Cooperation is What India Makes of It – A Normative Inquiry into the Origins and Development of Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean

Asian Security ISSN: 1479-9855 (Print) 1555-2764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20 Cooperation is What India Makes of It – A Normative Inquiry into the Origins and Development of Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Arndt Michael To cite this article: Arndt Michael (2017): Cooperation is What India Makes of It – A Normative Inquiry into the Origins and Development of Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, Asian Security, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2017.1347636 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1347636 Published online: 28 Jul 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 92 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fasi20 ASIAN SECURITY https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1347636 Cooperation is What India Makes of It – A Normative Inquiry into the Origins and Development of Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Arndt Michael ABSTRACT Successful multilateral economic, political or security cooperation as best exemplified by organizations such as the EU or ASEAN invites the question why comparable organizations have never been established in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim, two geo-strategically important world regions. This article foregoes political-realist arguments and offers an alternative explanation for the failure of regional multilateralism in those two regions by using the social-constructivist framework of norm localization. This framework, based upon third-generation norm diffusion, provides a new analytical toolbox for analysing the general puzzle why one region may accept a particular norm while rejecting another. Arguing the case for the existence of a special South Asian regional variation of multilateralism which is termed ‘Panchsheel-multilateralism’, the article examines the process of the localization of the global norm regional multilateralism and analyses how this norm became institutionalized in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The main argument of the article is that the global norm of regional multilateralism has been localized into a principally Indian influenced model of multilateralism, based on the latter’s cognitive prior. Consequently, there has virtually never been room for any genuine multilateral cooperation, while tangible cooperative results are found in the bilateral domain only. Introduction The emergence of the independent nations in Asia naturally leads to what might be called vaguely an Asian way of looking at the world. I do not say there is one Asian way because Asia is a big continent, offering different viewpoints. However, it is a new angle, and is a change from the Europe-centred or any other view of the world. Jawaharlal Nehru, 19581 With Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi revitalizing and reorienting Indian foreign and security policy since 2014, expectations were high that regional cooperation in South Asia and neighboring regions would also be strengthened. However, despite the important gesture of inviting the heads of state or government of all SAARC countries to this official swearing-in ceremony on May 26, 2014, the Modi government subsequently did not use the 18th SAARC Summit (November 26–27, 2014) to outline major changes to India’s general strategy towards regional cooperation. Rather than presenting a grand new vision for an improved model of regional cooperation, the summit resulted in declarations of intent and promises of more integration, with little concrete to show for it.2 Two years later, the 19th SAARC Summit scheduled for November 2016 in Islamabad was postponed indefinitely3 after India had declared it would not participate on the grounds of ongoing terrorist activities emanating from Pakistan, leaving the future of regional cooperation in South Asia in limbo. CONTACT Arndt Michale arndt.michael@studgen.uni-freiburg.de © 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 2 A. MICHAEL Exactly 70 years earlier, on the eve of India’s independence, India’s future prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, predicted that, “in Asia it seems inevitable that two or three huge federations will develop. [. . .] India is going to be the centre of a very big federation.”4 Yet, while regional cooperation has been successfully initiated in practically all regions of the world, similar developments have so far not occurred in South Asia, which economically and politically today remains “the least integrated region in the world,”5 despite the existence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since 1985. The same holds true for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where regional cooperation has been unsuccessfully attempted since 1997 with the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), renamed Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 2013. The European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are two prime examples for organizations that were able to greatly promote regional integration. Regarding the EU (and before it the European community [EC]), it could emerge and grow because it had strong economic foundations and because Europe was already economically interdependent prior to 1951. Also, the EC was committed to economic liberalism and, in part, because no one state succeeded in setting the agenda alone, with France and Germany balancing each other. The EC was also given strong support by the US, which strongly advocated greater integration throughout the Cold War. In its first 30 years of existence, there was also a common enemy – the USSR – with which the West was competing, both trying to demonstrate more effective economic and political models. Shifting the focus towards the Asia-Pacific, ASEAN is a case in point for an Asian model of regional inter-state cooperation. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has gradually evolved and expanded, following its special “ASEAN way” of institutional-organizational minimalism and an informal non-legalistic method of cooperation.6 Today, ASEAN is the most successful (economic) Asian regional organization in the world, and intra-regional trade accounts for 25 percent of total trade, compared with SAARC where the latter stands at just 5 percent of total trade.7 The success stories of regional cooperation in Europe as well as Southeast Asia invites the question why comparable developments have not taken place in South Asia and neighboring regions such as the Indian Ocean. Clearly, the case of South Asia shows idiosyncracies which are not found in other regions of the world, and which partly account for the lack of integration, economic as well as political. Generally speaking, there is a very low level of economic interdependence in South Asia and the interconnected issue of high and growing levels of economic independence between South Asian states and China. As a matter of fact, South Asian states do not trade extensively with each other, infrastructure in the whole region is generally poor and only slowly being improved, necessary transit rights close to non-existent, etc. South Asian states trade much more with states outside South Asia. In addition to this, there is the issue of asymmetry, i.e., India’s relative size and power in South Asia. Also, the role of outside powers in South Asia needs special recognition. More concretely, four difficulties are central to the situation in South Asia. First, the post-colonial settlement after 1947 was a stumbling block for economic interdependence. An important city such as Calcutta was, for example, cut off from much of its economic hinterland in those parts of Bengal that went to East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Karachi lost its influential Hindu businesspeople and its links to northern India and Bombay, etc. Second, India’s postcolonial economic policy worsened the situation, emphasizing self-reliance and swadeshi (self-sufficiency) rather than openness and free trade as the engine of development. Third, India is much stronger relative to the other players, so agreement between her and the smaller states is relatively more difficult than it is in Europe, where a kind of balance of power exists within the EU. And fourth, there is no common enemy. Rather, South Asia is split within itself, and while some see China as a potential threat, all South Asian states trade more with China than they do with each other. In other words: relative gains from South Asian regionalism might be low, and economically it might make sense for South Asia states to negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with states and organizations outside the region (for example China, ASEAN, or even the EU and the US), since the economic gains there will be much greater than the small gains in South Asia. ASIAN SECURITY 3 Still, while all of these are reasons that account for lack of interconnectedness and integration in South Asia, this article goes beyond this line of reasoning and offers an additional and, in parts, alternative explanation for the failure of classic regional multilateralism to take hold. The article applies the social constructivist framework of norm localization, based upon third-generation norm diffusion. This framework “is helpful in understanding why any given region may accept a particular norm while rejecting another, as well as variation between regions in undergoing normative change.”8 Arguing the case for the existence of a special South Asian regional variation of multilateralism that I term “Panchsheel-multilateralism,” I examine the process of the localization of the global norm “regional multilateralism” and its implementation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim. The main argument here is that the global norm of “regional multilateralism” has been localized into a model of multilateralism that was compatible with the ideational orthodoxy of Indian foreign policy. As a consequence of this localized model that incorporates a specific normative and ideational foreign policy orientation, there is virtually no room for any genuine regional multilateral cooperation, and any tangible cooperative results are found in essence in the bilateral domain only. By using this approach, I also argue that current research inspired by Europeanization studies,9 which focuses on tendencies towards world-wide Europeanization,10 and claims that there are global processes towards mimetic behavior, cost-benefit calculations, processes of social learning of regional multilateral structures, and an increasing homogenization of regional organizations, does not account for the idiosyncrasies of the South Asian and Indian Ocean context. The article is structured in five sections. Following the introduction, the theoretical and methodological basis will be discussed, i.e., the framework of localization and the global norm of regional multilateralism. The third section analyzes the ideational orthodoxy of Indian foreign policy, or what Acharya has aptly termed “cognitive prior.” In the penultimate section, I use process-tracing to analyze the course and result of norm localization for the SAARC and the IORA. The fifth and final section summarizes the findings of the analysis and makes predictions on the future of regional multilateralism with Indian participation. Theoretical and methodological approach: Constructivism, norm localization, and the global norm of regional multilateralism Historically, realist explanations for political developments regarding countries of the Global South have been the dominant approach. Although political realism today remains the most influential paradigm in International Relations (IR), one can certainly not speak of a consistent body of realist-related ideas and characteristics. On the contrary, realism is informed by assumptions that are more often than not different and divergent, and hence produce different and divergent implications. As Glenn H. Snyder noted, “The field of international relations now has at least two varieties of ‘structural realism,’ probably three kinds of offensive realism, and several types of defensive realism; in addition to ‘neoclassical,’ ‘contingent,’ ‘specific’ and ‘generalist realism,’”11 and – one may add – also subaltern realism.12 What all of these have in common is a focus on power and material capabilities as the major explanatory variable. However, constructivist approaches, especially compared to classic rationalist theories either in their realist or institutionalist variants, offer several analytical advantages. In particular, they focus on contingency and long-term historical developments. Constructivist analyses do not actually exclude arguments typically used by (political) realism, such as power and material capabilities, nor are they inherently biased in favor of cooperative norms, as shown by Wendt13 and brilliantly argued in Johnston’s analysis of strategic culture in China.14 On the contrary, such approaches are open to identify political realism as the tenets of a country’s foreign policy. Constructivism examines how endogenous preference building takes place by incorporating ideational factors. If one takes the position of long-term analysis (or longue durée), this perspective allows explanation of how state preferences for specific foreign policy actions and political patterns (also realist ones) have evolved over time. In addition, constructivism offers a much greater degree of cultural sensitivity as well as the possibility of interpreting international relations from domestic perspectives, hence opening the 4 A. MICHAEL domestic “black box,” which for example a neo-realist analysis with its sole focus on the nation-state as an unitary actors fails to take into consideration Finally, different perceptions of “self” and “other” are important analytical angles found in constructivist literature. One especially significant field of analysis of the social constructivist approach has been the constitutive influence of norms in global affairs. Constructivist norm diffusion literature regards change as endogenous and focuses on the appropriateness of norms. Both these aspects – change and appropriateness – permit examination of the ideational roots and evolution of institutions, to capture their cultural idiosyncrasies and to conceptualize the cognitive dimension of power.15 Especially Amitav Acharya investigated how trans-national norms (and ideas) shaped an existing regional institution (ASEAN) and showed how these ideas and norms produced institutional change as the dependent variable of norm diffusion in the case of ASEAN. Acharya used the framework of localization for exploring norm diffusion that analyzed the agency role of norm-takers through what he termed “a dynamic congruence-building process called localization.”16 The focus on a regional organization allowed Acharya to “conceptualize and represent localization as a form of institutional change induced by transnational norms,”17 especially with a view to increasing the norm-takers authority and legitimacy. Localization theory may shed light into the “black box of foreign policymaking and adds a bottom-up dimension to the dominant top-down and outward-in perspective in the construction of norm and institutional change in non-Western regions.”18 In more general terms, localization is an “evolutionary” or “everyday” form of progressive norm diffusion and “a likely response to external normative challenges if the foreign ideas are confronted with a cognitive prior that is deeply entrenched in the collective memory of the recipient society.”19 Localization is neither regressive nor static but progressive, and it can reshape already existing beliefs or practices and foreign ideas in their local context. In a nutshell, localization analyzes a (complex) process by which norm-takers build congruence between trans-national norms (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and local beliefs and practices. In this process, foreign norms are incorporated into local norms, even though they may not at first fit together with the local beliefs. More importantly, localization does not extinguish the cognitive prior of the norm-takers but leads to its mutual inflection with external norms. [. . .] Hence, in localization, the existing normative order and an external norm are in a “mutually constitutive” relationship, but the resulting behaviour of the recipient can be understood more in terms of the former than the latter, although it can be fully understood in terms of both.20 Norm localization can be analyzed by following a course of analysis using three distinct dimensions, namely “framing, grafting and pruning.”21 Framing, which actually plays a subordinated role in the wider process of localization, is understood as first defining issues “by using language that names, interprets and dramatizes them”; framing in the trajectory of localization denotes first examining the evaluative connotations which are being used in framing normative challenges. Alongside framing, the dimensions of grafting and pruning then come into play. Grafting is understood as “a tactic norm entrepreneurs employ to institutionalize a new form by associating it with a pre-existing norm in the same issue area”22; pruning refers to “selecting those elements of the new norm which fit the preexisting normative structure and reject those which do not.”23 In essence, pruning means that select features of the original norm will reappear only in a much-diminished version in the localized norm; this process of pruning amounts to a cultural pre-selection of specific parts of the new norm and a subsequent adjustment to foreign ideas to ultimately find a better match with the existing local beliefs and practices. The result of this process of norm localization “is neither the sum nor the average of the ideational components fused, but a new ideational configuration modernizing traditional norms.”24 The global norm of regional multilateralism In order to examine a process of localization, a global norm needs to be identified and its implementation examined. The global norm, which serves as the point of reference for the two empirical case studies in this article, is “regional multilateralism,” i.e., general multilateral activities at a regional level. Historically, ASIAN SECURITY 5 regional multilateralism as a norm first emerged in the 1950s in Europe, with activities at the regional level taking place between the six founding states of the EC. In 1958, Ernst B. Haas already labeled regional cooperation as only “a vague term covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet commonly experienced need.”25 In the wake of the European example, other world regions26 then began to follow suit in the decades ahead, for example Latin America, Africa with the Organization of African Unity (1963) or Southeast Asia with ASEAN (1967). A working definition comprising the main features of regional multilateralism needs to address the dimension “norm,” “multilateral activity,” and “regional.” Norms, generally speaking, are “standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.”27 In addition, they comprise “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a collectivity of actors”28 or “intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour.”29 In the literature on norm diffusion, several international norms have been identified, with their common denominator being the influencing and regulation of state behavior. Regional multilateralism fulfills the requirements expected from a norm since it demands states to cooperate and thus imposes rights and obligations. With regard to the multilateral aspects, this article builds upon the works of Ruggie, for whom multilateralism in essence means the “coordination [of] behaviour among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.”30 These principles of multilateralism are general principles that specify conduct without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties; principles that are indivisible among the parties with respect to the range of the behavior in question; and relations that are marked by diffuse reciprocity, i.e., they yield roughly equal benefits to their members in the aggregate over time. Principled multilateralism implies that members show a willingness to invest in an institution, for example in terms of material capabilities or by making concessions. I term this “enduring cooperation,” and it essentially means that decisions and actions taken in the frame of an institution are geared towards strengthening the institutions in the long run, for example with a view to task and scope expansion. From an institutional point of view, multilateralism should have two interrelated objectives: it should first treat the idea of “institution-building” as a prerequisite for successful cooperation, i.e., it should clearly define the shape of the institution. Alongside this shape of the institution, the scope of the institution needs to be delineated, especially with a clearly defined degree of autonomy so that it can work on common multilateral projects in an independent capacity (thereby transcending the bilateral domain of cooperation). Finally, the tools for common identity-building need to be in place. The ASEAN way, to which all ASEAN member states have subscribed, is one example that shows that an institution translated its principle into a common method and thereby provided the institution with an identity. An important aspect of multilateralism is that it is Janus faced. It comprises two features, each of which carry the same weight; it has both a regulative and a constitutive dimension. Multilateralism is regulative in that it aims at regulating states’ behavior vis-à-vis cooperation, and it is constitutive in that it creates a specific frame for inter-state cooperation. However, an important caveat for the purpose of this article is that the norm of regional multilateralism is not necessarily concerned with a Table 1. The norm of regional multilateralism: Generic criteria. 1. A minimum number of three independent states 2. Voluntary Formation 3. Equality of all states (one state, one vote) 4. Common projects as general agenda 5. Coordination (e.g. of national policies) as special agenda 6. Rejection of uni- or bilateralism in sectors of cooperation and inclusive approach 7. Enduring cooperation 8. An independent institutional set-up that is capable of purposeful work on goals & projects 9. Institution-building 10. Common identity-building 6 A. MICHAEL concrete area of cooperation such as economic or military cooperation. Rather, the question of regional multilateralism revolves around the general extent of regional activities between states, which can later spill over into several different sectors of cooperation, ranging from low to hard politics. Distilling the major aspects developed above, regional multilateralism is based upon the ten generic criteria listed in Table 1. These criteria allow comparison of the extent to which regional multilateralism has been implemented in different world regions, and they especially serve as an analytical matrix for the question as to the extent to which regional multilateralism has been localized in the two organizations examined here. As a second caveat, it should be noted that the absence of certain of these criteria does not question regional multilateralism per se but rather its overall robustness and resilience. Put otherwise, cooperative activities of regional multilateralism, once officially started in a region, are on a continuum that ranges from hardly detectable to extensive. The methodology I apply rests on a qualitative content analysis. Besides a wide range of primary literature that was gathered during various field trips to libraries in New Delhi, Shimla, Kathmandu, and Paris, I draw on 60 semi-structured expert interviews (including late former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, several former MEA secretaries, members of Indian foreign policy establishment, retired diplomats, directors and experts from Indian think tanks) conducted in New Delhi and Kathmandu during several field trips in 2006–2007 and between 2012–2015, an extensive literature review as well as newspaper analysis of English language newspapers (The Times of India, Hindustan Times, and The Hindu). The two case studies follow process-tracing.31 The cognitive prior of India’s foreign policy: Ideational foundations, phases and shifts As argued in the theoretical section, the dominant features of the respective local norm(s) – the local identity and the prevailing ideational orthodoxy – must be known in order to analyze the reasons for – and conditions under which – a local response to an external norm takes place. Acharya has termed this the cognitive prior, i.e., “an existing set of ideas, belief systems, and norms, which determine and condition an individual or social group’s receptivity to new norms.”32 For the present analysis, the term cognitive prior will be expanded to include major foreign policy principles of a state and denotes the ideational foundation of India’s foreign policy. India’s cognitive prior has been selected as the main focus of the analysis since India was part of the initial negotiations for SAARC and the IOR-ARC and was especially also in charge of drafting the founding charters that prescribed that institutional design. A content analysis of historic speeches and MEA documents related to India’s foreign policy confirm the existence of a set of unalterable foreign policy principles and determinants. However, these principles consist of ideational and normative push and pull factors, i.e., a policy torn between idealist and realist parameters.33 The parameters of Indian foreign policy immediately after independence reflected the colonial experience but, more importantly, her political culture and civilizational heritage. A duality can be discerned especially in the field of political thought: India has two ancient conflicting traditions, with the political realist Kautilya’s Arthashastra (especially the latter’s mandala concept, i.e. concentric circles of friend-enemy states)34 and the idealist strand of Buddhism, Ashoka and Gandhi.35 Accordingly, Nehru clarified with regard to the origins of India’s foreign policy that “it should not be supposed that we are starting on a clean slate. It is a policy which flowed from our recent history and from our national movement and its development and from various ideals we have proclaimed.”36 From the very beginning of his term as prime minister, Nehru formulated a distinct Indian international relations policy that was, especially in its early years, determined in accordance with the ideals of the freedom struggle and Gandhian philosophy (i.e., tolerance and non-violence). Nehru time and again expressed his belief that a nation’s self-interest requires cooperation with other nations. It was originally a policy where – in rhetoric at least – morality played a more prominent role than the ASIAN SECURITY 7 use of force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes was the key instrument by which world peace could be achieved. While his belief especially in the principle of non-violence was constantly reiterated, Nehru himself voiced the contradiction in foreign policy principles and action. He declared in the Lok Sabha on February 15, 1956: “I am not aware of our government having ever said that they have adopted the doctrine of ahimsa (non-violence) to our activities. They may respect it, they may honour the doctrine, but as a government it is patent that we do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doctrine of ahimsa.”37 Two central characteristics of India’s foreign policy derived from Nehru’s policy are the Panchsheel-principles and the policy of non-alignment. The Panchsheel, i.e., the peaceful co-existence of nations of different ideologies and interests,38 were formally recognized when, on April 29, 1954, India and China signed the Declaration of Five Principles39 as the new basis of their relationship. The five principles enumerated in the preamble of the agreement were respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, and peaceful coexistence. Nehru later outlined the important connection between Panchsheel and cooperation: “Likewise, this idea of Panchsheel lays down the very important truth that each nation must ultimately fend for itself.”40 In other words: adherence to the Panchsheel for Nehru equalled the absolute primacy of both independence and national sovereignty. Besides these Panchsheel-principles, India’s foreign policy firmly rests on the concept of non-alignment. This policy was initiated and pursued by Nehru between 1946 and 1954. Soon after assuming office as interim prime minister, Nehru announced in September 1946 the broad framework of the policy of nonalignment: “We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.”41 Nehru’s promotion of non-alignment has been adequately summarized as essentially a political “means of minimizing, if not totally excluding, political and military intervention by the great powers in regional affairs.”42 As regards global multilateralism, after independence, India became a staunch supporter of the United Nations and has participated in and been at the helm of a large number of peacekeeping missions all over the world.43 Opposed to this, the Indian approach towards regional multilateralism – especially in scope and limitations – developed over the course of several decades, with the normative origins essentially stemming from India’s experiences in regional Asian conferences in the 1950s onwards. Several important (political) conferences took place in the late 1940s and 1950s, in which South Asian and Southeast Asian countries participated, though none of those led to the establishment of permanent institutions.44 The one major foreign policy principle that Nehru aired during this time was his complete dislike of multilateral security cooperation.45 Nehru especially highlighted the relationship between a defense alliance and a nation’s independence: I can understand a number of countries coming together for their own defence and thus making an alliance. [. . .] It means that any internal development in that area might also entitle these countries to intervene. Does this not affect the whole conception of integrity, sovereignty and independence of the countries of the area?46 This particular stance towards multilateral security – and hence political – cooperation has become one of the mainstays of India’s foreign policy. All in all, during the early days of India’s independence, there was an obvious contradiction between India’s foreign policy rhetoric as outlined and her actions. While India publicly insisted on the principle of morality, she on occasion decided to use force and military action against the princely states of Junagadh (1948) and Hyderabad (1949), and later Goa (1961). After India’s defeat in the Indo-China war in 1962, Indian foreign policy finally became more pragmatic and saw a heavy increase in her military defence systems. The defeat also questioned the efficacy of non-alignment and markedly diminished India’s international standing. Military clashes with Pakistan occurred in 1965 and again in 1971. In September of that year, Indian forces liberated East Pakistan, which led to the establishment of Bangladesh. The Indian victory in 1965 strengthened 8 A. MICHAEL Indian self-sufficiency and introduced a growing awareness of superpower politics, which was shown before the 1971 war when India signed a 20-year Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union. This treaty led to influxes of Soviet aid and arms and balanced against the United States, Pakistan, and China. The Indian victory of 1971 showed India as a power capable of successfully fighting a (limited) conflict and essentially redefining the South Asian strategic environment by removing the two-front threat from Pakistan. Post-1971, India emerged as the region’s most dominant political and economic power, and India even acquired nuclear weapons, achieved through the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of May 18, 1974. India’s dominance was also demonstrated by increased Indian intervention in her immediate neighborhood, as exemplified by the Indira Doctrine of dissuading external involvement via the deterrence (and use) of military force. Despite creating the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s – aimed at rebalancing disparities between the developing and developed countries – India’s multilateral influence nonetheless waned because of her 1971 intervention and of the 1974 PNE. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, India lost a major ally with the Soviet Union. Coupled with her economic reforms and an increasingly defunct Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the realities of the post-Cold War world demanded new Indian foreign policy dimensions.47 Representative of this approach was the Gujral Doctrine (named after Prime Minister I. K. Gujral), based upon reciprocity and benevolence towards India’s South Asian neighbors. As such, Nehruvian idealism was replaced by a more pragmatic and concessionary stance to garner better security, energy, and trade relations. From 1992, India created further diplomatic (and military) ties with South-East Asia through the “Look East” policy. For the first time since independence, a non-Congress government gained power in India in 1998. Led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) carried out nuclear weapons tests in May 1998. For the nationalistic BJP, the tests were also meant to increase India’s self-reliance and assert her national pride. The 1998 tests signaled India entry into the international system as a potential global player; from the confines of South and Southeast Asia, Indian foreign policy began to gain a (nascent) global focus. With the beginning of the 21st century, better ties with China saw the building of a more comprehensive and strategic relationship. India’s leaders also began to talk of an extended strategic neighborhood that encompassed control of the IOR and policies that extended India’s relations towards Africa and the Asia-Pacific.48 This latest phase of Indian foreign policy witnessed a substantial improvement of Indo-US relations; relations with powers such as Japan and the European Union (EU) also improved exponentially. On the multilateral level, India became more actively involved in discussions concerning global issues such as world trade or climate change and has begun to proactively project her own foreign policy agenda via groupings such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). On January 11, 2006, the then Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran confirmed the essence and continuity of India’s general foreign policy orientation: Table 2. Cognitive prior of India’s foreign policy. (1) Tolerance (idealism) (2) Non-violence (ahimsa) (idealism) (3) Mandala-concept (realism) (4) Panchsheel-concept (idealism-realism) (5) Non-alignment (idealism-realism) (6) Primacy of National Interest (realism) (7) Primacy of Autonomy (realism) (8) Principle of Bilateralism (realism) ASIAN SECURITY 9 India has maintained a remarkable continuity in the fundamental tenets of its policy. The core of this continuity is to ensure autonomy in our decision making. It is to ensure independence of thought and action. This was and remains the essence of our adherence to the principle of Non-Alignment. It is also the basis of our commitment to the Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which India and China jointly advocated in the early 1950s, and still believe to be relevant in contemporary international relations. There are other key elements of continuity as well. These include maintenance of friendly relations with all countries, resolution of conflicts through peaceful means and equity in the conduct of international relations.49 In summary, the Panchsheel-principles are still India’s most important principle regarding the way India wants relations between nations to be governed, i.e., without interference and at equidistance. Nonetheless, the normative origins and roots of regional multilateralism still stem from the 1950s and Nehru’s opposition to multilateral security cooperation. Summarizing the aforementioned, the Table 2 enumerates the eight major principles and normative orientations of India’s foreign policy. They show that there are idealist as well as realist trends, but that realist aspects clearly predominate. In sum, India’s cognitive prior is indicative of important features of India’s collective memory. It has incorporated an idealist strand that has led to rhetorical confirmation of idealism and cooperation but, more often than not, actually follows political realism. Based upon Acharya's arguments outlined previously, the subsequent case studies will thus try to establish how relevant stakeholders first framed the “new” idea of regional multilateralism. This will then be followed by an analysis of how the idea was eventually grafted and pruned to make it compatible with the cognitive prior and how the latter shaped the local implementation of the norm “regional multilateralism”. Case study 1: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) The framing of regional multilateralism Against the backdrop of a lively academic debate in South Asia on the necessity and advantages of regional cooperation in South Asia in the late 1970s as well as a favorable politico-strategic environment between the countries of the region, a first tentative step towards implementing a general structure of regional cooperation was made by Zia-ur-Rahman, president of Bangladesh until 1981. He discussed the possibility of organizing regional cooperation in South Asia during personal visits to Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the late 1970s and in 1980.50 At this early stage, Rahman’s role was that of a norm entrepreneur by advocating the introduction of a foreign norm – i.e., regional multilateralism – into South Asia. In a letter sent to the heads of state or government of several South Asian countries, he argued, “The contemporary experience in inter-state relations all over the world strongly emphasizes the need for regional cooperation with a view to maximizing either security and stability or accelerating economic and social development.” 51 These words show that the incorporation of security aspects were thought of as an integral part of regional cooperation. In an interview with a former Indian Ambassador, I was informed about a discussion between Indira Gandhi and high-ranking Indian diplomats, in which she voiced her apprehensions about Bangladesh’s motives. She had made it very clear to Rahman in a personal talk that Bangladesh had to make significant “concessions” if India was to join any kind of regional cooperative endeavor. Also, she told Rahman that India follows the Panchsheel and regional cooperation had to respect that policy.52 At the same token, Indira Gandhi shared her father’s dislike of multilateral collective security and was aware of the danger of South Asian neighbor’s cooperation without Indian participation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh then drafted a proposal53 in November 1980 and circulated it among the countries of the region. The paper expressed the determination to uphold respect for the principles of sovereignty, national independence, territorial integrity, non-interference, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes.54 The fact that the proposal referred to “independence,” the Panchsheel principle, and the Non-Aligned Movement confirms the significance of these principles but also shows that due to Indira Gandhi’s early insistence on their inclusion, they 10 A. MICHAEL were mentioned in the proposal. Nehru’s ideational legacy visibly influenced the process at this early stage. The proposal, although already influenced by the informal talks between Indira Gandhi and Rahman, still contained ideas that stood in contrast to Indian interests. India made it clear that any strategic and security related aspects would have to be excluded from the proposal. India also feared that the initiative for South Asian regional cooperation might be an attempt to limit her actions in South Asia, which was not acceptable when looking at her historical experiences as a former British colony. The Indian reaction was therefore both testament to the cooperative side of India’s foreign policy principles and the belief in the primacy of bilateralism and independence. At the same token, it is important to realize that the kind of proposed institutionalized regional multilateralism was actually a new element for India’s foreign policy. Accepting it – that is, localizing it – meant, in principle, that India could also enhance its authority in the region. In pursuance of the Bangladesh proposal, the foreign secretaries of seven South Asian countries gathered in Colombo from April 21–23, 1981 in order to discuss the Bangladesh proposal. During this meeting, the then Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Sathe outlined India’s approach and insisted on following a slow, gradual course of action regarding regional cooperation, while opposing the creation of any institutional arrangement already at that early stage. Sathe restrained the enthusiasm of Bangladesh and smaller states and insisted on “confining” regional cooperation to certain areas and voiced two important pre-conditions for regional cooperation in South Asia: Here I would submit that the principle of avoiding discussions in regional framework of all bilateral and contentious issues and of unanimity as the principle on the basis of which decisions in regard to regional cooperation are taken should be followed scrupulously.55 As a result of several exchanges of opinions at the foreign secretary level during a period of five years until mid-1983, an already very limited model of South Asian regional multilateralism was discussed. The Indian position was characterized by restraint with regard to the speed of cooperation and the insistence on issues related to trade. India had fast evolved to become the agenda setter and had pushed through her normative agenda by excluding any issues related to political or strategic fields from the discussions. It was at this meeting in Colombo that the norm of “regional multilateralism” was framed: the original norm entrepreneur Bangladesh was successful in introducing the outside norm, but the norm was immediately framed by Indian involvement to be in accordance with the cognitive prior. The grafting and pruning of regional multilateralism As outlined in the theoretical section, grafting means the linking of existing ideas with news ideas. The evolution of regional multilateralism in South Asia made a step in this direction when the foreign secretaries decided to shift the discussion to the foreign ministers’ level in New Delhi on August 1–2, 1983.56 The session was inaugurated by the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,57 a symbolic gesture that was a public display of the importance attached to the general idea of interstate cooperation that already Nehru had favored. While she stressed South Asian common denominators such as a shared ancient civilization, geography, cultural experiences – all of which were in consonance with major strands of India’s foreign policy – she also repeated India’s strict policy of non-alignment and summed up her vision of the regional grouping: Our policy is not to interfere in the affairs of others. [. . .] The regional grouping that brings us together is not aimed against anyone else. Nor are we moved by any ideological or military considerations. Our cooperation in no way limits each country’s freedom of judgment. [. . .] We are all equals. We are against exploitation and ASIAN SECURITY 11 domination. We want to be friends with all on a footing of equality. We should be ever vigilant against the attempts of external powers to influence our functioning.58 At the conclusion of the meeting, the foreign ministers signed and adopted a declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC), also known as the New Delhi Declaration,59 the second milestone in the evolution of regional multilateralism. According to the document, any future association was to be inter-governmental, not supra-national in nature. It did not involve a pooling of any common resources – military or otherwise – of the member countries. After several preparatory meetings, SAARC finally came into existence on December 8, 1985. In his speech at the first SAARC Summit, Rajiv Gandhi repeated India’s ideational stance and explained the Indian policy towards regional cooperation in South Asia: We have not sought to melt our bilateral relationships into a common regional identity, but rather to fit South Asian cooperation into our respective foreign policies as an additional dimension. We have evolved modalities which do not allow bilateral stresses and strains to impinge on regional cooperation.60 On the trajectory of localization, the process of pruning – the selection of those elements of the new norm that fit the cognitive prior and the rejection of the other parts – constitutes the final stage: it was at this very summit that the SAARC Charter was adopted. It enumerated the objectives, principles, and the institutional framework of SAARC and repeated elements of the corresponding two founding declarations. Most importantly, the charter institutionalized the now pruned norm of regional multilateralism. Two significant conditions reflecting the strict Indian position were incorporated as “General Provisions”: decisions at all levels would be taken on the basis of unanimity, and bilateral and contentious issues had to be excluded from the deliberations. The five principles of Panchsheel were reiterated. Also, it prescribed the institutional setup of the organization: a pyramidal structure with summits at the apex, supported by the Council of Ministers meeting, and standing committees comprising foreign secretaries. One consequence of the pruned norm of regional multilateralism was under-institutionalization, i.e., a weak secretariat with practically no authority, let alone capabilities to enforce decisions. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan wanted to give SAARC an institutional shape corresponding to ASEAN. India strongly opposed the idea.61 It eventually took until 1987 to agree on establishing a secretariat with severely limited powers and resources in Kathmandu. Successful institution building was thus not possible, with ensuing failures of independent and purposeful work on multilateral projects. All in all, while the norm had successfully diffused into the South Asian region prima facie, the ensuing process of norm localization led to the organization receiving a shape in accordance with India’s cognitive prior, resulting in a contradiction. It was an organization that was expected to further cooperation, yet it was explicitly forbidden to discuss bilateral and contentious issues. This, in the final analysis, practically precluded any progress in areas of inter-state cooperation in a region where especially bilateral problems were prevalent. Essentially, the institutional and organizational design of SAARC has not changed since the first summit. Between 1985 and 2017, only 18 SAARC summits have taken place. The organization presently has seven conventions and 13 agreements in place. A South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), though officially in existence, is still not fully functioning. Applying the matrix of regional multilateralism as developed in the theoretical section, the Table 3 shows the implementation of the norm after the process of localization. All things considered, the process of norm localization in the South Asian context has led to an institutional shape (Panchsheel-Multilateralism) that has incorporated India’s cognitive prior but has ultimately paralyzed genuine regional cooperation. 12 A. MICHAEL Table 3. The norm of regional multilateralism in South Asia. 1. A minimum number of three independent states 2. Voluntary Formation 3. Equality of all states (one state, one vote) 4. Common projects as general agenda 5. Coordination (e.g. of national policies) as special agenda 6. Rejection of uni- or bilateralism in sectors of cooperation and inclusive approach 7. Enduring cooperation 8. An independent institutional set-up that is capable of purposeful work on goals & projects 9. Institution-building 10. Common identity-building + - (peer pressure) + + - Case study 2: The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)62 Ten years after SAARC was founded, another attempt at regional multilateralism with Indian participation was made, this time with a view to finding common ground between the countries of the IOR. Regional cooperation was promoted by two very different initiatives and norm entrepreneurs. One originated in Mauritius, another in Australia.63 The framing of regional multilateralism Different stakeholders in the IOR began to frame the norm of regional multilateralism at different point in times, in ways that benefitted their differing objectives. In March 1995, the government of Mauritius launched the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI)64 in order to probe the possibility for an intensified IOR cooperation. As originally proposed by Mauritius in December 1994, the first Inter Government Meeting (IGM) of Experts of Indian Ocean Rim countries was held in Port Louis from March 29–31, 1995.65 The seven participating states – Australia, Singapore, India, Oman, Kenya, South Africa, and Mauritius – were supposed to represent seven sub-systems of the Indian Ocean region. The precise nature of the proposed framework, however, was not substantiated. Sandy Gordon highlights that “the Mauritius process was developed by Mauritius under the guiding hand of India.”66 The second initiative to forge the IOR countries into a wider political and economic forum originated from the Australian government. From June 11–13, 1995, the meeting of the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) was held in Perth. IFIOR followed a trans-national approach, bringing together 122 participants from business, academia, and government in their personal capacity from 23 Indian Ocean region countries. Unlike the Mauritius meeting, the Perth meeting had a more comprehensive agenda that included economic and fiscal matters, social, political, and strategic issues, as well as maritime issues dealing with the Indian Ocean per se, all of which the Mauritius group had virtually ignored. According to K. R. Singh, “some participants, particularly from India, successfully tried to restrict the debate to economic matters.”67 Indian delegates were concerned that bilateral disputes might be raised if, in a proposed multilateral association like the Perth Forum, the subject matter of “security” was placed on the agenda. In view of the wide-ranging problems in the Indian Ocean, Australia on the other hand initially expressed her keen interest in including security issues, indicating that security was an integral part of Australia’s cognitive prior.68 An analyst summarized the state of affairs: “Canberra does not seem to be too keen on economic cooperation, since it is part of the APEC. It is more interested in roping in other countries as a possible bulwark against the rising power of China.”69 The Indian perspective was expressed by the Indian delegate Verinder Grover: We want [the IOR-ARC] to concentrate on economic cooperation. It is our firm belief that economic cooperation and the resultant growth and development of our Indian Ocean world will itself have a beneficent leavening influence on the political and security climate of the region.70 ASIAN SECURITY 13 This once again confirms India’s cognitive prior and shows that Australia – as the original norm entrepreneur – originally followed a completely different agenda. The divergences in approach over the rim plan visibly surfaced at Perth. Australia preferred “security issues” to be included along with economic matters in the new type of forum. Similarly, Australia also preferred a broad-based representation of the rim countries. However, a majority of the delegates at the Perth Forum, influenced and led by India, insisted on excluding the security agenda and on a limited and graduated membership, in consonance with India’s traditional approach towards regional multilateralism. It was hence at this forum that regional multilateralism was framed. The Australian attempts of putting regional security onto the agenda proved futile, which led the Australian media to conclude that the “defeat of Australia’s proposal to establish a new organization of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean [. . .] is a major setback for the ‘Look West’ strategy.”71 Australia practically refrained from raising security issues again.72 The grafting and pruning of regional multilateralism As a follow-up to the inaugural IORI conference, the First Working Group Meeting of IORI was held in Port Louis, Mauritius from August 15–17, 1995. Based on comments made and written inputs to be received from other delegations, the working group mandated India to coordinate the preparation of a draft charter for the considerations of the next working group meeting. Thereby, India was able to draft the charter according to her own preferences, as had happened a decade earlier in the case of SAARC; regional multilateralism was grafted and pruned by taking on a shape that was in accordance with India’s cognitive prior. The Second Working Group Meeting of IORI was held in Port Louis on May 14–16, 1996. The Indian draft version of the IORI Charter was discussed, revised and then referred to governments of both member states and prospective member states. Thus, as an Indian observer concluded 1996 in The Hindu, “wittingly or unwittingly, India has taken over the leadership role in this regional cooperation programme.”73 Comparable to the situation during the deliberations leading to the founding of SAARC, the norm of regional multilateralism was ultimately pruned in the shape of the charter. According to this charter, the Panchsheel form the guidelines for any cooperation, and decisions are made by consensus. There are three bodies: The Council of Ministers (CoM), the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), and the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF). There was practically no debate about the exact institutional mechanisms for the proposed organization; the consensus was a de facto adoption of the tripartite governance model of APEC with “open regionalism,” i.e., maximization of trade and investment opportunities through a flexible regulatory system and elastic rules of membership. To what extent this model would suit the needs of diverse IOR was not debated in-depth. The inaugural Ministerial Meeting of the IOR-ARC was held on March 5–7, 1997 at Port Louis in Mauritius.74 Between 1997 and 2017, altogether 16 Ministerial Meetings were held, which were preceded or followed by track two meetings. Except for several communiqués and declarations, no tangible collaborative achievements have taken place, and the most notable change only happened in 2013 when the name of the organization was changed to IORA. In the process of localization, all features of regional multilateralism that dealt with enduring cooperation, independent institutionalsetup, institution building, and identity building were pruned and instead Indian ideas towards the scope and limits of regional multilateralism grafted. Table 4 shows the difference between the generic features of the norm and the features after norm localization: The result of the grafted and pruned norm of regional multilateralism was already aptly summarized in 2009 by the then Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor. He commented that after 12 years of cooperation, “[IOR-ARC has not] done enough to get beyond the declaratory phase that marks most new initiatives.”75 14 A. MICHAEL Table 4. The norm of regional multilateralism in the Indian Ocean Rim. 1. A minimum number of three independent states 2. Voluntary Formation 3. Equality of all states (one state, one vote) 4. Common projects as general agenda 5. Coordination (e.g. of national policies) as special agenda 6. Rejection of uni- or bilateralism in sectors of cooperation and inclusive approach 7. Enduring cooperation 8. An independent institutional set-up that is capable of purposeful work on goals & projects 9. Institution-building 10. Common identity-building + + + + - Conclusion: Panchsheel-Multilateralism as a localized form of Asian regional multilateralism Localization clarifies why Asian regionalism remains, in essence, under-institutionalized. Localization creates path-dependency, and the latter “reveals much about the absence of ‘European style’ regional institutions in Asia, despite recent efforts at strengthening and legalizing their institutional framework to cope with new pressures.”76 The two case studies demonstrated that cooperation per se has been an important feature of India’s cognitive prior, and therefore a general acceptance of regional multilateralism was fairly straightforward. This finding could not have been corroborated by applying a political realism approach. A focus on material factors and power alone cannot not adequately explain why India entered into such regional arrangements in the first place, considering the political and economic asymmetry which has always existed in South Asia and, by extension, in the IOR. Also, arguing that it is mostly the Indo-Pak antagonism that has been the major stumbling block for SAARC fails to acknowledge that the ideational basis regarding multilateralism has been very strong on the Indian side. The example of IORA also shows that a constructivist interpretation of the founding and evolution of this organization provides a much more nuanced understanding why this organization has never really functioned. In both cases, India’s insistence on the idea of complete independence and autonomy were much stronger ideas or, as Nehru defined the essence of Panchsheel, each country fending for itself.77 The aspect of legitimacy and authority as a major part of the objective of localization also needs special recognition: India’s participation, prima facie, was a gesture towards the smaller countries of both regions. India’s desire to increase her reputation necessitated it to publicly display that she was willing to participate in regional forums. Still, as a consequence of India’s cognitive prior, regional multilateralism was implemented but in a drastically diminished form in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, limiting spill-over processes and independent institutional growth, which are the traditional hallmarks of regional multilateralism. Ongoing research into “transformative power Europe”78 has shown that worldwide regional cooperation has often implemented key parts of the European role model prima facie, yet without the willingness for indispensable concrete follow-up action. The case of South Asia and the Indian Ocean is dissimilar and can best be approached by looking at the cognitive prior of India. The process tracing conducted in the preceding two sections shows that India modeled the institutional structure and decision-making procedures of SAARC and IORA in accordance with her cognitive prior, while for the first time firmly incorporating regional multilateralism as an integral part of her foreign policy. Both organizations are practically shackled to the ministry of external affairs of the respective countries. Genuine regional multilateralism can neither be detected in South Asia nor the Indian Ocean, and the performance of regional multilateralism remains in a state of stasis, a fact that has been recognized time and again in speeches and political commentaries but has not been addressed in institutional terms. Panchsheel-multilateralism, in the final analysis, is a South Asian variation of a Western model of cooperation, providing a somewhat uncompromising, culturally and historically based reaction to the attempt of introducing a global norm into South Asia. Only a proper acknowledgment of the historical and ideational roots of India’s foreign policy makes it possible to understand why regional cooperation in these regions of the world will not, or cannot, successfully implement the global norm of regional multilateralism. ASIAN SECURITY 15 Notes 1. J. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946–April 1961 (3rd Reprint). (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 2006), 280. 2. “Modi-Sharif Handshake Salvages SAARC Summit,” Times of India, November 27, 2014, http://timesofindia. (accessed indiatimes.com/india/Modi-Sharif-handshake-salvages-Saarc-summit/articleshow/45296970.cms November 28, 2014). 3. “SAARC Summit Postponed Indefinitely,” The Hindu, September 30, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/ international/SAARC-summit-quotpostponed-indefinitelyquot/article15419427.ece. (accessed October 1, 2016). 4. J. Nehru, “Inter-Asian Relations.” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 2 (1946): 327. 5. World Bank, South Asia: Growth and Regional Integration (Report). (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 2. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7377089/south-asia-growth-integration-regional-integra tion; World Bank, Regional Integration in South Asia (Brief). (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014). http:// www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/south-asia-regional-integration 6. A. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001); J. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture. Origins, Developments and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); A/ Jetschke, & J. Rüland, “40 years of ASEAN: Perspectives, Performance and Lessons for Change,” The Pacific Review 21 (2008): 397–409; S. Rother, Normen, Identitäten und die Logik der Anarchie. Die ASEAN aus konstruktivistischer Perspektive (Freiburg: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, 2004). 7. World Bank, Regional Integration into South Asia. 8. A. Acharya, ”How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism.” International Organization, 58 (2004): 239–275, 269; Whose Ideas Matter. Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 9. K. Featherstone & C. Radaelli, Eds., The politics of Europeanisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); C. M. Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change,” European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 4, no. 8 (2000): 1–25. 10. T. Börzel & T. Risse, The Transformative Power of Europe. The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas. Freie Universität Berlin (KFG Working Paper No. 1), 2009, http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/ publications/working_paper/WP_01_Juni_Boerzel_Risse.pdf; T. A. Börzel & T. Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction,” West European Politics 35 (2012): 1–19; A. Jetschke, “Institutionalizing ASEAN: Celebrating Europe through Network Governance,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22 (2009): 407–426.; A. Jetschke & T. Lenz, “Vergleichende Regionalismusforschung und Diffusion: Eine neue Forschungsagenda,“ Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52 (2011): 448–474. 11. Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 149–50, 12. M. Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World,” in International Relations Theory and the Third World, edited by S. G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 31–54. 13. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. 14. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 15. M. Barnett & R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59 (2005): 39–77. 16. Acharya, “How Ideas Spread,” 240. 17. Ibid., 252; Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter. 18. J. Rüland, “Constructing Regionalism Domestically: Local Actors and Foreign Policymaking in Newly Democratized Indonesia,” Foreign Policy Analysis 10 (2014): 181–201. 19. Ibid., 190. 20. Acharya, “How Ideas Spread,” 251–252. 21. Acharya, “How Ideas Spread,” Whose Ideas Matter. 22. Acharya, “How Ideas Spread,” 244. 23. Ibid., 242–251. 24. A. Jetschke & J. Rüland, “Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: The Cultural Limits of ASEAN Cooperation,” The Pacific Review 22 (2009): 192. 25. E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (London: Stevens, 1958), 16. 26. In general, a region for the purposes of this article denotes a geographical area in which nation-states are interconnected by cultural, ethnic, and historical common denominators. 27. S. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. 28. J. T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999), 83. 16 A. MICHAEL 29. H. Boekle, V. Rittberger, & W. Wagner, Norms and Foreign Policy. Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory (Tübingen: University of Tübingen [Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung No. 34a], 2000), 4. 30. J. G. Ruggie, Ed., “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3, (1992): 574. 31. A. L. George & A. Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005). 32. Acharya Whose Ideas Matter, 21. 33. A. Michael, India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 21–47. 34. M. Liebig, “Kautilya’s Relevance for India Today,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 69, (2013): 99–116; R. U. Zaman, “Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy 25 (2006): 231–247. 35. A. Appadorai, The Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy, 1947–1972 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 36. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 280. 37. L. J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 3. 38. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 99–105, 39. The term Panchsheel is found in ancient Buddhist literature and refers to five principles of good conduct of the individuals. These are truth, non-violence, celibacy, refraining from drinking and vowing not to steal. 40. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 99–100. 41. Ibid., 2. 42. M. Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 104. 43. D. M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 249–263. 44. These were the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia (January 1949), the Baguio Conference (May 1950), the Colombo Powers Conference (April 1954), the Bogor Conference (December 1954), the Bandung AsianAfrican Conference (April 1955), the Shimla Conference (May 1955), the Brioni Conference (July 1956), and the Belgrade Conference (NAM Summit) (September 1961). 45. A. Acharya, Why is there no NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Weatherhead Center (WCIF Working Paper No. 05-05), 2005, http://files.wcfia.harvard. edu/1049__Why_No_Asian_Nato_FINAL.pdf 46. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 88–89. 47. Sumit Ganguly, Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 130–162. 48. Harsh Pant, Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2016), 178–191. 49. S. Saran, Present Dimensions of Indian Foreign Policy: Address by Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 2006, http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?2078/Present +Dimensions+of+the+Indian+Foreign+Policy++Address+by+Foreign+Secretary+Mr+Shyam+Saran+at +Shanghai+Institute+of+International+Studies+Shanghai. 50. S. D. Muni, “SARC: Building Regionalism from Below,” Asian Survey 25 (1985): 391–404; S. D. Muni & A. Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984). 51. Z.-u. Rahman, Letter on South Asian Cooperation, 1978, http://www.mofa.gov.bd/13saarcsummit/Homage% 20to%20Zia.pdf 52. Interview by author with former MEA secretary L. L. Mehrotra, 25 November 2006, New Delhi, India. 53. SAARC Secretariat, From SARC to SAARC: Milestones in the Evolution of Regional Cooperation in South Asia (1980-1988): Vol. I (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, 1988), 2–3. 54. Ibid., 7. 55. Muni & Muni, Regional Cooperation, 109. 56. I. Bokhari, “SARC: Progress, Problems, Potential and Prospects,” Asian Survey 25 (1985): 371–399. 57. I. Gandhi, “Inaugural Address: Meeting of South Asian Foreign Ministers,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 40 (1984): 259–261. 58. Ibid. 59. SAARC Secretariat From SARC to SAARC, 58–60. 60. R. Gandhi, Selected Speeches and Writings 1984-1985: Vol. I: 31 October 1984 - 31 December 1985 (New Delhi: Publications Division [Ministry of Information and Broadcasting],1987), 399–402. 61. Bokhari “SARC”; S. D. Muni, “SARC.” 62. IORA currently has 21 member states, seven dialogue partners and two observer organizations. 63. R. Mehta, “Indian Ocean Rim: Economic and Trade Issues,” Strategic Analysis 20 (1987): 243–262. 64. A. Saeed, “An Economic Forum for the Indian Ocean Region,” Regional Studies XIV, no. 1 (1996): 59–94. ASIAN SECURITY 17 65. C. Wagner, “Between Regionalism and Transregionalism: The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation,” in Interregionalism and International Relations, edited by H. Hänggi, R. Roloff, & J. Rüland (London: Routledge, 2006), 284 –292. 66. S. Gordon, “Building Regionalism in the Indian Ocean,” in Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence: Vol. 116. Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region, edited by S. Gordon (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1996), 199. 67. K. R. Singh, “The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation: Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean,” inEngaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy, edited by R. Harshe & K. M. Seethi (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005), 348. 68. G. Evans, Indian Ocean Regional Cooperation: Exploring the Possibilities. Keynote Address to the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region. Keynote address. Perth, 1995, http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1995/ 110695_indianocean_cooperation_possibilities.pdf 69. C. Mahapatra, Cooperative Efforts in the Indian Ocean Region (Working Paper No. 41) (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996), 18. 70. Gordon “Building Regionalism,” 201. 71. Mahapatra, Cooperative Efforts, 19. 72. A. Downer, Looking West: Australia and the Indian Ocean. Address to the International Business Council of Western Australia. Speech. Perth, 1997, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1997/look_west.html 73. H. S. Chhabra, “Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Rim,” The Hindu, November 8, 1996. 74. Michael, India’s Foreign Policy. 75. S. Tharoor, Indian Ocean Unity. Today’s Zaman, July 18, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/world_indianocean-unity_181261.html 76. Acharya “How Ideas Spread.” 77. Nehru India’s Foreign Policy, 99–100. 78. Jetschke “Institutionalizing ASEAN.” ORCID Arndt Michael http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6133-9230 Notes on contributor Dr. Arndt Michael is a senior lecturer at the University of Freiburg (Germany), Department of Political Science. He teaches classes on International Relations, India’s Foreign and Security Policy and Emerging Regional Powers. He has published extensively on India’s Foreign and Security Policy, regional cooperation in South Asia and India in Africa. His book India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) received the Arnold Bergstraesser Award 2012 for Political Science (University of Freiburg, Germany), the Cecil B. Currey Book Award 2013 from the Association of Third World Studies (ATWS, US), and the Gisela Bonn Award 2013 from the German-Indo-Society (Deutsch-Indische-Gesellschaft, Germany).