UNESCO s project to Revive the Spirit of Mosul.pdf

International Journal of Heritage Studies ISSN: 1352-7258 (Print) 1470-3610 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjhs20 UNESCO’s project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’: Iraqi and Syrian opinion on heritage reconstruction after the Islamic State Benjamin Isakhan & Lynn Meskell To cite this article: Benjamin Isakhan & Lynn Meskell (2019): UNESCO’s project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’: Iraqi and Syrian opinion on heritage reconstruction after the Islamic State, International Journal of Heritage Studies To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2019.1578988 Published online: 12 Feb 2019. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjhs20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES https://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2019.1578988 UNESCO’s project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’: Iraqi and Syrian opinion on heritage reconstruction after the Islamic State Benjamin Isakhan a,b and Lynn Meskell c,d a Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia; bDepartment of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa; cDepartment of Anthropology, Stanford University, CA, USA; dSchool of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Following the devastation of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul by the Islamic State (IS), UNESCO launched a project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’. This article critically reflects on this UNESCO-led project, drawing on 47 interviews with Syrians and Iraqis, as well as documenting the implications of UNESCO’s efforts in earlier (post-)conflict heritage reconstruction projects in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Mali. Specifically, this article focuses on two sites in Mosul, both deliberately destroyed by the IS and both nominated by UNESCO for reconstruction. The data analysed reveal that heritage reconstruction projects, especially in complex (post-) conflict environments such as Iraq, requires ongoing, nuanced and careful engagement with local populations to succeed. Failure to do so leaves both local people and their heritage sites vulnerable to renewed attacks and therefore ultimately undermines UNESCO’s broader mission to foster peace. Received 9 December 2018 Accepted 2 February 2019 KEYWORDS Iraq; heritage; UNESCO; Islamic State (IS); reconstruction; Mosul Introduction In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the pulpit at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul. He announced the creation of a new Islamic State (IS), stretching across the borders of Iraq and Syria and appointed himself Caliph Ibrahim, the leader of all Muslims. As they had done across the vast territories they controlled, after capturing Mosul, the IS unleashed a cataclysmic wave of human suffering and heritage destruction (Isakhan 2015; Kilcullen 2016). In terms of human suffering, the IS enacted genocidal pogroms against several minority communities, executing thousands and dumping their bodies in mass graves, kidnapping women to be used as sex slaves and forcing many thousands more to flee for their lives. In terms of heritage destruction, once they had captured the city of Mosul, the IS undertook a systematic iconoclastic programme which saw the razing of countless cultural and religious sites. Perhaps most notoriously, the IS filmed and then distributed videos of themselves destroying statues at the Mosul Museum as well as blowing up remains at nearby archaeological sites such as Nineveh and Nimrud. As part of this iconoclastic programme, in July 2014, the IS destroyed the Nebi Yunus mosque, a contemporary mosque built atop an archaeological mound housing the remains of an ancient Assyrian palace dating back to the seventh century BCE. Before they decimated the site, the IS loaded easily moveable valuables into trucks to be carted off for sale. Then, they cleared the mosque and the local area, warning residents of the impending explosion. They rigged explosives across the site before a massive explosion sent a giant brown mushroom cloud into the sky, reducing the mosque to rubble. CONTACT Benjamin Isakhan Benjamin.isakhan@deakin.edu.au © 2019 Benjamin Isakhan and Lynn Meskell. Published with license by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL Three years later, in June 2017, Mosul was in the midst of the final stages of a protracted and bloody battle to oust the IS from the city. The battle had been orchestrated by the Iraqi Security Forces in collaboration with an unusual mix of partners: a US-led coalition provided aerial and logistical support to ground forces that included pro-independence Kurdish Peshmerga units and Iran-backed Shia militias. The battle to ‘liberate’ Mosul from the IS also had a significant toll on the local civilian population and on the heritage sites of the city (ASOR 2017c). Facing imminent defeat, the IS detonated explosives inside the same mosque from which Baghdadi had declared his Caliphate in 2014, the Great Mosque of al-Nuri. The explosion flattened the mosque along with its famous gravity-defying leaning minaret, affectionately known to locals by the sobriquet, al-Hadba (‘the hunchback’). While some commentators argued that the destruction was ‘the group’s final act of angry defiance before finally losing their grip on Mosul’ (BBC 2017), it seems more likely that it was deliberately orchestrated to deprive IS enemies of the opportunity to declare an end to the Caliphate from the same mosque from which it had been launched. With the defeat of the IS, the once magnificent city of Mosul was reduced to little more than smouldering rubble and twisted debris. In response, the Director General of UNESCO, Audrey Azoulay, announced a new flagship project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ (UNESCO 2018e). According to her, the project was specifically designed to coordinate several initiatives to reconstruct the Old City and other key religious and historical sites in and around Mosul (Azoulay 2018). Since then, UNESCO has slated two key heritage sites for reconstruction: the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and the Nebi Yunus mosque. However, while such a project is undoubtedly well intentioned, it will occur within a complex (post-)conflict environment, in which the IS and many other actors remain capable of unleashing new waves of violence and iconoclastic attacks. More to the point, projects such as UNESCO’s efforts in Mosul often rely on problematic assumptions about how the local population value and engage with their heritage, how they perceive and interpret its destruction and the value they place on its reconstruction. As with earlier projects, UNESCO has claimed that they will work closely with the people of Mosul to ensure that they are not only employed as part of the reconstruction team where possible but that they are also consulted throughout the project (Spong 2018). Along these lines, in October 2018, UNESCO held the first in a series of public meetings in the Old City, providing locals with a unique insight into future plans for the reconstruction of their historic city (UNESCO 2018d). What remains opaque, however, is the extent to which these community consultations are designed to appease or empower locals. In other words: are they window-dressing to UNESCO’s top-down technocratic model or are they designed to foster an authentic grass-roots engagement with local stakeholders who will shape, and even steer, the reconstruction process? The iconoclastic attacks by the IS and the launch of the UNESCO-led project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ therefore serve as a timely opportunity to reflect on various issues pertaining to the reconstruction of heritage sites in (post-)conflict contexts such as Iraq. However, this article is not the first to address the heritage destruction of the IS and its aftermath. Earlier studies have focused on a plethora of important related topics such as the IS use of social media to present their heritage destruction as dramatic spectacles to local, regional and global audiences (Smith et al. 2016; Cunliffe and Curini 2018); the extent to which their destruction draws on a tradition of religious and political iconoclasm (Isakhan and Zarandona 2018; Harmanşah 2015); the ways in which the IS have targeted the heritage sites of specific minority communities in their genocidal campaigns (Bevan [2006] 2016; Isakhan 2018); the extent to which heritage destruction forms part of a broader process of indoctrinating young jihadis (Shahab and Isakhan 2018; Campion 2017) and the failures of state governments and multinational bodies to respond effectively (Brodie 2015; Lostal and Cunliffe 2016). While the merits of each of the studies outlined above must be acknowledged in any nuanced account of issues pertaining to the heritage destruction perpetrated by the IS, what is noticeably absent in the existing literature is empirical data documenting how the myriad peoples of Syria and Iraq have reacted to and understood this destruction and subsequent reconstruction efforts. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES 3 This article addresses this lacuna by presenting the results of 47 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Iraqis and Syrians from various areas and ethnic and religious backgrounds. It begins with a discussion of UNESCOs role in heritage reconstruction projects in other (post-)conflict contexts such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and Mali. The article proceeds to offer some general observations about the interviewees’ responses concerning heritage reconstruction. More specifically, it focuses on their attitudes towards UNESCO’s Mosul project with particular attention paid to the two sites currently slated for reconstruction. The article concludes by noting that the new empirical insights gleaned from these interviews is a step towards enabling current and future (post-)conflict heritage reconstruction projects to be cognizant of local sentiment and to tailor their initiatives to best meet the needs and respect the values of the local communities. It is hoped that such awareness will help prevent well-intentioned projects from being insensitive or unaware of the nuanced and divergent opinions, attitudes and needs of the local populations whose heritage they seek to reconstruct. UNESCO and the politics of heritage Established in 1946, UNESCO was born of war with an explicit mission to promote universal peace via various educational, scientific and cultural initiatives and awareness raising programmes (Guitton 2006). One of its most successful campaigns has been the flagship World Heritage Program launched in conjunction with the World Heritage Convention in 1972. Since then, sites deemed to be of ‘outstanding universal value’ to the common culture and heritage of humanity have been nominated and then awarded a place on the highly coveted World Heritage List (UNESCO 1972). However, to label a heritage site as being of ‘outstanding universal value’ has proved contentious and politically charged. Critics have pointed to the problems inherent in imposing one overarching set of criteria that fails to acknowledge the unique and divergent ways in which heritage sites are valued by local communities (Labadi 2013; Titchen 1996; de Cesari 2010). Other scholars have accused the process of being Eurocentric, reflected in the fact that a significant proportion of ‘world’ heritage sites are located in Europe (Cleere 1996, 2000) and that UNESCO apparently views cultures and their heritage as monolithic, stagnant and coherent (Eriksen 2001). Further literature has underscored the highly politicised process of inscribing sites (Scholze 2008), including the fact that debates over inscription have become a proxy for broader geopolitical struggles and competing agendas between states (Meskell et al. 2015; Meskell 2015). Further debate has ensued over UNESCO’s handling of conflict, particularly when it has involved the deliberate destruction of heritage sites, including those on the World Heritage List. The organisation has struggled to address heritage destruction in conflict for several key reasons: its cumbersome bureaucratic procedures have precluded it from adapting to the rapidly evolving nature of contemporary conflict and the complex motives of the perpetrators of heritage destruction (Van der Auwera 2013); because the agency is reticent to name and shame Member States responsible for the destruction, particularly powerful nations (Meskell 2018); due to the failure of conflict-prone developing countries to ratify or uphold the relevant UNESCO conventions on the protection of cultural property during conflict (Van der Auwera 2014); and because of the difficulties faced by UNESCO, and international law more broadly, in holding non-state actors to account (Cunliffe, Muhesen, and Lostal 2016). More to the point, UNESCO has instigated and facilitated several large-scale multilateral efforts to reconstruct heritage sites in complex (post-)conflict environments, which the organisation frequently cites among its greatest successes.1 However, the reconstruction of heritage sites is perhaps as politically charged as their designation as being of ‘outstanding universal value’ (González-Ruibal 2008, 2013). First, while UNESCO is not the primary United Nations agency that responds to military intervention, peacekeeping, refugee crises or humanitarian disasters, it has often been criticised for prioritising heritage reconstruction over broader humanitarian and developmental needs (Meskell 2018). Second, while UNESCO has produced countless 4 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL documentation promoting its efforts in community consultation (UNESCO 2018a, 2002, 2007), it has nonetheless been criticised for failing to adequately engage with local populations during the reconstruction process (Chirikure et al. 2010). UNESCO has also struggled to ensure that Member States uphold their commitment to appropriate community engagement (Labadi 2005). This leaves a host of difficult questions which plague the literature on (post-)conflict urban heritage reconstruction. Who decides what should be preserved as heritage or rebuilt, by whom, when and for what purpose (De Cesari and Dimova 2018)? Should destroyed heritage sites be left in ruins to commemorate the horrors of war (Logan and Reeves 2009; Lennon and Foley 2000)? Or should heritage reconstruction play a role in peace-building and a renewed sense of national solidarity after the end of hostilities (Khalaf 2017; Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008)? Would heritage reconstruction further the agenda of oppressive regimes or militant actors, thus exacerbating tensions and leading to renewed violence and iconoclasm (Viejo-Rose 2011; Munawar 2017)? Or is heritage reconstruction neither a positive or negative part of (post-)conflict renewal, but rather an inevitable process via which negotiations over the past play a vital role in the present (Giblin 2014)? These questions are far from new. Of the many post-conflict heritage reconstruction projects that UNESCO has facilitated during the late twentieth and into the early twenty-first centuries, three examples serve to demonstrate the complexity of such efforts. The first came in the wake of the ethno-religious violence that tore apart the Balkans in the 1990s, which included the ‘deliberate destruction of mosques, churches, museums, civil records, monuments and artifacts’ (Layton and Thomas 2001, 12). Following the conflict, several initiatives were launched to reconstruct key heritage sites such as the Stari Most Bridge in the Old City of Mostar in today’s Bosnia–Herzegovina. However, the reconstruction was criticised for not only failing to consult locals during the process (Walasek 2016), but also that the UNESCO-led reconstruction was a stage-managed affair designed to promote the multilateral body to international audiences. As part of an essentially neoliberal peace process, the bridge became a symbol of UNESCO’s ‘success’ in creating peace and stability via heritage reconstruction, fostering tourism and economic recovery if not reconciliation (Forde 2016; Ulengin and Ulengin 2015). The second example of Afghanistan follows successive decades of conflict and destruction, especially after the Soviet withdrawal of 1989, the rise of the Taliban in 1996 and the US-led intervention from 2001. UNESCO failed to halt the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001 and the sixth century CE statues were reduced to rubble (Elias 2013; Huseini 2012). In this case, international intervention only exacerbated the situation: the Taliban claimed to have acted in deliberate defiance of appeals made by the UN and other agencies. Then in 2003, UNESCO declared the Bamiyan Valley a World Heritage site, thereby turning an instrumental failure into a public relations success.2 However, UNESCO, Afghan authorities and various other stakeholders have frequently disagreed over whether or not to reconstruct the Buddhas. The Afghan government and some local residents of the Bamiyan Valley would like to see them reconstructed in the hope of re-kindling tourism and a renewed sense of national solidarity in the wake of the crimes of the Taliban (Itasaka 2017). However, UNESCO has frequently cautioned against the reconstruction on technocratic grounds arguing that it would be extremely difficult given their size, location and the fact that the original materials were almost entirely destroyed in the blasts (UNESCO 2017). A final example is the high-profile UNESCO-led heritage reconstruction project that followed the destruction of 10 religious and historic sites (Sufi shrines) in Timbuktu in Mali in 2012 by the terrorist group Ansar al-Dine (‘Defenders of the Faith’) (O’Dell 2013). Here, funds from the European Union enabled UNESCO to reconstruct the sites (UNESCO 2015b). A crucial difference to earlier projects was the involvement of local people in the process which UNESCO claims has contributed to broader peacebuilding and reconciliation processes (UNESCO 2015a). However, one anthropologist conducting long-term fieldwork in Mali has argued that INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES 5 by prioritizing the protection of cultural heritage, UNESCO has mostly airbrushed out the extreme poverty and poor sanitary conditions faced by the inhabitants of the sites. This causes grievances among the local population on a number of levels. First, there is the perception that the ‘heritage elite’ benefit disproportionately from the money being given in the name of cultural heritage and second, that the more pressing problem of economic marginality is being ignored. (Joy 2018, 17) This has had the further negative consequence of leaving both the local population and their heritage sites vulnerable to further waves of violence and iconoclasm. What is perhaps most telling about the three examples of the Balkans, Afghanistan and Mali is that there is very little empirical data on how local populations understood, engaged with and perceive such monumental reconstruction. They also reveal that UNESCOs (post-)conflict heritage reconstruction projects have been plagued by several specific problems: they tend to privilege the opinions of heritage experts and technocrats over those of locals; they prioritise monumental reconstruction over broader humanitarian and developmental needs; they utilise heritage reconstruction as a symbol of peace and reconciliation in societies still riven with division and conflict and they leave both local people and their heritage sites exposed to further waves of violence and iconoclasm. Failing to engage with the nuanced and divergent opinions of locals on heritage, its destruction and reconstruction in complex (post-)conflict contexts therefore ultimately undermines UNESCOs broader mandate to foster sustainable peace. As this article demonstrates, UNESCO’s current project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ runs the risk of repeating these past mistakes. Methodology This article draws on 47 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted both in person and via phone/Skype between March 2017 and October 2018.3 The ongoing security situation severely limited fieldwork as well as access to more vulnerable communities, such as ethnic and religious minorities, refugees and internally displaced people, and women. Such constraints undoubtedly affect all international organisations or projects operating inside Syria or Iraq, including UNESCOs efforts to consult with relevant communities. Nonetheless, the researchers were able to conduct inperson interviews inside Iraq as well as in neighbouring states with high numbers of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and migrants, such as Jordan and Lebanon. The rest of the interviews were conducted via phone/Skype. With the consent of the participants, all interviews were recorded, translated and transcribed. These interviews form part of a larger project examining heritage, heritage destruction and reconstruction in Syria and Iraq in the context of the ongoing conflicts. While all of the respondents were asked about their opinions on what role the international community can or should play in post-conflict heritage reconstruction, they were not directly asked about UNESCO’s project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’. This is in part because a significant proportion (21) of the interviews were conducted before UNESCO launched the project in February 2018. Therefore, any reflections on UNESCO’s projects in Mosul are drawn from the remaining interviews (26) and were volunteered by the participants without having been prompted. The interviewees were identified via targeted or purposive sampling; they were specifically chosen not because they are representative of a broader population but because of their experiences of, and knowledge about, heritage destruction and reconstruction in Syria and Iraq. It is important to note that the interviewees represent a broad spectrum of different people from across Syria and Iraq. First, they were asked to identify where they were from. Importantly, the interviewees represent a broad geographical spread, many coming from a city or town occupied or threatened by the IS and other Islamist factions. The majority were from Iraq (32), including participants from Baghdad (8), Mosul (6), Bashiqa (4), Dohuk (3), Sinjar (2), Zummar (2), Kirkuk (1), Erbil (1), Sulaymaniyah (1), Koya (1), Tel Eskof (1), Khanaqin (1) and Baqoufah (1). The remainder were from across Syria (15): Homs (4), Aleppo (3), Damascus (3), Qaboun (1), Darayya (1), Mahardah (1), Suweida (1) and Qamishli (1). It is also important to note that while just under half (23) of respondents remained in Syria and Iraq (even if they were internally 6 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL displaced), the rest had left their homelands since the onset of the current conflict and were now living in Jordan (9), Lebanon (6), the United States (3), Germany (2), Australia (2), the Netherlands (1) and Turkey (1). Second, the respondents were also asked whether they identified themselves as part of a particular ethnic, religious or cultural group. The respondents therefore self-identified as being part of an array of different affiliations, including Sunni Arab (20), Christian (13, including 5 Chaldean, 3 Assyrian, 2 Syrian Orthodox, 1 Armenian, 1 Syriac Catholic and 1 Greek Orthodox), Yezidi (6), Sunni Kurd (4), Shia Arab (3) and Druze (1). Finally, due to the security situation and cultural and religious mores that sometimes constrain women’s ability to participate in such research, a little over one quarter of the participants were women (13). Results Before addressing the respondents’ specific perspectives on UNESCO’s ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ project, it is worth making some general observations about their broader attitudes to heritage reconstruction. In total, a majority of the respondents (35) commented on the theme of reconstructing Iraqi and Syrian heritage sites after conflict. Seven of these respondents provided generic support for the notion that the international community should play a prominent role in reconstructing Syria and Iraq’s significant heritage sites that had been damaged or destroyed during the ongoing conflict. A typical response along these lines came from a Kurdish man from Qamishli who called on institutions from within the US, Australia and Europe working on cultural heritage [to] get involved in preserving the cultural heritage in these countries [Syria and Iraq] in coordination with the UN and credible lawyers. There are institutions working like that who receive and hand over monuments and other remains legally through the UN. These can do a great job. (IN005) Four other respondents argued that the most valuable contribution that the international community could make was to provide urgently needed technical and trade skills training so that Syrians and Iraqis can rebuild their own heritage. Typical of such responses, one Sunni Arab man from Zummar stated that ‘whether in Iraq, Lebanon or Yemen . . . the international community can provide the technical support to scholars to repair damaged antiquities, develop and reexcavate heritage sites’ (IN009). As another respondent put it: ‘We cannot rebuild all this quickly. We need to be taught the right skills and need international support to get it right. But if we can rebuild it properly it would be very good for tourism and the economy’ (IN036). In addition to the urgent need for skills and training, as well as other forms of support from the international community, five respondents were very clear that it ought to be Syrians or Iraqis who are ultimately responsible for the reconstruction of their heritage sites. One respondent, a Sunni Arab man from Homs, put it succinctly: ‘We don’t want others to just come and rebuild it all for us. We destroyed it so we should rebuild it together’ (IN037). For some, the very process of Syrians and Iraqis rebuilding their own heritage could help to re-establish inter-community solidarity and herald a move towards a more peaceful future. As one Sunni Arab woman from Homs put it: The most important thing is security. To get security in Syria, you need to rebuild the relationships between different communities; to rebuild the trust. There is not much trust left between the different communities. Heritage can play a role – if we rebuild the Christian and Sunni and Alawi places together then we can rebuild the country. (IN035) These generic responses shed light on the complex array of opinions of local people towards heritage reconstruction in (post-)conflict Syria and Iraq. In addition, as is detailed below, 10 respondents, more than one-fifth of the total 47 interviewed and over one-third of the 26 interviewed after the February 2018 launch of UNESCO-led project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’, volunteered specific views about the project. Indicating the prominence of this project INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES 7 in the minds of Syrians and Iraqis, they offered views on the reconstruction of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and the al-Hadba minaret, and the Nebi Yunus mosque and the Assyrian palace of Nineveh. The Great Mosque of al-Nuri and the al-Hadba minaret The al-Nuri mosque was erected in 1172 CE by a great Emir of Damascus and Aleppo and military figure known as Nur Al-Din ibn al-Zenki. He is widely regarded as the man who unified Muslim armies across Syria before launching the first successful holy war against the European Crusaders. He not only won decisive victories against the Crusaders, he also conquered cities such as Damascus, Raqqa and Sinjar and came to control Mosul before his protégé, Salah al-Din, took Jerusalem in 1187. Such historical victories have made Nur al-Din something of a jihadist icon today, with at least one contemporary terrorist network named after him, the Syria-based Harakat Nur al-Din al-Zenki (‘The Movement of Nur al-Din alZenki’). Founded in 2011, the movement, in collaboration with other jihadist factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra (‘The Support Front’), has not only been responsible for horrific human rights abuses and the abduction of religious clergymen (AI 2016, 21) but also for iconoclastic attacks on significant heritage sites (ASOR 2018, 43–50). The mosque had been renovated several times since the sixteenth century but retained several significant architectural details such as marble pillars, engravings from the Quran and other ornamental Arabic calligraphy carved into the structure. However, the most significant and iconic part of the mosque is the adjacent leaning al-Hadba minaret that had remained untouched since it was first built in 1172. The minaret is well known for the seven ornamental bands of brickwork that decorate its shaft (ASOR 2017b, 118–22). As with many heritage sites across the Middle East, especially in diverse cities such as Mosul, the Great Mosque and its minaret can be considered a shared sacred space, mixed sanctuaries where people with different ethnic and religious affiliations come together to perform or witness different forms of devotion – often at the same time (Alber and Couroucli 2012). As one Sunni Arab man from Mosul put it: ‘It was an iconic monument for all of us: Muslims, Yazidis, Christians’ (IN017). Over time, the leaning minaret became a symbol of Mosul and its rich and diverse heritage. As another respondent put it: ‘The name of Mosul city is synonymous with the name of the minaret. You find photos of this minaret on the bank notes and on clothes. It is the oldest minaret with ornamentation and gradient architecture in Iraq’ (IN008). Another stated that the mosque and minaret ‘occupied a place in the Mosul image. It is collectively of a significant value for all the population of Mosul’ (IN017). In July 2014, in the midst of an iconoclastic wave of destruction unleashed by the IS after conquering Mosul, militants arrived at the al-Hadba minaret carrying explosives and threatening to destroy it. Local residents rushed to the site and formed a human chain around the base, prepared to risk their lives to save their iconic landmark. In a rare sign of weakness, the militants gave up and left (Bowley 2014). Three years later, in June 2017, the IS succeeded. Facing imminent defeat, the militants detonated explosives inside the mosque, destroying it along with the leaning minaret (Hassan and Arango 2017). As one Sunni Arab man from Mosul pointed out: ‘They left the Great Mosque till the very end . . . I think they left it till the end because it had a symbolic significance for Da’esh. . .. There was a political agenda behind this destruction. . .. Everything they did was deliberate and for a purpose’ (IN020). Other respondents reflected on their emotional reaction to seeing the destruction of the mosque and minaret on television: The destruction of al-Nuri Mosque and al-Hadba Minaret . . . was an absolute disaster. I felt that we got the knock out [blow] to what remained of our civilisation. This was one of the religious edifices and the minaret tells the history associated with the city . . . [We watched on] TV how people were crying while watching the great mosque destroyed. (IN008) 8 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL However, the site continued to suffer even after the IS had been evicted from Mosul. When the Iraqi Security Forces and various Shia militia finally conquered central Mosul in July 2017, photos of soldiers and militiamen posing in front of the ruins were posted online. These photos revealed that graffiti had been sprayed at the base of the minaret to celebrate the victory over the IS (ASOR 2017b, 118–22). Following the liberation of key territories from IS control in 2017, UNESCO partnered with the Iraqi Government to launch the Response Plan for Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage in the Liberated Areas of Iraq (2017–2019).4 The following year, in February 2018, the Kuwait International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq saw some USD$30 billion donated, falling well short of Baghdad’s appeal of USD$88 billion. The largest donors were from across the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Turkey, each contributed significant sums to the reconstruction and redevelopment of Iraq after the country had been ravaged by the IS. UNESCO’s newly elected Director General, Audrey Azoulay, used the Kuwait conference to launch a new flagship project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ (UNESCO 2018e). The first and perhaps the largest component of this project began in April 2018 when an agreement was signed between Iraq, the UAE, UNESCO and ICCROM in the Assyrian Hall of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad. The UAE committed USD$50.4 million over 5 years for the reconstruction of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and its famous minaret, including its lean (UNESCO 2018c). The project also includes the creation of a memorial and a museum on the site to document its history as well as the heritage destruction unleashed by the IS across the city. The project began in December 2018 with a symbolic ceremony to celebrate the laying of the mosque’s foundation stone, attended mostly by political and religious dignitaries (UNESCO 2018b). However, UNESCO’s efforts to rebuild the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and its iconic minaret received mixed reactions from the interviewees. Several respondents were supportive, with one Sunni Arab from Mosul noting that: ‘The main demand of the masses [in Mosul] is the restoration and rehabilitation of the religious places, mosques and churches which were attacked’ (IN008). Another respondent, a Shia Arab from Baghdad, was more specific: I think that it is important for Iraq to rebuild some of the heritage sites like the Al-Nuri Mosque. I think UNESCO and the international community will do a good job and the reconstruction will be a positive sign of peace for Iraq. I think the plan for a museum to commemorate the terrible destruction by Da’esh is a good idea. (IN038) However, as this interviewee went on to note, UNESCO: must make sure they consult with the community and give jobs to Iraqis. UNESCO must also make the reconstruction part of a broader plan for stability and peace. It is useless to rebuild the mosque if there is not real peace and security. It would be terrible if it was destroyed again in a few years. (IN038) Another respondent elaborated on the theme of the need for heritage reconstruction to be embedded within a broader plan for ongoing peace and security in Iraq. He argued that heritage reconstruction was not a priority given the enormous challenges Iraq faces after the defeat of the IS. As he put it: I think it is a strange idea to reconstruct places – for example the mosque of al-Nuri and the minaret. Perhaps in a few years when Mosul has been re-built and people have returned. And what about other cities? I am from Kirkuk and there is a huge need there. We have tension with Kurds and Arabs. We have sectarian violence. We have people starving, we have ladies who have been raped, we have kids with no school and all they have seen is violence and terror. Children raised on death and destruction. They need help: hospitals, schools, roads, psychology, jobs, food, water, electricity, education. We need hygiene and security and work. We don’t need an old minaret. It was useless anyway. . .. We need security and then services. Heritage is not a priority for us. (IN040) Other respondents were less critical of the prioritising of heritage reconstruction over broader humanitarian needs, as they were about the ethics of taking money from countries who allegedly funded the rise of the IS. Each of the Middle East states who donated funds for the reconstruction INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES 9 of Iraq at the February 2018 Kuwait Conference has been accused of either directly or indirectly funding IS militants. Both Kuwait and Qatar were accused of lax financial regulation which enabled their citizens, as well as wealthy private donors from other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to send funds through to jihadists groups such as the IS (Boghardt 2014a, 2014b). For its part, Turkey has been complicit in weapons, money and foreign fighters flowing across its borders into Syria to bolster the efforts of various militant groups (BBC 2014). In other words, UNESCO is now taking funds to reconstruct Iraqi heritage sites from those who directly or indirectly funded the militants who destroyed the sites in the first place. While UNESCO hasn’t commented publicly on this ethical dilemma, it was front of mind for some of the respondents. As one Syrian Orthodox Christian from Mahardah put it: [In both Iraq and Syria, the] government wants to reconstruct many of these heritage and historical places. They have even been giving some of the contracts to Qatar and Turkey – these are the people responsible for the destruction. They funded different groups and let them come across the border. They caused the destruction and now they want to be paid to rebuild it. They should pay us. (IN039) Focusing specifically on the UAE funding the UNESCO-led project to reconstruct the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and the al-Hadba minaret, one Sunni Arab woman from Khanaqin made her objections very clear: The reconstruction of the al-Nuri mosque is just politics. The UAE want to fund it because some of them are Wahhabi’s and they funded Da’esh to do all this terrible destruction. It is Wahhabi ideology to kill Christians or Yezidis and to destroy historical sites and cultural sites. But now the Gulf countries are embarrassed by what De’esh did so they want to show that they are for peace and don’t believe in this violence. But they funded it, they created it. They saw that Iraq was a Shia majority and that Syria’s Alawite government was collapsing, so they wanted to bring Sunni’s to power. Even I am Sunni, I don’t agree with this ideology. They gave money to Da’esh to make them powerful. But then they went crazy and so now the Gulf wants to pay some money to fix up the mess they made. I don’t want their dirty money. I want them to leave us alone to live in peace. (IN042) The Nebi Yunus Mosque and the Assyrian Palace of Nineveh The Nebi Yunus Mosque has a rich and complex past. The contemporary mosque that the IS destroyed is built atop an archaeological mound which forms part of the ancient Assyrian capital of Nineveh. It is the site where the seventh century BCE king Esarhaddon built his palace, later renovated by his son and heir, Ashurbanipal (ASOR 2015, 48–54). A Nestorian (Assyrian) church was later built on the site which houses the tomb of a Christian patriarch that came to be associated with the Prophet Jonah (known in Arabic as Nebi Yunus). Jonah is the Biblical prophet who is most famous for having been swallowed by a large fish before travelling to Nineveh to urge its inhabitants to repent their sins or face the wrath of God. In the fourteenth century CE, the site was converted into a mosque and was the subject of many subsequent renovations over the centuries (ASOR 2017a, 85–94). Although several small-scale archaeological excavations have occurred at the site over the years, most recently between 1987 and 1992, the bulk of the site has not been excavated (Al-Juboori 2017). As with the Great Mosque and the al-Hadba minaret, the Nebi Yunus Mosque was also a shared space, attracting pilgrims and visitors from a variety of faiths and backgrounds. The top of the mound offers views across the city of Mosul and was a popular spot for family picnics. As such, it also played a significant social role. For many young men and women, sites like the grounds of the Nebi Yunus mosque are one of few opportunities to mingle with the opposite sex under the close eye of family and friends. This is common across the Middle East, where such sites become the location of important courting rituals and rites of passage for young people (Poujeau 2012). Reflecting on the layers of significance of the Nebi Yunus site for the local community and for visitors from across Iraq and abroad, one Sunni Arab man from Mosul commented that: 10 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL This mosque had cultural, social, historical, and communal value for the population of Mosul. Not only for the people of Mosul, but for many Iraqis. Since my childhood I had seen many buses filled with people who would come all the way from the south or from Baghdad as well as other cities to visit the mosque. . .. Religiously, it was only a mosque but historically and from an archaeological point of view, this mosque was built on the top of [an] Assyrian palace. (IN017) Another respondent, a Sunni Arab woman from Mosul, discussed the significance of the site in more personal terms. She recounted her pleasant memories of the mosque: We had been going there every time for praying. It was the most beautiful mosque in Mosul and it was something that everyone in the world knew was there. . .. And I have many good, beautiful memories of this mosque. When I was a child, with my parents I was going there. . .. It is a very beautiful area and when we are going there, we feel comfortable there . . . we really feel that we connect with Allah directly. The area is so beautiful, so big, so clean. There is a good smell. When I am going there I am always feeling comfortable. Even when I was young when I was feeling uncomfortable or worried about something, I would say to my dad let us go there to that Mosque because it is where we feel comfortable. And when we are walking into the Mosque we feel that we are in another world. (IN025) As part of their broader iconoclastic campaign in Mosul, the IS destroyed the Nebi Yunus mosque in July 2014. Although some of the outer courtyards remained intact, the explosion tore through most of the modern mosque, leaving it in ruins (EuroNews 2014). Later videos posted on YouTube by locals show the extent of the devastation at the site. Residents can be seen climbing over the giant pile of rubble and twisted debris, many taking photographs and videos of the devastation (YouTube 2014). Several respondents commented on their sense of loss and trauma at the destruction of the Nebi Yunus Mosque at the hands of the IS. As one Sunni Arab man from Mosul put it, it was ‘a deeply painful loss for all people of Mosul regardless of their religion, nationality or sect’ (IN017). Another respondent, a Sunni Arab woman from Mosul, had a similarly emotional response after watching the destruction on television and then subsequently visiting the site after it had been destroyed. ‘My reaction was like trauma. When I heard of this destruction, it was like trauma for me. . .. Every time I am going and seeing this destroyed mosque, I feel like something has been destroyed in my life or inside me’ (IN025). Another interviewee, a Sunni Arab man now living in Mosul, claimed to have been an eyewitness of the destruction of the Nebi Yunus site in 2014. He was incredulous not just at the attack itself, but that the IS would have the audacity to destroy it on the night of Laylat al-Qadr (‘The Night of Destiny’). This is the most sacred night of the entire holy month of Ramadan as it marks the anniversary of the night when the Archangel Gabriel revealed the first verses of the Qu’ran to Mohammad in 610 CE in Mecca. The respondent went on to recount his emotional reaction to seeing the destruction of this significant mosque: When I saw this, they were unimaginable moments. I was just watching and just like entangled and cannot do anything. Watching those ISIS mobs, many people standing next to me were crying . . . I wish I had died before seeing that happen as I could not do anything for it . . . I was very disappointed as I am proud of something, which is destroyed by some ignorant mob. How can you describe this? They do not understand they are destroying the civilisation of our ancestors. (IN008) In January 2017, Iraqi forces captured the area around the Nebi Yunus Mosque, revealing the full extent of the damage inflicted by the IS. They discovered that the IS had dug several tunnels through the mound underneath the mosque that housed the ruins of the Assyrian palace, most likely for several purposes: to escape enemy attacks, to shelter from airstrikes and to look for antiquities they could sell on the international black market (ASOR 2017a, 85–94). In March 2017, archaeologists were able to access these tunnels and discovered that the IS had clearly looted many significant artefacts from the site. As one Sunni Arab man from Mosul put it: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES 11 [The IS] looted archaeological sites to fund their operations . . . the hill on which [the] Nebi Yunis mosque was built was an archaeological hill with so many precious antiquities. . .. So Da’esh dug tunnels under the mosque and looted a lot of artefacts and sold them on the black market. (IN020) However, the IS tunnels also unearthed – for the first time ever – cuneiform inscriptions and large carved reliefs, as well as several other sculptures and artefacts. One cuneiform inscription appeared to date all the way back to the founding of the palace by Esarhaddon (Al-Juboori 2017). In an odd twist of fate, the IS militants also uncovered a pair of well-preserved Lamassu statues, giant winged bulls with a human head that formed the iconic edifice of the Assyrian Empire. In some of their earlier propaganda, the IS had taken power tools and sledgehammers to other Lamassu statues at the Nergal Gate of Nineveh, condemning them as false idols (Al-Hayat 2015). Such discoveries fuelled tensions over whether the mosque should be rebuilt or the ancient archaeological site excavated and preserved. In terms of the reconstruction of the mosque, several members of the local Muslim community and their religious leaders expressed their desire to see the mosque rebuilt as soon as possible (Al-Shahid 2017). In February 2017, the Imam of the mosque expressed his determination to see the mosque rebuilt, stating that: ‘We will turn to UNESCO and all relevant international organisations to help us rebuild’ (al-Taie 2017). Similar sentiments were expressed by local politicians and engineers who argued that the site was of very high significance to the local Muslim populations and that ‘we are going to rebuild it and bring it back to the way it was, no matter how much time it takes’ (al-Taie 2017). In March 2017, the head of the Sunni waqf (religious endowment) visited Mosul and announced that the site’s mosque would be rebuilt (Zeed 2017). Iraqi authorities had apparently already received funding from a wealthy Arab benefactor (Westacott 2017) and some reports indicated that the reconstruction had already begun with the laying of the foundation stone (al-Taie 2017). This raised concern among some local, but predominantly foreign, archaeologists who wanted to see the ancient Assyrian palace underneath the mosque properly studied, excavated and preserved before any reconstruction began. They were especially concerned that a major reconstruction project would inflict further damage on the sensitive ancient ruins (Zeed 2017). As early as February 2017, British and other foreign archaeological teams were bidding to excavate and preserve the site. In April 2018, as part of the broader partnership between Iraqi authorities and UNESCO to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’, the Nebi Yunus Mosque was identified as one of the sites in need to preservation and reconstruction (AlHurra 2018). However, UNESCO is likely to see itself caught in a complex debate between those who want to see the mosque rebuilt and those who would study the ancient remains. In terms of the reconstruction of the mosque, one Sunni Arab male now living in Mosul argued that the local population was very much in favour of heritage reconstruction. For him, the ‘Prophet Yunus Mosque [and other sites] . . . are places which people are looking forward to restore’ (IN008). Others disagreed, arguing that the timing wasn’t right and that all reconstruction projects, including that at the Nebi Yunus mosque, should wait until after the conflict completely subsided. ‘When life is back to normal, UNESCO or other organisations may help building churches, mosques or temples like [they did] rebuilding the Al Askari Shrine.5 At least people can feel that the world is sympathetic towards them’ (IN018). However, a Sunni Arab woman from Mosul expressed some concerns about whether a reconstructed Nebi Yunus mosque could recapture the emotions and memories the original site evoked for her. Everything that was destroyed, maybe we can rebuild. Especially this mosque [Nebi Yunus]. It was very important for all people of Mosul. We can rebuild it but maybe it will need some time . . . I don’t know. Maybe after I go and am walking inside I will feel the same feeling as before or maybe it will be different. (IN025) Another respondent, a male Sunni Arab from Damascus, was more critical of UNESCO’s Mosul project: I think this whole project by UNESCO to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ is just a marketing campaign. I don’t know how you revive a spirit. A spirit is dead and gone. Perhaps that’s what they should do: leave the monuments destroyed like the spirits of our ancestors. But I think UNESCO want to rebuild to use Mosul as a symbol to say ‘we defeated Da’esh and we are for peace.’ Its just going to be a nice photo at the end and a political celebration. But it won’t bring real peace to Mosul. (IN046) 12 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL Conclusion The UNESCO-led project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ is an important and meaningful initiative that could have a profound and positive impact on the future of the city and the region. However, if the project is to be successful, UNESCO must continue and expand its efforts to create an ongoing dialogue with the local population – despite their divergent and competing views – and create opportunities for their participation in, and ownership over, every stage of the reconstruction process. Failing to do so from the outset could see UNESCO confront the same challenges they faced in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Mali. Indeed, the interview data presented here suggest that familiar and problematic patterns are already emerging. At the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and the al-Hadba minaret, UNESCO’s efforts appear to echo those of Mali to the extent that broader humanitarian and development needs are being sidelined in favour of heritage reconstruction. To rectify this, UNESCO ought to be seen to work with locals towards bettering their life and livelihood in pragmatic ways or be seen to support and work with other agencies that conduct broader humanitarian and development aid work. At the Nebi Yunus mosque and the Assyrian palace of Nineveh, UNESCO must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of Afghanistan by privileging the opinions of foreign experts and technocrats over those of the local population. UNESCO could turn this situation into an opportunity by facilitating broad-based discussions on whether and how to make sure that both the archaeological remains of Nineveh are preserved, while the locals are able to rebuild their important mosque. At both sites, and throughout the entire Mosul project, UNESCO must be careful not to emulate mistakes such as those in the Balkans when heritage reconstruction was used as a symbol of peace at the expense of enacting meaningful post-conflict reconciliation and stabilisation. Failing to engage with local opinion on heritage, its destruction and reconstruction, in Iraq may therefore not only undermine UNESCO’s broader goal of fostering peace and reconciliation but may also leave both the local population and the heritage of Mosul vulnerable to further waves of human suffering and heritage destruction. Further research is urgently needed to document the ways in which people in complex (post-) conflict environments such as Iraq value and engage with their heritage, how they perceive and interpret its destruction and the value they place on its reconstruction. Such research could be done in partnership with UNESCO and other national and multinational institutions to enable current and future heritage reconstruction projects in (post-)conflict environments to be cognizant of local sentiment and to tailor their initiatives to best meet the needs and respect the values of the local communities. Until such issues are addressed and understood, heritage reconstruction initiatives such as the campaign to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’ run the risk of being largely ineffective and plagued by familiar problems. They also run the risk of fuelling the propaganda machine of Islamist groups such as the IS by failing to grant agency over their own past and future to the people of Iraq. Notes 1. See: ‘World Heritage Centre: Success Stories.’ UNESCO, Accessed 4 December. https://whc.unesco.org/en/107/. 2. See: ‘Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley.’ UNESCO, Accessed 4 December. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208. 3. The interviews were collected in accordance with the ethical standards of the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee, Australia. Informed consent was obtained for all participants, who remain anonymous and non-identifiable. 4. See: ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul.’ Accessed 6 November. https://en.unesco.org/projects/the-spirit-of-mosul. 5. The Al-Askari mosque and shrine is a significant Shia religious and historical site in Samarra, Iraq. In 2006, and again in 2007, Al-Qaeda in Iraq bombed the site, unleashing a wave of sectarian violence (Isakhan 2013). From 2008, UNESCO led a project sponsored by the Iraqi Government and the European Union to rehabilitate and reconstruct the site over a 4-year period (UNESCO 2011). The project used hundreds of local Iraqi contractors to do much of the clearing and reconstruction work. More importantly, UNESCO is said to have regularly consulted with local civil society actors and with religious leaders who were regularly briefed on progress (Ghaidan 2008). By April 2009, the mosque had been partially rebuilt and was reopened to visitors. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STUDIES 13 Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the hard work and enthusiasm of several colleagues who helped collate some of the materials presented and analysed in this article: Ahmed Hassin, Sofya Shahab, Taghreed Jamal Al-Deen and Antonio Zarandona. We also acknowledge the insightful comments and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers and the editor of this journal. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Notes on contributors Benjamin Isakhan is an associate professor of Politics and Policy Studies and founding director of Polis, a research network for Politics and International Relations in the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University, Australia. He is also Adjunct Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Lynn Meskell is a professor in the Department of Anthropology at Stanford University. She is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and founding editor of the Journal of Social Archaeology. Her new book, A Future in Ruins: UNESCO, World Heritage, and the Dream of Peace (2018, OUP New York), reveals UNESCO’s early forays into a one-world archaeology and its later commitments to global heritage. Her new fieldwork explores monumental regimes of research and preservation around World Heritage sites in India and how diverse actors and agencies address the needs of living communities. ORCID Benjamin Isakhan http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5153-7110 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9087-3611 Lynn Meskell Cited interviews IN005. Interviewed in person in Sulaymaniyah (Iraqi-Kurdistan), May 2017. Male Sunni Kurd from Qamishli (Syria). Now living in Damascus (Syria). IN008. Interviewed via phone/Skype from Amman (Jordan) to Mosul (Iraq), July 2017. Male Sunni Arab from Zummar (Iraq). Now living in Mosul (Iraq). IN009. Interviewed via phone/Skype from Amman (Jordan) to Mosul (Iraq), July 2017. Male Sunni Arab from Zummar (Iraq). Now living in Mosul (Iraq). IN017. Interviewed via phone/Skype from Melbourne (Australia) to Istanbul (Turkey), November 2017. Male Sunni Arab from Mosul (Iraq). Now living in Istanbul (Turkey). IN018. Interviewed via phone/Skype from Melbourne (Australia) to Detroit (the United States), November 2017. Male Shia Muslim from Baghdad (Iraq). Now living in Detroit (the United States). IN020. Interviewed via phone/Skype from Melbourne (Australia) to Amsterdam (The Netherlands), December 2017. Male Sunni Arab from Mosul (Iraq). Now living in Amsterdam (The Netherlands). IN025. Interviewed via phone/Skype from Amman (Jordan) to Dohuk (Iraqi Kurdistan), May 2018. Female Sunni Arab from Mosul (Iraq). Now living in Dohuk (Iraqi Kurdistan) but working in Mosul (Iraq). IN035. Interviewed in person in Mufraq (Jordan), October 2018. Female Sunni Arab from Homs (Syria). Now living in Zaatari (Jordan). IN036. Interviewed in person in Mufraq (Jordan), October 2018. Male Sunni Arab from Homs (Syria). Now living in Zaatari (Jordan). IN037. Interviewed in person in Mufraq (Jordan), October 2018. Male Sunni Arab from Homs (Syria). Now living in Zaatari (Jordan). IN038. Interviewed in person in Amman (Jordan), October 2018. Male Shia Arab from Baghdad (Iraq). Now living in Amman (Jordan). IN039. Interviewed in person in Beirut (Lebanon), October 2018. Male Syrian Orthodox Christian from Mahardah (Syria). Now living in Beirut (Lebanon). IN040. Interviewed in person in Beirut (Lebanon), October 2018. Male Sunni Kurd from Kirkuk (Iraq). Now living in Kirkuk (Iraq). 14 B. ISAKHAN AND L. MESKELL IN042. Interviewed in person in Beirut (Lebanon), October 2018. Female Sunni Arab from Khanaqin (Iraq). Now living in Khanaqin (Iraq). IN046. Interviewed in person in Bar Elias (Lebanon), October 2018. 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