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YANG Jisheng, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962
(London, Allen Lane, 2012), 629 pages, 1 illustration. Price : £30.
ISBN 978-1-846-14518-6.
ZHOU Xun (ed.), The Great Famine in China, 1958-1962: A Documentary
History, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 2012, 204
pages, 1 illustration, ISBN 978-0-300-17518-9.
The Great Chinese Famine (1958-1962) was one of the worst humanitarian
catastrophes in world history. There now seems to be irrefutable evidence to
prove that this disaster was almost entirely man-made. It was caused primarily by policies introduced by the Communist Party during the Great Leap
Forward. Although a number of foreign scholars have written detailed studies
of this famine, due to its continuing political sensitivity Chinese historians
have been limited in the extent to which they have been able to conduct and
publish research. In recent years, however, an increasing number of scholars
based in Mainland China and Hong Kong have sought to defy official taboos,
and have begun to unearth the hidden history of the Great Famine. One of
the most prominent of these scholars is Yang Jisheng, a journalist from Hubei
Province who conducted research into the famine for over a decade. He consulted a vast number of official documents only available to those granted
admission to exclusive Communist Party archives, exploited informal channels to procure rare documents, and interviewed cadres who governed areas of
rural China in 1958-1962. This monumental and courageous research project
culminated in the publication of a weighty two-volume study, offering perhaps
the most comprehensive overview of the famine yet produced. Unfortunately
Yang’s book remains banned in Mainland China. It has now been heavily edited and translated by Stacey Mosher and Guo Jian, and published as
Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao’s Great Famine.
Yang intersperses chapters detailing regional case studies with those providing general analysis of the political causes of the famine. His specific local
examples help to shift the focus of the discussion away from an elite-centered
perspective that has often dominated the history of famine. He does not
totally eschew discussion of high-level power politics. Significant attention is
dedicated to cataloguing the court intrigues that raged amongst members of
the higher echelons of the Communist Party. Yet the strength of Yang’s study is
in its ability to trace links between the Politburo and the People’s Communes.
He demonstrates how elite-level decisions were filtered through the particular
prisms of local politics, and were intensified by processes of positive and negative feedback. This multilayered perspective constructs an analytical model
that dissects the Maoist political system from core to periphery.
The image of the system that Yang presents is one beset by horrific repression and desperate survival strategies. Readers seeking further evidence to
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indict the Maoist regime for its crimes against the Chinese population will not
be disappointed. Yang describes widespread cannibalism, torture, cadre corruption and starvation, often in forensic detail. He begins by recalling the death
of his own adopted father, whose starvation he personally witnessed (p. 3-12).
Given that Yang was motivated to conduct research into the famine by this
personal trauma, it is entirely understandable that he writes with a degree of
anger and passion that somewhat precludes a fully nuanced approach. His
picturesque prose betrays his background in journalism rather than academia.
His description of Chinese political culture as “despotic” (p. 484), and his references to the “bellicose temperament” (p. 465) of ethnic minorities, will not
appeal to professional historians, who have long questioned such descriptive
categories. Yet Yang’s study has much to offer scholars, both in its analytical
approach and in its insight into restricted documents.
Yang’s study has an unapologetically political agenda. Its primary target is
the totalitarian rule of the Communist Party, which, he claims, lacks a “corrective mechanism” to arrest to development of corrosive decision-making
patterns (p. 496). He provides a neat aphorism to describe Chinese political
culture during the famine, noting how each official “wore two faces: before
his superiors he was a slave, and before his subordinates, a tyrant” (p.486).
Later he goes further, claiming that everyone bore at least some responsibility
for the system that drove China to starvation (p. 496). He somewhat undermines this argument for collective responsibility, however, by insisting upon
highlighting the personal culpability of Mao Zedong. He is not content to
view Mao as the misguided and callous leader of a dysfunctional system, but
rather insists upon uncovering his malign influence at every possible juncture.
Thus, on the one hand, Yang argues that responsibility for the famine was dissipated throughout the political system, and yet, on the other, attributes near
omnipotent power to Mao. The tension between these dual perspectives is
never reconciled satisfactorily.
Given that Tombstone repudiates Communist rule so wholeheartedly, it
is somewhat intriguing that Yang’s analysis retains so many of the Party’s own
explanatory frameworks and rhetorical idiosyncrasies. For example, he refers
to the collective psychological dynamics that perpetuated the famine as the
“Communist Wind” and the “Exaggeration Wind” (pp. 248-269). Here not
only does Yang’s terminology remain rooted firmly in official political discourse, but his explanatory framework also bears a strong resemblance to that
given by the Communist Party, which sought to disavow its former radicalism
in later years. Similarly, Yang describes an idealist/pragmatist split that arose
within the Party, claiming that the latter faction defied the hard-line Maoists
to precipitate the end of the famine (p. 518). Here his explanation shares an
oblique parallel with official Communist Party historiography, promoted by
the pragmatist faction in the post-Mao years. Some historians now dispute this
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narrative, and suggest that it was widespread civil disobedience against grain
procurement policies, rather than the internal rectification of policy errors,
that finally ended the famine.12
Whilst Yang demonstrates an encyclopaedic knowledge of the Great
Famine, his analysis suffers from a severe lack of historical context. In particular, he makes very little reference to the fact that famine had struck China
repeatedly throughout its history, and had grown particularly acute since the
mid-nineteenth century. Whilst it is certainly true that no previous crisis had
begun to approach the magnitude of the 1958-1962 famine, several had been
significantly more intense, causing greater per-capita losses within a limited
geographical region. The Incredible Famine of 1876-1879 killed an estimated 9-13 million people, and the Northwestern Famine of 1928-1930 10
million.13 In over 500 pages, Yang’s discussion of previous famines is largely
confined to a single paragraph, during which he presents a misleading picture
of the historical consensus on the severity of these events (p. 13). This absence
of context is particularly telling during Yang’s discussion of the impact of
the famine in Henan. He concludes that a minimum of three million people
perished between 1958-1962 (pp. 80-82), yet fails to mention that a comparable number died during the 1941-1943 Henan Famine.14 This oversight is
indicative of a deeper problem with Yang’s approach. He does not seem to be
motivated by a desire to assess the impact of the 1958-1962 famine, but rather
by an attempt to find evidence to support the most damning indictment of the
Communist Party possible. In order to pursue this political objective, he seems
content not only to sacrifice subtlety, but also to overlook the inconvenient
deaths of millions of Chinese people who perished in the years before Mao
came to power.
Yang’s research was aided considerably by his status as a journalist. This
provided him with the cover to access government documents, and to discuss
the famine extensively with former cadres. The Hong Kong-based scholar
Zhou Xun adopted a different approach, exploiting a relaxation in the rules
governing archival access at the end of the last decade to conduct a groundbreaking research project into the Great Famine. Between 2006-2010 she
travelled to nine provinces and gathered over one thousand documents. A
selection of these is reproduced with introductory remarks in The Great
Famine in China, 1958-1962: A Documentary History. For the first time,
12 Ralph A. THAXTON, “How the Great Leap Forward Famine Ended in Rural China:
“Administrative Intervention versus Peasant Resistance”, in Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on
China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine, ed. Kimberely Ens Manning and Felix Wemheuer
(Vancouver, 2011), pp. 251-271.
13 Lillian M. Li, Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market, and Environmental Decline,
1690s-1990s (Stanford, 2007), p. 284.
14 Ibid, p. 284.
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non-Chinese readers and those without access to Communist Party archives
are able to examine 121 official documents. These are an important resource,
as they not only provide evidence of widespread cannibalism, political repression, violence and starvation, but also demonstrate the extent to which the
government was aware of such problems. Zhou collates her documentary collection by theme and chronology.
The documents work best when they are revealing the everyday experience of villagers attempting to survive. We learn how the famine led to the
disintegration of communities and families, and forced individuals to pursue
desperate survival strategies. Zhou also describes less well-known aspects of
the famine, providing, for example, a fascinating chapter about religious movements that challenged the legitimacy of the Communist Party (pp. 91-113).
One of the most illuminating documents describes how women were coerced
into working topless during the Great Leap Forward (pp. 39-42). What is
particularly arresting about this account is not so much the tyrannical nature
of local cadres, for which abundant evidence is provided throughout Zhou’s
collection, but rather how those inflicting sexual humiliation seem to have
believed, at least partially, that their actions were ideologically justified.
Forcing women to remove their clothes, it was reasoned, emancipated them
from the oppression of feudal tradition. Even the most skillful historian would
struggle to describe the terrifying logic of the People’s Communes in a more
evocative manner. In such moments, Zhou reveals the power that primary
evidence has in illuminating the darkest and most inexplicable moments of
history.
Zhou collaborates closely with historian Frank Dikötter, who has provided
several of the archival documents cited in his own study of the famine for this
collection.15 Zhou’s analysis follows her collaborator closely, and she repeats
several of his more controversial claims without reference to subsequent critiques.16 At one point she reproduces a document used by Dikötter as proof of
Mao’s personal culpability for the famine (pp. 23-25). It is claimed that Mao
ordered the continuation of grain procurement policies in full knowledge that
they were causing starvation. The picture that emerges from the document
itself, however, is far more ambiguous. Certainly Mao did assert that it was
“better to let half the people starve so that the other half can eat their fill”
(p. 25), yet it is far from clear whether he was speaking literally. In allowing
this document to be published, Dikötter has demonstrated the extent to which
he relies upon somewhat ambiguous evidence to bolster his polemical claims.
15 Frank DIKÖTTER, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe,
1958- 62 (London, 2010).
16 For example, Zhou repeats mortality statistics disputed in Cormac Ó GRÁDA, “Great Leap
into Famine: A Review Essay”, Population and Development Review, March 2011, 191-210.
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On occasions Zhou’s study might have been improved had she interrogated
her sources more thoroughly. The reader is confronted with numerous official
documents that decry severe systemic problems. Yet there is no reflection upon
the fact that this evidence was itself produced by the very political system that
it serves to indict. Admittedly, this methodological difficulty confronts any
scholar attempting to produce a documentary history of a society in which the
dissemination of information is so rigidly controlled. Yet whilst this problem
may be inevitable, it should be acknowledged and incorporated into analysis.
Whilst Zhou does enjoin readers to “maintain a critical distance” from the
sources (p.xiii), there is no significant attempt to explore the partiality of evidence, or to explain how it may have been distorted by the cadres and investigation teams responsible for its production and preservation.
Taken in concert, these two studies not only highlight the horror of Maoist
misrule, they also demonstrate the staggering extent of official knowledge
about the famine. No longer is it possible to make a credible argument that
one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes resulted from a failure to
disseminate information from the grassroots to policy makers. Thus, whilst
these studies may not always offer the most nuanced analysis, they are an
excellent resource for historians and students. Perhaps most importantly,
they contribute to an ever-expanding dossier of evidence that fundamentally
undermines official Communist Party history. Whilst neither study manages
to provide irrefutable evidence of Mao’s personal culpability, they both serve
as a powerful indictment of the system he helped to create. Historians should
now desist from perpetuating the rather sterile debate about Mao’s role, and
instead focus upon the areas of the famine that remain less well understood.
Yang and Zhou have provided detailed analyses of the official knowledge of
the famine, dealing exclusively with Party documents. The voices of ordinary
Chinese people remain frustratingly absent. If historians can now integrate the
evidence offered by these official documents, with oral history testimony and
information gathered from outside the apparatus of the state, then they will
begin to reveal the true unknown story of the Great Famine.
Christopher Courtney, University of Manchester