'War and Peace' and the APRC Proposals

‘War and Peace’ and the APRC Proposals1 Dr. Colin Irwin University of Liverpool www.peacepolls.org May 2010 Key findings: 1 • The preliminary APRC proposals have gained more Sinhala support after the war so that they are now equally acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamils, Up-Country Tamils and Muslims. • Although the majority of Tamils and Muslims across Sri Lanka want a unitary state a significant minority of Tamils from the Northern Province still want to keep the ‘right to secession’. However most of them will give this up for the complete ‘package’ of APRC reforms. • The President, political and religious leaders can all influence support for these preliminary APRC proposals but although Eastern Tamils will follow their politicians on this issue Northern Tamils ‘Don’t Know’ how to respond to theirs. • Although all communities strongly support language and fundamental rights Tamil concerns about the special status of Buddhism has increased after the war as a political issue. This research is based on a preliminary set of proposals formulated in February 2009. Contents Page About the poll 2 Introduction 2 Sinhala response 5 Tamil response 7 Up-Country Tamil response 11 Muslim response 13 Support for reform 15 Some further notes on Northern, Eastern and Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka 18 Political party response 20 A further note on the politics of ‘Religious Rights’ 28 Summary of results for the APRC proposals 29 Problems 30 If there is no reform 33 Those for or against the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka 35 Opposition to progressive reform outside Sri Lanka 37 Appendix: Questionnaire and additional results 39 1 About the poll The research for this poll was carried out by the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo, on behalf of Dr. Colin Irwin from the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method as part of the successful Northern Ireland peace process. The survey work for the first poll in this series was completed between March and May 2008 and included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. Using the same methods the survey work for the second poll was completed a year later in March 2009 to test the then preliminary APRC proposals against public opinion before the end of the war. A year later in March 2010 these same proposals were tested again but with a larger sample that included the Northern Province. Additionally four versions of the questionnaire were run to measure the impact that the support of the President, religious and political leaders would have on the acceptability of the proposals (Table 1). All interviews were face-to-face and the margin of error varied between +/- 2% and +/- 4.3% depending on the question and version of the questionnaire being analysed. A copy of the questionnaire is given in the Appendix with additional results. Table 1. Sample plan Sinhala Tamil Up-Country Tamil Muslim Total Neutral 300 200 200 200 900 President 250 100 75 75 500 Religious 250 100 75 75 500 Political 250 100 75 75 500 Total 1050 500 425 425 2400 Introduction The President of Sri Lanka established the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to draft a set of constitutional reforms that, following the war, would provide the country and all it’s citizens with a real opportunity for enduring political stability, increased economic growth and improvements in the quality of life. Critically, when tested against public opinion a year ago these proposals, with some minor reservations were acceptable to a significant majority of both Sinhalese and Tamils (Table 2). But due to the ongoing conflict the Tamils in the North could not be sampled then. With the end of the war and the defeat of their leadership would they accept the APRC proposals? Additionally 21% of Sinhalese did not know or were unwilling to give an opinion on such important issues at that time. With the end of the war would their views change and if so would this be for or against the APRC proposals? Table 2. Question: ‘Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?’ (March 2009). Per cent Sinhala Tamil Up Country Tamil Muslim Yes 67 86 92 90 No 12 4 0 1 DK 21 10 8 9 The poll run in March 2009 also indicated that the President then enjoyed unprecedented popularity (93% ‘trust very much or trust quite a bit’ amongst the Sinhala) so it also seemed important to test the effects his support and the support of religious and political leaders could have on the acceptability of the APRC proposals. This was done by framing the questions in these terms and also by asking if such support would change the views of the person being interviewed in a neutral version of the questionnaire. 2 A summary of the APRC proposals as they existed in February 2009 is listed in Table 3 as a series of 14 ‘show cards’. Those being interviewed were asked what they thought of each item on a given card. Was it ‘essential’, ‘desirable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘tolerable’ or ‘unacceptable’? Then they were asked what they thought of the ‘package’ as a whole, if they would support such a ‘package’ and under what circumstances. Table 3. The APRC proposals in summary form, as they existed in February 2009. SHOW CARDS 1 to 14 1. The Structure of the State – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state. 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces – These powers will be clearly defined in two separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces.2 3. The Parliament - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators. 4. Amending the Constitution – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.3 5. The Powers of the President – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent’s term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives. 2 An additional constitutional item overlooked at the time of drafting the APRC proposals for this questionnaire could be inserted here as follows: Land and Water – The Central Government will retain State lands required for the functions in its list of powers. All other State lands will go to the Provinces subject to the rights of persons owning or occupying such land. The Provincial Government will be responsible for the management of these lands with priority in land settlement being given to the needy of local Districts. An independent Commission of experts with equal representation from the Central Government and Provinces will be established to develop and oversee land and water use policies. Although this item has not been tested against public opinion it seems unlikely that it should diminish support for the APRC proposals. 3 Since drafting this questionnaire the APRC have refined the amendment procedure as follows: Amending the Constitution – Amendments to the Constitution will require the approval of two thirds of the members of each House of Parliament sitting and voting separately. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum. It is not expected that this change would significantly alter the results of the public opinion poll as it has almost the same effect in law 3 6. The Powers of Local Authorities – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution. 7. Language Rights – The Tamil and Singhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Singhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Singhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education. 8. Religious Rights – Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed. 9. Fundamental Rights – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law. 10. Electoral System – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation. 11. The Judiciary – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts. 12. Public Service – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent. 13. Safeguards against secession – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to succeed from the State. 14. Law and Order - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre. 4 Sinhala response The results for the Sinhala community are listed in Table 4 for 2010 and Table 5 for 2009 with a rank ordering of those items they consider ‘essential or desirable’ in Tables 6 and 7. The key percentages to look at in Tables 4 and 5 are the levels of ‘unacceptable’. First of all it should be pointed out that these results are very good when compared to places like Northern Ireland and the Middle East where levels of ‘unacceptable’ of 50 per cent plus had to or have yet to be negotiated. Having said that of course Sri Lanka is not Northern Ireland or Israel and Palestine. The political context in Sri Lanka is very different. Table 4. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) Sinhala per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 25 19 19 22 23 13 47 64 60 21 37 24 43 39 42 40 33 40 37 36 35 25 31 34 39 36 33 32 14 16 18 14 13 18 8 5 7 15 14 21 10 10 3 3 4 5 5 9 3 2 1 7 2 4 3 2 8 11 12 6 15 15 5 2 8 3 5 4 9 8 11 15 13 8 10 2 1 2 15 6 11 7 7 20 38 22 7 4 10 Table 5. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) Sinhala per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 20 13 9 14 12 11 33 46 35 18 18 13 18 21 35 28 21 23 26 22 35 30 36 25 28 28 25 25 16 23 19 19 14 27 12 10 16 18 16 21 19 16 5 5 6 5 5 7 3 3 2 4 4 6 4 7 9 11 15 8 23 11 9 5 3 13 10 6 8 14 16 21 29 31 19 23 8 6 7 24 24 25 26 17 13 21 25 11 9 22 The most important finding to note here is that the level of ‘unacceptable’ has fallen significantly across most of the APRC proposals from a high of 23% ‘unacceptable’ for the ‘The Powers of the President’ in 2009 to only 15% in 2010. Most significantly the levels of acceptability have risen, while, at the same 5 time the ‘Don’t Knows’ in 2010 are half of what they were in 2009. Perhaps the Sinhala who were reluctant to express their views before the end of the war had, for the most part, positive views of the APRC proposals but were only willing to express those views now that the war is over or, perhaps, post war they have decided to be magnanimous towards their Tamil countrymen and women when they have been faced with military defeat especially in the context of growing confidence that their country will not be divided. Whatever the reason the trend is clear and can be seen across all the results for the Sinhala community. Table 6. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010) 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’ Fundamental Rights Religious Rights Language Rights The Judiciary Safeguards against secession Law and Order The Structure of the State Amending the Constitution The Powers of the President Public Service The Powers of the Centre and Provinces All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Electoral System The Parliament The Powers of Local Authorities 91 89 82 76 76 71 67 62 60 60 59 58 55 52 49 Table 7. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009) 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’ Religious Rights Fundamental Rights Language Rights The Structure of the State The Judiciary Law and Order Electoral System Safeguards against secession The Powers of the Centre and Provinces Public Service The Powers of the President Amending the Constitution All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ The Powers of Local Authorities The Parliament 76 71 68 55 46 46 43 43 41 41 38 37 34 33 30 As to the benefits these are prioritised for the Sinhala in Tables 6 and 7. Interestingly the top three items in 2009 were Religious, Fundamental and Language Rights at 76%, 71% and 68% ‘essential or desirable’. In 2010 the order has changed a little with Fundamental Rights first at 91% (20% up on last year) followed by Religious and Language Rights at 89% and 82% (up 13% and 14% respectively). As one of the top priorities for the Tamil community remains ‘Language Rights’ this result continues to be most encouraging for the prospects of long term peace. 6 Tamil response The results for the Tamil community are listed in Tables 11 and 12 with a rank ordering of those items they consider ‘essential or desirable’ in Tables 13 and 14. Again the key percentages to look at in Table 11 and 12 are the levels of ‘unacceptable’ and again the results are very good. However, unlike the results for the Sinhala there is little change between 2009 and 2010 with one notable exception. The one serious potential difficulty here is ‘Religious Rights’ at 28% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 rising to 50% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010. But on the same issue 44% of Tamils consider this feature of the APRC proposals to be ‘essential’ in 2009 falling to 22% in 2010. They are clearly ‘split’ on this item. Why? And why is opposition to this constitutional provision so unusually strong? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the way the question was asked? In the summary proposals ‘Religious Rights’ was drafted as, ‘Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.’ It seems very likely that those Tamils who considered this proposal to be ‘unacceptable’ were focusing on the suggestion that ‘Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ while those who considered this proposal to be ‘essential’ were focused on ‘with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.’ The problem here seems to be a matter of education, understanding and or some sort of good or bad previous experience in this regard. Clearly this item requires some explanation or clarification to make sure there are no misunderstandings in the Tamil community and that their religious freedom will be effectively guaranteed by a new Sri Lanka constitution. Unfortunately, with the end of the war and the defeat of the Tamil insurgency in the North of the country more Tamils are now concerned about the implications of this provision than they were before the end of the war. Perhaps a certain amount of ‘triumphalism’ on the part of the Sinhala community or some sense of not knowing their own position in a newly united Sri Lanka has aggravated this problem. The Government may wish to consider what steps it can take to address this issue before it becomes a cause for disaffection. Fortunately the end of a season of electoral politics and the formation of a new Parliament will provide the people of Sri Lanka with a new opportunity for reconciliation. With regards to the benefits of the APRC proposals the top items for the Tamils are ‘Language Rights’ at 85% ‘essential or desirable’, ‘Fundamental Rights’ at 76% and ‘The Judiciary’ at 73% in 2009 and ‘Fundamental Rights’ at 87%, ‘Language Rights’ at 86% and ‘The Judiciary’ at 84% in 2010 (Tables 13 and 14). Fortunately the Sinhala also welcome these reforms so there should be no political difficulty with each community’s top priorities. In other conflicts around the world such a result is most unusual. Top priorities generally require a degree of ‘horse trading’. It is perhaps a mark of the understanding of each community’s needs by the other community that has produced this unusual but most welcome result and/or the careful drafting of the All Party Representative Committee. In 2009 it was not possible to undertake this research in the Northern Province. However in 2010 this was now possible. Table 15 gives the results for the APRC proposals broken down for the Tamil response in the Eastern Province and Northern Province separately and also for the rest of Sri Lanka without these Provinces included - ‘Other Sri Lanka’. There is little difference between these three samples with one exception. Again all three groups of Tamils reject the ‘Religious Rights’ proposal at 52%, 49% and 49% ‘unacceptable’ in the Eastern, Northern and ‘Other’ Provinces respectively. But Northern Tamils also reject the proposal for ‘Safeguards against secession’ at 28% ‘unacceptable’ although 38% believe it is ‘essential or desirable’, 15% ‘acceptable’, 5% ‘tolerable’ and 14% ‘don’t know’. So like the other Tamils in Sri Lanka this group remain a minority which is reduced further to only 7% ‘unacceptable’ for Northern Tamils and 3% for all Sri Lanka Tamils providing the other provisions of the APRC proposals are implemented together as a ‘package’. 7 Table 11. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) Tamil per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 37 44 46 41 51 37 75 22 66 34 57 38 28 41 29 29 27 25 19 34 11 11 21 22 27 39 24 32 17 13 14 19 14 17 11 7 10 26 7 17 18 14 5 4 2 2 3 4 2 8 1 5 2 1 7 5 7 4 4 5 5 2 1 50 1 3 1 15 5 5 5 8 8 8 6 1 2 2 10 7 6 9 4 42 24 17 5 3 8 Table 12. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) Tamil per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 33 31 37 39 37 34 72 44 69 31 49 38 33 55 19 22 24 26 29 21 13 10 7 21 24 28 17 17 16 21 17 15 12 15 8 6 11 15 12 17 17 11 11 15 13 7 6 15 2 6 4 12 7 8 16 7 15 4 1 2 6 6 1 28 2 7 1 3 7 2 7 7 8 11 9 9 4 6 7 13 6 7 11 8 41 27 14 6 2 11 8 Table 13. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010) 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’ Fundamental Rights Language Rights The Judiciary Public Service The Powers of the Centre and Provinces The Parliament Law and Order The Powers of Local Authorities The Powers of the President The Structure of the State Amending the Constitution All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Electoral System Safeguards against secession Religious Rights 87 86 84 77 73 73 73 71 70 66 66 66 56 52 33 Table 14. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009) 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’ Language Rights Fundamental Rights The Judiciary Law and Order All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ The Powers of the President Public Service Amending the Constitution The Parliament The Powers of Local Authorities Religious Rights The Powers of the Centre and Provinces The Structure of the State Electoral System Safeguards against secession 9 85 76 73 72 68 66 66 65 61 55 54 53 52 52 50 Table 15. Northern, Eastern and ‘Other’ Sri Lanka Tamils in the rest of the country (March 2010) Eastern Tamil 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 39 46 45 49 59 39 69 8 54 34 72 37 39 31 34 32 29 26 23 31 12 11 29 17 22 46 19 49 19 15 20 20 9 28 19 9 15 35 3 14 23 17 2 3 3 2 3 2 6 5 2 3 2 3 2 45 29 19 6 Northern Tamil 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 31 39 41 25 41 37 72 27 65 21 46 27 14 31 26 26 26 28 19 37 13 13 19 25 29 41 24 22 21 17 14 21 20 12 11 6 14 29 17 25 15 21 9 8 2 4 7 8 4 4 1 7 2 1 5 8 11 6 6 11 5 2 1 49 2 5 11 12 8 5 1 28 11 1 1 13 6 5 14 7 32 21 20 8 7 12 Other Sri Lanka Tamil 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 44 49 53 54 56 37 85 28 78 49 56 53 34 65 28 31 25 19 15 34 7 9 16 24 28 28 29 27 10 7 7 15 12 15 3 7 2 7 4 2 2 3 3 9 9 9 10 13 10 3 4 4 12 15 10 9 4 53 24 13 10 2 2 20 8 2 14 3 4 2 2 2 3 13 52 2 2 2 5 2 5 49 2 3 2 9 18 2 3 2 5 2 2 2 7 2 10 Up-Country Tamil response Although the recent war has largely been viewed as a conflict arising from Tamil grievances the APRC proposals have been drafted for the benefit of all the communities in Sri Lanka. Like other Tamils the Up-Country Tamils share an increasing concern about the ‘Religious Rights’ provision rising to 60% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 from 46% in 2009 (Tables 16 and 17). Their top priority remains ‘Language Rights’ at 91% ‘essential or desirable’ in 2009 and 94% in 2010 (Tables 18 and 19). So like other Tamils they will accept the reforms proposed by the APRC as a package (only 2% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010) providing their major concerns are dealt with. Table 16. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) Up-Country Tamil per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 42 45 30 42 47 32 88 19 74 23 62 41 51 66 27 22 25 22 26 28 6 6 17 32 21 22 20 18 18 17 13 15 11 20 5 6 4 12 9 22 11 7 2 4 8 8 5 6 2 1 8 2 6 2 1 60 2 3 3 5 2 10 11 16 11 5 11 1 2 1 22 3 11 8 5 50 26 14 2 2 6 6 2 7 2 4 5 2 Table 17. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) Up-Country Tamil per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 44 38 37 58 34 49 79 42 79 35 52 37 63 67 23 23 16 21 13 20 12 4 8 17 20 23 10 12 12 17 15 2 8 11 2 2 4 14 7 18 6 8 2 1 5 3 24 3 1 0 2 12 6 6 4 1 11 8 13 4 11 1 2 46 0 5 3 1 6 3 9 13 13 13 10 17 5 6 7 17 13 15 12 10 71 15 4 0 0 9 11 Table 18. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010) 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Up-Country Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’ Language Rights Fundamental Rights Law and Order The Judiciary All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ The Powers of the President Safeguards against secession The Structure of the State The Powers of the Centre and Provinces Amending the Constitution Public Service The Powers of Local Authorities The Parliament Electoral System Religious Rights 94 91 84 83 76 73 71 69 67 64 63 60 55 55 25 Table 19. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009) 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Up-Country Tamil per cent ‘essential or desirable’ Language Rights Fundamental Rights All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Amending the Constitution Law and Order Safeguards against secession The Judiciary The Powers of Local Authorities The Structure of the State The Powers of the Centre and Provinces Public Service The Parliament Electoral System The Powers of the President Religious Rights 12 91 87 86 79 79 73 72 69 67 61 60 53 52 47 46 Muslim response Although the Muslim community were also split on ‘Religious Rights’ at 30% ‘essential’ and 17% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 (Table 21) this concern, unlike their Tamil countrymen and women, seems to have diminished at only 10% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010. Perhaps then it is not the ‘Religious Rights’ as such that is the problem here but the special place Buddhism is given in the APRC proposals, the Tamil defeat and a degree of associated Sinhala triumphalism? But as Tamil speakers one of their top priorities is ‘Language Rights’ at 82% ‘essential or desirable’ in 2010 and 85% in 2009 (Tables 22 and 23). Clearly this problem needs to be addressed for the benefit of all the minorities in Sri Lanka reviewed in this report. Table 20. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) Muslim per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 45 48 33 38 37 28 67 47 53 32 47 39 35 46 37 29 27 28 22 44 15 19 29 32 31 34 31 37 8 11 19 21 19 17 10 13 8 19 13 13 14 8 2 5 12 4 2 4 5 9 8 6 4 7 5 2 5 5 6 3 13 5 1 10 7 1 5 6 4 4 2 4 7 5 3 2 3 2 5 5 4 10 5 40 32 16 4 2 7 Table 21. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) Muslim per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 29 25 22 28 28 25 49 30 47 28 33 34 24 35 39 36 42 43 30 33 36 32 35 36 42 40 37 38 17 17 17 13 16 20 8 9 10 16 10 9 11 11 3 10 4 4 4 8 2 9 2 9 4 7 11 4 4 2 5 3 11 2 1 17 3 3 1 1 4 3 7 10 10 9 11 13 4 3 4 9 9 9 13 10 27 45 13 4 0 10 13 Table 22. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010) Muslim per cent ‘essential or desirable’ 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Law and Order The Structure of the State Language Rights Fundamental Rights The Judiciary The Powers of the Centre and Provinces Public Service The Powers of Local Authorities All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Amending the Constitution Religious Rights Safeguards against secession Electoral System The Parliament The Powers of the President 83 82 82 82 78 77 73 72 72 66 66 66 64 60 59 Table 23. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009) Muslim per cent ‘essential or desirable’ 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th. 8th. 9th. 10th. 11th. 12th. 13th. 14th. 15th. Language Rights Fundamental Rights The Judiciary Public Service Law and Order All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Amending the Constitution The Structure of the State The Parliament Electoral System Religious Rights The Powers of the Centre and Provinces Safeguards against secession The Powers of the President The Powers of Local Authorities 14 85 82 75 74 73 72 71 68 64 64 62 61 61 58 58 Support for reform All these results are very good but if, for example, the people of Sri Lanka were asked to vote for them in a referendum would the results be different? With this point in mind each person being interviewed was asked if they would support this set of proposals as a simple ‘Yes’/ ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ question (Table 24). Table 24. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? Per cent (2010) Sinhala Tamil Up Country Tamil Muslim Yes 83 84 86 80 No 9 7 12 13 DK 9 8 2 8 Per cent (2009) Sinhala Tamil Up Country Tamil Muslim Yes 67 86 92 90 No 12 4 0 1 DK 21 10 8 9 For the Sinhala the results are significantly better up from 67% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 83% ‘Yes’ in 2010 as Sinhala ‘Don’t Knows’ move to the ‘Yes’ column. For the Tamils (86% to 84% ‘Yes’) and Up-Country Tamils (92% to 86% ‘Yes’) the results are a little down in 2010 from 2009 but not significantly so. But the Muslims have dropped ten points from 90% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 80% ‘Yes’ in 2010 which brings them more in line with other parties included in this poll. Nonetheless a stunning result over all with little or no significant difference between Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim support for the APRC proposals at an average of 83% ‘Yes’. Subject to some reservations over a couple of items a broad consensus for constitutional reform has been achieved. The question of leadership was also dealt with by asking, after all the other questions on the APRC proposals had been asked, if the person being interviewed would change their view and switch from ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ to ‘Yes’ if their leaders were for the proposals or if they would switch from ‘Yes’ to ‘No’ if they were against them. These results are given in Tables 25 to 32. The results are mixed with no particular leader (President, Religious, Political) having any more significant effect on the outcome than any other leader. However all these leaders do have the ability to influence support for the proposals one way or another but as the ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Knows’ were so low for all the communities at an average of only 17% the impact that they can have to raise support above the average of 83% is not a great deal. They might be able to get above 90% but not much more than that. However, if all the leaders worked together to undermine support for the APRC proposals their efforts would be felt. Together the political elites of Sri Lanka could weaken the present consensus and reduce it to less than a simple majority providing they worked together to this end. With little or no effort political reform is there for the taking with the overwhelming support of the people or, with a concerted effort on the part of all the political elites they could deny the people of Sri Lanka the prize they presently seek. The future of Sri Lanka, as always, is in their hands. 15 Table 25. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Sinhala per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 56 50 54 No 28 28 30 DK 16 22 16 62 16 22 Table 26. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Sinhala per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? Yes 54 50 56 No 43 42 40 DK 3 8 4 44 50 6 Table 27. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 27 27 38 No 47 50 44 DK 27 24 18 35 32 32 Table 28. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? 16 Yes 42 45 42 No 50 48 51 DK 9 8 8 37 54 9 Table 29. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Up-Country Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 28 17 44 No 44 56 33 DK 28 28 22 28 39 33 Table 30. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Up-Country Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? Yes 64 67 62 No 35 29 36 DK 2 4 3 60 38 2 Table 31. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Muslim per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 37 44 44 No 44 30 33 DK 19 26 22 56 26 19 Table 32. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Muslim per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? 17 Yes 42 45 40 No 47 45 46 DK 11 10 14 48 38 14 Some further notes on Northern, Eastern and Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka Table 33 gives a breakdown of the support for the APRC proposals for the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in the rest of Sri Lanka. They all support the proposals in a range from 77% ‘Yes’ in the North to 89% in the East and 90% in the rest of Sri Lanka. However when asked what impact their respective leaderships might have on their decision the Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka and East can be significantly moved to change their opinions by as much as 67% from ‘Yes’ to ‘No’ with only 2% ‘Don’t Know’ in the East when their politicians are involved in the decision (Tables 35 and 37). However the Tamils in the North are not quite so easily moved with 39% from ‘Yes’ to ‘No’ and 15% ‘Don’t Know’ when the views of their politicians are taken into account (Table 39). The lowest turn out in recent elections was in the North suggesting the Tamils in that Province have little confidence in their political parties at this time. Unlike the political elites who led the Tamils in the Eastern Province out of a disastrous war to peace and political influence the Tamils in the North lost their leadership in a bloody defeat and it may take them some years to find new leaders who they can trust. This observation is further supported by the results from another questionnaire where support for the APRC proposals is framed specifically in terms of being supported by the informant’s political party. In this case Eastern Tamil support rises from 89% to 96%. However, when the same question is put to the Northern Tamils support drops from 77% to 32% with a very significant 54% ‘Don’t Know’ which is very probably due to the political parties in the North not yet being firmly established in the post war era (Table 40). Critically, however, they do support the APRC proposals with only 7% rejecting the package as ‘unacceptable’ (Table 15), but any effort to manipulate their views in this regard may presently have little effect or even be counterproductive. Table 33. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? Per cent Eastern Tamil Northern Tamil Other SL Tamil Yes 89 77 90 No 0 15 4 DK 11 8 6 Table 34. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:4 Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 43 43 57 No 43 43 29 DK 14 14 14 43 43 14 Table 35. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? 4 Yes 43 48 48 No 54 48 48 DK 3 5 5 41 54 5 As the number of persons saying ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ was very low in this sample the results in this table are not reliable. 18 Table 36. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:5 Eastern Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 71 71 71 No 14 71 DK 29 29 14 29 Table 37. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Eastern Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? Yes 48 40 31 No 47 59 67 DK 5 2 2 26 71 3 Table 38. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:6 Northern Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 5 5 20 No 65 70 60 DK 30 25 20 20 40 40 Table 39. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: Northern Tamil per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? Yes 35 46 46 No 48 39 39 DK 17 15 15 43 40 17 Table 40. If the political party you are closest to supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Per cent Eastern Tamil Northern Tamil Other SL Tamil 5 Yes 96 32 84 No 0 14 13 DK 5 54 3 As the number of persons saying ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ was very low in this sample the results in this table are not reliable. 6 As the number of persons saying ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ was very low in this sample the results in this table are not reliable. 19 Political party response As the SLFP is the President’s ruling party and has the largest number of seats in the Parliament it is to be expected that their response to the APRC proposals (Table 41) most closely mirrors the response of the Sinhala community in general (Table 4). This seems to be the case with significant percentages of ‘Don’t Knows’ in 2009 (Table 42) moving to the ‘essential’, ‘desirable’ and ‘acceptable’ columns in 2010 and the overall unacceptability of the package as a whole falling from 8% in 2009 to only 3% in 2010. Table 41. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) SLFP 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 25 22 20 23 21 18 51 61 62 20 40 23 44 40 43 41 35 39 35 33 30 25 28 33 37 38 31 34 15 16 20 19 12 21 8 5 7 19 14 20 12 10 3 3 4 4 4 8 3 3 1 6 2 5 3 3 8 12 11 5 21 12 6 5 1 11 2 4 3 8 7 7 11 10 6 7 2 1 2 11 5 10 7 6 23 36 24 6 3 8 Table 42. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) SLFP per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 24 16 11 18 15 15 37 45 38 19 20 17 20 25 37 32 23 25 25 24 33 30 36 26 31 30 28 26 15 22 22 18 15 27 13 11 16 16 14 22 18 16 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 3 2 6 5 5 5 7 8 9 12 6 23 8 8 7 3 13 8 6 7 12 13 17 27 28 18 20 6 3 5 21 23 20 23 14 19 26 25 9 8 13 20 For the main opposition party, the UNP, there does not seem to be a great deal of difference between the results for this question when asked in 2009 and 2010 with overall resistance to the package at only 3% and 2% ‘unacceptable’ respectively (Tables 43 and 44). However, their enthusiasm seems to have waned a little with those who consider the package to be ‘essential’ falling from 39% in 2009 to 29% in 2010. They seem to have moved across to the ‘desirable’ column, which is now up from 29% in 2009 to 36% in 2010. Similarly the JVP support for the APRC proposals has shown a decline from only 4% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 going up to 9% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 (Tables 45 and 46) and like the JVP and UNP the SLMC support for these proposals is also a little down on last year from 0% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 rising to 3% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 (Tables 47 and 48) with significant shifts from the ‘essential’ column to the ‘desirable’ column for all three of these opposition parties. Table 43. The UNP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) UNP 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 35 32 27 32 41 20 60 49 61 30 45 26 42 43 33 32 32 29 29 36 30 22 27 31 32 42 29 33 16 17 11 16 11 21 4 5 7 18 13 15 14 11 1 5 7 6 2 8 2 3 1 4 1 3 5 3 8 6 10 5 11 7 4 18 1 5 2 3 2 4 7 9 13 13 6 9 1 2 4 12 7 11 8 7 29 36 19 6 2 8 Table 44. The UNP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) UNP per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 29 23 24 34 28 27 53 43 59 29 40 31 38 43 29 26 24 26 28 22 29 20 20 25 24 26 19 24 18 22 18 16 13 21 9 7 12 21 17 23 13 12 7 12 10 7 10 13 2 5 3 11 5 7 10 7 7 4 11 7 13 4 2 20 0 5 4 1 5 4 10 13 13 10 7 13 5 5 5 8 10 12 15 10 39 29 16 6 3 6 21 Perhaps the explanation is quite simple. There has been a great deal of discussion about these proposals since the end of the war particularly during the recent Presidential Election. Also the 2010 poll was taken in March of this year between the Presidential and General Elections at a time when the party in Government and their SLFP supporters felt confident about their future, including constitutional reform, while the opposition parties, and their supporters, are not quite so willing to embrace change when they are less certain about their political influence over the coming years. These results could change again when the elections are all over but it seems very unlikely that they will change a great deal given their stability from a time of war to a time of peace. Table 45. The JVP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) JVP 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable 14 6 19 15 44 6 35 36 42 23 20 13 37 21 38 40 45 40 40 32 57 48 48 42 62 46 30 35 13 19 17 27 6 22 16 37 17 9 10 22 14 19 10 14 Tolerable 1 9 9 Unacceptable 35 27 17 13 10 32 DK 9 4 8 6 13 4 23 13 30 22 9 4 Table 46. The JVP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) JVP per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 39 17 30 36 30 14 57 65 52 35 43 26 39 39 22 35 35 36 26 23 22 17 35 35 22 52 22 35 13 22 4 14 17 23 4 4 4 4 9 0 9 0 9 4 9 5 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 13 17 17 5 17 27 13 13 9 13 22 4 22 13 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 0 0 13 4 9 9 4 30 26 9 26 4 4 22 Table 47. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) SLMC 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 31 39 28 31 35 25 64 56 63 41 49 38 35 49 41 30 22 33 19 34 16 19 18 24 26 35 28 29 14 19 23 19 19 28 10 8 10 21 15 14 17 8 2 6 18 8 12 6 5 7 4 7 4 7 5 6 8 4 6 4 11 3 1 8 2 2 3 6 4 5 3 4 6 5 5 4 2 5 6 5 4 9 5 38 27 18 5 3 10 Table 48. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) SLMC per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 34 27 19 19 25 27 46 26 33 26 36 30 24 36 37 46 57 50 38 39 34 31 36 45 40 43 46 43 24 22 14 19 23 22 10 12 19 17 12 10 15 10 0 2 2 7 3 2 2 12 2 0 5 13 7 2 2 0 5 2 5 0 5 17 5 5 0 3 0 2 2 2 2 2 8 10 2 2 5 7 7 3 7 7 28 38 26 3 0 5 23 However, the results have changed considerably for the TNA up from only 3% ‘unacceptable’ in March 2009 to 11% ‘unacceptable’ in March 2010 (Tables 49 and 50). Similarly those opposed to ‘Safeguards against secession’ has risen from only 5% in 2009 to 25% in 2010, but then it is also 28% for Tamils in the Northern Province (Table 15). ‘Religious Rights’ are also up for the TNA supporters from 47% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 to 66% in 2010 and 49% for Tamils in the Northern Province. Two factors may explain these changes. Firstly that the sample now includes the Northern Province where most of the TNA supports are to be found and secondly that the ‘Religious Rights’ issue, or rather the ‘pride of place’ of Buddhism issue has strong political connotations for TNA supporters. Table 49. The TNA response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) TNA 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 45 52 41 39 53 49 77 14 63 32 66 50 26 33 23 24 30 29 24 26 9 7 20 21 19 29 22 28 14 10 13 13 7 9 13 6 12 24 6 13 14 15 3 3 3 3 4 6 13 6 5 8 6 4 2 66 2 3 3 5 8 8 6 6 40 17 16 9 7 8 3 3 9 7 1 25 10 3 13 5 6 3 8 11 8 Table 50. The TNA response to the APRC proposals (March 2009) TNA per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 31 28 42 44 39 39 90 43 88 31 51 40 35 71 24 23 28 35 33 19 7 4 4 28 39 35 20 17 14 30 16 15 13 19 2 4 5 18 8 17 20 8 8 13 13 1 4 15 0 2 1 10 1 5 19 2 22 6 1 0 7 9 0 47 1 9 1 2 5 1 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 0 40 34 20 3 3 1 24 When asked the constitutional package question again in a simple ‘Yes/No’ format the pattern of responses for the political parties remains much the same (Table 51). The SLFP come out with the strongest support up from 68% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 87% ‘Yes’ in 2010 followed by the UNP at 80% ‘Yes (down from 85% in 2009), then the TNA at 78% (down from 90% in 2009), then the SLMC at 74% (down from 88% in 2009) and finally the JVP at 69% ‘Yes’ in 2010 down from 83% in 2009. As before these results are most likely a result of ongoing discourse on constitutional issues, the inclusion of the Northern Province in the sample and government verses opposition electoral politics. Table 51. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? Per cent (2010) SLFP UNP JVP TNA SLMC Yes 87 80 69 78 74 No 6 11 27 17 14 DK 7 9 4 5 12 Per cent (2009) SLFP UNP JVP TNA SLMC Yes 68 85 83 90 88 No 10 3 4 2 5 DK 22 12 13 7 7 One more observation that was to be expected can be taken from this political party analysis. The SLFP can be significantly moved to change their opinion in favour of the constitutional proposals by their President, religious leaders and party (Table 52) while the UNP are more influenced by their party and not so much by the President (Table 54). The same goes for the TNA (Table 58). Table 52. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: SLFP per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 65 51 53 No 24 24 32 DK 11 25 15 65 17 18 Table 53. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: SLFP per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? 25 Yes 50 49 56 No 47 44 41 DK 3 7 3 42 53 5 Table 54. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: UNP per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 15 22 40 No 50 51 36 DK 35 28 24 34 34 32 Table 55. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: UNP per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? Yes 52 48 49 No 45 43 42 DK 3 10 9 45 51 4 Table 56. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: JVP per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 46 92 No 100 54 8 46 8 DK 46 Table 57. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: JVP per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? 26 Yes 50 24 9 No 50 61 92 DK 35 61 4 15 Table 58. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: TNA per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 28 No 81 91 62 DK 19 9 9 19 34 47 Table 59. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: TNA per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? Yes 43 31 33 No 52 64 62 DK 5 5 5 29 67 5 Table 60. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: SLMC per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Your religious leaders supported them? The political party you are closest to supported them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes 54 77 76 No 35 12 24 76 DK 12 12 24 Table 61. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: SLMC per cent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them? Your religious leaders were against them? The political party you are closest to was against them? President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them? 27 Yes 42 41 34 No 49 55 58 DK 8 4 8 38 51 11 A further note on the politics of ‘Religious Rights’ If it is the case that the problem with the ‘Religious Rights’ proposal is essentially political rather than religious then it seems very likely that the reaction of Tamil speaking Christians and Sinhala speaking Christians will be different if it is a political/ethnic problem but the same if it is a religious problem. An analysis of these communities on this issue confirms support for the ‘political hypothesis’ with 39% of Tamil speaking Christians considering these proposals to be ‘unacceptable’ and only 14% of Sinhala speaking Christians sharing this view (Table 62). Additionally, the TNA ‘top’ this list at 66% ‘unacceptable’ suggesting it is a political issue for their supporters. Table 62. Political, religious and ethnic response to the ‘Religious Rights’ provision in the APRC proposals sorted in rank order by per cent ‘unacceptable’. Religious Rights per cent TNA Up-Country Tamil7 Tamil8 Tamil Christian UNP Sinhala Christian Muslim SLMC JVP SLFP Sinhala 7 Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable 14 19 22 43 49 46 47 56 36 61 64 7 6 11 3 22 25 19 19 48 25 25 6 6 7 10 5 4 13 8 9 5 5 7 6 8 4 3 11 9 7 3 2 66 60 50 39 18 14 10 8 8 5 2 DK 2 2 1 2 0 3 2 1 1 As the Up-Country Tamils were not directly involved in the Sri Lankan insurgency this result of 60% ‘unacceptable’ seemed to be too high. However, when those doing the interviews were asked about this issue they pointed out that the survey work had been done in the largely Hindu Up-Country towns of Hatton and Kotmale in the District of Nuwara Eliya where recent incidents had led to the raising of religious tensions. 8 The Tamils represented here are a combination of Hindu and Christian Tamils. As the Christian Tamil response to the ‘Religious Rights’ issue was 39% ‘unacceptable’ it necessarily follows that the Hindu Tamil response to this question will be higher than the 50% recorded here. 28 Summary of results for the APRC proposals Table 63 gives an island wide response to the APRC proposals. It was not possible to do this in March 2009, as access to the Northern Province was not possible before the end of the war. However, with the benefit of a sample from all the Provinces in March 2010, including the Northern Province, it is now possible to produce a weighted sample that is representative of Sri Lanka as a whole. At 25% ‘essential’, 34% ‘desirable’, 22% ‘acceptable’, 7% ‘tolerable’ and only 3% ‘unacceptable’ this is an excellent result for the proposals taken together as a ‘package’ with only 8% ‘Don’t Know’. However, it should be emphasised that when the same results are looked at from an ethnic perspective the special place for Buddhism in the proposed constitution is presently a problem for Tamils at 50% ‘unacceptable’ (Table 11) and the future role of the President is a matter for concern for his SLFP supporters at 21% ‘unacceptable’ (Table 41). Table 63. Sri Lanka response to the APRC proposals (March 2010) Sri Lanka per cent 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable DK 29 26 23 26 28 21 54 54 60 24 42 25 41 41 38 37 33 35 32 32 29 23 28 30 36 37 29 31 15 15 17 17 12 20 8 6 7 19 13 19 13 11 2 4 5 4 4 7 3 3 1 5 2 5 4 3 9 11 10 5 17 11 4 11 1 9 2 4 5 7 7 8 12 12 7 9 2 2 2 13 6 11 8 6 25 34 22 7 3 8 Similarly the result for Sri Lanka as a whole at 83% ‘Yes’, 9% ‘No’ and 8% ‘Don’t Know’ when asked the more simple ‘Yes/No’ question regarding support for the constitutional package is very encouraging (Table 64). The most important points to note here are that Sinhala and SLFP support has shifted from the ‘Don’t Know’ column before the war to the ‘Yes’ column after the war and even the Northern Tamils and TNA support the proposals at 77% and 78% ‘Yes’ respectively. However, when asked how they felt about the proposals in the context of support from their political leaders the Northern Tamil ‘Yes’ dropped to only 32% with 14% ‘No’ and 54% ‘Don’t Know’ but when the Eastern Tamils were asked the same question in the same context their ‘Yes’ rose from 89% to 96% (Table 40). Northern Tamils, it would seem, need time to develop new political leaders who they can trust. Table 64. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? March 2010 Yes No DK Sri Lanka 83 9 8 March 2009 Yes No DK Sri Lanka - Sinhala Tamil 83 9 9 84 7 8 Sinhala Tamil 67 12 21 86 4 10 UC Tamil 86 12 2 UC Tamil 92 0 8 Muslim 80 13 8 Muslim 90 1 9 Eastern Tamil 89 0 11 Northern Tamil 77 15 8 Other Tamil 90 4 6 Eastern Tamil - Northern Tamil - Other Tamil - 29 SLFP UNP JVP TNA SLMC 87 6 7 80 11 9 69 27 4 78 17 5 74 14 12 SLFP UNP JVP TNA SLMC 68 10 22 85 3 12 83 4 13 90 2 7 88 5 7 Problems Before the end of the war in March 2009 all those being interviewed were asked to rate the importance of 51 different problems collected from the different communities of Sri Lanka. However, in March 2010, after the war, it was no longer possible to ask questions about ‘The ongoing war’ or LTTE. Similarly questions about the JVP and JHU in government could not be asked as the government had been dissolved. So these items had to be cut from the questionnaire when it was repeated in March 2010 (Table 65). Table 65. Problems asked in 2009 as being ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’, ‘Of little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’. Items struck through were not repeated in March 2010. 1. Unemployment 2. Lack of basic health care 3. The decline of the economy 4. Inflation 5. The ongoing war 6. Violence over the past 30 years 7. Escalating violence in the last 2 years 8. Fragmentation of the island into ‘cleared’ and ‘un-cleared’ areas 9. State aided colonization and change of demographics 10. Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 11. Failure to protect historic Hindu sites 12. The continued violence of the LTTE 13. It is not possible to kill the last Tiger 14. The LTTE can only be weakened by war 15. A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups 16. Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces 17. The Police do not provide a police service for the public 18. The Police are predominately Sinhalese 19. The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese 20. Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life 21. Polarisation of civil society 22. Increasing number of IDPs 23. Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka 24. Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE 25. Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces 26. Abuse of Human Rights by the Police 27. Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces 28. Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice 29. All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces 30. Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes 31. Failure to implement language rights 32. Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment 33. Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 34. Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems 35. Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems 36. Politicisation of the public service 37. Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU 38. Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU 39. Corrupt politicians 40. Vested interests in ongoing conflict 41. Non-productive Peace Secretariat 42. Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes 30 43. Politicians frequently changing party 44. Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation 45. State control over media 46. The failure of successive governments to find a political solution 47. Failure to implement 13th Amendment 48. Failure to implement 17th Amendment 49. Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka 50. The British Colonialism 51. Discrimination after independence The full results for this question in 2009 and 2010 are given in the appendix in rank order of ‘Very significant’ for the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, Eastern Tamils, Northern Tamils, Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka and the major political parties. However, to summarize, Table 66 lists the top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2010 and Table 67 in 2009. The top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2010, are given in Table 68 and in Table 69 for 2009. Table 66. Top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2010 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Sinhala per cent (2010) Inflation Corrupt politicians Unemployment The decline of the economy Politicisation of the public service Very Significant 68 64 62 54 53 Table 67. Top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2009 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Sinhala per cent (2009) Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE The continued violence of the LTTE Vested interests in ongoing conflict Violence over the past 30 years It is not possible to kill the last Tiger Very Significant 63 61 45 42 41 Lists of problems like these have been produced for many different conflicts around the world. Although every list is different they all have one characteristic in common. If the items at the top of each communities list is not addressed and the causes of the conflict remain in place then the conditions required for long-term peace and stability will not be met. For example, in the Middle East the number one priority for Israelis is security and for Palestinians it is a Palestinian state. If Israelis do not get security and if Palestinians do not get a state there will not be peace in the Middle East. Fortunately for the Sinhala of Sri Lanka their pre-war concerns have all been met. Their top 5 items in March 2009 were ‘Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE’ 1st at 63% ‘very significant’, followed by ‘The continued violence of the LTTE’ 2nd at 61%, then ‘Vested interests in ongoing conflict’ 3rd at 45%, ‘Violence over the past 30 years’ 4th at 42% and ‘It is not possible to kill the last Tiger’ 5th at 41% ‘very significant’. None of these questions could even be asked in March 2010 as, with the end of the war and defeat of the LTTE none of them were relevant and in this context any attempt to ask these questions was met with incredulity and the interview could not be completed. After the war in March 2010 the top 5 items for the Sinhala were ‘Inflation’ 1st at 68% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘Corrupt politicians’ 2nd at 64% then ‘Unemployment’ 3rd at 62%, ‘The decline of the economy’ 4th at 54% and ‘Politicisation of the public service’ 5th at 53% ‘very significant’. These are all problems of the economy and good governance. If not dealt with the government may lose its popularity and electoral mandate but not much more than that. 31 Table 68. Top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2010 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Tamil per cent (2010) Unemployment Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Inflation Violence over the past 30 years Very Significant 66 62 61 60 59 Table 69. Top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2009 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Tamil per cent (2009) Discrimination after independence Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Failure to implement language rights Very Significant 66 63 62 60 60 In 2009 the top 5 problems for the Tamils were ‘Discrimination after independence’ 1st at 66% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems’ 2nd at 63%, then ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solution’ at 62%, ‘All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces’ 4th at 60% and ‘Failure to implement language rights’ 5th also at 60% ‘very significant’. The government can take comfort from the fact that in 2010 this list has changed a little with ‘Unemployment’ now first on the Tamil list at 66% ‘very significant’ and ‘Inflation’ 4th at 60%. So the government’s policy to stimulate the Sri Lankan economy will go some way to resolving the problems of all Sri Lankans. However, the ‘Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems’ at 62% ‘very significant’ and ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solution’ at 61% remain the 2nd and 3rd priorities for Tamils. Fortunately the government’s policies for constitutional reform as set out in the APRC proposals are acceptable to the vast majority in all the communities of Sri Lanka. If the government were to bring such reforms into law by the end of the year then it seems very likely that the constitutional problem could be resolved and thus provide a political context within which the economic needs of the country can be effectively addressed. However policy makers should also be aware that there are some regional differences in Tamil priorities and concerns. For the Tamils living in the Northern Province the top priorities remain issues of constitutional and political reform both 1st and 2nd at 71% and 69% ‘very significant’ and ‘Unemployment’ 3rd at 64% (Table 70). However, in the East the passing of the war has given way to slightly different priorities. For them ‘Violence over the past 30 years’ came 1st at 80% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces’ 2nd also at 80%, then ‘Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces’ 3rd at 74%, ‘The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese’ 4th and ‘Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment’ 5th both at 70% ‘very significant’ (Table 71). As for the Tamils in the rest of the country their priorities are not so very different to everyone else with an emphasis on issues of the economy and good governance (Table 72). Table 70. Top 5 problems for the Northern Tamils in 2010 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Northern Tamil per cent (2010) Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Unemployment Violence over the past 30 years Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life 32 Very Significant 71 69 64 64 64 Table 71. Top 5 problems for Eastern Tamils in 2010 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Eastern Tamil per cent (2010) Violence over the past 30 years All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Very Significant 80 80 74 70 70 Table 72. Top 5 problems for other Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka in 2010 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010) Inflation Unemployment Corrupt politicians Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation The decline of the economy Very Significant 79 72 69 68 68 Similarly the needs of the Muslim and Up-Country Tamils are a little different, as well as the priorities of those who support the major political parties (SLFP, UNP, JVP, TNA and SLMC) but as would be expected party priorities tend to follow ethnic and regional concerns (see appendix for full results). If there is no Reform One of the most welcome results from the pre-war and post-war analysis of the APRC proposals was the fact that Sinhala support for these proposals rose from 67% ‘Yes’ in March 2009 to 83% ‘Yes’ in March 2010 (Table 64). This was achieved by significant numbers of ‘Don’t Knows’ moving to the ‘Yes’ column in post-war Sri Lanka. Similarly when asked what they ‘think will happen if there is no reform of the constitution to deal with the problems of the past’ the Sinhala who said they ‘Don’t Know’ in 2009 have now clearly expressed their view that there will be a political, economic and social cost to pay (Table 73 and 74). In 2009 8% of Sinhala considered it ‘very probable’ that ‘The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again’ rising to 15% in 2010 (18% ‘probable’ and 34% ‘possible’) with ‘Don’t Knows’ falling from 25% in 2009 to only 6% in 2010. Table 73. Sinhala concerns if there is no reform in 2010. Sinhala per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 16 19 30 21 7 7 19 18 24 25 9 6 10 15 37 18 11 10 15 18 34 16 11 6 16 17 34 16 10 8 33 Table 74. Sinhala concerns if there is no reform in 2009. Sinhala per cent (2009) Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 7 18 19 25 13 18 7 18 22 23 15 15 7 20 23 16 9 25 8 21 21 14 11 25 11 16 19 18 13 24 The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation Following the same pattern of support for the APRC proposals there is little difference between the 2009 and 2010 results for this question for the Tamils at 41% ‘very probable’ in both 2009 and 2010 but a slight drop in concern (and support for the APRC proposals – Table 64) for Muslims at 44% ‘very probable’ in 2009 and 31% in 2010. Clearly there is a relationship between a persons support for the APRC proposals and their concern for the future of Sri Lanka although this concern is felt more strongly amongst Tamils than Sinhala (Table 75). Table 75. Concerns if there is no reform in 2010 as per cent ‘Very probable’. Per cent ‘Very probable’ (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Sinhala Tamil North Tamil East Tamil Other Tamil UC Tamil Muslim SLFP 16 44 36 50 48 37 26 16 27 9 45 19 19 51 40 67 50 49 27 19 30 19 64 23 10 39 27 38 53 24 31 10 23 23 42 33 15 41 37 59 32 47 31 16 24 19 53 33 16 54 53 62 48 51 30 16 26 14 65 24 34 UNP JVP TNA SLMC Those for or against the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka The results of this poll suggest that approximately 10% of the population of Sri Lanka are opposed to the APRC proposals and that this 10% are a feature of both the Sinhala and Tamil communities, but clearly not for the same reasons. So who are these 10% and what are their characteristics? In an effort to answer this question a battery of demographic questions were asked at the end of the questionnaire not only to ensure a good sample but also to explore the attitudes of those who supported or who did not support constitutional reform. Table 76 lists these questions and demographic variables along with their correlation coefficients for all those who said ‘No’ to the APRC proposals. These are quite easy to interpret. If the coefficient is positive (+) then the variable in question is a characteristic of those who said ‘No’. However if the coefficient is negative (-) then the variable is a characteristic of those who said ‘Yes’. Finally if the coefficient has one asterisk* then it is ‘significant’ and if it has two asterisks** it is ‘very significant’. (Copies of the questions used can be found in the appendix) Variable Gender (male) Age Type of area (urban) Income Education Central North Central Northern Eastern North Western Sabaragamuwa Southern Uva Western SLFP UNF JVP TNA SLMC Importance of religion Importance of own ethnic group Importance of being Sri Lankan Contact with other ethnic group Democratic value Victim of conflict Sinhala ‘No’ (N=882)9 0.041 0.044 0.011 -0.071* -0.012 0.043 -0.077* -0.029 0.053 -0.063 0.002 -0.031 0.055 0.019 -0.111** 0.04 0.116** -0.072* -0.111** -0.096** -0.015 -0.125** 0.084* Tamil ‘No’ (N=477) 0.039 0.024 -0.094* 0.042 0.108* -0.107* -0.03 0.252** -0.122** -0.015 0.029 -0.033 -0.072 -0.05 -0.078 -0.015 0.147** -0.021 -0.168** 0.002 -0.259** -0.244** -0.066 0.089 There is a slight but insignificant positive correlation with gender suggesting males are a little more likely to say ‘No’ to the APRC proposals than females. This is to be expected, as males tend to be slightly more involved in conflicts and confrontation then females but not significantly so. Age does not seem to be an important factor but there is a significant negative correlation for being urban and being a Tamil who might say ‘No’ to the APRC proposals. So Tamils who might say ‘No’ tend to be rural. They also tend to be from the Northern region, are better educated and are associated with the TNA. No surprise there except perhaps for education. But the Tamils who are most likely to say ‘Yes’ to the APRC proposals and who are most definitely NOT in the ‘No camp’ are the Tamils in the East. As indicated in the ‘Problems’ section of this report there are significant differences between the Tamils of the North and the Tamils of the East (Tables 70 and 71). 9 Comparisons of the value of the correlation coefficients can only be made within each group (Sinhala or Tamil) but not between each group as the number in each group (N) is not the same. 35 From the available data the Sinhala who are most likely to say ‘No’ tend to be associated with the JVP while those who would be most strongly ‘Yes’ live in the North Central region, might be a little poorer and vote for the President’s party the SLFP. Significantly the importance of religion does NOT correlate with saying ‘No’ for either the Sinhala or Tamils. Religious ‘radicalisation’ does play a role in other conflicts around the world but this does not seem to be a feature of the conflict here according to this data. However, the politics of religion may be a different matter as noted earlier in this report (see Table 62). Being Sinhala correlates with saying ‘Yes’ to the APRC proposals as does being Sri Lankan for both Sinhala and Tamils. A lack of contact between Tamils and Sinhala may be a problem in Sri Lanka as Tamils who do not have such contact are more likely to say ‘No’ to the APRC proposals. For Sinhala democratic values correlates with saying ‘Yes’ but being a victim of the conflict, for them, also correlates with saying ‘No’. Those who know and understand Sri Lanka society better than this author will no doubt be able to add more meaning and appreciation to the numbers briefly reviewed here. The important point to be made, however, is that now that the whole of Sri Lanka is open to the kind of social research undertaken in this poll such research will be able to make a positive contribution to peace making, peace building and reconciliation in the future. 36 Opposition to progressive reform outside Sri Lanka The years of careful negotiation by the members of the APRC, including informal discussions with parties outside the APRC process, has led to the formulation of a set of proposals that are equally acceptable to all the communities in Sri Lanka. This program of research has now been able to explore and describe that support (or lack of support where applicable) in much detail pointing out the problems where they exist. Throughout the years of similar negotiations in Northern Ireland there was a considerable lack of understanding of what was really going on in Northern Ireland in the USA. There many Americans of Irish descent continued to support the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their aspiration for a united Ireland with little knowledge or appreciation of the power sharing arrangements being negotiated under the terms of the Belfast Agreement. Similarly, it seems to be the case that the Tamil diaspora are not fully aware of the efforts of the APRC to find a constitutional solution to their country’s problems. In contrast to the detailed APRC proposals tried and tested here (Table 3) the members of the Tamil community around the world were recently provided with the following statement in what they called a Tamil Referendum: ‘I aspire to the formation of the independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in the contiguous north and east territory of the island of Sri Lanka on the basis that the Tamil speaking people in the island of Sri Lanka make a distinct nation, have a traditional homeland and have the right to self determination.’ They were then asked to ‘Mark a cross (X) in the appropriate box’ which provided for only a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ response. These polls or referenda were held in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland for a total turnout of 207,058 votes cast out of a possible 323,500 to produce a combined result of 99.68% for the Tamil Eelam proposition and only 0.32% against (Table 77). Table 77. Results of the Tamil Referendum in April 2010 Country Australia Canada Denmark France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Switzerland UK Total Total Polled 8,154 48,583 4,147 31,148 23,089 3,680 2,750 5,633 16,441 64,692 207,058 ‘Yes’ per cent 99.38 99.82 99.49 99.86 99.41 98.79 99.67 99.11 99.80 99.71 99.68 ‘No’ per cent 0.62 0.18 0.51 0.14 0.59 1.21 0.33 0.89 0.20 0.29 0.32 It was very important that the Belfast Agreement was put to the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (the South of Ireland) in a referendum to give the peace agreement political legitimacy. In that referendum held on May 22nd 1998, 71% of the people of Northern Ireland voted ‘Yes’ and in a public opinion poll conducted on behalf of the parties in the negotiations, just 2 weeks before the agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments on Good Friday 1998, 77% said they would support the agreement. The opposition of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who were able to get their members to vote against it, can explain the drop of 6% between the results of the poll and the referendum. So the poll was very accurate. The results for the test of the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka are certainly as good as if not better than the results for the Belfast Agreement poll, and in Northern Ireland the people there were able to make peace 37 on the strength of those results. Hopefully, now that the elections are over in Sri Lanka the new government will take steps to bring the APRC proposals into constitutional law. With effective implementation all the people of Sri Lanka can reasonably expect to share in all the benefits that will inevitably flow from the peace and stability that these reforms can bring. Referendums that only offer the options of independence for Tamil Elam or the status quo can’t achieve this. Neither of these two options is what is wanted in Sri Lanka now. The people there are prepared to move on. However, it remains an open question as to whether or not the political leadership in Sri Lanka will take this opportunity to resolve the ‘national question’ once and for all. As far as the people are concerned this door is open. Given the unprecedented electoral mandate handed to the President and his government by the people they are now in an exceptionally strong position to lead them through. 38 Appendix Questionnaire and additional results for questions 1 and 2 not given above Political Reform in Sri Lanka Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is _____ from _____ At this critical time we are conducting a survey of public opinion to find out what the people of Sri Lanka believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the island. The Research is being carried out by the staff of Social Indicator in Colombo. The Survey involves interviewing two thousand people from all parts of Sri Lanka to complete a representative sample in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and geographical area. Topics covered include: • • • • • • The range of problems faced by the people What you think will happen if reforms are not put in place The major elements of possible reforms for achieving lasting peace and stability Your views on some of these reforms Your views about yourself And finally some questions that tell us where you fit into our sample All your answers will be kept completely confidential. 39 1. The Problems People from different communities often hold very different views about the current problems faced by them. Here is a list of some of the problems given to our research team from the different regions of Sri Lanka. Which problems do you consider to be ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’, ‘Of little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 10 Sinhala per cent (2010) Inflation Corrupt politicians Unemployment The decline of the economy Politicisation of the public service Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Lack of basic health care Violence over the past 30 years The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Politicians frequently changing party Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Increasing number of IDPs Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life State control over media Polarisation of civil society 10 The failure of successive governments to find a political solution The British Colonialism Failure to implement language rights Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to implement 13th Amendment Failure to protect historic Hindu sites All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Discrimination after independence The Police are predominately Sinhalese Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment State aided colonization and change of demographics Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Divisions among civic organisations, political groups and media 40 Very Significant 68 64 62 54 53 52 50 44 42 42 41 38 37 36 32 32 28 27 27 26 25 23 20 19 19 17 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 13 12 10 9 8 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42nd 43rd 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th Sinhala per cent (2009) Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE The continued violence of the LTTE Vested interests in ongoing conflict Violence over the past 30 years It is not possible to kill the last Tiger The ongoing war The LTTE can only be weakened by war The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Corrupt politicians Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces The decline of the economy The British Colonialism Polarisation of civil society Failure to implement language rights Non-productive Peace Secretariat Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Inflation Unemployment State aided colonization and change of demographics A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Politicisation of the public service Discrimination after independence Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Lack of basic health care The Police do not provide service for the public Politicians frequently changing party State control over media Failure to implement 13th Amendment Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces The Police are predominately Sinhalese The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Increasing number of IDPs Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU 41 Very Significant 63 61 45 42 41 37 32 32 31 25 25 20 20 19 19 18 18 18 18 17 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 12 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 9 8 8 8 7 6 6 3 2 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th Tamil per cent (2010) Unemployment Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Inflation Violence over the past 30 years Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Failure to implement language rights The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Corrupt politicians Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment The Police are predominately Sinhalese State control over media Increasing number of IDPs The decline of the economy Discrimination after independence Politicisation of the public service Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Polarisation of civil society State aided colonization and change of demographics Lack of basic health care Politicians frequently changing party Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to implement 13th Amendment The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Failure to implement 17th Amendment Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka The British Colonialism Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 42 Very Significant 66 62 61 60 59 58 58 58 56 55 55 55 55 54 53 52 51 51 50 50 49 47 44 42 41 41 40 36 35 35 34 33 30 26 24 22 21 14 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42nd 43rd 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th Tamil per cent (2009) Discrimination after independence Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Failure to implement language rights The ongoing war Violence over the past 30 years The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice State control over media The Police are predominately Sinhalese Failure to implement 13th Amendment Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces State aided colonization and change of demographics A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to implement 17th Amendment Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces Non-productive Peace Secretariat Increasing number of IDPs Politicisation of the public service Unemployment Vested interests in ongoing conflict It is not possible to kill the last Tiger The Police do not provide service for the public The continued violence of the LTTE The British Colonialism Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Inflation Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU The decline of the economy Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU Corrupt politicians Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Politicians frequently changing party Polarisation of civil society Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes The LTTE can only be weakened by war Lack of basic health care Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 43 Very Significant 66 63 62 60 60 59 54 53 53 52 51 50 50 49 46 46 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 38 37 37 36 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 28 28 25 25 24 22 22 21 20 20 20 17 14 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th Up-Country Tamil per cent (2010) Inflation Failure to implement language rights All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Corrupt politicians Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Abuse of Human Rights by the Police The Police are predominately Sinhalese Unemployment Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The decline of the economy The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Lack of basic health care Discrimination after independence Violence over the past 30 years State control over media Politicisation of the public service Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Politicians frequently changing party Polarisation of civil society Increasing number of IDPs State aided colonization and change of demographics Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to implement 13th Amendment Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East The British Colonialism 44 Very Significant 78 77 75 71 67 67 66 65 63 63 63 59 59 58 58 57 57 54 52 51 50 50 50 47 47 40 40 35 33 33 28 27 27 25 21 19 15 12 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42nd 43rd 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th Up-Country Tamil per cent (2009) Violence over the past 30 years The ongoing war State control over media All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Failure to implement language rights Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU The failure of successive governments to find a political solution A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Discrimination after independence Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces State aided colonization and change of demographics Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces The Police are predominately Sinhalese The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Corrupt politicians The continued violence of the LTTE The Police do not provide service for the public Vested interests in ongoing conflict Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE Inflation The decline of the economy It is not possible to kill the last Tiger Polarisation of civil society Politicisation of the public service Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Politicians frequently changing party Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East The LTTE can only be weakened by war Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to implement 13th Amendment Increasing number of IDPs Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The British Colonialism Unemployment Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Non-productive Peace Secretariat Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Lack of basic health care 45 Very Significant 80 79 73 72 71 65 64 62 62 62 61 60 59 59 58 56 52 50 47 47 47 42 41 40 39 38 38 37 35 31 31 31 31 31 30 30 26 22 22 22 21 19 19 16 16 13 13 10 5 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th Muslim per cent (2010) Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Unemployment Violence over the past 30 years Inflation The decline of the economy Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Corrupt politicians Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems State aided colonization and change of demographics Abuse of Human Rights by the Police State control over media The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Politicisation of the public service Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Lack of basic health care Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Failure to implement language rights The Police are predominately Sinhalese All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Polarisation of civil society Increasing number of IDPs The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to implement 13th Amendment Discrimination after independence Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Politicians frequently changing party Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka The British Colonialism 46 Very Significant 53 50 50 48 45 44 43 43 42 42 41 41 41 40 40 38 37 37 37 36 35 34 34 34 33 32 29 27 26 25 24 24 23 23 22 22 19 12 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42nd 43rd 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th Muslim per cent (2009) The continued violence of the LTTE Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE Failure to implement 17th Amendment It is not possible to kill the last Tiger Failure to implement 13th Amendment Violence over the past 30 years All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces State aided colonization and change of demographics Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces The ongoing war Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to implement language rights The failure of successive governments to find a political solution A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups The Police do not provide service for the public The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Politicisation of the public service The Police are predominately Sinhalese Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Vested interests in ongoing conflict Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Discrimination after independence The LTTE can only be weakened by war Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU Corrupt politicians State control over media Unemployment Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Non-productive Peace Secretariat Inflation The decline of the economy Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Increasing number of IDPs Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Politicians frequently changing party Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Polarisation of civil society The British Colonialism Lack of basic health care 47 Very Significant 57 55 54 53 52 51 51 50 49 48 48 46 45 44 44 43 43 42 40 40 40 39 37 37 37 37 37 35 34 33 33 33 32 31 31 31 28 27 25 25 23 23 22 20 19 17 17 17 9 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010) Inflation Unemployment Corrupt politicians Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation The decline of the economy Failure to implement language rights Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Lack of basic health care Politicisation of the public service State control over media Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces The failure of successive governments to find a political solution The Police are predominately Sinhalese Increasing number of IDPs Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Politicians frequently changing party Polarisation of civil society Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Violence over the past 30 years The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Discrimination after independence Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems State aided colonization and change of demographics Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to implement 13th Amendment Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East The British Colonialism 48 Very Significant 79 72 69 68 68 66 63 62 59 57 57 52 48 48 47 47 46 46 44 44 43 43 43 43 41 41 37 37 37 36 25 24 24 23 23 22 14 11 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th Eastern Tamil per cent (2010) Violence over the past 30 years All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Unemployment Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Increasing number of IDPs State aided colonization and change of demographics Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation The Police are predominately Sinhalese Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Inflation Discrimination after independence Corrupt politicians Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Politicians frequently changing party Failure to implement 13th Amendment Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka State control over media Polarisation of civil society Failure to implement language rights Failure to implement 17th Amendment The decline of the economy Politicisation of the public service Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Failure to protect historic Hindu sites The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Lack of basic health care The British Colonialism Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems 49 Very Significant 80 80 74 70 70 67 66 63 62 60 60 58 56 55 55 51 51 50 46 46 45 44 43 40 40 40 39 38 35 34 31 28 26 25 25 21 19 16 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th Northern Tamil per cent (2010) Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Unemployment Violence over the past 30 years Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Failure to implement language rights Discrimination after independence The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese The Police are predominately Sinhalese Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice State control over media All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Politicisation of the public service Inflation Polarisation of civil society Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces State aided colonization and change of demographics Increasing number of IDPs Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Corrupt politicians The decline of the economy Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Failure to implement 13th Amendment The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Lack of basic health care Politicians frequently changing party Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to implement 17th Amendment Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The British Colonialism Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 50 Very Significant 71 69 64 64 64 63 62 59 56 56 55 52 51 51 51 49 48 48 48 48 47 45 44 42 42 39 36 34 34 30 30 29 28 28 20 16 15 7 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th SLFP per cent (2010) Inflation Corrupt politicians Unemployment The decline of the economy Politicisation of the public service Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Violence over the past 30 years Lack of basic health care The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Politicians frequently changing party Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Increasing number of IDPs Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life The failure of successive governments to find a political solution The British Colonialism Polarisation of civil society State control over media Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to implement language rights Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Failure to implement 17th Amendment The Police are predominately Sinhalese The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to implement 13th Amendment Discrimination after independence Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment State aided colonization and change of demographics Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems 51 Very Significant 66 61 59 54 51 49 47 46 44 42 41 37 36 34 33 32 30 28 27 26 25 23 22 21 20 18 18 17 17 16 16 16 15 15 14 14 11 10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th UNP per cent (2010) Inflation Corrupt politicians Unemployment Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Politicisation of the public service The decline of the economy Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes State control over media Lack of basic health care Abuse of Human Rights by the Police The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Politicians frequently changing party Violence over the past 30 years Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Polarisation of civil society The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Failure to implement language rights Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Increasing number of IDPs The Police are predominately Sinhalese Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to implement 13th Amendment Discrimination after independence State aided colonization and change of demographics Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems The British Colonialism 52 Very Significant 70 66 63 61 55 54 54 51 51 48 47 44 43 40 38 38 35 33 32 31 30 29 28 28 28 28 27 26 22 21 21 20 20 18 16 15 15 14 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th JVP per cent (2010) Unemployment Inflation Politicisation of the public service Corrupt politicians Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes The decline of the economy Lack of basic health care Politicians frequently changing party State control over media Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Failure to implement 17th Amendment Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Violence over the past 30 years The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Failure to implement 13th Amendment Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Failure to implement language rights Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Increasing number of IDPs Polarisation of civil society Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East The British Colonialism Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Discrimination after independence Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems The Police are predominately Sinhalese State aided colonization and change of demographics 53 Very Significant 80 64 59 58 58 47 46 40 40 38 37 37 35 33 32 28 28 27 26 25 25 25 20 19 17 17 16 16 16 16 14 13 12 12 10 7 6 4 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th TNA per cent (2010) Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Violence over the past 30 years Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces Discrimination after independence The Police are predominately Sinhalese Failure to implement language rights Corrupt politicians Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Unemployment Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation State aided colonization and change of demographics Abuse of Human Rights by the Police Politicisation of the public service State control over media Polarisation of civil society Increasing number of IDPs Failure to implement 13th Amendment Politicians frequently changing party Failure to implement 17th Amendment Failure to protect historic Hindu sites Inflation The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public The decline of the economy The British Colonialism Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Lack of basic health care Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East 54 Very Significant 82 77 77 77 77 76 75 74 72 70 69 67 66 63 61 61 60 60 59 58 57 55 54 46 46 44 43 42 39 35 34 33 33 32 29 24 20 15 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th SLMC per cent (2010) Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation Violence over the past 30 years Failure to implement language rights Corrupt politicians Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces State control over media Unemployment Increasing number of IDPs Inflation State aided colonization and change of demographics The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces Abuse of Human Rights by the Police All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment The decline of the economy The Police are predominately Sinhalese Lack of basic health care Failure to protect historic Hindu sites The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems The failure of successive governments to find a political solution Failure to implement 13th Amendment Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East Politicisation of the public service Polarisation of civil society Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka Failure to implement 17th Amendment Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes Discrimination after independence Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes Politicians frequently changing party Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka The British Colonialism 55 Very Significant 56 53 53 53 51 50 50 48 47 46 46 45 45 45 44 43 43 42 40 39 38 37 36 36 36 36 36 35 35 34 31 28 26 26 23 23 19 12 2. If there is no Reform Q2.From the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if there is no reform of the constitution to deal with the problems of the past. Please indicate which ones you consider to be ‘Very probable’, ‘Probable’, ‘Possible’, ‘Improbable’ or ‘Very improbable’. Sinhala per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Sinhala per cent (2009) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 16 19 30 21 7 7 19 18 24 25 9 6 10 15 37 18 11 10 15 18 34 16 11 6 16 17 34 16 10 8 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 7 18 19 25 13 18 7 18 22 23 15 15 7 20 23 16 9 25 8 21 21 14 11 25 11 16 19 18 13 24 56 Tamil per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Tamil per cent (2009) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation Up-Country Tamil per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Up-Country Tamil per cent (2009) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 44 27 14 5 3 6 51 26 13 4 2 4 39 28 18 4 4 6 41 19 21 5 6 9 54 22 12 4 4 4 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 44 26 19 3 3 4 55 21 17 3 1 3 34 28 24 8 1 4 41 22 19 3 1 14 52 22 14 2 1 8 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 37 29 16 4 7 7 49 26 13 4 4 5 24 35 19 6 7 9 47 14 17 6 9 7 51 25 9 3 4 7 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 35 21 18 12 10 5 63 10 9 10 4 4 51 18 13 7 4 6 58 15 4 7 6 9 67 12 6 4 6 5 57 Muslim per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Muslim per cent (2009) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 26 39 18 9 4 5 27 23 31 11 5 4 31 27 15 12 10 7 31 24 21 10 7 7 30 32 20 6 4 8 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 45 32 11 4 0 7 49 31 10 5 1 4 24 38 23 4 1 11 44 27 13 1 2 13 36 38 12 3 1 10 58 Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Eastern Tamil per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Northern Tamil per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 48 25 8 7 5 8 50 24 13 6 4 2 53 21 12 5 7 3 32 20 19 9 15 6 48 22 10 4 10 6 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 50 33 7 2 2 6 67 23 3 2 1 4 38 37 16 4 2 4 59 19 14 2 1 6 62 31 5 2 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 36 25 27 5 2 5 40 30 20 4 1 6 27 28 27 5 4 10 37 18 27 3 2 14 53 15 19 6 2 5 59 1 SLFP per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation UNP per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation JVP per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 16 16 31 23 7 7 19 17 25 26 9 5 10 15 37 18 11 8 16 18 32 16 12 6 16 18 32 17 11 6 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 27 30 21 12 3 7 30 24 18 17 5 7 23 25 21 13 9 9 24 21 27 12 10 6 26 26 26 7 7 9 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 9 43 26 17 4 19 30 23 23 4 23 19 45 9 4 19 44 33 4 14 28 49 60 4 4 TNA per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation SLMC per cent (2010) The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka The Sri Lankan economy will not develop India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 45 24 15 5 6 4 64 15 8 3 3 6 42 25 18 5 3 7 53 16 21 3 3 3 65 17 5 4 3 6 Very probable Probable Possible Improbable Very improbable DK 19 44 27 10 23 21 44 10 1 2 33 25 14 16 9 4 33 22 27 9 6 4 24 36 23 8 6 4 61 1 3. A Program for Reform With regards to the future peace and stability of Sri Lanka I am now going to present you with a number of reforms on a series of cards. For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’ and for the purposes of this poll ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ mean: ‘Essential’ – You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better future for the island and should be fully implemented. ‘Desirable’ – This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Essential’, but you think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice. ‘Acceptable’ – This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Desirable’, if you were given a choice, but you could certainly ‘live with it’. ‘Tolerable’ – This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it. ‘Unacceptable’ – This option is totally unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the island. (VERSION 1 - Neutral) You may use each of the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in each question. (VERSION 2 - President) If President Mahinda Rajapaksa strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in each question. (VERSION 3 - Religious) If your religious leaders strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in each question. (VERSION 4 - Political) If the political party you are closest to strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in each question. 62 SHOW CARDS 1 to 14 15. The Structure of the State – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state. 16. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces – These powers will be clearly defined in two separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces. 17. The Parliament - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators. 18. Amending the Constitution – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum. 19. The Powers of the President – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent’s term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives. 20. The Powers of Local Authorities – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution. 21. Language Rights – The Tamil and Singhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Singhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Singhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education. 22. Religious Rights – Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed. 23. Fundamental Rights – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law. 24. Electoral System – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation. 25. The Judiciary – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts. 26. Public Service – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent. 27. Safeguards against secession – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to succeed from the State. 28. Law and Order - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre. 63 SHOW CARDS 1 to 14… Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable 1. The Structure of the State 2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces 3. The Parliament 4. Amending the Constitution 5. The Powers of the President 6. The Powers of Local Authorities 7. Language Rights 8. Religious Rights 9. Fundamental Rights 10. Electoral System 11. The Judiciary 12. Public Service 13. Safeguards against secession 14. Law and Order 15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ Q4 (VERSION 1) Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? Yes/No (VERSION 2) If President Mahinda Rajapaksa strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Yes/No (VERSION 3) If your religious leaders strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Yes/No (VERSION 4) If the political party you are closest to strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? Yes/No Q5 (VERSION 1 ONLY) If answer is ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ or No Response: Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: 1) President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? Yes/No 2) Your religious leaders supported them? Yes/No 3) The political party you are closest to supported them? Yes/No 4) President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? Yes/No Q6 (VERSION 1 ONLY) If answer is ‘Yes’: Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if: 1) President Mahinda Rajapaksa did not support them? Yes/No 2) Your religious leaders did not support them? Yes/No 3) The political party you are closest to did not support them? Yes/No 4) President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all did not support them? Yes/No 64 Q7 Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Democracy may have problems buts it's better than any other form of government." (Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?) 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Strongly disagree 98. Don’t know/Not sure 99. No response SECTION III: DEMOGRAPHICS 1. Sex: 1. Male 2. Female 2. Religion: 1. Buddhism 2. Hinduism 3. Islam 4. Roman Catholicism 5. Christianity (Non-RC) 6. Other _________ 2.1. Which of the following BEST describes the importance of religion on your life? 1. It’s the most important thing in my life 2. It’s very important but it doesn’t dominate my life 3. It’s somewhat important in my life. 4. It’s not very important in my life 5. It’s not at all important in my life 3. Age: ________________ 4. Ethnicity: 1. Sinhala 2. Tamil 3. Up-country Tamil 4. Muslim 5. Burgher 5. Other _________ 4.1. How important is being (use group from question 4) to the way you think of yourself, very important, important, neither important or unimportant, not very important, or not important at all? 1. Very important 2. Important 3. Neither important or unimportant 4. Not very important 5. Not important at all 65 4.2. And how important is being Sri Lankan to the way you think of yourself, very important, important, neither important or unimportant, not very important, or not important at all? 1. Very important 2. Important 3. Neither important or unimportant 4. Not very important 4.3. How often you tend to come into contact with people from other ethnic groups? 1. Daily 2. Once a week 3. Once a month 4. Once a year 5. Rarely/Never 5. First language: 1. Sinhala 2. Tamil 3. English 4. Other _________ 6. Occupation of the respondent (SINGLE CODE ONLY) 1. Executives, Managerial and Administrative Professionals 2. Professionals 3. Technicians and Associate Professionals 4. Clerk 5. Travel, Restaurant, Protective Service Workers and Sales Workers 6. Agricultural and fisheries workers 7. Students 8. Housewife 9. Retired 10. Business 11. Self employed 12. Elementary Occupations 13. Unemployed 14. Other 7. Could you please tell me your educational qualifications? (SINGLE CODE ONLY) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Cannot read and write Literate but no formal education Up to grade 5 Grade 6-9 Up to O’ Level O’ Level Up to Advanced Level 8.Advanced Level 9.Vocationally trained 10.Technically trained 11.Professional 12.Undergraduate 13.Graduate and above 8. Total monthly income of the household: 1. Below Rs 5000 2. Rs 5001-Rs 10,000 3. Rs 10,001-Rs 15,000 4. Rs 15,001-Rs 20,000 5. Rs 20,001-Rs 25,000 6. Rs 25,001 & above 66 9. Please tell me that in your view, which political party is the closest to your personal political ideologies? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. SLFP UNF JVP JHU TNA SLMC EPDP UCPF NFF NUA Other _______________________________ 10. Can you tell me if you have ever: Conditions a. Had a family member fight in the conflict? b. How about your friends or neighbours? Have any of them had a family member fight in the conflict? c. Have you or any family member been physically injured, killed, or disappeared in the conflict? d. How about your friends or neighbours? e. Have you or anyone in your family had property damaged or lost land in the conflict? f. Have you ever experienced any loss or limitation of your rights as a result of the conflict? Yes No 2 Don’t know/Not sure 98 No response 99 1 1 2 98 99 1 2 98 99 1 2 98 99 1 2 98 99 1 2 98 99 1 2 98 99 67 1. RESPONDENT’S NAME: 2. ADDRESS: 3. TEL NO: 4. PROVINCE 1 Central 2 North Central 3 Northern 4 Eastern 5 North Western 6 Sabaragamuwa 7 Southern 8 Uva 9 Western 5. DISTRICT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Colombo Gampaha Kalutara Kandy Matale Nuwara Eliya Galle Matara Hambantota Batticaloa 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Ampara Trincomalee Kurunegala Puttalam Anuradhapura Polonnaruwa Badulla Moneragala Ratnapura Vavuniya Mannar Jaffna 6. DIVISIONAL SECRETARIAT: 7. GN: 8. TYPE OF AREA: 1. Rural 2. Urban 9. LGB: 10.DATE: 11.START TIME: THANK YOU! 68 12.END TIME: