Hungary
by Balázs Áron Kovács and Flóra Hevesi
Budapest
10.0 million
US$19,090
Capital:
Population:
GNI/capita, PPP:
Source: he data above was provided by he World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011.
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores
1.25
1.25
Independent Media 2.25
Governance*
3.00
1.25
1.25
2.25
2.50
1.25 1.25 1.25 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75
1.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.00
2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 3.25
2.50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
National Democratic
Governance
n/a
n/a
n/a
2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 3.00
Local Democratic
Governance
n/a
n/a
n/a
2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50
Judicial Framework
and Independence
2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.25
Corruption
3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.50
2.13 1.96 1.96 1.96 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.29 2.39 2.61
Electoral Process
Civil Society
Democracy Score
* Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic
governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these
two important subjects.
NOTE: he ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this
report. he opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). he ratings are based on a scale of 1 to
7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. he Democracy Score is an
average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.
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Nations in Transit 2011
Executive Summary
P
arliamentary elections were held in Hungary in April 2010. As expected,
the opposition Young Democrats’ Alliance–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz)
and its junior partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP),
dealt a crushing defeat to the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which
had been in power since 2002 and was deeply discredited due to several factors,
including the September 2006 revelation (via leaked tapes) that Prime Minister
Ferenc Gyurcsány had deliberately lied to win elections, and the government’s gross
mishandling of the ensuing protests. Failed fiscal policies predating the onset of
the global economic crisis cemented MSZP’s deep unpopularity. With the 2010
elections, Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán became prime minister of a new government
that controlled more than two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. he resulting
opposition consisted of the MSZP and the Politics Can Be Different (LMP) party
on the left, and the radical nationalist Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)1
on the extreme right.
he new government’s supermajority gave it the authority to amend or replace
the constitution, and it planned to adopt a new charter in early 2011. Such
a concentration of power in the hands of a single political bloc was practically
unprecedented in Hungary’s postcommunist history. In 1994–98, the MSZP and
its junior partner, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), also had a two-thirds
majority, but they were often at odds and practiced self-restraint in amending
the constitution, pegging such legislation to a four-fifths vote for the duration
of their term. In the conservative coalition elected in 2010, the junior partner is
independent in name only, as the small KDNP is effectively under Orbán’s control.
Between its inauguration in May and the end of the year, the Orbán government
appointed loyal party cadres to head key institutions; adopted a retrospective tax
law and reduced the powers of the Constitutional Court after it attempted to strike
down the legislation; drastically weakened labor protections for civil servants;
summarily eliminated the Budgetary Council, tasked with the independent
evaluation of the national budget; used individual members of the parliament to
propose important laws, including constitutional amendments, to circumvent the
stakeholder negotiations required for government-proposed measures; curtailed
freedom of speech through the adoption of new media legislation; intimidated
the judiciary by summoning judges to parliamentary hearings on cases related to
the riots of 2006; changed election procedures to give the ruling parties an edge
in the October municipal elections; and nationalized the savings in a system of
compulsory private pension funds.
In addition to these concrete steps, the government used problematic rhetoric
and political symbolism during the year. he prime minister and other members of
Hungary
the governing parties declared the April elections to be a “revolution at the ballot
box” and the “closure of regime change,” comparing the ouster of the MSZP to the
end of communist rule. he Proclamation of National Unity—adopted with votes
of FIDESZ-KDNP alone—enshrined this version of Hungary’s recent history in
an official document, which a subsequent presidential decree obliged all offices of
public administration, services, schools, hospitals, etc. to display in a glass frame.
he decree requested, but did not require, that the judiciary and municipal offices
do the same. he conservative government also apparently aimed to neutralize
the right-wing appeal of Jobbik by appropriating some of that party’s ideological
fodder, such as ethnic Hungarian issues in neighboring countries; the 1920 Treaty
of Trianon, which truncated Hungary’s territory at the end of World War I and
continues to be regarded as an injustice by many Hungarians; and even more
symbolic concerns like the restoration of the “Sacred Crown” concept, which had
formed the basis of the country’s premodern constitutional framework.
he government’s actions and rhetoric to date suggest that it intends to
undermine liberal democracy in Hungary. While this effort should not be equated
with an attempt to establish an outright dictatorship, it does appear to be aimed
at reshaping the political, institutional, and constitutional framework to keep the
Fidesz-KDNP bloc in power for the foreseeable future, and ultimately to move
Hungarian society in a more conservative, corporativist-authoritarian direction.
National Democratic Governance. Following the April parliamentary elections,
the opposition Fidesz-KDNP coalition formed a new government that controlled
68 percent of the seats in the unicameral National Assembly. It went on to take a
series of steps that seriously undermined the independence of key institutions and
weakened the rule of law, resulting in the most significant backslide in Hungary’s
democratic development since 1989. Hungary’s national democratic governance
rating declines from 2.50 to 3.00.
Electoral Process. he national elections in April and municipal elections in
October were both deemed free and fair. Although new electoral rules adopted
ahead of the municipal voting favored incumbents and major parties in general, the
effects may balance out in the long run and will not necessarily lead to a decline in
the quality of the electoral process itself. Accordingly, Hungary’s electoral process rating
remains unchanged at 1.75.
Civil Society. With a relatively large number of organizations and a generally
hospitable legal framework, Hungary’s civil society is well developed and
vibrant. However, the absence of substantial private funding leaves the sector
disproportionately reliant on state and European Union resources and exposed to
political changes. In 2010, the new government froze the funds of the National
Cultural Fund and a variety of other cultural and research entities. New applications
for funding were delayed, and payments of assigned grants were withheld.
Accordingly, Hungary’s civil society rating declines from 1.75 to 2.00.
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Nations in Transit 2011
Independent Media. Although Hungarian media can still be considered generally
free and diverse, with commercial outlets dominating the broadcast and print sectors,
new media legislation that introduced fundamental reforms raised serious concerns
in 2010. It drastically curtailed the independence of public-service television and
radio broadcasters, and established a new regulatory body with sweeping authority
over broadcast media, print publications, and the internet. Due to this alarming
concentration of political power over the media, Hungary’s rating for independent media
declines from 2.75 to 3.25.
Local Democratic Governance. he political independence of each of Hungary’s
3,200 towns and villages is viewed as a key virtue of democracy, but the system
often proves to be excessively fragmented and inefficient in practice. A lack of
economic and fiscal viability may undermine the municipalities’ capacity to carry
out their functions. In order to overcome financial difficulties, numerous cities and
villages have issued bonds in recent years, setting the stage for an expected debt
crisis in 2011. Meanwhile, overwhelming Fidesz victories in the October 2010
municipal elections added to the party’s national dominance. Hungary’s rating for
local democratic governance remains unchanged at 2.50.
Judicial Framework and Independence. he judiciary’s perennial problems
of transparency and accountability were not resolved in 2010, and the new
government took a number of steps during the year to politicize, intimidate,
and weaken the courts. he Fidesz leadership changed the regulations governing
the chief prosecutor’s office and appointed a former party cadre to the post. In
September, a parliamentary subcommittee summoned leaders of the judiciary to
question them on decisions following the 2006 antigovernment riots. Finally, the
parliamentary majority overruled a judgement by the Constitutional Court and
curtailed the court’s jurisdiction over budgetary legislation. Hungary’s judicial
framework and independence rating declines from 2.00 to 2.25.
Corruption. In March, a former MSZP lawmaker was sentenced to eight and
a half years in prison for embezzling state subsidies. he heavy sentence was the
first serious corruption penalty in Hungary’s recent history to be directly related
to a governing party. he Fidesz government that took office in May appointed a
commissioner for accountability and anticorruption with a mandate to uncover
wrongdoing by the previous administration. As a result, an enormous amount of
new corruption scandals erupted in 2010, implicating top-ranking officials and
politicians from the MSZP government. he revelations may have a positive effect
on society, which has long been disillusioned by impunity for political corruption,
though it remains unclear whether officials of the current government will face
similar scrutiny. Hungary’s corruption rating remains unchanged at 3.50.
Outlook for 2011. he most important expected development in 2011 will be the
adoption of a new constitution in the spring. he general principles of the drafting
Hungary
process published on the parliament’s website suggest that the new constitution
will guarantee less freedom than the one in force, put more emphasis on citizens’
obligations as opposed to rights and liberties, compromise the secular nature of
the state, and decrease the powers of the Constitutional Court. It is likely that
following the promulgation of the new constitution, the government will meddle
more extensively in independent institutions like the judiciary. It remains to be seen
whether the leadership will tackle some of the state’s chronic problems related to
health care, social services, education, and local government.
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Main Report
National Democratic Governance
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
n/a
n/a
n/a
2.00
2.00
2.25
2.25
2.50
2.50
3.00
Hungary has a parliamentary system in which executive power lies with a prime
minister elected by an absolute majority of the parliament following general
elections. he prime minister can only be removed, together with the entire
cabinet, through the process of “constructive no-confidence,” which combines a
no-confidence motion with the election of a new prime minister in a single vote.
Accordingly, under normal circumstances, the parliament does not provide a strong
check on the executive.
he 386-member, unicameral parliament, the National Assembly
(Országgyűlés), is the top legislative organ in Hungary. he government and the
ministries may enact lower-level legislation that must conform to existing laws.
he president, elected by the parliament for a five-year term, has mostly symbolic
functions as well as limited control over the nomination and appointment of
public officials. he president may also refer legislation back to the parliament or
the Constitutional Court for further consideration before signing it into law. He is
considered the commander in chief of the armed forces.
Hungary built robust democratic institutions after the transition from
communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. hese institutions came under stress
in 2006, slowly decayed over the next few years, and were severely battered in 2010.
In the April 2010 parliamentary elections, the conservative opposition
coalition—consisting of the Young Democrats’ Alliance–Hungarian Civic Union
(Fidesz) and its junior partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP)—
captured 263 seats, more than two-thirds of the total. his supermajority gave the
new ruling bloc the ability to amend the constitution or adopt a new constitution
without the need to compromise with the opposition. he outgoing ruling party,
the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), was reduced to just 59 seats. he radical
nationalist Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) placed third with 47 seats,
followed by Politics Can Be Different (LMP) with 16. One independent was also
elected.
As a final gesture before handing over power, the government of Prime
Minister Gordon Bajnai proposed a law to make Holocaust denial a crime, and the
parliament approved the measure. Although the law restricted freedom of speech,
the new government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán not only retained it but
expanded its scope to include the denial of crimes committed by the communist
regime.
Fulfilling a promise made by many earlier governments, the new leadership
amended the constitution in May to reduce the number of parliament seats to 200
Hungary
as of the 2014 elections. Among other benefits, the new system included provisions
that would allow for better representation of ethnic minorities.2
However, many other steps taken by the Fidesz-KDNP government during
2010 systematically undermined the checks and balances built into the country’s
constitutional framework. For example, it appointed trusted party cadres to
crucial and ostensibly independent institutions such as the Hungarian Financial
Supervisory Authority, the State Audit Office, the Tax Authority, the Competition
Authority, the Constitutional Court, the chief prosecutor’s office, and, in a very
controversial decision, the presidency of the republic.3 he outgoing head of state,
former Constitutional Court president László Sólyom, had been nominated and
supported by Fidesz in 2005, but he proved to be an independent and activist
figure. He was replaced in June 2010 by Pál Schmitt, an Olympic champion fencer
and longtime Hungarian Olympic Committee chairman who had served as a
member of the European Parliament with Fidesz and, most recently, as speaker of
the National Assembly. In one of his parliamentary confirmation hearings, Schmitt
announced that as president he would serve as an “engine” rather than a “brake”
with respect to approving legislation, effectively surrendering perhaps the only
substantial function of the office.4
he Fidesz government took office in a country with a bleak economic outlook.
Orbán apparently hoped to keep some of the unrealistic promises made during the
election campaign by reaching an agreement with Hungary’s main creditors—the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Union
(EU)—on easing the terms of its loans and decreasing the national debt and budget
deficit. However, following the government’s failed negotiations with the creditors,
Orbán audaciously decided to break with them and beat a new path for Hungary’s
economic recovery.5
To harmonize the country’s fiscal and monetary policies, the government
launched an attack on the president of the National Bank, András Simor, who
still held on to his position at year’s end.6 In addition, the Budgetary Council,
an independent expert body that provided public analysis to ensure transparent
and responsible budgetary policy, was eliminated. he council had been created in
2009 as part of a 2008 agreement between Hungary and the IMF. he government
reportedly planned to replace it with a new entity that would have no staff to
produce actual budget analyses.7
he removal of such checks led to a series of laws that seriously damaged
Hungary’s democratic framework. In a symbolic piece of legislation, the government
imposed a retroactive tax of 98 percent on personal income generated through
severance payments in the public sector. While the professed goal of the tax was
to recover funds siphoned off by cadres of the previous government, it alarmed
many observers. he Constitutional Court ruled the tax unconstitutional in
October, but just hours after the decision, the government announced that
it would amend the constitution to limit the court’s jurisdiction and prevent it
from examining future legislation on budgetary matters, among other topics.8 he
amendment was adopted by the parliament in November, and the contentious tax
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Nations in Transit 2011
law was passed again the same day, even increasing the span of retroactive taxation
to five years.
With the Constitutional Court out of the way, the government moved in
December to nationalize the wealth accumulated in compulsory private pension
funds. Since the late 1990s, employees had been required by law to contribute to
the private funds on an individual basis. After the nationalization, individuals were
permitted to stay in the private pension funds if they chose, but on the condition
that they lose the other part of their pension, accumulated through the state pension
fund—a very strong incentive to leave. Civil servants faced particular pressure, since
their labor protections had been diminished to facilitate the government’s partisan
appointment policies.
Electoral Process
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
Since the transition from communist rule, Hungarian elections have consistently
been assessed as free and fair. Members of the parliament (MPs) are elected for
four-year terms in a two-round, mixed electoral system. Of the 386 seats, 176 are
filled through races in single-seat constituencies, up to 152 through proportional
representation based on regional party lists, and the remainder through proportional
representation based on national party lists. A second round of voting is held to
decide single-seat constituency races where no candidate won an absolute majority
in the first round. Parties must reach a 5 percent vote threshold to gain seats from
the regional and national party lists.
While this system ensures freedom and fairness in elections, it is very complex.
he new Fidesz-led government successfully passed the long-awaited amendment
to reduce the size of the legislature in 2010, but it remains unclear exactly how the
smaller parliament will be elected when the reform takes effect in 2014. Moreover,
the new constitution planned for 2011 may provide for the creation of an upper
chamber with its own electoral system.
he April 2010 parliamentary elections ended eight years of scandal-ridden
rule by the MSZP and its junior coalition partner, the Alliance of Free Democrats
(SZDSZ). he two parties had been thoroughly discredited by the events of 2006
and by their inept handling of fiscal policy, even before the onset of the global
economic crisis. Voter turnout in the first round was 64 percent, and as expected,
the conservative Fidesz-KDNP coalition won a landslide victory. It captured nearly
all of the single-seat constituencies, a majority of the regional party-list votes, and
68 percent of the seats overall. Two historical parties—the liberal SZDSZ and
the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)—disappeared from the
legislature, while two other parties—the Green and liberal LMP, with 4 percent
of the seats overall, and the radical nationalist Jobbik, with 12 percent of the seats
Hungary
overall—entered for the first time. he MSZP became the main opposition party,
with just 15 percent of the seats in the parliament.9
hese results amounted to a complete realignment of the party structure.
Hungary previously had a de facto two-party system, with Fidesz on the right and
the MSZP on the left. he new balance of forces leaves the country with a largely
symbolic and fragmented opposition, and the parliament with little real control
over the government so long as discipline in the ruling coalition is maintained. It
remains to be seen how the newcomers to the chamber, Jobbik and the LMP, will
cope with the situation. LMP struggled to find direction in 2010, while Jobbik
used rhetoric last heard in the parliament in the 1940s, and the banned Hungarian
Guard—an unarmed “paramilitary” movement affiliated with Jobbik—remained
active. Both the LMP and Jobbik suffered from internal conflicts among their
leaders.
Political parties in general are active in the country, especially the newer groups,
which seem to be more responsive to grassroots concerns. Representation of women
and minorities, particularly the Roma, is still unsatisfactory. he new legislation
that will reduce the number of MPs to 200 as of 2014 contains provisions for the
representation of ethnic and national minorities, but it does not mention women’s
representation. he number of female MPs declined from 40 to 34 following the
April elections; there are very few women in leadership positions in the government,
and none at the ministerial level.10
Prior to the October 2010 municipal elections, the parliament amended the
Law on the Election of Local Council Members and Mayors. he number of
council members in the municipalities was reduced, the official campaign period
was shortened from 72 to 60 days, campaigning was forbidden only on election
day as opposed to 24 hours beforehand, and less time was allotted to collect the
nomination slips required to stand as a candidate. he new legislation also reduced
the number of local minority representatives. he changes favored major parties
over smaller parties, civic associations, and independent candidates. he municipal
elections were nevertheless considered free and fair, and resulted in an overwhelming
victory for the governing Fidesz-KDNP bloc.11
he president of the republic is elected by the parliament for a five-year term
and can be reelected once. In the first two rounds of the election, a supermajority is
required; if it cannot be reached, the candidate can be elected by a simple majority
in a third round. he term of President László Sólyom, a former president of the
Constitutional Court, expired in 2010. Although he was originally supported
by Fidesz and was eligible for a second term, the government opted to replace
him with a more politically reliable candidate, Pál Schmitt, whom it had only
recently installed as speaker of the National Assembly. he constitution grants the
president limited powers to scrutinize legislation, but Schmitt made it clear that he
intended to remain within the ceremonial boundaries of the office and support the
government’s efforts.
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Civil Society
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.50
1.50
1.75
1.75
2.00
he legal framework is generally hospitable to civil society, accommodating various
forms of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Associations, foundations, and
nonprofit limited companies can be established and financed without significant
administrative burdens. As a result, with 70,000 registered organizations, the
Hungarian civil society sector can be considered vibrant and relatively strong.
Of the registered organizations, about 50,000 are regarded as active and
functioning, and their scope of activities covers almost all aspects of society. hey
range from small associations targeting local issues to high-profile watchdog
organizations that monitor legislative, governmental, and juridical procedures.
Hungary’s rating on the NGO Sustainability Index, produced by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID),12 has increased slightly—by
0.1 points to 2.8—and is now in a phase of steady consolidation on almost every
indicator. It is lagging behind in only two areas: financial viability and public image.
Owing to the still feeble nature of private philanthropy and the lack of
significant tax incentives for charitable giving, the NGO sector is financially
vulnerable, relying almost solely on government and EU funds. his situation has
slightly worsened in recent years due to the severe effects of the financial crisis
and the need for drastic reductions in public spending. NGOs are subject to the
same tax rules as ordinary companies, including high payroll taxes, making human
resource development difficult.
he country’s unique “1 percent system” is an important fundraising
mechanism. Individuals can assign 1 percent of their income tax to an NGO of
their choice, which generates a considerable proportion of civil society groups’
resources. To encourage private investment in sports, a recent legal amendment
established a new system in which companies are allowed designate 70 percent of
their corporate income tax to support sports clubs. However, only five sports are
eligible: soccer, hockey, water polo, basketball, and handball.
A recent survey revealed that about 3.5 million people, or 40 percent of those
over the age of 14, have performed some sort of volunteer work.13 Most of this
work involved helping family or friends, but a growing number of people engage
in organized volunteering activities, such as community projects to improve their
neighborhoods. Most volunteers prefer to support children and the elderly, as well
as people with learning or physical disabilities; fewer are willing to help Roma,
people with addictions, and other marginalized groups.
here has been a growing tide of radicalization in Hungary, with extreme,
illiberal views spreading among certain civil society groups and the overall
population. However, the successes of Fidesz and Jobbik in the parliamentary
elections seemed to have a calming effect on right-wing elements in the civil sphere.
While almost all national celebrations since 2006 had involved some level of
Hungary
rioting, the demonstrations marking the anniversary of the 1956 revolution were
peaceful in 2010.
he new government in May 2010 immediately froze the most significant state
funds for civil society entities, including the National Cultural Fund (NKA), the
Research and Technology Innovation Fund (NKTH), and the National Civil Fund
(NCA). Not only were new applications for funding delayed, but grant payments
that had already been approved were also withheld. Since the civil sphere heavily
relies on governmental funds, the suspension of payments put many organizations
at serious risk.
he NCA was established in 2004 with the aim of centralizing state funds for
civic groups, as well as eliminating direct political influence over funding decisions.
To ensure the latter, the NCA’s governing body and its thematic boards have been
composed of the representatives of civil society organizations.
In late 2010, the government discussed plans for a “radical reform” of this
system, with a new body to be established in 2012. State Secretary Bence Rétvári
argued that the NCA’s practices in giving out grants were questionable, and that
new measures were needed to put an end to inefficient resource allocation.14 he
restructuring of the NCA was welcomed by many NGOs, which have often accused
its governing council and boards of unfair distribution of funding. However, others
expressed fears that the reform would endanger the tens of thousands of small
organizations that rely mostly on NCA grants.
Many observers also raised concerns about the government’s halving of the
NCA’s budget for 2011. It will only cover expenses for the first half of the year, and
tendering procedures will be suspended again after June.
Although the image of most of the nonprofit sector is relatively good,
recurring scandals such as the case of the Egymásért Alapítvány (Foundation for
Each Other) have fueled mistrust toward NGOs in general. In 2005 and 2006,
the former chairman of the foundation imported goods worth 1.4 billion forints
(US$7 million) as “donations” without paying tax on them, and used 900 million
forints (US$4.3 million) in foundation funds as his own. After being sentenced to
prison for smuggling and embezzlement in December 2010, he fled from the court
building in Budapest.15 He was being sought under a European and international
arrest warrant at year’s end.
Independent Media
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.75
3.25
Hungary has a diverse media market that is dominated by private companies.
Most are multinational print media houses, but a growing number of news outlets
are now owned by Hungarian corporate interests. he most important outlets
in the country are two foreign-owned commercial television stations (TV2 and
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Nations in Transit 2011
RTL Klub) and two tabloid newspapers (Blikk and Metropol) that are almost
completely apolitical. Although the wide range of broadcast, print, and internet
outlets provide space for a variety of ideas, many of them are openly supportive of
individual political parties, meaning independent voices are rare. While the number
of young journalists striving for high professional standards is steadily growing, on
an ownership level the media scene still largely mirrors the deep political divisions
of the country. his is particularly true among daily broadsheets, as almost all major
papers can be clearly identified with one or the other political camp. Because of
this partisanship and their often poor journalistic standards, the papers are steadily
losing readers. he total circulation of the four major dailies, two on the left and
two on the right, is now less than 150,000.16
Often with investments from affluent businesspeople who openly support
Fidesz, a burgeoning right-wing media scene has developed in recent years. It
includes print publications like the daily broadsheet Magyar Hírlap, radio stations
such as Lánchíd Rádió, and the television channels Hír TV and Echo TV. It remains
unclear how Fidesz’s landslide election victory after eight years in opposition will
affect this market.
he diversity of the media sector also provides space for the most radical
viewpoints, with a thriving scene of far-right, anti-Semitic, racist, and ultranationalist
websites and niche magazines. Meanwhile, as a legacy of unpopular communist
rule, radical leftist ideas are almost absent from public discussion.
he number of regular internet users in Hungary reached 6.1 million by the
middle of 2010. With an internet penetration rate of 61.8 percent, Hungary is not
far below the EU average of 67.6 percent.17
Although investigative journalism is still struggling, the number of articles
seeking to highlight political corruption and unethical business practices is steadily
growing. Major online news portals such as Origo, Index, and Hírszerző (the
first two of which have almost a million unique users per day) employ qualified
investigative journalists and are among the most cited and reliable sources in the
mainstream media. In addition to international NGOs, some local journalist
associations also work to promote investigative journalism as a fundamental tool of
democratic control. Conferences, free trainings, and scholarships are available for
journalists seeking to improve their professional skills.
he political realignment in 2010 brought fundamental changes to the
media field. In June, Fidesz introduced a sweeping package of media legislation
that, having passed through the parliament over the subsequent months, was
set to take full effect on January 1, 2011.18 Referred to in part as a “new media
constitution,” the legislation was expected to bring “strictness in content control,
clarity in market regulation, effectiveness and rationalized operation in publicservice broadcasting, and transparency in authority.”19 It established a new National
Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) by merging the National
Communications Authority (NHH) with the National Television and Radio
Commission (ORTT). Besides granting licenses and broadcasting frequencies,
the ORTT had also been responsible for monitoring the programs of public and
Hungary
commercial broadcasters, a duty that it often failed to fulfill. It was consequently
subject to heavy criticism, and was accused of being ineffectual, particularly with
regard to the two major commercial television channels.
he new NMHH’s main body for content regulation, the Media Council,
consists of five members. he council’s president—currently Annamária Szalai,
a former Fidesz delegate to the ORTT—is first appointed directly by the prime
minister as head of the NMHH as a whole and then automatically becomes the
head of the Council as well, with a mandate of nine years in both positions.20 he
other four members of the Media Council are elected by a two-thirds parliamentary
majority, which in practice means that Fidesz is able to appoint all five members,
and no opposition representation is ensured.21 While the ORTT monitored only
broadcast media, the new Media Council’s scope of authority has been extended
to print and online media. he Media Council will be able to impose steep fines
on media outlets that do not respect its guidelines, which are vaguely defined by
the law and may therefore be applied arbitrarily. For example, grounds for being
fined include providing unbalanced or immoral coverage. Such subjective criteria
are likely to result in significant self-censorship.22 Fines for broadcast outlets can
be as high as US$934,000. For weekly and daily print outlets, fines can reach
US$120,000 and US$47,000, respectively.
All media outlets will be required to register with the NMHH, which has the
power to issue and revoke licenses, including for online content.23 Former OSCE
representative on freedom of the media Miklós Haraszti has argued that the “single
greatest danger for the freedom and pluralism of the media” in Hungary is the
arbitrary language governing tenders for licenses. If an outlet has been reprimanded
by the Media Council within the past five years, the companies owning it may be
refused a license.24 his may lead media owners and editors to temper criticism of
the government for fear of being denied a license at the next renewal interval.
he lack of reliable and independent funding, combined with regular
political meddling, has devastated public-service media since Fidesz came to
power. Moreover, the new media legislation completely redraws the public-service
media landscape. By creating a central property management and production
fund, it deprives three previously independent institutions of their financial and
organizational autonomy. A significant number of staff members were fired from
Hungarian Television (MTV), Hungarian Radio (Magyar Rádió), and Danube
Television (Duna Televízió), and the number of employees for these organizations is
now capped at 49, meaning trade union rights are severely limited. News for these
stations will be centrally produced and distributed by the Hungarian News Agency
(MTI). he power to appoint chief executives for all four public outlets rests solely
with the president of the Media Council.25
he new chief executive of MTI defended the public media overhaul by
arguing that a public-service journalist should be loyal to the government, since “it
is unfair to accept a commission and then to offend the procurer.”26 MTI will offer
its news service for free, which will have the effect of undercutting all privately
owned news sources, most of which are already under significant financial pressure.
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Local media owned by regional municipalities have also become increasingly likely
to act as mouthpieces for government policy, as Fidesz won 22 out of 23 major
municipalities in the October 2010 local elections.
he new media legislation triggered a storm of indignation in the country as
well as abroad. OSCE representative on freedom of the media Dunja Mijatovic
issued a strong statement, saying that the package “violates OSCE media freedom
standards and endangers editorial independence and media pluralism.”27 In a
December 2010 letter to the Hungarian government, European Commission vice
president Neelie Kroes raised specific concerns as to whether the media legislation
was in compliance with the EU Audiovisual and Media Services (AVMS) Directive,
or with more general EU standards on respect for freedom of expression and
media pluralism.28 Despite the outcry, President Pál Schmitt signed the last of the
new rules into law on December 30. Journalists noted a marked difference in the
Hungarian media atmosphere in late 2010, as outlets began to adapt their practices
in anticipation of the new regulatory system.
Local Democratic Governance
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
n/a
n/a
n/a
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.50
2.50
2.50
Under the constitution and the 1990 Law of Local Self-Governance, each of
Hungary’s 3,200 villages and towns may directly elect their local units of selfgovernment, consisting of a mayor, a council, and other entities. Some functions
are shared between the municipal governments and those of the 19 counties, which
serve as the regional administrative units.
his high level of decentralization was a symbolic element of Hungary’s
political transformation after the fall of the communist regime. However, it has
resulted in inefficiency and a serious lack of financial and human resources in local
government. Despite some centralization of administrative tasks in recent years,
most villages and towns still maintain full-fledged municipalities, managing local
public services, state administration tasks where local expertise is necessary, and
development functions. However, due to the high level of unemployment and the
absence of industry in certain parts of the country, many have no significant revenues
from local business and are almost solely dependent on the central government’s
redistribution of taxes. hus their legally enshrined autonomy is quite limited in
practice. hese problems particularly affect such impoverished areas as the eastern
county of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg or the marginalized southwestern corner of the
country known as Ormánság.
About 10 percent of the country’s towns and villages became critically indebted
over the last several years, according to a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis.29
he nominal per capita amount of state aid has been steadily decreasing since
2005. Furthermore, to reduce the budget deficit, the government delegated more
public-service responsibilities to local governments in 2005, without ensuring the
Hungary
necessary resources. At the same time, a legal amendment allowed municipalities
to issue bonds, and no central supervisory body or unified registration system was
set up to monitor or control the practice. As a result, the value of the issued bonds
increased twentyfold in two years, and is now worth about 747 billion forints
(US$2.8 billion), according to the State Audit Office.30 Some 93 percent of the
bonds are valued in foreign currency, meaning the volatility of the Hungarian forint
poses a further risk to the nearly 300 issuing municipalities. here is an urgent need
for a solution to the problem, as 92 percent of the issued bonds will be due for
repayment in the first half of 2011. Without major central reforms, local councils
are unlikely to find a way out of the debt trap.
When it joined the EU in 2004, Hungary agreed to reform its local and
regional self-government structure to bring it into line with existing EU policies
and meet the eligibility criteria for EU development funds. A system of 174 small
regions (subcounty units) and seven regions (supracounty units) were created for
development purposes, and they now exist side by side with the old county system.
his has led to a situation in which the division of competencies is insufficiently
defined.
he capital, Budapest, comprises 23 autonomous districts, each with an elected
mayor and assembly. he structure is topped with an independently elected mayor
and council on the citywide level. his two-tiered system, in which the districts are
not subordinated to the Budapest municipality, leads to a lack of coordination on
key decisions and projects.
After taking over the national government with a two-thirds parliamentary
majority in the spring of 2010, Fidesz also secured an overwhelming margin in the
autumn municipal elections, winning in 22 out of Hungary’s 23 major cities. he
MSZP even lost in areas that had long been considered unconquerable Socialist
bastions, or “red towers,” such as the eastern city of Miskolc. Fidesz won control of
all 19 county assemblies, but in its most symbolic victory, it captured the capital’s
mayoral position for the first time. Budapest has traditionally been a liberal-left
stronghold, and Gábor Demszky of the SZDSZ had served as mayor since 1990.
In his election-night speech, Prime Minister Orbán commented on the result by
saying that “the nation has finally got back its capital.” his statement openly
recalled the belligerent communications strategy that was begun by Fidesz during
its first national government in 1998–2002, and which is based on the constant
verbal exclusion of all non-Fidesz voters from the nation.
Judicial Framework and Independence
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2.00
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
2.00
2.25
Civil, political, social, and cultural rights are recognized and protected by the
Hungarian constitution. Citizens are equal before the law, and the judiciary serves
as the primary safeguard of constitutional rights. he judiciary is organized in a
249
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four-tier system of local courts, county courts, high appeals courts, and the Supreme
Court. Local and county courts have jurisdiction over their territorial districts, with
county courts also serving as local appeals courts in minor cases. he high appeals
courts have regional jurisdictions, with seats in Budapest and four other towns. he
Supreme Court serves as a final appeals court and ensures the uniform application
of laws, developing a limited form of case law.
Since 1990, the eleven-member Constitutional Court has shaped the legal
framework of Hungary. Its members are elected by the parliament from among the
country’s legal scholars. he court’s primary function is to safeguard constitutional
rights through its interpretation of the constitution and control of legal norms.
Since it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism, however, some decisions,
most notably on the representation of minorities in the legislature, have not been
implemented by the parliament.
As part of the drive to weaken the institutions that constitute checks and
balances in the country’s constitutional system, the Fidesz government in 2010
amended the constitution to strip the Constitutional Court of its jurisdiction
over important matters that, under the constitution, are already closed to public
input via referendum. As a result, the topics in question, including taxation and
the national budget, are now the exclusive preserve of the parliament. Importantly,
the Constitutional Court is not authorized to intervene to protect property rights.
In September, a parliamentary subcommittee investigating infringements on
civil and political rights between 2002 and 2010—that is, under the previous
government—summoned several leaders of the judiciary to question them on
decisions following the antigovernment riots of 2006. he intimidation implied
in such a hearing has the potential to harm judicial independence, especially with
respect to politically sensitive cases.31
Under a reform enacted in 1997, the judiciary has been administered by the
National Judicial Council, whose head is the president of the Supreme Court. Nine
members of the council are elected by and from among judges; the other members
are the ministers of justice and of finance, the chief prosecutor, the chairman of the
Hungarian Bar Association, and one delegate each from the parliament’s judicial
and finance committees.
he chief prosecutor is nominated by the president of the republic and elected
by the parliament. he Fidesz government in 2010 extended the chief prosecutor’s
term from six years to nine, and eliminated lawmakers’ right to question him in
the parliament. Moreover, the law governing the chief prosecutor’s election now
calls for a two-thirds vote. hese changes effectively entrenched Péter Polt, an
Orbán confidante who was elected in December, in the office for more than two
parliamentary terms.
he parliament elects four ombudspersons to report on human rights, privacy
rights, the rights of ethnic and national minorities, and the right to life and a
healthy environment. he ombudspersons operate independently from the
judiciary and have no legal authority. hey provide a complementary mechanism to
protect human rights through their investigations and reporting to the parliament.
Hungary
Citizens have the right to turn to the ombudspersons to investigate human rights
violations.
While tensions between the Romany minority and the ethnic Hungarian
majority have been high for years—in part due to manipulation by the extreme
right—there were some positive developments in 2010. he suspects in the
previous year’s series of murders of Roma were prosecuted, and in October a
negotiated agreement ended a school segregation dispute in the northeastern village
of Taktaharkány. Following a report by the local elected Romany self-government
body, successful negotiations were held with the participation of the school, the
local minority government, the Antidiscrimination Authority (Egyenlő Bánásmód
Hatóság), and the Chance for Children Foundation.32 his process and the resulting
agreement are encouraging and could serve as a model for the resolution of similar
conflicts. Nevertheless, the overall situation of the Roma in Hungary remains dire,
and the increased political influence of the extreme right may not be helpful.
Corruption
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
3.00
2.75
2.75
2.75
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.50
Hungary fell behind the region’s average score on Transparency International’s 2010
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and is now ranked 50 out of 178 countries
surveyed. Despite government promises to tackle corruption, no significant
measures have been put in place in recent years. As a result, some 75 percent of
Transparency International (TI) survey respondents now believe that corruption
has been increasing in Hungary, with most of them naming political parties as the
most corrupt institutions.33 his common perception is not only a key obstacle in
fighting everyday corruption but has also led to widespread public disillusionment
with the democratic process as a whole.
In terms of low-level corruption, the most affected sector is health care.
Doctors are commonly given cash-filled envelopes in exchange for better treatment.
According to TI’s survey, 26 percent of respondents had paid bribes, a serious
increase compared with the previous year.
When asked, people openly and eagerly condemn corruption, and according to
TI’s Global Corruption Barometer, 9 out of 10 Hungarians would even be willing
to report corruption cases. Nevertheless, last year’s survey found that 63 percent of
people confronted with corruption in reality never reported the incident.34 his is
partly due to the lack of an adequate system to protect whistleblowers, which would
be essential to motivate citizens to take personal action against corruption.
Party financing and public procurement are among the areas most afflicted by
major corruption. According to recent estimates, graft occurs in 65 to 75 percent
of all public procurement processes.35 While on the surface all parties have long
insisted that the party financing system needs to be fundamentally transformed,
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behind the scenes such an overhaul has never been seriously considered. his is
partly because the reform would require a two-thirds parliamentary vote. hat in
turn, until recently, would have meant an inconceivable consensus between Fidesz
and the MSZP. Moreover, lacking sufficient public pressure, the major parties have
had little incentive to change a system that serves their interests.
he new Fidesz government, with its two-third parliamentary majority, could
tackle the party financing problem on its own, but no concepts have been proposed
so far. In the meantime, parties continued to abuse state and municipal resources
for their 2010 parliamentary and municipal campaigns, raise funds through illegal
channels, and spend money in ways that are incompatible with the letter as well
as the spirit of the law. According to experts, 9 forints out of 10 are channeled to
party campaigns through potentially illegal channels and from potentially illegal
sources, and the money spent by parties on campaigns doubles every four years.
he State Audit Office has often been accused of failing to fulfill its duty to provide
real control over parties and resisting the full exploitation of its mandate to monitor
campaign spending.
A few weeks before the April 11 parliamentary elections, a court of first instance
sentenced János Zuschlag, a former MP with the MSZP, to eight and a half years
in prison for embezzling state subsidies. Zuschlag and more than a dozen of his
accomplices were accused of creating fictitious NGOs to collect subsidies totaling
75 million forints (US$356,800). Given the relatively minor financial damage and
the fact that the defendant made partial restitution well before sentencing, the
harshness of the penalty was unprecedented, raising concerns that it was politically
motivated. Critics of the sentence argued that criminals convicted of manslaughter
can receive lighter punishments. However, others pointed out that the complex
corruption case was the first in Hungary’s recent history that was directly related to
a governing party, and that the ruling therefore had symbolic importance.
An enormous number of new corruption scandals emerged later in the
year, due in part to the activities of Gyula Budai, a special commissioner for
accountability and anticorruption who was appointed by Prime Minister Orbán
to uncover the wrongdoings of the previous MSZP government. he cases affected
former and current chief executives of state-owned companies, parliamentary
politicians, mayors, and even the two previous prime ministers, Ferenc Gyurcsány
and Gordon Bajnai, who had to give testimony in connection with a billion-dollar
casino development project. A few months later, Budai told the press he had proof
that Gyurcsány and Bajnai had given false testimony. hey in turn sued Budai for
slander and violation of privacy rights.36 In November, Budai launched another
attack on Gyurcsány, suggesting that an unnamed person whose right of immunity
is under review in connection with the case must be the former prime minister
himself, and expressed his hope that the chief prosecutor would not “cover up” for
Gyurcsány. Budai was then accused of making a public threat and giving political
orders to the judiciary.
Hungary
Authors: Balázs Áron Kovács and Flóra Hevesi
Balázs Áron Kovács is an instructor in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies
of the United Nations–mandated University for Peace in Costa Rica and academic
coordinator of the Asia Leaders Programme with Ateneo de Manila University
in the Philippines. Flóra Hevesi currently works as a freelance journalist based in
Hungary. Her reports have been published by the Hungarian Television, CNN and
in numerous print publications. She is also a dedicated environmental and human
rights activist.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
he name of the organization is a pun in Hungarian on various uses of the word jobb (right),
meaning at once “the better one,” “the one which is more correct,” and “the more conservative
one.” Movement for a Better Hungary is the official English translation.
“200 fős lesz a parlament [200-Member Parliament],” FN.hu, 20 May, 2010, http://www.
fn.hu/belfold/20100520/ket_torvenyjavaslatot_mar_elfogadott/ (in Hungarian).
“Szász Károly visszatér a PSZÁF élére [Károly Szász Returns to Head the Hungarian Financial
Supervisory Authority],” HVG.hu, 23 June 2010, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20100623_szasz_
karoly_pszaf_elnok_lesz (in Hungarian); “Domokos László az ÁSZ elnöke [László Domokos
Will Be the President of the State Audit Office],” Origo.hu, 28 June, 2008, http://www.
origo.hu/uzletinegyed/hirek/20100628-domokos-laszlo-az-asz-elnoke.html (in Hungarian);
“Alkotmánybíróvá választották Bihari Mihályt és Stumpf Istvánt [Mihály Bihari and
István Stumpf Elected Constitutional Court Justices],” Hirado.hu, 22 July, 2010, http://
www.hirado.hu/Hirek/2010/07/22/19/Alkotmanybirova_valasztottak_Bihari_Mihalyt_
es_Stumpf_Istvant.aspx (in Hungarian); “Schmitt Pál most már köztársasági elnök [Pál
Schmitt Is Now President of the Republic],” HVG.hu, 29 June, 2010, http://hvg.hu/
itthon/20100629_schmitt_pal_lesz_az_allamfo_allamfovalasz (in Hungarian).
“Motor lenne Schmitt Pál [Pál Schmitt Would Be Engine],” Mandiner, 24 June, 2010,
http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20100624_motor_lenne_schmitt_pal (in Hungarian).
Roland Baksa and Gergely Dudás, “Megszakadtak a tárgyalások az IMF-fel és az EU-val
[Negotiations with IMF, EU Broken],” Index.hu, 17 July, 2010, http://index.hu/gazdasag/
magyar/2010/07/17/megszakadtak_a_targyalasok_az_imf-fel_es_az_eu-val/ (in Hungarian).
“Orbán után Varga Mihály is nekiment Simornak [After Orbán, Mihály Varga Assails
Simor],” Origo.hu, 5 May, 2010, http://www.origo.hu/uzletinegyed/hirek/20100505-vargamihaly-is-nekiment-simor-andras-jegybankelnoknek.html (in Hungarian).
“Jelenlegi formájában megszűnik a Költségvetési Tanács [Budgetary Council Ceases to Exist
in Current Form],” MTI, 13 December 2010. http://mti.hu/cikk/2010/12/13/jelenlegi_
formajaban_megszunik_a_koltsegvetesi_tanacs-519449 (in Hungarian).
András Király, “Már nem akadály az Alkotmánybíróság [Constitutional Court Obstacle
No More],” Index.hu, 16 November 2010. http://index.hu/belfold/2010/11/16/mar_nem_
donthet_barmirol_az_alkotmanybirosag/ (in Hungarian).
“Országgyűlési választások 2010 [Parliamentary Elections 2010],” Valasztas.hu, 26 July 2010.
http://www.valasztas.hu/, accessed 16 December, 2010 (in Hungarian).
“Képviselő riport [Representatives Report],” National Assembly website, 19 December 2010.
http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_kpv.kepv_rip?P_CALL_MOD=%23KEPV_
RIP_DATE&P_CKL=39&P_DATUM=2010.12.19&P_BIZ=null&P_NEME=2&P_
253
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Nations in Transit 2011
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
EGYENI=I&P_TERULETI=I&P_ORSZAGOS=I&P_MEZO=null&P_SORREND=null
(in Hungarian).
Áron Kovács, “Egyszínű falvakat hozhat a Fidesz reformja [Fidesz Reform may Create
One-Colored Villages],” Origo.hu, 28 May 2010, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20100528felborithatja-a-helyi-eroviszonyokat-az-onkormanyzati-valasztasi-torveny-modositasa.html
(in Hungarian); “Elfogadták a választási törvényt [Law on Elections Adopted],” FN.hu,
21 June 2010, http://www.fn.hu/belfold/20100621/elfogadtak_valasztasi_torvenyt/ (in
Hungarian); Attila Antal, “Átalakuló választási rendszer—1. rész—Az önkormányzati
választás új szabályairól [he Transforming Electoral System—Part 1—On the New
Regulations of Municipal Elections],” Jogi Forum, 16 June 2010. http://www.jogiforum.hu/
hirek/23259#axzz18aFH7JNI (in Hungarian).
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 2009 NGO Sustainability Index for
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Washington, D.C.: USAID, June 2010), http://
www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2009/complete_document.
pdf.
Klára Czike and Éva Kuti, “Lakossági adományok és önkéntes tevékenységek [Private
donations and volunteer activities],” p. 8, http://nonprofit.hu/sites/default/files/study/2010/
12/lakossági-adományok-és-önkéntes-tevékenységek-gyorsjelentés-2004-es-felméréseredményeiről-2005/6890_Gyorsjelentes_0.pdf (in Hungarian) 2005.
“Komoly átalakításokat tervez a kormány a civil szférában [Government Plans Serious Changes
in the Civil Sphere],” HVG.hu, 12 November, 2010, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20101112_
kormany_civilek_atalakitas_ (in Hungarian).
“Kisétált a bíróságról az Egymásért Alapítvány elítélt vezetője [Upon Being Sentenced,
Chairman of Foundation for Each Other Simply Walked Out of Courtroom],” Origo.hu,
22 December, 2010, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20101222-itelethirdetes-az-egymasertalapitvany-buntetougyeben.html (in Hungarian).
“2010. III. negyedévi auditált adatok [2010. hird Quarter Audited Data],” Hungarian
Circulation Audit Association, http://matesz.hu/data/#mainpart_3 (in Hungarian).
“Internet Usage in the European Union,” Internet World Stats, updated 30 June, 2010,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm.
For a draft of the portion of the package governing content regulation, see “Act CLXXXV
of 2010 On Media Services and Mass Media,” available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
46456482/NMHH-Media-Law-2011-Eng.
“Rogán: meg kell szüntetni a párhuzamosságokat a közmédiában [Rogán: Parallels in the
Public Media Need to be Eliminated],” MTI, 25 November, 2010, http://www.mti.hu/
cikk/2010/11/25/rogan-_meg_kell_szuntetni_a_parhuzamossagokat_a_kozmediaban515665 (in Hungarian).
his structure, which concentrates regulatory authority in one overarching entity, one
appointed leader, and, ultimately, one political bloc, is nearly unprecedented in Europe, seen
only in Russia and Belarus. See Miklós Haraszti, “Notes on Hungary’s Media Law Package,”
Eurozine, 19 February, 2011, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-03-01-haraszti-en.
html.
Karol Jakubowicz, Analysis and Assessment of a Package of Hungarian Legislation and Draft
Legislation on Media and Telecommunications (Warsaw: Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media,
September 2010), p. 44, http://www.osce.org/fom/71218.
Ibid., p. 34.
Regulation and licensing of online content is specifically forbidden in Council of Europe
guidelines. See Haraszti, “Notes on Hungary’s Media Law Package.”
Haraszti, “Notes on Hungary’s Media Law Package.”
Hungary
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Haraszti, “Notes on Hungary’s Media Law Package.”
“Belénessy Csaba a köz új szolgálatáról [Csaba Belénessy on the New Public Service],”
168oraOnline, December 8, 2010, http://www.168ora.hu/itthon/belenessy-csaba-a-koz-ujszolgalatarol-66304.html (in Hungarian).
OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, “Hungarian Media Law
Further Endangers Media Freedom, Says OSCE Media Freedom Representative,” news
release, 22 December, 2010. http://www.osce.org/fom/74687.
Peter Spiegel, “EU Presses Hungary on Media Law,” Financial Times, December 24, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6408bc8a-0f65-11e0-b336-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1KkKb
2yXz. See also European Commission, “Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European
Commission Responsible for the Digital Agenda, Hungary’s New Media Law, Open Hearing
on Freedom of the Press in Hungary, European Parliament, Brussels, 11 January 2011,” news
release, 11 January, 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEEC
H/11/6&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
PricewaterhouseCoopers,“Eladósodó
önkormányzatok
[Municipalities
Becoming
Indebted],” news release, 13 May, 2010, http://www.pwc.com/hu/hu/pressroom/eladosodoonkormanyzatok.jhtml (in Hungarian).
“Önkormányzati csődhullám jöhet [A Wave of Municipalities Bankruptcy Is Expected],” Index.
hu, 29 September, 2010, http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2010/09/29/onkormanyzati_
csodhullam_johet/ (in Hungarian).
“György Bolgár’s interview with Máriusz Révész,” Galamus-Csoport, 4 September, 2010,
http://galamus.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25638:bolgargyoergy-interjui-a-galamusban-2010-szeptember-2&catid=69:bolgar-gyoergy-megbeszeljue
k&Itemid=106&limitstart=1 (in Hungarian).
“Taktaharkányban vége a szegregációnak [Taktaharkany: he End of Segregation],” Index.hu,
25 October, 2010, http://index.hu/belfold/2010/10/25/megegyezett_a_jogvedokkel_egy_
romakat_szegregalo_iskola/ (in Hungarian).
Transparency International (TI) Hungary, “Korrupció Érzékelési Index 2010 [Corruption
Perceptions Index 2010],” news release, 26 October, 2010, , http://transparency.hu/cpi2010
(in Hungarian).
TI Hungary, “Globális Korrupciós Barométer 2010 [Global Corruption Barometer 2010],”
news release, 9 December, 2010, http://www.transparency.hu/gcb2010?PHPSESSID=7b2be
da1f963198f55bad7d7c83de649 (in Hungarian).
Gábor Papanek, ed., A korrupció és a közbeszerzési korrupció Magyarországon [Corruption and
Public Procurement Corruption in Hungary] (Budapest: GKI Gazdaságkutató Zrt., 2009),
http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/static/uploaded/document/Korrupci%C3%B3s_k%C3%B6z
beszerz%C3%A9si_kutat%C3%A1s_Magyarorsz%C3%A1gon_I._k%C3%B6tet.pdf (in
Hungarian).
“Former PMs Take Commissioner to Court Over Casino Case,” Politics.hu, 13 August ,
2010,
http://www.politics.hu/20100813/former-pms-take-commissioner-to-court-overcasino-case.
255