Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Energy Research & Social Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss Original research article When democracy meets energy transitions: A typology of social power and energy system scale T Ryan P. Thombs Department of Sociology, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, USA A R TICL E INFO A BSTR A CT Keywords: Energy democracy Just transitions Energy system scale Energy justice Societies need to transition to renewable energy and eliminate fossil fuel use as soon as possible. However, policymakers have mostly neglected to consider that there is an array of possible energy transition pathways. Therefore, I offer a typology that envisions potential energy futures as falling along a two-dimensional model comprised of the structural organization of the social (political, economic, and civil) on one axis — on a spectrum of democratic versus monopolistic — and the scale of the energy system on the other — dichotomized as centralized versus decentralized. This typology suggests that there are four potential energy futures, which I term: (1) libertarian energy decentralism, (2) technocratic energy centralism, (3) democratic energy centralism, and (4) democratic energy decentralism. These four futures are not equal in terms of power, equity, and ecological impact. I argue that the democratization of the social is necessary to facilitate a “just transition,” but the scale of the energy system will also play a pivotal role in reinforcing and reproducing democratic and just social relations. 1. Introduction Given the urgent need to curtail catastrophic climate change, governments across a multitude of scales have set renewable energy targets to achieve by specific dates. According to REN21 [1], more than 150 countries have set a renewable energy target as of 2017. However, policymakers have predominately relied on policy instruments that utilize price mechanisms to deploy sustainable energy without giving much consideration to justice concerns and larger political economic questions of who owns the energy system, what technologies are utilized, and how the energy is used [2–12]. Outside the political arena, the just transition and scholar-activist energy democracy literatures have sought to highlight structural issues of power, equity, and justice related to climate change policy and energy transitions [e.g., [5,8,13,14]. Both of these literatures do not view energy technologies as apolitical things, but rather as processes embedded within larger socio-ecological systems. They endeavor to bring issues of justice and equity to the forefront of the discussion surrounding energy futures and transitions. However, both literatures also highlight how the design and scale of energy systems are important considerations in achieving a just transition [12,14,15]. Particularly among those working within the energy democracy literature, there has been a bias toward decentralized renewable energy technologies (see [14] for a discussion).1 Many times the inherent goodness of distributed technologies, and the intrinsic badness of centralized energy goes unquestioned [17,18]. Therefore, these literatures describe how potential renewable energy futures are not only products of structural socio-ecological relations but also allude to how the scale of energy technologies and systems play a key role in facilitating just and democratic futures. Given these considerations and insights from both bodies of literature, how might one envision the litany of potential futures and the key determinants that will drive and shape them? To answer this question, I take the issues of social power and technological/managerial scale raised by the previously mentioned literatures and argue that energy futures will be partly determined by E-mail address: thombs@bc.edu. This is not to say that all working within this framework argue this [e.g., 16]. However, there is a general favorability toward decentralization in the energy democracy literature [see 14]. 1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.02.020 Received 19 July 2018; Received in revised form 16 February 2019; Accepted 20 February 2019 2214-6296/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs a two-dimensional interaction between the structural organization of the social2 on a spectrum of democratic to monopolistic, and the scale of the energy system on a spectrum of centralized to decentralized. Given the potential manifestations of this interaction, I suggest that energy futures will fall into four broad quadrants, which I term: (1) libertarian energy decentralism (monopolistic and decentralized), (2) technocratic energy centralism (monopolistic and centralized), (3) democratic energy centralism (democratic and centralized), and (4) democratic energy decentralism (democratic and decentralized). I will argue that democratic energy futures provide the greatest potential to achieve ecological and social sustainability, and therefore, a just transition. However, the scale of the energy system will also play a key role in facilitating democratic processes and just outcomes. I suggest that the most sustainable future — ecologically and socially — will necessarily be democratic and likely consist of an amalgam of centralized and decentralized technologies, ownership structures, and management systems. empowerment due to their smaller scale. Their decentralized characteristics have challenged the continuance of centralized energy systems that are dominant in many places across the world. Renewables allow for the decentralization of generation, transmission, and distribution, and the centralized grid structure in many places is illequipped to deal with this reality [26]. Of course, renewables are not inherently decentralized (e.g., dams), and their scale is often determined by who owns and controls the energy technologies (e.g., corporations versus community energy cooperatives). Therefore, energy itself is not a “thing” separate from the social processes that produce, transform, and use it. Rather, its production and use are embedded within social structures and systems of social power. Energy and its related technologies cannot be discussed without invoking the social as a whole. To discuss and envision the multitude of energy futures that might emerge, the structure of the social, along with the scale of the energy systems and technologies employed, need examined in a simultaneous manner. Given this need, how might social power and energy system scale and design interact with one another to produce an array of socio-ecological futures, and among them, which of them is most synonymous with a just transition? To discuss the ways in which these dimensions interact, I employ a 2 × 2 matrix that suggests that there are broadly four potential energy futures that societies may choose to undertake.3 I coin them: (1) libertarian energy decentralism; (2) technocratic energy centralism; (3) democratic energy centralism; and (4) democratic energy decentralism (see Fig. 1). These futures are imagined as lying along a two-dimensional spectrum where the structural organization of the social lies along the x-axis, and the scale of the energy system on the y-axis. The structural organization of the social refers to who owns, has access to, and decides how economic surplus is produced and distributed, and who controls and has decision-making authority within the political and civil spheres of society. The organization of these spheres determines how energy is produced, transmitted, distributed, and consumed, which extends beyond the energy technologies themselves and into the organizations, institutions, and households that produce and use energy. The left side of the x-axis is labeled “democratic.” Democracy is a complex term and has various meanings depending on the context. Partly following Van Veelen and Van der Horst’s [23] work on energy democracy, I refer to democracy as both a process and an outcome involving an overlapping set of various dimensions that include participatory (individuals are involved in decision-making), associative (self-governance in voluntary democratic associations), deliberative (open public debate), and material (equal access to resources) elements. At a basic and fundamental level, the guiding principle of democracy is “one-person, one-vote,” that allows communities, regions, and nations to decide their own fate, while negotiating through, maintaining, and transforming current forms of power. The realization of the one-person, one-vote principle is also contingent upon the various elements of democracy outlined above, as they facilitate whether the principle materializes in practice.4 The notion of a democracy used herein extends beyond the concept of liberal democracy that pertains primarily to the state, and includes democratic processes and outcomes in the economic and civil spheres as 2. Energy futures: four potential transitions A large body of relatively recent scholarship has begun to delve into “just transitions” and issues of power and justice related to energy and socio-ecological futures, arguing that structural change is necessary to address socio-ecological crises like climate change to create a better and sustainable future [2–8,10–12,19]. Though the notion of a “just transition” is a contested term that varies according to the specific context in which it is used [19], I employ Jenkins et al. [12] core tenants of energy justice (distributional, recognition, and procedural) as the foundation of a just transition in this article. These three tenants build off the work of Rawls [20] and Fraser [21], among others, and the energy justice literature broadly attempts to evaluate and make normative claims regarding these three tenants of justice [12]. The distributional tenant considers who and what places experience injustices, whereas the recognition tenant examines whose voices and concerns are ignored and recognized, and the procedural tenant examines the fairness of decision-making processes [12]. However, this literature has not always made explicit critiques of social, economic, and political systems, whereas the energy democracy literature overtly posits that injustices are a function of inherently unequal social systems (e.g., capitalism) [22]. The definition of energy democracy, like a just transition, has been broadly and often vaguely defined [23]. However, those working in this literature have generally called for the decommodification of energy systems, aspiring to make energy a common good and democratically owned [see 22]. Both literatures provide insights into current and past injustices, and how societies might be transformed to address both social and ecological needs. Though both literatures have tended not to speak directly to one another, with exceptions [24], much of the issues and concerns raised by both overlap with one another and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Therefore, both bodies of literatures offer insights into how energy systems are embedded in and shaped by social systems of power. In addition to issues of power, justice, and equity, both of these literatures have acknowledged that the scale and design of the energy system matters [12,14,15,25]. Renewable and distributed technologies offer unique opportunities for radical alternatives and social 3 Framing futures in this way is inspired by Wainwright and Mann [27,28]. Some may argue that the “one-person, one-vote” principle is a weak framework for effective democracy. However, even though a country like the United States is “one-person, one-vote” in theory, in practice, it is far from achieving this ideal due to low voter turnout rates, a history of voter suppression laws, the extent of private money in politics, and structural factors like the electoral college which can suppress the will of the majority of voters. Thus, I argue that “one-person, one-vote” is an effective guiding principle of democracy, but it needs to be facilitated by other structural rules and regulations that enable dissent and opportunity to participate in not only political decisionmaking but also in the economic and civil spheres as well. 4 2 The social includes the political, economic, and civil spheres. For the purpose of this article, I use a simplistic definition for each sphere. The political pertains to the state and its associated apparatuses and functions. The economic refers to the social relations that constitute the market place, and the civil is defined as the activities operating in and beyond the workplace and state (e.g., community energy projects, housing, mobility, and transportation). This does not suggest that they are individually separate. Throughout this article they will be discussed as overlapping and interacting with one another. They have been separated into three categories for practical reasons and for ease of discussion. 160 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs democracy in this context means, and how the scale of non-fossil fuel energy systems and technologies will play a role in the process. 2.1. Libertarian energy decentralism The bottom righthand quadrant in Fig. 1 is termed “libertarian energy decentralism.” This future is defined by two key features — it is monopolistic and decentralized. It is monopolistic because a relatively small number of wealthy elites exert control over the economic, political, and civil realms of society and the energy system. It consists of distributed energy technologies that are primarily owned and operated by profit-maximizing private enterprise(s) with modest governmental oversight and regulation. In this future, distributed energy technologies at all levels of the energy system are commodified and oriented around profit maximization. Furthermore, there is little or no collective decision-making regarding energy production and use. Energy is regarded as a private good, and people do not have access to it unless they are able to purchase it as end-users. In its most ideal form, this future would consist of a group of elite prosumers who could afford microgrids, distributed generation, and storage technologies. These elite prosumers would be able to island themselves from the energy system, creating self-sufficient homes, buildings, and private enterprises. In some places this future is already taking shape, particularly in the United States where in states like Nevada and Florida, political conservatives and libertarians see energy technologies like rooftop solar as an issue of choice and individual liberty rather than one of environmentalism [30,31]. They view distributed technologies as a way to create new markets that allow individuals to buy and sell energy to one another. They primarily see utility companies as a wasteful middleman and aspire to surpass them. However, they also are not keen on using strong government intervention to build a renewable energy future. Rather, they endeavor to cut taxes and regulations that allow individuals to do as they please on their own private property. Of course, these initiatives have little interest in environmental and economic justice concerns and issues of access to such energy resources. Therefore, policies implemented to facilitate this future (e.g., tax cuts, reregulating building codes, subsidies oriented toward the rich) could mean that a large segment of the population would be either left reliant on an increasingly dilapidated central grid system, be forced to buy electricity from those who could afford to place distributed technologies on their property, or would be left without access to energy resources all together. Fig. 1. Four Potential Energy Futures. well. These spheres can be said to be democratic if they are organized to reflect and reproduce the notion of one-person, one-vote, while allowing for both difference and dissent that is maintained and negotiated through the other various elements of democracy outlined above. In contrast, the far right of the x-axis is labeled “monopolistic,” which in its ideal form is a society where control over social structures and decision-making mechanisms are held by a few elite individuals. A monopolistic society also limits and commodifies basic goods, such as energy, where only those who have the ability to pay have access to them. Though the axis is comprised of a dichotomy, it falls along a spectrum to capture the various degree of democratic and monopolistic organization. Similar to the x-axis, the y-axis is defined as a dichotomy falling along a spectrum ranging from centralized to decentralized. According to the IPCC [29], an energy system is defined as comprising “all components related to the production, conversion, delivery, and use of energy” (p.1261). In this case, scale pertains to all of these components including the scale in which these components are managed. On the one end is “centralized,” which refers to generation, transmission, and distribution occurring at an aggregate level where the production of energy is separated from end-use. This scale, at least since World War II, characterizes most Western nations where large power plants, extensive transmission networks, and global supply chains distribute energy to final consumers. The other end of the y-axis is labeled “decentralized,” referring to an energy system where all aspects of the system are concentrated at micro levels, and the production and consumption of energy occurs at a relatively close proximity. Examples of decentralization could be a nano or microgrid comprised of distributed technologies that serve a building or home. Scale in this typology is context specific. A centralized system at a city level may be a municipal utility, whereas centralization at a nation-state level may include numerous large utilities that provide services to a region. In contrast, decentralization is more straight forward in most aspects. Rooftop solar panels or nanogrids would be examples of decentralization at a city, regional, or national level. Therefore, decentralization on the axis is relatively fixed, whereas what is considered centralized can range depending on the particular context or level of analysis. To reiterate, these two axes interact with one another and can be broken down into four broad quadrants: (1) libertarian energy decentralism, (2) technocratic energy centralism, (3) democratic energy centralism, and (4) democratic energy decentralism. Each quadrant itself can be further broken down along a spectrum as well, as no category can perfectly describe every possible situation. For example, various points within each quadrant may contain aspects of the other quadrants. It is unlikely that any quadrant would ever materialize into an ideal type. The following sections further outline each future. I will broadly speak of each to describe their basic foundation and characteristics. As I have alluded to, any just transition that is ecologically and socially sustainable is necessarily democratic and likely a mix of technological scales. The reasons why will be discussed further in Section 3. Section 3 will also delve into what this democratic future may look like, what 2.2. Technocratic energy centralism Societies characterized by monopolistic control over political, economic, and civil institutions that are reliant on centralized energy systems, are coined “technocratic energy centralism” (top right-hand quadrant). This future is similar to many present-day societies, which tend to be monopolistic, to various extents, where political and economic decisions, including those regarding the energy system, are made by corporations, utility companies, and governmental regulatory bodies. A technocratic-centralist energy future could consist of social and energy-related institutions that are state-owned, privately-owned, or a mix of both. Whether these institutions are state or privatelyowned is less significant than how the decisions pertaining to the system are made. State-owned institutions with little accountability to the general public operate essentially the same as private monopolies, concentrating power into the hands of a few elite actors. This future would primarily rely on centralized grid infrastructure. Non-fossil fuel energy sources may replace fossil fuels, but they would be primarily generated in large centralized spaces such as solar farms, wind farms, or dams, and transmitted and distributed across long distances to final consumers. Similar to libertarian energy decentralism, minimal assistance and resources would be extended to vulnerable populations unable to purchase energy resources. New York State and 161 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs their Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) strategy is an example of this future (see [32] for a basic overview). Though this state-led initiative provides some resources for distributed and community energy projects through the NY Sun program (see [33]), it has largely sought to facilitate the deployment of large-scale renewables, while reshaping, but maintaining, utility companies and the general structure of the current socio-economic system. Another example that is further left on the democratic scale and potentially more decentralized is the Energiewende in Germany. Certain aspects of the Energiewende have facilitated democratic processes and outcomes tied to the rise of organizations such as energy cooperatives and municipal utilities (also known as the Stadtwerke). However, Germany has also been reluctant to pursue larger socioeconomic transformations. For example, they have been hesitant to eliminate coal, the feed-in tariff program is regressive [34], and industry has often been exempt from paying higher energy costs [see 35], which disproportionately places the cost of the Energiewende on working class citizens. similar to democratic energy centralism due to the democratization of societal institutions, organizations, and everyday life. However, the energy system is operated at decentralized levels (e.g., a building complex or neighborhood) comprising of distributed generation, storage, and grid technologies, closely connecting production to consumption. This future closely reflects the ideals put forth by many community energy projects and those working within the energy democracy literature, which seek to make energy a human right, a part of the commons, and give communities the power to redefine their relationship with natural systems [23,38–40]. The shift to democratize the institutions, organizations, and processes of everyday life is also what separates this future from libertarian energy decentralism. Rather than viewing non-fossil fuel energy technology as a new source of capital accumulation or individual choice, this future seeks to de-commodify energy and provide access to all. It also distinguishes itself from democratic energy centralism due to its more anarchic characteristics that prioritize direct democracy and localized control rather than bureaucratic governance of the energy system. 2.3. Democratic energy centralism 3. A just transition: toward a democratically (de)centralized energy future Shifting the discussion to the democratic futures, these futures are more hypothetical in nature given the lack of examples that have been successfully implemented at a sufficient scale. However, conceptualizing them and their potential structural makeup is important for two reasons. First, it is necessary to use the political and social imaginary to think through what needs to be done, what it would look like, and how we might get there. Second, it provides a way to view and frame situations and conditions that might emerge and how they relate to past and present situations. The first democratic future (the top lefthand quadrant) is referred to as “democratic energy centralism.” This future is defined as a society comprised of democratically controlled political, economic, and civil institutions with a centralized energy system. Again, democracy in this case is defined as a multifaceted concept comprising of participatory, associative, deliberative, and material elements that facilitate the basic notion of one-person, one-vote across all spheres of society. This future shares many fundamental aspects of social organization with democratic energy decentralism (discussed below), but its main distinction being that energy technologies and systems are primarily centralized. With a centralized energy system, this future would include some form of a bureaucratic governance system. However, these bureaucratic institutions would be held accountable by the general public, and technocrats would derive decision making through democratic means. An example of a democratic and centralized energy system may include large-scale renewable energy cooperatives where consumers across a geographical area democratically control generation, distribution, and transmission systems [36]. These cooperatives may be overseen by a board of trustees, but the board is elected by its members. Examples of this future could include rural electric cooperatives found in some parts of the United States or municipal utilities.5 However, what separates it from these examples in their current forms, and technocratic energy centralism in general, is the fundamental reorganization of the political economy that promotes democratic and just processes and outcomes across various social spheres. Given the four potential futures outlined above, which one(s) are most compatible with a just transition that not only addresses environmental issues but also matters of power, equity, and social justice? I contend that first and foremost, any equitable and sustainable energy future will have one absolute characteristic; it will be democratic. The reasons why and what democratizing the social may look like will be discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The desired scale of the energy system is less straight forward as what is appropriate may vary across contexts and certain characteristics of centralization and decentralization may be favorable. How the scale of energy systems may facilitate or hinder democracy and just outcomes will be outlined in Section 3.3. 3.1. Democratization as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition Democratization is required as it provides a pathway that transcends the capitalist system’s unsustainable need to grow and expand. By grow and expand, I mean that the system requires surplus to be reinvested to further the accumulation process [41–43]. The need to accumulate is predicated on the competitive nature of the system, which requires capitalists to maximize profits. The logic of accumulation drives the system’s most ecologically unsustainable element — economic growth. Economic growth is often defined as an increase in the production of good and services measured as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Yet, economic growth cannot be understood simply as increases in monetary value. The production of goods and services are embedded within ecological systems. The expansion of growth has relied on the mobilization of material resources and human labor to realize monetary value. Though theoretically GDP could increase without causing ecological harm by producing goods that “dematerialized” the economy, there is little evidence to suggest this could happen in reality [19,44,45]. Rather, the evidence indicates that “greening” the economy, such as through the deployment of renewables, often adds to the total energy stock rather than displacing fossil fuels in a growth oriented economic system [40,41]. Although growth is fundamentally a product of surplus accumulation, it also stems from increases in worker productivity (increasing the number of units produced per hour), which is a core aspect of systems that require surplus accumulation to reproduce themselves. Both accumulation and productivity are largely (but not entirely) a product of labor exploitation, which in capitalism, is primarily made possible through wage labor. Because workers are paid less than what they produce, profit is created, which is then reinvested to further additional accumulation. To lower costs and increase production, capitalists also 2.4. Democratic energy decentralism “Democratic energy decentralism” (bottom left-hand quadrant) is 5 However, these types of organizations are not perfect examples of democratic institutions in their current forms. For example, Aronoff [37] describes the ways in which decision-making in rural electric cooperatives in the U.S. have largely been captured by a small number of people through the years. However, these type of institutions offer pathways and opportunities for democratic participation that are not available with privately-owned utilities. 162 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs invest in new technologies that increase productivity. As Kallis [46] argues, the employment of new technologies is a way to “mobilize nonhuman work,” which requires resources and energy to be operable. Therefore, the growth mechanism of capitalism is the product of the exploitive relations of the system, which are intrinsically undemocratic. To transcend capitalism and its unsustainable reliance on growth, fueled by the accumulation of surplus and increases in productivity, societies must democratize (though not sufficient in of itself)6 to be able to transition to a future that is both equitable and sustainable. Democratization is pivotal, as mentioned, because it transcends the unequal social relations that give rise to human and environmental exploitation, and it provides a pathway to sufficiently address the distributional, recognition, and procedural aspects of justice. This fundamentally requires that decision-making is shifted to the general public where people can make collective decisions rather than through the unequal means that define current-day decision making processes (e.g., the labor-capitalist relation; winner-take-all political systems, and voluntary but essential everyday needs such as housing). If democratization is a necessary condition for a just transition, then technocratic energy centralism and libertarian energy decentralism futures are not compatible with this notion given their monopolistic characteristics, which undermine equity, recognition, and fairness. This leaves democratic energy centralism and democratic energy decentralism as the two futures to be pursued. But what might democratization in these two futures look like? Section 3.2 outlines the changes that are necessary to democratize social life, and Section 3.3 discusses the ways in which the scale and architecture of the energy system may facilitate, compliment, or hinder democratic processes and just outcomes. transcending the growth mechanism, democratic workplaces present an opportunity to fundamentally reduce and reshape energy use. If democratic enterprises come to fruition at scale, their indifference toward further growth could either keep energy growth steady or reduce it. This is pivotal for any just transition because renewables have a lower EROI (Energy Return on Investment) than fossil fuels given their diffuse nature [46].8 Therefore, if total energy use decreased, transitioning to renewables would be simpler due to less demand needing to be met. Democratization of the workplace will not inevitably reduce energy use, but it will provide opportunities to do so that are not possible in a growth-oriented system. However, a just transition must extend beyond the workplace and into the many everyday activities and structures that rely on energy. As Fig. 2 illustrates, greenhouse gas emissions emissions from the energy sector come from a range of processes with emissions from electricity/ heat being the largest category, followed by transportation and manufacturing/construction. The array of emission sources suggests that democratizing the political and civil spheres is essential in addition to the economic. Both spheres are large users of energy, and the political sphere is a vital site for facilitating democratic processes and just outcomes across the economic and civil realms, whereas the civil realm is a key site for practicing new forms of living [50]. Given that all three of these spheres are interlinked, simply making the political realm more democratic or regulating CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions within the current political economic structure are not the solutions. Rather, the interconnections of everyday activities and institutions suggest that radical new forms of living are needed that shape and reinforce each other. 3.2. Democratizing the social: the need for structural changes in society 3.2.2. The political Though liberal democracy primarily restricts democratic processes to the state, states deemed democratic have tended to narrowly conceptualize democracy by relying on winner-take-all-systems and neglecting the power relations that allow elites to have greater access and influence on political decision-making. The state itself is relational to larger structures of power and social relations in general society [52,53]. The relational nature of the state suggests that fundamental changes to society through state apparatuses are limited without addressing the social relations operating beyond it [52]. However, the state is also a key tool and mechanism that can be used to open up opportunities for new democratic forms of living. For example, democratic enterprises are unlikely to reach a sufficient scale unless there is state intervention that promotes and enables them through policies that subsidize and give them preference through regulations and other means [54]. Likewise, energy use and emissions from the transportation sector are unlikely to be sufficiently reduced without democratizing the political realm because any equitable and sustainable future will have to transcend individual motor vehicle ownership and promote electrified, mass transit, which requires spatial planning. This of course cannot happen without mass collective action that will inevitably have to be facilitated through state apparatuses. There are plenty of instances of spatial planning having disastrous effects on the poor and people of color with Robert Moses’ actions in New York after World War II being a prime example [55]. However, such examples are primarily due to planning being conducted in a top-down manner, used as a means to facilitate profitable development opportunities and to segregate people based on race and class [56]. Though democratic and inclusive planning will not inevitably lead to a decrease in fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions, it is unforeseeable that transitioning to a sustainable future could happen without it. Therefore, democratizing the political realm will require transforming governing structures across multiple scales. Across all levels, The recent scholar-activist literature regarding energy democracy either explicitly or implicitly argues for extending democracy beyond the energy technologies themselves, suggesting that the concept is fundamentally about democratizing the social and creating new forms of living [23]. The social itself, which I have categorized in this paper as including the economic, political, and civil spheres, is always dependent on energy to function, e.g., without solar radiation there would be no human civilization. However, energy and its many processes are embedded within the social relations that use, transform, and consume it. Therefore, the future of energy and the social are intrinsically intertwined with one another and must be discussed concomitantly. To do so, the rest of this section will describe the ways in which a more democratic social could be achieved and what it might look like without providing a concrete, universal roadmap. 3.2.1. The economic Democratization may take on an array of organizational forms depending on the context. However, it will necessarily involve transcending the current organization of the workplace enterprise that is generally defined by the capitalist-laborer relation. At a fundamental level, this requires extending the notion of one person, one vote to the workplace [47]. Democratizing the workplace would shift power to the workers and allow them to collectively decide how to allocate and distribute economic surplus.7 Unlike profit-maximizing enterprises, democratic workplaces are less likely to grow because their existence is not predicated on the continuance of accumulating capital [46]. By 6 As Kallis [46] argues, workers could democratically decide to reinvest surplus into new technologies that would increase productivity and possibly lead to increases in economic growth. Therefore, democratic processes and outcomes are a necessary condition of any “just transition” but unlikely to be sufficient in of themselves; at least in terms of democracy at the enterprise level. 7 See Wolff [47] and Johanisova and Wolf [48] for a further discussion on economic democracy. 8 EROI is a ratio that measures how much energy is produced relative to how much energy was required to produce that energy [49]. 163 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs would involve revolutionizing the fundamental elements of everyday life such as housing and play. The civil sphere also represents a space that can facilitate new forms of associative living such as community energy projects, which offer prospects for democratizing energy use. A range of studies have found that these projects often have a wide range of social, cultural, economic, and ecological goals that go beyond profitmaximization and growth, and in some cases, can result in lower energy use [36,40,61,62]. Beyond associative forms of living such as community energy projects, the politics of the local and everyday life are fundamental to the civil sphere, including issues pertaining to the built environment. The political struggles over the built environment are substantial in terms of promoting justice and equality, and the power relations embedded within the built environment play a fundamental role in how energy is used and who uses it. For example, developers seek land to build new homes, offices, and apartment complexes, which often come about through enclosures and the dispossession of poorer communities of color. According to Smith [63], these gentrification processes are a product of capitalists seeking new spaces to develop or redevelop to maximize profits and continue the process of capital accumulation. The need of the current economic system to maximize the exchange value of the built environment has substantial implications for energy use. First, new building requires resources and energy, and depending on the type of building being erected, larger living spaces need more energy to be heated and cooled. Second, new development over time often leads to further suburbanization and sprawl, which then results in more car usage and energy and resource consumption — undermining social and ecological sustainability. Thus, similar to the workplace enterprise, removing the profit motive from the built environment is a necessary undertaking. This can be done by creating housing cooperatives and land trusts that remove profit from the housing and development sectors. Rather than seeking new outlets for accumulation, creating community-owned land trusts shifts the purpose of land from being one for profit to one that serves the needs of the community. Likewise, allowing tenants to own their homes and apartment buildings lessen the chances of dispossession through gentrification and diminishes the intensity of land use change. As the use value of land is prioritized over its exchange value, transforming the social purpose of land and housing could reduce energyintensive suburbanization, promote denser housing, and encourage new collective uses of space [64–66]. To reiterate, in contrast to a system oriented around profit-maximization, energy growth is less likely when the various spheres of society are democratically controlled [46]. Democracy shifts decisionmaking to the general public, which lessens the potential for exploitation and surplus accumulation; the main drivers of intensive resource use and ecological exploitation. Furthermore, democratic processes and outcomes are more likely to slow down daily life due to their deliberative and collective natures. If social processes generally slow down, people will have the opportunity to work and consume less, which could also contribute to a reduction in energy use and CO2 emissions [67–69]. Thus, if a just transition is to occur, it must embrace the concept of democracy — not just greater democracy in the political realm, but greater democracy in the economic and civil spheres too. Only by addressing exploitation and inequality across all spheres, can a just and carbon free future be born, which transcends the need for societies to rely on fossil fuels and unsustainable consumption. Fig. 2. Global GHG Emissions from Energy by Sub-Sector, 2014. Note: Data from the World Resources Institute [51]. multi-winner voting schemes are required to allow for a greater array of voices to be heard and recognized. Though these kind of voting systems are far from perfect, they do offer opportunities to curb powerful interests like the fossil fuel industry that is much harder to do in winnertake-all-systems. An example of such a scheme are proportional voting systems that divide elected bodies based on portions of the vote parties receive. Unlike winner-take-all systems, proportional representation or ranked choice voting makes it more likely that a diverse set of preferences and groups are reflected in representative governing bodies [57]. They also create environments that encourage differences in opinion, whereas winner-take-all-systems are more susceptible to capture by a select group of people given their structure that incentivizes a small number of parties and opinions. Though these voting systems are unlikely to create the necessary changes alone, they can open up opportunities for new modes of equitable and sustainable living that are less likely to occur in political systems that are more prone to capture by elites. At the local and regional levels, democratizing the political realm could also involve expanding community involvement in decisionmaking through mechanisms such as participatory budgeting that allow for communal participation in shaping budgetary and policy decisions. Participatory budgeting began in the 1980s in Porto Alegre, Brazil and has since spread to many places across the globe taking on various forms [58,59].9 Though empowered participatory governance designs such as participatory budgeting can reproduce societal inequalities; they also open up the state to further contention than otherwise would be the case. Participatory budgeting creates opportunities to invest in public goods and address ecological concerns to an extent that would not occur otherwise. Allowing communities to collectively decide how budgets are expended increases the likelihood of investing in collective goods like parks, recreation, education, and the arts, and because public goods are less likely to “grow” in terms of monetary value, they create opportunities for sustainable and collective consumption, learning, and skill building. 3.2.3. The civil However, as I have acknowledged, being able to fully participate in democratic processes pertaining to political decision-making is contingent upon economic and social relations that operate beyond state power itself. Therefore, democratizing and reshaping the social organization of everyday life, including the civil sphere, is a necessary condition to facilitate democratic processes and outcomes. Doing so 3.3. (De)Centralized energy systems: the best of both scales The typology outlined in this article indicated that democratic energy centralism and democratic energy decentralism were the two futures compatible with a just transition as they offer a pathway to new forms of social living that promote equity, fairness, and recognition. Given these two futures are distinguished by scale, how might centralized or decentralized energy systems facilitate or hinder democratic 9 See the Participatory Budgeting Project [60] for a map of participatory budgeting models worldwide. 164 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs and just processes and outcomes that were outlined in Section 3.2? Following arguments made by Leopold Kohr [70], Lewis Mumford [71], E.F. Schumacher [72], and Amory Lovins [73], many activists and scholars have suggested that small scale systems and technologies open up new opportunities for democratic and empowering social relationships. This is true for renewables such as solar energy where people and groups can own the means of energy prosumption, which offer democratic opportunities that are not possible with centralized fossil fuel systems. However, complete decentralization (or centralization) of the energy system creates barriers in facilitating democratic processes and just outcomes, making a mix of scales the most foreseeable pathway to a socially just and ecologically sustainable future. Centralized systems seem incompatible with most sustainability goals as they require large and extensive investments in fixed infrastructure that are land and resource intensive, and they are susceptible to being captured by elites and technocratic governing bodies given their bureaucratic nature. In contrast, decentralization creates considerable issues related to ensuring equitable access to energy resources for marginalized populations, and like centralized systems, are also susceptible to elite and technocratic capture due to the complexity of managing decentralized technologies. However, there are attributes of each scale that can help mitigate the weaknesses of the other scale and vice versa. Centralization can facilitate change much more rapidly across space (e.g., switching to renewables and reducing fossil fuel use), whereas decentralization can open up opportunities for direct and democratic control among individuals and groups. Thus, the architecture and scale of the energy system matters and warrants serious consideration alongside the social relations that shape the political, economic, and civil spheres. Due to climate change being an issue of scale, sufficient mitigation and adaption will require some form of centralized energy planning at regional, national, and transnational levels. Because there is evidence that renewables only minimally displace fossil fuels [9,74,75], nationalizing the fossil fuel industry is likely a necessary course of action [76,77]. However, centralized energy planning and the utilization of decentralized technologies are not necessarily incompatible with one another. Nationalizing a nation’s fossil fuel supply is likely a required step in facilitating the deployment of more decentralized technologies, i.e., replacing coal power plants with rooftop solar panels. Furthermore, curtailing emissions from transportation will require centralizing transit systems and expanding mass transit. This will require expanding train and bus lines powered by renewable energy that span across cities, regions, states, provinces, and national boundaries, which will ultimately require multi-scalar planning to come to fruition. However, large centralized systems are susceptible to capture by elites and technocrats. The large centralized energy systems present in many places across the world tend not to offer many opportunities for the general public to partake in decision-making regarding energy use and management. Thus, decentralization offers opportunities to distribute decision-making by allowing people to become prosumers and actively participate in energy management. However, like centralization, decentralization is also susceptible to elite and technocratic capture for several reasons. First, the deployment, use, and management of distributed technologies (e.g., generation technologies, storage technologies, microgrids, etc.) requires specialized knowledge, which can make managing these systems difficult for the average person and allow technocratic elites to dominate the system. Second, there are many possibilities regarding how these technologies may interact with each other such as peer-to-peer, prosumer-to-grid, and organized prosumer group models [78].10 Each of these models pose their own challenges in terms of regulating them and the knowledge required to make them function properly, and if all of these models become ubiquitous, coordinating them with one another will involve an additional complexity 10 in management and regulatory schemes. For example, at scale, a large number of autonomous prosumers selling and buying from one another would require complex regulatory structures to ensure liability and accountability, which would be much more complicated than seemingly similar platforms like Airbnb or Uber [78]. Other decentralized designs such as “organized prosumer groups” where users in a community energy project or organization form a virtual powerplant or similar design [78], offer the potential for direct, democratic control, while being connected to other organized groups through a centralized grid. This kind of scheme could decentralize decision-making and allow a relatively small number of energy users to democratically pool resources together, while also allowing for democratic, multi-scalar oversight of the centralized grid. Such a framework would simultaneously democratize the micro and macro scales of the energy system while promoting connectivity across space. But this kind of management scheme is not without its faults, it would demand large amounts of data to be collected and exchanged and would make managing the various powerplants, microgrids, or organized groups difficult [78]. Implementing such a system will require substantial planning, and if not done properly could hinder democratic processes and just outcomes and reproduce social inequalities. Many of these organized prosumer group designs would also require a microgrid master controller that decides how energy resources interact with the main grid and between one another [79]. Thus, the goal of the system and the way the master controllers are programmed to operate are important considerations that have social implications. If energy is bought and sold based on an auction system, distributed technologies could be used to reproduce existing social inequalities in the market place where some people make tremendous profits and others are left behind. However, if the system is used to make energy flow to where it is needed, or through mechanisms decided through participatory planning or community input, distributed technologies and organized prosumer energy systems could open up new forms of energy management and use. These systems could distribute decision making to the general public and employ smart grid technologies to meet social needs. Although decentralized systems do offer the advantage of direct control, which centralized systems do not, an issue with assuming that decentralized systems and technologies are inherently better is that, social processes, including any substantial form of justice and democracy, operate at multiple scales [12,25,80]. Therefore, by championing the local, exclusionary boundaries are formed, which can undermine issues of justice. Given inequalities across class, race, and gender, the fight for a predominately decentralized energy future would ultimately exclude many people. Though numerous community energy projects have both social and environmental goals associated with them, in many cases they tend to be comprised primarily of men, the relatively affluent, and the well-educated [74,75], which indicates that certain people have a greater ability to participate in these projects than others. This also alludes to the need to facilitate democracy beyond the projects themselves and across the political, economic, and civil spheres. Otherwise, due to social inequalities and the decentralized nature of these projects, people will be excluded and unable to participate, resulting in missed opportunities to tie social empowerment and justice with ecological sustainability. Furthermore, creating systems that allow for marginalized populations to own their own energy technologies creates pathways to possibly transforming certain aspects of past and present inequalities by facilitating material democracy, along with addressing issues of justice, leading to more equitable access to resources across populations. However, whether this is actually achieved will be dependent on larger structural changes in society that provide the necessary resources and tools to people so they are able to participate in such future. Therefore, the scale and architecture of the energy system and its many components (e.g., the scale at which energy is regulated, produced, transmitted, and distributed) can inhibit or facilitate democratic See Parag and Sovacool [78] for a discussion of each model. 165 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs processes and just outcomes. Centralization offers certain benefits that decentralization does not and vice versa. Though it may seem decentralization allows for greater participatory, associative, deliberative, and material forms of democracy, along with the ability to address historical and present injustices, these are unlikely to occur without centralization’s ability to make transformative changes on a grand scale. Sufficiently mitigating CO2 emissions will require centralization’s ability to reduce fossil fuel use at a macro scale, along with leading planning efforts regarding regulatory standards and equitably distributing resources to facilitate a just transition. For this reason, societies going through a just transition will likely find themselves fluctuating between both democratic energy centralism and democratic energy decentralism, not necessarily supporting one over the other, but utilizing the best features of each scale and design to maximize democratic decision-making, participation, and material access that rectify social and environmental injustices. Socio-ecological movements should be wary of this. Only by transforming the social along with the technologies, their design, management schemes, and uses can a just transition occur, as each will feedback into one another and influence democratic processes and just outcomes. Fig. 3 illustrates this process in motion, demonstrating how a democratized social and a (de)centralized energy system can lead to democratic and just outcomes (distributional, recognition, and procedural) through a set of feedback loops and processes. Transforming the social may be a necessary condition to bring the best of both scales to fruition, but doing so would also lead to processes and outcomes that reinforce and open up new opportunities for democratic, sustainable, and just forms of living. Though an examination of socio-ecological movements is beyond the scope of this article, such a future will ultimately rely on these movements transforming both the social world and energy systems as democratic processes and just outcomes must be driven from the bottom-up. Only by seeking to transform both will a just transition occur — one that reduces ecological degradation while simultaneously improving social well-being. possible, and they are not equal in terms of power, equity, and ecological impact. As I have outlined, these futures are a manifestation of the structural organization of the social and the scale of the energy system, and in total, there are broadly four possible futures: (1) libertarian energy decentralism, (2) technocratic energy centralism, (3) democratic energy centralism, and (4) democratic energy decentralism. Currently, most societies reflect libertarian energy decentralism or technocratic energy centralism, but facilitating a just transition is unlikely to occur in either of these futures due to their exploitive natures and unsustainable resource consumption. Democratizing social relations, including those that serve as the foundation of any energy system, is fundamental to any just transition as it opens up opportunities to address issues regarding social power and historical and present injustices. Furthermore, energy system scale will play a fundamental role in shaping and reinforcing social relationships and warrants serious consideration by activists and policymakers. Employing policy instruments that are multi-scalar is a necessary endeavor. Complete centralization or decentralization will have both social and ecological limitations, so a just and sustainable future will likely be an amalgam of the two that creates interconnected communities, resources, technologies, and governance structures. Though I have argued that democracy is a necessary condition for a just transition, I have not suggested that it is sufficient. Democratic processes and outcomes are embedded within social relations, and most societies are defined by unequal power dynamics that limit the effectiveness of democracy. Given that any form of democracy is relational to social power and embedded within it, achieving democratic processes and just outcomes must be a multifaceted undertaking that challenges power across all facets of society. A just transition will not occur overnight, but opening up social decision-making particularly to those who have been marginalized is essential for creating opportunities that set in motion a more equitable, just, and sustainable future. Though democratization is not sufficient in itself, the historical inequalities and oppressions that have created climate change will remain in place without it. Democracy may not automatically usher in a better future, but without it, a better future is not possible. This paper provides a nuanced approach to thinking about energy transitions and futures. It offers a typology that transcends strict technological determinism and outlines the relationship between social 4. Conclusion As societies transition to renewable energy and redesign their energy systems, I have argued that an array of potential energy futures are Fig. 3. The Process of a Democratic (De)Centralized Energy Transition. 166 Energy Research & Social Science 52 (2019) 159–168 R.P. Thombs organization, technology, and scale. Moreover, the typology offered here is flexible and can be applied to various situations. Future research could apply it to current transitions occurring at local, regional, national, or transnational levels. Doing so would allow for a mapping of such transitions and provide a way to frame and situate them relationally to one another. In summary, potential energy futures will not simply be a function of the technologies employed and their scale; they will fundamentally be shaped by the social relations that configure societies as a whole. Decentralized technologies offer new opportunities for social organization and empowerment, but they are always employed within the social contexts in which they emerge. The future is never pre-determined, and the relationship between the structural organization of the social and energy system scale will largely determine the manifestation of any energy future. 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