The EU's Transformative Power in its Eastern Backyard

School of Politics and International Relations Issues in Democratisation (2011) Giorgi Kezherashvili The EU’s Transformative Power and Its Eastern Backyard Abstract This article observes the dynamics of the EU’s relations and promotion of democratic principles in Eastern neighborhood under its conditionality and lately signed Eastern Partnership initiative. Because of exaggerated expectations, some of the officials and academic researchers express certain disappointment stating that it lacks credible measures for democratic transformations, while others emphasize the necessity of the new initiative to strengthen their ties framed by the European Neighborhood Policy. The EU transformative power has seen a number of successful stories of democratic consolidation in its immediate neighbors during the previous accession rounds, although it is still vague if the conditionality brings the same outcomes for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where full membership perspectives are not considered to be realistic nowadays. The article attempts to evaluate perspectives for democratisation in these six countries and the role of EU’s conditionality to shape their domestic politics. Introduction: EU Conditionality and Democratisation The draft of the Eastern Partnership states that: "Shared values including democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights will be at its core, as well as the principles of market economy, sustainable development and good governance." It has changed the labels of the six states from “neighbors” to “partners”. The EaP is to prepare groundwork for new Association Agreements for the partners reaching satisfactory levels of democracy. The draft also states that the Eastern Europe is of "strategic importance" and the EU has an "interest in developing an increasingly close relationship with its Eastern partners..." (EU Observer, 2009). Evidently, EU conditionality has been a successful mechanism for promoting democratic principles in its closest neighbors. We can evaluate contemporary governments of a number of postcommunist countries, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia or Estonia who have successfully embraced the fundamental doctrines of the European Community. It would not be adequate to reject their quality of consolidated democracies, despite still suffering with various difficulties, but so do the other “old Europeans”. We can also bring Croatian example, which has made a significant progress since granting a candidate status in 2004. Perhaps, one could also argue that a reason why the European leaders signed the treaty in December 2011 with Croatia to become a 28th member of the union was the immediate need of enlargement. It was crucial to demonstrate their credibility of going further even during their hardest Eurozone crisis, standing very close to an economic disaster. However, I would say that Croatia deserved the granted membership not less than any other previously joined applicants, since numerous visible improvements had been made in almost every policy sectors and a colossal part of them were direct impacts of the EU conditionality. Yet, all those countries were enjoying one common advantage: A realistic perspective for accession, which was effectively used by the EU forcing and accelerating the transformation processes. But do the EU conditions have enough authority in countries where chances of full membership remain rather marginal, especially in the South Caucasus states that do not even have a common border with the EU, and are not likely to have in foreseeable future? Schimmelfennig and Scholtz define political conditionality and two other major means used by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for democratic promotion. They are economic development and transnational exchange. According to their belief, the impact of the EU on democratic transformation in its Eastern neighbors largely depends on credibility and size of rewards accessible only in case of substantial democratic changes (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2007). “For the new democracies, Europe remains a powerful idea, signifying the fundamental values and aspirations which their peoples kept alive during long years of oppression,” (Commission, 1992). Both the Single European Act and the Masstricht Treaty, as well as many other EU regulations and directives require its member-states to respect human rights and the rule of law. In addition to those fundamental political requirements there are also economic conditionality of establishing an open and free market based economy with fair competition. While, this principle does not postulate any particular point of improvement that in necessary to achieve and leaves a huge space for flexibility in terms of state interference in economic activities. (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Eventually, the candidates’ another duty is still non-negotiable: To adopt and ratify all the chapters of the acquis communautaire – a complete frame of the EU legislation starting with the principles of free movements of goods, persons, services, capital; competition, agriculture, environment policies, etc. Dynamics of Democratisation under the EaP The Eastern Partnership, launched at the summit in Prague in 2009, was assumed and expected to add certain values to the European Neighborhood Policy, to hold a region out of Russian clutch and enhance a shift towards the European family. Although it is still questionable, whether the new framework is capable to deliver sufficient engagement to these six Post-Soviet countries. However, the expectations to intensify ties with the EU used to be much higher before signing the agreement, mainly because the policies would be regulated directly from Brussels, unlike the Union for the Mediterranean, where its own secretariat was established. “The Partnership will also promote democracy and good governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability” (EEAS). In my opinion, one of the most vital novelties in the EaP is an attempt to institutionalize a cooperation between opposition parties and civil societies of the region, even though they are still in underprivileged stance. Despite the existing annual Civil Society Forum under the EaP framework, there is still poor commitment towards empowering the NGO’s, since most of the deals are made directly with the governments that lead to further exclusion of civil participation from decisionmaking and undermine the degree of transparency in state institutions. The multilateral track of regional cooperation carries meaningful rank as well, promoting new channels for socialization (Boonstra & Shapovalova, 2010). In accordance to the annual country reports by the Freedom House, only Ukraine and Georgia were identified as Transitional Governments in 2009, but since then Moldova became an example of progress in the region scoring 4.96 points in 2011, standing among the Partly Free countries, while it was 5.14 in 2009. A group of analysts predicts Moldova to become a success story of the EU conditionality. The first in the chart is Ukraine, scoring 4.61 points, despite experiencing a noticeable decline, since it was situated among the Free countries in 2009 with 4.39. The second is Georgia that has raised its score from 4.93 to 4.86. The democratic environment in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus have rapidly worsened since launching the EaP, scoring 5.43, 6.46 and 6.57 respectively, especially in the last two countries, labelled as consolidated authoritarian regimes (Freedom House Country Reports, 2009; 2011) Therefore, I would still argue that despite their more or less similar aspirations towards the European integration, the EaP six countries are too distinctive in their needs and preferences to be applied with the same conditions. Each of the stories is a special case with different dynamic of democratic transition that has to be accommodated by the EU transformative incentives. I claim the main flaw of the EaP to be an assymetric delivery of their offers to the six countries. If we make a rough comparison, “some partners are closer to the EU in terms of democratic development and aspirations and can transform through EU positive conditionality, especially if the carrot offered by the EU is sweet enough” (Boonstra & Shapovalova, 2010). The proposals were obviously more benefiting for the countries with very poor record of democratic improvements during the recent years, meanwhile the more progressive states like Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova were in a relatively disadvantaged position, instead of awarding them with, for example, visa liberalization as a starting point, for trying to do their “hometasks”. The fact that European Commission foresaw €175 million for all the EaP6 in three years perspective clearly shows their level of commitment. While current estimations predict that only Ukraine will need $100 billion from 2006-2015 to satisfy EU conditions and implement comprehensive reforms in eight priority policies (Mayhew, 2008). The high costs of democratic reforms endorsed by the Commission forces the national governments to postpone or avoid their execution, especially when the encouragements and financial assistance provided have been rather marginal. Consequently, the region as a whole has not seen any headway for democratic consolidation that greatly declines the EU’s transformative power in its Eastern neighborhood. Commonly, preelection promises about democratic reforms do not tend to be undertaken by the governments after their charismatic and loud victories. Under the conditions of typically weak opposition movements and incapable civil societies, newly elected governments have no difficulties to seize too much power and thus drive the country to semi-authoritarian rule. Normative Power Europe or Rational Choice? When talking about the normative power of Europe, it is essential to mention Ian Manners and his influential and at the same time, controversial article where he claims the EU to be representing a solid normative power and is authoritative enough to define what can be “normal” in international politics. “The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002). He identifies five core and five secondary norms of the EU considering them as its normative basis. He starts listing the core norms with 1) peace, 2) liberty, 3) democracy, 4) respect for human rights, and 5) rule of law, found in acquis communautaire, acquis politique, The Copenhagen Criteria, The Treaty of European Union and various EU laws (Manners, 2002). The secondary norms include solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. However, more interesting and relevant for our topic is the measures for spreading these norms in different regions such as new policy initiatives by the Commission or the EU Presidency, intensive trade, exchange of goods and financial or technical assistance, inter-regional cooperation, creation of political and social identity based on its fundamental norms. I have no doubt that the EU has gained a certain degree of normative power and it has capacity to influence and define what has to be normal and how politics should be pursued, but I argue that Manner’s belief still lacks empirical evidences. He tries to bring an example of abolition of death penalty, successfully influenced by the EU in many countries, but this argument is not convincing enough, especially when even the EaP country refused to adopt it, particularly Belarus. Furthermore, he brings the examples of human rights diffusion in Turkish legislation, which have been constantly abused and the environmental norms in the UK, which has also been unresponsively fulfilled. Death penalty is not really an issue carrying significant importance for national interests and those states could have easily made a compromise not to disappoint European “friends”. As a matter of fact, governments do not tend to make compromises to reform electoral and judicial systems or media environment, which have been under state control. They are unlikely to share power to opposition movements or civil society voluntarily, unless they are sufficiently forced and thus the enforcement has to become the key objective of the Eastern Partnership. “More than ever before the EU faces the challenge of effective application of conditionality in the EaP. The EU must resolve the ongoing dilemma between consistency in application of conditionality and the leverage it can have regarding partner countries. “Otherwise, the EU risks losing its credibility among neighboring states and their populations” (Boonstra & Shapovalova, 2010). Coming out of the rational choices of state leaders, it is rather difficult for me to see the EU’s capacities to encourage governments towards those expensive transformations unless more attractive perspectives are offered and stronger mechanisms are set up to regulate the democratisation process. It is crucial for the EU to establish its active presence and provide sufficient funding for the costly EaP reforms. Hence, from my point of view, it would be more adequate to disagree with Manners and admit that what the EU does is much more important today, than what it says or especially what it is. Conclusion Conclusively, I would still argue that it has been inadequate to frame all of the EaP6 countries with different approaches under similar conditions. Simplification of the region makes it rather difficult to acknowledge the actual problems and challenges in each of the particular states. They have quite distinctive attitudes towards the relations with the European Community and they need to be treated with different expertise and analyses. In such countries as Azerbaijan and Armenia the EU needs to take up very careful policies because of their close ties with Russia. Oil reach Azerbaijan will supposedly be interested only in economic and trade relations with European states and will not accept any tough political regulations set by the EU. Armenia considers itself as a patronage of the Putin administration, permanently supplying them with financial and military aids. The EU rewards must be higher in order to make Armenia reconsider their foreign policy preferences. Supposedly, they will continue too seek economic advantages from the Eastern Partnership, trying to avoid “unnecessary” costly reforms. A relationship with Belarus has to be lunched with the most accuracy, especially after launching the customs union with Russian and Kazakhstan in 2010. Human rights abuse and disrespect for rule of law stays in the agenda as the most painful concerns out of the EaP6, but launching further economic sanctions to Lukashenko government might motivate them to completely turn their back upon Europe and democratic values. Ukraine might be the least passionate about the EaP as it is already benefiting with close relationships with the EU and it did not provide any significant novelties for them. The issue of underfunding is a primary concern for Yanukovich administration. Moldova has successfully undertaken their responsibillty to maintain an effective democratic transformation. They will find easier to reassess mutual interests with the EU and the Europeans are likely to get more committed in their democratisation process, unless the Communist party is in absolute majority. The easiest space for the EU to demonstrate its transformative power is Georgia who has no other alternatives rather than striving towards Europe and NATO. Despite significant economic growth and becoming European-type of modernized country there is still very limited progress of civil participation in decision making that badly affects the problem of transparency of state administrative resources. Freedom of media or judicial system is also questionable although Georgia has been admitted to run the most effective struggle against corruption since the last decade. Saakashvili administration is actively engaged in fulfilling the EU conditions in order to launch the DCFTA as soon as possible that will undoubtedly increase their internal reputation. Subsequently, the Eastern Partnership is having difficulties to overcome the ENP obstacles in regards of successful incentives for democratic formations. “This is not to say that the EU’s impact will necessarily be negligible without a membership perspective… the impact of credible association has been clearly more consistent than that of association without credible conditionality” (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2007). We might argue that the EU does not invest enough in fostering democracy in the EaP countries to play a strategic role in their domestic policies. Higher the EU incentives and engagements are, greater perspectives for effective promotion of democratic transformation, even without a full membership perspective. The EaP agreement clearly displays the lack of political will from the European Community to add credible values to their presence by not just setting up the conditions but creating capable reform-control mechanisms for their implementation. Inexpensive reforms such as visa liberalization or Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) could have been implemented years ago. Since the attitude remains so indifferent, the EaP countries are likely to continue short-term fragmented, incomplete reforms capable to work only for certain period of time. They will need to show the Europeans their ongoing commitment, hunt for the following financial assistance and attract foreign investments. Ultimately, it happens at the expense of democracy, that makes a fundamental consolidation much further perspective. References Boonstra, Jos & Shapovalova, Natalia (2010), “The EU’s Eastern Partnership: One Year Backwards”, FRIDE Working Paper: A European Think Tank for Global Action Borzel, Tanja A. & Risse, Thomas (2000), “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 4, No. 15. Commission of the European Communities Report (24 June, 1992), “Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement” Cremona, Marise (1998), “The European Union as an International Actor: The Issues of Flexibility and Linkage”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 67– 94. Delanty, Gerard & Rumford, Chris (2005), “Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and Implications of Europeanization”, Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, pp. 168-183 EU Observer (22.05.2008), “Poland and Sweden to Pitch 'Eastern Partnership' Idea”. EU Observer (18.03.2009), “Values to Form Core of EU 'Eastern Partnership'”. European Union External Action; http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm Freedom House Country Report (2009; 2011), “Freedom in the World”. Grabbe, Heather (2006), “The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe”, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, Palgrave Macmillan Ladrech, Robert (2010), “Europeanization and National Politics”, Palgrave Macmillan, The European Union Series, pp. 165-189. Manners, Ian (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in terms?” University of Kent at Canterbury, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 40, No. 2, pp. 235–258. Mayhew, Alan (2008), “Ukraine and the European Union: Financing Accelerating Integration”, Urzad Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (UKIE), Warsaw. Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001), “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 47– 80. Schimmelfennig, Frank & Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005), “Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe”, Cornell University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank & Scholtz, Hanno (2007), “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighborhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development, and Transnational Exchange”, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR), Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, Working Paper No. 9.