E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the
Socio-Cultural
Integration
of
Immigrants
in
the
1
Netherlands, France and Germany
Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans
This paper compares the levels of socio-cultural integration of naturalised and
non-naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany. Sociocultural integration is measured by host-country identification, proficiency and use
of the host-country language, and interethnic social contacts. To increase crossnational comparability, we focus on immigrants from two rural regions in Turkey
who migrated before 1975. Based on the assumption that easily accessible
citizenship promotes socio-cultural integration, we test two hypotheses. First,
whether naturalised immigrants display higher levels of socio-cultural integration
than non-naturalised immigrants. Second, whether immigrants in countries with
few preconditions for naturalisation show higher levels of socio-cultural
integration. We find that naturalisation is positively associated with socio-cultural
integration only in those countries—France and Germany—that have traditionally
required a certain degree of cultural assimilation from their new citizens.
Regarding country differences, we find that Turkish immigrants in France show
higher levels of socio-cultural integration on all four indicators. For host-country
identification, they share this position with Dutch Turks. The results show that
limited cultural assimilation conditions tied to citizenship may be helpful in
promoting socio-cultural integration, but also that the allowance of dual nationality
does not have the negative effects that are sometimes ascribed to it.
Keywords: Citizenship; Naturalisation Policies; Dual Nationality; Socio-Cultural
Integration
Introduction
Since the turn of the century, several European countries—for example
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany—have introduced stricter socio-cultural
integration requirements for naturalisation. Existing language requirements have
been extended, with formalised tests that sometimes also include a cultural
section. In debates on changing the requirements for naturalisation, two lines of
argument are commonly used. Left-wing parties—such as the Social-Democrats
and the Greens in Germany and the Netherlands—argue that the acquisition of
citizenship stimulates integration and therefore access to citizenship should be
easy. Granting immigrants citizenship means giving them a vested interest in
society and signals acceptation. Conservative parties—such as the Christian
Democrats in Germany and the Netherlands—tend to argue that citizenship
1
This paper has appeared as Ersanilli, Evelyn & Ruud Koopmans (2010) ‘Rewarding integration? Citizenship regulations
and socio-cultural integration of immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 36(5), pp 773—791 special issue on ‘Migration and Citizenship Attribution: Politics and Policies in Western
Europe’ edited by Maarten Vink . Copyright Taylor & Francis The article is available online at
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/13691831003764318
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
should be the end-point of integration and only awarded to those who have made
a conscious choice for their new country and can fulfil high integration
requirements. In this view, citizenship should be a reward for successful
integration and also an incentive to integrate (see e.g. de Hart 2005; de Hart and
van Oers 2006; Hailbronner 2006).
Despite cross-national convergence in citizenship laws, several significant
differences remain (de Hart and van Oers 2006; Howard 2005). These
differences allow an examination of the relation between citizenship regulations
and the integration of immigrants. The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion
Index considers regulations that allow naturalisation after three years of
residence, without any supplementary requirements such as language tests, and
allow dual nationality to be the most favourable for integration (Geddes and
Niessen 2005), but is this justified? This paper addresses the question by
investigating whether easily accessible citizenship indeed promotes higher levels
of the socio-cultural integration of immigrants. We focus on socio-cultural
integration because many countries have been implementing stricter sociocultural requirements for citizenship access and debates about dual citizenship
also focus on socio-cultural aspects of integration such as identification and
language proficiency (see e.g. Staton et al. 2007).
The countries studied in this paper—Germany, the Netherlands and France—
were selected because they have clearly different conceptions of citizenship and
attendant nationality and naturalisation policies. Until the 1990s, Germany had
citizenship based on ius sanguinis, with high barriers to naturalisation.
Subsequently, the barriers were lowered somewhat and, in 2000, a limited
degree of ius soli was introduced. Dual nationality is accepted only in a minority
of naturalisations. The Netherlands has a stronger ius soli component and low
requirements for naturalisation until 2003; dual nationality is mostly condoned.
France has a strong ius soli component in its citizenship law and unconditionally
allows dual nationality. However, it has traditionally imposed cultural
requirements for naturalisation.
International comparisons always pose methodological problems. The main
problem is the lack of adequate comparative data (Favell 2003). Different
countries use different statistical categories and the composition of the
immigrant population varies across countries, in terms of the countries of origin,
the regional origins within these countries, and the types (e.g. guestworker,
postcolonial, refugee, family reunification) and timing of migration flows. Without
controls for these factors, it is not possible to determine to what extent crossnational differences are due to differences in integration policies such as the
nationality and naturalisation regulations discussed in this paper, or to migration
patterns and compositional effects. Existing immigrant surveys cannot
sufficiently circumvent these problems because information on the type and
timing of immigration and on the regional origin of immigrants is usually lacking.
Controls for country of origin are also problematic in these surveys because, as
a result of the very uneven spread of immigrants across destination countries,
representative surveys of the immigrant population contain many empty or nearempty cells on the country-of-origin variable. For instance, immigrant surveys in
France usually contain only a handful of Turks, and surveys in Germany only a
handful of Moroccans, which creates a shaky basis for statistical controls for
countries of origin.
To avoid these problems, the data used in this paper are based on a quasiexperimental design that focuses on one comparable and clearly circumscribed
immigrant group in three destination countries—namely Turks originating from
two rural regions in Turkey—who either themselves migrated before 1975 or are
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
the foreign-born children of these first-generation guestworkers. We exclude the
second generation born in the host country because, in countries with strong ius
soli elements in their citizenship law such as France and the Netherlands,
virtually the entire second generation holds citizenship, and thus there is no
empirical basis for a comparison of its naturalised to non-naturalised members
of the second generation.1
In the following section, we discuss existing research on the relationship
between naturalisation and integration, and formulate two hypotheses to test the
claim that easy naturalisation promotes socio-cultural integration. We then
provide an overview of naturalisation policies in Germany, the Netherlands and
France. Subsequently, we discuss the data and the operationalisation of
variables, and present the results of regression analyses with host-country
identification, language use and proficiency, and social contacts with host-country
ethnics as the dependent variables. We conclude that host-country identification
is indeed enhanced by easily accessible naturalisation, but linguistic and social
integration are not. Naturalisation is positively associated with linguistic
integration only in those countries that have traditionally required a certain
degree of cultural assimilation from their new citizens. However, we do not find
any indication that the allowance of dual nationality would be detrimental to
socio-cultural integration.
Citizenship and Socio-Cultural Integration
Bauböck et al. observe that in recent naturalisation policy developments ‘the
concept of “naturalisation as a means of integration” is apparently being replaced
by another paradigm of naturalisation as the “crowning of a completed integration
process”’ (2006: 24). Both paradigms presume a link between naturalisation and
integration, but in a different direction. Several studies have looked into the
relation between integration and naturalisation. Some of them looked at
measures of integration as determinants for naturalisation (e.g. Constant et al.
2008; Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994), others at the effects of naturalisation
on integration (e.g. Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Fougère and Safi 2008).
Both types of study have found mixed results. In the United States, Yang (1994)
found a positive relation between English competence and naturalisation, but
Portes and Curtis (1987) found no significant relation between knowledge of
English and the likelihood of naturalisation for Mexican immigrants. In Germany,
Constant et al. (2008) found a positive effect of having close German friends both
on the intention to naturalise, and on actual naturalisation, for immigrants from
Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, in the Netherlands, Bevelander and Veenman
(2006) found no significant relationship between contacts with Dutch natives and
the odds of naturalisation for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.
If a relationship between socio-cultural integration and naturalisation exists, it is
of course important to know the direction of this relationship. One way of testing
this is using panel data (Portes and Curtis 1987). However, longitudinal studies
within one country are not really suited to answer the question that is central in
public debates about naturalisation—namely whether naturalisation with minimal
or with strict requirements has the strongest positive impact on socio-cultural
integration. Even if for a certain country it is established that naturalisation has
positive subsequent effects on socio-cultural integration, it does not follow
logically from this that lowering the requirements for naturalisation and thus
increasing the number of naturalisations will have positive aggregate effects on
socio-cultural integration, because the naturalisation effect may well depend on
the strictness and type of criteria attached to naturalisation. Therefore cross-
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
national analyses that compare countries with different naturalisation regimes are
necessary to complement existing single-country studies.
Although the results of previous studies are inconclusive, not least because
they lack a cross-national comparative component, for the sake of clarity we will
take the view that easily accessible naturalisation promotes socio-cultural
integration as a basis for formulating our hypotheses. If this view is correct, two
things should follow. To begin with, immigrants who hold the nationality of the
country of residence should display, compared to non-naturalised immigrants,
higher levels of socio-cultural integration in the sense of stronger identification
with the country of residence, higher language proficiency and usage, and more
social contacts with host-country ethnics (H1).
While finding that such an empirical pattern is necessary for accepting the claim
that easy naturalisation promotes socio-cultural integration, it is not sufficient. A
positive correlation between host-country nationality and socio-cultural integration
would namely also fit the opposite view that strict naturalisation requirements
stimulate socio-cultural integration. We must therefore also look at the data from
a cross-nationally comparative angle. If the view that easy naturalisation
promotes socio-cultural integration is correct, we should find that immigrants in
countries with accessible citizenship regimes display higher levels of sociocultural integration than their counterparts in countries with restrictive citizenship
regimes (H2).
Naturalisation Policies in Germany, the Netherlands and France
Of the three countries in this study, Germany has the most rigid naturalisation
regime. It is probably the most cited example of an ‘ethnic’ citizenship regime.
Reforms in 1991 and 1993 made naturalisation somewhat easier for both firstand second-generation immigrants. However, for the first generation, language
knowledge as well as an ‘orientation towards German culture’ (Hinwendung zum
Deutschtum) remained preconditions for naturalisation, although the strictness
with which they were applied varied across the German federal states (Hagedorn
2001; Hailbronner and Renner 1998). Over the course of the 1990s the
naturalisation rate increased slowly from 0.4 per cent in 1990 to a peak of 2.5 per
cent in 2000 (see Table 1).
Table 1. Naturalisation rates for all immigrants and Turkish immigrants in 1990, 2000 and
2005 by country
Naturalisation rate,
Naturalisation rate, Turkishall foreign- born¹
born¹
1990
1995
2000
2005
1990 1995 2000
2005
Germany
0.4
1.0
2.5
1.7
0.1
1.6
4.01
1.9
Netherlands
1.8
11.4²
7.7
4.1
1.0
19.9²
4.7
3.5
1
3
1
3
France
1.7
4.6
4.3
0.6
5.9
5.1
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on SOPEMI 2000 and 2008.
1
Data for 1991.
² Data for 1996.
³ Data for 1999.
The citizenship law that came into effect in 2000 lowered the residence
requirement to eight years and abolished the requirement of identification with
the German culture. At the same time, language criteria were formalised and a
loyalty oath to the German constitution was introduced (Groenendijk et al. 2000;
Koopmans et al. 2005). Though immigrants are still required to renounce their
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
previous nationality, the grounds for exemption have been broadened. Between
1987 and 1999 dual nationality was tolerated in 23 per cent of all naturalisations
(170,000 cases). Since the 2000 citizenship law, the average rate has increased,
largely due to the automatic granting of dual citizenship to refugees (Green
2005). In 2005 the toleration rate of dual citizenship for all immigrants was 47.2
per cent, though for Turks it was only 15.5 per cent. Contrary to France and the
Netherlands, Germany does not allow recipients of welfare or unemployment
benefits to naturalise, unless they ‘cannot be held personally responsible’ for this
situation (Hailbronner 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005). In 2000 Germany also
introduced a limited form of ius soli for the second generation. The
implementation of the 2000 law did not, however, lead to a higher naturalisation
rate. After the peak in 2000, the rate slowly declined again, and by 2005 it was
down to 1.7 per cent. Several authors have suggested that the long processing
time of citizenship applications deters people from applying (Green 2005;
Koopmans et al. 2005), but the newly implemented language and civic integration
tests are also likely to have played a role. Until 1994 the naturalisation rate for
Turks was lower than the general rate—as low as 0.1 per cent in 1990. In the
following decade the naturalisation rate rose, two factors contributing to this
increase. Firstly military service as a precondition for being released from Turkish
citizenship was more often accepted as grounds for allowing dual nationality.
Secondly the Turkish government started to allow the reacquisition of the Turkish
nationality after German naturalisation, and between 1993 and 1995 the
naturalisation rate of Turks almost tripled (Joppke 1999). Many naturalised Turks
reacquired Turkish nationality after receiving German nationality. With the 2000
nationality law, the voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality resulted in the
automatic withdrawal of the German nationality. Due to this new rule, an
estimated 40,000 Turks lost their German nationality (Hailbronner 2006).
The Netherlands is the country that the most clearly shifted from the citizenshipstimulates-integration view to the view that citizenship is a crown on successful
integration. From 1983 to the mid-1990s the dominant view was that citizenship
acquisition stimulates integration (de Hart 2007; Heijs 1995). Therefore the new
Citizenship Act of 1985 lowered the requirements for naturalisation. Firstgeneration immigrants can obtain citizenship after five years of legal residence.
Having a reasonable knowledge of the Dutch language and being accepted in
Dutch society were requirements for naturalisation (van Oers et al. 2006) but, in
practice, there was only a modest informal language assessment, consisting of a
few oral questions on name, address, year of arrival and year of birth. Between
1983 and 2003 less than 2 per cent of applications were turned down on grounds
of insufficient integration (van Oers et al. 2006). Until 2003, Dutch-born children
of immigrants had an unconditional option right to the Dutch nationality when they
come of age. Since 2003 the option right can be refused, based on the outcome
of a public order investigation. In 1992 dual citizenship was introduced, which led
to an increase in the naturalisation rate from 4.2 per cent in 1991 to 11.4 per cent
in 1996 (see Table 1). The right to dual citizenship was, however, highly
contested and, in October 1997, the obligation to renounce prior citizenship was
reinstated (van Oers et al. 2006). Nevertheless, there are many exemptions to
the renunciation obligation and the law is not applied very rigidly. In 2006, 62.7
per cent of applicants kept their original nationality (van Oers et al. 2006), a
significantly higher share than in Germany. In 2003 a new act introduced a
naturalisation exam that not only tests oral and written language skills at a much
higher level than before but also includes questions on Dutch politics and society.
People who qualify for Dutch nationality through option (the elderly, the Dutchborn and the spouses of Dutch citizens) do not have to fulfil an integration
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
requirement. The reform led to a decrease in naturalisations, because half of the
applicants failed the exam (Bauböck 2006; van Oers et al. 2006). In 2005 the
naturalisation rate was down to 4.1 per cent, which is, however, still average by
European standards. Until 1992 the naturalisation rate of Turkish immigrants was
slightly below the Dutch average—3.0 per cent in 1991. With the allowance of
dual nationality, the naturalisation rate for Turks started to rise and peaked at
19.9 per cent in 1996. Between 1992 and 1997 almost 140,000 Turks—about
half of all people of Turkish origin in the Netherlands—became Dutch citizens,
compared to fewer than 14,000 between 1987 and 1992. Most of those who
naturalised retained their Turkish nationality (Böcker 2004). This continued after
the official reinstatement of the renunciation requirement. Between 1998 and
2006 the number of people holding both Dutch and Turkish nationality increased
by almost 90,000. Böcker and Thränhardt (2003) calculated that in 2001 all
naturalising Turks kept their Turkish citizenship.
France has a strong ius soli tradition of citizenship and, as a result, secondgeneration immigrants automatically become French. For first-generation
immigrants, naturalisation is possible after five years of residence. Applicants
have to prove their language ability and sufficient assimilation, the latter being
part of French nationality law since 1945. In the 1950s sufficient assimilation
mainly meant sufficient language knowledge but, in the 1970s, when the number
of non-European applicants for naturalisation increased, sufficient assimilation
also meant accepting French values—wearing a headscarf, for example, was
sometimes judged to be a sign of insufficient assimilation (Weil and Spire 2006).
Between 1985 and 2003 about 25 per cent of applications were turned down.
According to Weil and Spire (2006), 40 per cent of rejected applications (i.e. 10
per cent of all applications) had to do with insufficient assimilation, five times as
many as in the Netherlands. A 2003 law introduced knowledge of the rights and
duties of citizenship as one of the criteria for assimilation into the French
community. Since 2005 French proficiency is determined in a 20–30-minute
interview in an Assimilation Evaluation Office (Weil and Spire 2006). Despite low
residence requirements and the full allowance of dual nationality, the
naturalisation rate in France is not very high; 2.5 per cent in 1990, increasing to
4.7 per cent in 2000 (see Table 1). However, this is in part explained by the fact
that—unlike in the Netherlands—the obtention of citizenship through ius soli by
the second generation is not represented in the French naturalisation statistics. 2
A study by Tribalat showed that naturalisation among Turks was relatively rare.
Of those who came to France before 1975, only 13 per cent of men and 17 per
cent of women had acquired French nationality (Tribalat 1995). But, as in
Germany and the Netherlands, their naturalisation rate rose during the 1990s,
exceeding the average rate and reaching 5.5 per cent in 1999 and 6.1 per cent in
2005.
Table 2 summarises the citizenship regulations in the three countries. All three
have made changes to their citizenship legislation over the past decades and in
all countries both views on the relation between citizenship and integration have
been present in political debates. Nevertheless differences remain. France
combines a short residence requirement and the allowance of dual nationality
with fairly strong linguistic and cultural integration requirements and a strong ius
soli for the second generation. Until 2003, the Netherlands had the lowest
barriers to naturalisation, with a short length of residence, minor integration
requirements and a de facto acceptance of dual nationality. Germany has the
highest naturalisation requirements and allows dual nationality only in a minority
of cases. Thus, if Hypothesis 2 about the effects of accessible naturalisation is
correct, we should find that levels of socio-cultural integration are highest in the
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
Netherlands, intermediate in France and lowest in Germany. The 2003 legislation
change in the Netherlands is not likely to have had a big impact on the
respondents of this study since they are long-time immigrants and were eligible
for naturalisation well before 2003.
Table 2. Overview of citizenship regulations
Germany
Netherlands
France
Residence
requirement
10 years (8 yrs since 2000)
5 years
5 years
Language
requirement
Yes
Yes, simple test until
2003. Now oral and
written test
Yes
Integration
requirement
Yes
Yes, simple oral test;
oral and written test +
societal knowledge
since 2003
Yes
Exclusion of welfare
recipients
Yes, but with exceptions
No
No
Dual nationality
Not allowed, several grounds
for exemption. Länder differ
in applied rigidity
Allowed between
1991–97; since 1998
mostly condoned
Unconditional
Ius soli
Yes (since 2000, but only if
nationality of parents is
renounced)
Yes (since 1985), can
opt in at majority
Yes , can opt out at
majority (1993–98
manifestation de
volonté)
Data and Variables
Several studies have shown that naturalisation rates vary between origin groups
within the same country of residence (Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Diehl
and Blohm 2003; Fougère and Safi 2008; Staton et al. 2007; Yang 1994). To get
a clearer view of differences between countries it is therefore best to study the
same immigrant group in each country. Turks are the largest group of thirdcountry nationals in the EU, accounting for approximately 20 per cent of all thirdcountry nationals (Groenendijk et al. 2000). The Turkish immigrant population of
Germany currently amounts to over 2.5 million and makes up almost 3 per cent
of the German population. France and the Netherlands have a significant, but
much smaller Turkish population of about 350,000, making up respectively 0.5
and 2 per cent of the population.
Turkish migration patterns to Germany, France and the Netherlands were fairly
similar during the guestworker era, but started to diverge after 1975 due to
different regulations for family migration and inflow of asylum-seekers (see e.g.
Dagevos et al. 2006; Muus 2003). To minimise the effects of different
immigration policies, the target population of our study is limited to migrants who
arrived before 1975 and their Turkish-born offspring. Since Turkey is a country
with large regional differences in prosperity, religious life, ethnic composition,
degree of urbanisation and level of education, and the regional origins of the
Turkish communities differ between countries, the target population is further
limited to migrants from two rural regions in Turkey, South-Central and EastCentral Anatolia.3 It is important to emphasise that our survey did not aim to be
representative for the Turkish populations in Germany, France and the
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
Netherlands. The aim was to create a cross-nationally comparable sample, thus
allowing a better test of causal hypotheses than would have been possible with
representative samples, which would have amounted to comparing apples and
oranges, without being sufficiently able to control for their different properties.
The sample was mainly drawn on the basis of surname sampling from online
phonebooks, based on a list of 30 stems of common Turkish surnames. Though
phonebook sampling does not provide a perfectly representative sample, it is the
best way to obtain a cross-nationally comparable sample. While in the
Netherlands the official registration of ethnicity makes it possible to draw
immigrant samples that include people holding Dutch nationality from official
registries, this strategy is not applicable in France—where the registration of
ethnicity is banned by law—or in Germany, where only foreign nationals are
registered, and where, as in France, naturalised immigrants disappear in the
statistical category of ‘Germans’. By using Turkish surnames, we were sure that
people of Turkish origin had an equal chance of being sampled in each of the
countries, irrespective of their nationality status. The choice for telephone
directories follows from this sampling decision, as phone directories are the most
encompassing listing of names that is available. Of course, some people are not
listed in the phonebook and therefore could not enter our sample. However, this
factor plays in all three countries, and therefore does not subtract from crossnational comparability. Again, it is important to emphasise that the aim of this
survey was not representativeness, but comparability. We could have drawn a
more representative sample in the Netherlands on the basis of official registries,
but such a choice would have undermined cross-national comparability. In crossnational research the best strategy is not to make the optimal choice for each
country individually, but to make the same choice in all countries, even if for
some countries ‘better’ options were available. Nevertheless, to check for
possible bias in this method, we employed two additional strategies in addition to
phonebook sampling, namely by recruiting respondents during their summer
holidays in the region of origin, and by asking respondents in one destination
whether they could give us phone numbers of their parents or children, or of
people from their region of origin in one of the other destination countries. Of
course, these sampling methods may have their own bias. Therefore all analyses
in this paper were controlled for sample type, indicating that there is no important
sample bias, as none of the sample control variables attains significance in any
of the analyses.
Data were collected between November 2005 and June 2006 by means of a
standardised telephone survey in all three countries. The survey was conducted
by bilingual interviewers and, depending on the preference of the respondent,
could be completed in either Turkish or the language of the country of residence.
All respondents qualified for citizenship based on the length-of-residence criteria
in their host country.
Most previous studies used a limited operationalisation of socio-cultural
integration. Yang’s data only allowed him to look at English language
competence (1994), Constant et al. (2008) only at having German friends.
Bevelander and Veenman (2006) used a more elaborate operationalisation by
measuring identification with the host country, contacts with host-country
nationals and levels of modernity. We measured socio-cultural integration with
four indicators—host-country identification, language use and proficiency, and
social contacts with host-country ethnics. Language is often cited as one of the
most important aspects of integration, with insufficient proficiency seen as a
threat to national cohesion and a cause of insufficient (economic) independence.
We will examine the relation between the possession of citizenship of the host
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
country and proficiency and frequency in the usage of the host-country language.
This latter was measured by asking respondents which language they spoke the
most frequently in three different contexts, namely with their friends, partner and
children: Turkish, French/Dutch/German, or both about equally often. The
answers were converted to scores of 0 (mostly Turkish), 0.5 (equally often
Turkish and French/Dutch/German) and 1 (mostly French/Dutch/German). A
scale was constructed based on the means of the three items (Cronbach’s alpha
.66). To measure host-country language proficiency, respondents were asked
how often they experienced problems in understanding. Responses were
measured on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘always’. This scale was
inverted so that a higher score means fewer problems and therefore a greater
proficiency.
Loyalty has always been an important part of citizenship. The quintessential
immigration country, the United States, has therefore long demanded an oath of
allegiance of its new citizens. Loyalty is operationalised as identification with
host-country nationals (Germans, French, Dutch) and measured with three
questions: To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?; To what extent do
you feel [group member]?; To what extent are you proud of being [group
member]? Cronbach’s alpha for identification with the host country is 0.78.
As a final indicator of socio-cultural integration into the host society, we look at
social contacts. Respondents were asked about the ethnic composition of the
social group they went out with. The scores are 1 (predominantly Turkish), 2
(equally often Turkish and French/Dutch/German)4 and 3 (predominantly
Dutch/German/French).
The difference between naturalised and non-naturalised Turkish immigrants in
each of the three countries is modelled by creating six dummy variables;
naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants in each of the three countries. Nonnaturalised immigrants in Germany serve as the reference category since our
hypotheses predict they will have the lowest level of socio-cultural integration. In
this way, we can investigate simultaneously the difference between naturalised
and non-naturalised immigrants within a country, and the differences between
countries. In addition to the regressions with non-naturalised German Turks as
the reference category, we also ran regressions with the other five categories as
reference groups in order to be able to test the significance of the difference
between each pairwise contrast, e.g. between naturalised and non-naturalised
immigrants in France, or between naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands and
Germany. We report these significance levels in the text.
In addition, we controlled in the analyses for individual-level demographic
factors that are known to influence socio-cultural integration and naturalisation
(gender, generation, level of education, employment and marital status).
Generation is added as a dummy that distinguishes between immigrants who
migrated as adults (the first generation) and those who migrated as minors (the
in-between or 1.5 generation). Three additional demographic characteristics were
controlled for: region of origin, religion, and the relative size of the Turkish
immigrant community (in the respondents’ place of residence, as this may affect
socio-cultural integration).5 East-Central Anatolia is an ethnically and religiously
more diverse region than South-Central Anatolia, and this can affect sociocultural integration. The same holds for religious denomination—the sample
includes both Sunnis and Alevis. Alevis are often considered to practice a more
liberal and humanistic form of Islam than Sunnis. Finally, we also control for
sample type. The phonebook sample serves as the reference category.
Descriptive statistics of all variables are included in Table 3.
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for the
Netherlands, France and Germany
Variable
Dependent variables
Host-country identity
Freq. of speaking host-country language
Host-language proficiency
Social contacts
Mean
SD
Min
Max
2.54
0.29
3.59
1.61
1.00
0.29
1.21
0.58
1
0
1
1
5
1
5
3
Independent variables
Germany, naturalised
Netherlands, naturalised
France, naturalised
Germany, non-naturalised
Netherlands, non-naturalised
France, non-naturalised
0.12
0.23
0.15
0.17
0.05
0.26
0.32
0.42
0.36
0.37
0.21
0.44
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
Female
1.5 generation
Education, none/primary
Education, secondary
Education, post-secondary
Alevi
East-central Anatolia
Married
Working
Phonebook sample
Holiday sample
Snowball sample
Share of Turkish immigrants
0.41
0.70
0.36
0.55
0.09
0.10
0.38
0.92
0.50
0.66
0.09
0.26
2.11
0.49
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.29
0.30
0.49
0.27
0.50
0.48
0.28
0.44
1.49
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7.46
Results
The percentages of naturalised citizens in our sample are presented in Table 4.
The data show the expected pattern, with a high share of host-country citizenship
possession in the Netherlands and lower shares in France and Germany. The
second column shows the percentage of people with dual citizenship among
those who naturalised. These data fit with the trends among immigrants in
general and Turks in particular within the three countries as displayed in Table 1.
In the Netherlands and France, about 90 per cent of naturalised Turkish
immigrants retained their Turkish passport; in Germany only 24 per cent did so.
We now turn back to the multivariate analysis set out in Table 5 in order to
investigate how these different patterns of naturalisation have affected the sociocultural integration of Turkish immigrants. Table 5 shows the results of ordinary
least-squares regressions with each of the four indicators of socio-cultural
integration as dependent variables. Starting with host-country identification we
find that, in the Netherlands, the difference between naturalised and nonnaturalised Turks is not significant. In France and Germany, however, there is a
significant difference between immigrants who did and those who did not
naturalise (p<.001, respectively p<.05). These results thus provide support, in
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
two of the three countries, for the first hypothesis, which predicted a positive
relationship between naturalisation and identification.
Turning to the cross-national differences addressed by Hypothesis 2, we see
that identification with the host country is higher in France and the Netherlands
than in Germany, regardless of naturalisation status (compared with nonnaturalised Dutch Turks p<.05; all other differences with Germany p<.01).
Identification of non-naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands is higher than of
non-naturalised immigrants in France (p<.05), but for naturalised immigrants, the
difference goes in the opposite direction (p<.05). These results largely support
our second hypothesis—immigrants in countries with accessible citizenship
regimes display higher levels of identification with the host society.
For frequency of speaking the host-country language, the results show a
different pattern. In both France and Germany, naturalised Turkish immigrants
speak the host-country language more often than those who did not naturalise. In
the Netherlands, however, the difference is not significant. Again the first
hypothesis is only partly confirmed.
Regarding country differences, Turkish immigrants in France use the hostcountry language significantly more often than their Dutch and German
counterparts, regardless of naturalisation status. Non-naturalised French
immigrants even use the host-country language more often than naturalised
Dutch immigrants (p<.10). The differences between the Netherlands and
Germany are not significant. Contrary to identification with the host country,
frequency of speaking the host-country language therefore does not display the
pattern that Hypothesis 2 predicted, as Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands do
not use the host-country language more than their German counterparts, and use
it significantly less than those in France.
Our second language variable shows a similar pattern. The third column in
Table 3 shows that naturalised immigrants in Germany experience fewer
problems with German than their non-naturalised counterparts. In France this
difference is also significant (p<.05). However, the Netherlands again diverge
from the expected pattern; there is no significant relation between problems with
the Dutch language and possession of Dutch nationality. Again, we find support
for Hypothesis 1 in Germany and France, but not in the Netherlands.
Table 4. Possession of host-country nationality and dual nationality by country
Germany
Netherlands
France
Host-country nationality
(% of total)
39.6
82.8
36.0
Dual nationality
(% of naturalised)
24.4
91.5
90.0
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
Table 5. Unstandardised coefficients of OLS regression for four measures of sociocultural integration
Host-country
identification
Germany non-naturalised
Ref.
Ref.
Germany, naturalised
.34*
Netherlands, naturalised
.73*** (.12)
France, naturalised
Freq. of using
host-country
language
(.14)
1.06*** (.14)
Host-country
language
proficiency
Ref.
Social contacts
Ref.
.09*
(.04)
.35*
(.14)
.08
(.09)
.03
(.03)
.13
(.12)
.13
(.07)
.17*** (.03)
.40** (.14)
.23** (.08)
Netherlands, non-natural’d
.88*** (.19)
.00
(.05)
-.04
(.19)
.11
(.12)
France, non-naturalised
.50*** (.12)
.09*** (.03)
.09
(.12)
.15*
(.07)
Female
-.07
.03
.07
(.08)
.02
(.05)
Generation 1
Ref.
Generation 1.5
.12
Education, none/primary
(.08)
(.02)
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
.14*** (.03)
.60*** (.11)
.11
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
Education, secondary
.37*** (.10)
.15*** (.02)
.97*** (.10)
.20*** (.06)
Education, post-secondary
.29
.24*** (.04)
1.28*** (.16)
.33*** (.09)
Sunni
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
Alevi
-.04
.08** (.03)
.01
South-Central Anatolia
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
East-Central Anatolia
.23**
(.08)
.04
(.02)
-.01
(.08)
.07
(.05)
Married
.14
(.14)
-.26*** (.03)
-.18
(.14)
-.01
(.08)
Working
-.09
(.09)
.04*
.18*
(.09)
.13*
Phonebook sample
Ref.
Holiday sample
.10
(.13)
.06
(.03)
-.03
(.13)
.00
(.08)
Snowball sample
.03
(.09)
.01
(.02)
.13
(.09)
.06
(.05)
Share Turkish immigrants
.01
(.03)
-.01*
(.01)
.00
(.03)
-.01
(.02)
(.20)
.21*** (.05)
Constant
Adj. R2
N
1.50***
.13
(.11)
(.16)
(.14)
(.02)
Ref.
.37
646
645
Two-tailed t-tests, *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
(.14)
(.05)
Ref.
2.35*** (.20)
645
(.08)
Ref.
Ref.
.40
.05
(.06)
1.16*** (.12)
.09
626
Cross-nationally, we find that naturalised Turks have fewer problems with the
host-country language in France than in the Netherlands (p<.05). Among the
non-naturalised Turks we do not find any significant cross-national differences.
Finally, we look at social contacts with host-country ethnics. In none of the three
countries is the difference in the extent of interethnic contacts between the
naturalised and the non-naturalised significant. In other words, we find no support
for Hypothesis 1 in regard to this variable. Comparing across the three countries,
we find that naturalised French and Dutch Turks have higher levels of interethnic
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
social contacts than the reference category of non-naturalised German Turks. If
we hold nationality status constant, we find no significant country differences
among naturalised immigrants. Among non-naturalised immigrants, the only
significant difference is between French and German Turks. As far as the
relatively low levels of interethnic contacts among German Turks is concerned,
this result fits Hypothesis 2. However, the fact that interethnic contacts are
somewhat more strongly developed among French than among Dutch Turks is
not in line with it.
Conclusions
Despite convergence, citizenship legislation still varies between countries.
Moreover, European immigration countries still carry the imprint of the more
strongly divergent policies of past decades. As we have seen, these differences
are reflected in naturalisation rates and in the prevalence of dual nationality
among the naturalised. In the Netherlands which—at least until 2003—had the
easiest access to naturalisation, the majority of Turkish immigrants have
naturalised. In France the long-time presence of ius soli has led to a high degree
of citizenship possession for the second generation but, despite a similarly short
residence requirement and the full allowance of dual nationality, the
naturalisation rate of Turkish immigrants is much lower than in the Netherlands.
This is related to the much stricter linguistic and cultural assimilation
requirements that applied to naturalisations in France compared to those in the
Netherlands before 2003.
Based on the assumption that easily accessible naturalisation promotes sociocultural integration, we formulated two hypotheses. The first implication of this
assumption pertains to within-country differences, and states that naturalised
immigrants should display higher levels of socio-cultural integration than those
who did not naturalise. This hypothesis received support for the German and
French cases regarding identification and language. Naturalised Turkish
immigrants in France and Germany identified more strongly with the host country,
used French or German more often and reported higher proficiency in it. In the
Netherlands, however, Hypothesis 1 had to be fully rejected as we found no
significant differences between the naturalised and the non-naturalised on any of
the indicators of socio-cultural integration. This result reflects the absence in the
Netherlands until very recently of significant linguistic and cultural assimilation
preconditions for naturalisation. However, the absence of significant differences
between the naturalised and the non-naturalised in the Netherlands also
indicates that naturalisation has had no significant positive subsequent effects on
the socio-cultural integration of those who became naturalised, as the argument
that easy naturalisation promotes socio-cultural integration would have led us to
expect.
The second implication of the assumption that easily accessible naturalisation
promotes socio-cultural integration pertains to cross-national differences, and
states that levels of socio-cultural integration should be higher in countries with
high naturalisation rates and minimal naturalisation requirements, along the lines
of the best practices for naturalisation recommended by the authors of the
European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes and Niessen 2005).
Hypothesis 2 therefore stated that levels of socio-cultural integration should be
highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in France and lowest in Germany. This
hypothesis could only be partly confirmed for identification with the host country,
which was significantly stronger in France and the Netherlands than in Germany,
both for the naturalised and the non-naturalised. The fact that levels of
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
identification with the host country are not higher in the Netherlands than in
France does not fit the hypothesis, however. We find a similar, though less overt,
pattern for interethnic social contacts, which are the most frequent among French
and the least among German Turks, with Dutch Turks in between.
For the language variables we found no support for the second hypothesis
whatsoever. Turkish immigrants in France, and not those in the Netherlands, turn
out to have the highest levels of host-country language proficiency and use. This
latter result applies both to the naturalised and the non-naturalised French Turks.
Even non-naturalised French Turks use the host-country language more often
than naturalised Dutch Turks. Turkish immigrants in Germany and the
Netherlands do not differ significantly regarding language use, but those in the
Netherlands report somewhat less host-country language proficiency. The fact
that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands overall show the lowest levels of
linguistic integration clearly contradicts Hypothesis 2.
Combining the results regarding the two hypotheses we can conclude that there
is little support for the assumption that low barriers to naturalisation promote
socio-cultural integration. If we compare the naturalised to the non-naturalised
within countries, we find that the positive relationship between naturalisation and
socio-cultural integration is strongest in France, limited to linguistic integration in
Germany, and entirely absent in the Netherlands. In other words, precisely in the
country with the easiest access to naturalisation, we find the least evidence of a
positive impact of naturalisation on socio-cultural integration. If naturalisation has
an effect on socio-cultural integration at the individual level, this effect is limited to
the two countries that have made naturalisation conditional on a certain degree of
linguistic and cultural assimilation.
The cross-national differences that we found did not provide much evidence for
beneficial effects of naturalisation with minimal conditions, either. France, the
country that has historically the most emphasised linguistic assimilation as a
precondition for citizenship, is also the country where Turkish immigrants display
the highest levels of host-language proficiency and usage. Conversely, the lack
of emphasis on linguistic assimilation that long prevailed in the Netherlands has
promoted lower levels of host-country proficiency and usage. Probably the
language factor also plays an important role in explaining the higher frequency of
interethnic social contacts among the French Turks. The only aspect of sociocultural integration where Dutch Turks did perform similarly to their French
counterparts and at a much higher level than German Turks was host-country
identification. This aspect of socio-cultural integration, with the sense of
belonging and acceptance that is attached to it, is of course a not-unimportant
dimension of integration and in that sense past Dutch naturalisation policies have
at least achieved one of their aims. There is little reason to fear, however, that
this positive effect will erode now that the Netherlands have made citizenship
less easily accessible, particularly by introducing stricter language requirements.
This policy shift brings the Netherlands close to the kind of naturalisation policies
that France has long pursued, and as our results show, levels of host-country
identification in France have not been harmed by such demands for assimilation
to the dominant language.
Apart from the result for host-country identification, there is a second reason
why our results should not be taken as support for the view that socio-cultural
integration is best promoted by very strict naturalisation requirements. Had we
taken this assumption as the point of departure for formulating our hypotheses,
we would also have found little support for it, as Germany, which clearly has had
the most restrictive naturalisation regime, performs relatively poorly on all four
indicators, particularly identification and interethnic social contacts. Our results
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
rather indicate that the French combination of short residence requirements,
strong ius soli elements—which of course do not affect our respondents directly,
but may affect them importantly through their children—coupled with certain
demands of linguistic and cultural assimilation, has been the optimal mix for
promoting the socio-cultural integration of immigrants.
It is worth emphasising that this French mix includes the unconditional
toleration of dual nationality, often framed in political debates as antithetical to
socio-cultural integration. In full contradiction to this view, France—the only one
among our countries that unconditionally allows dual nationality—is
simultaneously the country where the positive effects of naturalisation on sociocultural integration are the strongest, including a comparatively strong sense of
identification with the host country. By contrast, Germany is the country that has
the strongest restrictions on dual nationality, but this has not made German Turks
better integrated than their French counterparts on any aspect of socio-cultural
integration.
Of course, these results should be treated with some caution because our data
pertain only to Turkish immigrants. Even though Turks are the most important
immigrant group in Europe, this limits the generalisability of our findings. The
naturalisation behaviour, as well as the determinants and consequences of
naturalisation, may differ for other immigrant groups. It is therefore important to
extend this kind of study to other immigrant groups and to other immigration
countries.
We see the cross-nationally comparative approach that we have followed in this
paper as an important complement to single-country studies of the relationship
between naturalisation and integration. However, future work should try to
combine the strengths of cross-national and longitudinal approaches. This would
require cross-nationally comparable panel data containing information on
immigrants before and after their naturalisation, and on a comparable group of
immigrants in the same country who did not naturalise.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Betty de Hart, Maarten Vink and the anonymous JEMS
reviewer for their constructive comments and helpful suggestions.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
In our sample only 2.6 per cent, i.e. two respondents, of the second
generation in the Netherlands do not have a Dutch passport. In France only
4.7 per cent, i.e. six respondents, do not have a French passport.
From 1993 until 1998, when the Pasqua law was in effect, the French-born
second generation did not automatically receive citizenship but had to show
a ‘manifestation de volonté’. During this period the second generation is
present in the statistics.
South-Central Anatolia consists of the provinces of Afyon, Aksaray,
Karaman, Kayseri, Konya, Nevşehir, and Niğde. East-Central Anatolia
encompasses Adiyaman, Amasya, Elaziğ, Malatya, Tokat, Tunceli and
Sivas.
The middle category includes a small number of respondents (n=49), who
indicated that the majority of their social contacts were with members of
immigrant groups other than Turks. We also ran the analyses excluding this
group and found similar results as those reported below. The only
exception is that, excluding these respondents, the difference in social
E. Ersanilli & R. Koopmans
[5]
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 36(5): 773—791
contacts between naturalised Dutch Turks and non-naturalised German
Turks is not significant.
We calculated the number of Turkish immigrants (excluding the second
generation) as a percentage of the total population within geographical
units. The variable thus varies from 0–100. For the Netherlands, data for
2005 on the municipal level were taken from the Central Statistical Agency
(CBS) website. For France, data from the 1999 census on the level of the
commune were used. Data were not available, however, for communes
with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, so the percentage of Turkish migrants
within the respective arrondissements were used. German data were taken
from the only dataset with information on the country of residence instead
of nationality—the Mikrozensus 2005—the Kreis or country level being the
lowest level for which it will allow us to calculate the percentage of Turkish
immigrants.
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