SOJ-05 Waterloo Artillery: British, French and Prussian

Waterloo Artillery British, French and Prussian SOJ-5 (2012) Edited by Dr Stephen Summerfield Ken Trotman Publication in association with the Napoleon-Series SOJ 5 Page 1 of 108 Editor: Dr. Stephen Summerfield, Loughborough University Chairman of the Editorial Board: Digby Smith Preface Welcome to the fifth issue of the Smoothbore Ordnance Journal published by Ken Trotman Ltd in association with the Napoleon-Series. The importance of the technical subjects of ordnance, science and engineering has been shown over the years by discussion on the Napoleon Series Forum. It is hoped that the journal will make such discussion more informed and productive. Contributions of translations and academic papers are welcomed on subjects connected to artillery or military engineering in the 18th to mid 19th century. This issue has four themes. Theme One: Waterloo Artillery Lt-Col Townend RA gives an informative introduction to the Artillery at Waterloo. Waterloo is one of the most written about battles but the role of the artillery is still poorly understood and controversial. Much of this revolves the letter written by the Duke of Wellington on 21 December 1815 that accused the Royal Artillery of cowardice and despite the evidence is repeated even in books published recently. David Wright revisits the Tactical Deployment of the Royal Horse Artillery at Waterloo as described by Maj-Gen BP Hughes. Stephen Summerfield gives an overview of The Board of Ordnance and Army Supply in 1815 and British Artillery at Waterloo. Erwin Muilwijk gives details upon the Netherlands Artillery at Waterloo. Theme Two: Horse Artillery [Part 2] This carries on the discussion of the role of horse artillery with papers by Hume upon the Classification of Artillery. Digby Smith translated Scharnhorst’s comments upon Horse Artillery. Stephen Summerfield explores Towards Tactical Mobility and Napoleonic Horse Artillery. Anthony Dawson and Stephen Summerfield demonstrate that the Origins of British Horse Artillery pre-dates 1793 when it received the Royal Warrant. Theme Three: Prussian Artillery of Napoleonic Wars Digby Smith continues his translation of the Geschichte der Brandenburg Preussischen Artillery [History of the Prussian Artillery] by Milnowsky and Bonin (1841). Theme Four: French Gribeauval and AnXI Cannon (1791-1828) Stephen Summerfield gives a chronology for French cannon over the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. The Notes on Artillery dictated by Napoleon translated by F.E.B. Laws justifies replacing of the Gribeauval System by the AnXI System. The Journal Aim The aim of the Journal is to provide a variety of translations, biographies, commentaries, documents and other material related to technical aspects of artillery and weapon systems of the 17th-19th century that has often been overlooked. Scope of the Journal Other technical subjects such as engineering, logistics, horses, bridging, and sieges may well be covered as they were important to the education of any artilleryman of the period and to the successful operation of artillery. Just a glance at the contents of the contemporary artillery texts will show the breadth of the subject. SOJ 5 Page 3 of 108 Contents Preface 3 Contents 5 Tables 8 Colour Plates 8 Section 1 Artillery at Waterloo 9 SOJ 5(01) Overview of The Artillery at Waterloo 9 Preface Some Comparisons between the Allies and the French The Weapons Arms Allied artillery at waterloo Prussian Artillery at Waterloo French Artillery at Waterloo 9 10 10 12 13 14 SOJ-5(02) The Board of Ordnance and Army Supply in 1815 15 Commissariat Board of Ordnance Regimental Colonels The Ordnance Field Train Department during the Waterloo Campaign 16 16 17 17 SOJ 5(03) Wellington to Master General of Ordnance 12 June 1815 19 SOJ 5(04) Waterloo Dispatch 19 June 1815 20 SOJ 5(05) Wellington to Master General of Ordnance, 21 Dec 1815 24 SOJ 5(06) The Waterloo myth of Royal Artillery cowardice 25 The Myth 25 The Reply 26 Did any Gunners run/the Field? 26 Was there any definite Artillery Reserve during the first part of the Battle? 26 Did the Gunners take Shelter in the Infantry Squares? 27 Did the Gunners of the British or Kings German Legion Artillery fly from the Field? 29 Did anything happen at Waterloo which might have suggested the Flight of the Gunners to an observer who was not an Artillery Officer? 29 The flight of our gunners was perceptible to only one person on the field of Waterloo. 31 SOJ-5(07) Commander of the Royal Artillery dispatch of 24 June 1815 32 Extract 1: Artillery at Quatre Bras Extract 2: Artillery skill at Waterloo Extract 3: Return of the losses for the British and German Artillery. Extract 4: Promotions after Waterloo 32 32 33 33 SOJ 5(08) British Artillery at Waterloo 34 SOJ 5(09) Tactical Deployment of the Royal Horse Artillery at Waterloo, an analysis of the theory of Major-General B. P. Hughes 37 From the Sources British Artillery at Waterloo Frazer’s Account of the Battle Royal Horse Artillery Movements Royal Artillery Brigades at Waterloo Movements of the RHA and RA 37 38 38 40 43 43 SOJ-5(10) Netherlands Artillery at Waterloo SOJ 5 46 Page 5 of 108 SOJ 5 (11) Comparison of Austrian, British, French and Prussian Ordnance France Austria Prussia Britain. 47 47 47 47 48 Section 2 Horse Artillery 49 Recommended Reading 49 SOJ-5(12) Classification of Artillery 50 Field and Horse Artillery Garrison and Siege Artillery Bi-functional Classification of Artillery Logical Classification of Artillery 50 51 52 52 SOJ 5(13) Scharnhorst, Horse Artillery is much better suited to be used in the Reserve than Foot Artillery. 54 Translator’s note. 54 Point 1. Horse Artillery moves three times as fast as Foot Artillery 56 Point 2. Horse Artillery in reserve 56 Point 3. Foot artillery cannot always follow the infantry 56 Point 4. Each detached cavalry command or detachment must have horse artillery attached, 57 Point 5. Horse artillery has a great advantage over foot artillery 58 Point 6. Horse artillery has a great advantage over foot artillery, when used with advanced and rear guards. 58 Point 7. Horse artillery is the only sure asset to be used in an outpost or in support of it. 59 Point 8. The most important use of horse artillery is in troops in the “order of battle.” 60 Point 9. Horse artillery lends itself much better for use in a feint attack than does foot artillery. 61 Point 10. Horse artillery has advantages over foot artillery also in defensive positions, where one awaits the enemy’s attack. 61 Point 11. If one is attacking the enemy to one’s front and also wishes to outflank him at the same time, cavalry and horse artillery are the ideal tools for the job. 62 Point 12. Horse artillery is better than foot artillery in tackling all special tasks which confront artillery in the open field, 63 SOJ 5(14) Towards Tactical Mobility and Napoleonic Horse Artillery 64 Introduction Horse Artillery Battery Organisation Horse Artillery Tactics The Limitations of Smoothbore Artillery 64 66 67 69 SOJ 5(15) Origins of British Horse Artillery (1761-92) 70 Williams Horse Artillery (1775-77) Desaguliers System in America Congreve investigates Horse Artillery (1779-82) M1780 Belford 6-pdr Williams Second System (1785) Duke of Richmond’s Horse Artillery (1788-92) Royal Horse Artillery (1793) References 70 71 71 73 73 73 74 76 Section 3: Prussian Horse Artillery 78 SOJ 5(16) Prussian Horse Artillery 78 Frederick II and Horse Artillery 79 SOJ 5(17) Prussian Artillery of the French Revolutionary Wars 83 Prussian Horse Artillery 1790-1807 83 SOJ 5(18) Reorganisation of the Prussian Army in 1809 87 The New Horse Artillery of 1809 SOJ 5 87 Page 6 of 108 Section 4 French Gribeauval and AnXI Cannon (1791-1828) 89 Bibliography 89 SOJ 5(19) French Guns in the Revolutionary Wars (1790-1802) 91 1791 First Inspector of Artillery Abolished 1792 Manson Tables of Construction 1794 Piedmont Mountain Guns 1795-1798 The Directory 1799-1801 The Consulate 91 91 92 92 92 SOJ-4(20) Notes on Artillery Dictated by Napoleon at St. Helena to Baron Gourgaud. Batteries Abolition of the Gribeauval 4- and 8-pdr Napoleon on the Gribeauval 6-pouce Howitzer Napoleon on 12-pdrs Napoleon on Caissons and Ammunition Provision Napoleon on Siege Guns Napoleon on Mountain Guns Napoleon on Mortars Field batteries 93 93 93 93 94 94 95 95 95 96 SOJ-5(21) Correction of Napoleon’s Calculations 98 On the arithmetic of the penultimate paragraph. The calculations in the last paragraph. 98 99 SOJ-5(22) On the Composition of the French Artillery Material. 100 SOJ 5(23) AnXI System (1803-07) 101 AnXI Field Guns AnXI Mountain Guns AnXI Siege/Garrison Guns 1806 Gassendi’s Report 101 103 103 104 SOJ 5(24) AnXI modified M1808 System 105 M1808 Modifications to the AnXI System 1809 Regimental Artillery 1810 Proposed new 6-pdr 1811 Regimental Artillery 1813-14 Wars of Liberation 1814-15 – The First Restoration (1814-15) 1815 The Hundred Days 1815-1824 Second Restoration 105 106 107 107 107 107 107 108 SOJ 5 Page 7 of 108 Tables Table 1: Command of the British land and naval forces. Table 2: British Land forces in 1815. Table 3: Supply in the field in 1815. Table 4: Board of Ordnance. Table 5: Depots of the Field Train Department in the Netherlands, June 1815. Table 6: Advanced Depots of the Field Train Department in the Netherlands, June 1815. Table 7: Field Train Department with the Field Army in the Netherlands, June 1815. Table 8: French Gribeauval and AnXI gun and projectile dimensions. Table 9: Austrian M1780 gun and projectile dimensions. Table 10: Prussian M1768 gun and projectile dimensions. Table 11: Comparison of the Windage for Austrian and Prussian Ordnance according to Table 12: British Blomefield gun and projectile dimensions. Table 13: British Desaguliers block trail wheel dimensions, carriage and limber weights. Table 14: The Emperor seems to have taken the following data: Table 15: Calculation of double ammunition provision. Table 16: Dimensions of French AnXI field and siege guns. 15 15 16 16 17 18 18 47 47 47 48 48 48 98 98 103 Colour Plates Six colour plates are exclusive to the printed edition of the Smoothbore Ordnance Journal – Issue 5. Plate 1: French Gribeauval gun tubes [Stephen Summerfield] Plate 2: Parts of a Gribeauval 8-pdr carriage [Stephen Summerfield] Plate 3: Gribeauval 8-pdr wheels and axle [Stephen Summerfield] Plate 4: AnXI field guns and howitzer [Stephen Summerfield] Plate 5: AnXI 3-pdr mountain gun on chevrette carriage [Stephen Summerfield] Plate 6: AnXI and M1808 6-pdr [Stephen Summerfield] SOJ 5 Page 8 of 108 SOJ 5(09) Tactical Deployment of the Royal Horse Artillery at Waterloo, an analysis of the theory of Major-General B. P. Hughes By David Wright B.P. Hughes concentrated on the deployment of the Royal Horse Artillery troops (and to a lesser extent on the Royal Artillery Brigades). This article does not, in any way underestimate the important contributions of the batteries from the King’s German Legion, Hanover, the Netherlands or Brunswick. Their positions and movements need to be studied to understand better the contribution of the Allied Artillery to winning the Battle of Waterloo. In his book Open Fire107, Major-General Hughes makes the following statement: “The Allies’ tactics in the use of artillery in defence show an interesting development of those which had been tried in the Peninsula. It is true that at Waterloo there was no artillery of the park on the Allied side, but the third echelon of artillery, as described in the British training manuals – the horse artillery – was available on a large scale, and was used as a mobile reserve most actively both to move and to fight.”108 A reserve is defined as: “A part of a force held under the control of the commander as a maneuvering force to influence future action.”109 For Hughes’s statement to be true, it must be shown that the RHA troops were under the control of a commander and that they moved actively to influence future action. Hughes goes on to state that; “The battle was a stationary one for the defending infantry until the last stages, and most of the field brigades were not called upon to move to any great extent. The actions of the horse artillery, on the other hand, involved a great deal of movement which is fully described in the letter which Frazer wrote110 immediately after the battle. It is not very difficult, therefore, to work out the movements of all the guns with some accuracy.”111 From the Sources The sources for the movements of the Horse Artillery Troops are letters written soon after the battle, such as those of Frazer, journals, such as those of Mercer112 and Ross113 and the letters written to Captain William Siborne114 for his Waterloo diorama. All sources must be taken cautiously, unless corroborated, as the participants had their vision and memories obscured by smoke, adrenaline and the natural instinct to exaggerate their own importance and minimize their errors. As Ross wrote to Siborne: “I feel that I cannot separate what I may fairly charge to my memory from the impressions left on it from what I have heard and read of that eventful day.”115 107 B. P. Hughes (1983) Open Fire, Artillery Tactics from Marlborough to Wellington, Antony Bird Publications. Open Fire, op. cit. p 79 109 Anon (2005) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Department of Defense. 110 Letters of Colonel Sir Augustus Simon Frazer, K.C.B.; Spottiswood and Co; 1859. 111 Open Fire, op. cit. pp 80-81. 112 Cavalié Mercer (1870) Journal of the Waterloo Campaign; General, Blackwood. 113 Dalrymple (1871) Memoir of Sir Hew Dalrymple Ross K.C.B, Woolwich. 114 H.T. Siborne (ed.) (1891) The Waterloo Letters, Cassell and Co. 115 Ross to Siborne, Carlisle, January 27, 1835 in Ross, op. cit. p 67. 108 SOJ 5 Page 37 of 108 SOJ-5(12) Classification of Artillery Hime (1908) In general there are an indefinite number of modes of classifying a given group of objects, and we naturally select that mode which is the most convenient and most useful. For instance, no one would divide the British Artillery into the Hong Kong-Singapore Battalion and the rest of the Regiment. To do so would answer no useful purpose. To render any systematic classification possible, we must first settle precisely the names of the objects to be classified and ascertain their distinctive differences. With this object we proceed to consider the names of the different objects and groups to be classified in the present case, and to point out those differences which will be employed here as being the most useful and practical. Consider the phrase, "Artillery fire." It is equivalent to "the fire carried on by Artillery," where "Artillery" implies "guns with their appurtenances—carriages, ammunition, side-arms, &c. &c.—and gunners to serve them." From this point of view we may adopt the following definition:- Field and Horse Artillery Artillery means guns, with their appurtenances, and gunners to serve them. This is the widest definition of the word, since it embraces both -materiel and personnel. All cannon are movable to a certain degree, but only some cannon are sufficiently movable by beasts of burden to take part in the movements and manoeuvres of an Army in the field. Mobility, by a useful convention, expresses any degree of move-ability which enables Artillery, as defined above, to share in the manoeuvres of an Army in the field. "Sharing in the manoeuvres of an Army in the field" does not include the march of a Siege Train, protected by an escort, to besiege a fortress. Field Artillery means mobile Artillery, with their means of draught—drivers, beasts of burden, harness, &c. It includes all Artillery which can share in the manoeuvres of an Army in the field. The phrase is constantly wanted for this purpose, and to employ it to specify any one of the parts of the whole, for instance the Field Batteries, gives rise to endless and needless confusion. Horse Artillery.—Sir Augustus Frazer somewhere expresses a wish that the gun detachments of all Field Artillery were mounted on horseback. Let us suppose for a moment that his wish has been gratified, and that we have before us a (real) Troop177 and a properly-equipped Field Battery with mounted detachments. Nominally, the Field Battery is now Horse Artillery; but is it so really? It certainly is not. The Troop is capable of making long movements at a very rapid pace, and this the Battery cannot do; for its mobility has been only increased infinitesimally by mounting its detachments on horseback. Here, then, is the peculiar and distinctive characteristic of Horse Artillery, as Decker rightly and stoutly maintained.178 The mounted detachments, however much they may attract the eye, are only a means to an end—a means of enabling Horse Artillery to make long movements at a very rapid pace. 177 It would simplify matters considerably to give back the old term "Troop" to the Horse Artillery. Field Batteries would then become simply "Batteries," and heavy Field Batteries, "Heavy Batteries." "Z Battery, Royal Horse Artillery," contains twenty-seven letters. "Z Troop" would convey the same information in six letters. 178 Muller, i. 90. SOJ 5 Page 50 of 108 SOJ 5(13) Scharnhorst, Horse Artillery is much better suited to be used in the Reserve than Foot Artillery. Translated by Digby Smith Translator’s note. This article appeared in Volume III of “Gerhard von Scharnhorst Private und dienstliche Schrifte” reprinted by the Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien, 2005. It was originally written in September 1802. At this point in his career, Johann David von Scharnhorst, born of common stock on 12 November 1775, was 47 years old and had transferred from Hanoverian service to that of Prussia on 19 May 1801. He had already distinguished himself in combat in the campaign in the Netherlands in 1794 and had published a number of tactical papers, which had also enhanced his reputation as a military theorist and competent staff officer. On 16 September 1802, he had been ennobled, in reward for his services. On 26 March 1804, he was appointed General-Quartiermeister-Lieutenant (Deputy Chief of Staff) of the Prussian army. King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia valued his services very highly. In the 1806 campaign he was initially attached to Gen von Rüchel’s staff but on 6 September, he was transferred to that of the Duke of Brunswick. He made suggestions for the conduct of the forthcoming campaign but von Massenbach’s opposition was too strong. At the beginning of the battle of Auerstädt, the Duke, fearing that GM von Schmettau’s division was advancing too far too soon, sent von Scharnhorst to him to rein him in. He said to von Scharnhorst: ‘Ich mache Sie für alles, was bei der Division Schmettau geschiet, verantwortlich.’ [I hold you responsible for everything that happens to Schmettau’s division]. Scharnhorst was thus removed from army-level command and relegated to divisional level where he was unable to influence the course of the battle to any great degree. Shortly after he arrived at GL von Schmettau’s division, that general was mortally wounded and von Scharnhorst had to assume command of the formation. He soon achieved local success, but lack of cavalry under his command meant that he could not exploit it. Scharnhorst was the last Prussian officer to leave the battlefield that day and was slightly wounded during the action. On 17 October, he met and joined Blücher’s corps at Nordhausen; they were both captured at the capitulation of Ratkau. Scharnhorst was exchanged on 9 November 1806; he went to Ostpreussen, reported to the king and was attached to the staff of L’Estocq’s corps from 14 January 1807. The years from 1807 to 1813 were hard for Prussia and for von Scharnhorst. On 11 March 1813, he was promoted to General-Lieutenant and appointed General-Quartier-Meister (Chief of Staff) to von Blücher. On 17 March 1813, he published his “Verordnung über die Organisation der Landwehr” [Regulation for the Organization of the Landwehr] which called up all able-bodied men from 17 to 40 years of age and on the 21 April he published his second Regulation, in which he stated: ‘all who have grown a beard are liable for service in the Landsturm’(home guard). On 27 February, von Scharnhorst left the his headquarters, at Czar Alexander’s invitation to visit Imperial Headquarters in Kalisch to discuss joint plans; the Czar later said: ‘Never have I seen a man with such a clear sense of planning and comprehensive knowledge as Scharnhorst’. The result of this conference was agreement that the old Kutuzov (at age 68) was to be C-in-C of the allied armies; Prussia was to command one of the two armies to be formed; von Blücher was to command the Army of Silesia, with von Scharnhorst as his Chief of Staff. The two men formed a nearperfect command and planning team. SOJ 5 Page 54 of 108 SOJ 5(15) Origins of British Horse Artillery (1761-92) Anthony Dawson and Stephen Summerfield The origins of horse artillery in Britain date back further than the issuing of the royal warrant in 1793. Interest in increasing the mobility of field artillery can be traced back to at least the 1760s and the introduction of Prussian horse artillery by Frederick the Great and the requirement for mobile artillery in North America In 1762, Major General Phillips237 who commanded the British Artillery and later Burgoyne’s Artillery at Saratoga had extensive correspondence with Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick who commanded the Anglo-Prussian Army during the Seven Years War (1756-63). This included discussion upon the use of Prussian Horse Artillery and the requirements for lighter pieces.238 In the 1780s, the East India Company attached two light-6-pdrs on galloper gun-carriages to each if their native cavalry regiments. The 27th Light Dragoons of the British Army received them as well. Previously, artillery had been drawn by bullocks and these horse drawn guns showed greater mobility but still considered an encumbrance to the cavalry.239 Williams Horse Artillery (1775-77) Major Griffiths Williams240 who commanded 5 Coy of 1st Bn between 1766-77 developed a Brigade of Horse Artillery equipped with 2x Light 3-pdrs and 2x 6-pdrs of his own design plus 2x Light 4½-in Coehorn Howitzers mounted on light two wheeled curricle carriages by a matched pair of horses with the driver sitting on a box behind. These could be moved forward with the greatest rapidity. James (1805) describes the curricle carriage as being of “acknowledged utility” and able to be “moved forward with the greatest of rapidity”; he also confirms it being drawn by two horses but in addition that “the artilleryman is seated on a box behind the gun” and that “the ammunition tumbrel that accompanied it was drawn by two horses and contained 60 rounds of ball cartridge.”241 Being a two wheeled vehicle and driven from behind, they had a tendency to overturn on rough ground or at speed. All of 60 gunners were mounted on horses. At the Battle of Stillwater (19 September 1777), Major Williams led his experimental Horse Artillery. J H Browne in “England's Artillerymen” notes that his horse artillery “rushed forwards” under heavy fire to give close support of the General Burgoyne’s infantry, and took the Americans by surprise.242 A letter from Colonel Samuel Cleveland dated 15 February 1778 noted that “Captain Williams and the Officers and men of two companies” were taken prisoner. Major Williams finally returned to England in 1782. 237 Phillips, William [Kane List No. 153] In 1758, he commanded the British artillery attached to the AngloPrussian army of Frederick of Brunswick. At Minden (1759), he had batteries commanded by Captain MacBean, Drummond and E. Foy. In 1776, he commanded the Royal Artillery in America and on 13 October 1777 was part of Burgoyne’s army that surrendered. In 1781, he was exchanged for an American General. He died at St Petersburg, Virginia of fever on 13 May 1781. 238 Caruana (1980) 3-4 239 Hughes (1971) 16 240 Williams, Griffiths [Kane List No. 131] Cadet (1744), Fireworker (1745), 1st Lt (1755), Captain-Lieutenant (1759), Captain (1760) and Major (1760). He was wounded and taken prisoner at the Battle of Stillwater (18 September 1777) during the American War of Independence and was promoted to Colonel on his return in 1782. He commanded 5th Coy 1st Bn (1766-77) before becoming Commandant of the Woolwich Garrison from July 1789 until his death in March 1790 241 James (1805) Gun 242 Brown (1865) SOJ 5 Page 70 of 108 Section 3: Prussian Horse Artillery Translated by Digby Smith, Thetford, January 2012. Louis von Milinowski274 and Robert von Bonin275 (1841) Geschichte der Brandenburg-Preussischen Artillerie, Duncker und Humbolt, Berlin, Volume I Volume I of this work contained myriads of details of the personnel establishments and nominal rolls of each artillery company in the corps from 1587 to just before publication in 1841. These details will be of very little interest to the wider public. I have thus omitted them to concentrate on the technical and materiel side of the artillery, covered in sections III – VI of this volume. SOJ 5(16) Prussian Horse Artillery Translated by Digby Smith (p296) The first traces of a type of horse artillery may be seen in the battle of Fehrbellin (28 June 1675 DGS), where twelve 3-pdrs, under Oberstlieutenant Ernst von Weiler, using double teams and having the crews mounted on horses, followed 5,600 cavalry, contributed to the victory of the Brandenburgers over the Swedes.276 There were nine 3-pdr, two 12-pdr cannon and two howitzers.277 The guns and the wagons carrying the ammunition, were pulled by double teams.278 The Kurfürst brought with him from Magdeburg, ten 3-pdr park pieces,279 and these guns could not keep up with the Kurfürst’s march and stayed behind.280 On 11 June, the Kurfürst took some regimental guns, two mortars and three Viertelkarthaunen from Berlin against the Swedes.281 The type of calibre is of importance in respect of the mobility asked of them and of the use made of them, thus the quoted sources are of value. This combination of the two arms is found again in the campaign of the Brandenburg Auxiliary Corps under General von Schöning, who, on the withdrawal from Ofen, attached three 3-pdrs to the cavalry passing through the Jablunka.282 274 Captain a.d. Premier-Lieutenant der Garde-Artillerie-Brigade. 276 This is related in Ciriacy Chronologisches Übersicht, Meyer Geschichte der Feuerwaffen-Technik, Decker Versuch einer Geschichte des Geschützwesens, Versuch einer Geschichte der Feldzüge Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm der Grosse, Memoires de Brandenbourg 1762, page 75. 277 von Buch, Augenzeugen und Sachkenner noted in his diary. 278 According to documents in the Staatsarchiv: Überfall auf Rathenow, Schlacht bei Fehrbellin 1675, Fol. 46. See also the Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geshichte des Krieges, 1839 279 According to Johannes Magirus, Heldenthaten Friedrich Wilhelms. This is confirmed by a note in the Theatre. Europaeum, XI, page 830, 280 Theatr. Europaeum, XI, page 830 281 M Joh. Joach. Möller`s Chroniciolum berolinense. This agrees with the description of the battle of Fehrbellin in the Theatrum europaeum and the reports in the other chronicles. 282 Des Feldmaschalls Hans Adam von Schöning Leben und Kriegsthaten. 275 SOJ 5 Page 78 of 108 SOJ 5(19) French Guns in the Revolutionary Wars (1790-1802) Stephen Summerfield of Loughborough University 1791 First Inspector of Artillery Abolished The post of First Inspector of Artillery was abolished. The French had 7,746 fortress pieces including 2,000 mortars and howitzers; 1,800 pieces of coastal artillery; 1,300 field pieces. The National Guard were issued with M1757 1-pdr Rostaing Guns. Withdrawn in 1797.320 1792 Manson Tables of Construction On 18 March 1792, the National Assembly took the emergency measures to use captured foreign guns including the Austrian M1753 3-, 6-, 12-pdr, 7-pdr howitzer and the Prussian M1768 10-pdr howitzers.321 In addition, the National Assembly ordered that the M1740/M1773 a la Suédois 4-pdrs would be rebored to 6-pdr calibre so that it could use captured ammunition.322 M1792 6-pdr on Brocard carriage and the M1732 single draft limber The Manson (1792) Tables of Construction323 codified the changes to the Gribeauval system made by Phillip   Comte de Rostaing and Jakob (Jacques) Manson (1724-1809).    Codification of the simplification of the M1773 siege and garrison guns. These included the M1765 6.4in howitzer receiving a vertical elevating screw instead of the Richtmaschine. Number of different wheels reduced from 26 to 13. Removal of the fixed tool box from the 4-pdr limber. Removal of the bolster from the 8-pdr limber.324 M1765 Gribeauval 12-pdr on Gribeauval M1792 Carriage and Gribeauval M1792 8-pdr limber. M1765 Gribeauval 4-pdr on Gribeauval M1792 carriage and Gribeauval M1792 4pdr limber M1765 Gribeauval 6 pouce howitzer on Gribeauval M1792 carriage and M1792 8-pdr limber  M1765 6.4in howitzer on M1792 carriage at Brussels Army Museum In September 1792 Louis XVI was deposed in September. The National Assembly sanctioned the use of captured guns (mainly Austrian M1753 ordnance) and re-bored the 4-pdrs a la Suédois to 6-pdr to use captured ammunition.325 The addition of captured and foreign equipment so increasing the logistic 320 Decker (1989) p56 Arrête (Law) of 18 March 1792 322 Arrête (Law) of 18 March 1792 323 Manson (1792) Tables of Construction….., Paris 324 Compare the plan of 8-pdr limbers in Jakobowski (1786) and Manson (1792) 325 Dawson, Dawson and Summerfield (2007) 68 321 SOJ 5 Page 91 of 108