MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
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Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18
ISSN 0025-1909 (print) ISSN 1526-5501 (online)
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2656
© 2016 INFORMS
Betting Your Favorite to Win:
Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
Carey K. Morewedge
Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215, morewedg@bu.edu
Simone Tang, Richard P. Larrick
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708
{simone.tang@duke.edu, larrick@duke.edu}
W
e examined whether people reduce the impact of negative outcomes through emotional hedging—betting
against the occurrence of desired outcomes. We found substantial reluctance to bet against the success
of preferred U.S. presidential candidates and Major League Baseball, National Football League, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball, and NCAA hockey teams. This reluctance was not attributable
to optimism or a general aversion to hedging. Reluctance to hedge desired outcomes stemmed from identity
signaling, a desire to preserve an important aspect of the bettor’s identity. Reluctance to hedge occurred when
the diagnostic cost of the negative self-signal that hedging would produce outweighed the pecuniary rewards
associated with hedging. Participants readily accepted hedges and pure gambles with no diagnostic costs. They
also more readily accepted hedges with diagnostic costs when the pecuniary rewards associated with those
hedges were greater. Reluctance to hedge identity-relevant outcomes produced two anomalies in decision making, risk seeking and dominance violations. More than 45% of NCAA fans in Studies 5 and 6, for instance,
turned down a “free” real $5 bet against their team. The results elucidate anomalous decisions in which people
exhibit disloyalty aversion, forgoing personal rewards that would conflict with their loyalties and commitments
to others, beliefs, and ideals.
Keywords: hedging; self-signaling; risk; identity; emotions
History: Received March 17, 2015; accepted August 23, 2016, by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision
making. Published online in Articles in Advance October 12, 2016.
target. We believe they will not. In contrast to standard
utility models positing that people should enact hedging as a utility-maximizing strategy, we suggest that
the identity relevance of desired outcomes introduces
a disincentive to hedge. People should be reluctant to
hedge desired outcomes because of the motivational
conflict hedging would induce. In economic terms,
hedging requires a decision maker to trade off the
potential gains in utility associated with the payout of
the hedge (i.e., outcome utility) against the negative
self-signal about her identity that hedging would produce (i.e., its diagnostic cost).
Most accounts of standard expected utility theory
suggest that if the utility of gambles and the outcomes determining those gambles are integrated, people should prefer to hedge emotional disappointment.
A strategy of betting on desired outcomes increases
the variance of possible outcomes. Specifically, it maximizes gains if the desired outcome occurs but also maximizes losses if the desired outcome does not occur.
By contrast, a strategy of hedging a desired outcome
decreases potential variance. It minimizes gains if the
desired outcome occurs but also minimizes losses if
Hedging is a strategy whereby one makes an investment to offset a potential loss in a companion investment (Smith and Stulz 1985). Many consequential
financial decisions involve hedging, including the
diversification of equity and currency portfolios in
financial investments and the purchase of medical,
home, auto, and life insurance for oneself and one’s
family. We examine whether, as with financial losses,
people are inclined to hedge the negative emotions that
would be induced by uncertain, negative future outcomes that are associated with important aspects of
their identity (e.g., a group, person, or position with
which they identify). To minimize the emotional disappointment incurred by the loss of her favorite team,
for example, a fan could make an emotional hedge. She
could bet that her team will lose its next game. If the
team loses, her disappointment would be reduced by
the payout of the gamble. If her team wins, she would
lose an amount of money that she might gladly forgo
for it to win.
Specifically, we test whether people will seek emotional hedges to offset the potential disappointment of
an undesirable future outcome for an identity-relevant
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Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
the desired outcome does not occur. In the case of
car insurance, people readily accept a pure loss (their
insurance payment) to reduce the magnitude of a possible greater financial loss due to an accident (the
value of their car and liabilities). Standard utility theories assume a concave utility function (i.e., diminishing marginal utility), which predicts that people will
prefer to minimize the risk of potential losses rather
than maximize potential gains and should bet against
rather than on desired outcomes (e.g., Bernoulli 1954,
Fischer et al. 1986, von Neumann and Morgenstern
1944, von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986).1
There are two reasons why people could be reluctant to hedge desired outcomes. One is that people do
not like to anticipate undesirable outcomes and may
engage in various motivated processes that lead to
inflated estimates of the likelihood of desirable outcomes (Baker and Emery 1993, Hoch 1985, Massey
et al. 2011, Simmons and Massey 2012; cf. Krizan and
Windschitl 2007). Consequently, these motivated processes may inflate the perceived expected value of
desired events (e.g., Levitt 2004, Simmons and Nelson 2006). If these motivated processes make desired
outcomes appear to be the most likely outcome, people may prefer to bet on desired outcomes because
people exhibit a preference for betting on more likely
outcomes (e.g., Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973). However, we suggest that even if people are offered a
very generous payout that accounts for these biases
and preferences, they will be unlikely to bet against a
desired outcome. This is because accepting a hedge creates an uncomfortable conflict between identity- and
outcome-oriented motives (diagnostic utility and outcome utility, respectively).
From a psychological perspective, hedging creates
an interdependence dilemma—a motivational conflict
between a short-term monetary gain and the long-term
benefits accrued from feelings of identification with
and loyalty to a position, person, or group whom the
bettor desires to succeed (Hogg et al. 2004, Kelley and
Thibaut 1978, Van Lange et al. 1997). From the perspective of balance theory (Heider 1958), psychological conflict arises as a result of an imbalanced triadic
relationship in which there is a negative relationship
between a desired outcome (e.g., a preferred candidate
or team winning) and a reward (e.g., pecuniary benefits of hedging) that are both positively related to the
self. The experience of motivational conflict induces
1
The value function in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979) yields a more complicated pattern of risk preference: risk
aversion for choices involving gains (due to concavity caused by
diminishing sensitivity), extreme risk aversion among mixed outcomes (due to loss aversion), and risk seeking for choices involving
all losses (due to convexity caused by diminishing sensitivity). We
assume that people view desired outcomes and gambling wins to
be gains.
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
considerable negative affect (Heider 1958). Numerous
demonstrations of cognitive dissonance illustrate how
people change their cognitions, beliefs, and behaviors
to avoid internal motivational conflict (Harmon-Jones
2000). Similarly, people exhibit arousal in response to
difficult decisions and often defer them to avoid the
negative feelings conflict engenders (e.g., Anderson
2003, Krosch et al. 2012, Shafir and LeBoeuf 2004).
Interdependence dilemmas usually occur in reciprocal relationships where commitment is two-sided. In
a two-sided interaction, acting in a disloyal way to
another party might lead that party to react unfavorably (e.g., retaliate, withdraw from the relationship,
express disappointment). We propose that even in onesided relationships where there is no potential for positive or negative reciprocation (e.g., a candidate or team
is unlikely to notice the action of an individual supporter or fan), the desire to avoid motivational conflict will induce a reluctance to hedge identity-relevant
outcomes. People will reject gambles that they would
otherwise accept if there were no loyalty conflict. Only
when the short-term rewards are sufficiently high to
outweigh the diagnostic costs will people compromise
their feelings of loyalty and commitment (Powell and
Van Vugt 2003).
In economic terms, this conflicted decision can be
modeled as a trade-off between the outcome utility
gained by hedging (e.g., money) and the diagnostic
costs it incurs (e.g., disloyalty; Bodner and Prelec 2003).
People make inferences about their beliefs and identity
from their behavior (e.g., Bem 1972, Goffman 1959). If a
person is uncertain about an aspect of her identity, such
as the extent to which she values a candidate or team,
hedging may signal to her that she is not as committed
to that candidate or team as she originally believed. If
the diagnostic cost of this self-signal and the resulting
identity change are substantial, it may outweigh the
outcome utility of hedging, and she may reject even
very generous hedges.
Both investments made by private and professional
investors and gambles made by National Football
League (NFL) fans provide tentative evidence that people are reluctant to hedge identity-relevant outcomes.
Private and professional investors exhibit underdiversification in their investment strategies. They overinvest in familiar assets from their own country,
geographic region, and company stock, despite considerable evidence suggesting this is a suboptimal
strategy (Foad 2010). Displaying an equity home bias,
a typical portfolio of American investors in 1987 was
predominantly (87.2%) composed of domestic equities despite the United States only commanding 43.1%
of world market capitalization (Cooper and Kaplanis
1994). Similar overinvestment in domestic assets is
observed in currency holdings. Most troubling is the
considerable overinvestment by individual investors
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in company stock. They risk losing both their job and
a large portion of their investments if their company
becomes bankrupt. The importance of this problem is
illustrated by the case of Enron, whose 21,000 employees’ 401(k) plans were primarily (62%) composed of
Enron stock when it failed (Benartzi et al. 2007). In
addition to greater comparative ignorance regarding
unfamiliar assets, these familiarity and equity home
biases have been linked to psychological identification with countries and firms (Foad 2010). Reported
national pride is positively correlated with home bias
(Morse and Shive 2011). Experiments in minimal group
settings show that investors prefer funds linked to their
social identity (Fellner and Maciejovsky 2003).
Evidence suggests NFL fans may be similarly reluctant to hedge identity-relevant outcomes. In one study,
76% of fans of underdog teams preferred to bet $50
that their team would win at even odds, despite a consensus of professional bookmakers agreeing that their
team would lose (Simmons and Massey 2012). These
gambles suggest that reluctance to hedge desired outcomes is not due to a moral aversion to profit from
the suffering of others (Inbar et al. 2012). Games, tournaments, and elections are structured so that suffering
is inevitable. One side must win and the others must
lose. Fans are perfectly willing to bet on the success of
their team, which is contingent on the suffering and
misfortune of its opponents. We predict that it is only
from the suffering and misfortune of their own team
that fans will be reluctant to benefit.
As we will show, reluctance to hedge desired outcomes produces two notable anomalies in decision
making: risk-seeking behavior and a preference for
financially and materially inferior options. Decision
makers who are reluctant to hedge exhibit risk-seeking
behavior for mixed gambles. They prefer to maximize
potential gains and losses by betting on desired outcomes, rather than minimizing potential gains and
losses by betting against them. Reluctance to hedge
also leads decision makers to violate a basic principle of rationality by preferring dominated alternatives. They may prefer an option guaranteeing them
no reward (e.g., $0) to an option rewarding them
(e.g., >$0) if an undesired outcome occurs.
Overview of Studies
We tested whether people are reluctant to bet against
desired outcomes among voters participating in U.S.
presidential elections (Studies 1 and 2), Major League
Baseball (MLB) baseball fans (Study 3), NFL football
fans (Study 4), National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball fans (Study 5), and NCAA
hockey fans (Study 6). We examined whether people
would be reluctant to hedge when we controlled for
wishful thinking by equating the expected value of
hedging and not hedging using participants’ own subjective probability estimates (Study 1), equating the
3
subjective probabilities and payouts of desired and
neutral outcomes (Studies 2 and 3), and equating the
objective probabilities of desired and neutral outcomes
(Study 4). We examined whether people would be
reluctant to hedge when hedging dominated its alternative in real choices (Studies 4–6). We also tested
whether the reluctance to hedge depended on the type
of reward offered (i.e., money or consumer goods;
Study 5) or merely reflected a more general aversion to
hedging or preference for betting on likely outcomes
(Study 2).
We tested our theoretical account of reluctance to
hedge in four ways. First, we examined whether people would be more reluctant to hedge desired outcomes with higher diagnostic costs than similar neutral
outcomes with lower diagnostic costs (Studies 2–4).
Second, we examined whether increasing the outcome
utility associated with hedging (i.e., its payout) would
reduce the reluctance to hedge (Study 4). Third, we
tested whether individual differences in the perceived
diagnostic cost of hedging a desired outcome would
determine reluctance to hedge it (Study 5). Fourth,
we examined whether reducing the diagnostic cost of
hedging a desired outcome would reduce the reluctance to hedge that outcome (Study 6).
We report how we determined our sample sizes, all
data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the studies we report. All study materials and
data can be accessed through the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/p2gj6).
Study 1: Hedging Against
Expected Value
We first examined hedging behavior by offering MBA
students a real bet on the 2000 U.S. presidential election. We calibrated bets to their personal beliefs about
which candidate would win by first eliciting individual
probability estimates of the election from each participant. We then used these estimates to offer each participant a choice of personalized bets on her preferred
candidate or his opponent to win, with equal expected
value. This allowed us to account for any optimistic
bias in the value of bets. We expected that participants
would still be reluctant to bet against their preferred
candidate, even though the structure of the bets they
were offered controlled for their personal (optimistic)
beliefs about the outcome of the election.
Method
Participants and Exclusions. One week before the
2000 U.S. presidential election, 111 MBA students participated in a two-part class exercise on October 30,
2000. Participants first reported their preferred 2000
U.S. presidential candidate of the four listed on our
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Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
survey: 45.9% preferred George W. Bush, 44.1% preferred Al Gore, 3.6% preferred Ralph Nader, and 0.9%
preferred Pat Buchanan, and 5.4% had no preference.
Eleven participants did not indicate a preference for
either Bush or Gore and were excluded from all further analyses. One participant did not respond to the
loyalty concern questions and was excluded from the
mediation analysis. No demographic information was
collected.
Procedure. In the first part of the class exercise, participants first indicated which of four presidential candidates they preferred in a paper survey: Bush, Gore,
Nader, or Buchanan. Next, participants reported the
strength of their preference for their preferred candidate on a nine-point scale with endpoints of very weak
(1) and very strong (9). To control for wishful thinking, participants then indicated the probability that
each candidate (i.e., Bush, Gore, Buchanan, and Nader)
would win the election from 0% to 100%.
In the second part of the class exercise, each participant was given a new sheet of paper offering paired
gambles for Bush and Gore to win the election, tailored to her probability estimates. To control for optimistic bias, the bets offered for each candidate to win
were adjusted so that each had an expected value of
$7.50. For example, if a participant believed Bush had
a 75% chance of winning the election and Gore had a
25% chance of winning, her paired gamble would be a
choice between the bets (a) earn $10 if Bush wins and
$0 if Gore wins and (b) earn $30 if Gore wins and $0
if Bush wins. Participants were matched from the first
part to the second via the last four digits of their student identification numbers.
All participants chose whether to bet on Bush or
Gore to win the election, and then they answered
six questions about the motives for their choice of
Table 1
bet on seven-point scales with endpoints of disagree
strongly (1) and agree strongly (7). The questions were
designed to capture a range of plausible motivations
under risky choice. Two items measured preferences
for probability or payment: “I wanted to choose the
option with the highest chances of winning money”
and “I wanted to choose the option that paid the most
money” (r = 0009, ns). Two insurance motive items
measured explicit awareness of a hedging strategy:
“I wanted to insure myself against a bad election outcome” and “I wanted to be sure to have something
to be happy about—either winning money or having
my candidate win” (r = 0058, p < 0005). Most important, two items measured loyalty to the preferred candidate: “I wanted to be loyal” and “I would not enjoy
money that I received if the opposing candidate won”
(r = 0051, p < 0001).
If participants chose Bush, they received payouts
after the U.S. Supreme Court determined the outcome
of the election.
Results
Optimistic Bias. Participants were slightly optimistic with respect to the perceived probability that
their preferred candidate would win. On average, Bush
supporters believed that Bush had a 53.5% chance of
winning (and Gore a 45.0% chance), whereas Gore supporters believed that Bush had a 50.7% chance (and
Gore a 48.6% chance), but these differences were not
significant (p’s > 0008).
Hedging and Loyalty. As predicted, a majority of
participants (74%) rejected an opportunity to hedge
and bet on their preferred candidate to win, a proportion significantly greater than 50% (binomial z = 4070,
p < 00001) (see Table 1). We next used logistic regression to examine betting on the preferred candidate to
Frequency of Betting Against the Focal Outcome (e.g., Hedging) by Type of Gamble, and Its
Expected Value Relative to Betting on the Focal Outcome, in Studies 1–6
Gamble
EV
Identity-relevant
hedge (%)
Pure
gamble (%)
Identity-irrelevant
hedge (%)
Study 1: 2000 U.S. presidential election
Study 2: 2016 U.S. presidential election
All focal outcomes
Unlikely focal outcomes 4p = 00405
Likely focal outcomes 4p = 00605
Study 3: 2015 MLB game
Study 4: 2010 NFL games (means)
Fans
Nonfans
Study 5: 2013 NCAA men’s basketball
Study 6: 2015 NCAA men’s hockey
=
2600
=
=
=
>
1400a
1600a
1200a
5200a
4406b
7000b
1906a
6600b
3900b
6400b
1400a
<
<
>
>
2203a
4107a
5309
4009a
4200b
4601a
9500b
Notes. Different superscripts within rows indicate significant differences between conditions 4p < 00055 with 2
(Studies 2, 3, and 6) or F (Study 4). Expected values for gambles of all types were matched within studies.
Expected values of bets against the focal outcome (EV) were equal to those of bets on the focal outcome in
Studies 1 and 2, were (on average) greater than those in Studies 3, 5, and 6, and were (on average) less than
those in Study 4.
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win as a function of strength of preference for the preferred candidate and the perceived probability of his
success (converted to log odds). Not surprisingly, the
perceived odds of the candidate winning significantly
predicted betting him to win (B = 4062, SE = 2008,
2 = 4095, p < 0003). More important, even after controlling for perceived odds, the strength of support for the
preferred candidate predicted the likelihood that participants would bet on him to win (B = 0027, SE = 0013,
2 = 3097, p < 0005).
Ratings following the choice suggest that conflicting
motives were the source of the reluctance to hedge.
Of the 99 participants reporting loyalty concerns,
those who rejected a hedge reported having more loyalty concerns for their preferred candidate (M = 5029,
SD = 2092) than did participants who hedged against
him (M = 2016, SD = 1015) (t4975 = 5022, p < 00001).
To test whether loyalty concerns mediated the influence of preference strength on the reluctance to hedge,
we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes 2013)
to test the indirect pathway from support to loyalty
concerns to the betting decision (Model 4 with 5,000
bootstrapped samples) and found a significant indirect path (95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.12, 0.66). To
test loyalty against the other two motives, we entered
the hedging strategy items, the option to win the most
money item, and the option with the highest chance
of winning as covariates into the model. The loyalty mediation remained significant (95% confidence
interval = 600101 00755. Finally, entering all motives in
the model resulted in only loyalty predicting hedging behavior (95% CI = 0.13, 0.79) and not insurance
(95% CI = −0025, 0.03), greatest profit (95% CI = −0007,
0.18), or greatest chance (95% = −0006, 0.04).
Discussion
A majority of participants were reluctant to hedge an
identity-relevant outcome. Rather than betting against
their preferred candidate, most participants bet on
their preferred candidate to win. Thus, participants
maximized rather than minimized risk when making
incentive-compatible choices between gambles. This
was true even though the expected value of the bets
accounted for any optimism in their subjective probability estimates. In other words, participants were not
simply reluctant to hedge against their preferred candidate because they thought he would win. As evidence that identity signaling underlay their reluctance
to hedge, that reluctance increased with their support
for the candidate and was only mediated by loyalty
concerns. It appears that the greater the diagnostic
cost associated with hedging, the less likely participants were to bet their preferred candidate to lose the
election.
5
Study 2: Hedging Identity-Relevant
and Identity-Irrelevant Outcomes
In Study 2, we decoupled identity relevance and
hedging to differentiate reluctance to hedge identityrelevant outcomes from a more general reluctance to
hedge any outcome. We did so by adding a condition
in which participants could hedge an outcome that
was not relevant to their identity. All participants indicated their preference between two candidates in the
2016 U.S. presidential election (i.e., Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump), the strength of their preference, and
their cash equivalent for that candidate to be elected—
how much money they would have to receive right
then to be as happy as if their candidate won the election. We then asked participants to choose between two
hypothetical bets of equal expected value ($100): a bet
on a focal outcome or a bet on its alternative.
We manipulated two factors: whether the focal outcome was more 4p = 00605 or less 4p = 00405 likely than
chance, and whether the bets included an identityrelevant hedge, an identity-irrelevant hedge, or only
pure gambles. In the identity-relevant hedging condition,
participants chose between a bet on their preferred candidate to win the election and a bet on his or her opponent to win the election. In an identity-irrelevant hedging
condition, participants imagined they stood to earn the
amount of money they stated as their cash equivalent
if a wheel of fortune landed on black instead of white.
This procedure equated the emotional benefits in the
identity-relevant hedge to its dollar equivalent in the
identity-irrelevant hedge. In an additional gamble on
that spin, they then chose whether to double down
on the first gamble by betting on black or to hedge
that first gamble by betting on white. In an identityirrelevant pure gamble condition, participants simply
chose whether to bet on black or white in a spin of a
wheel of fortune (as in the identity-irrelevant hedging
condition, but without the cash-equivalent gamble).
Our theory suggests that reluctance to hedge should
be driven by the identity relevance of the outcome
rather than a general aversion to hedging. In other
words, participants should be more reluctant to accept
an identity-relevant hedge than an equivalent identityirrelevant hedge, whether or not participants were
more reluctant to accept an identity-irrelevant hedge
than an equivalent pure gamble.
Method
Participants and Exclusions. Three hundred and
two residents of the United States (151 women, Mage =
35084, SD = 12044) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) on August 4, 2016, to participate
in a study on the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Sample size was set on AMT in advance to 300 participants; 301 completed the experiment. All participants had an AMT approval rating equal to or higher
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
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than 95%. One participant who did not complete the
experiment was excluded.
Procedure. All participants first indicated whether
they preferred Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump to be
elected president of the United States of America on
November 8, 2016. They then indicated the extent to
which they preferred that candidate to his or her opponent on a five-point scale with endpoints of no more (1)
and very much more (5). Third, participants indicated
how much money they would have to earn right then
as a bonus payment to be as happy as they would be on
November 8, 2016 if their candidate won the upcoming
2016 election and was elected president of the United
States of America. This amount served as their cash
equivalent for that outcome.
Participants were then randomly assigned between
subjects to consider one of three gambles: an identityrelevant hedge, an identity-irrelevant hedge, or an
identity-irrelevant pure gamble (see Table 2 for examples). In the identity-relevant hedge condition, participants imagined that on the morning of the election
they believed their candidate had a 60% chance of winning the election (likely condition) or a 40% chance
of winning the election (unlikely condition). Perceived
likelihood of winning was represented by the shaded
region on a pie graph and was randomly assigned
between subjects. Participants in the identity-relevant
hedging condition then indicated which of two bets
they would prefer: a bet for their candidate to win the
Table 2
election or a bet for his or her opponent to win the election. Each option had an expected value of $100 such
that in the likely condition, the bets were a 60% chance
to earn $167 if a participant’s candidate wins (i.e.,
$167 × 0060 = $100 EV) and a 40% chance to earn $250 if
his or her opponent wins (i.e., $250 × 0040 = $100 EV).
In the unlikely condition, the bets were a 40% chance to
earn $250 if a participant’s candidate wins and a 60%
chance to earn $167 if his or her opponent wins. Participants were told they would earn $0 if the outcome
they chose did not occur. If participants chose to bet on
their candidate to win, their response was coded as not
hedging (coded as 0; betting on the focal outcome), and
if they chose to bet on his or her opponent to win, their
response was coded as hedging (coded as 1; betting
against the focal outcome).
Participants in the identity-irrelevant hedge condition were shown a black-and-white pie chart representing a wheel of fortune and imagined that they
had a 60% chance (or 40% chance) to win the cash
equivalent if the spin of an arrow on that wheel of
fortune landed on black. For example, if a participant
in the unlikely condition said her cash equivalent for
her preferred candidate winning the election was $700,
she would see, “Imagine you have a 40% chance to
win $700 if an arrow on a wheel of fortune randomly
lands on BLACK [not white].” These participants then
imagined that they were offered an additional, separate bet on the same spin of the wheel of fortune—this
being the critical dependent variable that measured
Example of Bets Offered by Gamble and Likelihood Conditions in Study 2
Unlikely condition
Likely condition
Identity-relevant hedge
Bet on focal outcome: Bet preferred
candidate to win the election.
Bet against focal outcome: Bet opposing
candidate to win the election.
Imagine that on the morning of the election, you
believed Hillary Clinton had a 40% chance of
winning.
• A 40% chance to earn $250 if Clinton wins.
• Earn $0 if Clinton loses.
• A 60% chance to earn $167 if Trump wins.
• Earn $0 if Trump loses.
Imagine that on the morning of the election, you
believed Hillary Clinton had a 60% chance of
winning.
• A 60% chance to earn $167 if Clinton wins.
• Earn $0 if Clinton loses.
• A 40% chance to earn $250 if Trump wins.
• Earn $0 if Trump loses.
Imagine you have a 40% chance to win $500 if the
arrow lands on black.
• A 40% chance to earn an additional $250 if black.
• Earn $0 if white.
• A 60% chance to earn an additional $167 if white.
• Earn $0 if black.
Imagine you have a 60% chance to win $500 if the
arrow lands on black.
• A 60% chance to earn an additional $167 if black.
• Earn $0 if white.
• A 40% chance to earn an additional $250 if white.
• Earn $0 if black
Imagine you are now offered a bet on the wheel of
fortune below. An arrow will spin around it and
then randomly land on one of two colors, black
(40%) or white (60%).
• A 40% chance to earn $250 if black.
• Earn $0 if white.
• A 60% chance to earn $167 if white.
• Earn $0 if black.
Imagine you are now offered a bet on the wheel of
fortune below. An arrow will spin around it and
then randomly land on one of two colors, black
(60%) or white (40%).
• A 60% chance to earn $167 if black.
• Earn $0 if white.
• A 40% chance to earn $250 if white.
• Earn $0 if black
Identity-irrelevant hedge
Bet on focal outcome: Second bet that the
arrow lands on black.
Bet against focal outcome: Second bet that
the arrow lands on white.
Identity-irrelevant pure gamble
Bet on focal outcome: Bet that the arrow
lands on black
Bet against focal outcome: Bet that the
arrow lands on white
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
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Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
identity-irrelevant hedging. In this additional bet, they
could choose to bet that the arrow would land on
black or white. Each option had an expected value of
$100 such that in the likely condition, the bets were a
60% chance to earn $167 if black wins ($167 × 0060 =
$100 EV) and a 40% chance to earn $250 if white wins
($250 × 0040 = $100). In the unlikely condition, the bets
were a 40% chance to earn $250 if black wins ($250 ×
0040 = $100 EV) and a 60% chance to earn $167 if white
wins ($167 ×0060 = $100). If participants chose to bet on
black, their response was coded as not hedging (coded
as 0; betting on the focal outcome), and if they chose
to bet on white, their response was coded as hedging
(coded as 1; betting against the focal outcome).
In the identity-irrelevant pure gamble condition,
participants saw a black-and-white pie chart representing a wheel of fortune and were told an arrow would
randomly land on one of two colors, black or white. In
the likely condition, the payouts and odds were a 60%
chance to earn $167 if black wins and a 40% chance
to earn $250 if white wins. In the unlikely condition,
the payouts and odds were a 40% chance to earn $250
if black wins and a 60% chance to earn $167 if white
wins. To compare betting preferences to the two hedging conditions, if participants chose to bet on black,
their response was coded as 0 (betting on the focal outcome), and if they chose to bet on white, their response
was coded as 1 (betting against the focal outcome).
For the purposes of clarity, the three conditions and
bets offered are summarized in Table 2. At the end of
the study, all participants reported their age and gender, and they again reported their preferred candidate
as an attention check.
Results and Discussion
Candidate Preferences and Cash Equivalents. Of
the 301 participants, 68.1% preferred Clinton and
31.9% preferred Trump to win. Relative to the indifference point (i.e., 1), participants exhibited a significant
preference for their preferred candidate to win the election (M = 4005, SD = 1033) (t43015 = 39077, p < 00001).
Cash equivalents were nonnormally distributed with
a positive skew and long tail (mean = $70,873.17;
median = $20.00; mode = $5.00; 25th percentile = $4.50,
75th percentile = $500.00).
Betting Behavior. Frequencies of bets by condition are presented in Table 1. We examined differences in betting behavior on the focal outcome with
a logistic regression coded with three dummy variables for likelihood (0 = unlikely, 1 = likely), pure gamble (0 = identity-relevant hedge, 0 = identity-irrelevant hedge, 1 = identity-irrelevant pure gamble), and
identity-irrelevant hedge (0 = identity-relevant hedge,
1 = identity-irrelevant hedge, 0 = identity-irrelevant
pure gamble). The identity-relevant hedge was the
7
omitted category. We then included two interactions in
the second step of the model, pure gamble × likelihood
and identity irrelevant × likelihood.
The initial regression model tested only main effects.
The model revealed a main effect of probability, where
people were less likely to bet against the focal outcome when its probability was high (B = −1090, SE =
0030, 2 = 40079, Exp(B) = 0.15, p < 00001), and a main
effect of pure gamble (B = 1087, SE = 0038, 2 = 23091,
Exp(B) = 6.46, p < 00001), indicating that people were
less likely to bet against the focal outcome when they
made an identity-relevant hedge than when they made
a pure gamble. Importantly, there was also a main
effect of identity irrelevance (B = 1057, SE = 0038, 2 =
17011, Exp(B) = 4.82, p < 00001), indicating that people
were less likely to bet against the focal outcome when
they made an identity-relevant hedge than when they
made an identity-irrelevant hedge.
A second model added two interaction terms, which
were both significant: a pure gamble × likelihood interaction (B = −1092, SE = 0075, 2 = 6064, Exp(B) = 0.15,
p = 00010) and an identity irrelevance × likelihood
interaction (B = −2006, SE = 0077, 2 = 7015, Exp(B) =
0013, p = 00007). We thus turned to the simple effects
in the output, which reveal how the two dummy
variables (pure gamble and identity-irrelevant hedge)
compare to the omitted category (identity-relevant
hedge) in the low-probability condition (Irwin and
McClelland 2001). Within the low-probability condition, participants were significantly more likely to bet
against the focal outcome in the pure gamble condition
than in the identity-relevant hedge condition (B = 2051,
SE = 0049, 2 = 25072, Exp(B) = 12025, p < 00001).
Importantly, they were also more likely to accept
an identity-irrelevant hedge than an identity-relevant
hedge (B = 2023, SE = 0049, 2 = 21017, Exp(B) = 9033,
p < 00001).
We also reverse-coded the high-probability condition as 0 and examined the simple effects of the hedging conditions when the preferred candidate’s probability of winning was high. We found that the identityrelevant condition did not differ significantly from the
identity-irrelevant condition (B = 0018, SE = 0060, 2 =
0009, p = 0077) or the pure gamble condition (B = 0058,
SE = 0056, 2 = 1008, p = 0030). These results suggest
that when the probability of the focal outcome was
high, participants showed a similar level of risk aversion in the identity-relevant hedge condition as in the
identity-irrelevant hedge condition and the pure gamble condition.
Additional analyses examining preference strength
for the preferred candidate as an individual predictor on hedging in the identity-relevant hedge condition revealed that preference strength for the preferred
candidate did predict reluctance to hedge the election (B = −00813, SE = 00241, 2 = 110374, Exp(B) =
0044, p = 00001). Preference strength did not predict
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
8
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hedging against the cash-equivalent gamble or betting
against the focal outcome in the pure gamble condition
(all B’s < −0007, all p’s > 0067). The results on betting
behavior remained the same, controlling for preference
strength.
Discussion
Participants were most reluctant to bet against their preferred presidential candidate—to hedge the identityrelevant outcome. By contrast, participants were just
as willing to accept an identity-irrelevant hedge as
an equivalent pure gamble. Participants were no less
likely to hedge against a gamble paying the cash equivalent of their candidate winning the election as they
were to place the equivalent bet in a pure gamble.
These results suggest that the reluctance to hedge is
unique to identity-relevant outcomes, that people do
not have a more general aversion to hedging.
It is important to note, however, that these analyses
only found reluctance to hedge identity-relevant outcomes when focal outcomes were unlikely. When focal
outcomes were likely, we presume that the preference
for betting on likely events (e.g., Levitt 2004, Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973, Simmons and Nelson 2006) made
betting on the focal outcome too attractive in all cases,
to differentiate betting on likely outcomes from reluctance to hedge identity-relevant outcomes. In Study 3,
we tested whether the reluctance to hedge identityrelevant outcomes is true when the focal outcome is
likely by making bets on likely focal outcomes less
attractive (i.e., reduced their expected value). We then
compared the propensity to accept generous identityrelevant hedges and similar pure gambles.
Study 3: Likely Identity-Relevant vs.
Identity-Irrelevant Gambles
In Study 3, we examined whether people are reluctant
to hedge likely identity-relevant outcomes. We asked
MLB fans outside Fenway Park about the Red Sox’s
chance of winning their game that day, assuming that
most fans would believe their team would win. We
then compared their preference for bets on that game
and on a nondiagnostic gamble with the same odds
and payouts (i.e., the spin of a wheel of fortune). This
allowed us to compare identity-relevant hedges and
identity-irrelevant gambles on likely events that had
the same subjective probabilities and payouts. In addition, we controlled for optimistic bias by eliciting fans’
perceived chance of their team winning.
Figure 1
Win = 0%
We set the payout for betting against the focal outcome in both gambles to be twice the payout for betting
on the focal outcome, so betting against the focal outcome had a higher expected value and would be an
attractive gamble. Our theory predicts that the greater
diagnostic cost of betting against their team would
make fans more reluctant to bet on their team to lose
than to choose the equivalent bet on the wheel of
fortune.
Method
Participants and Exclusions. One hundred one
pedestrians (30 women; Mage = 34094, SD = 14006) outside Fenway Park in Boston, Massachusetts, volunteered to complete a short survey before the start of
a game on July 25, 2015, between the Boston Red Sox
and the Toronto Blue Jays. Before the beginning of the
game, research assistants asked pedestrians in Kenmore Square and around Fenway Park if they were
willing to complete a survey about the game that
evening. Sample size was set to 100 complete surveys.
Data from one additional participant who did not
make choices for gambles were collected but not
included in this count or analyses because the critical
dependent measures were not completed.
Procedure. A research assistant handed each participant a pen and a clipboard holding a one-page paper
survey. Participants first answered, “To what extent are
you a fan of the Boston Red Sox?” on an 11-point Likert scale marked at the end and midpoints with hate
the Red Sox (1), neutral (6), and love the Red Sox (11).
Next, they drew an X through the 1 of 11 circles that
best depicted their perceived chance of the Red Sox
winning the game that day. The ratio of white to black
in each circle corresponded to the subjective probability of the Red Sox losing or winning, as illustrated
in Figure 1.
In a counterbalanced order, participants then indicated which (hypothetical) option they would choose
that day if offered each of two matched gambles, an
identity-relevant gamble on the game and an identityirrelevant gamble on the spin of a wheel of fortune.
For the identity-relevant gamble, participants indicated whether they would choose a bet paying $10 if
the Red Sox lost the game (the hedge) or a bet paying
$5 if the Red Sox won the game.
For the identity-irrelevant gamble, participants first
imagined that the circle they selected was a wheel of
fortune with an arrow that spun around the wheel until
Diagram Used to Elicit Subjective Probability of the Boston Red Sox Winning in Study 3 (Represented by Shaded Region)
Win = 10%
Win = 20%
Win = 30%
Win = 40%
Win = 50%
Win = 60%
Win = 70%
Win = 80%
Win = 90%
Win = 100%
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
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it randomly landed on black or white. They then indicated whether they would choose a bet paying $10 if
the arrow landed on white or a bet paying $5 if the
arrow landed on black. Finally, participants reported
their age and gender.
9
related. Indeed, when controlling for subjective probability, we found that there were no significant differences between the correlations between identification
and the two bets, nor were there significant differences
between the correlations for subjective probability and
the two bets (all Z’s < 1062, p’s > 0010).
Results
Descriptive Statistics. The majority of participants
indicated being fans of the Boston Red Sox (75.2%;
M = 8050, SD = 2012), as indicated by selecting a value
higher than the midpoint (6) of the scale. Despite the
Red Sox having lost more games than they won at
that point in their 2015 season (43 wins–54 losses), participants were on average more likely to believe that
the Red Sox would win than lose the game (MP(win) =
54.05%, SD = 23044). Perceived likelihood of a win was
positively correlated with the degree to which participants self-identified as fans (r4985 = 0040, p < 00001).
Hedging Behavior. Exhibiting a greater reluctance
to hedge in the identity-relevant than identityirrelevant gamble, participants were significantly less
likely to bet on the Red Sox to lose (M = 5200%) than to
bet on white (66.0%) (McNemar’s 2 4N = 1005 = 4069,
p = 0003) (see Table 1). Restricting the sample to the
participants who believed that the Red Sox were more
likely to win than lose the game (i.e., gave subjective
probability estimates greater than 60%), fewer participants were willing to bet on the Red Sox to lose (28.3%)
than bet on white (52.2%) (McNemar’s 2 4N = 465 =
5088, p = 00015). The effect of question order on betting
behavior was examined on the full sample in a 2 (gamble: identity-relevant, identity-irrelevant) × 2 (first bet:
identity-relevant, identity-irrelevant) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the first factor (as suggested by Rosenthal and Rosnow 1991 for
binary outcomes with n > 40). The greater reluctance
to bet on the Red Sox to lose than to choose the equivalent bet on white in the spin of the wheel of fortune
(F 411 985 = 5082, p = 00018) was not moderated by order.
There was no main effect of order or interaction (all
F ’s411 985 < 2011, all p’s > 0015).
In exploratory analyses, we found that self-identification as a fan was negatively correlated with betting
on the Red Sox to lose the game (r4985 = −0028, p =
00005). It was not negatively correlated with betting
on white in the nondiagnostic gamble (r4985 = −0012,
p = 0022). Subjective probability estimates were negatively correlated both with the likelihood of betting on
the Red Sox to lose the game (r4985 = −0043, p < 00001)
and with betting on white in the nondiagnostic gamble (r4985 = −0020, p = 00045). The evidentiary value
of these analyses is tempered by the positive correlation between self-identification and subjective probability assessments, suggesting that identification with
the team and the perceived likelihood of it winning are
Discussion
In many cases, optimism is likely to make betting one’s
team to win an unrealistically attractive gamble (e.g.,
Simmons and Massey 2012). Even when controlling for
optimistic bias and accounting for the preference to
bet on likely outcomes (Levitt 2004, Lichtenstein and
Slovic 1973, Simmons and Nelson 2006), we find that
people are reluctant to hedge likely identity-relevant
desired outcomes. Fans were more reluctant to accept
an identity-relevant hedge than an equivalent identityirrelevant pure gamble when we explicitly matched
their odds and payouts, even when restricting the sample to those who believed it was most likely that their
team would win.
Considered with the findings in the previous studies, optimistic bias does not seem to be solely responsible for reluctance to hedge desired outcomes. Partisans were reluctant to hedge the loss of their presidential candidate when the expected value of the hedge
accounted for their optimistic biases in Study 1, and
they were still reluctant to hedge the election when
their candidate was more likely to lose than win the
election in Study 2. Similarly, MLB fans were more
reluctant to hedge the loss of their team than accept a
similar pure gamble in Study 3.
By contrast, identity relevance appeared to play an
important role in the reluctance to hedge desired outcomes in each of these studies. Preferences for presidential candidates predicted the propensity to bet on
them to win in Studies 1 and 2. Partisans were more
reluctant to accept an identity-relevant hedge against
their preferred presidential candidate than identityirrelevant hedge or pure gamble on a wheel of fortune
in Study 2. Similarly, MLB fans were more reluctant to
hedge the loss of their team than accept a comparable
identity-irrelevant pure gamble in Study 3.
Study 4: Objectively Matched Desired
and Neutral Outcomes
Our fourth study compared bets on more similar kinds
of identity-relevant and identity-irrelevant gambles,
and further examined the role of diagnostic and outcome utility in reluctance to hedge. We compared the
gambles preferred by Pittsburgh Steelers fans in an
identity-relevant NFL game involving the Steelers to
the gambles they preferred in an identity-irrelevant
NFL game involving the Philadelphia Eagles. Both
teams were given the same odds of winning their
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10
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
games, which were played on the same day.2 Because
bets on the Steelers game should have more diagnostic utility than bets on the Eagles game, we predicted
Steelers fans would be less likely to bet against the
Steelers than the Eagles. By contrast, for participants
who were not fans of the Steelers, the bets in both
games should have no diagnostic utility, so they should
not be more or less likely to bet against either team.
To manipulate outcome utility, each participant indicated whether they would bet on the focal team or its
opponent to win across 41 different pairs of payouts for
both games. Our theory predicts that nonfans should
exhibit similar sensitivity to payouts in both games
(i.e., only exhibit a main effect of payout), because only
outcome utility should influence their choice of gambles. By contrast, Steelers fans should be more sensitive
to payouts when choosing gambles for the Eagles game
than for the Steelers game (i.e., exhibit a payout × game
interaction). In the Eagles game, fans should only consider outcome utility when choosing gambles. By contrast, in the Steelers game, fans should have to trade
off the outcome utility of gambles against their diagnostic utility, diluting the influence of outcome utility
on their choice of gambles.
Method
Participants and Exclusions. On July 14, 2010, one
hundred pedestrians (65 women; Mage = 37.65, SD =
16055) were recruited at the intersection of Forbes
Avenue and Murray Avenue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by a team of research assistants. The study
took place in a mobile laboratory, a large truck with
eight private computer terminals in its rear. Participants received $5 for compensation. Data collection
began when the laboratory was opened to participants at 10:19 a.m. and was arbitrarily ended when 100
responses had been collected at 4:43 p.m. There were no
participant exclusions.
Procedure. Each participant was seated at a private cubicle in a mobile laboratory and completed
the experiment on a laptop computer. In the experiment, participants made hypothetical bets on two
NFL games that took place on Sunday, September 12,
2010; these were the first games for each participating team in the 2010 regular season. Both games had
at the time been assigned the same average point
spread by VegasInsider.com: the Pittsburgh Steelers
(−1 against the spread) versus the Atlanta Falcons,
and the Philadelphia Eagles (−1 against the spread)
2
NFL spreads set by bookmakers are not precise reflections of the
outcome of games (spreads tend to be designed to exploit biases
to bet on visiting teams and favorites), but bookmakers set spreads
within a few percentage points, so each outcome is similarly likely
(Levitt 2004).
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
versus the Green Bay Packers. The order in which
games were considered was counterbalanced.
Participants first reported the extent to which they
were fans of each team playing in one game (e.g., the
Steelers and Falcons) on two five-point scales with endpoints of not at all (1) and a lifelong fan (5), and the
number of regular season games that they watched the
previous season. Participants then made hypothetical
bets on that game by picking which team they would
bet to win in each of 41 choice pairs. In each pair,
the payout for one team to win was $20. The payout
for its opponent increased in $1 increments from $0
to $20 ($0 if the Pittsburgh Steelers win or $20 if the
Atlanta Falcons win, $1 if the Pittsburgh Steelers win
or $20 if the Atlanta Falcons win, etc.). Thus, for each
team there was always a choice pair in which choosing
that team meant preferring to earn $0 than having a
chance to earn $20. These dominance violations were
the critical tests of whether participants would refuse
to hedge a desired outcome (the endpoints of the x axis
in Figure 2).
After making choices for the first game, participants
reported the extent to which they were fans of the
teams in the other game (e.g., the Eagles and the Packers) on two five-point scales and the number of regular
season games that they watched the previous season.
Participants then picked which of those two teams they
would bet to win in that game for each of 41 identical choice pairs. Finally, participants reported their age
and gender.
Results
Team Preferences. Seventy-six participants exhibited a greater preference for one team: the Pittsburgh
Steelers (64%), Philadelphia Eagles (6%), Green Bay
Packers (6%), and Atlanta Falcons (0%). Some participants did not prefer one team to all other teams (24%).
For Steelers fans and nonfans, their bets were coded
into choices for and against the Steelers and the team’s
matched control (i.e., the Eagles). Team preferences
appeared to be corroborated by behavioral reports.
Reported fandom for all four teams (MSteelers = 2092,
SD = 1052; MFalcons = 1018, SD = 0066; MEagles = 1041, SD =
0089; MPackers = 1050, SD = 1006) was positively correlated with the number of games that team played that
participants reported having watched during the 2009
NFL season (MSteelers = 5098, SD = 5089; MFalcons = 0064,
SD = 2044; MEagles = 1028, SD = 3008; MPackers = 1050,
SD = 3066) (all r ′ s4985 > 0077, all p′ s < 00001).
Steelers Fans. We first examined whether Steelers
fans (N = 64) would be more likely to exhibit a dominance violation by refusing to bet against the Steelers
in the choice pair in which they would receive nothing
($0) if the Steelers won and $20 if their opponent won
than the corresponding bet against the Eagles. Indeed,
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
11
whereas 78% of Steelers fans preferred a bet paying
them $20 if the Packers won rather than a bet paying
them $0 if the Eagles won, only 55% of Steeler fans
were willing to accept the equivalent hedge paying
them $20 if the Falcons won rather than a bet paying
them $0 if the Steelers won (t4635 = 4005, p < 00001) (see
the left panel of Figure 2). This resulted in a “loyalty
premium” of $4.70. Specifically, if the teams picked by
fans in this critical choice pair won, Steelers fans stood
to earn significantly less on average in the diagnostic
game involving the Steelers (M = $10093; SD = 10003)
than in the nondiagnostic game involving the Eagles
(M = $15063; SD = 8033) (t4635 = 4005, p < 00001, r=0.46).
All bets were then analyzed in a 2 (focal team: Steelers, Eagles) × 41 (payout) repeated-measures ANOVA.
Across all choice pairs, fans were less likely to bet
against the Steelers (M = 2203%, SE = 207) than the
Eagles (M = 4200%, SE = 209) (F 411 635 = 31023, p <
00001, p2 = 0033) (see Table 1). As the payout for both
focal teams increased, so too did the percentage of fans
who bet on them to win( F 411 635 = 49053, p < 00001,
p2 = 0044), as illustrated by the trends for bets on both
focal teams in Figure 2 (left panel). These main effects
were qualified by the predicted significant interaction.
Steelers fans were more reluctant to accept a bet
against the Steelers than the Eagles, although they were
increasingly willing to accept a bet against the Steelers
as the financial benefits of hedging increased in magnitude, as reflected by a significant focal team × payment
interaction (F 411 635 = 7091, p = 00007, p2 = 0011) (left
panel of Figure 2). Simple effects tests found that Steelers fans were more likely to reject a bet against the
Steelers than the Eagles for all cases in which the payout for the opposing team was equal or greater (all
t’s(63) ≥ 3000, all p’s ≤ 00004) (left panel of Figure 2).
Only in choice pairs in which the payout for the focal
team was $12 higher than the payout for its opponent
(e.g., $20 if the Steelers won, $8 if the Falcons won)
were participants equally likely to bet on the Steelers
and the Eagles (all t’s(63) ≤ 1093, all p’s ≥ 0006). In short,
it appears that Steelers fans were more sensitive to the
outcome utility of gambles for the game in which the
Eagles were the focal team than in the game in which
the Steelers were the focal team.
Not Steelers Fans. Whereas Steelers fans were more
reluctant to accept a gamble against the Steelers than
the Eagles, nonfans (N = 36) did not prefer either
focal team and appeared to base their choice of gambles purely on outcome utility. For these participants,
the same 2 (team) × 41 (payout) repeated-measures
ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of payout. Participants bet the team whose win would pay
more (F 411 355 = 24083, p < 00001, p2 = 0042) (right panel
of Figure 2). No main effect of focal team or interaction was found, as participants were as likely to bet
against the Steelers (M = 4107%; SE = 309) as they were
to bet against the Eagles (M = 4601%, SE = 402) (F < 1
and F 411 355 = 1007, p = 0031, respectively) (see Table 1).
Nonfans were not willing to pay a loyalty premium.
They stood to earn a similar amount of money in the
critical choice pair in the games between the Steelers
and Falcons (M = $15056, SD = 8043) and the Eagles and
Packers (M = $16011, SD = 8003) (t < 1).
Discussion
These results illustrate the trade-off between diagnostic and outcome utility inherent in hedging identityrelevant outcomes. NFL fans exhibited sensitivity to
diagnostic utility in their betting behavior. Fans were
more likely to bet on a focal team with which they
identified (i.e., Steelers) to win than a comparably
favored team with which they did not identify (i.e.,
Eagles), particularly when betting on the opponent to
Bets on Focal Team by Team, Bet Payouts, and Fan Status
Steelers fans
Not Steelers fans
$20 to W/$0 to L
$20 to W/$5 to L
$20 to W/$10 to L
$20 to W/$15 to L
$20 to W/$20 to L
$10 to W/$20 to L
$20 to W/$0 to L
$20 to W/$5 to L
$20 to W/$10 to L
$20 to W/$15 to L
$20 to W/$20 to L
$15 to W/$20 to L
$10 to W/$20 to L
$5 to W/$20 to L
$0 to W/$20 to L
Eagles
$5 to W/$20 to L
Steelers
100
90
80
70
60
% 50
40
30
20
10
0
$0 to W/$20 to L
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
$15 to W/$20 to L
Figure 2
Bet to lose (%)
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Notes. Pittsburgh Steelers fans were significantly more reluctant to bet against the Steelers than against a team given the same odds of winning that
day (i.e., Philadelphia Eagles) for all outcomes in which the payout for the focal team was less than 2.5 times the payout for its opponent. By contrast,
participants who did not identify as Steelers fans were indifferent in their betting behavior for both games. L, lose; W, win.
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12
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
win was more profitable. Only when the payout for
betting on both focal teams to win was at least 2.5 times
more profitable than betting on their opponents to win
were fans equally likely to bet on both focal teams to
win. Suggesting that diagnostic costs drove this betting behavior rather than idiosyncratic differences in
the games, participants who were not fans of either
team were equally likely to bet on both focal teams to
win at every level of payout.
Both fans and nonfans exhibited sensitivity to the
outcome utility of gambles. Participants who were not
fans were only sensitive to outcome utility in their betting behavior. Their bets on teams were determined
only by how much money they stood to earn if each
team won. NFL fans were sensitive to outcome utility in their choice of gambles, but were less sensitive
to outcome utility in the identity-relevant Steelers–
Falcons game than in the identity-irrelevant Eagles–
Packers game. In the identity-relevant game, even
when the pure outcome utility of betting against the
focal team outweighed the outcome utility of betting
on the focal team to win (as indicated by bets in the
Eagles–Packers game), the diagnostic costs involved in
hedging led many fans to still bet on the Steelers to win.
Study 5: Riskless Hedges
In Study 5, we tested whether people would reject a
very favorable, real, riskless single monetary or nonmonetary hedge against the failure of a valued social
target. We recruited NCCA basketball fans outside an
arena before a game and offered all participants one
real “free” incentive-compatible hedge: $5 or a good
of comparable value if their team lost. There was no
option to bet on their team to win; rejecting the hedge
guaranteed that participants would earn nothing. This
further addressed the issue of individual variations in
subjective probability estimates, as participants could
accept the hedge and have a nonzero chance to earn
a prize or reject the hedge and have zero chance to
earn a prize. We included nonmonetary hedges in
this experiment to address the possibility that reluctance to hedge was due to a sacred value or resistance to put a dollar value on a social relationship (e.g.,
Heyman and Ariely 2004, Tetlock 2003). We predicted
that a significant proportion of fans would exhibit
reluctance to hedge and reject these “free,” riskless
hedges. In addition, we directly measured whether
participants cited relational or superstitious motives
regarding their decision to hedge.
Method
Participants and Exclusions. On February 18, 2013,
one hundred two pedestrians (48 women; Mage = 28028,
SD = 15026) in Pittsburgh received a beverage and
snack for participating in a study about University of
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
Pittsburgh men’s basketball before entering an arena to
watch an NCAA basketball game between the University of Pittsburgh and Notre Dame. Sample size was
set at the number of participants recruited by an experimenter and two research assistants between the start
of data collection at 4:15 p.m. and the beginning of the
game at 7:15 p.m. Of these 102 participants, 83.3% were
students or alumni and 100% supported Pittsburgh.
One additional volunteer who reported supporting
Notre Dame was not included in the study. No other
participants were excluded.
Procedure
Each participant completed the study on a computer
in one of eight private cubicles in the rear of the mobile
laboratory used in Study 4. The mobile laboratory was
parked on De Soto Street approximately one city block
from the arena in which the game was played, the
Petersen Events Center at the University of Pittsburgh.
Participants first estimated the probability that Pittsburgh would win the game on an analog scale with
endpoints at 0% and 100%. Next, participants indicated
whether they supported Pittsburgh or Notre Dame in
the game in a binary measure. On separate scales, they
reported the extent to which they liked, valued, and felt
connected to Pittsburgh’s basketball team on five-point
scales with endpoints of not at all (1) and extremely (5);
Cronbach’s = 0090.
In a between-subjects design, participants were then
randomly assigned the opportunity to accept one of
three hedges: In a monetary hedge condition, participants accepting the hedge would receive $5 if Pittsburgh lost the game and $0 if Pittsburgh won (see
Figure 3 for a screenshot). In one of two nonmonetary hedge conditions, participants accepting the hedge
would receive a plain shot glass if Pittsburgh lost
and nothing if the team won. In a second nonmonetary hedge condition, participants accepting the hedge
would receive a University of Pittsburgh shot glass if
Pittsburgh lost and nothing if Pittsburgh won. (Participants were not offered a chance to win anything
if they rejected the hedge.) Participants then accepted
or rejected the hedge to which they were randomly
assigned.
After accepting or rejecting the hedge, on a separate
page, participants reported the influence of relational
and superstitious motives in their betting decision.
To measure the former motive, participants indicated
how accepting and rejecting the hedge would affect
the team and their relationship with it on two sevenpoint scales with endpoints of would definitely affect
it negatively (1) and would definitely affect it positively (7). To measure the latter motive, participants
reported the extent to which accepting and rejecting
the hedge would influence whether Pittsburgh won or
lost the game on two seven-point scales with endpoints
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
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Figure 3
13
(Color online) Screenshot of Monetary Hedge Offered to Participants in Study 5
of it would make Pitt much more likely to lose (1) and
it would make Pitt much more likely to win (7). Finally,
participants reported their gender, age, and affiliation
status with regard to the University of Pittsburgh (i.e.,
currently enrolled student, alumnus, prospective student, faculty or staff, fan, none of the above).
At the end of the survey, a two-letter code appeared
on each participant’s computer monitor indicating
their choice, which they showed to the experimenter.
The experimenter then handed the participant a rafflestyle ticket with one of four codes discretely printed
on the ticket that indicated whether they had accepted
one of the three hedges or had rejected a hedge. After
the game, which Pittsburgh lost, participants who
accepted a hedge had one hour to return to the laboratory to redeem their payout with their ticket.
Results
As in Study 3, a majority of fans believed their team
was more likely to win than lose the game (M = 73093%;
SD = 13098), one-sample t41015 = 17029, p < 00001.
Most important, exhibiting a preference for a dominated alternative, nearly half of participants (46.1%)
rejected a riskless, real opportunity to hedge against
their team (see Table 1). Reluctance to hedge was
not unique to monetary payoffs; rejection rates were
similar whether the incentive was $5 (40.0%), an
unmarked good (48.6%), or university merchandise
(50.0%) ( 2 421 N = 1025 = 0081, p = 0067).
Suggesting again that hedging was not due to differences in optimistic bias, participants who rejected
the hedge were no more likely to believe that Pittsburgh would win the game (M = 74.66%, SD =
15064) than participants who accepted the hedge (M =
73031%, SD = 12050) (t < 1). Unexpectedly, participants
who accepted and rejected the hedges did not differ in their self-reported identification with their team
(Mreject = 3097, SD = 0089; Maccept = 3077, SD = 1001)
(t41005 = 1006, p = 0029). This null result may have been
due to a ceiling effect. The sample consisted of fans
attending a game on a cold evening in the middle of
February.
We next compared the influence of self-reported relational and superstitious motives in reluctance to hedge.
First, we reverse-coded responses for how accepting
hedges would influence the relationship and outcome,
and we then separately averaged those measures with
the correlated corresponding reports of how rejecting a
hedge would influence participants’ relationship with
their team (r41005 = −0063, p < 00001) and its likelihood to win the game (r41005 = −0074, p < 00001). We
then entered both measures of relational and superstitious influence into a logistic regression to see whether
either predicted a reluctance to hedge. We found that
participants who believed that hedging would affect
their relationship with the team were more reluctant to
hedge than were participants who did not (B = −0058,
SE = 0024, 2 = 5072, Exp(B) = 0.56, p = 00017). By contrast, participants who believed that hedging would
affect their team’s likelihood of winning the game were
no more reluctant to hedge than were participants who
did not (B = −0091, SE = 1003, 2 = 0077, Exp(B) = 0.40,
p = 0038). Similar results are obtained when including
in the regression participants’ perceived chance of their
team winning and the strength of their attachment to
the team: relational motive (B = −0057, SE = 0025, 2 =
5027, Exp(B) = 0057, p = 0002) and superstitious motive
(B = −0091, SE = 1006, 2 = 0075, Exp(B) = 0040, p = 0039).
Discussion
A substantial proportion of fans were reluctant to
accept a real, generous hedge against their team that
offered them “free” money or goods of similar value.
The dominance violation exhibited in this study and
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14
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
Study 4 does not appear to be due to cheap talk. There
was no difference between rejection rates for monetary
and nonmonetary hedges, so the reluctance to hedge
does not appear to be due to an aversion to placing a
monetary value on a social relationship (e.g., Heyman
and Ariely 2004, Tetlock 2003). Supporting the role
of self-signaling in the reluctance to hedge, fans that
rejected the hedge expressed more concern that hedging might affect their relationship with the team.
We did not find an effect of superstitious beliefs
on hedging in Study 5. An additional ancillary study
provides more evidence that attributions of reluctance
to hedge to superstition may be more a justification
than cause of the behavior (see the appendix). NFL
fans were given the option to accept a hedge or were
assigned a hedge against their team, either before or
after estimating its likelihood of winning the corresponding game. If fans (superstitiously) believed that
hedging would reduce their team’s chance of winning,
probability estimates following a choice or assignment
to hedge should be lower than probability estimates
preceding a choice or assignment to hedge. There was
no order effect on probability estimates, which were
the same whether they preceded or followed hedging, suggesting that hedging does not change the perceived probability of the desired outcome. We further
discuss the potential role of superstition in the general
discussion.
Study 6: Diagnostic Utility and Hedging
As a final test of the role of self-signaling in the reluctance to hedge, we varied the diagnostic cost of the
same identity-relevant hedge in Study 6. Boston University’s NCAA men’s hockey fans were offered a $5
hedge if Boston University (BU) lost a game against its
rival. We predicted that BU fans would be more likely
to reject the hedge if the $5 payout was paid to them
than if it was donated to charity. Whereas the former
self-interested hedge would incur negative diagnostic costs because of the self-signal it entailed, the latter “charitable” hedge should incur lower diagnostic
costs. It might even provide positive diagnostic utility,
if accepting the charitable hedge created an altruistic
self-signal.
Method
Participants and Exclusions. On January 12, 2015, a
link to a “science experiment” was posted on a Boston
University hockey blog, four days before a men’s game
against Boston College. Forty-four readers completed
the experiment between that time and the start of the
game on Friday, January 16, 2015 (40 men; Mage = 40098,
SD = 15057). Most participants were Boston University
students or alumni (75.6%); some were faculty or staff
members (19.5%). No participants were excluded.
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
Procedure. All participants first indicated the percent chance that Boston University would win the
game on an analog scale with endpoints at 0% and
100% and the team they preferred (Boston University, neither team, or Boston College). As measures of
identity-relevance, they then indicated the extent to
which they liked, valued, and felt connected to the
Boston University men’s hockey team on five-point
scales with endpoints of not at all (1) and extremely (5).
Most important, in a between-subjects design, participants were then offered one of two hedges. In the
self-benefit condition, participants were offered a hedge
that would pay them $5 if Boston University lost the
game and $0 if Boston University won. In the otherbenefit condition, participants were offered a hedge in
which the experimenter would donate $5 to Doctors
Without Borders if Boston University lost the game
and would donate $0 if Boston University won. All
participants then indicated whether they accepted or
rejected the hedge, reported their gender, age, and university affiliation, and provided their mailing address
in the case they accepted the self-interested hedge.
Boston University did lose the game. Checks were
sent out one week after to participants and Doctors
Without Borders.
Results
Manipulation Checks. All participants reported
supporting the Boston University men’s hockey team
in its game against Boston College. Participants believed that it was likely that Boston University would
win the game (M = 73018%, SD = 11051), with all estimates ranging from 50% to 100% (i.e., no participants believed their team was more likely to lose than
win the game). Their average identification score with
Boston University was 4.42 (SD = 0060; = 0076).
Hedges. Most important, a significant difference
was found in the reluctance to hedge between the
two conditions. Whereas the majority (59.1%) of participants in the self-benefit conduction rejected a free
hedge paying them $5 if Boston University lost the
game, only one participant (5%) in the other-benefit condition rejected a free hedge that would donate $5 to charity if Boston University lost the game
( 2 411 N = 445 = 13079, p < 00001) (self-interested and
other-interested hedges are referred to in Table 1 as
the identity-relevant and identity-irrelevant hedges,
respectively).
In additional exploratory analyses, we examined
the relationship between identification with Boston
University and hedging in the self-benefit and otherbenefit conditions with logistic regression. Whereas
there was a marginally significant relationship in the
self-benefit condition, such that participants who were
more likely to identify with Boston University were
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less likely to accept the hedge (B = −1029, SE = 0077,
2 = 2078, Exp(B) = 0028, p = 00096), there was no relationship between identification with Boston University
and hedging in the other-benefit condition (B = −0047,
SE = 2046, 2 = 00036, Exp(B) = 0063, p = 0085). Obviously, the low statistical power of the regression
analyses limits the inferences that can be drawn, but
tentative support for a connection between hedging
and team identification was present only in the selfbenefit condition. There was no evidence for any connection between hedging and team identification in the
other-benefit condition.
Discussion
The results support a self-signaling account of reluctance to hedge. Fans were reluctant to accept a lucrative identity-relevant hedge that might incur a negative
self-signal regarding their identification with their university’s team. By contrast, fans readily accepted an
equivalent hedge paid to charity that might provide
a positive altruistic self-signal. These results also constitute a dominance violation. If identity signaling
was not a factor, the $5 hedge should have had a
greater utility to participants in the self-benefit condition because they could have used the money any way
that they liked, including donating it to Doctors Without Borders or a charity of greater personal importance.
General Discussion
People seem reluctant to hedge desired outcomes that
are relevant to their identity. A majority of participants preferred to increase potential gains and losses
by betting on their candidate or team to win rather
than reduce potential losses and gains by betting on
their candidate or team to lose. Participants exhibited
reluctance to hedge even when their optimism was
controlled for statistically (Study 1) or procedurally
(Studies 2 and 3), and when refusing a hedge meant
having no chance to receive a reward rather than having a riskless, “free” chance to earn real money or other
goods (Studies 4–6).
Although we examined hedging in relatively lowstakes contexts, people may be reluctant to hedge
desired outcomes even when stakes are high. For
instance, Auburn fan Mark Skiba refused to hedge
a 500 to 1 bet he fortuitously placed on Auburn to
win the 2014 BCS National Championship that would
have paid $50,000 if Auburn won. By hedging, he
would have been guaranteed to win thousands of dollars more than the initial $100 he paid for the bet on
Auburn, whether it won or lost the game. Despite these
high stakes, Skiba ultimately decided not to hedge
because “he felt weird about betting against his team”
(Rovell 2014).
The one-sided nature of the relationships between
participants and their candidates and teams meant
15
that their reluctance to hedge was not due to fear
of sanctions or reprisals for hedging (e.g., Fehr and
Fischbacher 2004). Instead, our findings suggest that
the reluctance to hedge was due to the diagnostic costs of hedging identity-relevant outcomes. In
Study 1, preference strength for a presidential candidate predicted reluctance to hedge his loss. Only loyalty concerns—a proxy for the cost of the negative
self-signal incurred by hedging—mediated the relationship between preference strength for the candidate and reluctance to hedge. In Study 2, participants
were more reluctant to hedge an identity-relevant outcome than a similar identity-irrelevant outcome or
pure gamble. Indeed, no differences in betting behavior between identity-irrelevant hedges and pure gambles were observed. In Studies 3 and 4, participants
were significantly less likely to accept a diagnostic
hedge against their MLB or NFL team than to accept
a nondiagnostic matched gamble or bet against a team
with which they did not identify. In Study 5, NCAA
basketball fans were less likely to accept a real, riskless
hedge if they perceived that doing so would influence
their relationship with their team. In Study 6, a majority of NCAA hockey fans rejected a hedge with diagnostic costs (i.e., winnings paid to them), whereas all
but one participant accepted a hedge with no diagnostic costs (i.e., winnings paid to charity). When considering whether to hedge, participants appeared to trade
off the diagnostic costs and outcome utility associated
with hedging. In Study 4, NFL fans became less reluctant to hedge against their team as the potential payout
for hedging became greater.
The reluctance to hedge was not driven by an aversion to gambling. Participants were willing to bet that
their candidate or team would win. Participants were
also willing to accept gambles against candidates and
teams to which they were indifferent (Studies 1–4). The
results of Study 5 suggest that a reluctance to hedge is
not due to the act of violating a social norm by placing a monetary value on a relationship (e.g., Heyman
and Ariely 2004). Nor did the participants’ reluctance
to hedge appear to be attributable to the framing of
gambles. Participants were reluctant to hedge whether
hedging was framed as a bet that one’s candidate or
team would lose (Studies 3, 5, and 6) or that the opponent would win (Studies 1, 2, and 4). The comparison
of betting on similar identity-relevant and identityirrelevant events in Studies 2–4 suggests that reluctance to hedge is not due to a failure to comprehend
the elicitation procedure.
We did not find any evidence that superstitious
beliefs or moral aversion to profiting from suffering
explained the reluctance to hedge identity-relevant
outcomes. In our ancillary study (see the appendix),
fans’ perceived probability of their team winning was
not affected by whether they had or had yet to hedge
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16
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
the outcome (via choice or condition assignment).
Nor did we find a relationship between superstitious
thinking and hedging behavior in Study 5, in which
superstitious beliefs were directly measured. Regarding moral aversion, fans in Study 4 were sensitive to the
outcome utility associated with betting against their
team, suggesting that they were weighing the costs
of hedging against its pecuniary benefits. Indeed, it is
possible that, offered enough money, all of these fans
would bet on their team to lose.
It is possible, however, that superstitious beliefs and
moral aversion do play a role in more general forms of
reluctance to hedge desired outcomes. Insurance is perceived to decrease the likelihood of the insured event,
which might encourage hedging because it would thus
increase the chance of the desired outcome (Tykocinski
2008). On the other hand, hedging might increase the
salience or ease of representing the negative outcome
and influence betting in ways that are orthogonal to
signaling motives (e.g., Morewedge and Kahneman
2010, Risen and Gilovich 2008, Simmons and Nelson
2006). Fans were clearly not averse to gambling on
the suffering of the opposing team in our studies (e.g.,
Inbar et al. 2012), but a substantial portion of fans
rejected costless profitable hedges when betting their
team to win had $0 expected value. It is possible that
fans that identify highly with their candidate or team
consider hedging to be so strong a negative self-signal
that it would be a moral transgression to bet against
their team. We suggest that future research would be
well directed toward further exploring the role of these
intriguing mechanisms in hedging.
The motivational conflict we explore in this paper—
an aversion to put oneself into conflict between the
opportunity to receive personal rewards and a negative outcome befalling important social targets—has
similar features to some economic games and to insurance. In the ultimatum and dictator games, players
trade off self-interest and concern for a social preference—pecuniary rewards for fairness (e.g., Camerer
2003, Morewedge et al. 2014). In these games people also appear to become more self-interested as the
stakes increase (Slonim and Roth 1998). Hedging and
insurance both serve to mitigate loss. However, most
insurance decisions differ from those studied here
because the payment that is received after a loss is
designed to materially redress the loss (a damaged
car is repaired or replaced) and has no identity consequence. In these situations, people are not reluctant to “hedge” bad outcomes for their automobiles,
homes, etc.
Interestingly, previous research has found that people are more likely to insure and claim insurance for a
good to which they feel great affection to receive “consolation” for its loss (Hsee and Kunreuther 2000), such
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
as a favorite, expensive painting. We believe that affection increasing the desirability of insurance could also
be consistent with self-signaling. In the absence of the
ability to signal concern for and attachment to a good
by paying for a good thing to happen to it (e.g., to
protect it from harm with extra security or safety measures), purchasing insurance serves as a signal to the
owner that the good is or was highly valued.
We speculate that buying insurance is not an attempt
to buffer the negative emotions incurred by the loss of
the insured good. In two ancillary surveys, we found
that framing hedges as insurance did not increase their
uptake. NFL fans were no more likely to pay $15 to
receive $30 if their team lost if the hedge was framed
as a “bet” (37%) than as “fan insurance” (39%) ( 2 411
N = 1005 = 0003, p = 0088). Nor were participants in a
different sample more likely to pay $15 to receive $300
if their car was vandalized in the next three years if the
hedge was framed as a “bet” (40%) than as “insurance”
(51%) ( 2 411 N = 1015 = 1031, p = 0025).
The reluctance to hedge against negative outcomes
for important social targets also resembles decisions
made in interpersonal relationships with reciprocal
commitment, for which people willingly engage in
self-sacrifice (Van Lange et al. 1997). In extreme cases,
this may include sacrificing their own and lives and the
lives of others for their ingroup (e.g., Swann et al. 2010).
The present research extends these findings by showing that even one-sided loyalties and commitments
elicit sacrifice when there is no opportunity for benefits
from future interactions. The identity-signaling mechanism we identify also implies that people should be
paradoxically more reluctant to hedge the failure of a
close other than their own failure. A professor should
be more willing to bet that her own paper will be
rejected than to bet that her colleague’s paper will be
rejected, and a father should be more willing to bet
on the loss of his own softball team than on the loss
of his daughter’s team. We find that people do place
other-interest before self-interest in such cases, because
betting against the self creates a weaker negative selfsignal than does betting against another person (Tang
et al. 2016).
A reluctance to hedge against undesired outcomes
leads to two important anomalies in decision making.
First, it leads decision makers to violate a basic principle of standard expected utility theory by choosing
a dominated alternative: preferring to receive nothing
than a chance to profit from an undesired outcome.
Second, it leads to risk-seeking behavior for mixed
gambles. By betting on the success of their favorite
team or candidate, bettors put “all of their eggs in one
basket.” They opt for a riskier higher-variance alternative than a less risky lower-variance alternative (i.e.,
hedging). von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) discussed multiattribute risk proneness conceptually, but
Morewedge, Tang, and Larrick: Costly Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes
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Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2016 INFORMS
to our knowledge, it has been rarely observed in the
academic literature.
Previous demonstrations have focused on choices
among pure losses, where the convexity of the prospect theory value function in losses produces riskseeking behavior (Fischer et al. 1986, Payne et al.
1984). Our demonstrations of risk proneness include
combinations of positive and negative outcomes that
are not explained by a basic reference dependence
account. They are consistent with von Winterfeldt and
Edwards’ (1986) conception of a negative interaction
between attributes—the diagnostic disutility of disloyalty decreases the value of money earned from the loss
of a favorite team or candidate.
Our results have implications for a broad set of behaviors. Optimistic betting in sports wagers and electoral predictions (e.g., Cantril 1938, Hayes 1936, Levitt
2004, Simmons and Massey 2012, Simmons and Nelson
2006) may reflect not just distorted views of the probabilities of outcomes but also the value of loyalty and
commitment. Commitment motives to bet on or “pick”
one’s team or candidate may outweigh substantial economic incentives or an accuracy motive. Our results
may also help to explain the lack of appropriate diversification exhibited by professional investors including
the equity home bias and familiarity biases (Cooper
and Kaplanis 1994, Fellner and Maciejovsky 2003, Foad
2010, Strong and Xu 2003). Personal investors who
receive stock in their own companies as compensation
tend to ignore advice not to hold too much company
stock and are thus exposed to undue risk—to lose both
their jobs and their retirement accounts if their company fails (Benartzi et al. 2007, Meulbroek 2005). Their
reluctance to sell or short company stock may be due
to its psychological cost—feeling disloyal or threating
an important facet of their identity. More generally, the
results may help to elucidate a variety of anomalous
decisions in which people forgo personal rewards that
would conflict with their loyalty and commitment to
others, their beliefs, or ideals.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Tess Bailie, Stephen Baum, Lauren Min,
Dana Molt, Taylor Turrisi, the Terrier Hockey Fan Blog, and
the Center for Behavioral and Decision Research summer
interns for assistance with the execution of the experiments.
Appendix. Ancillary Study
Method
Participants, Sampling, and Exclusions. Four hundred
hits were requested from AMT to complete a survey about
NFL games on Qualtrics on Tuesday, September 13, 2013. All
participants had an AMT approval rating equal to or higher
than 95%. Four hundred twenty-two participants took the
survey and received 25¢ as compensation. Of the four hundred six participants who completed the survey, four hundred two passed the attention check (indicating the same
17
favorite team twice) and were included in the analyses.
No participants who completed the survey and passed the
manipulation check were excluded.
Procedure. All participants first indicated their favorite
NFL team from all 32 teams, the extent to which they preferred that team to all other teams (M = 2033, SD = 0086) on
a seven-point scale with points marked as much less than
other teams (−3), no more or less than other teams (0), and
much more than other teams (3), and the team it was playing
in the game that week (week 2 of the 2013 NFL season).
All participants were offered a hedge, a 5¢ bonus if their
team lost its game in week 2. Participants in a choice condition had the option to accept or reject the hedge, and participants in a no choice condition were simply told they would
receive the bonus if their team lost its game in week 2. Participants randomly assigned to a hedge first condition were first
offered the 5¢ hedge against their team and then estimated
the percent chance on an analog slider scale (0%–100%) that
it would win its next game. Participants randomly assigned
to a hedge last condition made the probability estimation and
were offered the hedge in the reverse order. All participants
again reported their preferred team as an attention check
and report demographic information. Participants were paid
bonuses if their team lost its game.
Results
Most important, a 2 (judgment order: hedge first, probability
first) × 2 (hedge: choice, no choice) ANOVA revealed that
of the participants who chose to or were assigned to hedge
against their team, there was no significant effect of judgment order. In other words, participants were just as likely to
perceive that their team would win before they had accepted
or were assigned to hedge against their team (M = 64029%,
SD = 21006) as they were after they had chosen to accept
or were assigned to hedge against their team (M = 63041%,
SD = 21034) (F 411 3565 < 1, p = 0077). Additionally, there was
no main effect of choosing or being assigned to the hedge
and no significant interaction (choosing: F 411 3565 = 2002,
p = 0016; being assigned: F 411 3565 < 1, p = 0044). Including
all participants in the choice condition in the 2 × 2 ANOVA
does not change the outcome of any of the main effects or
interaction (all F ’s411 3985 < 1, all p’s ≥ 0037).
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