The Capability Approach: Ethics and socio-economic development

The capability approach Ethics and socio-economic development Oscar Garza-Vázquez and Séverine Deneulin [pre-approved version (April 2018) for J. Drydyk & L. Keleher (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Development Ethics. Routledge https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbook-of-DevelopmentEthics/Drydyk-Keleher/p/book/9781138647909 ] Development ethics begins from the position that development processes always involve ethical judgments and normative valuations (Crocker 1991, 2008; Goulet 1980; 1997). It is concerned with ‘the project of rethinking and redefining “development”’ (Qizilbash 1996) in order to distinguish between ‘worthwhile development and undesirable maldevelopment’ (Drydyk 2016). Because ethical judgements are concerned about what should be done and which corresponding actions to take, laying bare and discussing what counts as development and how it can be assessed is key to designing, evaluating, and legitimising public policies. In this chapter, we offer an overview of the capability approach, one of the most important conceptual frameworks that has contributed to this ethical debate. We discuss why a capability view of development provides the most compelling ethical framework to date for dealing with the practical and normative questions that development processes raise. We present the approach as an interdisciplinary evaluative framework which views concerns for wellbeing, equity, rights, agency and participation, freedom and justice as central to the theory and practice of development. We start by setting the empirical ground for our theoretical discussion. We present a concrete policy case, namely recent labour reforms in Mexico, to illustrate why ethical judgements matter for people’s lives. In the second section, we introduce the capability approach and the key authors who have shaped this normative conceptual framework. We then identify the main differences and advantages of the capability approach over other evaluative perspectives used in development policy such as subjective approaches or resource-based approaches. In the third section, we discuss some implications of the capability approach for development ethics and other dimensions of ‘worthwhile development’. We conclude by highlighting some controversies within the capability approach and important new directions. 1. Development policy and why we need development ethics Throughout history, development, broadly conceived as ‘good’ social change, has always been a contested concept both in theory and in practice. How it has been interpreted has shaped our shared social reality and continues to do so in the present. The example of labour policy in Mexico illustrates how interpretation matters, and how any policy, whether social, economic, political, cultural, and environmental, reflects certain values which embody a specific understanding of what a society is aiming for and of the ways used to move towards that aim. 1 The current Mexican President, Enrique Peña Nieto, enacted after his election a series of legal and economic reforms known as “Moving Mexico” (Mover a México, in Spanish), in order to promote development in the country. Among these reforms were amendments to labour laws that aimed at promoting ‘competitiveness, flexibility of labour markets and making job hiring easier’ (elected President of Mexico, EPN). Following these reforms, several economic and financial organisations such as the OECD, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and the Mexican Business Coordinating Council expressed their support due to the expected positive impact of these ‘modern’ labour practices on economic growth, investment, and productivity (e.g. see Cruz 2012; Hernández 2012). This position was also shared by the Mexican Association for Human Resources Management (AMEDIRH) which expressed its support in the following words: “The way to create jobs in modern society is [through] companies. So we must be clear that the law that best protects workers, is one that protects the companies where they work” (Borda 2012; authors’ translation). Yet, these reforms were met with strong resistance in the country due to their associated social costs. In general, the labour reforms were perceived to be in opposition to the historical labour rights that have been won since the Mexican Revolution of 1910. For instance, the labour reform threatened worker’s rights to seniority, social security and pension benefits (Art. 39 – F), labour stability, and redundancy payments. As a result of the reforms, corporations are now able to dismiss employees ‘without [involving] any responsibility for the employer’, that is, without any compensation to the employee (Art. 35, 39-A). Meanwhile, the reforms formalized outsourcing employment (Art. 13) (Bensusán 2013). These two contrasting positions reflect the fact that there are different visions about what is of ultimate value for different people and the appropriateness of the means to achieve these visions. While for some the main concern was that of increasing productivity and competitiveness of the country in order to promote economic growth, others emphasised the necessity of protecting the conditions of workers and their employment stability. Similar conflicts between different understandings of what is of value to people and questions about how these can be settled are ubiquitous in development practice. How can we, as a society, assess whether a social, political, or economic reform such as the Mexican labour reform is actually conducive to successful and desirable development? For too long these ethical decisions have been based on a narrow understanding of development in which social progress and human wellbeing are associated to the amount of material prosperity a nation produces. From this perspective, the objective of development policies is to enhance economic growth. Meanwhile the relevance of any other social or environmental concerns is seen only as instrumentally important for the end of expanding the economy. As a result, the study and practice of development risks being reduced to a ‘technical examination of how to mobilize resources and people most efficiently and fashion the institutional arrangements best suited to growth’ (Goulet 1997, 1160). The approval of the labour reforms in Mexico in 2012 shows that this framework continues to be dominant in policy-making in countries such as Mexico. In recent decades, however, the understanding of development as economic growth and its ability to respond to the challenges that societies face today has been questioned, for material expansion does not necessarily translate in increased wellbeing of its members. In fact, this narrow view of development can make things worse by justifying unnecessary and undesirable social inequalities, as well as human and environmental harm. Ultimately, the current runaway climate and global inequalities ask us to reflect about what development ought to be so that it could be considered ‘worthwhile’ as opposed to ‘undesirable’ (see Penz et al 2011). 2 It is precisely in this context of ethical reflection about the ends and means of development that “the capability approach” provides the most compelling evaluative framework to promote ‘worthwhile development’ to date. 2. The capability approach Nobel Prize economist Amartya Sen introduced what is now known as ‘the capability approach’ in the late 1970s (e.g. see Sen 1980, 1985, 1988). It has been expanded by him (e.g. see Sen 1990, 1992, 1993, 1999a, 1999c, 2009), by philosopher Martha Nussbaum (e.g. see Nussbaum and Sen 1993, Nussbaum 2000, 2006, 2011a), and by a variety of scholars (for overviews of the capability approach see, for example, Alkire 2005; Deneulin 2009, 2014a, 2014b; Crocker 1992, 2006, 2008; Qizilbash 1996; Robeyns 2005a, 2006, 2011, 2016). As it will be clear below, the capability approach has been developed in different ways and for different purposes. In this chapter, we take Sen’s writings as basis and highlight some different interpretations among its key authors. The capability approach makes two fundamental normative assertions. First, the human being and his or her quality of life ought to be at the centre of any assessment of society or social life. A second assertion is that people’s quality of life is better appraised by focusing on their capabilities, and not on the incomes or resources they possess. In other words, the capability approach can be seen as a broad normative proposition that development, wellbeing, and justice concerns, such as poverty and inequality, must be assessed in relation to people’s capabilities (Sen 1980, 1992, 1999a, 1999c, 2009). Indeed, the initial motivation behind the capability approach was that of providing a better space for appraising wellbeing in comparison to alternative spaces such as the commodities/resources or utility/happiness spaces (Sen 2017), as we will examine further below. The statement that the focus of assessment of society and social life ought to be on people’s capabilities means that what really matters is paying attention to the kind of life that people are able to live, what they are able or not able to do and be given their incomes, resources and the social arrangements in which their life unfolds. From this perspective, the ultimate objective of moral concern is the real freedom a person enjoys to achieve valuable doings and beings such as being well fed, being educated, or enjoying social relationships of quality, participating in social life, living in a secure and nonpolluted environment, and so on. The notion of capability then is composed of two distinct but complementary aspects: the actual beings and doings that a person may value, and the freedom to choose between these. While the actual achievement of the various doings and beings a person may value are called ‘functionings’ (e.g. being well fed), the actual freedom to achieve them would be the corresponding capability (e.g. being able to be well fed) (see Sen 1999a, 75). In short, capability is the ‘actual freedom of choice a person has over alternative lives [i.e. functionings] that he or she can lead’ (Sen 1990, 114). Even though both the actual achievement of doing and beings (i.e. functionings) as well as the actual freedom to achieve them (i.e. capabilities) are constituents of living well (Sen 1985), the capability approach maintains that it is fundamentally the notion of capability which provides a more appropriate space for judging people’s quality of life than income, commodities or the utility space, although both capabilities and functionings belong to the same evaluative space, and different contexts will give more priority on the latter than the former (Sen 1980, 1985, 1992, 2017). The critique of the capability approach to evaluations in the utility space, is that they evaluate social life on the basis of people’s mental states such as happiness or life satisfaction as assessments of quality of life, which may not be sensitive enough to other non-mental deprivations and can be easily distorted. 3 For instance, people who live in situations of extreme deprivation may adapt to their circumstances and be content with the little they have (Nussbaum 2000, Sen 1992, 1993, 1999a). This phenomenon of adaptation is known in the literature as ‘adaptive preferences’ (see, among others, Clark 2012, Khader 2011). Meanwhile other people might be well-off but feel dissatisfied if they do not get expensive luxuries they would love to own, yet this does not necessarily mean they are worse off than those who have adapted to their circumstances but are not able to be well nourished and live in minimal proper conditions. Hence, equality in subjective evaluations can subsist with disparities in other important spaces such as needs (Sen 1992). The capability approach is also a critique of the evaluation of social life based on information related to income or resources. The problem with income or resource measures of wellbeing is that they focus on the means to, and not the freedom to achieve wellbeing itself. Focusing the evaluation of social life in the space of income or resources does not pay attention to people’s different abilities to convert such means into valuable ends. The ability to convert income or resources into actual doings and beings such as spending time with friends at night will vary across people if, for example, a society imposes more restriction to women than to men. Similarly, even if two individuals possess the same amount of resources their freedom to move from one place to another may vary due to a personal disability. The capability approach then, would insist that both information about subjective evaluations and resources fail to acknowledge and account for people’s diversity (i.e. that people is different in diverse ways). On the one hand, subjective evaluations fail to recognise that people value various things and for distinct reasons besides happiness, on the other, a focus on resources fails to recognise that ‘equality in holdings of primary goods or resources can go hand in hand with serious inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons’ (Sen 1990, 115). For this reason, the capability approach affirms that focusing on what people are actually able to do and be offers a better metric to development and justice. This does not mean that a capability-based assessment regards income, resources and other goods as unimportant. Rather, it emphasises that income and resources are only instrumentally important to achieve valuable states of being. As Robeyns (2005, 100) writes: ‘all the means of well-being, like the availability of commodities, social institutions, and so forth, are important, but the capability approach presses the point that they are not the ultimate ends of well-being’. Similarly, the capability approach would not deny the importance of subjective states, but it would argue that being happy is only one of the many things someone may have reason to value being and doing and therefore an exclusive focus on happiness or life satisfaction is inadequate. As Sen notes, the functionings that people can value are plural and may ‘vary from such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health … to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on.’ (Sen 1992, 39, see also Sen 1993, 31, 36-37). In this way, the capability approach makes a clear normative distinction between the ends and the means of social, political, and economic policies. It claims that if development is about enhancing people’ wellbeing then development must be concerned with the expansion of people’s capabilities, i.e. the expansion of ‘the real freedoms that people enjoy’ (Sen 1999a, 3). To return to our example, the concepts of capability and functionings provide us with an alternative conceptual framework to assess the labour reforms in Mexico. From a capability-centred understanding of development, one would judge this labour policy on the basis of the extent to which it serves the end of enabling people to achieve doings and beings that they might have reason to value. Besides considering their income-enhancing features, one could also ask whether the reforms provide greater opportunities to be in a fulfilling and stable job, whether they enhance workers’ skills, their self-respect, whether they allow workers to spend more time with their family and friends, or to live 4 in better housing conditions, etc. From a capability perspective, those things matter because they are intrinsically valuable for living well, regardless of whether they contribute to productivity and economic growth. In fact, even if the Mexican labour reforms were to be actually conducive to higher levels of national income (including workers’ income), there could still be good reasons to contest them because they may further exploitative, unsafe, unstable, and discriminating conditions, which do not facilitate people’s freedom to live well. So far, we have established that the capability metric provides a more adequate space for evaluating society and social life if we are concerned with people’s quality of life, and that this assessment involves a plurality of things that people may value doing and being. Sen, however, does not indicate which capabilities should enter the evaluation as constitutive of living well. Rather, he presents the approach as intentionally open-ended and indeterminate (Sen 1993, 48-49, 1999a, 253-254). He opts for limiting the notion of capability as a space for comparative assessment and advocates for an agencyoriented approach to identify capabilities people ‘have reason to value’ (Sen 1992, 81) through public discussion. The relevant capabilities would vary not only according to the context but also for different ‘practical purpose[s]’ (Sen 2004a, 79). This idea is made more explicit in his Idea of Justice (Sen 2009) where he uses the capability metric for comparative assessments of justice but insists in an agencyview of individuals who engage in public deliberation to select, weight, and make comparative evaluations. In contrast, Nussbaum has developed the approach as a ‘partial theory of justice’ in which she defends a list of ten central capabilities (see Nussbaum 2000, 2003, 2006, 2011a)1. Despite its incompleteness and it being subject to different interpretations, the rather simple, and yet radical, ideas of the capability approach have provided the theoretical tools underlying new alternative measures for assessing progress. We can note here the pioneering role of the Human Development Index to assess development or progress differently, taking people as the real wealth of nations (see the annual Human Development Reports, and the many regional and national human development reports which have developed alternative measures of progress at a regional and national level, see hdr.undp.org). For, when assessing social life what counts as progress or ‘success’ would depend on how it is measured, whether we measure it in terms of economic growth performance or in capability expansion. For example, Drèze and Sen (2013) have illustrated in their study on India that despite high economic growth rates over the last decade, the ability of children to be well nourished has not expanded. The capability approach has also played an important role in developing measures of poverty by emphasising the multidimensionality of capability deprivations that people experience (Alkire et al. 2015). Several national governments are using alternative measures of poverty and have shifted from relying solely on income-related information to information about how well people are doing in several dimensions of quality of life2. India again, as other countries, appears as showing a contrasting performance if poverty is measured in the income space or capability space (see www.ophi.org.uk). While these examples are already salient contributions of the capability approach to development concerns, one should not restrict its relevance solely to the space of capability-evaluation. The capability approach and its key concepts of capabilities, functionings and agency, has made significant contributions to ongoing debates within development ethics regarding equality, participation, agency, sustainability, and human rights, among others. 1 There are other areas in which Nussbaum’s and Sen’s versions of the approach differ. See Crocker (2008, particularly chapters 4, 5, 6) and Robeyns (2011, 2006, 2005) for an overview of the capability approach including similarities and differences in Sen’s and Nussbaum’s writings; See also Nussbaum (2011a), Robeyns (2016), Sen (2004, 2009). 2 See the Multidimensionality Poverty Peer Network, www.mppn.org. 5 3. The capability approach and topical issues in development ethics One of the fundamental positions of development ethics is that positive social change must avoid those forms of development that deepen social inequalities. Here, the capability approach emphasises that those inequalities that matter are those in the space of capability, e.g. inequality in the ability to be healthy, to participate in society or to have one’s voice heard by those who make decisions. Still one could ask which distributive criteria should inform our concern for inequality. Although his ‘Equality of What?’ (Sen 1980) question seems to suggest equality of capabilities as policy goal, his account of comparative justice refutes settling the question dogmatically and favours leaving the answer to the question open-ended (Sen 2009, 2017). He would insist instead on public deliberation to settle this question by weighting equality concerns in relation to other important considerations such as human rights or efficiency (Sen 2009). Nussbaum, in contrast, whose approach remains closer to the demands of a theory of justice, proposes a distributive rule, i.e. that a just social arrangement is one in which everyone is above a certain threshold of her list of central human capabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 2006, 2011a). Another contribution of the capability approach to a central topic of development ethics is with regard to agency and participation (what Sen would call the ‘process aspect’ of freedom, in contrast to the ‘opportunity aspect’ contained in the concept of capabilities). As Crocker (2008) writes: If countries are to progress towards the goal of authentic development, it will be largely because of critical discussion among and collective participation by citizens themselves, especially those worst off (p. 90)…when done well, international development ethics requires global dialogue and democratic deliberation in a variety of venues – from small villages, through development-planning ministries, to the World Bank (p. 95). Importantly, worthwhile development involves more than simply asking for people’s opinions, or engaging people superficially in a project just for ticking the externally imposed participation box. Rather, it requires seeing people as agents of change themselves. Sen defines agency as ‘someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives’ (1999a, 19); or as the person’s freedom ‘to do and achieve…whatever goals or values he or she regards as important’ (Sen 1985, 203). Agency freedom is thus the counterpart of the notion of capability (i.e. wellbeing freedom) and both are constituents of development (Sen 1985). In Development as Freedom, Sen (1999a) stresses that freedom is the ultimate end of development as well as the primary means to achieve it. Therefore, instead of participation loosely defined, it is agency which promotes worthwhile development. In this context, some have defined the concept of empowerment as ‘expansion of agency’ (Alkire 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire 2007; Penz et al 2011). However, some have contested reducing the concept of empowerment to agency alone (see chapter 17, Empowerment, of this Handbook). Others have extended Sen’s notion of agency to propose an ‘agency-oriented’ deliberative version of democracy to ‘freedom-enhancing development’ (Crocker 2008, 2; Crocker and Robeyns 2009; Keleher 2014). It is not only the wellbeing freedoms and agency freedoms of current generations, but also that of future generations that are of concern for development ethics. Worthwhile development must be also sustainable development. Here too, the conceptual framework of the capability approach can make some contributions to this ongoing debate of intergenerational justice. While there is no single definition of sustainability that is accepted by all, the definition proposed by the Brundtland Commission Report Our Common Future has been the most widely used. This report 6 defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987, 8). The capability approach would agree with the general terms of this definition and its implications but it insists that it is capabilities that should be sustained for the present and future generations (Anand and Sen 2000; Sen 2013). According to Sen, this provides a broader understanding of humanity and accounts for the process aspect of freedom by respecting people’s agency (see also Holland 2014 for an analysis of environmental policy from a capability perspective). Sen (2009, 250) writes: Certainly, people do have needs, but they also have values and, in particular, cherish their ability to reason, appraise, choose, participate and act. Seeing people only in terms of their needs may give us a rather meagre view of humanity… Our reason for valuing particular opportunities need not always lie in their contribution to our living standards, or more generally to our own interests. From this freedom-based perspective, ‘sustainable development is essentially about sustainable human development in terms of enhancing [human freedoms] of present and future generations’ (Anand 2014, 126). Also, from a more philosophical position, some scholars have examined the possibility of extending Sen’s capability approach into an intergenerational theory of justice (e.g. Crabtree 2013; Gutwald et al 2014). Similarly, Nussbaum has proposed different ways in which her capabilities approach can incorporate intergenerational justice not only for humans but also for non-human animals (Nussbaum 2000, 2003, 2006). Despite these merits of a capability perspective to sustainable development, however, some advocate for going beyond what it is primarily an anthropocentric understanding of sustainable development (see chapter 22, Rights of nature and the buen vivir movement, of this Handbook). We shall return to this issue in the section 4.4 below. Another important area of concern for development ethics is that of human rights (see chapter 23, Human Rights, of this Handbook). Many of the previously mentioned values that make development a desirable enterprise such as wellbeing, equality, sustainability could be pursued by coercion and violation of human rights such as rights to freedom of culture or religion. This is why worthwhile development sees both development and the promotion of human rights as belonging to the same project (Burchardt and Vizard 2011; Drydyk 2011; Nussbaum 1997, 2011b; Sen 2004, 2005; Vizard et al 2011). This has been ratified by the UN Declaration of the Right to Development (1986) which states that each individual is ‘entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized’ (see chapter 24, Right to Development, of this Handbook). Sen and Nussbaum, as well as other scholars working with the capability approach have been influential voices in human rights debates. Sen (1997, 1999a, 231 – 248), for example, has debunked the belief that “Asian values” (if it is possible to group their cultural diversity within one single group of values) are traditionally less embracing of freedom and civil and political rights than so-called ‘Western’ values (see chapter 35, East Asia, of this Handbook). Sen also refutes the idea that authoritarian regimes that suppress civil and political rights could offer a better route to achieve wellbeing or equality. Human rights have intrinsic value and are irreducible to each other. From a capability perspective, destroying for example the cultural heritage of a group of people to promote employment opportunities is not ‘worthwhile development’, neither is ensuring education and health for all while at the same time undermining freedom of expression or putting political opponents in prison. 4. Critical issues and new directions 7 We have illustrated in the previous section the highly influential character of the capability approach to enrich current debates within development ethics, but differences of interpretations and contestation within the approach remain. Among the unresolved questions are: Which capabilities are relevant for the evaluation of states of affairs, and how is this decision made? How can we measure and operationalise the notion of capabilities? To what extent is the capability approach a theory of justice? What kind of individualism does the capability approach endorse, and is it sufficiently broad? Is the capability approach solely an evaluative framework or is it also action-oriented? 4.1. The capabilities that people have ‘reason to value’ The issue of the ‘list vs. non-list’ has been widely discussed in the literature (e.g. see Crocker 2008; Nussbaum 2000, 2003, Robeyns 2011, 2006, 2005; Sen 2004), therefore we shall concentrate on a related but different issue. One could argue that Sen’s emphasis on agency, empowerment, and public participation is a better fit to the values of development ethics. A ‘totally fixed’ list is problematic since it ‘den[ies] the possibility of fruitful public participation on what should be included and why’. Sen compellingly defends his position against a ‘predetermined canonical list of capabilities’ (Sen 2004, 77-78 both quotes) in favour of treating people as ends in themselves and as agents to choose the capabilities that people have reason to value. In this way, agency freedom via public discussion and wellbeing freedom (i.e. capabilities) go hand by hand in the development process. While agreeing with the latter, there is still the issue of the indeterminacy about how ‘the capabilities that people have reason to choose and value’ should be understood. Alkire (2015, 14), for example, recognises that there is uncertainty about whether it implies ‘(a) things people value; (b) things people have reason to value; or (c) things people both value and have reason to value’. Yet, this question cannot be but crucial to development ethics, especially in real contexts of large social inequalities, power imbalances, discrimination, and marginalisation. To illustrate, let us go back to our initial example of the labour reforms in Mexico. Considering the high levels of social and income inequality (CONEVAL 2013), corruption, discrimination and marginalisation (CONAPRED 2011a, 2011b), along with the fact that only 8.8% of the Mexican labour force are associated to a labour union (Martínez 2013), which is itself co-opted by leading political parties (Obregón 2013), one could question the outcome of ‘public’ deliberation in such conditions. If it turns out that after due ‘public’ reasoning, the Mexican people value more the capability of flexible employment with one of the lowest wages in Latin America as opposed to the capability for decent and stable employment, could one separate such outcome from the unjust situation in which it takes place – a situation characterised by a long history of colonialist mind-set of exploitation and marginalisation that has left poor people with little choice other than being contented and thankful for even having the chance to be employed (see also Sen 2017, 177)? It is in this sense that some capability scholars worry that, with its emphasis on individual capabilities and individual agency, the capability approach may overlook the far reaching impact of social structures and social influences (e.g. marketing towards a consumerist life) on people’s own expression of agency and on the objectives they value (e.g. Deneulin 2011, 2008; Deneulin et al 2006; Evans 2002; Gore 1997; Stewart and Deneulin 2002). It would indeed be problematic if the capabilities that people end up valuing are the result of entrenched unjust social contexts, manipulation, or else. Sen is certainly aware of the pervasiveness of social influences on individuals, as we will discuss in section 4.2, yet he would still insist that it is through ‘more [and inclusive] public engagement’ (Sen 2009, 245) that people’s sequestered reason can be ‘partly or wholly overcome in ways that take us to a less confined view’ (Sen 2009, 170). And indeed, Sen’s forceful and coherent support for democracy and agency as means to overcome injustice and prejudices provides a strong argument (see Alkire 8 2006; Crocker 2008; Drèze and Sen 2013; Sen 1999a, 1999c). It is people themselves who ought to decide via open public discussion which capabilities are relevant in their own contextual realities. This is why Alkire (2015) concludes that the capability approach is neither based on people´s preferences only (option “a” above), nor in preference-independent approaches such as externally imposed lists and weights between the plural capabilities (option “b”), but rather it endorses option “c” above. That is, in line with Sen’s emphasis on the intrinsic, instrumental, and the constructive role in shaping the values of society, ‘the capability approach aims at expanding the intersection of what people value and have reason to value – not just one category or the other’ (Alkire 2015, p. 15; emphasis in original). The problem is that Sen gives little guidance about what would make a public discussion acceptable, how such public discussion can take place in specific social realities, or what kind of actions would improve it. Some scholars have proposed different ways to fill this gap. For instance, Crocker (2006, 2008) has taken Sen’s writings on agency and public participation into a more complete model of deliberative democracy. In addition, others have developed alternative criteria/methods for selecting relevant capabilities (e.g. Alkire 2002, Anderson 1999, Robeyns 2003a, 2005b; see also Robeyns 2006, 2011 for other references). Notwithstanding these theoretical proposals, the challenge for development ethicists to deal with these issues in practice remains. In doing so, it might be worth bearing in mind Sen’s (1999b) sharp thought: ‘[a] country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy’ (p. 3; emphasis in original). 4.2. Ethical individualism A major area of dispute in the capability approach relates to the kind of individualism that the capability approach espouses, ethical individualism. Ethical individualism claims that in the assessment of social life, ‘individuals, and only individuals, are the ultimate units of moral concern’ (Robeyns 2008, 90; emphasis in original – see also Robeyns 2005, 107). From this perspective, all economic, social, and political institutions, as well as formal and informal norms ought to be assessed in relation to their contribution to people´s freedom to live well. It is important to remark, nonetheless, that ‘a commitment to ethical individualism is not incompatible with an account of personhood that recognises the connections between people, their social relations and their social embedment’ (Robeyns 2008, 91; 2005, 108). According to Robeyns, Sen’s capability approach advances this ethical position. This is why Sen is able to recognise the influence of social phenomena in people’s ‘thinking, choosing, and doing’ (Sen 2009, 245); that ‘individual freedom is quintessentially a social product’ (Sen 1999a, 31, xi-xii, 297); and that the notion of capability ‘provides a perspective in which institutional assessment can [and should] systematically occur’ (Sen 1999a, 142; see also Robeyns 2005), and yet insist that the role of these social aspects ‘can be sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to [people’s] freedom’ (Sen 1999a, 142). Some scholars find Sen’s ethical individualism troublesome. At risk of simplification, they advance two main points: (1) that the nature and existence of social structures and collectivities lie beyond – even if bounded by - individual’s actions and properties; and (2) that the sum of these social relations embodied in cultural and political practices are necessary to fully understand and promote people’s functionings and capabilities (e.g. see Alkire 2008; Deneulin 2014b, 2008, 2006; Deneulin and McGregor 2010; Gore 1997; Hill 2003; Robeyns 2005, 2008; Sen 2002; Stewart 2013). For example, a society in which corruption is institutionalised at all levels may force an honest person to be corrupt even if she detests corruption and values an honest life herself. Yet, this is imposed on her by a corrupt structure that she can neither change nor escape it (see Deneulin et al 2006, 6-7). Consequently, they argue for including institutions and groups, or what is sometimes referred to as collective capabilities 9 (Evans, 2002; Ibrahim 2006; Stewart 2005) or social competences (Stewart 2013), as an intrinsic aspect of the evaluation of states of affairs along with individual freedoms. There are at least two explanations for Sen’s reluctance to embrace these critiques of ethical individualism. First, ethical individualism avoids overlooking inequalities between individuals within a group, collectivity, or community (Alkire 2008). For instance, Robeyns (2008) argues that ethical individualism serves better feminist concerns within the family in so far as it focuses on the wellbeing of each member and not on the family as collective unit, which may hide the oppression to some of its members – usually women. Second, to the extent that including collective units in the moral assessment of state affairs may involve demarcating between good and bad structures, this position might be at odds with agency freedom in the sense of seeing people ‘as being actively involved in shaping their own destiny’ (Sen 1999a, 53). Implicit in Sen’s writings is the idea that there is no reason to discard in advance the possibility of very different social arrangements providing the conditions that enable people to live well in terms of the capabilities ‘people have reason to value’, which may as well vary from context to context. For this reason Alkire (2008, 40), along with Sen and Robeyns, concludes ‘that ultimately the capability approach must focus on individual’ capabilities for evaluative purposes. However, this position can only be presented as a partial resolution given the different interpretations of the approach. Of particular relevance here is the valuation of nature, and whether non-human life has value only if it furthers individual capabilities, a point which shall be discussed further below 4.3. Evaluative and action-oriented framework To be of relevance for people’s actual lives, a capability-based understanding of development needs to be translated into concrete policies or actions to expand people’s capabilities. In this respect, Alkire (2008) suggests that another (perhaps more fruitful) way to understand the previous arguments against Sen’s ethical individualism is in terms of the kind of guidance that the capability approach is likely to provide for policy. She argues that the focus is therefore on the ‘prospective application of the capability approach’ which, in contrast to the ‘evaluative’ role, is concerned with advancing capabilities and the ‘policies, activities, and recommendations…most likely to’ promote this goal (Alkire 2008, 30; emphasis in original). Again, this position is contested. Critics of ethical individualism argue that one cannot separate the evaluative from the prospective role, for the purpose of evaluation is ultimately to feed policy recommendations. Hence, they argue that it is precisely due to the exclusive focus on individual freedoms that the capability approach might fail to examine adequately, and thus bring into question, the social structures which are partly responsible for the kind of lives that people are able to lead. Let us illustrate with an example of the reality that many indigenous people experience in Latin America. In Mexico, indigenous people have fewer opportunities for education, health, good quality jobs, and for participation in public, and their physical appearance, the way they dress and talk is a constant target for shame and humiliation (e.g. CONAPRED 2011a, 2011b; see PNUD 2010). While the capability approach as an evaluative framework might be apt to account for all of these forms of unfreedoms (Pereira 2013, Robeyns 2003b), the problem would be the way in which these situations are conceptualised solely in terms of individual deprivations. This interpretation runs the risk of disregarding the underlying social structures and social mechanisms that generate (ex-ante) such unjust outcomes in the first place, thus leaving them outside of the political action needed to redress such situation. This concern is echoed by others who analyse the capability approach from a critical perspective and who emphasise the importance of a relational approach to international development (e.g. Hickey 2014, Koggel 2013; see also Robeyns 2003b). 10 Robeyns (2005, 2008) argues that the capability approach does allow for the systematic analysis of structural and social phenomena since these are factors that partly determine what someone can do and be. Therefore, capability expansion will most likely involve structural, social, and institutional amendments according to the issue at hand (Drèze and Sen 2002, 2013; Robeyns 2005). It remains, nonetheless, an open challenge to deal with, and find ways to orient policy in such a way that the translation of the capability approach into practice does not brush away structural features. One solution may be the one proposed by Alkire (2008) which requires being explicit about the distinct uses of the capability approach, and the need to complement it with other social or explanatory theories for the sake of prospective analysis (Robeyns 2005). Alternatively, one of the authors of this chapter wonders whether replacing the word ‘individualism’ - which may cause some confusion and objection - for ‘personalism’ could be a strategic solution to this debate. Using ‘ethical personalism’ might better capture the interplay between the uniqueness of human beings who are part of social relations and groups that make up that unicity. This position, however, would have to show that it can accommodate both collective and individual information as units of moral concerns without the risk of hiding the heterogeneities of individuals within such relationships and/or the oppression of individual members. 4.4 Beyond an anthropocentric perspective? The environmental situation of the world and the value that different models of development attach to nature also pose a challenge to the ethical individualism of the capability approach. The depletion of nature through extractive industries in Latin America, climate change, ocean acidification, floods, and other environmental concerns, are already having disastrous impacts on people’s lives (especially the poor), other species and whole ecosystems (see chapter 20, Environmental sustainability, of this Handbook). It is not surprising therefore that there is an urgent call for an alternative development model to the one that leads to these undesirable expressions of ‘development’ (see chapter 22, Rights of nature and the buen vivir movement, of this Handbook). In this respect, as noted previously, the capability approach can enrich our understanding of sustainable development by emphasising that it is the ‘generalized capacity to create wellbeing’, which present generations are ‘obligated to leave behind’ (Anand and Sen 2000, 2035). While several scholars recognise the relevance of the contribution of the capability approach within the sustainability debate (e.g. see Anand, 2014; Bockstael and Watene 2016; Ballet et al 2013; Holland 2008a; Scholtes 2010), others question whether it is indeed sufficient to deal with the broader environmental concerns (e.g. see Bockstael and Watene 2016, Merino 2016; Watene 2016). The main issue at stake is that the capability approach tends to value the natural world in so far as it contributes to people’s freedom (e.g. Anand and Sen 2000, Holland 2014, 2008a, 2008b; Sen 2013), or if it threatens human security (Gasper 2013). From this perspective, nature does not have any intrinsic worth, rather its value its contingent to people’s wellbeing and agency (in Sen’s version of the approach) or to the dignity of humans and non-humans animals (in Nussbaum’s version of the approach) (see Watene 2016). The problem, critics argue, is that this position leaves nature vulnerable since it is conceptualised in terms of resources that can be exploited, appropriated and substituted (Anand and Sen 2000, 2035). This position and valuation of nature contrast with many indigenous perspectives that see nature and people as interdependent, and thus conceptualise development as living well together in harmony with one another and in harmony with the natural world (Merino 2016; Watene 2016). As such, Watene (2016) concludes that the ethical individualism of the approach may exclude certain worldviews such as the Māori. 11 Sen has been quite explicit about his anthropocentric view of nature. However, he has also been equally emphatic in defending the relevance of agency and public reasoning for dealing with such problem (see Scholtes 2010 and the references cited there). It is not so much that humanity is trying to sustain the natural world, but rather that humanity is trying to sustain itself. It is us that will have to ‘go’ unless we can put the world around us in reasonable order. The precariousness of nature is our peril, our fragility. There is, however, also another side of this relationship. The quandary of unsustainability may be our predicament, but the task of solving it is ours as well. The nature of the problem, its fuller appreciation and the ways and means of solving it all belong to us - humanity as a whole (Sen 2013, 6-7; emphasis in original). Indeed, Sen’s notion of agency aims to capture the fact that we can value and pursue ends which are not necessarily connected to our wellbeing. Hence, Sen’s position is less restrictive as it first appears. His emphasis on agency leaves open the possibility for accommodating different perspectives on, and different ways to deal with, nature. One could, for example, ‘judge that we ought to do what we can to ensure the preservation of some threatened animal species, say, spotted owls’ even if our wellbeing might be completely ‘unaffected by the presence or absence of spotted owls’ (Sen 2004b, 10-11). The point is - Sen would say - that whether we need to attach intrinsic or instrumental value to nature is a matter of public debate, for there are contrasting views about the place of nature between individuals even within the buen vivir movement (Merino 2016) let alone across different societies. Moreover, there are other scholars who find in the capability approach a better framework to deal with the environment from the perspective of justice (e.g. Holland 2014, 2008a, 2008b), especially when one goes beyond ‘the relationship between [Wo]Man and Nature’ to also include ‘the relationships between human beings mediated by nature’ (Ballet et al, 2013, 31). There is no doubt, however, that there is a lot of scope for future research and (as Watene suggests) intercultural dialogue in order to develop better ways to deal with what is one of the most significant challenges to date, not only to development ethics, but to the future of humankind. Hence, as Sen would suggest, more public discussion should be directed to this fundamental subject, as no human life is possible without a well-functioning environment for it to function. 5. Conclusion This chapter has argued that the capability approach, by putting human lives and their quality of life as the ultimate end of development processes, provides a promising conceptual framework to displace the mind-set that reduces development to economic growth. It has used Mexican labour reforms law to illustrate its arguments. However, there are some important questions left hanging and which will have to find some resolution for the capability approach to make a difference for the way policy decisions are taken and the kind of decisions that are made. Of particular concern is whether the capability approach is helpful in resisting the reproduction of unjust structures when people can no longer identify the injustice or when the injustice has been so normalised that is seen as ‘just’ or part of what a ‘good’ society is about, and fit to stop the reproduction of a development model based on the instrumental use of nature to human ends alone. A central feature of the capability approach is the centrality of reasoning processes, and perhaps this is its major contribution to development ethics, beyond offering an evaluative framework to judge societies from the perspective of what people are able to do and be. Sen (2009, 451) sees the ‘ability to reason’ as a fundamental human feature, and we would add that this ability is also linked to the ability to give sense and meaning to the kind of person one is and to what one does. A conceptual framework based on questioning and reasoning about the meanings and ultimate ends of one’s actions 12 cannot but be an antidote to the ever expanding instrumental reason and the alienation of human life from its purpose of living an examined life and living it well. References Alkire S. (2002) Valuing freedoms: Sen’s capability approach and poverty reduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford Alkire S. (2005) “Why the capability approach?” Journal of Human Development, 6(1), 115-135 Alkire S. (2006) “Structural injustice and democratic practice” In Deneulin S., Nebel M. and Sagovsky N. eds, Transforming unjust structures, Springer, Dordrecht. Alkire S. (2008) “Using the capability approach: prospective and evaluative analyses” in Comim F izilbash M and Alkire S eds, The capability approach: Concepts, measures and applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Alkire S. (2015) “The capability approach and well-being measurement for public policy”, OPHI Working Paper No. 94. Alkire S., Foster J., Seth S., Santos M.E., Roche J.M., and Ballon P (2015) Multidimensional poverty measurement and analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford Anand P.B. (2014) “Sustainability and the capability approach: From theory to practice?” in Tiwari M. and Ibrahim S eds, The capability approach: from theory to practice, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke Anand S. and Sen A. (2000) “Human development and economic sustainability”, World Development, 28(12), 2029–2049. Anderson E. S. (1999) “What is the point of equality?” Ethics 109(2), 287–337. http://doi.org/10.1086/233897 Ballet J., Koffi J. and Pelenc J. (2013) “Environment, justice and the capability approach”, Ecological Economics, 8528-34. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.10.010 Bensusán G. (2013) “Reforma laboral, desarrollo incluyente e igualdad en México”, Serie estudios y perspectivas CEPAL, 143, 67. Bockstael E. and Watene K. (2016) “Indigenous peoples and the capability approach” Oxford Development Studies, 44(3), 265-270. Borda, P. (2012) “Boletín de prensa: Reforma Laboral”. Retrieved 31 August 2016, from http://amedirh.com.mx/publicaciones/noticias/item/boletin-de-prensa Burchardt T. and Vizard P. (2011) “‘Operationalizing’ the capability approach as a basis for equality and human rights monitoring in twenty-first-century Britain”, Journal of Human Development and capabilities, 12(1), 91-119. Clark D. ed. (2012) Adaptation, poverty and development, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke CONAPRED (2011a) National survey on discrimination in Mexico. México: Conapred. CONAPRED (2011b) Documento informativo sobre Discriminación Racial en México. México: Conapred. CONEVAL (2013) Resultados de la medición de pobreza 2012. México: CONEVAL. 13 Crabtree A. (2013) “Sustainable development: Does the capability approach have anything to offer?” Journal of Human Development and capabilities, 14(1), 40-57. Crocker D. (1991) “Toward development ethics”, World Development, 19(5), 457–483. Crocker D. (1992) “Functioning and capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development ethic”, Political Theory, 20(4), 584-612 Crocker D. (2006) “Sen and deliberative democracy”, in Kaufman A ed, Capabilities equality: Basic Issues and Problems, Routledge, New York. Crocker D. (2008) Ethics of global development : Agency, capability, and deliberative democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Crocker D. and Robeyns I. (2009) “Capability and agency” in: Morris C. ed., Amartya Sen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Cruz J. C. (2012) “Reforma laboral haría de México ‘un país atractivo’: Standard & Poor’s Proceso. Retrieved 22 August 2016, from http://www.proceso.com.mx/320937/reforma-laboral-hariade-mexico-un-pais-atractivo-standard-poors Deneulin S. (2006) “Necessary thickening’: Ricoeur’s ethic of justice as a complement to Sen’s capability approach”, in Deneulin S., Nebel, M. and Sagovsky N. eds., Transforming unjust structures, Springer, Dordrecht. Deneulin S. (2008) “Beyond individual freedom and agency: Structures of living together”, in Comim F., Qizilbash M. and Alkire S. eds. The capability approach: Concepts, measures and applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Deneulin, S. (2011) “Development and the limits of Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice” Third World Quarterly, 32(4), 787–797. http://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.567008 Deneulin S. (2014a) Wellbeing, justice and development ethics, Routledge, London Deneulin S. (2014b) “Constructing new policy narratives: The capability approach as normative language”, in Cornia, G. A. and Stewart F. eds, Towards human development, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Retrieved from http://opus.bath.ac.uk/31885/ Deneulin S. and McGregor, J. A. (2010) “The capability approach and the politics of a social conception of wellbeing”, European Journal of Social Theory, 13(4), 501–520. http://doi.org/10.1177/1368431010382762 Deneulin S., Nebel M. and Sagovsky N. eds (2006) Transforming unjust structures: The capability approach. Dordrecht: Springer. Deneulin S. ed. (2009) An introduction to the human development and capability approach, Earthscan/IDRC, London Drèze J. and Sen A. (2002) “Democratic practice and social inequality in India”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 37(2), 6–37. Drèze J. and Sen A. (2013), An uncertain glory: India and its contradictions, Allen Lane, London Drydyk J. (2011) “Responsible pluralism, capabilities, and human rights”, Journal of Human Development, 12(1), 39-61. Drydyk J. (2016) “Ethical issues in development”, in Grugel J. and Hammett, D. eds., The Plagrave Handbook of International Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 14 Evans P. (2002) “Collective capabilities, culture and Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom”, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37 (2), 54-60. Gasper D. (2013) “Climate change and the language of human security”, Ethics, Policy, and Environment, 16(1), 56-78. Gore C. (1997) “Irreducibly social goods and the informational basis of Amartya Sen’s capability approach” Journal of International Development, 9(2), 235–250. Goulet D. (1980) “Development experts: The one-eyed giants”, World Development, 8, 481-489. Goulet D. (1997) “Development ethics: A new discipline”, International Journal of Social Economics, 24(11), 1160–1171. Gutwald R., Leßmann O., Masson T. and Rauschmayer F. (2014) “A capability approach to intergenerational justice?”, Journal of Human Development and capabilities, 15(4), 355-368. Hernández M. (2012) “¿Reforma laboral?”, El Economista. Retrieved 22 August 2016, from http://eleconomista.com.mx/finanzas-publicas/2012/09/30/reforma-laboral Hickey S. (2014) “Relocating social protection within a radical project of social justice”, European Journal of Development Research, 26(3), 322–337. http://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2014.9 Hill M. (2003) “Development as empowerment”, Feminist Economics, 9(2-3), 117–135. http://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077962 Holland B. (2008a) “Ecology and the limits of justice”, Journal of Human Development, 9(3), 401425. Holland B. (2008b) “Justice and the environment in Nussbaum's "Capabilities Approach", Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 319-332. Holland B. (2014) Allocating the earth, Oxford University Press, Oxford Ibrahim S. (2006) “From individual to collective capabilities”, Journal of Human Development, 7(3), 397-416. Ibrahim S. and Alkire S. (2007) “Agency and empowerment”, Oxford Development Studies 35(4): 379-403. Keleher L. (2014) “Sen and Nussbaum: Agency and capability-expansion”, Ethics and Economics 1(2): 54-70. Khader S. (2011) Adaptive preferences and women’s empowerment, Oxford University Press, Oxford Koggel C. (2013) “Is the capability approach a sufficient challenge to distributive accounts of global justice?”, Journal of Global Ethics, 9(2), 145–157. http://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2013.818458 Martínez M. (2013) “La tasa de sindicalización va a la baja en México”, Economista. Retrieved from http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2013/10/28/tasa-sindicalizacion-va-baja-mexico Merino R. (2016) “An alternative to ‘alternative development’?: Buen vivir and human development in Andean countries”, Oxford Development Studies, 44(3), 271-286. Nussbaum M. (1997) “Capabilities and human rights”, Fordham Law Review, 66(2), 273–300. Nussbaum M. (2000) Women and human development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Nussbaum M. (2003) “Capabilities as fundamental entitlements”, Feminist Economics, 9(2-3), 33–59. http://doi.org/10.1080/1354570022000077926 15 Nussbaum M. (2006) Frontiers of justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Nussbaum M. (2011a) Creating capabilities: The human development approach, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass Nussbaum M. (2011b) “Capabilities, entitlements, rights”, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12(1), 23-37. Nussbaum M. and Sen A. eds (1993) The quality of life, Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford Obregón C. (2013) México: Un país desarrollado, México: Pensamiento Universitario Iberoamericano Penz P., Drydyk J. and Bose P. (2011) Displacement by development: Ethics, rights and responsibilities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pereira G. (2013) Elements of a critical theory of justice, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke PNUD (2010) Informe sobre desarrollo humano de los pueblos indígenas en México, Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, México Qizilbash M. (1996) “Ethical development”, World http://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(96)00030-7 Development, 24(7), 1209–1221. Robeyns I. (2003a) “Sen’s capability approach and gender inequality”, Feminist Economics, 9(2/3), 61–93. Robeyns I. (2003b) “Is Nancy Fraser’s critique of theories of distributive justice justified?”, Constellations, 10(4), 538–554. http://doi.org/10.1046/j.1351-0487.2003.00352.x Robeyns I. (2005a) “The capability approach: A theoretical survey”, Journal of Human Development, 6(1), 93–117. http://doi.org/10.1080/146498805200034266 Robeyns I. (2005b) “Selecting capabilities for quality of life measurement”, Social Indicators Research, 74(1), 191-215. Robeyns I. (2006) “The capability approach in practice” Journal of Political Philosophy, 14(3), 351– 376. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00263.x Robeyns I. (2008) “Sen’s capability approach and feminist concerns”, in Comim, F., Qizilbash M. and Alkire S. eds, The capability approach: Concepts, measures and applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Robeyns I. (2011) “The capability approach”, in Zalta E. N. ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach/ Robeyns I. (2016) “Capabilitarianism”, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 17(3), 397– 414. http://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2016.1145631 Scholtes F. (2010) “Whose sustainability? Environmental domination and Sen's capability approach”, Oxford Development Studies, 38(3), 289-307. doi:10.1080/13600818.2010.505683 Sen A. (1980) “Equality of what?”, The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, I, 197–220. Sen A. (1985) “Well-Being, agency and freedom”, The Journal of Philosophy, 82(4), 169–221. http://doi.org/10.2307/2026184 Sen A. (1988) “The concept of development”, Handbook of Development Economics, 1, 9–26. http://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4471(88)01004-6 Sen A. (1990) “Justice: Means versus freedoms”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(2), 111–121. 16 Sen A. (1992) Inequality re-examined, Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford Sen A. (1993) “Capability and well-being”, in Nussbaum M. and Sen A. eds., The quality of life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 30–53. Sen A. (1997) “Human rights and Asian values”, The New Republic, 217(2-3), 33-40 Sen A. (1999a) Development as freedom, Anchor Books, New York Sen A. (1999b) “Democracy as a universal value”, Journal of Democracy, 10(3), 3–17. Sen A. (1999c) Commodities and capabilities, Oxford University Press, Oxford Sen A. (2002) “Response to commentaries”, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37(2), 78–86. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686264 Sen A. (2004a) “Capabilities, lists, and public reason”. Feminist Economics, 10(3), 77–80. http://doi.org/10.1080/1354570042000315163 Sen A. (2004b.) “Why we should preserve the spotted owl?” London Review of Books, 5 February, 26 (3),10–11. Sen A. (2005) “Human rights and capabilities”, Journal of Human Development, 6(2), 151-166. Sen A. (2009) The idea of justice, Allen Lane, London Sen A. (2013) “The ends and means of sustainability”, Journal of Human Development, 14(1), 6-20. Sen A. (2017) Collective choice and social welfare, Allen Lane, London Stewart F. (2005) “Groups and capabilities”, Journal of Human Development, 6(2), 185-204. Stewart F. (2013). Capabilities and human development: Beyond the individual (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2344469). Rochester, NY: UNDP. Stewart F. and Deneulin S. (2002) “Amartya Sen's contribution to development thinking”, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37(2), 61–70. Vizard P., Fakuda-Parr S. and Elson D. (2011) “Introduction: The capability approach and human rights”, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12(1), 1-22. Watene K. (2016) “Valuing nature: Māori philosophy and the capability approach”, Oxford Development Studies, 44(3), 287-296. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987), Our Common Future, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf 17