed that the local population had little interest in Chinese radio programming.862 Other surveys suggest that African audiences, for the most part, tuned in to the radio stations of "old colonialists", and if they sought an alternative, turned to the Voice of America. 863 A further complication was the restrictions imposed by governments (sometimes even the friendly ones) on the dissemination of Chinese propaganda items.864 Still, however, few can deny that Chinese media had considerable reception in Africa. Listener letter data for Swahili and Hausa broadcasts confirm this point especially when the high illiteracy rate in Africa is taken into account. 865 These sources also suggest that, during the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution (19661969), while the size of the audience for Radio Peking broadcasts shrank in most parts of the world, it only grew in Africa.866 This shows that China's radicalized foreign propaganda content during the Cultural Revolution –with its strong emphasis on revolutionary struggle stroke a chord with African people. 5.2.2.3. Western Audience Although Third World countries were of primary importance to the PRC regime in the period 1949-1976, China also made a systematic effort to win over audiences in 862 This survey was quoted by USIA analysts in a research paper on Chinese foreign propaganda. According to the authors, the survey which was conducted among 2936 Nigerian adults in 1972 showed Peking with a regular audience (per week) of 4% percent compared to higher figures for most other broadcasters –BBC (45%), VOA (35%), Moscow (8%)…" See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 109 863 See, Alan Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, 100 864 See, "Jineiya xianzhi waijiao shituan sanfa xuanchuan cailiao shi" (The matter of Guinea’s limitation of the propaganda materials distributed by the foreign affairs diplomatic mission) Archive No : 116-00493-04 1 Release Date ; 1960.11.9 \1960.12.27 865 See Table 16, Table 17. 866 The increase in the number of letters received by the Swahili language department was explained by the betterment of Sino-Tanzanian relations. See Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 178 287 Western countries. As noted in Chapter 1, China had launched its English language broadcasts well before the socialist revolution in 1949. The English language section was the oldest and largest at Radio Peking, preceded only by Japanese. English was also the primary foreign language for FLP periodicals, books and pamphlets. Besides English, the periodicals had editions in several European languages: the Peking Review in Spanish, French and German; China Pictorial in French, Spanish, German, and Italian, and China Reconstructs in French and Spanish. During this period, the Chinese media had mixed success in reaching and convincing Western audiences. By and large, middle-of-the road listeners/readers in the West were the most skeptical towards Chinese foreign propaganda. However, especially during the 1960s, PRC foreign language media managed to recruit loyal subscribers among the dissident groups in Europe and the U.S. In its attempt to reach North American audiences, Chinese media achieved its earliest success during the Korean War. Radio Peking's interviews with American POWs were re-broadcast by local media in the US, where it caused considerable sensation. 867 But, overall, simply because short-wave radio listening was not popular in North America, Radio Peking never enjoyed wide reception in the US. 868 Apparently the only listener feedback from the US came from young radio hobbyists 867 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001. 311. Also See, Han Yuejing, "50 niandai de yingyu zu" (English section of the 1950s), Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 129 868 Although not a representative survey in statistical terms, a research conducted in a small Midwest community in 1961 indicated that only 4 among 204 households listened to short wave broadcasts from other countries. Despite a number of inherent biases, caused by the political atmosphere of the Cold War (not everyone listening to communist broadcasts would say so) and the geographical location of the community (East and West coast residents might have turned up a higher percentage) it is clear that Americans were not a big fan of short-wave receivers. See, Smith, Don, “Is there a US audience for international broadcasting?” Journalism Quarterly, 39, 1962, 86-87. This point is confirmed by Gail Pellett –a foreign expert at Radio Peking in the late 1970s: "Americans listen to radio for music and news headlines (…) In the US few people have short-wave radios. Short-wave radio has been a hobby for young boys since the 1920s and is part of the fascination with the technology of radio rather than with the content of the programming." See, Gail Pellett “Radio Peking and its ‘Audience’ Problem”, The Quill, March 1982, 20 288 who were interested in receiving QSL listener cards.869 Technical drawbacks became another major factor here, as the clear reception of the broadcasts was limited to the West Coast.870 During the 1950s, there were also several local restrictions in the US, which made the purchase and consumption of communist publications unlikely. It was only in the 1960s (mostly owing to the efforts of Henry Noyes and his China Books and Publications, Inc.) that Chinese media found an outlet in the US market. Several dissident groups which sympathized with Maoism became consumers of these publications, among them, the Progressive Labor Party until 1971, the Black Panthers, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP).871 Similar to other parts of the world, China's audience in the Western countries was overwhelmingly young. A survey conducted by Radio Peking in 1972 found that the majority of the listeners for English broadcasts were under the age of 30, students being the most numerous group.872 Seemingly, Chinese listeners in Australia, New Zealand and the UK were older and although they sent fewer letters they were able to address more serious issues.873 869 See, Han Yuejing, "1958 nian-1969 nian yingyu guangbo laixin gongzuo diandi" (A bit of English broadcasts listener letters work in 1958-1969) in Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 132. 870 Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007. This observation might be limited to the earlier periods though. For instance, John Sheridan Morgan was able to record broadcasts on both Western and Eastern coast by the mid-1960s. See his A descriptive analysis of the North American Service of Radio Peking from the fifth of December 1966 to the second of February 1967, unpublished masters thesis, Speech Arts, San Diego State College, 1968, 58 871 See, Robert J. Alexander, Maoism in the Developed World, Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, London, 2001, 7-51 872 For this sample, Radio Peking staff sent 4,000 questionnaires in October, 1972. Only 800 of the listeners responded to this survey, of which 500 were graded. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 346-347. 873 See, Han Yuejing, "1958 nian-1969 nian yingyu guangbo laixin gongzuo diandi" (A bit of English broadcasts listener letters work in 1958-1969), Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 132. 289 Being a major contest area between the opposing blocs throughout the Cold War, Europe became a major target for the PRC media. As early as 1955, China joined this contest (initially alongside the USSR) with the launch of Radio Peking's English broadcasts directed at Western Europe.874 Likewise, PRC embassies in neutral Scandinavian countries became important outlets for circulating Chinese foreign propaganda media in Europe.875 Britain, being amongst the few capitalist countries which had official contact with the PRC also served as a base for circulating China's foreign language media.876 Towards the end of the 1950s, there was rising curiosity among British people about domestic developments in China and especially the Great Leap Forward.877 Radio Peking's British listeners were particularly interested in and demanded more of the programs that focused on Chinese daily life, culture and society. 878 Knowledge contests and "Q&A" programs were popular among these listeners.879 In terms of publications, there was not much demand for theoretical books, whose language was far too complicated for the average reader.880 As compared to 874 See, Han Yuejing, "50 niandai de yingyu zu" (English section of the 1950s), Huang Daqiang ed. Zhongguo guoji guangbo huiyilu [Recollections of Chinese International Broadcasting], Beijing Zhonnguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1996, 129 875 Chinese embassy in Finland is one such example. See, "Zhongguo tong fenlan wenhua jiaoliu wunian guihua yaodian ji yijiuwujiu nian wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo jihua" (Summary of SinoFinland cultural relations in the last five years and the plans for cultural propaganda work in the year 1959) Archive No : 110-00738-07 1 ; Release Date ; 1958.4.22 \1958.10.23 876 According to the data collected by the Chinese mission, 32,430 volumes of publications were distributed in the UK in five years (1954-1959). See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu 1954-1959 nian wenhua xuanchuan he shangwu gongzuo zongjie" (Summary of our British representation’s cultural propaganda and commercial work in the years 1954-1959) Archive No : 110-00905-04 1 Release Date ; 1960.1.19 \1960.1.19 877 The official PRC representatives in the UK made an optimistic assessment of this rising demand. According to them, this was related to British people's increasing skepticism towards the Anti-China propaganda they were subjected in their country. See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu yijiuwujiu nian yanjiushi he waisong shukan gongzuo zongjie" (Work summary of our British representation’s research office and foreign dissemination of our publications in the year 1959) Archive No ; 110-00905-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.1.7 \1960.1.19 878 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 316 879 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 317 880 Overstocking of theoretical books was a major problem for the Chinese representation in Britain, See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu yijiuwujiu nian yanjiushi he waisong shukan gongzuo zongjie" (Work 290 India, Western Europe had a very insignificant audience for China's English language periodicals.881 While the British audience remained highly skeptical, French offered better prospects for the Chinese media. Even before the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC regime had good connections with the dissidents in France, who consumed Chinese publications. In the 1950s, members of the French Communist Party were active in organizing pro-China activities and opposing De Gaulle's policy of non-recognition towards the PRC regime.882 The PRC Embassy in Switzerland and the Sino-French Friendship Association were critical in supplying this audience with Chinese books and publications. The great impact of the Cultural Revolution in the French context is well-known. During the 1960s, France had the most ardent supporters of Maoism in Europe, among them intellectual celebrities.883 French groups' interest in China was reciprocated by the PRC media's remarkable coverage of the May 68' events. 884 5.2.2.4. Audiences in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries Since the early 1950s, Chinese foreign language publications circulated in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries. However, until the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, the PRC regime's sole objective in disseminating these items was to inform its summary of our British representation’s research office and foreign dissemination of our publications in the year 1959) Archive No ; 110-00905-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.1.7 \1960.1.19 881 See, "Dui 'beijing zhoubao' (yingwen ban) de jidian yijian" (A couple of thoughts on Beijing Review (English edition) Archive No : 116-00233-02 1 Release Date ; 1958.11.1 \1958.12.26 882 See, "Faguo gongchandang dui wo wenhua xuanchuan gongzuo de yaoqiu he qingzhu wo jianguo shi zhounian huodong de qingkuang" (French Communist Party’s demands from our cultural propaganda work and the situation concerning the celebration activities for the tenth year anniversary of our country’s establishment) Archive No : 110-00834-03 1 Release Date ; 1959.2.4 \1959.10.29 883 See, "French Maoism" in Alexander, Robert J., Maoism in the Developed World, Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, London, 2001, 67-79 884 In May and June 1968, during the student demonstrations in France, Radio Peking increased its French and English language broadcasts to Europe from 14 to 56 and 14 to 35 hours per week respectively. The additional hours were discontinued after the demonstrations ceased. See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 110 291 allies on domestic progress and the economic reconstruction of China. This task was undertaken by the PRC embassies via sending periodical bulletins and other media to the previously agreed name-lists. The bulletins aimed to improve bilateral relations with the bloc countries by emphasizing mutual assistance and ideological solidarity.885 As reaching mass audiences was not a priority until the early 1960s, Chinese publications were followed only by the elite, most of whom were communist party members in the host countries. 886 One exception to this was the broadcast content, which was sent to the Soviet side in accordance with the Sino-Soviet bilateral program exchange agreement of 1954. Then again, these programs were mainly focused on the daily life of the Chinese people, not politics. Nevertheless, these programs enjoyed a wide reception in the Soviet Union. This friendly state of affairs changed drastically in the early 1960s, when Chinese foreign propaganda media shifted its content to ideological issues. Following this shift, China received several warnings from the Soviet Union and faced immediate repercussions in the propaganda field. 887 In 1962, upon the termination of Sino-Soviet radio program exchange agreement, Radio Peking launched direct broadcasts in Russian. However, it is hard to measure the size of the Soviet audience in the 1960s because listener liaison was 885 For instance, Chinese embassy in Romania received positive feedback on their bulletin content relating to the Romanian experts' assistance to China in the petroleum field. See, "Wo zhu waishi lingguan xinwen gongzuo (zhongwen, yingwen)" (Journalistic propaganda of our embassies abroad (chinese, english) Archive No: 116-00372-03 1 Release Date ; 1957.2.5 \1957.10.16. Chinese embassy's bulletins were also welcomed by Hungarian readers. HCP's Science and Culture Department especially enjoyed the articles on China's experiences in the educational field. See, "Guanyu zhu xiongyali shiguan kaizhan duiwai xuanchuan qingkuang de wendian"(Telegram concerning the situtation of foreign propaganda launched by the Chinese Embassy in Hungary)Archive No ; 10901857-05 1 Release Date ; 1958.1.29 \1958.12.28 886 This was in sharp contradiction with the PRC propaganda policy in the capitalist countries. In the UK, for instance, China avoided contacting the official organizations and tried to reach people directly. See, "Zhu yingguo daibanchu 1954-1959 nian wenhua xuanchuan he shangwu gongzuo zongjie" (Summary of our British representation’s cultural propaganda and commercial work in the years 19541959) Archive No : 110-00905-04 1 Release Date ; 1960.1.19 \1960.1.19 887 When the USSR issued its warning, it was noted that Chinese publications were circulating as far as Uzbek, Georgian and Krygiz areas. See, "Sulian waijiao bu yaoqiu wo tingzhi sanfa xuanchuan cailiao shi zhaohui zhu sulian shiguan fuzhao" (Note of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to our embassy in the Soviet Union demanding us to stop distributing propaganda items and our embassy’s reply)Archive No : 109-00921-01 1 Release Date ; 1960.7.21 \1960.9.11 292 hindered due to security concerns. Heavy restrictions imposed by the Soviet government, such as mail inspections, led Radio Peking to stop corresponding with its listeners in order to protect the latter's identity. As opposed to its attitude towards the capitalist countries, which the PRC regime refrained from disclosing the Sino-Soviet dispute, there was an early emphasis on "anti-revisionism" in the Chinese media aimed at socialist countries. In an attempt to win supporters in her struggle against Soviet "revisionism", Chinese propaganda media started targeting average people residing in the socialist countries. In 1960, Radio Peking launched its German broadcasts. 888 Judging from the official East German reaction and attempt to restrict these items, it seems that China was able to win over some comrades to her case.889 In the second half of the 1960s, the PRC foreign propaganda media exploited several opportunities to intensify the existent anti-Soviet sentiment in East Europe. As a significant example, Radio Peking launched its Czech language broadcasts soon after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.890 5.2.2.5. Insignificant Audiences: Middle East and Latin America In 1957, the PRC regime launched its Persian, Turkish and Arabic broadcasts aimed at the Middle Eastern region. According to some observers, it was the Suez Crisis of 888 Most listeners for Radio Peking's German broadcasts were in East Germany. In the first month following the launch of the broadcasts in 1960, 150 out of 191 letters received by Radio Peking staff came from East Germany. Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 4, 2005, 124 889 East Germany complained to the Chinese side that these publications led into disputes among German people. Presumably, some people –maybe even the cadres themselves- have sympathized with the Chinese side. See, "Youguan minzhu deguo yaoqiu wo zai guangbo zhong zengjia duiwai xuanchuan minde de wenjian" (With regard to the Democratic Germany’s demand for us to increase the number of articles concerning itself in our foreign propaganda broadcasts.) Archive No ; 10901504-02 1 Release Date ; 1960.3.7 \1960.9.20 890 See, The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 110 293 the same year which drew the PRC regime's attention to this region.891 Solidarity with the Arab people against European and Israeli imperialism was the motto of China's propaganda directed at Middle East. The New China News Agency bureau in Iraq was an important channel to influence the local media in the region, by supplying them with news items. 892 In order to attract listeners from the region, Radio Peking launched a special program called "Arab brothers, we support you" (alabo xiongdi women zhichi ni) in 1958. 893 Besides Radio Peking broadcasts, both China Pictorial and China Reconstructs had Arabic language editions. Before the UAR government raised customs duties and prohibited the sale of specific propaganda items, China Pictorial's Arabic edition had a considerable audience in Syria.894 However, Radio Peking's listener letters data suggest that China's influence was limited in the Arabic-speaking countries, and virtually non-existent in Turkey and Iran. 895 Although Mao's translated works and the Little Red Book made an impression on leftist youth groups in Turkey during the 1960s, Radio Peking broadcasts were 891 See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 100 892 USIA analysts were concerned about China's presence in Iraq: "In the press field, the NCNA office in Baghdad not only filed copious material to the Chinese press but also provided news and feature articles to the Iraqi press. ..Other newspapers frequently cited NCNA as the source of information and the viewpoints favorable to Communist China." See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 10 893 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 318 894 Based on Chinese sources, China Pictorial's Arabic edition had 5,000 subscribers in Syria as of 1958. See, "Alian jin wo shukan shi" (The issue of United Arab Republic’s prohibition of our publications) Archive No ; 107-00280-03 1 Release Date ; 1958.7.14 \1958.12.19 895 See Table 20, 21, 22 for Turkish, Persian and Arabic broadcast sections' listener statistics. While Radio Peking had virtually no audience in Turkish and Persian-speaking geographies, its Arabicspeaking audience was not substantial either- given the fact that Arabic is the common language in the whole Middle East region except for Turkey, Iran and Israel. It is remarkable that, despite the lack of official Chinese data at the time, USIA made a similar analysis: "Peking radio was broadcasting in all but Greek at the end of 1959. There is no evidence, however, that these radio broadcasts have appreciable impact. Indications are that as far as the Turks and Persians concerned, they do not exist, and it is doubtful that their audience among the Arabs is of significant size." See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 11 294 only followed by a handful of Turkish Maoists.896 China's failure to reach the middleof-the road masses in countries like Iran and Turkey was linked to the popularity of anti-communist ideology in the region. 897 Religious conservatism was another important factor behind the relative weakness of Chinese propaganda in the region. Although many Arabs were attracted to the anti-US and anti-Israel jargon employed by the Chinese, it was difficult to penetrate a predominantly Muslim region through a communist ideology known for its atheistic values. The Latin American audience was another insignificant audience for Chinese foreign propaganda. Here, NCNA offices in Havana, Santiago and Mexico City became outlets for Chinese foreign language publications and news bulletins. 898 Spanish radio broadcasts aimed at this region was launched in 1957. However, judging from the number of listener letters, it is clear that China did not enjoy a broad audience in the Latin American countries.899 This point is further confirmed by the surveys conducted by third parties several individual countries. 900 Overall it is clear that China's propaganda items and broadcasts enjoyed little reception in Latin America. Several factors contributed to China's relative weakness in this region. Although the Latin American audience was sympathetic towards socialist and anti896 For a detailed study of Turkish Maoists, See, Cagdas Ungor "Impact of Mao Zedong Thought in Turkey: 1966-1977" (unpublished MA thesis, Istanbul Bilgi University, Cultural Studies, 2004) 897 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 336 898 By the end of 1971, NCNA materials found outlets in six countries: Argentine, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Uruguay. See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 49 899 See Table 23. Listener statistics for Spanish language broadcasts show although this language is universally spoken in Latin American countries, except for Brazil, Radio Peking did not have a significant audience in this region. 900 Mexico illustrates a major example. USIA analysts cite a survey conducted among 2,001 Mexican residents of cities with 10,000 populations. Although the gap between different broadcasters was marginal, it is still significant that Radio Peking was the last among the five: "Interviews with 2,001 Mexican residents of cities with 10,000 population or more indicated Peking’s audience was 0,4 percent –slightly smaller than audiences of VOA (2,8 %) BBC (1,2%) Moscow (0,8%) and Havana (3,0%). See The external information and cultural relations programs of the People’s Republic of China, United States Information Agency, 1973, 109 295 imperialist ideals, China could not break the Soviet influence in the region.901 Due to the geographical and cultural distance between Latin America and East Asia, the Chinese revolution was an unfamiliar model to follow. When Latin American revolutionaries sought inspiration, the Cuban example provided them with a model close to home. 5.3. Assessment of Feedback The reception of propaganda in a local setting was determined by several factors, including the common perception of China in a particular country, religious, ideological, cultural and educational background of individual receivers, as well as the specific propaganda content. Hence, most of the time, the same content was received differently in different geographical locations, as well as by different individuals or groups in the same locality. As we will see in the following section, throughout the period 1949-1976, some messages were well-received by the audience while others were totally ignored, or rejected. Although a quantitative measurement of negative, positive and irrelevant responses is beyond reach, Chinese official sources and recollections of the ex-staff provide us with sufficient evidence to highlight the diversity of audience reactions in different periods. The multitude of listener/reader feedback suggests that, the audience for PRC foreign propaganda media was neither passive nor easy to convince. This is especially evident given the extent of negative and irrelevant responses. But let us first focus on the positive feedback. 901 China's limited penetration to this region was also acknowledged by some scholars during the Cold War era. See, William E. Ratliff, "Communist China and Latin America 1949-1972", Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 10 (Oct., 1972), 846-863 296 5.3.1. Positive feedback Radio Peking broadcasts and FLP publications (books, pamphlets and magazines) were most positively received by the segment of the audience who already had leftist leanings. Most of the time, the reason behind the readers/listeners' favorable reception of these broadcasts and publications was not their impressions of a specific content, but their sympathy towards the ideals expressed in this media. Hence the positive feedback (messages of appreciation, encouragement, congratulation, etc.) mostly derived from ideological affinity. For instance, before the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, Chinese foreign propaganda media was well-received by the party cadres in the socialist bloc countries. In the spirit of comradeship, socialist country audiences inquired the latest domestic developments in China and enjoyed the country's successes. 902 The audience for Radio Peking's Swahili language broadcasts, albeit small in size, was very appreciative of the Chinese concern and support for African independence. 903 Likewise, many Burmese readers were impressed by China's advocacy for anti-imperialistic sentiment and its social and economic progress in the aftermath of the socialist revolution.904 On a smaller scale, the audience for China's foreign language media also appreciated single policy issues undertaken by the PRC regime. Although not believing in communism per se, there were many things that impressed this larger group of "middle elements". For instance, upon China's release of the remaining Japanese POWs in 1956, Radio Peking received large numbers of letters from its 902 For the support and encouragement of the Hungarian audience, See, "Guanyu zhu xiongyali shiguan kaizhan duiwai xuanchuan qingkuang de wendian" (Telegram concerning the situtation of foreign propaganda launched by the Chinese Embassy in Hungary) Archive No ; 109-01857-05 1 Release Date ; 1958.1.29 \1958.12.28 903 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 178 904 See, "Zhongguo shukan zai miandian" (Chinese publications in Myanmar) Archive No ; 105-0097407 1 ; Release Date ; 1959.9.1 \1959.9.30, Archive No ；105-D0505 297 Japanese listeners. These letters, by and large, were apologetic in tone regarding Japan's past war crimes; expressed anti-war sentiment and support for the PRC's humane attitude in releasing the POWs. 905 Likewise, the special radio program covering the meeting against the US nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean was welcomed by the Japanese listeners. 906 Except for the sympathy originating from ideological affinity and support for specific policy matters, readers and listeners of the PRC's foreign propaganda media gave positive feedback when they liked a particular article, picture, or a program. For instance, Listeners Letterbox and Knowledge Contest programs of Radio Peking were quite popular with the listeners, regardless of their cultural and educational background. Many readers liked China Pictorial and China Reconstructs, because of their focus on Chinese daily life, as well as social and economic reconstruction – rather than politics and ideology.907 5.3.2. Negative feedback In broad categorical terms, the majority of the negative feedback was related either to the format or the language employed in the PRC foreign propaganda media. It was customary for the listeners/readers to complain about the dull, stiff nature of Chinese radio programming/publishing, with too much emphasis on politics and too little on entertainment (in the case of magazines, few pictures and few articles on daily life in 905 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 313. 906 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 317 907 Dutch readers, for instance, had a clear preference of China Reconstructs because of its lively content and perhaps, also packaging, as opposed to People's China (forerunner of Peking review). See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No : 110-00692-04 1 Release Date ; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8 298 China). 908 The most common criticism was the "dense propaganda flavor" of the magazines.909 Burmese readers complained that the magazines' content was not lively enough and the articles were too long and difficult to understand.910Chinese socialist fiction, likewise, had its critics. For instance, Dutch readers were not in the least moved by the contemporary Chinese novels and sought ancient classics instead.911 Many listener letters received by the Radio Peking staff in the early 1950s expressed boredom with the program schedule which always followed the same pattern: news, reviews, and music. According to these listeners, while domestic news items were few and trivial, international news items were slow (i.e., 2-3 days later than the actual event) and narrow in scope. 912 Another complaint was on the scarcity of culturalartistic programs. Western listeners especially demanded less news, which they found unattractive, and more programs on ordinary people's lives.913 Many demanded more music and shorter news items.914 Despite the senior cadres' continuous emphasis on reaching the "middle elements" by avoiding the excessive use of Marxist-Leninist jargon, language used in 908 For Radio Peking listener complaints, See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 315 909 According to Shen Suru, an old staff in China Reconstructs magazine, and in his later years, also a propaganda scholar, this was counter-productive propaganda. According to him, best propaganda was done if the foreign audiences did not feel or think what they received was propaganda. Hence Shen thinks that in the past, because Chinese foreign reporting was criticized by foreign friends and foreign experts for its “too dense propaganda flavor”, it failed to realize its goals. See Shen Suru, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu [Fundamentals of foreign reporting work] Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chubanshe, 1989, 50-51 910 See, "Zhongguo shukan zai miandian" (Chinese publications in Myanmar) Archive No ; 105-0097407 1 ; Release Date ; 1959.9.1 \1959.9.30, Archive No ；105-D0505 911911 This was explained by the Chinese representation staff with the Dutch readers' lack of knowledge for modern Chinese society. See, "Wo guo shukan ji xuanchuan pin zai helan de shiyong he fanying" (Use and reflections of our country’s publications and propaganda items in Holland) Archive No : 11000692-04 1 Release Date ; 1957.5.8 \1957.5.8 912 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 315 913 See, Radio Peking English section's listener survey in 1972. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 347 914 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,319 299 the broadcasts was very difficult for an average listener to comprehend. Even friendly voices had to admit that Chinese media was not able to reach the common folk in its target locations: An interesting comment came from a woman visitor to Beijing who was a highranking official in the New Zealand Communist Party. I attended a banquet of Chinese leaders in her honor, at which she was asked her opinion on the broadcasts to Oceania. She responded that the program was perfect, couldn’t be better – she tried never to miss a day. When she was asked whether the programs suited the average New Zealander, not left-wing friends, she exclaimed, “Heavens, No! They couldn’t begin to understand it!” 915 As the program texts were often written in Chinese and approved by senior cadres, most of whom never had the chance to visit a foreign country and therefore were only familiar with their immediate surroundings, this situation was inevitable. Even the cadres with the best intentions filled the program/article content with phrases, which were unfamiliar to overseas audiences. For instance, by the end of the 1950s, Radio Peking received many letters from confused listeners inquiring words they heard on the broadcasts, such as "rectification", "big character poster", "rightist" or "four harmfuls".916 A similar result can be inferred from a mail survey conducted by Radio Peking's English section in 1972, which indicated that American listeners could not comprehend what was meant by US imperialism.917 Although these letters could not be categorized as negative feedback per se, they still indicated that listeners could not easily digest the messages they received, let alone being convinced by them. 918 915 Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007 916 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 317 917 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,347. 918 This is also observed by John Sheridan Morgan: “the old saying that the western mind does not comprehend the oriental mind mayo r may not be true, but the people who are operating the international service of Radio Peking do not ora re not able to understand the western mind. The language of Radio Peking is grammatically poor, overloaded with ideology and shows no concern for presenting content in terms of interest to its target audience…the terms used in these editorials and other programs in many cases do not have the same meaning to a listener in America.” John Sheridan, A descriptive analysis of the North American Service of Radio Peking from the fifth of December 1966 300 Another type of negative feedback originated from the audience's disagreements with the PRC line in ideological matters and specific policy issues. For instance, in the late 1950s, China's attacks on "Tito revisionism" as it appeared in China's foreign language media frustrated Yugoslav party members. 919 In an individual counter-propaganda move, an angry comrade sent Socialism and War (written by the famous Yugoslav communist Edvard Kardelj) to the staff working at China Reconstructs as a small but unforgettable token of his rejection.920 Likewise, during the Sino-Indian border skirmishes in 1959, Radio Peking received letters from several listeners (whom were categorized as "those under the influence of Western propaganda") expressing disapproval for China's stance on this issue. 921 A similar situation occurred during the early 1960s on the articles/news items covering the Sino-Soviet split. The Radio Peking staff received a great number of letters from listeners in the Soviet Union and East Germany criticizing their program content. In terms of assessing the negative feedback, the Cultural Revolution period is treated in the Chinese sources as a separate case. As discussed in Chapter 2, this period eradicated the already blurred line between diplomacy and propaganda in the People's Republic. In October 1966, CCP Central Committee agreed that the foremost to the second of February 1967, unpublished masters thesis, Speech Arts, San Diego State College, 1968, 256 919 The target audience for these publications was the Yugoslav CP, political organizations, mass organizations, universities, etc. As a result of the attacks, many work units refused to receive Chinese foreign language magazines. See, "Guanyu zhu nansilafu shiguan tingzhi zai nan sanfa ewen “youhaobao” he “beijing zhoubao” de wenbao" (Telegram concerning the cease of distribution of the Russian language “Frienship magazine” and “Beijing Review” in Yugoslavia by our Embassy located in Yugoslavia.) Archive No: 109-01316-01 1 Release Date ; 1958.7.30 \1958.9.3. Also See, "Zhu nansilafu shiguan guanyu zengfa xuanchuanpin de jianyi dui nan xuanchuan gongzuo qingkuang baogao" (Report on Yugoslavia embassy’s proposal to increase the dissemination of foreign propaganda items in Yugoslavia and the situation of propaganda work in Yugoslavia) Archive No : 109-02016-02 1 Release Date ; 1959.1.26 \1959.9.7 920 China Reconstructs staff did not know how to respond and sought instructions from above. See, Guanyu zhongguo jianshe shoudao nansilafuka deer “shehui zhuyi yu zhanzheng” yi shu de chuli yijian (Ideas concerning the handling the issue of China Reconstructs magazine’s reception of a book called “Socialism and War” by Yugoslav Kardelj) Archive No ; 116-00258-04 1 Release Date ; 1960.11.9 \1960.11.9 921 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001 321 301 task of all the Chinese embassies abroad was the dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought.922 Chinese diplomats' circulating of propaganda items such as Mao badges and the Little Red Book met with resistance in several host countries and occasionally caused violence. 923 During this period, a number of countries expelled Chinese diplomats and froze their official ties with the PRC.924 During this period, Chinese foreign language media's content shifted radically to the left much to the dismay of the average audiences. 925 The sharp drop in the number of listener letters during the Cultural Revolution926 is interpreted by the excadres as the result of Radio Peking’s breaking off with the largest segment of its audience. While the sharp decrease in the listener letters might be considered as a sufficiently negative result in itself, the remaining correspondence also shows that many listeners were unable to understand the content. Referring to the political terminology, a Japanese listener complained that the broadcasts were far above their level.927 Likewise, an Australian listener expressed his frustration with Radio Peking broadcasts by reminding the staff of Mao's famous critique of "eight-legged essay" whereas he likened the broadcasting language to a schoolchild's composition essay, 922 See, Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministy, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2004, 152 923 Burma is a major example. Here, anti-Chinese riots were provoked in 1967 seemingly because of the Chinese students' wearing of Mao badges. See “Sino-Burmese Relations Ease” February 3, 1971 (Hoover Institution, Preliminary Inventory of International Communist Affairs Yearbook, Box 13, file: China/International Southeast Asia). Likewise, in other countries, Chinese diplomats, experts and technicians in aid programs, local Chinese, and leftists were attacked for attempting to spread propaganda or wearing Mao badges. See, Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministy, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2004, 156 924 In 1967, Tunisia and Indonesia suspended diplomatic relations with China. The countries that expelled Chinese diplomats were the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Central Africa, Ghana, and British authorities in Hong Kong. See, Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2004, 156, 164. 925 For instance, many readers cancelled their subscription for Peking Review magazine. See, Leonard W. Lazarick, China’s smiling face to the world: Beijing’s English-language magazines in the first decade of the People’s Republic (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), 170 926 See the 1966-67 interval in Table 10. 927 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 324 302 "so formal and cut off from the colloquial style spoken among regular people".928 These criticisms were not exclusively coming from the capitalist bloc countries, however. In 1974, the PRC embassy in the Soviet Union warned Radio Peking on the content of Russian language broadcasts. Soviet listeners' impression was that the broadcasts were not lively; they employed stiff language and had little convincing ability.929 Likewise a research conducted by Japan's biggest broadcasting corporation in 1974 indicated that average Japanese listeners did not get the content of Radio Peking broadcasts. According to the survey, news and program language was wellsuited only for experts; abstract, stiff, doctrinaire, laden with too much theory and forcing itself on people.930 5.3.3. Irrelevant Feedback One of the interesting findings of audience research for China's foreign propaganda media is the considerable size of irrelevant feedback. These can be categorized under different headings. For instance, Radio Peking received many letters from young radio enthusiasts all over the world, “asking for certification that they actually received this distant station”.931 During the formative years of Radio Peking, Swedish youngsters asking for QSL listener cards constituted a substantial portion of the listener audience.932 928 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 325 929 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 325 930 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001, 325 931 Interview with Sidney Rittenberg, English broadcasts section, e-mail correspondence, USA, January 9, 2007 932 Until 1955, 70% of all listener letters came from Japan, Indonesia, and Sweden. In 1955, letters originating from these three countries constituted the 77,8 % of a total of 7365 letters. See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,312. 303 According to an ex-foreign expert who worked at the Foreign Languages Press, many readers sent "laughable comments". These letters, by and large, manifested that the foreign language magazines were far from making the intended impact on the readers: I suppose these publications had some of the uninspired Letters to the Editors in the world. The letters would be silly, gooey things that didn’t say anything. “I enjoyed the lovely pictures and the wonderful articles about China. Good luck in the future.” They would be signed R. Jones, New York or T.S. Smith Chicago. They were not fabrications; they were real. The man who handled the correspondence sat right behind me. They got hundreds of letters, but not very many from America or England. Mostly from Indonesia and places like that. The majority of the letter writers wanted the name and address of some beautiful girl who appeared in the magazine. They couldn’t print those of course; just record the name and address. Occasionally, they might print one that said a photograph wasn’t clear, something like that. If they really wanted a wide readership, they should have printed the love letters. 933 Although it is clear that love letters did not constitute the majority of listener feedback, this is a significant example illustrating the extent of disparity between the intended message and its reception. Many listeners of Radio Peking sent their pictures alongside these letters and told the staff about their personal lives. Although they generally displayed a friendly attitude in their writing, this type of feedback can still be considered as irrelevant – given that the intent of the broadcasts was to convince the overseas audiences in political matters. Besides, these letters occasionally included arrogant comments. One foreign expert at Radio Peking's English broadcast section explains the variety of irrelevant listener feedback as follows: Fan's desk was always littered with recent offerings from the other side: photographs of listener's children, postcards of churches, a package of Big Red chewing gum, a Catholic prayer with gold-leaf trim on stiff paper suitable for framing, and a card enclosing a five-dollar bill with a scribbled note "Go and buy yourself a drink."934 933 See, Morris R. Wills, J. Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American’s 12 Years in Communist China: the story of Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1966, 129 934 Although this happened after the end of the Cultural Revolution period, it is still a relevant anecdote in terms of showing the multitude of listener responses. See, Pellett, Gail, “Radio Peking and its ‘Audience’ Problem”, The Quill, March 1982, 20 304 Another form of indifference towards Chinese media can be inferred from the unanswered questions in the listener surveys conducted by Radio Peking during the period 1949-1976. A mail survey conducted among 530 Japanese listeners in the period 1959-1960, inquiring as to listeners' attitude towards the radio broadcasts, found out that 370 people, an overwhelming majority, did not offer any ideas at all.935 This example, along with other types of irrelevant feedback, suggests that Chinese foreign language media was being consumed for reasons which was not designed (nor imagined or expected) by the PRC foreign propaganda agencies. Among these reasons, simple curiosity, passing leisure time, or looking for a temporary alternative to national media, probably played some role. 935 See, Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai zhi,(shang) [Record of the China International Broadcasting Station, 1.volume] Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001,345 305 TABLE 11 Radio Peking's annual listener letter statistics (1949-1976) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Vol 4, 2005, 530 Year 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Country and region 18 33 42 47 52 62 76 92 97 105 110 112 114 135 135 132 124 132 117 127 114 118 130 125 138 130 Number of listener letters 650 1,000 1,906 2,296 7,365 15,284 29,398 32,593 34,483 48,915 65,528 66,425 208,534 154,597 286,163 165,839 44,937 30,148 28,330 21,833 23,257 24,823 46,153 61,545 102,755 118,709 306 Country and region 160 140 120 100 80 Country and region 60 40 20 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 Number of listener letters 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 Number of listener letters 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 307 TABLE 12 China Reconstructs magazine reader survey, 1961 (Out of a sample of 1,583 reader letters) Source: Shen Suru, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu [Fundamentals of foreign reporting work] Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chubanshe, 1989, 40 (originally published in Waiwen chubanshe “gongzuo jianbao” 1962, issue 9) Country Occupation Teacher, student Scientist Office worker Official,entrepreneur,landlord Laborer, peasant Literature and arts, journalist, Publisher Others Total Latin America India US Total Percentage 28 17 14 13 9 10 50 9 17 11 1 7 25 21 12 7 17 7 103 47 43 31 27 24 34,3% 15,7% 14,3% 10% 9% 8% 9 100 5 100 11 100 25 300 8,4% 100% TABLE 13 China Reconstructs magazine reader occupation statistics, 1966 Source: Shen Suru, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu [Fundamentals of foreign reporting work] Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chubanshe, 1989 p.41 (China Reconstructs neibu (internal) source) Student Professor Office worker, technical staff Journalist, cultural, medicine, law Laborer,sales clerk,service staff Retired laborer, unemployed Peasant Soldier, police, armymen Housewife Pedlar Industrial entrepreneur Official Military officer Landlord Missionary (preacher) Total 221 45 67 26 48% 9,7% 15% 5,6% 58 13% 12 6 1 3 13 6 1 1 1 461 2,5% 1,3% 0,2% 0,7% 2,8% 1,3% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 100 Based on the survey conducted by the magazine's English, French, Spanish and Arabic editions from January to February 1966. (461 letters used out of a sample of 1,197 reader letters from 71 countries) 308 TABLE 14 Listener letter statistics (Indonesian) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 27-28 Year 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 560 520 1715 4608 4426 889 3466 5919 8427 18026 20610 31729 820 1414 785 407 303 70 18 42 34 34 14 TABLE 15 Listener letter statistics (Hindi) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 387388 Year 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 177 804 970 845 484 508 591 144 77 17 36 11 7 4 18 19 34 32 309 TABLE 16 Listener letter statistics (Swahili) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, 180 Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 29 77 176 623 1348 1993 1454 721 690 790 816 866 770 632 783 TABLE 17 Listener letter statistics (Hausa) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 4, 2005, 327 Year 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 273 1039 1794 1837 1117 1992 1506 1923 2483 2409 4407 5107 7347 6546 310 TABLE 18 Listener letter statistics (French) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 529530 Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 478 666 865 2219 2332 2376 2507 2117 1701 1494 1181 934 956 2616 2735 3581 3343 TABLE 19 Listener letter statistics (German) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 4, 2005, 126 Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 1469 2472 2856 3289 1989 2598 2231 2511 4091 5251 4687 5099 4814 6145 5319 5996 6240 311 TABLE 20 Listener letter statistics (Turkish) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 343 Year 19571959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 11 28 33 7 18 15 8 6 12 11 20 7 13 37 50 60 TABLE 21 Listener letter statistics (Persian) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 3, 2003, p.74 Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 14 7 0 14 19 15 18 15 19 11 6 10 1 0 4 2 312 TABLE 22 Listener letter statistics (Arabic) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 2, 2001, 477 Year 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 44 195 409 315 216 246 310 674 1110 1028 514 613 675 768 775 1736 1093 1606 2209 TABLE 23 Listener letter statistics (Spanish) Source: Li Dan, Chen Minyi eds. Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai bumen zhi, [Departmental Record of China International Broadcasting Station] Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, Volume 4, 2005, 42 Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Number of Listener Letters 696 646 524 889 763 807 681 531 560 549 444 616 851 874 892 866 1084 313 CONCLUSION This study has been an attempt to examine the complex dynamics of diplomacy and propaganda in the People's Republic of China during the period 1949-1976. As discussed throughout the dissertation, propaganda through the use of mass media was one channel (among many others) used by the PRC regime to exert its influence abroad. In this sense, Radio Peking and the Foreign Languages Press held key positions within the Chinese foreign propaganda scheme. During the Cold War years, the task of publicizing China's side of the story, its achievements and ideological outlook was undertaken by these two propaganda agencies. Throughout this period, drastic changes in the PRC regime's foreign policy, propaganda objectives and target audiences found their reflections in the country's broadcasts and publications in several languages. The FLP and Radio Peking were so indispensable to the PRC regime that these agencies continued their operation even in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, which shattered many other party and governmental organs in China. Therefore, the centrality of these agencies within the larger PRC foreign affairs apparatus is indisputable. The story of the FLP and Radio Peking is an important departure point to reflect on a number of broader topics surrounding China's foreign policy, propaganda and persuasion work. This is important, first of all, to make the long-neglected historiographical adjustment in the field of propaganda analysis. By illustrating the complexities of the PRC foreign propaganda work in various fields, this study challenged the earlier portrayal of the Chinese foreign propaganda organization as a highly efficient body with huge financial sources and manpower. This re-assessment 314 was based on Chinese language sources, most of which mention these setbacks in order to highlight the cadres' continued adherence to the fulfillment of propaganda tasks. Not surprisingly, the challenges plaguing China's foreign propaganda work often appear in the midst of a patriotic narrative. Similar to their Western counterparts, Chinese sources tend to see the gradual increase in the total propaganda output as a sign of success. According to many retired cadres, during the episodes of "leftist mistakes", radical groups "hijacked" the otherwise better foreign propaganda establishment. While these sources spare Mao Zedong the blame, they accuse the orthodox Marxists who have executed these campaigns at the lowest level. By the same token, the `golden age` of Chinese foreign propaganda appears to be in the early 1960s: after the end of the Great Leap and before the launch of the Cultural Revolution. This study, on the other hand, argued that the problems plaguing the PRC foreign propaganda establishment were more complex, multi-faceted and long lasting then it was suggested in the Chinese language sources. Although it is clear that the impact of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution has been disastrous for the cadres and the working environment at Radio Peking and the FLP, problems were clearly not limited to these episodes. The dissertation shows that the Chinese foreign propaganda agencies were under the spell of staff shortages, technical insufficiencies and heavy bureaucracy even during the 'favorable' early 1960s. Overall, the challenges and setbacks were structural and not temporary in nature. There were several dilemmas underlying the system (e.g., commercial vs. non-commercial distribution, truthfulness vs. propagating successes or not leaking state secrets, timeliness vs. arduous approval processes) which often proved impossible to resolve in practice. Due to these paradoxes, content providers found it difficult to 315 accommodate audience tastes whereas the organs responsible for dissemination work faced difficulties in satisfying the demands of host governments and client bookstores. Often times it was impossible to meet foreigners' expectations while trying to fulfill the propaganda tasks imposed by the PRC leadership. This study also challenged another underlying premise of the previous scholarship, which depicted China's propaganda apparatus as an inhumane lie machine which deserved analysis only with regard to its output, objectives or subversive potential. Bringing in the missing human element to the story largely complicated this picture. Based on the memoirs, this study demonstrated that the Chinese propagandists were not mere ‘cogs in the machine’ who blindly followed the rules. By contrast, these individuals were active agents in the shaping of the Chinese foreign propaganda organization during the Cold War years. The debates on the production of content and other larger issues (such as `how to do propaganda`, `which principles to prioritize or employ`), continuous exchanges between Chinese staff and foreign experts, as well as senior and junior cadres, bitter struggles between orthodox Marxists and more pragmatic figures, show that the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus was a realm of negotiation and contestation. This is not to say that the FLP and Radio Peking were democratic institutions where everyone had equal say in major decisions. On the contrary, these agencies were strictly hierarchical in nature. This state of affairs makes it even more important to acknowledge the active involvement of the individual cadres and different cliques in the making of foreign propaganda. It is likewise difficult to reduce the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus to a grandiose lie machine. Although it is clear that the leadership was very selective in deciding what is to be told abroad, there were also various instances when outright lies were dismissed by the senior editors simply as "untruthful content". Mao’s 316 occasional remarks on the need to maintain truthfulness (shishi qiushi) suggest that this principle had at least some inspirational value for the PRC foreign propaganda agencies. Yet, it is clear that when it contradicted with the general editorial line or when other priorities were at stake, the cadres had to forgo this principle in order to attain higher political goals, such as "countering imperialist slanders", "presenting China's successes", etc. But the Chinese foreign propaganda organization was hardly unique in this sense. For all the major players of the propaganda race, Cold War mentality dictated its own rules in determining what is considered as truth. The AntiChina publications circulating in the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s demonstrate that the use of gross exaggerations and half-truths was not a communist monopoly. Chinese propagandists, similar to their counterparts in the West, paid attention to the larger political context when producing content. While the editorial policies of the 1960s might seem chauvinistic in their aims and jargon, I suggest that the PRC regime’s attitude was self-defensive in nature –a manifestation of what Chen Jian calls a "victim mentality". This is discernible from the catch phrases used in the foreign propaganda guidelines, such as "breaking off China’s isolation", "countering imperialist slanders", etc. With regard to China's foreign policy and international relations during the Cold War years, this study helps us acknowledge the central role of the propaganda organs within the PRC's larger foreign affairs apparatus. It is clear that the major decision-making organs in the foreign policy realm, the State Council Foreign Affairs Office, the CC Liaison Department, the Foreign Ministry, were also instrumental in shaping China's foreign propaganda work. This was a dynamic organization, whose working necessitated continuous exchanges among different work units. Many governmental offices, including China's diplomatic missions, were dependent on the 317 books, magazines, and souvenirs produced by the FLP. While foreign propaganda agencies supplied China's overseas missions with the necessary propaganda items, they received assistance from these representations in recruiting foreign experts, getting audience feedback, resolving issues with host governments and client bookstores. This dynamic relationship continued throughout the Cold War years. It is clear that the PRC regime used foreign propaganda media as a supplement to diplomacy in order to create a favorable impression abroad. Radio Peking's considerable audience in Japan and the case study of the China Books and Periodicals in the U.S. show that China's foreign language media succeeded in reaching people who were not reachable by regular diplomatic channels. However, by and large, propaganda media was much more accessible in the countries, where China was officially represented and/or she was able to maintain friendly bilateral relations. The cases of Indonesia and India illustrate, for instance, that the worsening of bilateral relations resulted in serious restrictions over the flow of China's propaganda media. This situation kept the PRC foreign propaganda agencies from reaching their longtime subscribers in India and Indonesia in the 1960s. Whereas the lack of official ties or the existence of mutual hostilities did not always prevent the circulation of China's foreign propaganda media, the existence of diplomatic ties or a favorable political atmosphere almost always meant broader audiences for the regime. The exponential growth of American and Japanese audiences in the first half of the 1970s is a good case in point. Certainly, much more needs to be done in order to make an accurate assessment of this media's reception abroad. This study, hopefully, will contribute to the future scholarly efforts to examine China's global impact in this realm. The PRC regime's specific experiences in the propaganda field could be better understood only within a broader framework. A comparative analysis of American, British, Soviet and 318 Chinese propaganda organs might provide us with new insights. In this sense, this study locates the PRC foreign language media on the map of the 'Cultural Cold War' literature, which focuses on the role of propaganda and persuasion in the waging of this ideological battle. Assessing the Maoist legacy is also crucial in order to understand the continuities and changes in the PRC regime's foreign propaganda system. The FLP magazines, China Pictorial, China Reconstructs (China Today) and Peking Review (Beijing Review) as well as Radio Peking (China Radio International) continue their operation today despite the name changes that signify a break with the past. As opposed to their revolutionary agenda during the Maoist decades, today's foreign propaganda agencies publicize the country's domestic economic development and its peaceful rise to great power status in the international arena. The fundamental transformation in China's foreign propaganda work in the post-reform era is evident by the outright dismissal of the word “propaganda” (xuanchuan). 936 Today's propagandists prefer more benign terms like "public relations" (gonggong guanxi) to describe their work.937 Another fundamental change which underlies decentralization. 938 China's post-reform foreign propaganda work is its Today's foreign language magazines have regional offices worldwide, which enable them to catch up with the local trends in a timely fashion. Likewise, the use of high-tech media and internet is growing in the foreign 936 Although this word does not have a negative connotation in China, post-reform era foreign propagandists are well aware of this term's association with lies and deception in foreign languages.An ex-propaganda staff, Shen Suru indicates that the connotation of “xuanchuan” in the Chinese context is a positive one; it simply means to disseminate Marxism Leninism and encourage people to gather around the CCP. Hence, he concludes, the same can not be asked of people living abroad, in nonsocialist countries. See Shen Suru, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu [Fundamentals of foreign reporting work] Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chubanshe, 1989, 49 937 See, Chen Ni, “From propaganda to public relations: evolutionary change in the Chinese government”, Asian Journal of Communication (Singapore) 13, no.2 (2003) , 96-121 938 Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign publications personnel training center, Beijing 319 propaganda field. As compared to the Maoist decades, today's foreign propaganda apparatus is paying more attention to the "inside and outside of the country is different" (neiwai youbie) principle. In fact, this principle's content is now enlarged with the recognition that "not only foreign countries are different from China, but there are also vast differences among foreign countries" (waiwai youbie). 939 Notwithstanding these striking changes, however, it is hard to say that the Maoist legacy has completely disappeared from the PRC foreign propaganda apparatus. Problems relating to the organization (bureaucracy, lack of timeliness), production of content (use of non-colloquial language, selection of unattractive themes, etc.) continue to concern today's foreign propagandists. Although nobody denies the centrality of the neiwai youbie principle, Chinese propagandists still downplay the topics that are of much interest to its overseas audiences. While today's foreign propaganda media focus on China's speedy economic development and peaceful foreign policy, foreign readers demand more items on human rights issues, environmental problems, etc. In a world where the global public opinion is largely shaped by the Western media institutions, China still finds it crucial to make his voice heard around the globe. Despite the significant technological and organizational progress in the foreign propaganda apparatus, however, presenting her side of the story is still a challenging task for the PRC regime. 939 Interview with Chen Rinong, February 27, 2008 at the Foreign publications personnel training center, Beijing 320 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES Digital collections NATIONAL ARCHIVES II, MARYLAND Records of the US Information Agency Research Reports 1960-82 USIA Propaganda county files HOOVER INSTITUTION on WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE Zhongguo gongchandang [Chinese Communist Party] Collection Alfred Kohlberg Collection Chinese Subject Collection Preliminary Inventory of International Communist Affairs Yearbook Arne Swabeck Collection Laurence M. Wiig Collection Lovestone Jay Collection John K. 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