CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS: THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE UNQUESTIONED IN IBN KHALDUN, MACHIAVELLI AND CARL SCHMITT Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469– 1527), and Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) made monumental contributions to political science and philosophy. They rebelled against the prevailing wisdom of Greco– Islamic/Christian thought which has historically sought to sanitize conflict and have helped generations understand a world that can appear immoral and obscure. Theories of these three artisans ground the perspective promoted in this book. Political history and philosophy is presented as a dialectic between the question (controversies and crises), on the one hand, and the unquestioned (established authority, the sacred, common principles, etc …) on the other. How these three greats of the Islamic golden age, Renaissance, and modern era framed their discourses on politics informs the narrative. Dr. Colm Gillis obtained a doctorate in chemistry from the University of East Anglia in 2016. Prior to 2016, he has four books in circulation. He writes about political philosophy, political history, and also has one book of poetry. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS This page intentionally left blank CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS: THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE UNQUESTIONED IN IBN KHALDUN, MACHIAVELLI AND CARL SCHMITT Dr. Colm Gillis CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Text Copyright © 2018 Colm Gillis All Rights Reserved First published 2018 Cover Art by Muhammad Ameen Franklin This book is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This book may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each recipient. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author. ISBN: 9781980358602 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS When your Lord said to the angels, ‘I am putting a representative on the earth,’ they said, ‘Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it and shed blood when we glorify You with praise and proclaim Your purity?. He said, ‘I known what you do not know.’ Quran, 2:30 (Bewley Trans.) The Greeks saw the entire nobility of their existence in the ability to question. The ability to question was their standard for distinguishing themselves from those who did not have it and did not want it. Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?; (p. 42) CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Preface Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469– 1527), and Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) are only three of the many notable intellectuals who have graced the arena of politics. So, the question may justifiably be asked: why are these Leviathans thrown together (seemingly randomly) in this book? Or again, if I am going to throw them together, why not include them in an encyclopaedia of other great political thinkers? My defense is this: Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Schmitt, were rebels of a peculiar stripe, sharing important features in common which can serve as the basis for a consistent thesis, an argument which can be developed in a consistent manner with material derived from the afore–mentioned aristocrats. Their insurgency was against the broad swathe of Western and Islamic thinkers who either wishfully viewed history as a prelude to a golden dawn or who waxed despondently of human nature. They defied those who have sanitized politics throughout known history. Instead of seeking a declaration of independence from history, by either proposing that the current system could never be bettered or that they had an ideal system in their hands which only needed a buyer, the three colossi accepted reality. Political life, by its nature, is ever fluid, CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS unstable, chaotic, uncertain. Transformation of human nature was futile, maybe even a worse evil. The truth set them free. Additionally, the triumvirate engaged in more than theoretical posturing. They experienced the pleasures and pains of power first–hand. Nevertheless, by contrast with other figures such as Thomas More (1478–1535) who were also involved in the cut and thrust of politics, their feet remained on the concrete. They adopted a scientific approach within a subject where it is all too easy to either condemn everything radical or praise what is merely familiar. They unsettled the status quo, communicating their observations in striking and memorable terms. Their writings not only challenge us – many of the more comforting intellectuals achieve that – but they astound us with their level–headedness and sheer realpolitik, their refusal to shy away from murkier aspects of the world. The Sun doesn’t extinguish itself if you live in a cave. To those who say my interest in Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli and Schmitt is highly personal, I say there is a measure of truth in that charge. I am channelling my own views on politics through the spirit of these great scholars. Possibly, I am reading them a certain way which is incorrect in parts, or CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS else which frays at the edges. In fact, it’s a certainty. Has anybody ever ingested and digested anyone else without seeing their own experiences or ‘projecting’ themselves somewhat? My defense on this matter is that I have approached their work with sincerity and an open heart, not wishing to defile any of the triumvirate by deliberately skewing their teachings. The position which I have taken in this work, namely that the axis of politics is a kind of tactical questioning and removal of doubt, is the rock I’ve built my house upon. At the end of the day, every philosophy is wrong. Yet, is it slippery sand or a relatively firm but eroding base that forms the foundation? Whatever the case, we must put our errors out there, in the hope that there is enough succulent meat clinging to the bone to chew on. So, welcome; you’re invited to taste the flavour of these words and ideas. Dr. Colm Gillis Norwich 2/6/1439 AH; 18/2/2018 CE CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Introduction In.1 Questions: Of Political and Non–Political In.2 Heaven on Earth (and Competitors) In.3 Make Controversy History? (What Does History Say?) In.4 Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Schmitt In.5 Argument Chapter I Ibn Khaldun: The Question Concerning ‘Asabiyyah I.1 Background to Muqaddimah I.2 Artisans and Zealots I.3 Al–‘Umran I.4 A Glorious and Fatal Cycle I.5 Contentious Interference I.6 ‘Asabiyyah I.7 Religion I.8 Rational and Utopian Politics I.9 Law as Corruption I.10 Ibn Khaldun the Zealot CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.11 Ibn Khaldun and the Ottomans Chapter II Machiavelli: The Question Concerning Prudence II.1 Governmental Forms II.2 A Neo–Polybian Cycle II.3 Deliberate Contentiousness II.4 The Domestic Scene II.5 Commoners and Nobles II.6 Taxation II.7 The Foundational II.8 The Accusation II.9 Immigration II.10 Religion II.11 The Dictator CHAPTER III Carl Schmitt: The Question Concerning the Decision III.1 “Who Decides?” III.2 A Machiavellian Obsession with Form III.3 Attention–Seeking with Controversy and Crisis III.4 The Enlightened Anti–Liberal III.5 The Quandary of Liberty and Democracy III.6 The Purge III.7 States of Exception III.8 Legitimacy CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS III.9 The Decision III.10 The Federation III.11 Contra Just War Conclusion References DR. COLM GILLIS CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Introduction The enemy is our own question as a figure. And he will hunt us, and we him, to the same end. Theodor Däubler, Sang an Palermo In.1 Questions: Of Political and Non–Political Questioning is an all too human habit. Pick any theatre you care to name. If we work, we are constantly being questioned about our efficiency and intentions. When we go home, our children question us and (as every hen–pecked husband knows!) our wife questions us. Police might stop us; we have questions to answer. Courts are question and answer sessions which scientifically determine whether legal lines have been crossed. When we shop, we are questioned or – to put it more CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS politely – ‘interest’ is shown in our consumer tendencies. At school, we are questioned. Break down all the faculties and schools at university you want; academia is simply one question after another. So, is it stating anything to say that this book is about politics and politics is about questioning? Politics may seem like simply another human activity where there are questions and responses, answers or else various methods by which similar questions can be answered in different but not necessarily incorrect or invalid ways. The only significant difference we may cite is that the questions regarding politics are different from those of engineering, ethics, or any field of human activity we may care to mention, merely because it is a different arena. Nonetheless, it is intuitive to grasp that questions in politics are often more urgent and risqué than those of a philosophy lecture. There is a simple explanation for this. In politics there is a crucial dialectic between normal questioning, the human desire to know, and the unquestioned, which in religion is the sacred or in politics might be some pure and sublime principle such as equality or which, alternatively, can also be the cult of a person (the latter something we CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS forget in an age of democratic legitimacy).1 Any ruler, or system of rule, will seek to make itself an unquestioned act of faith. While this is obvious for theocracies, monarchies, and the like, this is true even for free societies where ideals like the rule of law or the will of the people are guarded jealously. Since there is a human desire to gain access to the power granted by the unquestioned, questioning itself is transformed from what it might be in the clubs of truth– seeking. In politics, questioning can often become an empty shell, devoid of any meaningful search to uncover facts or formulate truths. There is usually a tendency to seize on any mistakes of the enemy but to excuse those of your own. Admissions of facts or of truths can often become tactical, so as not to lose face. Added to that is the old adage that man is a social animal. By definition, no man is an island and humans exist in social groups where men and women fulfil specific roles, where there are structures, elites, strata, and 1 The legendary example of the Pythagorean Hippasus being killed for discovering irrational numbers, or the more verifiable historical instance of Galileo being threatened with torture for upsetting the prevailing cosmology, may appear to show that academia is not immune from guarding the unquestioned. However, in both cases there was either a political doctrine to be protected (Galileo) or a quasi–auto o ous so iet hi h a ted to pu ge itself of false dogmas. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS customary understandings, both spoken and unspoken. This realistic view leads to the following definition: Politics is social manoeuvring disguised as ethics. Social manoeuvring is the essence of politics but ethics is the Trojan horse of political tactics and strategies. So, a leader or intellectual may advance an argument that the other team are behaving unfairly while turning a blind eye to similar or worse infractions at their own end. Stakes are high and every battleground, particularly that of the truth, is transformed into a tool of politics. Yet, it’s not always the case that politics becomes so empty that it screams of being a sham. Where this does happen, you have a tyranny, either of an autocrat or a mob. But typically, one side can’t score a complete victory over the other or assume a position of brutal hegemony. Some measure of compromise has to take shape. Despite the apparently cynical approach to politics defined earlier, it is true that conflict and competition usually lead to at least some semblance of justice, or at the very least agreement on ground rules. Competing political interests result in a melee of questions being thrown up. Questions are the by–product of politics, but the injustice of these questions are ‘de– politicized’ somewhat by practical considerations. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In a rather simple model of conflict involving two parties the cut and thrust of questions means that a neutral third party is sought. Questions then pre–condition political authority. And political authority can be summed up in one word: judgement. Judgements may arrive in the guise of a legislature passing laws, a justice giving his/her decision, or an executive resolving to pursue a certain policy, e.g. reforming the economy or waging war. We call the division of judgement the ‘balance of powers,’ but in reality it’s a specialization of functions and a managerial approach to the science of governance. Whoever is said to be sovereign is the Supreme Court, the home of last appeal. The relationship between authority and those whom authority dominates can be characterized as a question and judgement session. In a speculation on the origins of sovereignty, De Jouvenal (1903–1987) summarizes how questioning gives rise to authority in the following elegant example: Now let us take a look at a group of fishermen, each in his boat, fishing the same stretch of water. There is no need in their case for a fishing commodore: all of them operate as independent individuals. Yet there will be times when their nets foul each other, when there is dispute as to the ownership of particular fish, when quarrels arise. At such times an arbitrator will be needed who can by his appeasing influence restore CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS peace. And it is a condition of success in the part that the arbitrator enjoys a habitual respect.2 When this authority is largely unquestioned, we say it enjoys legitimacy. When telling questions begin to be asked authority is diminished and at some stage the once legitimate authority will be overthrown. Legitimacy is the currency of authority; ‘uncomfortable’ questions devalue legitimacy and consequently authority. Authority for its part asks those ‘underneath’ for obedience. Greater obedience amounts to less searching questions. Those who are obedient to authority will yet fight and claw with each other as groups, as religious groups, trade groups, social groups, ethnic groups, ideological groups, or as official groups (like military classes). These vying fragments question each other and jockey for position.3 There also will be external allies and enemies. These antagonists have a tendency to ask both less civil, or highly civil, questions. When relations are good, 2 Jouvenal. Sovereignty; 34. It s ote o th that those ho a e ost opposed to a hie a h o do i atio i so iet uestio e e thi g ost i te sel . We a think of anarchists or left–wingers (either Communists/Socialists or Cultural Marxists/New Left, but perhaps only when they are not in power themselves). The equally intense manner with which such ideologues exercise themselves in suppressing dissent – either directly by oppression or re–edu atio , o i di e tl politi al o e t ess (censorship) – is ironic but also attests to the central role questioning plays in political discourse. 3 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS highly civil questions are asked in a rigorous format. This is known as diplomacy internationally or stability domestically. When relations are bad or non–existent, there is a state of emergency, civil war, or inter–state war. By default, all nations and states in the world are at war with one another until they have diplomatic relations. When relations break down, questions are asked in less formal manners, in the way of testing resolve and military strength, in the way of casting doubt on a country’s credibility or integrity. This might not be with a view to destroying the enemy, but can be a means of deflecting domestic questions by making the local constituency focus on foreign policy. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In.2 Heaven on Earth (and Competitors) Governance could be defined as security, as bureaucracy, as form, as liberation. However it is defined, the essence of all governance is creating the illusion of a heaven on earth. The more this firm illusion, the more secure the invisible grip on the hearts and minds of the subjects, a state also known as authority. Yet, to create, implement, maintain, sustain, and cultivate authority is no mean task. Power will generally be seized violently, a fact that usually gets lost after the event, except to inveterate foes of the new regime. There are often purges and civil strife accompanying the new takeover, although this is typically less extreme than what occurs during the initial seizure of power.4 “o eti es it s diffi ult to easo h the old gua d suffe ed a loss of authority. It's a lot easier to explain the overthrow of the Czar in 1917 than his cousin in Germany the following year, for instance, but to many people in Russia at the time the democratic, and then Bolshevik, coups must have seemed like alien entities from a distant planet assuming control. And governments that 'should' have been overthrown weren't, while those who shouldn't have were. Italians rose up against the mild Fascism of Mussolini, while the German commoners never tried to replace Hitler (that task was left to the aristocrats and eventually to a combination of liberals and Bolsheviks). 4 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Invariably, the dust settles. Once wounds heal, once the new order is accepted as a reality, if not necessarily with any degree of yearning. Once all serious issues have been resolved, then the new authority will take charge, typically for several generations at least. Outward signs of prestige dominate. Symbols of the prevailing authority festoon the public domain. Festivals are held, commemorating important events in the revolution or religious days crucial to the new order. Courts deliver just verdicts. Public scandals are dealt with satisfactorily. Emergencies are overcome. Milestones are accomplished. New fields, agricultural, industrial, or otherwise, are ploughed. History supports the institution and maintenance of the authority. Education inculcates a general respect. There is normality. Every day, every year, the wheel of time turns. Narratives repeat and solidify the public tale. All seems natural and foreordained. Enemies of the regime might be expelled or imprisoned. But even if the ‘ground zero’ of revolution grants the new order complete authority and legitimacy, there will inevitably be splits amongst those close to the reins of power. Boats will either be raised or lowered, or perceived to be so. Those who Another point relates to bloodshed after the seizure of power. Totalitarian movements often buck the trend whereby the seizure of power is followed by more benign rule post– oup d état. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS are raised will champ at the bit and thus level questions so as to gain even more power. Those who see their stock plummet may hearken (in the misty glow of romanticism) to more beneficial times. Some may simply be bored and pine for the excitement of adventure; they will question so as to satisfy the natural human desire to relieve ennui. Some or all of the established patterns of authority cited in the previous paragraph then become challenged. These manoeuvres go under the headings of dissent, rebellion, protest, treason, sedition, plotting. History is often the most bitter battlefield because it is so critical in underpinning legitimacy. Often the first act of a new regime is to re–write the chronicles. What happens when authority is questioned, when heaven on earth is revealed as hell, when Disneyland is unmasked as a façade for Hotel California? Well, the questioner(s) could be executed, they could be marginalized, they could be ostracized, they may suffer slander, they might be castigated as mad. This would be characteristic of authorities such as monarchies where personal dignity is paramount in commanding obedience. More enlightened authorities, realizing that naked coercion threatens the normal and seemingly automatically functioning world that has been set in train, will desist from such naked oppression, giving space for contrarian opinions. This is a risky but necessary CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS strategy. In such a scenario, history will become a topic of debate. Dissenters who refrain from saluting the flag or participating in public ceremonies are excused; after a while, their rebellion may even become normal to the point of securing commercial interest. Soldiers are not cheered on their way to the battlefield. Actions and words that would have been blasphemous for previous generations are met with a shrug of the shoulders. The price of the polite detente is a state of uncertainty. Those wishing to provoke revolution lack the frictional forces which give them a certain moral leverage. But the State may appear weak and ripe for revolution. Tension still reigns in such a detente and conflict is usually a few steps away.5 In any case, how can we summarize what is going on here? At the apex of any polity sits a powerful principle. This attracts either jealousy, legitimate criticism, or simply natural competition.6 Authority and its supporters seek to 5 A good example is the contentedness with the 'cosy consensus' politics which existed across much of the Western world post-WWII, no doubt a reaction against the apocalyptically violent war that preceded the truce. 6 It s o th poi ti g out that political power is ot so eo e s i th ight. It s ha d to o st u t a moral framework where someone has a right to dominate someone else, no matter what criteria of moral superiority, religious piety, bravery, custom, good family, popula it , et …, e hoose to appl . Of ou se the e a e CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS shield their house from being divided. Competitors want to stir the pot. Authority and its champions throw questions back onto the pretenders and the favour is returned in kind. Questions may not be exclusively verbal. Authority can employ force to underpin its denials of impropriety, the pretender may rebel likewise. Questioning can be resolved into two components. One component is controversy; it is simply the appeal to a constituent audience susceptible to doubting the story told by authority.7 The other form of questioning is that of crisis, often that of external threats, civil conflict, or financial stress. Where there is no genuine attempt to displace or replace power, we cannot speak of questioning in the sense meant here. If taken to extremes, conflict is framed in the accepted institutions that either the powerful or the people decide upo to esol e the issue. But agai , it s ha d to o st u t a o al framework where personal popularity is any more ethical than, say, the right of birth. 7 Sticking to strictly dynastic examples, the Estates representative will sa that the “u does t ise at the Ki g s ehest, o that i app op iate corruption has rendered monarchy superfluous, or even that o a h is t that atio al a s ste afte all. Or as great historical examples in the theological sphere, look at Galileo (1564–1642) or Luthe s (1483–1546) quarrels with the church. Luther called for a root a d a h lea si g of the hu h, Galileo s dep e atio of Aristotelian cosmology was enough to throw the Vatican into crisis. Republics can also suffer from great controversies, Weimar Germany the supreme instance. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS starkest language and this is even evident for non–violent, domestic conflict. Violence done by one side is terrorism, violence by the other police actions. One side robs from the public purse, the other improves the economy. One side suppresses free speech, the other is merely clamping down on hateful or extremist sentiments. Each side will develop terms and phrases favourable to its own world–view. All the most blameworthy insults are projected, with the strategy that of raising sufficient question–marks over the other side. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In.3 Make Controversy History? (What Does History Say?) No one, not even the most optimistic about the ability of public affairs to resolve conflict, would deny that politics is an arena of controversy and crises, a stage for bitter debates and unspeakable cruelty. That men can succumb to brutality, or engage in major controversies with the potential to cripple society, was a spectre memorably explored in Hobbes’ (1588–1679) Leviathan (1651).8 However Hobbes’ masterpiece is interpreted (or mis–interpreted), one conclusion, important for this discussion, is clear; Hobbes said that an end must be brought to controversies within a territory so that civil society can flourish and the sovereign can deal with external threats. He countered domestic controversy so that the sovereign could focus on crises In formulating his theories, Hobbes saw civil society as grounded in a social contract. He sought to end any questions 8 Leviathan justifies authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism, while relying on essentially democratic arguments rooted in psychological theory concerning the self–interested motives of the most dangerous individuals in a society. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS over the right of the sovereign to be obeyed and even in the 17th century had a keen perception that democratic legitimacy had a special currency. The basic argument was that men themselves had written the terms of their own obedience by entering into a social contract. Reneging on this accord was unjust. In the absence of such agreement, Hobbes felt compelled to deliver one of the most famous, and pessimistic, evaluations of what happens in a political vacuum. [In] a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man … In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.9 Those who followed Hobbes, like Locke (1632–1704), had more optimistic assessments of human nature. Hence, they did not view revolution as necessarily a bad thing because some governments were indeed tyrannies, and since government was identical with law (tyranny inherently anti– 9 Hobbes. Leviathan; Bk. I, 13. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS legalistic), an unlawful government could be overthrown since it was a government only in name. This tendency has been a staple of philosophy going back to the ancient Greeks. Over time many more philosophers were convinced that there existed a holy grail of stable and self–sustaining government and also a just international order. Since tyranny is essentially blatant disregard for law and lack of representation, law and representative government engaged intellectuals like Montesquieu (1689–1755). By the time of the French and American revolutions, it was thought by a great many influential intellectuals that a balance of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary unlocked secrets of nature concerning human governance. Liberals in the post–Hobbesian world did understand that constitutional government would neither be controversy nor crisis–free; they certainly had no illusions about foreign affairs and on the whole conceived the latter as a desert of morality on which the sands shifted unpredictably. Nonetheless, since Hobbes’ time, a certain confidence has been expressed that there do exist mechanisms – discoverable by empiricism and natural reason, and further regulated by natural rights (i.e. humans possessing essentials of personal integrity) – for managing crises and controversies. In sum, the end of the world of crises and CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS controversies is nigh or, to put it another way, questions about political authority and power can be rendered manageable. The general ideological, intellectual, sociological, and historical trends of the last several centuries can all be categorized in a box marked: The end of controversy and crisis. Not surprisingly, this has been accompanied by a desire to end all forms of domination by humans over other humans (i.e. an ending of personal authority). The words ‘crisis’ and ‘controversy’ may still be used, but they will inaccurately depict situations that will more precisely be described as events that are slight wrinkles on the fabric of the ‘new’ history. Even ‘history’ itself has become, a dirty word, ‘history’ synonymous with a ‘bad past.’ Religion as well must either go or be watered down, because it is guilty, in the minds of many enlightened people, for stoking sectarian passions by providing well–defined roadmaps for living in harmony with one’s conscience (to the flagrant disregard of non–believers), and even more controversially, dispensing answers to life’s big questions. Of course, religion and history will have their place. Religious people will act as social workers, and historians will titillate us with stories of how bad things were, entertaining and engaging us, albeit the events they describe will be a safe historical CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS distance away. In addition, to crackdown on religions or historians would violate the very principles of non– controversy and non–crisis liberals espouse. We would be bringing ourselves to ‘their’ level. But in the heel of the hunt, the students of theology or history mustn’t be allowed to dictate behaviour and politics. If religion acquires too much power, it will set up barriers between believers and heathens, both within a territory and without. History is a similarly fraught battlefield, with its teachers imbuing novices with notions of identity and place. So, historians, like religious gurus, must be labelled X–rated: not suitable for all viewers. Alert readers will of course be aware that the justifications for liberal–democracy that posit an ‘end of history’ are in fact indistinguishable from the praise of flattering courtiers who surrounded themselves around the personage of the king in times past. Saying that liberal–democracy is non– controversial and justifying this statement on the basis that history is a story of the mass of people yearning for recognition (or institutionalizing some of such arguments) liberal–democracy itself. is the It is understandable and completely natural that those who benefit from the current paradigm, or are simply committed to it because it is the only reality they know, would seek to defend it and clothe it in objective scientific theses. At CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS bottom, however, it is a political justification and not merely scientific demonstration of fact that democracy is the be–all and end–all. Of course, in 2017, there is a major assault being launched on the ramparts of liberal–democracy, even in the bastion of liberal–democracy itself, which goes to show that every regime has its defenders and competitors. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In.4 Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Schmitt Instead of adopting the liberal perspective on the question, this topic will be approached from a realist angle in this book. The question within politics will not be considered a ‘problem,’ as such, which is the natural tendency of liberal and leftist thinkers. An ‘end of history,’ (i.e. an end to critical questioning) will not be posited. Neither will conflict be celebrated, still less will it be considered a ‘tragedy.’ Rather, politics and political authority are merely elements of the human condition; the questioning of authority, the questioning of those dominated by authority by authority itself, and the mutual questioning of those competing with one another in the game of pseudo–ethical social manoeuvring, realities we live with, past generations have lived with, and inheritances to future generations. To explore controversy and crisis I will call to the witness stand three of the greatest political philosophers and political scientists in history; Ibn Khaldun, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Carl Schmitt. Before presenting the thesis of the book in terms of the intellectual work of the triumvirate, we will briefly look at the life of each. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Wali al–Din ʿAbd al–Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr Muhammad ibn al–Hasan Ibn Khaldun was born on Ramadhan 1, 1332 AH in Tunis, the son of a jurist, philologist, and poet. He went to study under the great philosopher Al–Abili (n.d.). From the age of twenty, Ibn Khaldun worked his way through a series of relatively high–level political and judicial appointments. These were with major dynasties in the Muslim world – the Hafsids (13th–16th century), Merinids (13th–15th century), Nasrids (13th–15th century), and Ziyanids (13th–16th century) – of whom some were direct rivals during Ibn Khaldun’s political career. Not only was Ibn Khaldun an erudite scholar, but he was also a cunning political operator who lacked sentiment or loyalty. This sometimes back–fired and he spent time imprisoned, exiled, in fear of his life, or temporarily sidelined from power. Nevertheless, his high standing as a scholar, coupled with his political experience, often made him an invaluable, although unreliable, asset to Muslim rulers. He was the quintessential ‘loose cannon.’ In 1374, he shied away from political matters and began work on his masterpiece, popularly known as AlMuqadimmah, completed in 1377. After a brief return to North African politics, he left the Maghreb for good in 1382 for Egypt. In his new homeland, he held prestigious posts, CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS filled the position of Chief Justice, and became wealthy from his various professions. During his Egyptian ‘autumn,’ he seems to have become more ‘down-to-earth’ religious and was appointed head of a major Sufi Institute in Egypt in 1389. While not immune from power politics, he yet did his best to stay out of intrigues as best he could, although his fortunes swung as they had done during his tumultuous career in the Maghreb. In 1401, he had a famous meeting with the Mongol warlord Timurlane (1336–1405), where Ibn Khaldun played the role of diplomat when the great Khan besieged and then sacked Damascus. Not long after a sixth appointment as Chief Justice in Egypt, Ibn Khaldun died in 1406.10 Niccolò di Messer Bernardo Machiavelli was born in 1469 to a trained, yet impoverished, lawyer. The Machiavelli family did have a degree of political pedigree, however, and were of the lower Florentine nobility. After receiving a relatively good education, Machiavelli tried his hand at poetry but was later drawn into politics during a tumultuous period in his city’s history. Florence had been conquered by 10 Ardiç. Genealogy or Asabiyya?; Enan. Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work; 3–64, 70–100; Gierer. Ibn Khaldun on Solidarity; Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; T a slato s I t odu tio ; Isla . Contrasting Political Theory in the East and West; Mahdi. I Khaldu s Philosoph of History; 24, 28–43, 52–60. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the French in 1494, and endured four years of revolutionary turmoil, before embarking on a more stable course dominated by an egalitarian republican ethic. Machiavelli put in a fourteen year stint within the city’s Chancery starting in 1498. He served as both first and second Chancellor within the Department of External Affairs (First and Second referred not to rank, but to different responsibilities). Despite his official status, he also took on a number of other posts technically outside his remit. In 1507, he took on the additional responsibility of administrating a department called the Board of Nine charged with organizing a Florentine militia, called the Ordinanza; he copied Roman tactics of recruitment, formations, deployments, and training. In 1509, the militia played a key role in capturing Pisa. An accepted appraisal of Machiavelli is that he was a hard–working and innovative official who strived with ethical propriety for the good of the republic. He tended to be critical and was not diplomatic in voicing his opinions and concerns, but at the same time demonstrated a Stoic commitment to the Florentine republic unimpeded by personal ambition. He was political, but not partisan, interested in public life without being obsessed with personal reward. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In 1512, Machiavelli was sacked by the restored Medici clan who had benefitted from a Spanish assault supported by the Papacy and aristocratic elements in Florence. Not long after being dismissed, Machiavelli found himself in prison, enduring the pangs of torture, where, among other humiliations, his shoulders were dislocated. Following release from prison, Machiavelli retreated into his family’s country home, speculating on his experiences on politics. Even in his enforced retirement, Machiavelli remained in demand as a minor political figure in Florence and even the Vatican tapped his wisdom. He also rejoined Florentine society, ‘holding court’ at the Orti Oricellari, an important cultural centre. Several works of genuine literary quality emerged from these gatherings and he also wrote highly acclaimed comedies during this period. A love affair with one Barbera Raffacani Salutati, a beautiful actress, occupied him in his later years. In 1525, he had been declared fit to run for public office and by 1526 filled a post where he, along with his son, were in charge of preparing Florentine defences. Another revolution in 1527 sidelined Machiavelli from domestic politics although he still remained ‘in the loop’ with regard to public CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS affairs. On 21st May 1527, he died after a short illness.11 His name has reverberated throughout history; whether fair or not, the statement of Leo Strauss (1899–1973) encapsulates a widely held sentiment towards Machiavelli, namely that he was a “teacher of evil.”12 Born in Westphalia in 1888, Carl Schmitt was baptized a Catholic. From a young age, he appreciated the antagonism between members of his faith and those of Protestantism. After attending university in Berlin and later Strasbourg (then part of Germany), Schmitt received his doctorate in 1910. Over the next decade, he developed the basis of a jurisprudence that came to define his career. 11 Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 6–7, 14–15, 30–39, 79–81, 98–100, 139, 185; Black. Machiavelli, servant of the Florentine republic in Bock et al. Machiavelli and republicanism; 71–99; Machiavelli. The Prince; 1–31; Guarini. Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 19–26; Landon. Politics, Patriotism and Language; 51–68; Mallett. The Theory and Practice of Warfare. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 179–180; Najemy. The controversy surrounding Machiavelli's service to the republic. in Bock et al. Machiavelli and republicanism; 102–117; Oppenheimer. Machiavelli: a life beyond ideology; 3–18, 54, 68–91, 123, 137, 154, 184–192, 199–202, 216–240; Rahe. Machiavelli's liberal republican legacy; xxxi–lxii; Unger. Machiavelli: A Biography; xxi–xxiv, 16–20, 24–137, 160–167, 189, 201–204, 237–241, 248–334, 375–382, 402–480; Viroli. Redeeming "The prince"; 57–65. 12 Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 9. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In 1919, Germany formally became a republic. While Schmitt would forever be known as a critic of the liberal– leaning republic, he was always loyal to Weimar from its inception, albeit with reservations, and Catholics like him were somewhat in the box–seat during the years of Weimar. Schmitt developed a reputation for favouring the maintenance of order over and before the application of law. In the last years of Weimar he became a political player, drawing close to conservative politicians such as Johannes Popitz (1884–1945), Franz von Papen (1879–1969), and General Kurt von Schleicher (1882–1934). During the chancellorship of Heinrich Brüning (1885–1970), the Catholic Centre party leader, and up until the Nazi seizure of power Schmitt acted as constitutional advisor to President Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934). Schmitt defended the use of emergency decrees which gave the republic brief respite through the treacherous currents of the early 1930s. However, his plans, and those of his conservative allies, to appeal to right–wing concerns ultimately backfired. Schmitt reluctantly joined the NSDAP in May 1933, although the purging of the civil service effectively compelled Schmitt to throw in his lot with his former adversaries. In return for providing legal cover for the Nazis, CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Schmitt received a full professorship in Berlin, a post at the Prussian state council, a nomination to the nascent Akademie für Deutsches Recht, an appointment to the editorial board of the publication of the National Socialist jurists – Das Deutsche Recht – and appointment to the head of higher education instructors of the National-Socialist Federation of German jurists. In 1934 Schmitt cautiously supported that year’s notorious purges in the provocatively titled The Führer Protects the Law. Opposing the slaughter of innocents, among them his friend von Schleicher, Schmitt was yet diplomatic towards his new patrons. Despite his attempts to quell the bloodshed in Germany, Schmitt’s writings appeared to emigrés as a rubberstamping of a fanaticism that was out-of-control. His former friend and emigré Waldemar Gurian (1902–1954) coined the term ‘Crown Jurist of the Third Reich’ for Schmitt, a nickname that has followed Schmitt around ever since. Protestations of emigrés against Schmitt didn’t go unnoticed by the authorities, and their dredging up of Schmitt’s past stance towards the NSDAP stifled, and then reversed, Schmitt’s rise through the ranks. Although Schmitt tried to ingratiate himself with the racist fanatics – by 1936 he had approved of the Nuremberg laws and also proposed a purging of the law–books of Jewish influence – he found himself alienated CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS from the inner circle of Nazis politics by late 1937 although he still remained an important academic and legitimist for the regime. Prior to being captured by invading Soviets in 1945, Schmitt served in the German equivalent of the Home Guard. Ironically, in light of his detestation of Communism, the Bolsheviks deemed Schmitt to be insignificant and he was released. Schmitt did not receive the same leniency from the Americans and he spent thirteen months, after his arrest in September 1945, incarcerated, suffering the ignominy of having his massive library confiscated. The main accusation levelled against him was that he had advocated the NSDAP Lebensraum policy. After his ordeal at the hands of the Americans, Schmitt retired to a house which was named San Casciano, the municipality of Machiavelli’s country home. Since he refused to admit his ‘war–guilt’ Schmitt would never hold an academic position again but he became an icon of the ‘New Left’ and ‘New Right’ over the coming decades. He died in 1985.13 Of all the statements made about Schmitt, 13 Auerbach. Carl Schmitt's quest for the political; Bendersky. Carl Schmitt, theorist for the Reich; Bendersky. The Definite and the Dubious; Bendersky. New Evidence, Old Contradictions; Hooker. Carl S h itt s International Thought; xiii; McCormick. Ca l S h itt s Critique of Liberalism; 266–271, 302–305; Norris. Review Essay: A Mine that Explodes Silently; Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 4, 7, CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the evaluation that he was a “mine that explodes silently,” by his friend Ernst Jünger (1895–1998) is perhaps the most succinct, enduring and accurate.14 His influence is likely to extend for centuries to come, with unpredictable results. 13–14; Schmitt. Constitutional Theory; 20–23; Schmitt. Dictatorship; xvii; Schmitt. The Leviathan; xii–xiii, xvi; Schmitt. The Nomos of the Earth; 12–19; Schmitt. Political Romanticism; ix–xi; Schmitt. Political Theology II; 1–2; Schmitt. State, Movement, People; viii–xiii; Schwab. The Challenge of the Exception; Seitzer. Legality and Legitimacy; xvi, xx–xxi; Zheng. Carl Schmitt, Mao Zedong and the politics of transition; Žižek. Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post–Politics. In Mouffe. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt; 18–37. 14 Norris, A. (2005). Review Essay: A Mine that Explodes Silently. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In.5 Argument The argument of this book is the following: Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Schmitt offered us – in their own distinct ways – a theory of politics whose axis is the dialectic of the question and the unquestioned. Authority finds it necessary to secure unquestioned ground. Those outside established authority, who are yet powerful, ‘shake’ authority by questioning it through the raising of controversies and instigation of crises. Authority continually finds itself having to issue judgements. These either stabilize its authority by operating within the rule book or by invoking responses to questions in ways which are themselves controversial. When the rule book is followed the effect is to make rule established, rational, and calculable. This avenue yet opens up the authority to overthrow because rule is consistently rendered impersonal and bureaucratic. Pretenders can attack or usurp power; reacting to this can be poisonous for authority because it is felt to be wrong to behave autocratically. If a crisis is responded to with something like dictatorship this show of power unmasks the reality of authority. Authority is no longer subtly operating and this CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS poses risks. Usurpers or conquerors can seize power either when there is a lack of belief in the prevailing authority or simply when military force can no longer give life to the understanding that authority functions automatically, permanently, and without interruption. As regards methods of our three intellectuals, Ibn Khaldun presented the politics of controversy and crisis in systematic terms. He applied a model of dynastic power with the concept of ‘asabiyyah – loosely translated as group–feeling or group–ethic – at its heart. Once a dynasty loses the bonds of group–feeling, it is overtaken by a rival with greater ‘asabiyyah. Nonetheless, the insurgents are foreign and thus their usurpation is controversial. To rationalize their power and make the dynasty unquestioned the incumbents first consolidate their rule. This is accomplished largely through just dealings and light burdens being placed on the populace. Then, the dynasty purges itself of its former supporters and finds new clients who will support it. This is to avoid crises stemming from internal power struggles. Later, the demands of the court outstrip those of fair and equitable dealings. More laws, taxes, and intrusions are needed to de– personalize power but are also products of an inner corruption and decadence. In fact, Ibn Khaldun’s entire theory of politics could easily be described in terms of CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS prudent and imprudent taxation. Finally, the dynasty is ripe for overthrow and can no longer call on the same store of zeal as its competitor. At the very moment it is has elevated itself above the clouds, it gets brought crashing down to earth. Machiavelli had little in the way of method, but we can construct one for him while still remaining true to his writings. The best way to encounter Machiavelli’s political science is to take his division of States into – with some exceptions – princedoms (effectively constitutional monarchies) and republics, the latter any type of polity where personal rule was banished. The advice which Machiavelli gives to a prince and that which he gives to the mass of republicans seem contradictory. To take one contrast, princes must eliminate all opposition and hone almost a personal cult; republics must stifle any aspirations to lordship, let alone kingship. This will appear strange to the modern reader who has been taught there exist perfect political systems which merely need to be constructed to specified standards. Machiavelli, however, did not exalt princedoms over republics or vice–versa. What he did recognize is that both have their own internal logic, particularly when it comes to the unquestioned. For instance, in a republic, free institutions must be protected at all costs, CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS while monarchies must glorify the personage of the king. When this method of Machiavelli’s is taken as a given, then the establishment, maintenance, and furtherance of an autocracy or republic can be understood as the managing (or mis–managing) of crises and controversies. Machiavelli was the first thinker to consciously understand that forms of government are less important than justifications for those forms which are self–consistent. Lastly, there is Carl Schmitt. He approached the dialectic of the question and unquestioned with a simple phrase; ‘who decides?’ (or ‘who interprets’ or ‘who adjudicates?’) This one two–word question permeated his scholarship in the same way as ‘asabiyyah infused Ibn Khaldun’s career. His Machiavellian influence, whereby he was agnostic about political form except when it came to the consistency of such forms, also came through strongly. There was very much a religious aspect to the question for Schmitt; whoever makes the final and decisive judgement is – for that moment at least – supreme over their domain as God asserts His supremacy over the universe through miracles. Yet, this moment of decision meant that politics threw up critical questions for every polity. Preceding those fleeting moments, where perfect unity was achieved, were those events where faith in the official doctrine became suspect. For hegemony to reign CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS there had to be doubts about sovereignty. Paradoxically, judgement on critical and controversial questions was also an exercise in purging uncertainties. Decision comes through time and again in Schmitt’s writings as a judgement that supplants doubt, as opposed to the perfecting of a humanist philosophy. These three giants of intellectual life are distinguished from the bulk of their fellow travellers in the domain of politics because they let the realities of political life question them, as opposed to imposing their own system on a world which others dismissed as ugly and needing urgent reform. They did not seek to make controversy and crisis history but neither were they believers in doctrines of blood and soil, violence for violence’s sake, or war as an end in itself. While civilization was an end for liberals, sophisticated and peaceful living was seen as just a phase in the life of a polity by Schmitt, Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun. Sudden disturbances of the prevailing order were understood as the necessary cold water to infuse life into a feeble and dying spirit. Explosions of controversies and crises were not lamented. At the same time, the three intellectuals recognized that civilization could be viewed positively without undue glorification or unfounded expectations of permanency. The truth of politics was confronted; the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS question was uncovered as the revealing of judgement and authority or even a lack thereof. Chapter I Ibn Khaldun The Question Concerning ‘Asabiyyah [P]eople find it difficult to submit to large dynastic (power) at the beginning, unless they are forced into submission by strong superiority … But once leadership is firmly vested in the members of the family qualified to exercise royal authority in the dynasty, and once (royal authority) has been passed on by inheritance over many generations and through successive dynasties, the beginnings are forgotten, and the members of that family are clearly marked as leaders.1 I.1 1 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 2. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Background to Muqaddimah After a lengthy period in which he was involved in political intrigue (a phase of his career which had seen him fall on hard times), Ibn Khaldun went into a self-imposed retreat in 1374. He took refuge in a castle at Bani Salama near Oran, modern–day Algeria, from 1374–1377. Over the next four years he began work on his masterpiece. The intellectual empire Ibn Khaldun constructed goes under the popular name of Al–Muqaddimah, the Prolegomena or, alternatively, the Introduction to History.2 This is only a short-hand, however. The entire tome is in reality composed of a short introduction and book, called Al–Muqaddimah, and a collection of five other books termed by Ibn Khaldun the Kitab al ‘Ibar, roughly translatable as the Book of History. Ibn Khaldun himself originally meant the former to only contain a short introduction, with the latter to serve as his book of history, but he later incorporated the first book Al–Muqaddimah can also be oughl t a slated as p e ise o p opositio ut may have many other meanings such as the idea of an analytical proposition (a proposition that is logically true without needing any further elaboration). 2 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS of the Book of History into the Prolegomena.3 Ibn Khaldun consciously set himself the task of explicating and adumbrating the process by which dynasties explode into the world, how they gain strength, how they prosper and win followers, and how they arrive at enfeeblement and senility, before being superseded by the new pretenders to the throne. Of course, success and failure couldn’t have come about without Allah’s will and in one sense it was enough to leave the bric-a-brac of history rest at that. But, it is also true to say that Allah’s will animates matter and therefore, since the Creator is imbued with purpose, the creation must also be, to some degree, rendered intelligible. With his great mission in mind, Ibn Khaldun set out to accomplish in the realm of the intellect what he was unable to accomplish in the halls of power and intrigue. He instituted himself as the grand monarch of historiography, overthrowing the previous chroniclers within the house of Islam, who – while fastidious in their mining of sources and critical in their assessment of narrators – seemingly never 3 Adem. Ibn-Khaldun as a Modern Thinker; Alatas. Ibn Khaldun and Contemporary Sociology; Corbin. History of Islamic philosophy; 279; Dale. Ibn Khaldun: The Last Greek and the First Annaliste Historian; Enan. Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work; 56-60; Gierer. Ibn Khaldun on Solidarity; Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; T a slato s I t odu tio : The Muqaddimah; Mahdi. Ibn Khaldu s Philosoph of Histo ; 63. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS advanced to the point where history could be understood as a science in the same way as other Islamic sciences. By contrast, the intellectual predecessors of Ibn Khaldun formulated history as an incoherent stream of events, these events reported in the same faithful manner as an awardwinning reporter would comment on breaking stories, and these events would also be presented as haphazardly as an evening news bulletin. Nonetheless, in spite of the seeming chaos and arbitrariness, some pattern did seem to be evident; this was Ibn Khaldun’s firm conviction. Throughout his sojourns in North Africa and the Iberian peninsula, Ibn Khaldun witnessed, among other things, still– born attempts to grab power, dynasties in full bloom, once glorious domains which were shells of their former lustre, successful usurpers, and conquerors who scythed the opposition like a harvester in a wheat–field. At the same time, he saw varying levels of prosperity and observed the vast gulf in civilized complexity which separated certain cultures. In particular, he homed in on the Bedouins, knowing – from the annals of Islamic history – that it was often the poor who inherited some portion of the earth and, furthermore, it was the most rough–hewn stones who could propel themselves to the summit, to the point where they began to be seen as the very crowning jewel of humanity. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS The historians job, as Ibn Khaldun saw it, was first and foremost to explain history and the observable facts of the present, interpreting whatever material could be evidenced or found to be rational in a consistent and coherent manner. Ibn Khaldun railed against acting as a mere hagiographer, and instead sought to engage history with the weapons of scientific and analytical reasoning.4 C iti ui g othe histo ia s' a al sis of d asties he said that the do not turn to the beginning of the dynasty. Nor do they tell why it unfurled its banner and was able to give prominence to its emblem, or what caused it to o e to a stop he it had ea hed its te . Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; Foreword. 4 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.2 Artisans and Zealots To accomplish his task, Ibn Khaldun was going to invoke, on the one hand, the principles which inspire men to fame, heroism and glory, which inculcate in groups of men the will to seek power and authority, but also, on the other hand, postulate that the personal and self–absorbed interests of men can only come to fruition in the midst of struggles for those same reservoirs of power, authority, fame, glory, and heroism. Essentially, he juxtaposed the zealots who ‘make history’ with the artisans who create and represent the world and who respectively, in their social relationships, performed as discriminators of culture or as indistinguishables of commonly shared human values. Zealots, by their nature, are controversial in the strictly political sense, posing critical questions. Artisans, for their part, fly their ensign at the apex of human flowering. Artisans seek to occupy neutral apolitical territory, whilst the zealots exist in the shifting sands of loyalties and fortunes. Superficial similarities seem evident when comparing the two. Both the zealot and artisan are manifestations of human CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS will, human determination to overcome, to transcend, to transform. Both the zealots and artisans can be said to sacrifice, to go out on a limb, to stand naked and exposed, in their endeavours. Humans are inherently sociable and just as the discriminators need principles to unite under, the indistinguishables must co–operate to create. What fundamental differences are there; what can we say separates the zealous and the artistic, those who discriminate and those who do not? For one, the conquests and glory of the artisan are of a personal nature; we only speak of these esoterically. For the zealot, their triumphs and losses, rising and falling, ebbing and flowing, fate and fortunes – whether good or bad – can be spoken about in more definite terms, in the calculus of life and death, ultimate failure and success. An artist may ‘kill themselves’ metaphorically (like Michelangelo) to execute a commission, whereas the zealot trades in life and death in a literal sense. The objects of the zealot are also vastly different to those of the artisan – glory, prestige, honour, which are to a degree personal, but more to the point which are done out of devotion for the group – whereas the artisan produces and manufactures to optimal perfection in a market where the quality of workmanship matches a price commanded or, alternatively, he lives to satisfy a personal desire to achieve. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS The discriminator inhabits a world of ‘us and them.’ For the indistinguishable competition may provide such a superficial contrast, but once more only in an esoteric sense and not literally. And – notwithstanding any deeper philosophical questions about why men must make, or what ‘making’ is – the artisan is motivated by the rational, the zealot by the irrational and the emotive.5 5 On this last point, Carl Schmitt would provide us with a wonderful image which starkly portrayed the contrast in vivid terms. Referring to Auguste Co te s (1798–1857) attempt to found a positivist church, where rational agents would represent the public in the political sphere in a similar fashion to aristocrats and clerics in the Middle Ages, Schmitt said that it as a istake to o side the ode “a a t and Business Ma as ge ui el ep ese tati e t pes … The Me ha t sits i his offi e, the “a a t i his stud o la o ato . Both … a e sala ied se a ts of so e ig usi ess o e … It ould e futile to i ui e if the a e representative of anything. They are either private individuals or e po e ts, ot ep ese tati es. “ h itt, C., & Codd, E. M. 9 . The necessity of politics; an essay on the representative idea in the church and modern Europe. London: Sheed & Ward; 58–59. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.3 Al–‘Umran The term Ibn Khaldun employed which describes the world of both artisan and zealot was that of al–‘umran (although sometimes he would also use the term al-ijtima’-albasharii). ‘Umran can be translated as ‘civilisation’ or ‘culture.’ However, it should be stressed that there must be some dynamic of development into fields of human activity (such as the economic) for ‘umran to be manifested. There was a further division between desert, nomadic life, those who may be called the ‘outsiders’ (those who live outside urban civilized culture) who were denoted as badawah, and those who were the inhabitants of urban/sedentary life, or hadarah. This gave rise to two separate cultures of al– ‘umran al–badawi and al–‘umran al–hadari, for the zealot and artisan respectively.6 6 Corbin, H., Sherrard, L., & Sherrard, P. (2014). History of Islamic philosophy. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; p. 279; Enan, M.A. (1941). Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work. Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf; 122-123; Yahaya, M. H. (2017). The Science of `Umran: Its Origin, Role, and Function. The Journal of Middle East and North Africa Sciences, 3(12), 17-22. Etymologically, the root word has the same meanings in Arabic as that CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS ‘Umran is an expression of the tendency of humans to use their God-given faculty of intelligence to advance beyond mere subsistence, co–operating together so as to live a higher form of life than would be possible alone. Men are deficient physically and so compensate by applying their mental abilities, reason, intellect, and imagination. Greater numbers of people co–operating results in a higher level of of European languages which are variations of colo (e.g. culture in English). Furthermore, it has meanings of dwelling in a certain place, sto ki g as i populati g , to e i a good state of upkeep, a d also that of cultivation. It has both the meaning of being present somewhere but also that of growth and elaboration [Mahdi. Ibn Khaldu s Philosophy of History; 184-187]. Mahdi illustrates use of how derivatives of the root word for u a a e e plo ed: The e al adjectives ā i a d a ū (is cultured) point to the existence of the a ious esults of a s la ou ithout fu ther specification, and are equally applicable to a land, a house, a fortress, or a marketplace, and i di ate a flou ishi g state o a ge e al state of p ospe it … The a become more specific in two ways. First, by the object described. Thus, when a house is called a ū , what is meant is that it is inhabited, taken care of, and in a good state of repair; while when the same adjective is applied to a harbour, what is meant is that it is bustling with e ha ts a d ships … “e o d, th ough the use of additional defining o ds o ph ases. Thus a a ketpla e is said to e ell-stocked with goods o f e ue ted e ha ts. [Mahdi. I Khaldu s Philosophy of History; 186]. Today, this could be simply stylized as the opposition of town versus country but in I Khaldu s ti e as i deed is still the ase i so e parts of the world, and as is even coming back into fashion in de eloped pa ts of the o ld , u a a eas e gaged i ag i ultu e. The ke diffe e e et ee to a d ou t i I Khaldu s world was that there was an observable gap in population density. But this population density was, at base, a product of the increasing social organization inimical to sedentary life. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS civilization, co–operation the operative word. Once co– operation wanes, ‘umran declines. In many ways, this is an uncontroversial view of social relations and is highly influenced by Aristotle (384–322 B.C.). Where Ibn Khaldun distinguished himself was in recognizing that civilization grows on the flower bed of fanaticism. He postulated that ‘asabiyyah pre–conditions luxury. So, the group–ethic is not something that can be dismissed as a permanently retarded state of barbarism, but rather is necessary for there to be civilized culture in the first place. A good example is the US, where puritanical religious zealots, versed in Bible–bashing and race–hatred, gave birth to a nation of innovators and rule–breakers. Contrary to Aristotle and his successors, men are not motivated by their rationally articulated interests, at least not in a certain developmental stage. Rather, they relate to their group in an irrational manner that is yet necessary for any civilization to take place. At the same time civilized culture and group–feeling appear in sharp opposition to one another, they also share an important characteristic in the sense that they are subjective. Culture “is not an independent substance, but a property … of another substance which is man.” Man is “not the product of his natural disposition and temperament,” and conditions “have replaced his natural disposition.” Instead, Man “is a child of the customs and the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS things he has become used to.”7 Read on their own, these statements could seem like a wistful acknowledgement of the variety of human experience, merely follies and fetishes which human internalize in themselves before they progress to a universal humanity. However, in the context of Ibn Khaldun’s world–view, the idea that humans are fundamentally subjective and group–centred implies that they are also bound to come into conflict with one another. Civilization is effectively a process of ongoing rationalization, legitimacy, justification, and establishment of an order. Controversy is suppressed. Its advantage is that it is impersonal. Men are rewarded for their merits, are elevated because of their usefulness, and there is a general process of education which occurs. The Bedouin are the anti–thesis. They are the ‘other.’ In the wild, far from sophisticated civilization, Bedouin struggle to meet the bare necessities of life. Gathering around a principle entails no loss to them in material terms, and in fact has the promise of profitable increase, personal glory, and the intoxicant of tribal superiority. Bedouin are self–reliant, go out heavily armed, are constantly vigilant, rarely given to relaxation, and at home in the challenging environments of the wilderness. 7 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; I, Fourth and Fifth Prefatory Discussions; Moha ad. I Khaldu s Theo of “o ial Cha ge. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS As a consequence, they are courageous and will apply their bravery and steadfastness when called upon.8 As an instance of how hardy peoples can unite around a principle and overwhelm those who have lost their roots in the wild, the example of the early Islamic conquests is cited. In their primordial stage, Ibn Khaldun tells us, a pillow on which to sleep was unknown to the Arabs. Their standard of living was rudimentary and the obvious correlate with this was that the arts and crafts were woefully underdeveloped. For instance, and in spite of their power as the greatest Empire of its time, the early Umayyad dynasty (7th–8th century) gave its clients camels as rewards for services rendered, such was the hold the desert life exerted on them, Ibn Khaldun informs us.9 Later, under the Abbasids (8th–13th century), this all changed and the Arabs engaged in conspicuous consumption on a scale befitting of the most lavish Oriental despots.10 Their alien presence became 8 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah; V, 20. Ibid.; III, 13. 10 Ibn Khaldun gives a startling description of a wedding of the fabled Harun al–Rashid in the 9th century: On the wedding day, al–Hasan b. Sahl [the father of the bride] gave a lavish banquet that was attended by al–Ma u s eti ue. To e e s of the fi st lass, al–Hasan distributed lumps of musk wrapped in papers granting farms and estates to the holders. Each obtained what chance and luck gave him. To the second class, (al–Hasan) distributed bags each of which held 10,000 dinars. To the third class, he distributed bags with the same 9 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS established. Discriminators and indistinguishables are different ‘breeds,’ one transforming into the other, with the maligned other – the Bedouin – essential to the sedentary (in much the same way as our modern ‘metrosexual’ couldn’t eat without the work of the farmer he despises). There are many examples throughout history where we can think of a more urbane and sophisticated culture transcending the ‘call of the wild’ or, to put another way, the rough–hewn taking the reins of the more luxurious and stately. The hardy Romans, based in the countryside, dominated the Greeks, the Romans themselves were overthrown by Germanic tribes, there were the amount in dirhams. In addition to all this, he had already spent many times as much when al-Ma u had sta ed i his house. Also, al– Ma u ga e Bu i a thousa d h a i ths u ies as he eddi g gift … on the wedding night. He burned candles of amber each of which weighed one hundred mann … He had put do fo he a pets o e with threads of gold and adorned with pearls and h a i ths … O e hundred and forty mule loads of wood had been brought three times a day for a whole year to the kitchen and were ready for the wedding ight. All that ood as o su ed that e ight … Boat e ee ordered to bring boats to transport the distinguished guests on the Tigris from Baghdad to the royal palaces in the city of al–Ma li … fo the wedding banquet. The boats prepared for that purpose numbered 30,000, and they carried people back and forth all day long. There were many other such things. Ibid.; III, 13. See also: Ahmed, A. (2002) Ibn Khaldu s U de sta di g of Ci ilizatio s a d the Dile as of Isla a d the West Today. Middle East Journal, 56(1), 20–45 [A mann is about .75 kg so each candle would have weighted about the size of medium–built man.]. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS conquests of Islam which transformed the worlds of Rome and Persia into the worlds Ibn Khaldun knew. Ibn Khaldun adopts what may be loosely termed a ‘noble savage’ view; he attributes moral virtue to the Bedouin – or at least the capacity for moral virtue – while at the same time pointing out the difficulties of reforming a sedentary people or making them act in ways which go beyond their selfish desires. Sedentary masses can become corrupted and unable and/or unwilling to change because of their habits which are in turn derived from their circumstances. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.4 A Glorious and Fatal Cycle Ibn Khaldun tracked a civilization from the moment when two worlds collided, through the consolidation, expansion, and embellishment of the victorious power, on until the time when the incumbent world clashes with a new world once more and is obliterated. In the initial stage, the zealots imbued with group–ethic ask questions of the de– personalized and civilized authority peopled by artisans. Then, a critical point is reached when a revolution happens. Since the new power is an unknown quantity, efforts have to be made to establish itself. As time goes on, the process of rendering rule self–evident begins to weigh down heavily on the populace, most observably in financial terms but also with regard to breaking the strong bonds of ‘asabiyyah that existed in the primal stages of the group. Finally, authority is lost and the first stage repeats itself, where the lord of the zealots clashes with the emperor of the artisans. Although we may be inclined to believe that Ibn Khaldun was in favour of maintaining a consistently personal and tribal form of government (i.e. a highly authoritarian one), CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS he understood that the ‘good life’ was a natural and necessary goal of all groups. While he had much praise for the Arabs or Bedouins – and indeed most people would see qualities like fortitude, resilience, and courage as worthy characteristics – he was not someone who deprecated civilised life. On the contrary, he portrayed sedentary existence as the goal of human development. For example: “Towns are dwelling places that nations use when they have reached the desired goal of luxury and of the things that go with it”11 and goes on to say that “sedentary culture is the goal of Bedouin life.”12 Since he reasoned that both threads were simply part and parcel of history, the idea that politics could somehow deliver an end to conflict was not something he considered sensible. As we shall see later, he considered such a modern– sounding philosophy but found it unrealistic. In Ibn Khaldun’s analysis, taxation becomes a kind of measure of the change from group–ethic to a corrupted ‘umran civilization, a barometer of dynastic discord. There is a kind of inverse proportional relationship between ‘asabiyyah and taxation, between zealousness and 11 12 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; IV, 5. Ibid.; IV, 18. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS financial prudence. When the group–feeling is strong, taxes are low, and vice–versa. Fiscal scrupulousness is also a public relations exercise. At the entrance of the discriminators of culture onto the scene, domination is deemed controversial by the indistinguishables. That is because “people find it difficult to submit to large dynastic (power) at the beginning, unless they are forced into submission by strong superiority.”13 Good taxation policies dampen disputes. When the former zealots become established, bad taxation policies start off as attempts to render authority politically sacred, which it does for a time, but then it induces a boiling point of crisis at a later date. The model of Ibn Khaldun is segmented into five stages. In the first stage, there is the decisive victory of the dynasty, coupled with the defeat of the old guard. Group–feeling means that the head of the dynasty enjoys the confidence of his people. “The desert attitude requires kindness, reverence, humility, respect for the property of other people, and disinclination to appropriate it … except in rare instances.” The head of the dynasty is just when collecting taxes. Assessments are low and only employed sparingly and because of that there is the determination on the part of the 13 Ibid.; III, 1. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS subjects to engage in commercial enterprises. Driven by this energy of trade, tax revenues increase and there is often a surplus in the public purse.14 In the next stage, the ruler and ruling elite seize the high ground and there is less of an inclination to share power with former allies of the tribe. Initially, those who fill “the administrative offices … as wazirs and tax collectors … [and] help ... to achieve superiority … participate in the government.”15 Those zealous elements who formerly supported the dynasty are sidelined, while appeals are made to new followers and clients more swayed by interest. The ruler takes these new actions so as to cut off the former supporters who could press legitimate claims to authority, while replacing them with new friends, whose most valuable contribution is their willingness to die for him.16 At this stage, a tendency of the first stage is ‘reversed’; while initially, outsiders were kept away and close tribal members brought close, now outsiders are brought in from the cold and members who share in ‘asabiyyah but slightly removed from the core of power are kept at arm’s length. We can say that initially, there is a less technical–bureaucratic approach 14 Ibid.; III, 36. Ibid.; II, 17. 16 Ibid.; II, 17. 15 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS to rulership, while latterly governing and ruling becomes more a matter of administering. This is a tactical manoeuvre designed to avoid a crisis. Public offices are filled with the new followers, and even titles formerly the preserve of the monarch are given to new supporters. However, even at this juncture, dangerous enemies are made. Actions of the ruler “announces the destruction of the dynasty and indicates that chronic disease has befallen it, the result of the loss of the group feeling on which the (dynasty’s) superiority had been built.”17 In exchanging the controversy of domination for the lure of the unquestioned, the former zealots cross a Rubicon which precipitates an insurgency against their artisanship. The third stage is the one where economic considerations dominate but these economic motivations are not merely directed for the securing of luxury. The intent is to render the rule of the sultan unassailable through artistic monuments, gifts to the population, military prowess, and shows of majesty to outsiders. Hence, taxation and accountancy become an obsession. Money is channelled into “erecting large buildings, big constructions, spacious cities, and lofty 17 Ibid.; I, Fourth and Fifth Prefatory Discussion; II, 17; Mohammad. Ibn Khaldu s Theo of “o ial Cha ge. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS monuments … presenting gifts to embassies of nobles from (foreign) nations and tribal dignitaries; and dispensing bounty to his own people.”18 Yet, above all, it is the attention shown to the military which guarantees that rule does not reach a crisis at this point of the cycle and it is often the case in large and well–run polities that a takeover can only really be affected by a military coup. Whereas before there was a surplus from taxation, the lavishness enjoyed by the ruling house can no longer be met by ordinary taxation. So, taxes rise to meet the shortfall. But the complexity of civilization, and the fact that there are large groups of people under the wing of the ruler means that the injustices and corruption can be hidden from view. Following on from this period of political stability, cultural glory, and economic prosperity, there arrives that of peace, consolidation, and imitation of tradition. There is both a fondness for past glories but also a sense of stagnation. Then there is the penultimate stage. This is characterized by poor economic management. Corruption becomes rife. Incompetent individuals fill public office. Civil strife results from the inability of the ruler to either foster loyalty or discern who is friend or foe. Soldiers are annoyed by not 18 Ibid.; II, 15. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS being paid or by being denied access to the ruler. Taxes end up draining more from the public, but giving less return. Clients and followers who were ‘paid off’ to lend their support see their expenditures slashed as the ruler attempts to re–assert financial control. But these allies have become powerful in their own right and can challenge the ruling dynasty, even with a dip in their short–term fortunes. The law of higher taxation is also the law of diminishing returns because enterprise is discouraged. Even if the authority is particularly shrewd in commerce, the knock–on effect on other businesses decreases the overall revenue stream. Trust in the dynasty is also eroded because taxes on ‘official’ enterprises are likely to be negligible while full measure will be levied on private competition. Subjects no longer can afford to engage in non–economic activity (what we may call civic society), they grumble about the unfairness of the assessments, and they become increasingly decadent. Eventually, with group–feeling all dried up, financial prudence also is jettisoned, with disastrous consequences.19 Ibid.; II, 15–18; III, 37–39, 44– ; Moha ad. I Khaldu s Theo of Social Change; Gierer. Ibn Khaldun on Solidarity. 19 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.5 Contentious Interference State intervention remains a highly contentious issue nowadays, although it is not at the pitch of the highly polarizing conflicts characterizing the Cold War. As with modern free–marketeers, Ibn Khaldun warned against the ruler engaging in commercial activity. Economic intervention occurs when the dynasty is either in decline or has reached its peak. In those stages, both the dynasty and those engaged in business activity are under pressure. Since power rests on the side of the legitimate authority there is an unfair commercial advantage. The wealth of the ruler is generally greater than those he competes against, and he is also more financially secure because, where he needs to, he can procure additional capital. Furthermore, the ruler may compel other businesses to purchase from him and to do so at high prices. Business is about buying low and selling high, so these transactions put strains on businesses, possibly crippling them.20 Not only does the dynasty buttress its power temporarily by 20 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 38. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS acquiring personal wealth; alliances are also formed with powerful interests such as farmers and merchants. Once more, the intention is to render the power of the ruler secure through financial methods. Private partners recognize that their own future is made safer if they join the ruler, and they benefit from low or zero taxation. Such practices are corrupt, although seemingly pro– business, and Ibn Khaldun advises the public authority not to seek counsel from such individuals because ultimately the revenue and custom stream is impacted detrimentally. Since taxation is a measure of the controversy attached to a regime, corrupt practices not only lead to accusations of partisan favouritism and inequality, but, moreover, the underlying material circumstances place the future of the dynasty in peril.21 21 Ibid.; III, 38. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.6 ‘Asabiyyah In contrast to a classical liberal view of existence, the role of violence and the irrational is critical for ushering in the new worlds. Tribal bonds, mutual sacrifice and subservience to a higher group-state, going under the name of ‘asabiyyah ... these qualities Ibn Khaldun identified as the genesis of civilisation. If we examine what ‘asabiyyah means linguistically and etymologically, we can then see how Ibn Khaldun rebelled both against the Islamic tradition into which he was born and the wider spirit of Greek philosophy and Western universalism. So, what is ‘asabiyyah? A research paper summarizes Ibn Khaldun’s portrayal of ‘asabiyyah as existing “due to the primitive life possessed by certain groups or nations when they face difficulties.” So restriction of provision and security fears of a common enemy foster tribalism and fanaticism. As a consequence, the adherents “stand together to protect themselves and their fellows from any danger outside their group.” ‘Asabiyyah can be based on blood, but CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS could also be more impersonal.22 To start with, Halim tells us the root, ‘asab’, has the meaning of ‘to bind,’ Baali adding that the binding refers to being bound to a group. The Enyclopaedia of Islam denotes ‘asabiyyah as having meanings of tribal kinship and there is a masculine sense to the term, the implication that of a strengthening bond. The Arabic–English Lexicon again gives yet more depth to the possible meanings of ‘asabiyyah; a person demonstrates group-feeling when he feels angry or compelled to act in defence of his group. The same dictionary also tells us that, etymologically, ‘asabiyyah has the meaning of a turban being bound around one’s head (the turban could be a metaphor for the tribe and for the head, the latter representing individual disposition but the former seems more likely). Goodman further tells us that the root word is that of ‘nerve,’ as in the “fiber or sinew by which a group is held together.” Toynbee elegantly described ‘asabiyyah as “the basic protoplasm out of which all bodies politic and bodies social are built up.”23 The etymology strongly suggests fanaticism or sectarianism. Abdul Halim. I Khaldu s Theo of Asa i ah. Abdul Halim. I Khaldu s Theo of Asa i ah. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research; Goodman. Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides; Qadir. Sociological Insights of Asabiyyah by Ibn Khaldun. 22 23 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS A sense of righteousness or morality is not inherently implicit in the use of the word. Lisan-al-Arab says that ‘asabiyyah means the requesting of mutual self–aid or co–operation. There is also the connotation of a metric, i.e. one could imagine whether their 'measure' of ‘asabiyyah is waxing strong or waning weakly. Ibn Khaldun himself says that group–feeling means “(mutual) affection and willingness to fight and die for each other.”24 Importantly, while ‘asabiyyah does undoubtedly evoke feelings of factionalism, it should not be confused with nationalism although there are numerous terms in Latinized dialects that can be used interchangeably with the word which may lead us to this conclusion.25 24 Ibn Khaldun. The Muqaddimah; III, 1. A dul Hali . I Khaldū s Theo of Aṣabiyyah. Jurnal alTamaddun Bil; A dul Hali . I Khaldu s Theo of Asa i ah. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research; Alatas. Ibn Khaldu a d Co te po a “o iolog ; Moha ad. I Khaldu s Theory of Social Change; Qadir. Sociological Insights of Asabiyyah by Ibn Khaldun. One author gives us the following catalogue of approximate or equivalent terms in a few European languages (most are from English): ‘ose thal t a slates it as g oup feeli g , Mo teil ostl as esprit de corps o esprit de clan . It see s isleadi g to e uate it ith Du khei s e ha i al solida it a d as i e to I Khaldu the lai that this is solidarity tout court ... Some others have used it as group consciousness, gemeinsinn, nationalitatsidee, corporate spirit, feeling of solidarity, group solidarity, group will, communal spirit, social 25 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS In the Islamic religion itself, the concept of ‘asabiyyah is frowned upon but not something categorically forbidden. A hadith of the Prophet says the following: He is not of us who proclaims the cause of tribal partisanship and he is not of us who fights in the cause of tribal partisanship; and he is not of us who dies in the cause of tribal partisanship.26 However, the Prophet elaborated on this by saying in response to a question that ‘asabiyyah is “helping your own people in an unjust cause.”27 While someone may rightfully possess a love for their tribe or nation in Islam, Islam teaches that Man’s individual relationship with Allah is paramount and this means that he shouldn’t jettison Divinely ordained laws and justice for the sake of experiencing or partaking in the addictive toxin of group–feeling.28 Given that he was an Islamic scholar and jurist, it is interesting that Ibn Khaldun chose this particular word. His own life–story indicates that he may have considered it appropriate to employ where questions of justice, or cohesion, martial spirit, striking power and social solidarity. Sumer. I Khaldu s Asabiyya for Social Cohesion. 26 A dul Hali . I Khaldu s Theory of Asa i ah. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research. 27 Ibid. 28 A dul Hali . I Khaldū s Theo of Aṣabiyyah. Jurnal alTamaddun Bil. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS fundamental conflicts concerning right, outweigh those of law (i.e. strife between rival dynasties, rival religious factions, or in the domain of power politics). Nevertheless, zealousness may be blameworthy in normal circumstances. He may also have used such a charged term for sectarianism to give his teachings a universal colouring but also to tell his main audience of fellow Muslims that the enemies of Islam have this primal urge to defend each other against outsiders while Muslims have lost this quality. However, there was a clear risk involved in, not only using the term but, rotating his entire philosophy on the axis of ‘asabiyyah. The word was associated with the times of ignorance (Jahiliyyah), the pagan era of Arabia which preceded Islam, and early scholars generally employed ‘asabiyyah in a pejorative sense. Later scholars of Islam adopted a more nuanced use of the term, whereby ‘asabiyyah is not always recommended but sometimes commendable.29 Despite this more favourable approach to ‘asabiyyah, it still took courage on Ibn Khaldun’s part to use the word so liberally, and the confidence with which he employed the term, as well as the context he gave it (i.e. within his analysis of civilizational growth and decay) was innovative because, Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; T a slato s I t odu tio , The Muqaddimah; Qadir. Sociological Insights of Asabiyyah by Ibn Khaldun. 29 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS it is fair to speculate, the tendency of scholars would have been to consider the universality and station of Islam as a given. Fanaticism would have been anathema, and the question of nationalism is still controversial amongst Muslims today. While we know that the early Muslims had quite strong bonds between them that were based on religion, their power was expanded also to a degree on blood–lines because the Caliphate was only supposed to fall to members of the Quraysh tribe but this fact was effaced somewhat as time went on and Islam moved further away from its roots, particularly when the Quraysh could no longer wield power effectively. And parties like the Ottoman dynasty went on to serve as the engine of Islam through what could justifiably be called ‘asabiyyah. Whatever the various etymological and linguistic speculations concerning ‘asabiyyah, we can say for sure that the idea of rational self–calculation, essential to a liberal– economic view of the world, does not enter into any understanding of the term. ‘Asabiyyah as the focal point of a political inquiry represents the very antithesis of a modern, rationalist account of politics. As Sumer says in a research article: For many centuries, the focus of the West has been on … individuality. For Ibn Khaldun, the group, not CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the individual, was history’s focal point and determining factor. Individuals seldom – if ever, unless they were divinely inspired – have more than a minor influence on the overwhelming forces of history. Indeed, the individual for Ibn Khaldun is practically neglected as a philosophical topic.30 Ibn Khaldun ignored or possibly even rejected the individual as an object of socio–political discourse investigation, or alternatively as the subject/agent of politics. Instead history was determined by group dynamics. That does not mean he neglected how humans behaved or their motivations. He merely went beyond individual psychology, turning to group dynamics to understand sociology and consequently history, but turned to individualism when explaining why groups formed in the first place.31 Nevertheless, while he installed group–ethic as the motor of civilization, Ibn Khaldun doesn’t see ‘asabiyyah as necessary under all circumstances and in fact can envisage a perfectly stable state without it. He also had high regard for civilisations that suppressed group–feeling. In a civilized state, there is the possibility of no ‘asabiyyah and also the possibility that a Bedouin culture might advance politically without becoming sedentary. Group–feeling is only necessary at the beginning of a dynasty – “group feeling 30 31 “u e . I Ibid. Khaldu s Asabiyya for Social Cohesion. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS makes it possible for a dynasty to become established and protected from the beginning”32 – and can be watered down or dispensed with as a dynasty grows in strength. Political strength can exist for a long time in the absence of group– feeling, but Ibn Khaldun surmises that the dynasty lacks the vital life force which enabled it to grow strong initially. It may live on extended time because of the lack of will–power on the part of challengers to openly oppose the ruler, or because those under the ruler are content with building their own private sources of power. Where a dynasty lasts without group–feeling, subjects have become weak and used to being ordered, and act with subservience and obedience as a matter of course. There may also be problems when ‘asabiyyah confronts those who don’t partake in the same group–ethic. At the beginning of a dynasty, those who are outside the group are unfamiliar with how the dynasty operates and there is a suggestion that they may not trust those who are dominating them. At this stage, group–feeling can be contentious because the rule of the dynasty has not become familiar to the strangers it rules over.33 32 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 2. Ibid.; III, 1; Çaksu. Ibn Khaldun and Hegel on Causality in History; Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 45. 33 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS The catch–22 which envelops a regime at the beginning of its life means there is a necessity for honing a sense of legitimacy. If managed correctly, what ensues is a virtually automatic willingness to follow an authority that has perfected the arts of obedience and rule, for at least a time. ‘Asabiyyah is dampened and less scepticism accompanies they dynasty to the point where it is politically holy. In exchange for submission, rational bureaucracy is instituted. At some point in the future, however, when taxes, burdens, and inefficiencies, weigh heavily, the self–evidence of the regime gives way to antagonism and eventually tumult. ‘Asabiyyah is a condition of power, it is not a necessary condition for the maintenance of authority, but if allowed to lapse can be fatal to the fortunes of a dynasty. When we analyse the various statements of Ibn Khaldun concerning group–feeling however, we can see that one thing is a constant; namely, a dynasty requires at all stages of its life those who will lay down their lives, or alternatively, kill other humans, in defence of the dynasty. In the primordial state where ‘asabiyyah manifests itself most strongly, the population of the group–ethic driven zealots are small in number. What these small groups do possess is a fanaticism, a factionalism, and a devotion to each other. This weighs heavily in the balance because they are willing to take the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS lives of other fellow-humans, sacrifice their own lives and comforts, and also consummate their bond with the groupethic. Yet – and in spite of the fact that group–feeling inspires valour, an adventurous spirit, and possibly even a certain ruthlessness – there is a creative element to ‘asabiyyah that is critical. Men are willing to jettison their own personal ambitions and accept subordinate positions because of the group–feeling. ‘Asabiyyah is important in providing the will to find a political structure, calming intra– factional passions, and giving solid foundations for social solidarity. We could even say simply that it gives a sense of meaning and purpose, or perhaps that most cherished of commodities accruing from association, an identity. Since there is a common basis for organized, socialized, life, there also results mutual loyalty.34 34 Goodman. Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.7 Religion Techniques of government, sources of wealth, and cultural flowering are all important in helping the dynasty gain dominance, but also more importantly remove questions from its authority. However, religious belief is by far the most effective solidifier and cultivator of an expansive ‘asabiyyah. And when the sacred ground of faith is linked with the dogma of political power, rule is axiomatic. In common with Machiavelli, Ibn Khaldun was all too aware of the power of religion to overcome differences and, for instance, he said that dynasties “of wide power and large royal authority have their origin in religion based either on prophecy or on truthful propaganda.”35 Religion is critical because, instead of discord, disunity, mutual rivalry, and jealousy, the tenets of religious faith induce an asceticism, acceptance of the goals of the group, and a willingness to co–operate for a higher purpose. There is a kind of ‘magic,’ a synergetic alchemy, that results from religious brotherhood. In turn,‘asabiyyah ultimately aims at 35 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 4. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS royal supremacy – the justification of authority and obedience – and propaganda is pivotal to the group–culture. Furthermore, despite the universality of Islam or indeed of Christianity, these religions have to be realized in a particular context. Action is an outcome of true group–ethic. If political power doesn’t result from ‘asabiyyah, then ‘umran is unable to flourish. Justice, good governance, and good administration depend on a vibrant zealousness. Jealously between hierarchies and factions are removed and, of course, the willingness to lay down life for the good of the community is fostered, this having the ultimate justification of everlasting bliss when religion is strong.36 Clearly, Ibn Khaldun understands this religious ‘asabiyyah in the Latin sense, religio as a ‘binding together.’ Religion fulfils a social function, while ultimately being based on a principle that inspires loyalty. Unity of meaning and purpose is crucial to Ibn Khaldun’s analysis, moreover, and ultimately this has its end in trading death for the benefit of the group. What separates those who drink from the religious group–feeling is the “willing[ness] to die for (their objectives)” while those who are attacked (assuming they are dissolute and A dul Hali . I Khaldu s Theo of Asa i ah. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research; “u e . I Khaldu s Asabiyya for Social Cohesion. 36 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS irreligious) is a variation in purposes, and a fear of death accompanies lack of conviction and cohesion with regard to a shared ethos.37 Military strength is necessary for propagating religion. It was a fact that “prophets in their religious propaganda depended on groups and families.” Although they “could have been supported by God with anything in existence, if He had wished,” the natural course of affairs in this world was generally – save for miracles – allowed by Allah to run its course.38 Religious belief which makes strong claims is always contentious but faith (either sincere or not) alone cannot substitute for martial prowess. On the other hand, martial prowess can either manipulate religious belief or promote a sincere faith. Ibn Khaldun despises both an honest attempt to reform religion which is dogged by a lack of political backing and is scornful of a blatant misuse of religion for worldly ends.39 Although Machiavelli appeared to be more concerned with the appearance of religious piety and moral rectitude, Ibn Khaldun seems to have genuinely implored the standard–bearers of faith to act with sincerity, possibly due to the many times the Quran excoriates the 37 Gierer. Ibn Khaldun on Solidarity; Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 5. Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 6. 39 Ibid. 38 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS munafiqoon, those hypocrites who ‘play for both sides.’ A religiously–based ‘asabiyyah conceives of group–feeling as existing beyond a tribal/nationalist basis. There are two elements to this; on the one hand, group–feeling is augmented by religion and, on the other hand, higher human virtues – those which pertain to an advanced civilisation – are benefits of a religious group–ethic. Religion protects the morality of a human grouping when it is in its expansion phase and thus dampens blameworthy passions that are not only irreligious but politically destructive because of the jealousy and greed they wreak. ‘Asabiyyah derived from religion allows for civilisation to flourish without at the same time voiding the group feeling. A charge often hurled at religious societies is that they encourage ‘fanaticism,’ not a totally untrue accusation, but one which seems to portray a loyalty to one’s own as something perverse. Nevertheless, the dilution of fanaticism that occurs when a purely tribal ‘asabiyyah gives way to a more universal ideal can bind people of diverse backgrounds into a striving for a higher set of principles which can successfully ground legitimacy, dominion, a common culture, and mutual sacrifice. Religion opens up tolerance and is an antidote to sectarianism but more importantly, in political terms, makes people less sceptical about royal authority. Dominion is de– CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS controversialized. Despite the necessity of diluting the group–ethic, it remains a social fact for Ibn Khaldun that religious ‘asabiyyah cannot emerge without strong tribal ties, but client–relationships can retain something of the nature of familial ties because of the closeness involved. In a sense, we may simply say that the higher virtues of religion require the more down-to-earth realities of zealousness, and it is also the case that merely maintaining blood–ties is simply inadequate in terms of maintaining and developing political dominion, in establishing royal supremacy rationally and rendering it unquestioned.40 As a state of narrow fanaticism wanes, as religious belief turns its face less to conquest and more to consolidation, the life of the sedentary artisan increasingly turns to ‘health and safety.’ Dynastic protection provides the environment within which the entrepreneur and artisan can develop their own skills and buttress their lifestyle, although they mingle with the genuinely religiously inspired. What sustains the latter is not wealth, but their righteousness supported by the group– ethic. By contrast, those who have given themselves over completely to the ‘religion’ of the sedentary culture find it hard to be motivated to make even small sacrifices. Even the 40 “u e . I Khaldu s Asabiyya for Social Cohesion. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS concept of public service becomes corrupted when higher principles beyond the individual wane. As “a result, the dynasty progresses toward weakness and senility.”41 It seems to be one of the tragedies of the political that zealousness in a primal state must give way to a more sophisticated culture, if the dynasty wants to thrive, but this complexity then ‘comes back to haunt’ the dynasty. Nonetheless, with Ibn Khaldun, there are ‘optimal’ points in the life of dawlahs (the equivalent of States in Arabic) whereby the gifts of sedentary culture meet the vitality of ‘asabiyyah. When in a low level of civilisation, ‘asabiyyah is largely ‘tribal.’ At a later date, this tribalism is insufficient and religiously based ‘asabiyyah displaces, without altogether supplanting, the familial bond. At this stage, sedentary culture is highly developed, but can corrode the self–reliance and strength initially generated by the group–feeling. Nonetheless, the fruits of civilisation do not simply end, although the dynamism of the nurturing dynasty, and hence the immediate relevance of its particular culture, is dissipated. 41 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; II, 11. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.8 Rational and Utopian Politics Ibn Khaldun considers a different sort of rule than that based on religion. Reason–based rule, or a rational politics (siyasat ‘aqliyya), comes in two flavours. The first is where the public interest is paramount and where the ruler must balance his interest in the arts of domination with that of the common good. He makes himself acquainted with what benefits the populace, administering his realm accordingly. Then, there is the second type of rational politics which Ibn Khaldun says is practised by both unbelievers and Muslims. This is power politics; interests of the public play second fiddle to force. There are four elements to this form of rule; religious piety, ethical considerations, natural forms of social organization, and measures taken to strengthen and consolidate group–feeling. Nonetheless, the letter which Ibn Khaldun cites to support this view of rational politics is highly religious in nature and the implication is that Ibn Khaldun thought of wholly religious based rule as being more egalitarian and less monarchical than was the norm in Muslim lands. The letter was written by Tahir bin al–Husayn (ca. 775–822) to his son who had been appointed a governor CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS in Egypt during the Abbasid caliphate. In it, he exhorts the ruler to remember God, the favour shown to him and the duty placed on his neck. Acts of piety, worship, welfare, and charity are encouraged, along with moderation. Just rulings are to be carried out, contracts to be honoured, along with support for jurisprudential scholarship: “For the best ornament of a man is judicial interpretation of the faith … and knowledge of how one can get close to God.” Nevertheless, the ruler should also prevent corruption, beef up the military, and punish fairly but harshly, if the need arises. As is a recurring theme for Ibn Khaldun, fiscal prudence is given great weight, and it’s discouraged to keep company with oligarchs or men of base character. Ibn Khaldun also characterizes the governor as not merely an executive, but a judge.42 His advice is similar to Machiavelli during Niccolò’s more religious moments, but both see justice as essential to countering dubious assertions about rulership. In addition to religiously based rule authorized by the institution of the Caliphate, and also the two types of rational rule, there is also the idealist version of politics which would dispense 42 with group–feeling Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 50. and hence political CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS organization. This might have been an insight of little interest at the time. But if we are studying Ibn Khaldun today, his thoughts have major relevance because of the influence of idealist movements like Communism (and even liberalism, to a large degree, has become more idealistic over the course of its history). In his presentation of political utopianism, Ibn Khaldun holds out a portrait of Platonic idealism, where people are led to moral perfection (presumably through education), and where the state ‘withers away’ in a Marxist sense. By [“political utopianism” (siyasah madaniyah)] the philosophers mean the disposition of soul and character which each member of a social organization must have, if, eventually, people are completely to dispense with rulers. They call the social organization that fulfills these requirements the “ideal city.” The norms observed in this connection are called “political utopias” (siyasah madaniyah). They do not mean the kind of politics (siyasah) that the members of a social organization are led to adopt through laws for the common interest. That is something different. The “ideal city” (of the philosophers) is something rare and remote. They discuss it as a hypothesis.43 Utopianism, then as now, was understood as a root-andbranch transformation of human nature with the eventual, hoped–for, result that of rulership – or domination – being 43 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; III, 50. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS jettisoned, possibly for a mere governorship, or stewardship. What may have surprised Ibn Khaldun with modern utopianism is the extent to which it relied initially on economic arguments, given that his own realist theories were so grounded in the economic, particularly taxation. While Socialism/Communism still relies heavily on economic foundations, the New Left proposes a cultural revolution to transform human nature, and this is something that Ibn Khaldun may have understood better, although he would have disputed the empirical claims of such ideologies. In any case, Ibn Khaldun dismissed the notion that rule could ever be unquestioned. Economies would always have to be managed, justice done because humans are aggressive, greed would never disappear, there would always be poor and needy, faith and religion required struggle, and suspicion would accompany the government, necessitating prudence, diligence, and scrupulousness. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.9 Law as Corruption One characteristic of a civilized people is the evolution of legal rationality. Ibn Khaldun cited law as a corrupting factor in the life of civilizations. He does exempt religious law because this exerts an inner influence on people; it disciplines them because their belief in religion is voluntary and self–enforcing, and the obligations it lays on them is a product of deeply–cherished beliefs. By contrast, laws in an urban environment are usually either of two types; (1) they are merely to punish because of the lack of self-restraint on the part of urban–dwellers, or (2) they are habitual and instrumental to the needs of technical and scientific education. We could summarize Ibn Khaldun’s entire view on this matter by saying that laws are least effective, foster sedition, weakness, and irreligiousness when such laws are seen as being imposed on the individual from ‘outside,’ rather than a dynamic expression of a culture of faith and piety. Where there is a cleavage between religious culture and law, then law has a corrosive effect. Signs of this decay are the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS relegation of the religious law to a mere branch of learning and something that is taught academically but less and less so practically. There then is less of an engagement with law as a living body of rules, and a subsequent tendency to meekly submit to any positive judgements.44 “Dying societies accumulate laws like dying men accumulate remedies:”45 So said Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913–1994), the great Colombian conservative. This aphorism tells us that order is not secured through hyper– induced law–making, but rather through an internalization of ‘higher’ laws, duties to obey parents, obligations to others, willingness to take on social responsibilities, etc … Ibn Khaldun drew similar conclusions to Dávila about law. A preponderance of legal prescriptions is an unhealthy sign of a society. Not only that, but it brings out the fact that men are being ruled, as opposed to this fact being hidden from them. Men don’t like being overawed but “man must by necessity be dominated by someone else.” However, just application of the laws means that legal machinery is applied sparsely and people come to rely on their own virtuous qualities. This fortitude becomes a habit and hence, there is 44 45 Ibid.; II, 6. Dávila. Don Colacho's Aphorisms; 180. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS order and less need to impose laws. On the other hand, if laws are imposed with “brute force and intimidation,” the fortitude of subjects is weakened and their internal “power of resistance” is dampened because of the “inertness that develops in the souls of the oppressed.” It's not only force which destroys a person’s self–reliance. When “laws are (intended to serve the purposes of) education and instruction and are applied from childhood on, they have to some degree the same effect [as force], because people then grow up in fear and docility and consequently do not rely on their own fortitude.46 In this regard, Ibn Khaldun compares and contrasts the rough–hewn Bedouin and those who live a sedentary, i.e. civilized, lifestyle. The Bedouin have little in the way of formal laws yet display immense self–reliance and strength, while those educated and habituated to law possess little of the Bedouin power for self–reliance.47 Law, like taxation, is thus a barometer whereby discriminators of culture and indistinguishables of artisanship lie at opposite ends of the spectrum. A way of interpreting Ibn Khaldun’s opinion is once again 46 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; II, 6. 47 Ibid. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS differentiating between law and justice, or between the rational and meta–rational. On the one hand, there is law, a mechanistic, formalized, technical apparatus which can be valid law even where it does not approach even a semblance of ‘right.’ On the other hand, we have justice. Justice might ‘break’ law, it might be in harmony with it, but it touches something deeper than merely rationalized forms of propagating or implementing technical legalities. With living law there is the will to discriminate, and discrimination is often judgemental and thus critical. Imposed law or ‘law by rote’ is the archetypal dead hand.’ The former is controversial while the latter lacks that spark of contentiousness which enliven the blood of a polity. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.10 Ibn Khaldun the Zealot Even in his historical method, Ibn Khaldun was both a zealot and artisan. He rebelled against academic civilisation like a Bedouin sectarian, on the one hand. But on the other hand, he also applied all the techniques of high Islamic civilisation and artisanship to his enterprise, weaving a delicate web of imagination and creativity. Since he was a zealot, he hearkened to tradition. In his critique, he presents himself and the other ‘rightly–guided’ historians, such as at–Tabari (838–923) and al–Mas’udi (893–956) as those representing the ‘true’ historical tradition, and the later historians, who compose the majority, as filling the ranks of the ‘false’ or unprofessional researchers.48 There is more than a hint here of his dichotomy between the dynamic Bedouins and ossified sedentary dwellers, or those with effective group– feeling and those sinking into decay beneath the weight of their lethargy. Before him, Muslim scholars had treated subjects such as governance which merely touched on deeper political truths 48 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; Foreword. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS or, alternatively, were moral discourses masquerading as political analysis. For the former, the objects of investigation were generally the Sultans, Imams, and official departments of dawlahs; Al–Dinawari (ca. 815–896) was an example of this tradition. At other times, the great philosophers of early Islam devoted their energies to adumbrating the virtues of the ideal city in neo–Platonic or neo–Pythagorean terms. Al– Farabi (ca. 870–950) was a notable example of this tradition. Here – as with the theorists of government –the ‘great man’ took centre stage, although he needed to be a man of virtue. In these neo–Platonic/Pythagorean speculations, the laws (again another Platonic influence) permeated the entire structure and in time–honoured fashion, legality needed to be sublimely instituted. Cities had to be perfectly constructed. Taxes and levies on the population is another noteworthy aspect of these books, i.e. the wise ruler not over–burdening his subjects, as are several other pertinent topics, e.g. war and military strategy.49 On the face of it, Ibn Khaldun deals with all of these topics, but whereas those earlier philosophers operated on an ‘ought’ basis, i.e. the ruler ought to do this or that, what Kant (1724–1804) would call the world of the Sollen, Ibn Khaldun 49 Enan. Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work; 137–144. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS investigated politics, history, culture, and economics, largely from an ‘is’ basis, i.e. this ‘is’ what happens in reality, what Kant would term the world of the Sein. Ibn Khaldun was astute enough to notice that many of those who did not do what they were ‘supposed’ to do (in a strictly moral sense) prospered culturally, and without a strong and stable political order – and emphasis on the Sein – the way that Muslims ought to behave in the world of the Sollen would be impossible to realize. Ibn Khaldun saw power politics – the domain of the ‘is’ – as an amoral domain where, like love, ‘all is fair’, while he was scrupulous about the theory, practise, and application of law, viewing it as a domain where a more universal ethical outlook was appropriate. Ibn Khaldun had a conviction that he was doing far more than merely writing a book on history but that his endeavour was in and of itself a rejuvenating factor within the house of Islam. Ibn Khaldun seems to link thoroughness in the kingdom of the intellect with the freshness and energy of a newly–emerging civilisation. Those scholars who shape history are of the few. They are part of an expert elite who trailblaze and lead the mass. Historians like him distinguish themselves from those who lack originality, are unprofessional, or who lack thoroughness. But what sharply divides the two camps is that one side engages in constant CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS critical enquiry whilst the other accepts what has gone before.50 Dismissing the dross that came between him and the purer historians, Ibn Khaldun stated certain conditions the genuine historiographer must meet. He must: (1) Investigate the origins of dynasties. (2) Determine forms of governmental organisation. (3) Analyse how dynasties interact with one another, why they separated or merged with one another. (4) Explain how dynasties superseded one another.51 He took the view that the content (which is likely determined by the historical origins of the dynasty) had to be considered along with the form of the dynasty. This is more of a subtle point that may be at first appreciated. For example, nowadays it is natural for scholars to discuss the forms when it comes to politics (whether a nation–state is a democracy, republic, monarchy, etc …) but to then assume the content comes with such forms (e.g. economic liberty is often portrayed as something that can only exist in a democracy, which is as absurd as saying that tyranny could 50 51 Mahdi. I Khaldu s Philosoph of Histo ; 147. Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; Foreword. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS never occur in the same form of government).52 To his great credit, Ibn Khaldun did not repeat this mistake and considered both the form and content of political communities in his historical analysis. It was an important insight later made by Machiavelli and Carl Schmitt, where the form–content axes appear more explicitly. 52 Parliamentarianism is another instance which deserves mention. Parliaments acted as counter–weights to monarchical majesty in Europe. Whereas the king stayed silent, the commoners and lords discussed and argued amongst themselves. The squalid and tempestuous arena of politics contrasted with the serenity and authority of the Highness. So, the content of parliamentarianism was wholly informed by history. Yet, an active parliament has come to be seen as absolutely essential for any government anywhere in the world, regardless of the history which has determined the culture of those lands. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS I.11 Ibn Khaldun and the Ottomans Following his death in 1406, the legacy of Ibn Khaldun was passed on to pupils of his like al-Magrizi (1364-1442) and Ibn Hajar (1372-1449) and then to others who had never met him like as-Sakhawi (1428-1497) and al-Andalusi (14281491). Something of a school of Khaldunian thought flourished in the 15th century although it by no means swept the Islamic world. However, in later centuries, Ibn Khaldun’s writings stimulated the interest of intellectuals attached to the Turkish sultanate and here there was the opportunity to apply Ibn Khaldun in a practical setting. Katib Çelebi (1609-1657) and Na’ima (1655-1716) were two of the most prominent intellectuals who meditated and innovated on the theories of Ibn Khaldun.53 Given that the Ottomans were in a state of decline when they interacted with Ibn Khaldun, these neo–Khaldunians sought to both stem, and manage, the eclipsing of Turkish power. According to Rosenthal their endeavours “constitute 53 Alatas. The Historical Sociology of Muslim Societies; El–Rayes. The politi al aspe ts of I Khaldu s stud of ultu e a d histo ; 4–5; Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; T a slato s I t odu tio . CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS an important segment of Turkish intellectual history.” Ibn Khaldun’s popularity went beyond the cream of Turkish as there were others, “often little known or anonymous, who brought numerous manuscripts of Ibn Khaldun’s work to Turkey and had them copied for their own study.”54 When Ibn Khaldun’s theories were distilled by the Ottoman intellectuals, there was an emphasis on order and authority, as opposed to law, and there were even measures proposed to strengthen blood–ties and group–feeling. In his absence, Ibn Khaldun became less of an impartial judge of history and culture, and more of an activist who vicariously propped up a once–great Empire.55 Ibn Khaldun emerged as a particularly important thinker for the Ottomans in one crucial dispute of paramount importance that took place in the Islamic world, that of the Caliphate. Within Islam, the Caliphate has historically played a pivotal role. The Caliph is the voice for Muslims worldwide, and in some ways conceptually similar to that of the Pope within Catholicism. However, the analogy Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddimah; T a slato s I t odu tio . Alatas. The Historical Sociology of Muslim Societies; Ardiç. Genealogy or Asabiyya? 54 55 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS shouldn’t be strained and unlike the Pope, there is a far greater political weight resting on the Caliph’s shoulders. Legally the Caliphate was the inheritance of the tribe of Quraysh. The Prophet Muhammad came from this tribe (it has often historically been a claim to legitimacy for Muslim rulers to trace ancestry from the Prophet’s family or from the Quraysh). The link between the office of Caliphate and Quraysh was not a problem for the first three hundred or so years of Islamic history, but as the power of the Quraysh waned this stipulation became burdensome. Theologians like al-Baqillani (950–1013) adopted a rational approach to the question of Quraysh pre-eminence. He concluded that if someone from the Quraysh could not fulfil important functions of the role – political power an obvious one – then authority could, out of necessity, pass instead to a non–Quraysh contender for the position of Caliph. Ibn Khaldun also concurred with this view and synthesized the opinions of earlier theologians with his own sociological insights. He argued that since the Quraysh no longer had the energy and strong political ties necessary to fulfil the role of Caliph, other hands could take hold of this vital position of authority in Islam. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS When, in the 15th century, the Ottomans emerged as the powerhouse in the Islamic world, Ibn Khaldun’s theories on the Caliphate were either used explicitly or provided inspiration for advancing arguments on behalf of a non– Quraysh Caliphate. He wasn’t the only scholar to offer an opinion of this major controversy but his scholarship was n important weight in the scales favouring Ottoman claims to legitimacy. Propaganda in favour of this new opinion was effective and Ottoman control of the Caliphate lasted until just after WWI (when the Caliphate was abolished and never revived). Even up until the dusk of the Caliphate, Ibn Khaldun featured in a battle for legitimacy between the Turks and other pretenders to the Caliphate who traced their lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad. During these fractious debates, which took place in the midst of a time when many lands in the Islamic had been colonized, where Imperial powers supported rival claims to Ottoman legitimacy, and where the forces of modernization were corroding the stability of the Ottomans themselves, the importance of Ibn Khaldun cannot be overstated. One Tunisian ex–Chief Justice, Ismail Safayihi, delivered the following justification for the Caliphate which is clearly derived from Ibn Khaldun’s interpretation of this delicate matter: CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Although the Qurayshite descent is a precondition for the Caliphate, as stipulated by the majority of the ulema [scholars] … it is not a precondition that is always required … What is necessary is the power that comes from the genealogical strength. . . . In the past, this [power] was found in the Quraysh; [today, it is not]. Therefore … it becomes valid and true for those rulers who lead Muslims after the Quraysh rule—even if they are not from the Quraysh.56 56 Ardiç. Genealogy or Asabiyya? CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Chapter II Machiavelli The Question Concerning Prudence Many writers have conceived of republics and princedoms which have never in fact been seen or known to exist. Since there is so great a discrepancy between how one lives and how one ought to live, whoever forsakes what is done for what ought to be done is learning self-destruction, not selfpreservation.1 II.1 Governmental Forms Machiavelli was somewhat a ‘cheeky’ rebel. The world into 1 Machiavelli. Prince, XV. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS which he was born was one which had re–discovered the ancients but which also interpreted Greece and Rome through a Christian prism. This meant that cultural and scientific learning was promoted while the fanaticism of the ancient world was all but ignored. Machiavelli deliberately focused on the less salutary aspects of Greco–Roman history as they related to war and expansion, making a point of this to his audience. His exposition of man’s existence as it related to politics was also controversial. For Machiavelli, men’s inclination is to be bad. Without government, human nature is fallen. Machiavelli was thus a firm believer in the necessity of civil life but he also was hopeful that the badness of man could be useful for civic glory. His controversial account of human psychology goes some way to explaining his fundamental political outlook.2 Machiavelli gave prolonged and serious consideration to two forms of government; one a princedom, what we may term a constitutional monarchy,3 the other a republic. For example, 2 Althusser. Machiavelli and us; 45–46; Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega ; xxxiv; Machiavelli. The prince; 31–42, 60–68; Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 279–282. 3 See Machiavelli. Prince; IX, for difference between a constitutional and absolute monarchy. Further proof that we are talking about a constitutional monarchy when discussing a Machiavellian princedom is contained in the Art of War: Ki gdo s that a e ell o de ed do ot give absolute (power to) Rule to their Kings, except in the armies, for CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the opening chapter of The Prince makes the bold declaration that “[a]ll states and all dominions that have had or now have authority over men have been and now are either republics or princedoms.”4 Alternative forms of government were considered but some, like ecclesiastical princedoms (e.g. the Vatican) were exceptions, yet others like tyrannies, absolute monarchies or aristocracies were corrupt. By corrupt, Machiavelli referred to the classic Polybian and Aristotelian cycle and typology whereby monarchies degenerate into tyrannies, aristocracies into oligarchies, and popular rule into democracies. The two types of rule that have held sway over men represented the far poles of ‘pure’ rule. Monarchies represent an ideal of personal power and privilege, while republics typify an ideal of de–personalized and de–privileged government. Yet they allow for elements of ‘mixed regimes’ (democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy) which enable their subjects and citizens to strive for glory. This basic categorization comes to life in his two most famous books, which we commonly only there is a quick decision necessary, and, therefore, he who (rules) there must have this unique power: in other matters, he cannot do a thi g ithout ou sel Ma hia elli. Art of War; 13). See also: Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 45–46. 4 Machiavelli. Prince; I. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS refer to in English as The Prince and Discourses on Livy.5 In the former, a constitutional monarch is advised while in the latter republicans are counselled. Machiavelli imagined each form of government as a perfect form in and of itself and each form of government determined its content. Another way of stating that is to say that forms of government had their own internal logic. That is why he could simultaneously extol a set of values exclusive to princedoms (or even ecclesiastical princedoms like the Vatican) and turn around and promote a different set to those of republics. We should also be careful; while the concept of monarchy hasn’t changed much in the public imagination since the Renaissance, a republic meant something different to Machiavelli than it might mean for us. Republicanism, for Machiavelli, was not fundamentally a partially lawful, partially populist entity, with judges, 5 Both were written and their contents public knowledge before Ma hia elli s death i 7, ut e e ot pu lished u til a fe ea s after his death. Both the science of constitutional monarchy (i.e. The Prince), and the science of republicanism (i.e. Discourses), are hard to analyse in the same way we could do with a book like Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah. Machiavelli simply does not approach his subject matter with the same sense of systemization. He is a political scientist, not a political philosopher, and describes politics mostly in terms of names which in turn are used rhetorically and intended for a native audience. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS legislators, and the executive DR. COLM GILLIS (possibly also the administration) forming a balance of powers. It was certainly not a forum for rational discussion nor yet a vehicle for economic growth and scientific progress. Machiavelli cited the essence of a republican existence as being that of liberty, insisting this essence be maintained so as to preserve the integrity of the republic. By liberty, he meant a de– personalized form of government where no citizen can dominate another, where institutions are open to all citizens, and where privilege has to be rooted out. Legality and equality are possible by–products of such a system but this was not the essence of republicanism for Machiavelli because he accepted the possibility of illegal methods and also considered some in society to better equipped for power than the many. Another key difference between Machiavelli the Renaissance republican and our modern views on republicanism is that Machiavelli considered religion and good morals as central to a well–functioning polity. By contrast, princedoms are centred around personal dignity. Dominance is accepted and privilege is institutionalized. In a republic, domestic conflict is allowed for, whereas in a princedom it is something suppressed, i.e. the domestic is CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS domesticated.6 6 His basic approach differed to one of his students, Thomas Hobbes, who believed that all forms of government realize their existence through similar means and must apply similar methods to sustain their authority. Hobbes simply had no concept of republican liberty in the a e of Ma hia elli, although he g eatl ad i ed Ma hia elli s basic approach to political science. Some scholars argue that Machiavelli was solely concerned with issues of liberty, whether they relate to a princedom or republic, but this is a thesis not followed in this book. See, for example: Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 9–10, 26–27. A notable commentator such as Mansfield has detected a philosophi al a gle i Ma hia elli s iti gs. Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy; xxxvi– li. Fo patte s i Ma hia elli s ethod, see also: Machiavelli. The prince; 78–90. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.2 A Neo–Polybian Cycle In his discourse on the classical categorization of states into those of monarchy, aristocracy, or popular government (or even the degenerate types of government, those of tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy), Machiavelli speculates on the origins of these forms of government. He disputes the idea that men choose rationally whichever form is best suited to their purpose; “variations of government arise by chance among men.”7 First is a monarchy. From living in a state of nature, men come together into sophisticated social units. After that, they then set someone over them as an act of prudence because they fear evil actions from bad men, something noted from experience. A fear of unregulated use of force means that the citizens in the primal state appoint the person perceived as most just. Controversy then attaches to the king over time because, instead of being chosen as the most effective and worthy of being granted authority, he holds power by succession. The halo of justice slips from the monarchy and occupants of the throne engage themselves in 7 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 2. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS decadent and licentious pursuits. This then opens them up to controversy. Knowing that they are generating controversy the monarchs and their clients will become more tyrannical and attempt to rule more with fear than justice. A famous example cited is that of Tarquin the Proud (fl. 535–509, d. 495 B.C.). Although he used extraordinary methods to regain the throne for his family, he could have yet won support for his regime if he had followed the ways of the ancient kings of Rome. Since he showed no respect for the laws and customs of Rome, and also laid burdens upon the plebs, it led to hatred for him which came to fruition with the rape of Lucretia. Another action which sows discord is that of complaining of the sins of their people. In a monarchy the king has such influence over his subjects that they imitate his virtues and vices or, alternatively, they will not engage in vice if he orders it to be stopped. Avarice, hypocrisy, and disrespect for pronounced laws all chip away at the princes’ authority. So, any criminality that is occurring is his fault and can be laid at his door. Once the tyranny reaches a breaking point of controversy, men of virtue then begin to capitalize on the disquiet and engage in conspiratorial and treasonous activity. When the tyrant has been overthrown the new leaders seek in like–minded spirit to make their rule uncontroversial. This they do by suppressing all the previous CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS ‘sins’ of the tyrant. They claim to act without self–interest, behave fairly towards the people, root out corruption, and expound a new set of laws. Once the memory of the controversial reign of the past tyrant has passed, the link between the people and the aristocracy is broken and oligarchy takes shape, imitating the faults of the past king. For roughly the same reasons as before, the aristocratic regime becomes controversial and a new popular regime is installed to bring justice, peace, stability, and greater equality. Nonetheless, this last regime quickly became unpopular because of prevalent license and injustice. Hence, it reverts back to that of a principality.8 A cycle, not too dissimilar to Ibn Khaldun’s historiography, is described in History of Florence: It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they are subject, pass from order into confusion, and afterward recur to a state of order again; for the nature of mundane affairs not allowing them to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same manner, having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost state of depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend; and thus from good they gradually decline to evil, and from evil again return to good. The reason is, that valor produces peace; peace, repose; repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so 8 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 2, 5; III, 29; Althusser. Machiavelli and us; 35–40. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS from disorder order springs; from order virtue, and from this, glory and good fortune.9 Questioning in either of Machiavelli's two ideal forms stands at radical opposites. On the one hand, a republic is a place of incessant controversy between persons. Controversy could even break the mould of natural justice. For example, individuals could be accused of committing crimes to prevent the accretion of personal authority, even where those accusations lacked evidence. As for crisis, a republic would need to be heavily armed to defeat external enemies, although political conflict within a republic may entail the manufacturing of external enemies so that the people can have a valve to spew out its bile. By contrast, princedoms would have to be wholly concerned with maintaining a sense of dignity and awe centred on personhood. Being personally despised is fatal to a prince and his rule. As opposed to republican freedom, any sense of controversy within a princedom would have to be radically suppressed with respect to the individual exercising of power. The existence and continuance of a princedom would have to seem foreordained and permanent, the stature of the prince unassailable. Differences between subjects must be homogenized, as opposed to republics where diversity (and 9 Machiavelli. History of Florence. V, 1. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS a consequent controversy because of divergent views) is encouraged because of republican egalitarianism. Crises posed by insiders would have to be crushed whereas conflicts with foreign powers is discouraged in a monarchy. Machiavelli did see the Roman constitution of mixed powers as ideal, but the recognition that different classes and forms of political involvement can take place in any form of government should not be confused with the idea that political systems must aim at purity, e.g. when Rome was threatened appeals were made to the people of Rome, not to a figurehead. Also let’s say, for example, a monarchy operates as a pure form. It can only do so for so long. At some stage, it must become mixed if the sincerity of its political purpose is to remain. That is the logic of the mixed government. There is not an either/or, either pure or mixed for Machiavelli. A pure republic or monarchy are fine as long as they are genuinely political, concerned with expansion, glory, and justice. Invariably, they degenerate and so a mixed form is needed for political purity.10 This conviction that rule must be consistent and coherent was also coupled with a belief that whoever ruled should aim Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega ; xliv–xlvii; Machiavelli. Prince. XIV. 10 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS for a public, communal, glory (even if the head is a sole monarch).11 11 Skinner. Pre–humanist Origins of Republican Ideas. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 137. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.3 Deliberate Contentiousness Machiavelli openly embraced the notion that he was providing contentious and explosive material. In Chapter XV of The Prince, he readily admits that his advice is going to be different to that of his predecessors and humanist contemporaries. Like Ibn Khaldun, he accuses these thinkers of deliberately avoiding controversy by retreating into idealism. Many writers have conceived of republics and princedoms which have never in fact been seen or known to exist. Since there is so great a discrepancy between how one lives and how one ought to live, whoever forsakes what is done for what ought to be done is learning self-destruction, not selfpreservation.12 While he sets his face against ‘imagined republics,’ substituting them for ‘real’ ones, it is nonetheless the case that all polities are in some way ‘imagined’ in the sense that they represent human will and are not merely things we stumble across or are material givens like water or oxygen. Everyone rules on the basis of what ‘ought to be’ and not 12 Machiavelli. Prince; XV. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS ‘what is.’13 What Machiavelli probably means – in his colloquial and direct style – is that the maintenance of a creative social existence is conflict based. Thus, the general tradition in Western philosophy – which seeks to find an unquestioned happy medium – is directly challenged by Machiavelli.14 The word which he regularly used, and which summarizes the ‘correct’ political attitude the prince or governing establishment should demonstrate towards crises and controversies is prudenza (‘prudence’). Practical wisdom, for Machiavelli, is not equivalent to goodness. Rather, it is an untaught sense of when it is judicious to act or not do so, an ethos which is tinged with the bitter reality that power constantly needs to be consolidated or expanded, further coupled with a recognition that no decision based on prudence will ever be risk–free. Prudent and imprudent behaviour forms the criterion of politics for Machiavelli, in the same way as the friend/enemy distinction does so for Schmitt). When armed (itself a form of prudence) and equipped with prudence, the ruling class is primed for political activity. In a speech written for the Gonfalonier 13 Fontana. Hegemony and power; 76–85, 113. Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe, Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega ; xxxiv–xxxviii. 14 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS (chief executive), he said: All the cities that have ever, at any time, been ruled by an absolute prince, by aristocrats, or by the people … have relied for their own defence on a combination of force with prudence; alone, prudence is not enough, and force does not make a policy successful, and, even if it does, it cannot maintain what has been achieved. Force and prudence are thus the very nerve of all states that have ever existed and that always will exist. And if one has observed how kingdoms have succeeded each other, and how provinces and cities have become ruined, one has seen that all this has been caused by nothing but the want of arms or wisdom.15 Once a prudent course of action is undertaken to manage questions, or stave off future controversies and crises, then the voyage must be buttressed by the quality of virtù (valiant courage) and blessed by Fortuna (the goddess of luck). Where a situation has become so critical that there are no options left open to the prince or elite but direct action, then prudence is equivalent to necessità (necessity).16 15 Machiavelli. Words to Be Spoken on the Law for Appropriating Money, after Giving a Little Introduction and Excuse (1503). In Cesa. Machiavelli on International Relations; 57. 16 Airaksinen. Against All the Odds: Machiavelli on Fortune in Politics. In Donskis. Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue; 3–13; Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 44, 142; Machiavelli. The prince; 31–42, 68–78; Fontana. Hegemony and power; 85–93, 114– 115; Landon, W. J. (2005). Politics, Patriotism and Language: Niccolò Machiavelli's "Secular Patria" and the Creation of an Italian National Identity. New York City: Peter Lang; 29–33; Loukola. Rethinking CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.4 The Domestic Scene While the advice to the prince may vary depending on circumstances, the intention for Machiavelli is the same; that of the prince avoiding controversy in the domesticated political arena. Nonetheless, there may be times when the gloves have to come off, so to speak, and so a prince can never completely avoid controversies or crises without plunging into ruin. So, a “prince who wishes to retain his power must learn not to be good, and to use, or not to use, that ability according to necessity.”17 Machiavelli thus goes beyond good and evil with respect to political action. This is an example of one of the key themes of Machiavelli, that of prudence, a quality which “consists … in choosing the Machiavelli: Republicanism and Tolerance. In Donskis. Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue; 97–100; Mansfield. Machiavelli on Necessity. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 43–49, 52–55; Mansfield. Ma hia elli s i tue; Pocock. The Machiavellian moment; 156–185, 189, 194–196, 200–208, 211–218; Skinner. Machiavelli and the Misunderstanding of Princely Virtù. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 139–152; Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 213–223, 245–259; Vatter. Between form and event; 201–208. 17 Machiavelli, Prince; XV. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS lesser evil.”18 This is more important than being consistently just. It would be ideal if a prince only employed those qualities which are virtuous (generosity, compassion, faithfulness, etc ...) and avoided those which are vicious (greed, perfidy, demonstrating a cunning ruthlessness, etc ...) Certain vices should be avoided by the prince but it’s impractical to totally shun bad behaviour. As put succinctly by one academic, reputation “is a possible consequence of strategic thinking.”19 When avoidance of a vice threatens his power, the prince must disregard his ethics and since ‘history is written by the victors,’ once the schism is settled the matter will be forgotten.20 In this regard, a notorious recommendation is the founding of colonies to control a region. Machiavelli advices dispossessing and scattering those inhabitants who are not loyal, thus removing the challenge to the prince from a position of legitimacy, while 18 Ibid.; XXI. Holler. Niccolò Machiavelli on Power. In Donskis. Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue; 37. 20 Machiavelli. Prince; XV, XVII–XVIII; Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 60, 142; Schleichert. Border–Value Morality and “e a ti al Cohe e e i Ma hia elli s Prince. In Donskis. Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue; 15–26. Of course, the traditional view, memorably expressed by Leo Strauss, is that Machiavelli operated in an amoral universe, encouraging others to do the same. Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 9–13. 19 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS political relations are maintained with loyal colonialists.21 As an example of a more benign public relations exercise, the prince is advised to maintain a sense of prestige. One key way of achieving this is to make decisions which are irrevocable. This impresses upon subjects the idea of sovereign rule, demonstrates its purpose, permanence, and consistency. When outward displays of prestige are exhibited to subjects, conspiracies are somewhat thwarted before they can fester.22 As opposed to monarchies republics are beset by individualism – which can translate into the will to dominate others as much as it can mean general agreement that equality is an ideal to be strived for – and this can put populist regimes in danger. Machiavelli astutely states that free cities, especially when they come into being from a previous state of tyranny, have ‘partisan enemies’ but not ‘partisan friends.’ By enemies, he means those clients of the former regime who still cling to ideas of privilege and domination. By contrast, free people earn their rewards and advance their careers without the aid of connections and thus do not have political friends as such. Citizens feel beholden 21 22 Machiavelli. Prince; III, V. Ibid.; XIX. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS to nobody. Although they may live a sheltered and prosperous life, it is simply not the mentality of free citizens to feel gratitude for their good life. By contrast, the former allies of the tyrant wish to see their former glories restored and so band together for that express purpose.23 Propaganda against republics can be co–ordinated and hence critical questions can be posed which threaten republican governance. He offers one of the most startling pieces of advice on this point, that is, to “kill the sons of Brutus.”24 The old guard who seek to reassert their power by stoking crisis should be done away with mercilessly because they present a united front and have clear designs as to their aims. Enemies who encourage scepticism concerning the self–evident truths of the republic must be done away with, but the leader must avoid offending the people at large.25 While it is always ideal for controversies and crises to be quashed, there may be times when dissensions have to be managed because attempting to extinguish discord would result in inflaming passions. Republics are particularly 23 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 16. Ibid.; I, 16; III, 3. 25 Ibid.; I, 16; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 66–71. 24 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS susceptible to instances where corrupt laws take root (those laws which inhibit freedom and liberty) or where a seemingly virtuous individual is allowed to acquire more power than is safe. Wealth and the ability to attract a personal following (essentially a mini–monarchy within a republic) are things impossible in a pristine republican order. Ideally, for Machiavelli, individuals should be happy to descend from higher to lower orders for the good of the republic. Those citizens who are ambitious and unwilling to relinquish higher office are dangers, we are told. Men of ambition will protest against being molested in any way, seeking freedom for themselves. Two ways of securing themselves involve forming alliances and also taking the weak and downtrodden under their wing. These men are difficult to hinder because the justifications for their actions resonate with principles that originate from far in the past, and beginnings carry with them a certain authority. He cites the case of Spurius Maelius (d. 439 B.C.), who ascended to power by using his wealth to feed the plebs. Since he excited popular favour, the Senate appointed a dictator who summarily crushed Spurius.26 26 Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 28. Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 60–62. See also Ma hia elli s o e ith the ise of g eat e as the elated to CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Yet, carving out a non–controversial space can be the death knell of a republic because it opens up the question of unjust domination which in turn leads to dubious thoughts concerning intent and future policies. If an individual has become so powerful to the point where “citizens and magistrates have fear of offending him and his friends,”27 Machiavelli sees only two courses of action, neither desirable, and both with the potential to call the polity into question. The first option is to “seek to eliminate him with danger of sudden ruin,” or secondly, “by allowing him to act … enter into a manifest servitude, unless death or some accident frees you from it.”28 Despite the dilemma emanating from this scenario, some good comes of these ambitious types and then there is the fact that people admire the spirit of the young. Machiavelli produces the concrete example of Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464), who acquired status as a youth and who was subsequently expelled from the city. Instead of ending Cosimo’s career, the episode helped him rise to power because the Medici partisans resented the offense given to their leader. Caesar (100–44 the Florentine republic: Rubenstein. Machiavelli and Florentine Republican Experience. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 12–13. 27 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 46. 28 Ibid.; I, 46. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS B.C.) is another famous example of dilemmas concerning the ambitious in a republic. Opponents of the ‘great man’ may prudently let the evil ‘run off’ by itself since the domineering individual may be bereft of something to call his partisans to unite against. Another thing to consider in this regard is that republics, despite always striving to de– personalize their rule, yet have need of venerable citizens with personal authority. Personal ties are vital, although not without danger to a republic, and when these are eroded free regimes are in danger.29 This question of balancing the need for great and venerable citizens with preventing individuals rising to power on the backs of discontent and personal popularity is a severe one for a republic. An individual exhibiting gravitas may be the only cure for checking the passions of the crowd. This is also why honour must be attached to offices or ranks, so that the person holding it is heeded. Ideally, however, institutions should be enacted which will prevent any one individual accumulating too much power and threatening the freedoms of the republic. At the same time, Machiavelli recognizes that an individual of great virtue can be ignored in a republic during times of peace. This is corrosive to the republic and 29 Ibid.; I, 53. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the virtuous citizen becomes disgruntled. In such a situation, the individual in question may seek to foment crises so as to create an opportunity whereby they can demonstrate their virtue.30 Machiavelli’s analysis of the problem involves dividing ‘good’ works into those done for private or public gain. Where there is public gain, such individualism should be encouraged but where the gain is private then the road should be blocked to personal ambition. Public honours are one common means of favouring citizens without them building their own private empire. While preventing private ambition is an anti–corruption measure, there is also the implication that private charitable works are to be viewed with suspicion, family ties are to be held in check, and the disputable opinion that poverty may be a good thing for social peace. In extreme circumstances, there is the paradox of creating a dictator in a republic to crush a private individual, a course of action where one private citizen has overwhelming command to prosecute a republican war against a private citizen. Furthermore, there should be orders, Machiavelli tells us, in place which keep the republic in constant preparation for war 30 Ibid.; I, 33, 34, 36, 37, 46, 52, 54; III, 8, 28; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 58– 60, 62–66; Viroli. Redeeming "The prince"; 49–52, 54–57. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS while at the same time preventing any domestic controversy arising. In Rome, for example, armies were kept outside the city (the significance of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon a violation of this rule).31 When considering three solutions to the problems of civil strife, Machiavelli questions whether executing or exiling notable leaders of parties to a rebellion is better than another alternative, that of making peace between the factions. He finds the peaceful solution least satisfactory; “it is difficult for them to abstain from injuring one another,”32 because they have to live together and quarrelling can arise. Nonetheless, only great republics will make such decisive judgements, and weak states will opt for more pacifist methods. Machiavelli is ever diligent with regards to the exigencies of war; a divided polity presents an easy target for outside enemies because there already exists a crisis which can be exploited. Controversies are particularly acute in republics where there are no limits on political power. Although these tumults may not destroy a republic in times 31 Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 16, 17, 28; Machiavelli. History of Florence; VII, 1; Pocock. The Machiavellian moment; 208–211; Skinner. Pre–humanist Origins of Republican Ideas. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 138–141. 32 Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 27. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS of peace they will burst out into the open as soon as an enemy rears its head.33 33 Ibid. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.5 Commoners and Nobles Machiavelli was an elitist who divided people into the minority of patricians and the mass of either the general populace and/or plebs. Nonetheless, he didn’t demonstrate an aristocratic snobbery towards the lower classes and generally saw them as a stable base for power, although he also appreciated the man of destiny and vision. What fundamentally separated the two strata was domination; the nobles desire dominance and command, while the common folk merely do not want to be dominated. This schism between noble and commoner was at the heart of Machiavelli’s political template, that of ancient Rome, and the management of discord for the public good was thus addressed.34 34 Althusser. Machiavelli and us; 26–27; Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 159–167; Bock. Ci il Dis o d i Ma hia elli s Istorie Fiorentine. In Bock el al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 188–191; Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega .; xlii–xliv; Fontana. Hegemony and power; 101; Fontana. Machiavelli and the Gracchi: Republican Liberty and Class Conflict. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 233–253; Mansfield. Machiavelli on Necessity. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 43, 45–46; Pocock. The Machiavellian moment; 197–198; CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Nobles desire to command (and in extreme cases to enslave people), while the plebs seek licence and thus the latter are wary of any regulations or attempts to change the political order. Machiavelli distinguishes between licence and liberty. Licence is a vice of the plebs. Some of its signs are “youth becom[ing] more dissolute than before, more extravagant in dress, feasting, and other licentiousness, and being without employment, wast[ing] their time and means on gaming and women; their principal study … how to appear splendid in apparel, and attain a crafty shrewdness in discourse.”35 By contrast, liberty is guarded by “ordinances capable of appeasing or restraining these contending dispositions, so as to prevent them from doing mischief.” Only when such institutions exist, can a republic call itself free because there is a structure in place for mediating domestic conflict and no one individual is needed for the whole edifice to cohere, as would be the case in a princedom. Where there aren’t good Skinner. Pre–humanist Origins of Republican Ideas. In Bock el al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 135–138; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 10– 12, 31–34, 40–43, 48–55; Vatter. Between form and event; 79–80, 91– 95. 35 Machiavelli. History of Florence; VII, 5. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS institutions, then either tyranny or licence will run wild.36 That is because tyranny cannot please the good, and license is offensive to the wise: the former may easily be productive of mischief, while the latter can scarcely be beneficial; in the former, the insolent have too much authority, and in the latter, the foolish; so that each requires for their welfare the virtue and the good fortune of some individual who may be removed by death, or become unserviceable by misfortune.37 Machiavelli was neither a supporter of a vacuous populist democracy, nor of a facile autocracy which is only the vehicle for a figurehead or dynasty detached from public welfare. It should be carefully noted that he neither opposed populism nor autocracy, merely their corrupt forms which did not serve the glory of the state. His ideal was the mixed polity of Rome where the plebs/people and patricians were represented, and where even a short–lived ‘monarchy’ in the form of a dictator was allowed, thus combining elements of democracy, aristocracy, and absolutism, in a ‘mixed’ constitution. He did not try to make all parties the same but was concerned with organizing them into a coherent unit where personal ambition would recede to communal glory. Ibid.; III, 1; IV, 1; Bock. Ci il Dis o d i Ma hia elli s Istorie Fiorentine. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 196–197; Vatter. Between form and event; 128–130. 37 Machiavelli. History of Florence; IV, 1. 36 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS It’s likely that he would have abhorred modern party political systems although he would have accepted that a republic hosts diverse classes and types of men, not all of whom have to love one another. There are highly practical considerations which necessitate the harnessing of noble talent and the placating of the populace, neither of which have to result in a class conflict.38 In a kingdom, the new autocrat is often installed because of the support of either one or both strata. Even if the nobles or commoners have exclusively helped the prince to power, at some stage the well-to-do and the ordinary subjects must be satisfied so that no controversies occur. However, 38 Avramescu. Machiavelli and the Theory of Exemplary Constitutions. In Donskis. Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue; 69–73; Bo k. Ci il Dis o d i Ma hia elli s Istorie Fiorentine. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 191–193, 197–201; Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega ; xlvii–li; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 44–48, 55–58. As “t auss puts it: The o o good lai s to e the good of everyone. But since the common good requires that innocent individuals be sacrificed for its sake, the common good is rather the good of the large majority, perhaps even the good of the common people as distinguished from the good of the nobles or of the great. This does not mean that the majority ought to rule in order to take care of the good of the majority. The majority cannot rule. In all republics, however well ordered, only a tiny minority ever arrives at exercising functions of ruling. For the multitude is ignorant, lacks judgment, and is easily deceived; it is helpless without leaders who persuade or force it to a t p ude tl . Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 259–260. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Machiavelli was wary of basing monarchical authority on that of the nobles because they have the means to overthrow him whereas the commoners are more likely to obey. As a prime example of a method by which the prince might shift the balance of power towards him, Machiavelli offers his opinion on why the French parliament was founded. He interprets this institution as a means of satisfying both the nobility and the commoners. Despite the seeming justice of the parliament, Machiavelli sees the commoners as enjoying an advantage through the assembly which rebounds to the king's favour. Moreover, although the system is ‘loaded,’ the advantage which the king obtains from this system is distanced from him and so the parliament seems to act independently of it’s ‘father.’ In a similar vein, the prince must appoint ministers who will execute his will without being ‘of him.’ They are proxies of his will but appear autonomous. Judgement must be prudent in this regard nevertheless; capable and loyal ministers are not only beneficial for the realm but also protect the ruler’s prestige as they make him seem intelligent, personal qualities all important in a monarchy.39 39 Machiavelli. Prince; IX, XIX, XXII; Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 61–62; Guarini. Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 27–28. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS If someone wants to make a republic from an aristocracy, they have to eliminate all traces of nobility. In German cities, there was such a desire for equality that those who posed as gentlemen or aristocrats – gentlemen defined as those individuals who lived off their possessions and who did not cultivate nor put themselves to trouble to earn a living – endured hostility and even death. When pondering the common classical opinion that a multitude is more lawless than a prince, Machiavelli disagrees with the ancients. He observes that while there are several notable examples of kings being restrained by laws, there are also many kingdoms that became tyrannies, more (Machiavelli believes) than would be the case if the people were free.40 By contrast, in a princedom, if it wishes to turn an egalitarian country or city into one ruled by honour, choice individuals must be elevated to high ranks and bound to the royal house. This guarantees that the polity isn’t questioned existentially. In a possible case of kingly rule, nobles and lord will be attached to one another while the remainder live under a yoke and are de–politicized (i.e. not in a structure where their questioning can be granted an audience). Nevertheless, he recommends causing as little offense as possible to 40 Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 114–118; Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 51, 59. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS individuals because they will do all in their power to avenge such insults, whether in a republic or princedom. Nonetheless, if someone is to be ‘wronged,’ it is better to merely eliminate them.41 If great equality or great inequality is not produced – this depending on the form of government – the polity won’t be stable. Where inequality is fostered, discontent and consequently revolution, is a possible by–product. A celebrated example of Machiavelli’s is contained in his History of Florence where he describes the Ciompi wool rebellion of 1378. The government at the time was restructured in such a way that those of the lower arts were disadvantaged and did not enjoy redress for their grievances. Lacking any effective legal outlet for their grievances, the wool–makers who formed the largest part of the lower classes burst out into open rebellion.42 Machiavelli puts into the mouth of the leader of the rebellion a dialogue. This manufactured discourse yet expresses a cognizance of the controversy which a usurper must navigate and this is 41 Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 193–196; Fontana. Hegemony and power; 122–123, 139; Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 3; Viroli. Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 152–160. 42 Machiavelli. History of Florence; III, 3; Mansfield. Machiavelli on Necessity. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 51–52. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS combined with a warning concerning the danger of humiliating the lower classes in a society. There is also a cynicism towards the sacredness of the prevailing authority and a keen awareness that nostalgia, not cold examination of the researched facts, constructs a history of how a usurper or revolution came to power. In other words, propaganda is essential. If the question now were, whether we should take up arms, rob and burn the houses of the citizens, and plunder churches, I am one of those who would think it worthy of further consideration, and should, perhaps, prefer poverty and safety to the dangerous pursuit of an uncertain good. But as we have already armed, and many offenses have been committed, it appears to me that we have to consider how to lay them aside, and secure ourselves from the consequences of what is already done. I certainly think, that if nothing else could teach us, necessity might. You see the whole city full of complaint and indignation against us; the citizens are closely united, and the signors are constantly with the magistrates. You may be sure they are contriving something against us; they are arranging some new plan to subdue us … We must … in order to be pardoned for our faults, commit new ones; redoubling the mischief, and multiplying fires and robberies; and in doing this, endeavor to have as many companions as we can; for when many are in fault, few are punished; small crimes are chastised, but great and serious ones rewarded. When many suffer, few seek vengeance; for general evils are endured more patiently than private ones. To increase the number of misdeeds will, therefore, make forgiveness more easily attainable, and will open the way to secure what we CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS require for our own liberty. And it appears evident that the gain is certain; for our opponents are disunited and rich; their disunion will give us the victory, and their riches, when they have become ours, will support us. Machiavelli goes on to make the point that republics must rebel against any sense of prestige. This is expressed in humanistic terms but undoubtedly Machiavelli was more interested in attacking the inconsistency of exalting some individuals over others in an egalitarian polity. Be not deceived about that antiquity of blood by which they exalt themselves above us; for all men having had one common origin, are all equally ancient, and nature has made us all after one fashion. Strip us naked, and we shall all be found alike. Dress us in their clothing, and they in ours, we shall appear noble, they ignoble—for poverty and riches make all the difference. In a manner reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun’s zealous adherents of ‘asabiyyah, the Ciompi insurgents then offer a justification for their barbaric and evil actions, which effectively amounts to that of ‘might makes right.’ Justice is only a function of force, history can be re–written, and the lack of group–feeling amongst the current rulers makes them ripe for revolution. The cynicism towards power is tangible, but the point is that all controversy can be swept under the carpet through a subsequent process of rationalization. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS It grieves me much to think that some of you are sorry inwardly for what is done, and resolve to abstain from anything more of the kind. Certainly, if it be so, you are not the men I took you for; because neither shame nor conscience ought to have any influence with you. Conquerors, by what means soever, are never considered aught but glorious. We have no business to think about conscience; for when, like us, men have to fear hunger, and imprisonment, or death, the fear of hell neither can nor ought to have any influence upon them. If you only notice human proceedings, you may observe that all who attain great power and riches, make use of either force or fraud; and what they have acquired either by deceit or violence, in order to conceal the disgraceful methods of attainment, they endeavor to sanctify with the false title of honest gains. Those who either from imprudence or want of sagacity avoid doing so, are always overwhelmed with servitude and poverty; for faithful servants are always servants, and honest men are always poor; nor do any ever escape from servitude but the bold and faithless, or from poverty, but the rapacious and fraudulent. God and nature have thrown all human fortunes into the midst of mankind; and they are thus attainable rather by rapine than by industry, by wicked actions rather than by good. Hence it is that men feed upon each other, and those who cannot defend themselves must be worried. Therefore we must use force when the opportunity offers; and fortune cannot present us one more favourable than the present, when the citizens are still disunited, the Signory doubtful, and the magistrates terrified; for we may easily conquer them before they can come to any settled arrangement. By this means we shall either obtain the entire government of the city, or so large a share of it, as to be forgiven past errors, and CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS have sufficient authority to threaten the city with a renewal of them at some future time.43 This is also a salutary lesson of the Machiavellian insight that republics need common enemies to rally against, in contrast to monarchies where ties of dignity and family are generally stronger.44 Egalitarian forms of government have the dangers of breaking down and giving rise to a tyranny. One example offered by Machiavelli is that of Spurius Cassius (d. 485 B.C.) who aroused the suspicion of the nobles by offering the plebs land taken in a war. Since the plebs valued their freedom (which obviously leads to social inequality), they did not take Spurius up on his offer. Machiavelli makes the point that “if such a people had been corrupt, it would not have refused the said price, and it would have opened the way to tyranny that it closed.”45 On the other hand, rule by a princedom, if it becomes tyrannical, leads to vast hopes amongst the multitude for freedom if the king is removed. This does not apply to cities conquered by republics. 43 Machiavelli. History of Florence; III, 3. See also: Bock. Civil Discord in Ma hia elli s Istorie Fiorentine. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 193–196. 44 Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega ; lvii. 45 Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 8. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Republics can make foreign peoples servile, in contrast to princes who generally let conquered people live by their old customs and freedoms. If poverty is widespread, like it was in Rome, then a way to remove crises associated with destitution is to keep open the ways to glory through official institutions. Since glory secured the honour of citizens, the desire for riches in Rome was less acute. The celebrated example in its history is that of Cincinnatus (519–430 B.C.) who (legend has it) left his small farm to take up the dictatorship of Rome at a time of crisis. Such orders have an effect, similar to that of religion, of making citizenship and leadership uncontroversial.46 The process of rationalizing and justifying rule over time involve dealing with constant crises and controversies whose solution or amelioration are often fraught with difficulty. Machiavelli cites the case of the creation of the censor which judged on which customs were truly Roman or not. The censor enabled Rome to live free and uncorrupted, although the magistracy was initially created for too long a time period, an oversight later rectified by a dictator. Despite the unpredictability of circumstance, cities ordered properly 46 Ibid.; I, 55, 59; II, 2, 28; III, 8, 25; Silvano. Early Sixteenth–century Florentine Republicanism. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 59. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS with respect to freedom are able to react to concrete events, while cities which are servile are unable to make the necessary changes at moments of crises. But at the beginning of any republic, questions must be ‘put to bed’; later controversies and crises will threaten the republic and these require a sound framework to be dealt with successfully.47 47 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 49. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.6 Taxation As with Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli is concerned with the role of taxation in maintaining power. The problem for Machiavelli is this; generosity is praiseworthy, yet to constantly renew an image of generosity, the prince must increase the burdens on his citizens. This then makes his rule controversial and can induce financial crises. Yet, it is a vicious cycle; if he is levying taxes to augment his majesty but then reins taxation in it can lead to his impoverishment which makes him despised in the eyes of subjects.48 Once the prince pulls back from ostentation and attempts to harvest a reputation for prudence, subjects interpret his actions as stinginess. Financial crises are averted when the prince makes a habit of being prudent from the start of his reign; subjects become acclimatized to this state of affairs and will then be thankful when any small acts of kindness are displayed. Generosity is useful when coming to power 48 Barthas. Machiavelli, the Republic, and the Financial Crisis. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 257–275; Machiavelli. Prince, XVI. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS because it tarnishes the incumbent with the moniker of stinginess. Once in power, however, the prince shouldn't tempt crises by continuing with such habits. Remembering once again that it is crucial for a prince to keep his sense of dignity at all times, Machiavelli states that “[a]bove all else a prince must protect himself from being despised and hated; generosity leads to both.”49 Even the death of a close relative does not cause as much discomfort to someone as the loss of property (or the dishonouring of their women). Therefore, the prince “should restrain himself from other people's capital: men are quicker to forget the death of a father than the loss of an inheritance.”50 What is also important for enhancing the prince’s dignity is the encouragement and support of artisanship in his realm. This involves taking measures to ensure that wealth, property, and personal integrity are guaranteed. Security and low taxes are highly recommended. Guilds and corporate institutions should be acknowledged through public displays of kindness and generosity.51 America provides a good contemporary example of the problem of taxation. While the revolution was sparked by a 49 Machiavelli. Prince; XVI (Emphasis added). Ibid.; XVII. 51 Ibid.; XIX, XXI. 50 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS tax, the 20th century showed that the US had to redistribute wealth so as to give the impression that citizens were being rewarded for their services. Similarly, Machiavelli tells us that when Rome was expanding it found itself unable to conduct long sieges or travel far to attack enemies because men joined the Roman army at their own expense. To circumvent this problem a professional army was instituted, with taxes levied. Although there was opposition from the tribunes (leaders of the plebs), both the plebs themselves and Senate supported this measure; the plebs because it seemed to enrich them, the Senate for the reasons of conducting warfare. Progressive taxation was levied so that the nobility contributed more but all were required to pay taxation to effectively pay themselves.52 Taxation is institutionalized so as to remove doubt over the regime but at a later date, questions of taxation can re–surface and it’s widely acknowledged that financial mismanagement lay at the heart of the Roman Empire’s later problems. 52 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 51. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.7 The Foundational Foundational moments are critical periods in a republic’s life, ensuring the future prosperity, security, and well–being of a polity. These moments are not merely one–off events in the life of a polity but can also refer to a ‘return to beginnings’ whereby all the previous corruption is swept away with an appeal to the original and pristine principles of the state, regardless of whether those values are mythic or historical. Perhaps at a fundamental level, the difference between a ‘pure’ foundation and a ‘return to beginnings’ is non–existent; it may be more accurate to say that Machiavelli’s political science requires ongoing prudential decision–making within a cultural context. In other words, while a great ‘founder’ or ‘renewer’ appears to act alone, it is somewhat mythic and in fact his temporary tyranny is sanctioned culturally. Judgements which appear either foundational or reforming both involve radical steps and their characterization as either completely new or traditional CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS may be more to serve propaganda purposes rather than being a characterization based in reality.53 Whatever the ultimate truth of the matter, what is clear is that such moments are meant to be political earthquakes which enervate the population, stir emotions, uproot the old and plant the new, possibly even instil terror. From the point of view of this book, such events cannot fail to be controversial or critical. When you consider that Machiavelli felt that the people should be protected whether in a constitutional monarchy or republic, his argument amounts to an idea that liberty requires a temporary tyranny to make it free. He goes so far as to admit that the foundation is a tyranny but it is an ethical tyranny because a general transformation is brought about that is creative and stable.54 The significance of the foundation act can be gleaned from key passages in The Prince. The last paragraph of the opening dedicatory letter is essentially a plea to the new ruler of Florence to become a great founder. The last chapter 53 Vatter. Between form and event; 63–70. Althusser. Machiavelli and us; 53–68; Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al ‘epu li a Lega ; li–lvi; Machiavelli. Discourses; xxvii–xxviii; Rasmussen. Excellence unleashed; 101–103; Viroli. Redeeming "The prince; 23–49. 54 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS (XXVI) of the same book finishes with an exhortation to a redeemer to liberate Italy. Machiavelli toys with the notion of prescribing the bitter medicine of a harsh terrain for new citizens as this will fortify them and bind them to each other. Necessity governs men’s decision–making and when the scope of choice is reduced, then the brave will seek virtuous glory over meek acceptance of impoverishment. There is something of the flavour of Ibn Khaldun’s dialectic of the Bedouin and sedentary civilization here. Machiavelli laments the current age where men had become too civilized and recommends any legislator of his time to work on mountain dwellers as they will be easier to form into resolute partisans. Foreign influences can also erode native fanaticism. In this regard, he praises subjects of Germany because they don’t mix with their adjoining countries, being content with eating and wearing what the land provides. By contrast, kingdoms like France and Spain were open and thus became corrupted.55 In the Art of War, one of the protagonists, Fabrizio, says the following qualities of the ancients are to be admired and emulated: 55 Cesa. Machiavelli on International Relations; 20–21; Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 11, 51. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS To honor and reward virtù, not to have contempt for poverty, to esteem the modes and orders of military discipline, to constrain citizens to love one another, to live without factions, to esteem less the private than the public good, and other such things which could easily be added in these times.56 Although such harsh surroundings would mitigate discord, promote industry, and forge unity, the inevitable poverty and inability to remain isolated would mean that the city could neither expand nor be able to dominate other regions, the latter a natural part of men’s desire to command others. Also, as the foundation of Alexandria by Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.) showed, a rich and prosperous land might exercise its own ‘necessity’ on people that makes them want to stay there and defend it. Necessity is a social glue but ‘natural’ necessity arising from physical surroundings is often impractical. So, artificial hardships are to be imposed from the beginnings of a city–state so as to minimize dissensions induced by a site lacking in good things. Wise laws are central to this task. Machiavelli cites the example of the Mamelukes of Egypt (13th–16th century), who were disciplined by the laws of that country to perform martial exercises, which deterred them from idleness, and he also cited the instances of Romulus (ca. 771–717 B.C.) and Numa (753–673 B.C.), key figures in Rome’s early history. In this 56 Machiavelli. Art of War; p. 9. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS regard, “hunger and poverty makes men industrious, but the laws make them good.”57 Since the mass of people are bad in the ‘wild state,’ the founder has an additional responsibility in that he will be responsible for shaping unformed matter into usable political material. Another application of sound law–making is when the homogeneity of a region like Sparta is maintained by population control and refusing entry to foreigners who would corrupt the order. This allowed Sparta to last for a long time. Nonetheless, Machiavelli opposes longevity for the sake of longevity, expressing hatred for Caesar because Caesar changed Rome from a republic to an Empire, thus destroying her freedoms.58 A prudent founder, like the Spartan Lycurgus (fl. ca. 820 B.C.), might impose an order that lasts without being corrupted for centuries or, alternatively, there may need to be renewal of the original foundation at relatively frequent periods, as happened in Rome, these happening as 57 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 3. Ibid.; I, 1, 3, 6, 10, 59; II, 3; III, 49; Skinner. Pre–humanist Origins of Republican Ideas. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 138; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 43. 58 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS “accidents.” Foundational or accidental moments are yet laced with controversy. Cities will never order themselves without danger, because enough men never agree to a new law that looks to a new order to a city unless they are shown by a necessity that they need to do it. Since this necessity cannot come without danger, it is an easy thing for the republic to be ruined before it can be led to a perfection of order.59 So, founders may be caught between possible disputes arising from the imposition of new orders or crises which are necessary to cement the new dispensation. While such an approach is effective – the “best remedy whoever becomes prince of either a city or a state has for holding that principality is to make everything in that state anew”60 – Machiavelli admits that it is cruel and thus attracts accusations of undue personal domination. He instances Alexandar’s father, Philip of Macedon (359–339 B.C.), whose ethnic cleansing procedures were routine and brutal. Completely re–ordering a city or state has the primary advantage of throwing a veil of secrecy over the workings of the government. Those who inherit the state are the only ones who are aware of the rationale for various measures. On the down side, the foundational act requires such evil as 59 60 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 2. Ibid.; I, 26. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS would be neither Christian nor human. For Machiavelli, however, taking a middle way is often harmful, although a common habit of men, and “they do not know how to be either altogether wicked or altogether good.”61 That founding a city or renewing new orders in a corrupt city (which essentially amounts to the same thing) is a risky venture is well appreciated by Machiavelli. First of all, the nature of the polity to be renewed has to be defined and understood; “there [can’t] be a similar form in a matter altogether different.”62 The process of instituting a pristine beginning or weeding out corruption is incredibly difficult, and this is compounded by the quest to find leaders of suitable mettle to carry out the tasks. Supposing someone is prudent enough to see chronic corruption – and this is unlikely – then they will have to convince everyone else of their insights. Yet men are creatures of habit and they do not like being told they are wrong. If someone wants to suddenly re–order a city or state, they will then have to use extraordinary methods, e.g. wanton violence. Violence is mostly relished by bad men, not by good ones, yet the goods ones are those who would be more likely to benefit others 61 62 Ibid.; I, 2, 26; II, 13. Ibid.; I, 18. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS without expecting anything material in return.63 Thus, there “arises the difficulty, or the impossibility, of maintaining a republic in corrupt cities or of creating it anew.”64 From this discourse of Machiavelli, it can be seen that states which tend to avoid controversy will dissolve, while those who court controversy must do so if they are to renew or establish themselves. An individual who wants to reform a polity will likely invite questions; if a bad man takes power he may deepen crisis, while less antagonistic individuals will often shy away from tasks which involve violence and domination.65 Since change is necessary but controversial, one strategy advised by Machiavelli is that of altering the orders of the city–state in such a way that it feels like no change has occurred. As he puts it; “the verdict of Cornelius Tacitus is golden, which says that men have to honor past things and obey present ones.”66 Such perception management can be achieved because men are often led by style as much by substance. An example proffered is that of the Romans, who 63 Ibid.; I, 18. Ibid. 65 Viroli. Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 170–171. 66 Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 6. 64 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS kept much of the trappings of the monarchy once they became a republic but the actual orders under the republic were different to those of the Tarquins.67 A pure foundation can only occur when one man acts alone. This foundational ‘tyranny’ is likely to stoke controversy for obvious reasons. Machiavelli answers potential criticism of such plenitude of power being invested in one man by stylizing the ideal founder as a Stoic figure whose prudence will be understood and praised, although he may be a pariah in his time. If he has an “intent to wish to help not himself but the common good, not … his own succession but … the common fatherland,” then he is entitled to seek sole authority and no sensible person will “reprove … extraordinary action … use[d] to order a kingdom or constitute a republic.”68 Violent methods are indeed to be frowned upon, but where the effect is good then it can be excused. Another method by which the founder can remove questions from his tyranny is to not make use of his power available for successors. The famous example is of Romulus, who killed his brother in founding Rome. Romulus also avoided censure for having conferred with the Senate on occasion, thus going some way to rationalizing and de– 67 68 Ibid.; I, 26. Ibid.; I, 9. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS centralizing his power. A mistake was made with the Tarquins, who were temporarily jettisoned from Rome by Servius Tullius (575–535 B.C.) by popular vote, but left alive. Despite being appeased by the newly elected king, the Tarquins sought to regain their throne and were successful.69 If a polity or even a religious order lasts a long time then there must have been some inherent good which allowed it to develop. However, such organizations become corrupted. Justice and religion decline. What brings them back to life is either a crisis or prudence, the latter of course leading to decisions that are risky but necessary. Nonetheless, the threat of crisis (or we could simply say ‘fear’), because of its existential nature, is not to be tempted and the way of prudence is always to be preferred. For prudential returns, orders are either reinvigorated or reinstituted or else an outstanding citizen leads the way. Republics become corrupted by personal aggrandizement and therefore much of the return involves equalizing the citizenry and bringing the haughty nobles low. The plebeian tribune and censor were notable institutions which renewed Roman vigour after it had lapsed. Dramatic actions herald the great return. 69 Ibid.; I, 9; III, 4; Viroli. Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 166–168; Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 43–49. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Executions and accusations are necessary. Such displays are designed to shock and in their absence, corruption seeps in. Machiavelli literally implores his fellow republicans to instil in the magistrates terror and fear once they start to become comfortable in positions of power, the ‘great terror’ to be undertaken every five years. He also approves of the French parliament for punishing the nobles and issuing verdicts against the king, thus maintaining the laws and orders. Disparagingly, Machiavelli cites the examples of the Dominicans and Franciscans who worked such great examples of piety to return the Church to beginnings that the corruption of clergy couldn’t go unchallenged and they inculcated a belief that incompetent or mendacious rulers should be obeyed in this life.70 70 Althusser. Machiavelli and us; 48–52; Cesa. Machiavelli on International Relations; 28–29; Machiavelli. Discourses; III, 1; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 71–73; Vatter. Between form and event; 219–235, 252–259. Strauss makes a good point in that Machiavelli is highly critical of the Church, while at the same time acknowledges its power, but he does t e plai i detail ho su h supposed eak ess a e the backbone of such a politically successful entity: Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 185–186. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.8 The Accusation While many of Machiavelli’s contemporaries lamented the in–fighting that took place in ancient Rome, the man himself embraced the existence of controversy in a free republic (though not in a princedom). Once the common good was served, then laws and measures conducive to freedom could be tolerated even if they seemed to threaten the fabric of the republic. A safety valve mechanism helped to drain Rome of the frequent tumults that arose between the plebs and nobles, which was that of either expelling or killing individuals accused of being enemies of the republic.71 It is the institutionalization of controversial and critical questioning. Two effects emerge from the device of the accusation, both of which help the free republic. Firstly, those who are traitors to freedom are kept in check, while the second benefit is that citizens are able to let off steam. If this second effect wasn’t 71 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 7; Rasmussen. Excellence unleashed:; 23– 24. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS manifested, frustration could boil over into worse predicaments.72 Indictments of a public nature should be ingrained into the fabric of the republic because if they are not, extraordinary measures might be necessitated and these are more risky than the relative ‘pin–prick’ of accusation. Denunciations also stave off crises because if someone is unable to vent their anger ordinarily, they will go abroad to seek help with respect to their grievances. The fact of the guilt of the accused is of little concern; what matters is that the heat of the crowd has been assuaged. People generally recoil from oppression or the threat thereof, however, and so Machiavelli expects that the wisdom of the populace will come to the fore when accusations are levelled. Where the fears of the multitude are unfounded, rhetoric employed by a skilled speaker will show them the error of their ways. At the same time as space should be allowed for accusations, calumnies should be harshly punished. Again this is to protect the freedom of republics rather than for any reasons of justice.73 The fostering of non–existential controversies and crises so as to ward off existential controversies and crises within a mixed republican polity remains a crowning 72 73 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 7. Ibid.; I, 4, 7, 8, 59. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS achievement of Machiavelli’s, if not something that sits easily with notions of justice. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.9 Immigration Immigration is a contentious issue nowadays and was so in the Renaissance. In parts of his writings, Machiavelli views communal purity in favourable terms. Nevertheless, exclusion of foreigners, while it retains the purity of the city– state also means that a polity can’t blossom into a major power. In this regard, Machiavelli says that Rome had a significant advantage over Sparta and Athens because it freely admitted foreigners into its franchise. Sparta and Athens were somewhat defective for having strict limits on the franchise and on the economy. Although Sparta, for example, produced brave warriors and a martial spirit, its closed door policies retarded its progress. Not only did Rome’s liberal attitudes mean that more men could be armed, but arts and commerce were allowed to flourish with less alarm over morals becoming corrupted. A controversial element of his immigration open–door policies is that republics must ruin their rivals and, where possible, ‘love’ the refugees from these conflict zones.74 74 Ibid.; II, 3. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Machiavelli shouldn’t be considered a believer in Renaissance ‘multiculturalism,’ however, and where foreigners hurt the communal ethic he makes this clear. So, in the final chapter of the Discourses, he cites the example of Rome where the huge influx of foreigners affected government policy fundamentally. Fabius Maximus (280– 203 B.C.) used the remedy of confining foreigners to small spaces and categorizing them into ‘tribes’ to limit their influence. Yet, on the whole, Machiavelli supported an ‘open–door’ policy. Support for immigration is also consistent with his division of the republic into plebs/populace and patricians. Since he took a dim view of human nature, the addition of foreigners wouldn’t change neither the desire of the mass to be dominated nor that of those noble characters to dominate. It simply would put a different face on such individuals.75 75 Ibid. II, 3; III, 49; Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 90–91, 107–108; Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Li e al Republican Legacy; lvii–lix; Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 260–262; Sullivan. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England; 38–39. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.10 Religion The very name Machiavelli (or indeed ‘Old Nick’) has had a controversial ring down through the centuries. It stands for a Satanic lust for power, an ethos unhindered by any moral considerations where even goodness itself appears only as a necessary fig–leaf to deceive the masses. This characterization derives from the supposedly amoral and anti–religious leanings of the man himself. But what were the true religious beliefs of Machiavelli? While he demonstrated an admiration for the power of the Vatican in some regards, Machiavelli was clearly an anti–clerical thinker who openly abhorred what he saw as the corruption, weakness, and effeminacy of Christianity, which nonetheless retained sufficient power to obstruct Italian unity. Machiavelli’s numerous statements deprecating Christian values have made it all too easy to portray Machiavelli as a blasphemous atheist. If we are attempting to understand Machiavelli’s true convictions, there is also the problem that his words were often chosen for effect as opposed to accuracy and so his Christian critics are not short of material but scholars are less certain. Despite the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS temptation to condemn Machiavelli (his works themselves were placed on the Index either in 1559 or 156476), the opinion of Viroli and other like–minded academics probably represents a sounder evaluation of Machiavelli’s true religious opinion. ‘Old Nick’ was an independent thinker who refused to believe that God would leave men defenceless to be preyed upon. Not only does God equip us with the means for defence, He also praises glory and therefore true religion should celebrate sacrifice and valour. God wants men to live together as communities and so it is critical for religion to infuse the lives of citizens, maybe more so in a republic than a monarchy. Therefore, religious customs and doctrines require special attention and protection but this can’t come about without knowledge of the dark arts of politics.77 76 There seems to be some dispute about the exact date. The two dates given are from: Viroli. Machiavelli's God; 35; Landon. Politics, Patriotism and Language; 73. 77 Landon. Politics, Patriotism and Language; 21–27; Mansfield. Machiavelli on Necessity. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 49–51; Viroli. Machiavelli's God. I I ela d, the e is the ele ated old i es tale of ho the effe ti e founder of the Irish Republic, Éamon de Valera (1882–1975), once inadvertently swapped coats with a bishop. The horrified prelate dis o e ed a op of Ma hia elli s Prince in the coat, the obvious purpose of the uncorroborated story that of showing up de Valera to be impious and ruthless. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS For Machiavelli, “politics is … concerned with real life … the ethos of the city and an essential component of this concern … religion.”78 Machiavelli has the utmost respect for those who institute religions, holding them in higher esteem than the founders of princedoms or republics. They are explicitly contrasted with tyrants in Discourses, I, 10. The rationale for Machiavelli’s honouring of these exalted figures is of the utmost importance, moreover. It is necessary for religious figureheads like Numa (who was to Rome what Moses was to the Children of Israel) to institute civil order, justify obligation, and cement unified action by instilling in the populace a fear of God and love for things sacred. The foundational act required religious sanction and laws are more easily accepted when they are believed to have come from a ‘higher’ place. For instance, Numa pretended to be intimate with a nymph when introducing new orders into the city of Rome. They would have been controversial had he not had recourse to religion.79 78 Viroli, M. (1990). Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics. In G. Bock, Q. Skinner, & M. Viroli (Eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 157. 79 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 10, 11; Pocock. The Machiavellian moment; 190–194; Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli; 225–232; Vatter. Between form and event; 70–72; Viroli. Machiavelli's God; 64, 198– 207; Viroli. Redeeming "The prince"; 52–53. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Machiavelli was an elitist who held that the masses were unable to understand the prudence exercised by those of greater intellect. Religion as a foundational act is elitism because religion gives the founder authority but it also acts as social glue between the upper and lower classes, as the latter are wont to question the position of the former or indeed of the reverence given to the founder in hagiographic versions of history. Religious authority extends across many sectors of society and even the well–educated are prone to religious sentiments. As an example, the Friar Savanorola (1452–1498) gained power in Florence by claiming to converse with God. Although Florence was the capital of the Renaissance with a sophisticated citizenry, the authority the Friar gained from religion swayed many to accept him.80 Ancient religion was contrasted with the practice of Christianity during the Renaissance. In ancient religions, the goods of this world were given high value whereas in Christianity they were deprecated. Rites and ceremonies primed people for action in this worldly life. Men who had achieved glory and worldly honour were exalted, in contrast to the Christian quasi–beatification of the weak and humble. 80 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 11. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS The slaying of animals prepared men for sacrificing themselves with their blood.81 Machiavelli laments that criminal men have taken control of the world because of the effeminacy of Christianity. Nonetheless, although heaven is “disarmed” that is more to do with the defective interpretation of Christian teachings. He claimed that Christianity teaches patriotism and inculcates individuals with the will to defend their heritage. Machiavelli’s interpretation of the correct role of religion (as he sees it) also encompasses an appreciation of the freedom that results from civil society. While he wants rule to be sacred, he is also cognizant that controversies are appropriate at intervals and to be preferred to quiescence. So, religion plays a role in fostering obedience but also encourages fanaticism at the right times. 82 In the past, oaths were kept and God was dreaded more than men. At times of crisis, when men wanted to desert the fatherland, oaths could be extracted which renewed loyalty to the republic. In fraught situations where mutual loyalty wavered, and during events where personal emotions 81 Machiavelli. Discourses; II, 2; Viroli, M. (2010). Machiavelli's God (A. Shugaar, Trans.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; 84–88, 99–103, 153–154, 185–198. 82 Machiavelli. Discourses; II, 2. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS threatened the order of the republic, religion could be used to correct any deviations from republican virtue. Even where a city is heavily armed, a lack of religion means the city is defective whereas a city that has religion applies to its weaponry the necessary zeal. Religion renders rule unquestioned because it bypasses the obvious accusation that men are merely commanding others for their own personal gratification.83 If religion failed then the prince would have to provide the defects that religion papered over, especially that of fear, or otherwise the polity would dissolve. Princes live for only short periods and since virtue is not going to be found in all men, cities where religion has been corrupted are in a perilous state. Once the pristine foundation has occurred, then it is of the utmost importance to maintain the rites of the state religion. In fact, the denigration of religion precedes the dissolution of the polity for Machiavelli. So the fundamentals of faith had to be preserved and Machiavelli quite rightly perceives that doctrinal beliefs completely determined the efficacy of the rites, ceremonies, and 83 Ibid.; I, 11; Viroli. Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics. In Bock et al. Machiavelli and Republicanism; 156–157; Viroli. Machiavelli's God; 84–88, 99–103, 153–154, 170–198; Vatter. Between form and event; 70–72. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS sacrifices, associated with that religion. If the two are out of kilter then the religion looks inconsistent, is open to question, and consequently disputatious. This is why Machiavelli urges princes and republicans alike to “maintain the foundations of a religion they hold.” If they do so, it will be “an easy thing … to maintain their republic religious and, in consequence, good and united.”84 Machiavelli has such regard for the role of religion in making life within the polity unquestioned that he even recommends attributing favour to the religion from events such as perceived miracles, even if such attributions are false. Common sacrifices are political gold dust. In one example, he cites how Camillus (446–365 B.C.), via the Roman plebs, pledged a portion of the booty from a war to Apollo by the Senate. Despite the obvious division in social class between the Senate and plebs, religion bridged the gap between the orders and so the money was offered up without any suspicion or rancour; the incident “shows how much goodness and how much religion were in that people, and how much good was to be hoped from it.”85 Religion is intimately bound up with the unity of a state, and, despite Machiavelli’s seemingly anarchic republican libertarianism, he is always at pains to search for 84 85 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 12. Ibid.; I, 55. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS shared principles. The other side of this is that when a polity is divided, there is crisis and questioning of the order. While he is also known as an anti–Christian thinker, Machiavelli in fact lamented the impiety and corruption of the Church because of its effect on the political situation in Italy but would have wholeheartedly embraced a corpus mysticum which was institutionally pure.86 Machiavelli lamented the state of Italy in his time but was also slightly critical of Spain and France, which he accuses of having become corrupted. What saved Spain and France, Machiavelli argued, were a strong central arm and good political institutions, i.e. fear coupled with liberty. By contrast, cities in Germany were able to live free in his time because of religion, which mitigated both internal treason and outside invasion. As an example, Machiavelli noted that there was no bureaucracy to levy taxes on individuals, but rather a loose assessment of what everyone should pay and then an unsupervised payment. Because the expectation of revenue met the collected amount, it was observed that religion in Germany had performed its task in disciplining citizens and making them honest.87 86 87 Ibid.; I, 12, 13, 14, 55; Althusser. Machiavelli and us; 90–92, 97–100. Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 55. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS II.11 The Dictator Of all the names of public offices which have reached us down to the present–day from Rome, perhaps none (save for the censor if you’re an artist) is as dreaded as the dictator. Dictators in the Roman republic were extraordinary magistrates instituted in times of crisis, rather like the head of an emergency management committee, although they could also oversee some fairly banal ceremonies or events. In the later Roman republic, the dictator acquired the reputation of a tyrant when both Sulla (139–78 B.C.) and Caesar used the name of dictatorship to wield absolute power. Machiavelli recognizes that in his day there was controversy surrounding the dictatorship and one unnamed writer blames the institution for Rome’s journey from republic to Empire. While Machiavelli laments the rise of Caesar to absolute power, he does not go so far as to blame the dictatorship for Rome’s servility to what was basically a military junta. Based on his analysis, Machiavelli esteems the institution within the context of Roman history. By contrast with many moderns, he sees the dictatorship as essential to the functioning of a free republic and blames two CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS elements for the corruption of the dictatorship; the first is that the autocratic dictators seized authority, whereas before they were appointed in an official capacity. The second element of corruption is that the dictatorship was limited for a short time period whereas the junta dictators set their own time limits. A specific reason Machiavelli gives is that the ‘normal’ dictatorship was built into the effective ‘common law’ of Rome, so when it was needed it was not controversial, whereas the seizing of power disturbed the polity and raised undue anxiety over the republic.88 Freedom in a republic requires non–controversial sets of institutions and orders to manage the inevitable evolution that republics foster through clashes of interests. Nevertheless, Machiavelli recognizes that measures taken by the dictator would prove detrimental to the republic if there wasn’t ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ that could justify the 88 Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 149–153; Fischer. Prologue. In Rahe. Ma hia elli s Liberal Republican Legacy; xxxix–xli; Geuna. Extraordinary Accidents in the Life of Republics: Machiavelli and Dictatorial Authority. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 280–283, 288–289; Landon. Politics, Patriotism and Language; 33–35; Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 34; Rasmussen. Excellence unleashed; 27–28. Florence itself had something similar to constitutional dictatorships during its history such as the balie. See: Ardito. Machiavelli and the modern state; 146–147. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS extraordinary steps and actions undertaken. A dictator could shed the blood of Roman citizens without appeal during his commission, a judgement that had an appeal in ordinary times. Other functions of the dictator included being able to decide solely what solution was needed for a problem and eschewing consultation. Evils like these were tolerated out of necessity. Since these functions are essentially tyrannical, he “was appointed for a time …not perpetually … to obviate only the cause by which he was created.”89 Even more importantly, Machiavelli believed (slightly inaccurately, in my opinion) that the dictator “could not do anything that could diminish the state … undo[] … old orders of the city and mak[e] new ones.”90 As an instance of what could go wrong with granting unregulated authority, Machiavelli cited the Second Decemvirate (ca. 450 B.C.) who abolished many of the orders of Rome instead of holding them in abeyance like the dictator. From these morsels of wisdom about the dictator, we can detect which features of a republic Machiavelli asserts must be uncontroversial. No one should hold permanent power, orders of the city must be preserved unless there is a degree of unanimity as to the need for change, personal rule is forbidden, courts must check one 89 90 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 34. Ibid. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS another, and there must be agreement as to what constitutes normal and abnormal situations. While the dictatorship, and like minded institutions such as existed in Venice, are not exempted from controversy, they are necessary to stave off far greater crises which causes existential questioning of the state and even overthrow of an entire order.91 Without emergency instruments, a republic will be “ruined by observing the orders or [must] … break them [i.e. the orders] so as not to be ruined.”92 One regular crisis requiring dictatorship is that of foreign war. Not only is the dictatorship necessary for such an endeavour, but republics themselves require war because of the disunion brought about by domestic discord; “the cause of disunion in republics is usually idleness and peace; the cause of union is fear and war.”93 Disunited republics can be preyed upon most effectively, Machiavelli tells us, by the arts of peace, whereby a larger power first befriends the polity and then plays the weaker side off against the more 91 Ibid.; I, 34, 35, 49; Geuna. Extraordinary Accidents in the Life of Republics: Machiavelli and Dictatorial Authority. In Johnston et al. Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict; 283–297; Holler. Niccolò Machiavelli on Power. In Donskis. Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue; 40–42. 92 Machiavelli. Discourses; I, 34. 93 Ibid.; II, 25. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS powerful, i.e. stirring up domestic tensions until any unity is dissolved. Thus, the evil of dictatorship saves the republic from itself and comes to the rescue.94 94 Ibid. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS CHAPTER III Carl Schmitt The Question Concerning the Decision The controversy always centred on the question. Who assumes authority concerning those matters for which there are no positive stipulations … In other words, who is responsible for that for which competence has not been anticipated.1 III.1 “Who Decides?” “Who decides?” This one simple question coursed through 1 Schmitt. Political Theology; 10. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the veins of Carl Schmitt’s philosophy. Just about every book, essay, and legal justification he composed during his long and distinguished literary career – whether on dictatorship, sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, the political (Schmitt’s equivalent of Ibn Khaldun’s ‘asabiyyah), the German presidency, political forms, or foreign affairs – gravitated back towards this question. Decision in the Schmittian corpus is synonymous with judgement, but that of a peculiar type, a critical judgement which enervates the political community. The Latin version of the key phrase in Schmitt’s canon is “quis judicabit?,” and this can also be translated with who judges?, who adjudicates? As discussed throughout this book judgement implies that there is some controversy and crisis requiring of judgement. The defining phrase of Schmitt’s entire career presupposed a political world permeated by the question, a world where judgements themselves could never deliver pure clarity. Schmitt regarded the content of the decision itself as a secondary consideration, albeit a crucial one requiring formalism. The primary factor to ponder when discussing public law for Schmitt was identifying the subject of the decision (e.g. who is the sovereign?). As opposed to many of his contemporaries, most notably his erstwhile rival Hans CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Kelsen (1881–1973), Schmitt refused to separate politics and law from personality, whether that personality took the form of a supreme law–giver, democratic citizens within a culture, or even business interests operating under the Trojan horse of political parties. He also focused on culture as opposed to science. In drawing attention to the role of personality and of culture, Schmitt rebelled against the prevailing mood of systems and abstract rationalism, of complete objectivity and certainty. Inextricably linked with the decision and the question of who judges was the exception. An exception in Schmitt’s literature means a controversial question or critical moment whereby (1) no precedence exists, (2) the entire politico– legal system is called into doubt (i.e. there is a question whether the issue at hand renders the prevailing system inconsistent), or (3) precedent exists but it’s uncertain whether a judgement to follow precedent would be prudent, e.g. a decision to go to war. Schmitt engaged with the exception philosophically through the ‘eyes’ of Donoso Cortés (1809–1853), an ultra–orthodox (perhaps unorthodox) Catholic–Spanish politician and diplomat, and Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), a highly original Danish Protestant theologian, both of whom were extant in the mid– 19th century. From the Spaniard he largely took on board the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS idea that a judgement in an exceptional circumstance can be likened to God imposing a miracle in an otherwise natural order. From the Danish rebel, he meditated on the manner in which an exception throws a rule–based order into chaos while being simultaneously crucial in confirming the essence of the norm, i.e. the exception proves the rule. And, of course, the exception resolves controversies about the central question for Schmitt. It tells us who is recognized as the verifiable ‘Supreme Court.’ If resolving the question of decision was simply stated, the conversation would go something like this: “Who decides?” “The sovereign.” “Who is the sovereign?” “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.2 A Machiavellian Obsession with Form Like Machiavelli, Schmitt saw political forms as essential when considering political authority. One of his potent criticisms of parliamentary democracy was that its structure was suitable for Estates appearing before the King during the era of absolute monarchies, but it lacked the same meaning where there was no discernible neutral figurehead (neutral with respect to the petitioning interests). As with Machiavelli he largely settled on monarchy and republicanism as the two forms worth serious study. Unlike Machiavelli he tended to think of true monarchy as absolutist and the republicanism he promoted for much of his career had a pseudo–Caesarist leader responding to plebiscitary invocations although the republicanism he ideally preferred would have been a replica of ancient Rome. In times of crisis and controversy, the German republican Caesar would reflect popular feeling and counteract the liberal ‘go–to’ institutions of the judiciary and legislature. Executive judgement was favoured over legislative or judicial deliberations. The question of legitimacy took precedence over legal process. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Schmitt was comfortable with the idea of integrating controversy and crisis into a political order, and even revelled in the sheer confusion and disorder produced by the paradox. Constitutions were suitable for normal times but had to be ‘stretched,’ re–interpreted, or set aside when questions began to be asked. During emergencies Schmitt gleefully engaged with the paradox of abolishing the constitution temporarily so as to save the constitution. Furthermore, Schmitt viewed the constitution as less a piece of paper, or (as for a nation like England) accepted precedence. Instead, the constitution was organic and even beyond organic, something that was a creation of will. The constitution for Schmitt represented the national, territorial, Imperial, or State culture. Culture for Schmitt was effectively synonymous with the constitution and with the State and people. Cultures evolve, so should constitutions. When the old order loses legitimacy, revolutions and/or the convening of constituent assemblies are necessary to institutionalize the new order so as to represent the new culture. Institutions, or ‘concrete orders,’ represent the fragmented groups encompassed by a legal–political order. Opposing those who sought to make the State into merely another competing concrete order amongst all other rivals such as CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS religious organizations and trade groups, Schmitt sought to exalt and insulate the State from controversy and crisis. In this sense, he resembled Machiavelli who wanted to ensure that public institutions in a republic were always open, free, and unquestioned, allowing room for opinions even if those were amoral or anti–religious. Schmitt made the State synonymous with the people – in fact, the State was the political unity of the people (in the same way the Church does not just mean the Vatican but also is the religious community of Christian believers) and hence is synonymous with culture and the constitution, thus drawing somewhat of a circle around the question of public institutions which were perpetually under attack from several quarters (e.g. Fascists and Communists wanting a one–party State, anarchists, many [but not all] liberals who disputed the need for authority). Law, and the normal situation it presupposed, was portrayed by Schmitt as illusory. While law appeared to be a non– controversial sphere for settling disputes, including those brought against the State or ruler, it only had currency because it was backed by authority. Furthermore, law came into existence because of somewhat arbitrary judgements, the handing down of the Ten Commandments to Moses a good example of how seemingly ‘natural’ laws believed in CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS by ‘men of good sense’ start their life as revolutionary and transformative edicts. Norms were circumvented by appealing to populism, i.e. cultural evaluations of good and evil, a strategy which might be suspected of preferring tyranny over the intellect. Another manner by which Schmitt sought to suppress controversy involved the purge although this was not as relevant in an absolute monarchy (except in a limited way; for instance, dealing with troublesome ministers), but only really was exposed in a democracy. Again this goes back to culture; since a democracy is a mass political movement, there has to be consistency in the cultural order because this is identical with the political order. Therefore, those who don’t fit in may need to be purged politically, e.g. through exile, ethnic cleansing, or de–enfranchisement. Since there had to be some notion of what was pure and impure, Schmitt also integrated the concept of the myth (most famously expounded by French syndicalist Georges Sorel (1847– 1922), into his philosophy. As regards international relations, Schmitt supported the traditional policy of insulating European nation–states from any legal norms outside a designated zone called the European public order. This order was later superseded by CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS collective security, the key difference being that whereas before European nation–states were free to wage war as they saw fit, provided they met legal standards of international recognition, the new order was a kind of global police state where all acts of aggression were outlawed and interventions were permitted to achieve adequate levels of security for all members. Sometimes even moral convictions could justify intervention. The new collective security arrangements rested on the assumption that just wars could be correctly identified, i.e. that conflict need not be controversial. Schmitt adopted a modification of the old European order to global politics and during the era of Nazism proposed an expansion of the Monroe Doctrine to other great powers in the world. Germany and other major nations would have zones of influence called Großraum, regions where they did not rule directly but where they had a recognized right of control and intervention. This thesis (seen as justifying Nazi aggression) fell by the wayside for obvious reasons. After WWII, Schmitt was unable to manufacture a consistent and coherent alternative to collective security. His analysis of foreign affairs yet revealed him as a thinker who engaged with the thrill of controversy although at the same time he believed that war between European nations could and should be regulated because the alternative was the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS barbarism of the religious wars of the Reformation and Counter–Reformation. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.3 Attention–Seeking with Controversy and Crisis For Schmitt, a politico–legal order bereft of controversy and crisis ceased to be a politico–legal order worthy of consideration. Controversy and crisis were the oxygen of political life. They not only had the specific aim of resolving and defining the essence of a particular nation–state; the question and subsequent judgement also impressed upon people the seriousness of life itself. Referring to Schmitt’s concept of ‘political theology,’ Slomp says that “we must try to limit hostility but must not try to overcome it and … we must never let morality and politics mix.”2 As part of his project of drawing controversy and crisis centre stage into the political sphere, Schmitt relied copiously on religious imagery and regularly formulated theological justifications. As alluded to earlier, the exception in politics was analogous to an act of faith in religion; it provided immediate knowledge of who was a political believer and who were the non–believers, heretics, and enemies of the political order. 2 Slomp. Carl Schmitt and the politics of hostility, violence and terror; 17. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Since he grounded politics in culture, war was a duel which only the two contending participants could understand. Animosity did not need to justify itself. The march of a nation also needed no intellectual justification; myth was sufficient to explain itself. Crisis and controversy enabled Schmitt to (1) draw attention to the essence of politics and law, (2) reassert the primacy of culture over rationalism, (3) construct links between politics and religion, (4) explain the existence of evil in politics, (5) demonstrate the connection between authority and legitimacy, and (6) justify the ‘mystery’ of authority and our limits of understanding concerning judgements. Simultaneously, he recognized that there had to be abstract, rationalist, established, institutions capable of containing questions and he increasingly developed his theories in line with the fascinating insights of the French institutionalist Maurice Hauriou.3 As with the institutionalist these rational structures were ‘elastic’ but not mere conveniences; they could be justifiably overthrown when de–legitimized but at the same time the State did not live a life divorced from the 3 For an excellent English translation of some of the institutionalists, see: Broderick, A., Hauriou, M., Renard, G., Delos, J. T., & Bergkamp, M. I. (1970). The French institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T. Delos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS people as many liberals or Communists contended. Schmitt was astute enough to recognize when questions did not threaten the integrity of authority or when prevailing authority was no longer tenable. He did not give the State a permanence that was undue, but neither did he separate the State and society when these two became synonymous. In sum, Schmitt used controversies and crises to draw the attention of his audience to his radical theories about authority, myth, dictatorship, legitimacy, democracy, and constitutionalism. Concrete situations, disdained by liberal philosophers as blemishes on their systemization, gave Schmitt’s target readers insight into deeper truths. He always aimed to demonstrate inconsistencies, historical or legal, in the arguments of his opponents, i.e. to rattle faith in their jurisprudence or ideologies. Controversies and crises were the doors into Schmitt’s house, while through the window of his speculations one could gain access to Schmitt’s penetrating mind. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.4 The Enlightened Anti–Liberal Throughout his career, Schmitt despaired of the manner in which a healthy ‘seriousness’ was being sucked out of politics. Since politics largely fulfilled the role that the medieval Church used to provide, a whimsical politics equated to a meaningless of life itself. One of his greatest rebukes to the modern culture of politics, and its inherent dishonesty operating under the mask of public service, crystallizes in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Much of his critique aims to debunk principles underpinning the cosy consensus which had developed, and which is still maintained to this day, between democracy and parliamentarianism, or between mass populism and the rule of law. For Schmitt, both principles were contradictory and the cognitive dissonance had become critical:4 Liberalism, for Schmitt, was effectively synonymous with parliamentarianism and served as a counter–principle to democracy since it placed individual rights above mass emotions. Nonetheless, at its heart, liberalism was 4 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 2, 8–9. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS materialistic. Liberalism offered a perspective on human nature dictated by economic concerns. The free play of competition would produce profitable and efficient forms of commercial transactions. From the same line of thinking, truth would emerge if thoughts, feelings, reasons, and intellectual foundations could be managed in such a way so as to produce the correct answers in a rational, on–going conversation. In this system, humans are abstracted from their culture and thought of as perfectly equal. While democracy relied on drawing clear distinctions between enfranchised and the ‘others,’ i.e. limiting political rights to the ‘right’ type of people, liberalism extends political rights to every adult. Democracy and parliamentarianism were inconsistent and thus controversial.5 Assailed by the extreme left and right–wing elements who were grounded in populism and extant at the time, parliamentarianism found itself in a crisis of historic proportions. Schmitt claims that this momentous hour had not arisen due to any rhetorical failures to galvanize public support for liberalism. Rather, the crisis lay in the self– contradictory claims of parliamentarianism itself. Schmitt Ibid.; 10–11; 35–36; McCormick. Ca l S h itt s iti ue of li e alis ; Ojakangas. A philosophy of concrete life; 113–115, 120–135; 3–5, 67– 68, 271–279; Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 89–93. 5 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS tactically aligned himself with extreme elements because he recognized the validity of their arguments vis-à-vis liberalism; the “curious contradictions of … liberalism struck not only reactionaries … but also revolutionaries.”6 Parliamentarianism aimed for a consensus reached through open, frank discussion. Yet, it happened to co–exist with mass democracy (as opposed to traditional democracy) and in such populist regimes, everyone had political rights but agreement would always be elusive because of the substantial differences between citizens. Liberal–democracy was effectively a house divided where the claims of populists to complete agreement met those of parliamentarians with their convictions about public good realized through dialogue. What made the situation worse was the historical tendency of parliamentarians to avoid controversy.7 Parliament justified itself historically through the medium of open, honest, truthful, discussion, by which justice and prudent decision–making could be pursued. By contrast with monarchical absolutism, which was controversial because one individual made judgements and pronouncements 6 Schmitt. Political Theology; 60. Ibid.; 62. Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 15–17; 34– 35. 7 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS whose rationale was sealed away from public scrutiny, the openness of liberal discussion led to the claim that the reason for decisions could be comprehended. Absolute monarchy was pilloried as an anachronism for having secrets and inner circles. Parliament, on the other hand, claimed to be ethical because it upheld the public right to know the turnings of the machinations of power. The houses were where the law, universal and immutable, could be delineated, whereas the royal house operated outside of legal norms. Where parliament did not directly set out to undermine monarchy, it still set itself as a balancing force; the constant petitioning and noise of the public chamber designed to maintain an apolitical space to counter the manoeuvrings of the king. Public opinion would constantly shed on light on power to prevent it corrupting. At a deeper level, the secrecy vs. openness dispute was merely a modern restatement about controversies surrounding power itself, whether might makes right.8 Despite claims regarding openness and secrecy, this portrayal of modern parliamentarianism, Schmitt is keen to point out, is nothing more than a veneer for interests who are elite, non–accountable, and hidden. 8 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 5, 38–39; 42–49; Vinx. The Guardian of the Constitution; 125–128, 148. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS [P]arliamentarism has … produced a situation in which all public business has become an object of spoils and compromise for the parties and their followers … politics, far from being the concern of an elite, has become the despised business of a rather dubious class of persons.9 Allowing parties to freely compete for power rested on the assumption that the people were good and that even if the people had not fully evaluated everything properly, parliament would wash away deviant opinions. Unlimited confidence meant that laws had become empty rules and parliament a house of organization and procedures. Schmitt, by contrast, says that the people who occupy parliament and the laws made there must have substantial agreement on core values.10 A sort of forgetfulness had overcome liberal–democrats; the constitutional state “may not be “neutral” toward itself and its own presuppositions.”11 Otherwise, a constitution may contain within itself its own “counter–constitution.”12 His criticism of the technical nature of the modern State is withering: “Comprehending law and statute without relation to any content as the present conclusion of the transitory 9 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 4. Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 25–27. 11 Ibid.; 27. 12 Ibid.; 58. 10 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS parliamentary majority corresponds to a purely functional manner of thinking.”13 There was an assumption that if something extraordinary happened it must be ignored in law and politics, and in a similar way the modern world denied miracles so that the purity of the natural Universe can be maintained. This movement towards thinking of the law in scientific terms occurred during the Enlightenment, most notably with Kant, who considered every emergency decree as non–legal. Transferring the chaos of political life to a sort of scientific obsession with rules and procedures rejected the evidence that laws and norms came into being historically through exceptions. Jurists had a lamentable tendency to design a perfectly well–conceived system which, while consistent and understandable, also excluded much of what was real and of value.14 Public service was essentially a mask for private selfishness. While opinion should be the bread and butter of public debate – a kind of scholarship of legislative activity – vested interest was the real ingredient. Schmitt evokes the contrast of the public chamber – supposedly inimical to open politics 13 Ibid.; 27. Kalyvas. Democracy and the politics of the extraordinary; 100–146; McCormick. Ca l S h itt s iti ue of li e alis ; 31–37, 42–55, 279– 286; Schmitt. Political Theology; 12–15; 19–24, 31–33. 14 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS – and the antechamber – associated with the days of absolute monarchy (similar to the parliamentary houses and royal houses). He claimed that the public chamber merely represented ‘hidden’ antechambers no different to those of kings of yesteryear, and in fact is more harmful because governments in the modern age have so much power and access to people’s lives relative to those of kings of auld lang syne.15 If someone purports to serve the public interest at all costs, but is beholden to certain, narrow sectors of society, the claims of parliament to justice and truth unravel. Modern politics is inauthentic and one of Schmitt’s greatest metaphors is coined, a similitude which takes a dig at the artificial nature of the technical age. Many norms of contemporary parliamentary law, above all provisions concerning the independence of representatives and the openness of sessions, function as a result like a superfluous decoration, useless and even embarrassing, as though someone had painted the radiator of a modern central heating system with red flames in order to give the appearance of a blazing fire.16 In contrast to the view of freedom of speech as an inalienable right, Schmitt merely sees this right as instrumental in good governance, the implication being that it could be suspended 15 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 5–7; 49–50; Vinx. The Guardian of the Constitution; 130–131. 16 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 6. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS if shown to be ineffective. In yet another blow to Enlightenment rationality, Schmitt argued that discussion is based less on reason, than on inciting passions and partisanship. Liberalism, by institutionalizing mini– controversies, effectively denied the existence of real, existential, controversies. Nonetheless, the actual empirical evidence which showed that parties would use the chamber to oppose enemies and advance their own cause showed that the claims of liberalism were indeed false. As a continental philosopher, Schmitt also derided parliamentarianism as an English model, useful in a British cultural context but not applicable on a global scale (deprecation of the universal claims of Anglo–Saxon culture was something of a habit for Schmitt throughout his career).17 17 Ibid.; 4–6, 37; Schmitt. The Liberal Rule of Law. In Weimar: a jurisprudence of crisis; 297. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.5 The Quandary of Liberty and Democracy One the greatest quandaries for those committed to both popular approval and liberal rule-of-law ethics surfaced in Germany in the 1930s and in other nation–states throughout the twentieth century. The problem is essentially this: Say if a constitutional system is set in motion and further suppose we can reduce the system down to three principles; (1) safeguards for individual rights, (2) declarations of the indissoluble unity of the political system, and (3) a validation of the popular will. As stated earlier, “the parliamentary legislative state [has a] system of legality [with] a different internal logic than plebiscitary democracy.”18 One classic recent historical example is the background to civil war in Algeria which sparked in 1992. Here the military suspended constitutional rule in response to the victory of an Islamist movement who had promised to end democracy once elected. It also enters into American foreign policy considerations, which has tended to support minority rule 18 Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 60. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS against the majority if the majority are perceived to be misguided with regard to economics.19 The examples we could list are numerous. But the Weimar Germany where Schmitt cut his academic teeth is the paradigm of this quandary. Throughout the 1920s and early 30s, Schmitt recognized that the Weimar Constitution, highly liberal but at the same time radically democratic, was an open door to destruction. Article 76, in particular, allowed any party with sufficient numbers to amend the constitution and this is exactly what happened with the National Socialists. While the danger of the Weimar constitution was appreciated by academics other than Schmitt, deep in the core of modern politics is a moral conviction that the people must be allowed to have their say and be obeyed even in the cataclysm of self–destruction.20 This is opposed by the less ambitious, yet more realistic, opinion promoted by champions of representative government whereby the people select those experts who can function in a legislature, 19 For examples, see: Schmitz. The United States and right-wing dictatorships. 20 This has reared its head in the UK as of time of writing where popular approval of so– alled B e it has spa ked pu li de ate as to hethe go e e t poli should e di tated the Ge e al Will. Of course, constitutionally the UK has a representative government but few opinion–makers on either side of the Brexit dispute are willing to make this point. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS and sometimes in administrative or judicial positions, with the common good in mind. Nevertheless, this is a somewhat anti–democratic position and questions still remain. Schmitt posed disturbing questions for those committed to the doctrines of liberalism and democracy and it is fair to say that his analysis is the one generally accepted by those involved in politics, law, and administration nowadays, either consciously or implicitly. The experience of the Weimar Constitution showed how the contradictory principles of majority rule and liberal norms can come into fatal conflict with each other; democracy is based on a transitory agreement by numbers whereas liberalism and parliamentarianism rely on an original recognition of fundamental principles that survive votes and amendments. Schmitt appears to view the constitution as an essentially liberal document that protects fundamental values and institutions. While he was a theorist of radical democracy, his pre–Nazi career favoured a robust, authoritarian, liberalism which upholds the rule of law and is directed against movements which rely on mass support. Whatever about feelings on the ground, the constitution and its defenders couldn’t be agnostic about the fact that they were CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS guarding principles and that domestic enemies would always seek to undermine the rule of law.21 While one option would have been to vest legitimacy in the representatives, Schmitt understood that the people (if not necessarily populism as the majority could be silent or disorganized politically) needed a champion, a defender of the constitution. Liberal institutions may not provide effective fortresses to ambitious groups and individuals. In the particular case of Weimar, the legislature, that bastion of liberalism, could even be a screen for totalitarianism. Weimar was thus characterized as a conflict between the extraordinary lawgiver (the people as championed by the President) and the ordinary lawgiver (the parliament). This conflict takes on the image of a race for Schmitt but also of a battle for legitimacy since both types of modern government form have different justifications. Parliament has a “head start” because of the vast administrative power opened up to a mandated party. However, the extraordinary legislator of the people yet had the office of the German president and he could act solely, a distinct advantage. By the early 1930s, President Hindenburg could judge 21 Mouffe. Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy. In Mouffe. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt; 38–53; Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 45–46; 50–54; 60–62, 94. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS decisively without the need for tortuous deliberations which are the bread and butter of legislatures, and could win the race against the ordinary lawgiver, grounding this political ‘athleticism’ in the name of the popular will. In terms of judgements, the crucial distinction is that the president handed down measures (executive decisions) as opposed to statutes (abstract general rules). Hindenburg became the ‘higher third’ who transcended both the people and parliament. Even though the Weimar constitution granted the legislature the power to set aside measures of the president, this would happen after the president had changed facts on the ground and the measures could be re–issued in another guise.22 Herein, the concept of the ‘unquestioned’ has been consistently evoked. With regards to the German president and his stance towards parliament, the courts, constitution, federated states, and the people, Schmitt saw it as necessary to have a neutral power (pouvoir neutre) and this accorded a sense of ‘holiness’ within a republican system. Hindenburg was not the sovereign because that is reserved for the people in the republic. Rather, the neutrality of the German 22 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 79–80; Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 80; Vinx. The Guardian of the Constitution; 148–150. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS president was that of a guardian who stands alongside the constitution, and this neutrality is further strengthened by the fact that he is not ‘active’ like the legislature or the courts; he only intervened when necessary and also formed an important link with the sovereign people.23 Schmitt offers something of a thesis for Caesarism and for dictatorship by pursuing a dialogue on the crisis besetting Weimar Germany. Where the elites and people no longer reach consensus on substantive matters, then an authoritarian figure is needed to breach the difference. The authoritarian makes decisions which have the force of law but which can’t be subsumed under pre–existing law in a consistent manner. Yet, the law can’t exist without order and the penalty for not recognizing this fact is the annihilation of law itself.24 Weimar Germany offered the ultimate historical lesson in strengthening the hand of authority with respect to hindering totalitarianism, and these sweeping movements also showed the fragility of parliament. While there may be gentlemanly agreements which mitigate the possibility of one party overthrowing the entire system of government, once domestic conflict is deep–seated, the majority party can 23 24 Vinx. The Guardian of the Constitution; 150–160, 168–173. Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 65–72. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS easily transform itself into the State, entering into the oxymoron of one–party rule (partisanship is by definition pluralist). Yet, for parliamentary government to be internally consistent it must pass laws in the legislature with the power of sovereignty, and then sit back and allow any party of whatever hue to freely compete for office. If it does not do this (and in practical terms, many legislatures will enact statutes against parties held to be un–democratic) then it might avoid its own extinction but it also undercuts the philosophical basis on which it was founded.25 Schmitt’s argumentation is interesting and comes down to a clash between culture and law. The prevailing culture is more important than pure legality. While this could justify illegal and illiberal actions by the government it could also render legal actions by a legally instituted government (e.g. the Nazis) illegitimate if they fly in the face of cultural mores. Nonetheless, during the mid–1930s Schmitt contradicted many of the positions he held prior to the Nazi seizure of power, identifying Hitler and his party with the constitution.26 Little weight should be given to these pronouncements, especially considering that it would be 25 Ibid.; 31–32; 56–57; 59–60. For example, compare Schmitt. State, movement, people and Schmitt. The Constitution of Freedom. In Weimar: a jurisprudence of crisis; 324–325. 26 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS near impossible to reconcile his pre–1933 opinions with those he professed during the era of extreme nationalism. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.6 The Purge Despite his dispute with Nazis and other totalitarian movements, Schmitt yet understood that the democratic age was one of the purge. Purging was far more consistent with democracy than liberal discussion, and he often alluded to the politics of ‘elimination.’ While democracy is often portrayed as a gold standard for protecting human rights, peace, and prosperity, Schmitt saw the value of democracy in its ability to enable clear distinctions to be made between the elite and the great unwashed, or the majority and the marginalized. As examples of purges, Schmitt cites the case of Turkey who began expelling their Greek nationals in the 1920s or Australia who framed their immigration laws so that only the “right type of settler” would be admitted. Going back to Athens or even in the ongoing policies of the British Empire, the drawing of distinctions between the enfranchised and those such as slaves or Imperial subjects was consistent with the ideal of democracy itself where inequality is woven into the fabric of equality. 27 More so 27 Ojakangas. A philosophy of concrete life; 107–111, 135–139; Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 262–263; Schmitt. The crisis of CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS than virtually any other major thinker on political matters in the modern world, Schmitt took a ‘hard’ classical line on questions of exclusion. Political freedom is not the essence of democracy, rather it is that of political equality. Equality and freedom are often opposed to one another. While liberals want to give every member of a political territory their right to actively participate in politics, true democrats are selective about who should be politically enfranchised. So the concept of distinction, or even inequality, is a vital component of any democratic regime. He calls upon those pillars of Western civilization, Plato (427–347 B.C.) and Aristotle (the former an opponent of democracy, the latter a guarded supporter) to witness. Plato criticized democracy on the grounds that it didn’t make sufficient distinctions between people with regards to their virtue, while for Aristotle the idea that slaves and barbarians are excluded from democratic participation is a given.28 Saying that political freedom is not necessarily part of a democratic nation–state is another way of saying that enslavement and the humiliation of other human beings in a democracy is perfectly acceptable. For a democracy, the parliamentary democracy; 9–10 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 9–10. 28 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 256–261. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS public space must be purged of all fundamental controversies with debate centring only on less fundamental issues. Democracy is effectively a religious condition, in the sense that, in a religion, believers and non–believers will be clearly distinguished. Just as religions have their chosen, so do democracies. For instance, settlers to the Puritan controlled Massachusetts colony had to attend public worship to enjoy the benefits of freedom. Thus, although he could accept a ‘robust’ liberalism, Schmitt completely rejected the trend in liberal ideals of treating all equally just because they had a human face. Instead, he opined that anything political must have a means of distinguishing between those who do and those who don’t belong. There are analogies in other fields of human endeavour and even in a non–political sphere such as economics, distinctions are made between persons so that their role may be contextualized.29 Differences between citizens are a source of controversy in a democracy and the challenge is met by standardizing 29 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 257–258, 260–261. In the Middle Ages, and even up to relatively historically recently, different religious groups could be identified. While this happened in both Muslim and Christian countries, the notorious treatment of Jews in the Papal States exemplifies the democratic principle of distinction. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS everyone who has a franchise: “A democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity.”30 Or, as he puts it elsewhere; “since every democracy rests on the presupposition of the indivisibly similar, entire, unified people, for them there is, then, in fact and in essence, no minority and still less a number of firm, permanent minorities.”31 Minorities have no proper rule in a democracy for Schmitt other than to serve as aliens or potential material for enfranchisement. Hence, democratic equality stands in opposition to minority rights and the will of the people cannot be contained, even when it comes to determining who is less equal than others.32 The question of ‘elimination’ or that of ‘otherness’ is thus an ongoing problematic for democracies. The philosophical high priest of the French Revolution, Jean–Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), is called by Schmitt as a witness to the need to homogenize citizens within a democracy. Rousseau envisioned a State where citizens are so completely committed to the principles that unite them, to the degree that no partisanship, special interests, religion (as 30 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 9. Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 28. 32 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 286; Ibid.; 42. 31 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS in separate religious beliefs), or even financial concerns can separate them. Even parties to a legal case all desire the same thing, and more importantly the same spirit pervades relations between governed and governors. Schmitt does not shy away from the notion that justice in a democracy may be mob–justice or that the election of justices may be necessary to express the people’s will. Rousseau believed that the essence of democracy was the identity of governed and government and he developed Hobbes’ idea that the apotheosis of all political systems is the end of all questioning vis-à-vis political authority.33 Controversy and the unquestionable assumes a particular relationship for egalitarian regimes. On the one hand, excluding aliens means that there has to be persistent controversies concerning membership. On the other hand, identification of who is equal and unequal removes inconsistency, and hence controversy, from political discourse. Schmitt, however, is astute enough to realize that the series of identifications necessary to meet the democratic ideal are in fact unapproachable. If a majority vote for something which the small number of ‘true’ democrats McCormick. Ca l S h itt s iti ue of li e alis ; 250–265; Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 300–301; Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 13–14, 25–26. 33 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS dispute, the claim can always be that propaganda has bewitched the public. Majorities can, in their turn, question the wisdom of elites. Since perfect democracy can never be consummated, a residue of dissatisfaction with unrealized promises of egalitarianism – a potentially explosive material which can ignite into controversy at any time – remains.34 Searching for unquestioned principles and then giving these life through political and legal judgements is inherent in all political systems and is part of the human experience of interpretation and meaning. Equality derives its meaning from exclusion and since humans face each other in the real world as concrete entities, and not philosophical abstractions, they cannot but help deduce who constitutes a political equal and who is different. The seriousness of political membership and politics itself would be grossly undermined if inequality was not inherent in democracies. While the stark division between equals and unequals is unpalatable for liberals the underlying assumption in any democracy is that the people are good and that their decisions, no matter how controversial, are expressions of 34 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 26–27. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS this goodness. Without this assumption, there is little reason to extend political suffrage to the majority.35 Internal enemies have to be identified in democracies by means of a declaration. In ancient Rome, for example, this involved the hostis pronouncement and in the Greek states the analogue was called polemios. A famous example in the case of Greece was the method of ostracism. Effective ostracisms are even in evidence today when we often witness organizations being proscribed by governments for being extreme, anti–democratic, terrorist, etc … While such purges may often be successful, it can sometimes arise that the targeted group possesses sufficient power to fight back and genuinely weaken the authority of the State, at which point a civil war occurs, and war for Schmitt (whether domestic or not) is always the “existential negation of the enemy.”36 35 36 Ibid.; 11–12; Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 24. Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 33, 46–47. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.7 States of Exception Dictatorship, or more generically a state of exception (covering juntas, emergency measures to deal with financial crashes and the like), retains a dubious relationship to democracy and constitutional rule. Liberalism, by seeking to make government unquestioned through legal means, would have little sympathy for an opinion which places order above law and stability above human rights. Yet, constitutionalism meets both its nemesis and saviour in dictatorial government. Liberal societies often turn to constitutional dictatorship to save them, the most obvious and celebrated example that of Lincoln’s dictatorship during the US Civil War. Schmitt was determined to remove the taint of dictatorship from republicanism. His entire Weimar career, spanning nearly 15 years, was an exercise in justifying the dictatorial role of the German president. Like Machiavelli, he argued that a temporary tyranny was not alien to republicanism. Dictatorship belonged to a republican tradition going back to ancient Rome. Moreover, the modern State functioned CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS like an effective dictatorship in that it was concerned with efficiency as opposed to implementing any higher laws concerning right and justice.37 Schmitt understood the pain dictatorship caused liberals; “every exceptional suspension of democratic principles, every exercise of power autonomously from the consent of the majority of those governed can be called dictatorship.”38 Even the justification of populism horrifies liberals: when the “liberal principle of inalienable human rights and of the rights of freedom is taken as the norm, the violation of these rights must count as dictatorship even if it rests on majority will.”39 Since he further denied the reality of law or constitutionalism as ‘stand–alone’ entities, which could almost self–regulate themselves because of the inherent ‘goodness’ of mankind, Schmitt rebuked liberals by supporting dictatorship as an integral part of a republic. His primary method of achieving his objectives was to tie dictatorship to democracy, thus by–passing the liberal 37 Schmitt. Dictatorship; xliv–xlv; Schmitt. The Dictatorship of the President of the Reich According to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. In Dictatorship; 150–226; Vinx. The Guardian of the Constitution; 150–160, 168–173. 38 Schmitt. Dictatorship; xli. 39 Ibid. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS emphasis on the rule of law by invoking the rights of the people to order. The Weimar republic was a liberal, constitutional, state, although it was heavily democratized. If Schmitt was going to justify dictatorship surely he was going to have to explain how the suspension of the constitution in an emergency made sense when the purpose of the State was to promote the core values of constitutional rule? Liberals could be said to have grounds for rejecting dictatorship because it suffered from apparent inconsistencies and was thus controversial. Schmitt had to address these paradoxes, but instead of explaining them he enjoyed them and did not try to make consistent arguments, instead pointing to the effectiveness of such measures throughout history. He revelled in dictatorship, seemingly presenting politics as merely nihilistic. Other times, Schmitt tried to square the circle. For example, he distilled the constitution itself from constitutional laws. A constitution was a totality which was a mirror to the political existence of the public, in a democracy the people. Constitutional laws, on the other hand, were only functional parts of the constitution. So constitutional laws could be suspended, without the constitution itself being violated. In other words, the whole of the constitution took precedence over parts, as if in saving CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS a person’s life they have to be taken care of in hospital for a time. Another justification for dictatorship is the necessity of setting in motion a constitutional order. The classic example is that of Cromwell, whose Instrument of Government (1653) is cited by Schmitt as the first example of a modern constitution. Schmitt’s own experiences of the founding of the new German democracy post–WWI also informed his view that constitutional order is grounded in effective dictatorship. The National Assembly which decided upon the Weimar constitution was elected directly, represented the direct will of the German people, and its powers were delegated by the people, giving content and form to the existence of the German people. This gave it authority, but not legality. Schmitt noted that liberals would castigate such concentration of power as dictatorial. One could justifiably claim that this formative moments in a nation’s history are meta–dictatorial. While a dictatorship breaks laws that are already in place, in the case of a constituent assembly there are no laws around to impede the work of the council but a legal framework still has to be made.40 McCormick. Ca l S h itt s iti ue of li e alis ; 121–155; McCormick. The Dilemmas of Dictatorship; Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 80, 92, 109–111; 136–137. 40 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Dictatorship is unregulated but protects regulations, and is abnormal but is necessary to maintain normality. The “justification for dictatorship consists in the fact that, although it ignores the existing law, it is only doing so in order to save it.”41 In other words, dictatorship may suspend particular rights such as due process, but the whole of the constitution and judicial process is in fact held in suspense if even one norm is effaced temporarily. “Paradoxically, dictatorship becomes an exception to the state of law by doing what it needs to justify.”42 While there are long intervals when norms function smoothly, at all times dictatorship stands behind the legal system, waiting to intervene. Schmitt continues by pointing out that ‘dictatorships’ effectively create law and that we mustn’t confuse the consistency of the entire legal apparatus with the reality that the political system may need the ‘shock’ of dictatorship at times to either come into existence or to remain in existence.43 Dictatorship seeks to defend law and the popular will but does so by breaking the law and subjecting everyone to the will of one man or a junta. In doing so, the dictatorship sets 41 Schmitt. Dictatorship; xliii. Ibid. 43 Ibid.; xlii. 42 CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS itself at odds with the law and it becomes a means to secure order. Schmitt disputes the tempting notion that law is just a means to an end because then the law can be easily portrayed as a dictatorship. When dictatorship suspends the law it shows the normality of law to be somewhat illusory but also separate from the question of maintaining an order within which law has a value separate from that of whether it promotes the peace or not.44 Part of Schmitt’s analysis involved back–handed praise for the Bolshevik regime who, he claimed, had grasped the essence of dictatorship by grounding their radicalism with the rider that the tyranny of the proletariat was a necessary evil before the transition to a classless society. By contrast with ‘bourgeois’ liberals, communists grasped the nettle of dictatorship by taking a doctrinaire position that the workers’ paradise can only come about when a dictatorship of the proletariat is implemented. Schmitt argues that the main justification for this in the communist literature is to nullify parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, that is not to say that the dictatorship is anti–democratic since (as Schmitt and the Bolsheviks agreed) parliamentary democracy is not true democracy but rather the arena for vested interests to bypass 44 Ibid.; xlii–xliii. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the public and impose their own agendas. Nevertheless, even for the communists dictatorship is not an end in itself or an essential part of Communism. What dictatorship represents is merely a technical way to bypass legality that would impede the economic (or even cultural) changes that are needed to fulfil the Marxist vision. Yet it maintains an association with democracy because it is a technical way of achieving mass liberation.45 Perhaps the main attraction for Schmitt with regard to dictatorship was that it offered a clear judgement. It was grossly offensive to modern standards of neutrality and a universalist approach to political matters. Precisely because it offered an awesome display of authority in the face of deliberation and rationality, Schmitt was prepared to be a champion of the state of exception throughout his career. Also, either implicitly or explicitly, the dictator will claim that he has populist legitimacy and this form of legitimacy is crucial in the modern world. Although people are not free to express themselves autonomously through democratic institutions, there still are moments in dictatorships when expressions of popular will surface. Dictators are often powerful lightning rods for populist sentiment. In fact, 45 Ibid.; xxxix–xlii; Ojakangas. A philosophy of concrete life; 140–148. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS dictatorship only makes sense within the context of democracy and this is the case even in the absence of agreement because consensus then has to be coerced. When political unanimity is lacking, the public have to educated by the ‘true’ democrats. Democracy must be suspended by a benevolent dictatorship. The intention is not to keep democracy permanently at bay, but to bring forward democracy by suspending it. The evil, illegal, nature of dictatorship means that the concept of equality is done away with for a short period of time although it retains some democratic flavour because anyone may take up the reins of dictatorship.46 Schmitt attempted to de–controversialize dictatorship by dividing it into commissary dictatorships and sovereign dictatorships. Sovereign dictatorships were unlimited in scope and power and thus delegitimized dictatorship; commissary dictatorships were not as controversial because they were unlimited in power, but not in scope. As classic examples, the scores of dictatorships, or commissions, operating under the Roman republic were commissarial. They were an extraordinary office created for a special purpose by the Roman people and Senate. Although the 46 Kalyvas. Democracy and the politics of the extraordinary; 81–87; Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 28–29, 41. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS dictator looked and walked like a king (that was deliberately designed to impress upon the public the gravity of the situation they were in) he was only an arm of the republic. They functioned under strict instructions for a short period, even though their power was to all intents and purposes unlimited and concentrated. Once their term finished they had to hand back the reins of power and this meant that the dictatorship was accepted, i.e. it’s controversy was dampened. Schmitt cites Jean Bodin (1530–1596), the 16th century Neoplatonist political philosopher who was one of the first modernists (although he still maintained many vestiges of feudalism). Bodin made some of the strongest claims for sovereignty in history, but he said the dictator didn’t fit the definition of a sovereign despite his vast power. Generally the “commissar [i.e. the dictator] … remains a direct tool of the concrete and alien will of someone else.”47 And, even someone like a meat inspector, in its embryonic development, can be thought of as a dictator. By contrast, the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar were sovereign dictatorships although they still talked of their power as being akin to commissions. The sovereign dictators seized power without it being delegated it to them by the people, using the name of dictatorship to give legitimacy to their 47 Schmitt. Dictatorship; 29. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS tyranny. Schmitt also suggested that absolute princes and other potentates that wielded complete power over life and death in Europe for much of its history were in fact dictators, ‘Caesars,’ if you will. European centralization and power, moreover, developed by synthesizing a mixture of sovereign dictatorship (kings) with commissary dictatorship (the setting up of new offices or temporary measures to extend kingly power). Yet, what links all sovereign and commissary dictatorship is the notion that the will of the people or the community legitimize the office.48 Another tactic which Schmitt uses to de–controversialize dictatorship is that of describing dictatorship in purely technical terms, appealing to the scientific dispensation of his audience. He bases this on a reading of Machiavelli. Instead of getting into arguments about whether dictatorship is moral or legal or justified, we should focus on the technical problem at hand and wonder whether dictatorship is effective or not: “Any political result – be it the absolute government of a single person or a democratic republic, the political power of a prince or the political freedom of the 48 Kalyvas. Democracy and the politics of the extraordinary; 88–96; Kalyvas. Hegemonic sovereignty; McCormick. The Dilemmas of Dictatorship; Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 111; Schmitt. Dictatorship; xliii–xliv, 2–6, 20–33. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS people – is just a task”49 A striking passage in Dictatorship (1921) describes the differentiation and specialization of functions which is part and parcel of the modern state, the intention being to normalize the illegal actions of a dictator within an otherwise normal legal framework. [T]he organs of execution must bow unconditionally to the interest of what is a technically flawless process. One has to obey – even if not blindly, nevertheless immediately – [to the] pre–eminently executive, namely the military; the same goes for the execution of a judicial judgement … outside the sphere of authoritative actions, too, any well – functioning organisation becomes impossible if the executives claim an autonomous right to contribute or to control, on the basis of whatever interests are created by different standpoints from those of the technical functioning. The simplest business of transport becomes impossible if the one who has to do the transportation takes any interest in what has to be transported apart from the fact that it just has to be transported. If a postal worker checked the contents of the letters, then that would mean that the technical organisation of mail is used to achieve ends that are external to the organisation. Such an action would necessarily contradict the technical perfection of the organisation.50 Schmitt made positive claims for dictatorship. It is always easy to make negative claims in the face of something positive or to point out inconsistencies; Schmitt was a master 49 50 Schmitt. Dictatorship; 6. Ibid.; 8–9. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS of this game himself. Dictatorship is controversial, not merely for the overwhelming force and arbitrary use of power it signifies, but also because it gives rise to a range of paradoxes which may be interpreted as inconsistencies. And something that is inconsistent, if part of the arsenal of authority, will never fail to be controversial because the government is always expected to follow some sort of consistent formula. In this regard, Schmitt analysed the thought of anarchists, finding them to be completely opposed to any sort of domination or rule but in a way which nevertheless led them back to an unorthodox type of dictatorship. Referring to the Russian Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), he states: Every claim of a decision must be evil for the anarchist, because the right emerges by itself if the immanence of life is not disturbed by such claims. This radical antithesis forces him of course to decide against the decision; and this results in the odd paradox whereby Bakunin, the greatest anarchist of the nineteenth century, had to become in theory the theologian of the antitheological and in practice the dictator of an antidictatorship.51 51 Schmitt. Political Theology; 66. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.8 Legitimacy Legitimate rule is the existential state within which a ruler, or form of government, is rendered unquestionable. To be legitimate is to be inherently and unconsciously justified, to perhaps even be in such an unquestioned state of hegemony that issues of justification do not arise. Legitimacy is thus a holy grail in politics and every authority aims at such a state. In contrast to other contemporaneous political theorists who focused on elucidating the legal basis and legal processes of a particular regime, Schmitt set his sights on legitimacy. What backed a regime, liberals claimed, was its lawfulness, or as Schmitt more precisely defines it, an adherence to valid norms. When the government speaks or acts, it does so only in the name of legal norms. Liberal political philosophy was then a matter of detailing the legal structure for a regime, or for an international order. So, the lawful state legitimized itself through law itself. Schmitt recognized that the legitimacy of rule was sanctioned outside of legal norms. His reasoning is somewhat circular. Because laws are made force by authority, there has to be a constant renewal of authority for the laws to carry weight, but since law always CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS meets unforeseen obstacles, authority is necessary to propel law forward. The implication of Schmitt’s philosophy is that universal means by which we could distinguish the illegal regimes from the legal ones, don’t exist. Rather, the currency of political dominance was a matter of culture which only those within the culture could understand. Thus, rule could only be underpinned through legitimacy, or a tacit cultural acknowledgement of where ‘true’ authority lay. While the purpose of legalistic thinking is that of ‘tying the hands’ of power, Schmitt’s appeals to legitimacy were motivated by a conviction that government was entitled to operate in an extra–legal and extra–judicial zone.52 Although the bearers of legitimacy may operate in the shadows, legitimacy depends crucially on the prevailing theological attitudes. When miracles were widely accepted as credible, absolute monarchies were in the box–seat because arbitrary and personal decision–making did not seem strange in a world dominated by ‘theistic’ conceptions of God. Once God became only the ‘master switch’ in an otherwise natural world (the First Cause), monarchy had to act within well–demarcated legal limits. Although He may be all–powerful, God had to act in a way according to reason 52 Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 3–4; 9, 17–18, 62; Zarmanian. Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS and through nature where laws permeated the entire architecture; this was the conviction of the Enlightenment rationalists. Finally, when atheism prevailed, rulership and politics had to be totally legal; political miracles during the life of a state, at the foundation, or on the international stage, became suspect or condemned. Science or economics assumed the status of a gold standard for running countries. Sovereignty then becomes a critical problem because this largely relies on a theistic concept of God.53 With the ascent of atheism any form of authority, no matter how benign or practical, is a target. In the context of this book, this could be traced as a development to where an intervening God was unquestioned, then became controversial, to where a distant God was unquestioned, then controversial, to the point where God Himself was controversial along with any form of arbitrary or personal decisiveness.54 Like Machiavelli, Schmitt saw legitimacy as largely belonging to two types of rule. Either there was a princely legitimacy based on personal authority or popular will based on the people’s will. This dichotomy is also expressed as a 53 54 Schmitt. Political Theology; 48. Ibid.; 36–42, 46–52. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS choice between rule by identity or rule by representation; in a democracy the governed and government must have total identity with one another, while the concept of personal authority requires representation, a re–presenting of that which is absent, e.g. the king is like an image of his realm or even of God Himself. Since Machiavelli this has been the fundamental dichotomy, with republicanism acting as a catch–all word to designate any form of rule opposed to absolutism and centralization, Schmitt believed. [T]he word ‘legitimacy’ was understood for centuries as the monopoly for the legitimation of dynasties. In other words, it was a justification of continuity, tradition, upbringing, and heritage; a ‘historical’ justification of the past and of an ‘historical school of law’ which its progressive and revolutionary enemies accused of legitimizing the injustice of today through the injustice of yesterday.55 The central conflict between a democracy/republic and other forms of government such as absolute monarchies revolves around the question of inequality. In any non–democracy there must be inequality if one person or elite dominates others. In a true democracy, any inequality is only temporary and rotates. Anyone can assume power in a legal, de jure sense, and not merely as a fact of brute nature. Schmitt classifies this as government by the people, not government 55 Schmitt. Political theology II; 118. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS by those who are distinguished from the people for reasons of birth, lineage, class, etc … Even God, whose authority is often used to justify hierarchies, must be aligned with the will of the people if His rule is not to be rejected outright in a democracy. In any non–democratic regime, there must be rule by the Divine will of God.56 Schmitt meditates on the given of legitimization by noting how the once axiomatic status of absolute monarchies had given way to either populism or law or a combination of both; “no kings … have the courage to declare openly that if necessary they would remain on the throne against the will of the people.”57 Law is a government of reason, personal rule that of passion or the will, the clear contradiction between liberalism and democracy, or liberalism and monarchism, once more evident. Monarchy suffered from a soul–destroying scepticism once a political consciousness began to develop in Europe during the Renaissance. Monarchs shifted tack from purely religious and familial justifications and padded their grounding in usefulness to the country and later in the promotion of science. Still later in Germany the monarch presented himself as a necessary 56 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 255, 264–267, 281–285; 302–303, 308–3; Schmitt. Political Theology; 49. 57 Schmitt. The crisis of parliamentary democracy; 29. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS arbitrator between the various parties who were politically active. Each of these evolutionary states demonstrated that a particular crisis afflicted the monarchy, and that a form of monarchy had become so controversial that it needed to be defused by the monarch who assumed a new form neutrality, legitimated his power according to the exigencies of the epoch.58 58 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 308–317. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.9 The Decision An unprecedented judgement in a critical moment, the decision, provides the litmus test of sovereignty for Schmitt. Decision is ‘The Hour.’ Although the ‘Supreme Judge’ claims to act in the public good or by the will of the people, ultimately there will be a certain controversy surrounding the person who makes the decision as well as the decision made in the critical moment. Schmitt explains the problem of the ‘high noon’: [E]veryone claims, of course, to support only what is best for all – only public welfare, rights and justice. But the question is: whose decision carries the day in the end, and by what authority? The matter does not depend on the ends, but rather on the decision about the means to achieve those ends. The question is, who judges here? Who has the … power of judgement to determine the essentials pertaining to a healthy society[?] …A state does not cease to be an absolute monarchy when, at the moment of coming to power, the prince promises to look after the welfare of the people and to support the good and punish the evil. For such a promise does not preclude the possibility of him being the one who decides on the means by which to achieve this end.59 59 Schmitt. Dictatorship; 18. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Even more dramatic and religious language is employed in one of his later works, Political Theology II, in the context of the traditional secular church/state division: Until the Day of Judgement, the Augustinian teaching on the two kingdoms will have to face the twofold open question: Quis judicabit? Quis interpretabitur? [‘Who will decide? Who will interpret?’].60 This question encompasses the entire Schmittian corpus. Decision–making is fundamentally ‘unbalanced,’ in that it favours a particular opinion of the right, the good, or the political. Moreover, the critical judgement is only noticed when there is an emergency, i.e. a situation that is unprecedented and can’t be brought into the architecture of legal norms. Personal authority also comes to the fore and The Hour reveals who really holds the aces. There is a complementarity between decisions (arbitrary judgements) and exceptions (‘hard’ questions) for Schmitt; “the decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word.”61 The exception has five characteristics; it is not part of the existing legal code, poses an existential threat to the State, its content is unknown, preceding laws can’t give it a form that could be encompassed by a prior judgement, and the 60 61 Schmitt. Political theology II; 115. Schmitt. Political Theology; 6. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS ‘answer’ must countenance the possibility of unlimited power. The illusion of the legal order is revealed. However, the maintenance of this illusion of law, the normal situation, is what paradoxically gives the sovereign a solid authority. The state as a legal institution is another fiction protected by a defining judgement. Sovereignty is recognized when there is clash of wills or set of circumstances which could end in the destruction of the State.62 [S]overeignty (and thus the state itself) resides in deciding this controversy, that is, in determining definitively what constitutes public order and security, in determining when they are disturbed, and so on.63 As a jurist, Schmitt framed this moment of decision in terms of a court case. There are disputants to the case but the final judgement is reserved for the third party. A decision is defined formally different in a liberal or democratic state; “In the parliamentary legislative state, law is the present decision of the transitory parliamentary majority. In direct democracy, it is the transitory will of the present people's majority.”64 In a democracy, this can be a severe problem if 62 Hirst. Carl Schmitt's Decisionism. In Mouffe. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt; 7–17; Kalyvas. Hegemonic sovereignty; Pan. Against Biopolitics; Zarmanian. Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order. 63 Schmitt. Political Theology; 9. 64 Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 39. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the parties are genuinely in conflict and not parties to a collegiate debate. However, if there is genuine division existing then a decision using democratic methods can no longer be made in a parliamentary system. In such a scenario one party must crush the other or a real or effective dictatorship must be instituted. This of course means that the aggrieved party claims that it has been treated illegally. For Schmitt, this is further evidence that the holding of power must be legitimate, as well as legal, and legitimacy means that there has to be cultural agreement on who is entitled to compete for power.65 A striking example of the Schmittian decision relates to constitutions. Constitutions are popularly portrayed as laying the ground rules for politics and law in a society. They stand like a paper judge in opposition to the political machinations and encroachments of government. The constitution is usually viewed as being a neutral and uncontroversial document which upholds private liberties against power, hermetically sealing them from the ‘devil’ of government. In opposition to this liberal view, the constitution for Schmitt represents a decision by a sovereign people to govern themselves according to sharply defined 65 Seitzer. Legality and legitimacy; 32–34. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS and fundamental principles. It is a document which in turn segregates their unique existence from other nations. A constitution only formally states what already exists. It does not create new legal values which counter the political and cultural values of the nation–state. Rather the legality it establishes is only a confirmation of the pre–existing cultural tendencies. Furthermore, again in opposition to constitutional ‘fundamentalists,’ Schmitt conceptualizes the constitution as a living document mirroring the cultural tendencies of a public, be it a king and his establishment or the people. Just as a constitution born of a revolutionary moment, like a constituent assembly, is not bound to obey any abstract concept of law, an inclination of a people to change its expression at a later date means that a new constitution can be born.66 Schmitt emphasizes the human nature of the constitution, specifically as something drawn up as a political decision, and not as the brainchild of academic intellectualism. Constitutions do not have to belong to the world of legality or human rights; the “decision requires no justification via 66 Böckenförde. The Concept of the Political; Kalyvas. Democracy and the politics of the extraordinary; 96–100; Pan. Carl Schmitt on Culture and Violence in the Political Decision; Schmitt; Constitutional theory; 75–78, 97. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS an ethical or a juristic norm. Instead, it makes sense in terms of political existence.”67 The constitution does not come into being by itself, nor does it have to conform to abstract norms. Neither does it qualify as a constitution because it is self– consistent. In particular, it does not establish itself. It is a product of political will. Schmitt uses an argument concerning the constitution which is rather Machiavellian. In essence, Schmitt said that the constitution confirms the political will of the people, not because it accords to some abstract sense of legality or justice, but rather because a nation–state exists and feels the urge to grow, develop, and maintain itself. Its own existence is its justification for its own type of constitution. Even though liberal states might identify the constitution with a theory of pure law, convictions like those concerning private property which are enshrined in constitutional law yet signify that a political decision has been made. So even rule of law countries require a ‘hidden’ constitution which effectively makes a decision on the content of the paper constitution.68 The significance here is that although liberalism aims to enshrine its doctrine of non–controversial and self–evident truths in a 67 68 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 136, 268. Ibid.; 76, 83–88, 169–170; Schmitt. Political Theology; 10–12. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS document, the reality is that it must come down on the side of certain principles and values. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.10 The Federation Schmitt provided some of the most insightful meditations on the nature of federations and other associations such as confederations and associations. Most of these are contained in his public law masterpiece, Constitutional Theory. Federal theory is ripe for controversy because it exemplifies the drive to centralize and integrate political units by the state, on the one hand, and the desire for parochial units to remain autonomous on the other. Integration requires a “minimum of homogeneity.” Only units sufficiently like–minded and disposed to integrate their political, legal, economic, and cultural diversity, could contemplate intervention of the federal government. This is similar to democracy, but on a scale where the component members are states. Existential controversies are precluded. Since homogeneity permeates the federation, war against the ‘other’ (non–federated entities) should never be a cause of disagreement amongst the members once the decision has been made. Furthermore, any ‘deviance’ by a member state can become sufficient reason for the federal authority to take CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS an interest. In extreme circumstances, military and security forces may be needed. While this may look no different from a de facto invasion, the status of the federation means that legally the federal authority is within its rights to coerce member states to comply with the rules of federation. At all times, there is a balancing act between the rights of the states and the duty of the federal authority. The compromises and freedoms offered by the federation do not imply that conflict is avoided.69 Schmitt famously defined sovereignty as knowable from an extraordinary decision made and accepted in extraordinary circumstances. The question of whether there is sovereignty within a federation poses problems for Schmitt, particularly when he links the state, constitution, and people so tightly. For example, in the US, the federal authority is not known as a ‘State,’ but rather is a series of committees and administrative bodies who oversee affairs on behalf of the federated members. It’s possible that sovereignty may be wholly unsuitable when applied to federal theory. In Constitutional Theory, he makes the confusing assertion that 69 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 159–160, 388–389, 392–395, 404. Schmitt would become embroiled in one of the most bitter public law battles of the Weimar republic, the so– alled ape of P ussia i 9 . See: Schmitt. Prussia contra Reich: “ h itt s losi g state e t i Leipzig. In The Guardian of the Constitution; 222–227. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the United States and Germany have become federal states because the people have integrated and the independence of the individual States has greatly diminished since the initial unification. While there is some truth in this and while this then enables him to apply his theories about sovereignty and the equation of constitution = people = state quite easily, he seems to stretch the evidence to fit the federal model.70 Despite the difficulties with his theory vis-à-vis sovereignty, the judgement on ‘the question’ undoubtedly manifests itself in a federation. For example, under normal circumstances, a court cannot decide on an issue pertaining to sovereignty within a legal framework. If it does issue a decision which is outside of any pre–existing norms, then this court is a sovereign institution and this does occur in federations. Since it has to decide in one direction, it has to put itself at odds with parts of the federation. A court, like any other office which acts in a similar fashion, has to not only issue decisions but has to act to self–preserve itself, a sign that it considers itself ‘higher’ than other institutions. If the decision on the existential conflict is made at a federal level that proves the sovereignty of the federal authority and disproves that of the independent states. Nevertheless, 70 Schmitt. Constitutional theory; 404–406. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Schmitt does admit that the question of whether the federal authority or the independent states wield the true power must always be an open one in a federation.71 The US Civil War was preceded by intellectual justifications for the independence of the states. One name, John C. Calhoun (1782–1850), will forever be associated with the doctrine of ‘state’s rights,’ a doctrine which still holds sway today in America. In Calhoun’s thesis, the member states in a federation retained their sovereignty even after incorporation. Member states did not have to recognize federal laws and measures where their sense of justice was offended. Each state could judge whether the actions or laws of the federation were in line with the constitution. Calhoun went even further and said that states could unilaterally secede and leave the federal contract. His theory was grounded in populism, legality, and even a crude individualism pioneered by the US. For Schmitt, such a theory totally compromised the seriousness of the federal pact. Indeed, one could question where the logic behind a federation lies if any federal member can merely walk out at any time. The Union, spearheaded by its more urbane Northern members, offered less in the way of intellectual 71 Ibid.; 389–390, 395. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS justification. Instead, the crisis of the American Civil War decided the issue in favour of the federation. Not only was this a decision for the American federation, but a decision as to whether the USA was indeed a federation and not merely an association or confederation.72 This victory meant the “continual renunciation of the right to secession.”73 Lincoln gave a judgement on the question and resolved it in perpetuity. 72 73 Ibid.; 391–392. Ibid.; 392. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS III.11 Contra Just War As with Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, Schmitt accepted the fact of war, but went arguably further, claiming that it was foundational and vital to political life itself. The binary of international law is that of war and peace, in the same way that the binary of domestic law is that of the just and unjust. The key difference is that a third party determines questions of justice domestically while internationally wars and peaceful situations are resolved by interested parties. Since he disputed the justice of an intervening third party, a sentiment such as ‘ending war’ or any other such lamentations on conflict is wholly absent from much of Schmitt’s career. As such, he distinguished himself sharply from those who wanted to ‘end all wars.’ Schmitt went so far as to say that peace doesn’t exist, but rather a state where there is ‘not war,’ a subtle difference which scores the idea that conflict is an ever–present sword of Damocles. As a jurist he faced the tricky task of trying to subsume war within a legal framework. This was especially fraught because, as CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS he himself declared, “the history of international law is a history of the concept of war.”74 The very existence of states means that the possibility of war is ever–present. As Slomp muses: “In domestic politics Schmitt loathed pluralism and wanted complete unity and homogeneity; in international politics Schmitt loathed global unity and wanted a political pluriverse.”75 By definition, the political equates to statehood, a consequent plurality of alliances and opposing ‘axes of evil.’ As long as cultures want to live independently with their separate customs, systems, and legal codes, then conflict is a potential downside but the decision to go to war must always reside in the hands of political units if sovereignty – and even meaning to human life – is to be maintained. Autonomy equals danger and decisive moments. If conflict were to disappear then only humanistic concerns would be left. People would merely entertain themselves and discuss how to make money. The prospect of these non–controversial activities replacing politics is horrifying and repugnant to 74 Schmitt. The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law. In Writings on War; 115–116; Schmitt. The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War. In Writings on War; 31. 75 Slomp. Carl Schmitt and the politics of hostility, violence and terror; 116. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Schmitt, although he would also argue that if entertainment and economics were cultural values then men would kill others and die for these norms.76 As with his meditations on subjects such as democracy and liberalism, Schmitt sought to spread crisis within the arguments of his inconsistencies. He opponents dismissed by the demonstrating pretensions of parliamentarianism as being masquerades for vested interests and in a similar sense the claim of the custodians of international law, such as Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924), to stoic neutrality were false; “politics … rules over … guarantees of international law.”77 Modern international law promotes the notion of a just war, a war that rationalizes itself on ethical grounds (as opposed to one fought explicitly to defend an interest). Schmitt calls this turn in modern thought the institution of a “discriminating concept of war” (i.e. war is no longer just a conflict but can be categorized as either a police action or a crime). In modern just war theory, a war cannot be fought because one side fears its rival might 76 Arditi. On the Political: Schmitt contra Schmitt; Böckenförde. The Concept of the Political; Hooker. Carl Schmitts international thought; 6–8; Ojakangas. A philosophy of concrete life; 83–98; Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 53–54; Slomp. Carl Schmitt and the politics of hostility, violence and terror; 21–23, 120–124;. 77 Schmitt. The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War. In Writings on War; 44. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS become more powerful; it can be fought if the rival is an enemy of humanity, is trampling on democracy, or doesn’t promote human rights. In the past, the Church may have looked for universal norms to justify its Crusades and wars. The modern language of human rights is just the traditional doctrine of the just war by another name. As with much of modern thought, the intention is a superficially apolitical one; its purpose is to make the most critical decision in politics unquestioned (the War on Terror is a perfect example of this tendency). A whole vernacular is used to support the transition from war as conflict to aggression as crime. War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain. The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.78 Schmitt is categorical in his belief that a just war is a lie or a Trojan horse strategy which either serves the purpose of a politically organized power or else is used historically by institutions to subvert the state. Bodies like the League of Nations were set up to judge on cases which necessitated the intervention of the international community. Invariably they 78 Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 79. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS would claim to act, not on behalf of the interests of a certain nation or community, but for that of higher principles. These principles were then framed in such a way so as to appeal to universal principles of justice and order. But, the monopoly on the final decision had to be wielded by a political power, not a judge, and thus countries could be cherry–picked to fall short of principles. The ‘third party’ in international relations is not a neutral dispenser of the norms of international justice, but rather a politically interested competitor. Neutrality – a position which every party involved in politics since the dawn of time seeks to command so as to avoid being seen in a controversial light – is a stance which presupposes the idea of war.79 While pronouncements could be made against war, and war itself declared to be outlawed, in reality it is individuals, 79 Brown. From Humanized War to Humanitarian Intervention: Carl “ h itt s C iti ue of the Just Wa T adition. In Odysseos & Petito. The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt; 56–62; Kervégan. Carl Schmitt a d Wo ld U it . In Mouffe. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt; 54–74; Moreiras. A God Without Sovereignty; Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 49–50; Schmitt. Schmitt. Forms of modern imperialism in international law. In Legg. Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt; 29– 45; Four articles; 33–36; Schmitt. Großraum versus universalism: the international legal struggle over the Monroe Doctrine. In Legg. Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos; 46–54; Schmitt. The nomos of the earth; 140–171, 246–247, 260–280, 320–322; Schmitt. The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War. In Writings on War; 31–36, 65–66; Slomp. Carl Schmitt and the politics of hostility, violence and terror; 30–36. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS groups, and institutions who are proscribed. And supposing a people disagrees with the prevailing consensus that an ‘enemy of humanity’ must be annihilated then the default position in international law is that they join that dissenting voice and thus put themselves into a conflict with another side. Schmitt goes so far as to even dispute the sense in introducing into international relations the concept of humanity. Since humans always fight one another in war, then there is as little sense in saying that a war is fought for humans, on the one side, and against humans, on the other.80 Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet. The concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being-and hence there is no specific differentiation in that concept. That wars are waged in the name of humanity is not a contradiction of this simple truth; quite the contrary, it has an especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent … To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him 80 Axtmann. Humanity or Enmity?; Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 49–54, 66–67; Hooker. Carl Schmitts international thought; 17–26; Slomp. Carl Schmitt's Five Arguments Against the Idea of Just War. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.81 The two main inconsistencies identified by Schmitt with regard to the new discriminating concept of war were that it introduced legal categories into conflict at variance with the essence of war, and, furthermore, made the international order legally the same as an actual federation. With regard to the first of these contradictions, Schmitt claims that prior to the end of WWI, countries did not have to prove the justice or injustice of their conflicts; they only had to be recognized as legitimate agents of their nations prior to the war breaking out. A metaphor he often employed was that of the old– fashioned duel, whereby the two parties could fight provided they were recognized as gentlemen. In a duel any ‘third’ parties are spectators, and not judges on whether the duel is justified or not. Third parties could say that an act was not a duel but an act of grievous bodily harm, but they couldn’t say that there are just and unjust duels. In addition, Schmitt did not agree with the division of war into the binary of defensive and aggressive. Every war, for Schmitt, was by definition simultaneously an aggressive and defensive one from the point of view of the participants (rather like a football team saying defense is attack and vice–versa). But 81 Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 54 (Emphasis added). CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS the judgement of defensive/aggressive for a third party couldn’t exist. Schmitt was prepared to concede that certain acts in a war could be adjudicated as ones of aggression and thus illegal according to rules of war, yet making all the actions of a State illegal – and in particular removing its jus belli – was a bridge too far. Schmitt counters the just/unjust criterion by insisting that ethics of war are separate from questions of justice (i.e., “all is fair in love and war”). Categorizations of just and unjust or legal and illegal acts cannot, according to Schmitt, be bound to the same legal concept. So, if the police come into conflict with criminals there cannot be just police intervention and unjust ones. He also asks a legitimate and far–reaching question about the concept of sanctions. Typically sanctions target representatives of the state and not the people. But if state actors do not represent the people any longer then why are they targeted at all as representatives of their people? This issue had particular poignancy for Schmitt; such was the basic line of argument against the German government during and after both world wars; the charge was made that they were not representative of the German people and the CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS war was against the government not the German nation as a whole.82 The second inconsistency relates to the attempt to turn the international order into a united federation. One point of inconsistency is that war is impossible within a federation (and even within a confederation). Therefore, a jurisprudence that recognizes the concept of war within a federation is incoherent. Wars do not exist in a federation; if there are wars, it is not a federation, and if a federation exists conflict is merely policing actions by the federal authority. Next, Schmitt claims that if a state is a real state, i.e. both the representative of a people and the unity of the people with the former having the final say on the decision, then it must be considered an equal on the international stage. Thus, each State has as much right to defend itself in the international arena in much the same way as a private citizen in a republic can, the difference being that defence in international affairs may involve full–scale war and always involves that 82 Odysseos & Petito. Introduction: The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt. In Odysseos & Petito, The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt:; 1–9; Schmitt. The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law. In Writings on War; 105–107; Schmitt. The International Crime of the War of Aggression and the Prin iple Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. I Writings on War; 128–129, 147–165; Schmitt. The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War. In Writings on War; 66–69. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS possibility. If an international order ever did meet an enemy who had enough power to overthrow the entire new world order (say, an alien military from outer space) then the “non– discriminating” concept of war – whereby there are no just or unjust wars but merely conflicts between rivals with equal claims to recognition under international law – would arise. Those who are outside the so–called international federation and those representing the federation would merely declare war on each other in an old–fashioned manner. Schmitt categorizes his general objections in this regard as being due to irreconcilable conflicts between universalism and federalism. In a federal structure there are always outside enemies and there can never be wars within the federation; universalization would mean transforming the entire world into one big state where there are only questions of justice, not politics.83 If questions concerning politics – the most pressing that of who wields the decision in extreme cases – were to disappear then the whole world would become one economic and social concern. While this sounds ideal (because no controversies would arise), Schmitt believes that such an arrangement would only ‘kick the can’ of power down the 83 Schmitt. The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War. In Writings on War; 70–74. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS road, so to speak. At some stage, someone somewhere would have to decide on existential questions. Moreover, the power granted to such an authority would be vast and “frightening.”84 84 Schmitt. The Concept of the Political; 57–58. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS Conclusion No great advance has been made in science, politics, or religion without controversy. Lyman Beecher In this study an intellectual from the ‘golden age’ of Islamic philosophy and two Catholic political giants have been brought together. They rebelled against the prevailing orthodoxy of either Greco–Islamic or Greco–Christian philosophy while at the same time recognizing the value of a stable legal and political system for the legitimization of political authority. In their separate ways, they brought us a disconcerting message; every political power breaks into the world as a terrible beauty, an enfant terrible. They also explained why we think we will reach the end of politics. When authority is established, we lull ourselves into acceptance of authority, at later date wax sceptical, then grow cynical, some of our discontent manifested because of a sloppy attitude on the part of power itself. The CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS establishment is assailed by questions which touch the sacredness of its authority. The more effectively it answers these challenges with arbitrary judgements, the more consistent and thus more unquestioned its hegemony. At the same time, the process of rationalizing its ‘being’ makes authority susceptible to accusations of inconsistency, coercion, domination, personal aggrandizement, etc … and also less able to answer direct challenges. For Ibn Khaldun, increased taxation leads to tragedy, for Machiavelli it’s a refusal to express authority in its correct form, while for Schmitt the exception helps the State break through the torpidity and repetition and realize itself, the correlate of that being that the nation which eschews decision dies. A doctrine of purity, of purging if you will, often emerges. The necessary tendency towards civilization is a risk worth taking but is inevitably fatal. But civilization, even one brought to fruition by an authority who won’t survive to enjoy its own fruits, is never a stepping–stone to the ‘last man,’ the final hurdle, the end–point of progress, universal morality, and perfect equality. Instead, a new authority, a new world, is revealed, one that has to stake its claim to legitimacy, to unquestioned obedience, to custodianship of the sacred. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS One may justly ask about the cultural and religious milieu of our rebels and insurgents. Christianity and Islam have enjoyed a remarkable and unprecedented rise from obscurity in the Middle East to domination of the globe, a process largely completed by the time of the American discoveries. Outside of the Far East, Christianity and Islam – in some shade or form – continue to grow and evolve, inform conversation, bracket working time with festivities, generate controversy, inspire, attract criticism, provide a platform for the devout and the depraved, give meaning to life, and all in all determine speech, thoughts, and actions for about 4 billion people. While Islam is heavily under attack from Western progressives, liberals, and conservatives, within the house of Islam the Prophet Muhammad is considered the measure and benchmark of Mankind. He is the ‘founding father’ and paradigm in the same way that Jesus Christ personifies perfection in Christianity. Both can seemingly be fitted into the traditional model of human behaviour which Greek philosophy has provided. And rebels within the House of Islam or the Chapel of Christianity, such as our three intellectuals, would seem to fall foul of the lofty ideals of their religion once this compatibility is adopted. Yet, when we look at the lives of Christ and Muhammad, we realize that they were men surrounded by controversy. They CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS brought about enormous social upheavals and raised critical questions about the prevailing order. Both suffered conspiracies. The political aspects of their missions can’t be denied, even though that of Christ has often been suppressed by the clerical and secular authorities.1 While no one would claim that Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, or Schmitt were paradigms of Muslim or Christian ethics, they did take something of the radical spirit of Christ and Muhammad. Our three thinkers were insurrectionists deeply concerned with truth, and this may place them closer to Christ or Muhammad than the men of compromise or of fabricated non–conformity. Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Schmitt were pedagogues who taught their contemporaries and future posterity from a realist perspective. It’s easy to accuse them of lacking either sympathy or idealism. They may have poured cold water on the notion that men and women could live in a communist paradise, as equals, without fear, hunger, warfare, or insecurity, or at least that the world could be shaped in a predictable and ordered fashion. That task was left to the Al– Farabis, the Ficinos, the Kelsens, amongst others. Perhaps 1 An excellent book countering the sanitized (and more to the point, historically false) version of Christ is: Aslan. Zealot: the life and times of Jesus of Nazareth. CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS they were mistaken in eschewing idealism? Does an idealist seriously believe that, say, hunger will ever disappear? Possibly not. But the myth that such targets can be achieved may be enough to satiate more bellies than would be possible if we just accepted the ‘way things are.’ Nonetheless, men and women with the most impeccable moral convictions may end up becoming propagandists or generals for the most obscene excesses. A peaceful demeanour often masks violent intentions. Highlighting the more bestial side of mankind (for Machiavelli, it was a case of choosing the alternative between a fox and lion) could be portrayed as throwing in the towel of humane ethics. The realist would argue that no goodness grows in a vacuum of order. As we see in many conflicts around the world today, some kind of technical nous is required so that goodness can thrive. The hidden hand of power challenges the universal good. This confrontation is of course wholly in line with the theme of this book. Perhaps the greatest claim the realist can make is that of humility. The realist bows before that which he feels he has no control over. As well as that, he trusts in himself. He can get a square meal of experience, to paraphrase Oakeshott (1901–1990), and is not afraid to admit that before one can taste the delicacy of sophistication, the bread and butter must CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS DR. COLM GILLIS be put on the table. Also, Schmitt, Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun did not sit on the fence, feathering their neutral position with impossible ideals, ideals which everyone will fall short of but claims for which the idealist can feel superior for proposing. In their public lives they were men of controversy and they kept this trait in their writings. To make a decision, even a bad one, takes courage. Eschewing decision–making is still a decision, one which avoids rebuke, but a stance which only allows opportunists a window. 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