Civilizationism and the political debate on globalization

CHAPTER 5 CIVILIZATIONISM AND THE POLITICAL DEBATE ON GLOBALIZATION Raffaele Marchetti T he focus of the debate on globalization is the inadequacy of the current institutional framework and its normative bases for a full development of the political sphere at the global level. Traditional political canons anchored in the nation-state and its domestic jurisdiction are increasingly perceived as insufficient, or indeed, self-defeating, in a world where socioeconomical interaction is, to a significant degree, interdependent and multilayered. Acknowledging the limits of this political tension, alternative projects of global politics have been developed in recent decades. What they have in common is their attempt to go beyond the centrality of the sovereign state toward new forms of political participation that allow new subjects to “get into transnational politics” from which they have been excluded. These new would-be- or quasi-global political actors are part of the broad category of non-state actors, which includes international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), networks and campaigns of civil society organizations and faith-based groups, transnational social movements (TSMs), transnational criminal networks, transnational political parties, regional public institutions,1 international private bodies, and individuals. Despite minor institutional experiments, most of these actors share the characteristics of effectively being excluded from international decision-making mechanisms, and yet being more and more active on the global stage.2 International exclusion constitutes the critical target of most of the alternative projects of global politics that occupy the centre of the public debate on globalization. Petito_Ch05.indd 93 2/6/2009 7:25:47 PM Raffaele Marchetti 94 Among the principal competing visions of global politics that are currently advanced in the public discourse about globalization, this chapter specifically investigates that of civilizationism as an alternative model of transnational political inclusion.3 The first part of the chapter develops an analysis of ideal models as cultural resources that grounds the different readings of human bonds. The second part applies the notion of ideal models to the new scenario of globalization. Section three identifies and briefly sketches four alternative interpretations of the notion of global politics, namely, Neoliberalism, Cosmopolitanism, Alter-globalism, and Dialogue among Civilizations. The forth part focuses on the model of civilizationism and draws the principal characteristics of this notion in comparative terms, with the competing models of global politics. Ideal Models as Cultural Resources Underpinning the debate on the global political deficit are a number of ideological readings of globalization that can be considered as archetypes or ideal models of global politics. These ideal models can be considered as “meta-tanks” or cultural resources from which political actors draw their ideas and principles in order to formulate their political reference.4 In being normatively substantiated, they form part of the shared understandings that shape actors’ identity and interests:5 Ideal-types are heuristic devices, which order a field of enquiry and identify the primary areas of consensus as well as contention. They assist in clarifying the primary lines of argument and, thus, in establishing the fundamental points of disagreement. They provide an accessible way into the mêlée of voices—rooted in the globalization literature but by definition corresponding to no single work [or] author.6 To better illustrate the notion of an ideal model, a parallel can be drawn between ideal political models and ideologies.7 While both constitute fairly pervasive, integrated, and long-standing sets of beliefs and values, ideologies have a more wide-ranging scope, in contrast to the politically limited scope of ideal models, as intended here. Ideologies can be conceptualized as interpretations of modernity in its entirety. More modestly, ideal models concentrate on normative politics, on its principled and institutional dimensions. Petito_Ch05.indd 94 2/6/2009 7:25:47 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate 95 Political actors actively deploy ideal political models and ideologies to construct their contentious political references in what has been named the interactive “politics of signification” or “collective action framing.” Three elements can be distinguished in this process of political referencing: ideal models (composed by the condenzation and coherentization of different elements of the frames), frames (cognitive social processes producing a determined reading of political reality), and political projects (specific programmes for changing or preserving the political reality as interpreted according to the frame).8 What distinguishes ideal models from political projects is their detachment from any specific political actor or action (content-orientation rather than action-orientation).9 In opposition to the hybrid characteristics of political projects, an ideal model remains “uncontaminated,” more static, and clearly distinguishable from other ideal models. Nonetheless, “intellectuals in a vacuum” do not create ideal models in the abstract. They are actually influenced in turn by social reflection, thereby including frames and political projects. Equally, while being rooted in ideologies and ideal models, frames are neither determined nor isomorphic with any single ideal model, and they are in continuous reciprocal relation with the social construction of politics. In the final analysis, however, the single actor creates its own political project by selecting and accentuating elements belonging to distinct ideal models and frames. The formulation of the concrete political projects advanced by political actors passes through a complex process in which longstanding ideologies and ideal political models, midterm political visions and circumstances, and contingent factors are combined and filtered through master frames and specific group frames, and rendered politically active. Accordingly, it must be noted that an actor can hold more than one model for different reasons. A political actor, for instance, is often a collective body (either an institution or a forum), and so it is intrinsically plural and changes with time. Seen from a highly normative point of view, the “pick and choose” underpinning the construction of a political project by social actors produces a result that remains difficult to foresee and sometimes inconsistent. Yet, once a project is defined and adopted by political actors, it has a great impact in shaping the global public discourse by motivating actors toward political mobilization. The academic discourse on ideal models of global politics is still underdeveloped. Few attempts have been made to map ideological background visions of global politics, and they either lack a number Petito_Ch05.indd 95 2/6/2009 7:25:47 PM Raffaele Marchetti 96 of important components or remain too shallow to grasp the most significant characteristics of each specific model. Moreover, the task of mapping a global political vision is also deficient to the extent that it fails to interconnect with political actors, interests, and actions. The links among ideas, actors, and actions are still fuzzy at the global level, requiring further investigation. In order to succeed, this kind of research needs to be interdisciplinary, for it requires the combination of a number of fields that are seldom integrated, including international political theory, international relations (especially the debate on norms), transnational political sociology, globalization studies, and international political economy. In this chapter we will primarily concentrate on the model of global politics of civilizationism rather than on actors and actions. A relationship will be identified between this specific model and a set of actors and actions. However, as mentioned earlier, any actor shapes its own political project by choosing different components from various models, and this choice varies over time, therefore the kind of association between models and actors later suggested can only be considered contingent. Global Politics and Its Ideal Models Patterns of globalization have accentuated the diminishing exclusivity of states as actors in international affairs.10 Following an almost conventional definition, interpreting global transformations as a, process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity.11 Globalization links distant communities and de-territorializes power relations, whilst simultaneously extending their reach beyond traditional domestic borders. While diminishing the exclusivity of states as international actors, this globalizing process has opened up spaces for new social actors.12 Among non-state actors, three categories can be identified: (a) public-interest-oriented nongovernmental actors; (b) profit-oriented corporate actors; and, (c) public intergovernmental organizations. Nowadays, these non-state actors play a significant role in international affairs by providing expertise and information (e.g., technical help provided by NGOs in development Petito_Ch05.indd 96 2/6/2009 7:25:47 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate 97 programmes), and also because they influence political discourse, agenda setting, and lawmaking (e.g., lobbying activities of advocacy or TNCs networks), as well as due to the part they play in the implementation of decisions (e.g., service provider organizations in humanitarian actions).13 Yet, non-state actors are for the most part still formally excluded from institutional power. A typical phenomenon of any democratization process at the international level is precisely the sense of instability generated by the emergence of un-institutionalized actors and new legitimacy claims (previously unheard) in the public domain. These actors try to upgrade their missing political and institutional power in order to align it to their existing social and economic power. Those excluded actors claim inclusion into the political system by deploying different strategies, from mild lobbying to harsh protest. Within this context of new political agency, an unprecedented global public domain gets consolidated, in which old, state-centered visions of international affairs mix with new non-state-centered visions of global politics, producing a complex map of ideological positions. This has been possible through the partial replacement of the Westphalian international system, in which authority and legitimacy was circumscribed, to reciprocally exclude territorial jurisdictions interacting exclusively at the intergovernmental level.14 The new global public domain remains a central place where underestimated dimensions and innovative applications of global legitimacy are developed and advanced in contrast to mainstream interpretations. This does not necessarily entail reformist or, indeed, revolutionary reading of legitimate global politics that influence concrete political action, but the mere chance of starting a dynamic of norms change in international politics makes this global public arena and its ideal content extremely important for current global politics.15 It is at this global public discourse and its components that we need to look in order to understand the future, long-term transformation of global politics. In this under-explored arena of discussion and contestation over the legitimate global social purposes, a number of distinct political positions can be identified. Few scholars have attempted such a classification. These attempts encompass broadly both antiglobalization and pro-globalization positions. Patrick Bond identifies five principal positions: global justice movements, third world nationalism, post-Washington consensus, Washington consensus, and resurgent rightwing.16 However, David Held and Anthony McGrew acknowledge six positions: radicalism, statism/protectionism, global Petito_Ch05.indd 97 2/6/2009 7:25:47 PM 98 Raffaele Marchetti transformation, institutional reformer, liberal internationalism, and neoliberalism.17 Mario Pianta and Federico Silva distinguish three projects: neoliberal globalization, globalization of rights and responsibilities, and globalization from below.18 Chrisophe Aguiton discerns three groups: radical internationalist (beyond state and capitalism), nationalist (south), and neo-reformist (global governance).19 While these categorizations provide a useful orientation in the debate, they are not fully satisfying for at least three reasons: (a) they provide only a limited range of alternatives (i.e., Held and McGrew; Pianta; Aguiton); (b) they fail to clearly distinguish between conventional (i.e., state-based) and the new nonconventional models (i.e., Bond; Held and McGrew; Aguiton); and more importantly (c) they fail to provide a valid method to interpret politically these categories in the context of globalization. Such taxonomy offers a new interpretation of the visions of global politics that avoids the deficiencies of the previous categorizations. First, the current proposal offers a wider spectrum of models of global politics that includes civilizations. Second, it recognizes those models that in disputing the centrality of the state in international affairs fully recognize the role of new political actors such as nongovernmental actors and individuals. Accordingly, the taxonomy focuses only on nonconventional models, excluding models still anchored in the Westphalian paradigm, such as nationalism, liberal multilateralism, neo-imperialism, and anarchical realism. Third, and most important, such taxonomy combines two key parameters of global politics: formation of political power (bottom-up and top-down) and the attitude toward globalization (positive and negative). Studying how political power engages with the issue of institutionalization (formation of political power), on one hand, and with the impact of globalization on the politics-society-economics nexus (attitude toward globalization), on the other, suggests the contrasting political essence of the different models of global politics under examination. These are the two key variables used to categorize the models of global politics, as shown in table 5.1. Accordingly, four key interpretations of the notion of world polity can be identified as delimiting the range of nonconventional ideal alternatives available to the global political debate: (a) the vision of world capitalism as associated to a global free market and private economic actors; (b) the project for the democratization of international institutions, as formulated in the cosmopolitan model with reference to individuals and supranational institutions; (c) the radical Petito_Ch05.indd 98 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate Table 5.1 99 Principal variables in mapping models of global politics Formation of Political Power Attitude toward Globalization Table 5.2 politics Positive Negative Bottom-up Top-down Cosmopolitanism Alter-Globalism Neo-liberalism Dialogue Among Civilizations Main characteristics of non-state-based models of global Neo-liberalism Cosmopolitanism Alter-Globalism Dialogue among Civilizations Formation of political power Top-down by economic actors Bottom-up by individuals Bottom-up by civic groups Top-down by cultural elites Attitude toward globalization Supportive Reformist Radical alternative conservative Human bond Economic Political Social Culturalreligious Agency Individual/ collective (firms and consumers) Individual (citizens) Collective (grassroots groups) Collective (civilizations and cultural elites) Pluralism Universalism homogeneity Universalism homogeneity Pluralism heterogeneity Pluralism heterogeneity Political principles Freedom Competition globalism Globalism universalism Participation Procedural fairness Place-basedness Participation Autonomy Diversity Solidarity Diversity Respect Goodwill Non-violence Institutional project Selfregulation Federation of individuals Groups networks Macroregionalism vision upheld by most social movements in terms of alter-globalism associated to civil society groups; and, finally (d) the discourse on the dialogue among civilizations, which refers to macro-regional actors often defined in religious terms. More specific differences among the models are provided later and summarized in table 5.2, which comparatively draws the remaining key political features of each model. Petito_Ch05.indd 99 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM 100 Raffaele Marchetti Mapping Models of Global Politics The attitude toward globalization expresses the perspective entailed by each model. The alter-globalism model is firmly against globalization for its detrimental effects on social life. Though it prescribes a different form of transnational organization, it clearly rejects the current form of globalization. Similarly, the dialogue among civilizations model is also against the current form of globalization due to its negative and homogenizing impact on cultures and civilizations. In opposition to this, cosmopolitanism has a more positive attitude toward globalization in that global transformations are seen as epochal changes that can generate new and fairer political arrangements. Finally, the neoliberal model is definitely the ideological paradigm underpinning the recent globalization of economic exchanges. Their attitudes toward globalization offer a clear reference in ordering the four suggested models. However, a complete categorization cannot be provided without taking into consideration a second crucial parameter. The vision of political power formation offers the second key parameter for the present proposal. A formation of political power refers to the modes in which political power becomes institutionalized, as well as to the crucial modes of interpreting and doing politics. Two alternative interpretations of this process need to be taken into consideration. One is a bottom-up interpretation, according to which political power is diffused and disaggregated at the bottom of society. From these numerous and fluid centers of potential power, nonpolitical resources can be canalized into institutions in order to produce a political impact. This is the case for alter-globalism, with its reference to grassroots groups or to cosmopolitanism with its ultimate reference to individuals. Second, a top-down interpretation, according to which political power is intense and concentrated at the top of society. From these few centers of actual power, nonpolitical resources can be canalized into institutions in order to produce a political impact. In agreement with such vision are both dialogue among civilizations, with its recognition of few cultural actors representing the whole civilizations, and neoliberalism, with its acknowledgement of the primacy of the powerful global economic actors, especially transnational corporations. A further consideration concerning human bonds needs to be taken into account before delineating the details of each ideal model. According to social theory, human actions can be interpreted with Petito_Ch05.indd 100 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate 101 reference to four general bonds among individuals: social, political, economic, and cultural-religious.20 While we assume that each frame of action includes elements belonging to several bonds, it is possible to identify the prioritized bond in each of them. Any action that is part of a larger frame can be interpreted as making a primary reference to a specific bond, while at the same time it is making a secondary reference to other bonds. The four models described above offer a reading of global politics that at times valorize one or the other of the four traditional human bonds. In this way, these models of global politics cover the entire spectrum of human interaction. Having clarified the principal parameters that allow for a demarcation of the four models, we now move to the specific characteristics of each model. The Competing Models Before outlining civilizationism, it is worth briefly introducing the other three models.21 While they cannot be fully analyzed, their significance lies in their capacity to expose civilizationism—for it is argued that such a model emerged in contraposition to the other three. As mentioned earlier, these four models together developed as alternative accounts of world politics that challenged the traditional state-centered readings. Though independent from each other, their social construction underwent an intense public and intellectual debate in which the comparative and dialogical dimension was the key. This is why it is important to have a sketch of the other three models. In fact, only by having a comprehensive perspective can the specific characteristics of the model of civilizationism be fully understood. The ideal model of neoliberalism is centered on the primacy of the economic bond. While acknowledging the relevance of other traditional human bonds, neoliberalism recognizes the predominance of the economic aspects of human existence. The model makes primary reference to private economic actors (entrepreneurs, firms, business networks, and consumers) as key agents in the political system. Accordingly, political power is interpreted as being managed in a decentralized way by consumers and, especially, entrepreneurs grouped in transnational elite networks. Powerful firms are seen as key players in a universal political system that is intended as homogeneous and minimal—as a sort of global invisible hand. Public Petito_Ch05.indd 101 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM 102 Raffaele Marchetti institutions are seen as universal tools allowing for a fair political life, beyond the limitations of a state-based system. Within the political and economic context of globalization, neoliberalism offers the clearest project in support of a libertarian globalization. The ideal model of cosmopolitanism is centered on the primacy of the political bond. While acknowledging the relevance of the other traditional bonds between human beings, cosmopolitanism recognizes predominance of the political and civic aspect of human life. The model makes primary reference to individuals as key actors in the political system. Accordingly, political power is interpreted as originated by citizens and managed in a global, multilayered way. Public institutions are foreseen as universal tools to allow for a fair political life—beyond the limitations of a state-based system. Within the political and economic context of globalization, characterized by a high degree of political exclusion, cosmopolitanism offers a reformist project based on social-democratic and liberal values, which aims to democratize the system of globalization without altering its fundamentals. The ideal model of alter-globalism is centered on the primacy of the social bond. While acknowledging the relevance of the other traditional human bonds (i.e., political, economic, and cultural), alter-globalism recognizes predominance of the social aspect. The model makes reference to grassroots organizations (e.g., civil society organizations, social movements, transnational social networks) as key actors in the political system. Accordingly, political power is interpreted as being managed through a rich network of local groups that preserves pluralism and heterogeneity. Within the political and economic context of globalization, characterized by a high degree of political and economic exclusion, alter-globalism offers the clearest radical alternative to the current global transformations. While a more detailed presentation and a full comparison cannot be developed, these brief remarks suffice to map the terrain in which the model of civilizationism can be implanted. Dialogue among Civilizations While the civilizational paradigm slowly emerged as a significant model of global politics only in the past few decades, it nonetheless constitutes a further robust component in the discussion about globalization. The civilizational model is centered on the primacy of the cultural and religious bond. While acknowledging the relevance Petito_Ch05.indd 102 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate 103 of other traditional bonds, such as economic and political, the discourse on civilizations recognizes the cultural and religious aspect of human life as predominant. The model makes primary reference to civilizations and cultural elites as key actors in the political system. Accordingly, political power is interpreted as being managed in a decentralized way by intellectual and religious leaders. Religions and macro-regional bodies are seen as key players in a political system that preserves pluralism and heterogeneity. Within the political and economic context of globalization, characterized by a high degree of political and economic exclusion, the perspective of civilizations offers grounds for a conservative rejection of current global transformations. The model of the clash/encounter of civilizations is centered on the notion of civilization being intended as the ultimate cultural reference, beyond any other local and national element. Civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity. While the notion of identity is reinterpreted as multilayered, civilizational identity is acknowledged as the ultimate, most encompassing layer. Civilizations are accordingly interpreted as double-natured. While externally civilizations present themselves as monolithic, internally they allow for moderate pluralism. Civilizations are relatively stable social references, though they may overlap, include sub-civilizations, and transform over time. In fact, civilizations have risen and fallen throughout history. What is interesting within the clash/encounter of civilizations approach is that with the recognition of the West’s loss of centrality comes also the recognition of other non-Western civilizations’ full status as antagonists/dialogical companions. According to the thesis of the clash of civilizations, the key mode of the relationship between civilizations is conflict and competition. While states remain important actors in global politics, conflicts will spring up between civilizations through fault lines, that is, those states that are on the border or even divided between two civilizations (torn countries). Civilizations need not necessarily collide, but history has proved that this is the most likely outcome. Remaining anchored to history, the thesis of the clash of civilizations claims to be purely descriptive. Accordingly, the reasons for conflict will thus be more related to cultural aspects than to ideological or economical factors. Key factors contributing to conflict principally relate to the aspect of irreducible cultural differences. Civilizational divergences are basic and irreconcilable. Since they are less mutable, they are also Petito_Ch05.indd 103 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM 104 Raffaele Marchetti less prone to compromise. Globalization also contributes to civilizational tension for a number of reasons. On one hand, globalization increases the awareness of the other; this allows for the rediscovery of one’s own identity but also generates opportunities for conflict. On the other hand, economic modernization is blending long-term local identities and, as the differences in these identities fade, larger, civilizational, and world religion identities supply a functional substitute.22 While sharing the ultimate assumptions on the nature of civilizations with the clash of civilizations, the model of the encounter of civilizations is more inclined to conceive normatively the possibility of dialogue among different cultures, and also the possibility of political cooperation. Within this perspective, there are four key principles. First, diversity maintains that cultural frameworks are irreducible to be compatible with one another, and thus it rejects universalism in the name of a reaffirmed pluralism.23 Second, respect entails equal treatment among different civilizations and refuses the normative hierarchies used by the nineteenth-century discourse on civilizations versus barbarians.24 Third, goodwill is seen as the crucial component for starting up a dialogue that leads to reciprocal understanding (based on the hermeneutic method) and a coming together of different civilizations.25 Finally, non-violence prescribes peaceful ways of interacting.26 According to the civilizational model, in both its conflict and dialogical variants, politics focuses on the high institutional level of exchange among elites. In contrast to the homogenizing tendency of current global transformations, this position fosters a multipolar world, in which mutual coexistence allows for the competition, or alternatively for the flourishing, of different cultural and political traditions. A major ideological foe of the model of civilizations is neoliberal globalization, as its equalizing tendency neglects cultural differences. Politically speaking, this means that multilateral projects aiming at developing regional cooperation within and among different civilizational areas have to be supported.27 A possible reform of the UN Security Council with civilizational representation would offer a valid institutional framework for this model.28 Incipient attempts to recognize the centrality of the notion of civilization in international affairs occurred in the late nineteenth century, with the establishment of the Parliament of the World’s Religions (1893), and in the first half of the twentieth century, with the creation of the World Congress of Faiths (1936). However, it was Petito_Ch05.indd 104 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate 105 only in the 1970s and 1980s that a clear recognition of the civilizational factor as a key component of international relations emerged. It was doubtless the publication of Samuel P. Huntington’s famous article on the “Clash of Civilizations” in 1993 that turned what had originally been a predominantly religious discussion into a fullfledged political debate.29 The events of September 11 only boosted the attention given to Huntington’s thesis and initiated a campaign of division along civilizational lines that is profoundly marking today’s global politics. In reaction to Huntington’s thesis, a number of political statements and theoretical formulations in terms of dialogue among civilizations have been developed not only in academia but also in public discourse and in institutional discussion. In academia, Fred Dallmayr and others offered a robust foundation for the dialogue of civilizations in hermeneutic terms.30 In the public political domain, the backing of the idea of a dialogue of civilizations by the centennial meeting of the Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993),31 and the World Public Forum–Dialogue of Civilizations,32 offered a concrete space for interaction. A number of key emergent global players supported the idea, including former Russian President Vladimir Putin (together with the Patriarch of Moscow and of All-Russia Alexius II),33 Chinese President Hu Jintao,34 and especially former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami.35 Beyond Iran, in the Islamic world, the idea of civilizations was also favorably received.36 The European Commission, with its President Romano Prodi, established a High-Level Advisory Group for the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue.37 And above all, the UN’s institutional backing—with the designation of 2001 as the year of the Dialogue of Civilization,38 and with the initiative on the Alliance of Civilizations (2004) cosponsored by the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and his Turkish equivalent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which generated a United Nations High-Level Group on this topic39—was the key to the consolidation of this discourse. Today, civilization is firmly established as a key concept for an interpretation of global politics beyond a limited state-based perspective. Its value resides in both its strong accent on the cultural and religious components of international affairs and its robust criticism of neoliberal globalization. On one hand, the model of civilizationism expresses at its best the relevance of the cultural and identitybased factors of international relations40 in a consistent way with the most recent developments of the theory of social constructivism. On Petito_Ch05.indd 105 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM 106 Raffaele Marchetti the other, the model of civilizationism voices a strong dissent from the prophets of neoliberal globalization intended as a universalistic and consumerist project of (a-)political transformation. In fact, the model has been adopted by many counter-hegemonic international actors, from Russia and Iran to China and the European Union, who aim to dispute the current unipolar trend in favor of a multipolar world order. While it may well, at times, be used to mask power positions, especially with reference to subunits in the alleged unitary civilizational spaces, this model provides a highly relevant critical stance in world politics that cannot be easily avoided. Conclusion In this chapter, the debate about the future of global politics in the age of globalization has been presented with a specific reference to the model of civilizationism. These models of global politics constitute the ideal background to the current political project advanced by non-state actors in the global arena. While translating to the global domain a number of characteristics of domestic politics, these models also present an innovative conceptualization of the political discourse. Going beyond traditional state politics, as anchored in parties and national representations, these models envisage a new system from which new actors and new social claims can emerge. Ideal models of global politics denounce the current exclusionary system of international affairs, stressing instead the need for its reconstruction on a different basis. What is claimed is a political voice—a recognition in global affairs from which they are excluded. From the religious perspective to participatory democracy, from transnational citizenship to global market, new understandings of the polity that challenge traditional intergovernmental politics emerge within the framework of globalization. The future of global politics will perhaps emerge from here. Traditional state-centered approaches to international relations will inevitably have to engage with these new forms of political agency in the age of globalization. The end result cannot be foreseen. However, it is reasonable to expect the partial inclusion of a number of tenets of these alternative models in the overall international institutional framework. If we take into consideration their increasing social and economic power, the voice that this kind of actors claim in global politics cannot be denied indefinitely without exposing the system to a certain degree of instability. The most Petito_Ch05.indd 106 2/6/2009 7:25:48 PM Civilizationism and Globalization Debate 107 likely result—signs of which are already evident in some instances of global governance—will be a combination of traditional intergovernmental mechanisms with new forms of governance structures in which these non-state actors will have an increasing significance and political power. Notes 1. Throughout this chapter, public institutions and intergovernmental organizations are taken to be primarily an expression for the institution itself rather than of the single member states. 2. Jan Aart Schote (2004) Democratizing the Global Economy: The Role of Civil Society (Warwick: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation), 22; Raffaele Marchetti (2005) “InteractionDependent Justice and the Problem of International Exclusion,” Constellations 12 (4), 487–501. 3. For an overview of the different models of global politics, see Raffaele Marchetti (2008) Global Democracy: For and Against. Ethical Theory, Institutional Design, and Social Struggles (London and New York: Routledge); and (2009) “Mapping Models of Global Politics,” International Studies Review forthcoming in 11 (1). 4. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford (2000) “Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology,” Mobilization 5 (1), 55–60. 5. Alexander Wendt (1995) “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20 (1), 71–81. 6. David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.) (2000) The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity), 2. 7. Ernesto Laclau (1996) “The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies (1), 201–220; John Gerring (1997) “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50 (4), 957–994. 8. Ervin Goffman (1974) Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of the Experience (New York: Harper Colophon); Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, and Joseph Gusfield (eds.) (1994) New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press); Doug McAdam, John D McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (1996) “Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Kim Fisher (1997) “Locating Frames in the Discursive Universe,” Sociological Research Online 2 (3); Robert D. Benford and David A. 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