An Ethics of Freedom

An Ethics of Freedom By Alain Guillemain © 2015 Contents §i – The thesis ................................................................................................ 1! Part 1 – Freedom ............................................................................................................ 3! §1.1 – A common misinterpretation of Sartre’s theory of freedom ............... 3! §1.2 – Facticity............................................................................................... 4! §1.3 – Coefficient of adversity, situation, and the human condition ............. 7! §1.4 – Ontological freedom and practical freedom ....................................... 9! §1.5 – Revising ontological freedom ........................................................... 13! Part 2 – Freedom and Subjectivity ............................................................................... 16! §2.1 – The subjectiveness of value judgments............................................. 16! §2.2 – The problem of moral equivalence of all free actions ...................... 19! §2.3 – The authentic torturer problem ......................................................... 20! §2.4 – Subjectivity and consistency ............................................................. 22! Part 3 – Freedom and Ethics ........................................................................................ 23! §3.1 – Setting the stage ................................................................................ 23! §3.2 – Relations with others......................................................................... 25! §3.3 – The interplay between ontological and practical freedom ................ 30! §3.4 – Conclusion ........................................................................................ 33! Works Cited ................................................................................................................. 35! §i – The thesis It is possible to have an ethics where beings have ontological freedom, practical freedom, and where moral judgments are entirely subjective. The argument takes for its premises (1) ontological freedom as true, (2) practical freedom as true, and (3) the objectivity of moral judgments as false. Premises 1 and 3 are not readily granted, so Parts 1 and 2 of the essay dedicate a significant portion of the discussion to arguing for these premises, respectively. Once the case has been made for ontological freedom and the subjectivity of moral judgments, Part 3 develops the conclusion that the best version of the world is one where we protect and develop ontological freedom and sustain practical freedom for all. The arguments offered are careful not to assert that protecting ontological freedom and sustaining practical freedom is objectively right, because the thesis is committed to the premise that all moral judgments are subjective. Rather, the arguments highlight how fostering one’s own freedom while oppressing the freedom of others is ultimately self-defeating. Ontological freedom is a concept that was introduced by Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre’s ontological freedom is a difficult concept to grasp; it has been incorrectly interpreted time and again by critics and advocates alike. An analysis of the concept is given in Part 1 that draws out what ontological freedom is. In the process, another type of freedom is revealed, that of practical freedom. The careful reader who is familiar with Sartre’s concept of ontological freedom may take issue with part of the conclusion being argued for: that it [ontological freedom] is what we must protect. Sartre’s concept of ontological freedom is inviolable. Sartre himself asserts, “The slave in chains is as free as his master.”1 What then is there to protect? The analysis of 1 (BN, 570) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 1 ontological freedom presented in §1.5 clarifies just what part of ontological freedom is inviolable and what part is not. Protecting against violations of ontological freedom is a job for ethics. Part 2 explores the differences between moral objectivism and subjectivism, or more specifically, the differences of views held by moral objectivists and subjectivists, respectively. The essay does not allow for a thorough discussion of the meta-ethical problem of whether or not there are objective moral facts. The conclusion reached is that it is necessary to live as though there are no moral facts because we are unable to know whether or not there are. Criticisms against Sartre’s moral subjectivism are presented, and the merits and failings of these criticisms are discussed. It is important to preface any critique of Sartre’s ethics with the fact that while Sartre did write on ethical questions, he never produced a completed ethical system2, even though over the course of his writing, commentators accredit Sartre with two ethics and a third very late in his career.3 “To will oneself free is also to will others free”4 is the foundational statement of the ethics of Simone de Beauvoir. Like Sartre, Beauvoir is committed to the claim that moral judgments are subjective. Beauvoir does not reconcile her ethics with her commitment to moral subjectivism, but she is careful to proceed in a way that is not inconsistent. Part 3 presents an ethics of freedom that is in alignment with Beauvoir’s ethics and demonstrates how such an ethics can be both prescriptive and subjective and also consistent, concluding that the best version of the world is one where we protect and develop ontological freedom and sustain practical freedom for all. 2 (Simont 1992, 178) (Anderson 1993, 1) 4 (EA, 73) 3 An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 2 Part 1 – Freedom Before being able to set forth an ethics of freedom, it is necessary to define first and foremost what is meant by freedom so that we may judge whether such freedom, as defined, is able to serve as a suitable foundation for ethics. There are two kinds of freedom to be defined: 1) ontological freedom, and 2) practical freedom. The concept of ontological freedom is defined first, with practical freedom to follow as a concept related to it. The starting point for the definition of ontological freedom is the concept that was proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre. By observing Sartre’s concept through a different lens, a final definition that bears an important difference to Sartre’s concept is noted. Unlike Sartre’s concept, the ontological freedom settled upon is one that is not identical for every human being. The sections in this part of the essay elucidate the concept. §1.1 touches on a common misinterpretation of Sartre’s concept of freedom. §1.2 and §1.3 provide important corrections to this view. §1.4 develops the concept of practical freedom and its distinction from and connection to the concept of ontological freedom. §1.5 presents a revision of ontological freedom that proves necessary for setting out an ethics of freedom. §1.1 – A common misinterpretation of Sartre’s theory of freedom David Detmer observes that Sartre’s theory of freedom often suffers from misinterpretation. “Absolute freedom” is taken to mean human omnipotence. From this, critics argue by modus tollens that: If humans have absolute freedom, then they are omnipotent. Clearly humans are not omnipotent. Therefore, humans do not have absolute freedom.5 The fault is not entirely with the critics. Sartre does refer to 5 (Detmer 1986, 36-37) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 3 humans as absolutely free, and such a claim does leave itself open to such misinterpretation. In Sartre’s defence, he does qualify, “I am absolutely free and absolutely responsible for my situation. But I am never free except in situation.”6 The way one interprets the facts of the world and perceives adversity to one’s aims because of these facts constitutes one’s situation. So, freedom according to Sartre is not omnipotent; it extends out of the adversity one faces. Four concepts introduced by Sartre help elucidate how the freedom he proposes is not one of human omnipotence, but a situated freedom that is composed of two parts – ontological and practical. The related concepts are facticity, coefficient of adversity, situation, and the human condition.7 These are discussed in the next two sections. §1.2 – Facticity Facticity refers to the set of facts encountered by consciousness in every one of its acts. Different facts are brought to the forefront by different acts of consciousness. The foreground facts in relation to an act are drawn from a realm that contains all the facts. This “realm of all facts” is the context out of which freedom operates. It is to this realm of all facts that Sartre assigns the term facticity. Facticity includes such facts as the time and place of one’s birth, the socio-economic status of one’s family, one’s gender, skin colour, height, weight, the results of all past acts, the attitudes others have towards one, etc. 8 A determinist would say there is nothing over and above facticity: That the universe is determined only by the facts that arise sequentially in accordance to the universal laws that have operated since the beginning of time, without interruption, from a set of starting conditions. Sartre is no 6 (BN, 530) (Detmer 1986, 39-40) 8 (Detmer 1986, 40) 7 An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 4 determinist, and so does not think this. Sartre acknowledges there are facts (i.e. everything past), but does not conclude that the facts ever determine what a person will do. That is the role of consciousness. Sartre makes a distinction between beingin-itself (the realm of all facts, facticity, the world) and being-for-itself (consciousness). Sartre also defines being-for-others where the self exists as an object for others, which involves a perpetual conflict where each tries to recover its own being while making an object out of the other.9 The point of an ethics of freedom is to relieve this tension by setting sustainable boundaries for the objectification of others. Sartre offers a story arguing that being-for-itself is what brings about nothingness in the world, and it is this nothingness that differentiates consciousness from the rest of the world. The example given is that of his friend Pierre at the café. Sartre arrives late at the café for an appointment with Pierre at 4pm. After inspecting the café, Sartre realises that Pierre is not present. Sartre argues that the café is a “fullness of being.” Pierre’s absence from the café is brought about only because Sartre’s consciousness expects Pierre to be there. It is consciousness that introduces nothingness into the world.10 From this analogy, Sartre argues that consciousness can thus nihilate anything in the world (any given fact), and consequently bring about new circumstances that are not determined by the facts or the universal laws that determine facts. This is a well-considered argument against determinism, but it is unlikely to convince the thorough going determinist. The object of this essay is not to attempt to convince determinists that the world is non-deterministic as a result of consciousness’s presence in the world. The non-deterministic nature of consciousness, 9 (BN, 650) (BN, 33-34) 10 An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 5 or at the very least the phenomenological experience of non-determinism, is assumed true for the purposes of developing an ethics of freedom. Freedom, as far as Sartre is concerned, presupposes facticity. A free act cannot occur except against a background of facticity. Rather importantly, the relationship between freedom and facticity is one of interdependence. For example: If not having a ticket to enter a particular event is an obstacle for me, it is because I have freely chosen to attend this particular event. The combination of my freedom of choosing to attend this event, and the facticity that a ticket is required for entry creates the interdependence between my freedom and facticity. Facts only emerge as obstacles in the light of freely chosen projects. As a finite being who cannot have everything at once, who has certain desires or needs rather than others that can only be satisfied through certain objects, there exists an inextricable connection between my freedom and facticity.11 Some critics remain unimpressed by Sartre’s concessions to facticity because one is always free to interpret facticity in a wide variety of ways. For example, a person who is rendered blind after a tragic accident would commonly be considered to suffer a severe limit to freedom. Sartre is not of this view; the blindness is not itself the limit to freedom. Rather, it is an occasion to exercise freedom. Sartre’s point is that one chooses the way in which facticity is constituted. A free act cannot occur except against a background of facticity. Thus, the relationship between freedom and facticity is one of ambiguity. The ambiguity arises when we ask to what extent facticity limits freedom and to what extent it makes it possible in the first place.12 The concept of facticity sets right the omnipotence misinterpretation, but it leaves critics 11 12 (Detmer 1986, 41) (Detmer 1986, 42) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 6 troubled. There is a sense in which Sartre defines the assertion of absolute freedom not to mean absolute freedom in a physical sense, but retains its meaning in terms of how one interprets facticity. Whether such freedom of interpretation can be limited is explored in the sections to follow. §1.3 – Coefficient of adversity, situation, and the human condition One’s project is any particular vision or end of one’s choosing. One’s coefficient of adversity refers to the external objects and states of affairs (facticity) that put up actual resistance to one’s freely chosen project. One’s coefficient of adversity is different to facticity, because unlike facticity that simply exists, one’s coefficient of adversity only exists relative to one’s chosen project. Detmer observes, “One way of seeing the difference between facticity and the coefficient of adversity is that the latter, unlike the former, admits of degrees. That is, while there are always an infinite number of facts which apply to me and to my situation, no matter what my project may happen to be, the degree to which my project is restricted by factors external to my consciousness clearly depends upon the project I choose and upon the nature of these external factors.”13 It would seem then, that while one is absolutely free to interpret facticity, one is not absolutely free to interpret one’s coefficient of adversity. Note the difference – One interprets facticity (the facts), and not one’s facticity (one’s facts). Facticity is an impersonal collection of facts. On the other hand, one interprets “one’s coefficient of adversity” (not “the coefficient of adversity”). Coefficient of adversity as a concept is unique to each person and is dependent on the person’s freely chosen project. 13 (Detmer 1986, 44) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 7 To preserve the inviolability of Sartre’s concept of absolute freedom, it can be argued that one could give up on one’s freely chosen project at any time and freely choose another project, thereby ridding oneself of one’s coefficient of adversity. The ability to change one’s project at will implies that one is ultimately absolutely free. This must be granted, and one’s absolute freedom certainly could be exercised in this way at any time, but insofar as one is dedicated to a project, one’s coefficient of adversity certainly limits one’s freedom in terms of how the facts of the world differ from the demands of one’s project, and the difficulty that ensues in trying to get the facts of the world and the demands of the project to come into alignment. This can be considered the first real limit to freedom – that in relation to one’s freely chosen project there are facts in the world that present an adversity with respect to the demands of one’s project. The way one interprets the facts of the world and the adversity that results in relation to one’s project can be said to constitute one’s situation. As Detmer observes, “My situation refers precisely to the result of the confrontation between my consciousness and the facts external to it at this particular time and place.”14 To Sartre, all freedom is situated. Sartre holds no doctrine of absolute freedom that can be contrasted with situated freedom. Sartre declares, “I am absolutely free … but I am never free except in situation.”15 It is this inevitability that for Sartre defines the human condition. While Sartre denies a human nature in terms of an essence that precedes existence16, he does hold the view that all humans are subject to a human condition17, entailed by facts such as birth, death and the need to choose. 14 (Detmer 1986, 46) (BN, 530) 16 (EH, 20) 17 (Detmer 1986, 49-50) 15 An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 8 §1.4 – Ontological freedom and practical freedom If Sartre is so quick to admit limitations to freedom, why has there been such commotion around his claims that humans have absolute freedom? Quite simply, it is because Sartre does not readily give up on the notion of absolute freedom. While he concedes that there are limitations to freedom in all situations, he asserts these to be limitations of a ‘practical’ kind. Freedom of the ‘ontological’ kind always remains unlimited for Sartre. To illustrate the distinction between ontological freedom and practical freedom we only need to recall Sartre’s controversial statement that “the slave in chains is as free as his master.”18 That being said, Sartre does allow for other senses of freedom where the slave is not as free as his master. Sartre recognises that is not true that a free man cannot hope to be liberated, for he is not free and bound in respect to the same things.19 Thus, the slave is free in one sense, but is relatively unfree in another sense. The slave is free in terms of ontological freedom or “freedom of choice”, and is unfree in terms of practical freedom or “freedom of obtaining”. For Sartre, it is because one is free in the ontological sense that it is possible to describe one as unfree in the practical sense. To construct an ethics of freedom, it is necessary to be clear on the distinction as well as the connection between ontological freedom and practical freedom. For Sartre, every consciousness is absolutely free, irrespective of its situation, because consciousness is not its situation. Consciousness can nihilate its facticity through interpretation, and so can separate itself from all that is external to it and is not determined causally by anything external to it. This is Sartre’s main argument against causal determinism. No matter what situation one is in, nothing can determine 18 19 (BN, 570) (Detmer 1986, 63) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 9 what features of that situation one will focus on, relegate to the background, accept, attempt to eliminate or employ as aids to assist in the undertaking of one’s project.20 What then is the distinction between being absolutely free in any situation and also being unfree in the same situation? Let us consider the situation of the slave. The slave is absolutely free in the sense that he can freely contemplate – he can freely consider escape or adopt an attitude of resignation. The slave is unfree with respect to what he cannot readily obtain – he cannot readily wander beyond the master’s confines. This is the distinction between ontological freedom and practical freedom. We are all like the slave in this regard. One can freely contemplate – choose one’s attitudes, considerations, interpretations, imaginings, and so on, but one cannot readily obtain all that one contemplates, even though one is absolutely free to contemplate all the same. These two kinds freedom are clearly distinct. Is there then a connection between them? Most certainly there is. The former necessarily precedes the latter. It is because one is free in the ontological sense that it is possible to describe one as free or unfree in the practical sense. In the case of the slave, it is because he can contemplate wandering beyond the master’s confines that he finds himself practically unfree to do so. Without contemplation, the facts of any situation are only facts. It is only in connection to contemplation that facticity becomes something that has a coefficient of adversity. The term coefficient of adversity is a most appropriate descriptor, because the coefficient varies from situation to situation. When I contemplate that I would like a glass of water as I write this, the coefficient of adversity of my obtaining a glass of water is far smaller than if I were to contemplate the same while lost in the middle of a desert. Just as we are 20 (Detmer 1986, 64) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 10 absolutely free in terms of ontological freedom, we are always unfree in terms of practical freedom. There is always some coefficient of adversity at play, no matter how large or how small. It takes effort and risk (of varying degrees) to transform the ontological freedom of contemplation into the practical freedom of obtaining. A criticism of this distinction is whether ontological freedom might not be a completely ineffective freedom having nothing to do with acting in the world, a purely idealist inner freedom. Maurice Merleau-Ponty directs this criticism at Sartre’s concept of freedom of choice: Choice, like judgment, is much less a principle than a consequence, a balance sheet, a formulation that intervenes at certain moments of the internal monologue and of action but whose meaning is formed day by day. Whether it is a question of action or even of thought, the fruitful modes of consciousness are those in which the object does not need to be posited, because consciousness inhabits it and is at work in it, because each response the outside gives to the initiatives of consciousness is immediately meaningful for it and gives rise to a new intervention on its part, and because it is in fact what it does, not only in the eyes of others but for itself.21 Merleau-Ponty refuses to distinguish between freedom of choice and practical freedom, and asserts there is only one freedom – the freedom that results from the interaction between consciousness and the world. There is no ontological freedom on its own, other than an “internal monologue” whose meaning is formed “day by day”, moment to moment by consciousness. This is merely contemplation, suggesting there is never any “decree” of choice until there is action, and even then it does not necessarily remain consistent because it is subject to change at any moment, 21 (Merleau-Ponty 1973, 197-198) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 11 depending on “each response the outside gives to the initiatives of consciousness.” The concept of freedom that is being attacked by Merleau-Ponty is this one: Indeed common sense will agree with us that the being who is said to be free is the one who can realize his projects. But in order for the act to be able to allow a realization, the simple projection of a possible end must be distinguished a priori from the realization of this end. If conceiving is enough for realizing, then I am plunged in a world like that of a dream in which the possible is no longer in any way distinguished from the real … If the object appears as soon as it is simply conceived, it will no longer be chosen or merely wished for. Once the distinction between the simple wish, the representation which I could choose, and the choice is abolished, freedom disappears too. It is necessary, however, to note that choice, being identical with acting, supposes a commencement of realization in order that the choice may be distinguished from the dream and the wish. Thus we shall not say that a prisoner is always free to go out of prison, which would be absurd, nor that he is always free to long for release, which would be an irrelevant truism, but that he is always free to try to escape (or get himself liberated); that is, that whatever his condition may be, he can project his escape and learn the value of his project by undertaking some action. Our description of freedom, since it does not distinguish between choosing and doing, compels us to abandon at once the distinction between the intention and the act.22 22 (BN, 504-505) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 12 For Sartre, choice (as opposed to dreaming or wishing) entails action, even where such ‘action’ has caused nothing in the world to change. For example, the slave may be taking action to escape, but no escape has yet eventuated, no alarms have been raised, not even a scratch on the wall that will open out to the escape tunnel has been etched. On the face of it, the world is exactly the same under the slave’s choice, as it is when the slave is dreaming or wishing. The difference between choosing and dreaming or wishing is contained entirely within consciousness and is completely opaque to the world outside. It is understandable then why criticisms like MerleauPonty’s that assert that freedom of choice is nothing more than a purely idealist inner freedom would be directed at Sartre’s concept of ontological freedom. Such criticism is predicated on the view that action does not occur until and unless some change is observable outside consciousness, and until then any ‘choice’ one may have made is by and large no different to dreaming or wishful thinking. The argument that the brain state of choice is different to brains states of dreaming or wishful thinking may be available in support of Sartre’s position, but this is not a view we need to explore for our purposes. §1.5 – Revising ontological freedom There is a sense in which Sartre is requiring the concept of ontological freedom to do too much, and that Merleau-Ponty is forcing it to do too little – Sartre wants a choice to count as action, and Merleau-Ponty is implying that choice is nothing more than a conscious experience (not unlike a dream or a wish) that is an “internal monologue” whose meaning is formed “day by day” and has little bearing on the world. Sartre is adamant that choice entails action, and he asserts that “In making … a decision [one] is bound to feel some anguish, but this does not prevent [one] from acting. To the contrary, it is the very condition of [one’s] action, for [one] An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 13 to first contemplate several options, and in choosing one of them, realize that its only value lies in the fact that it was chosen.”23 This is important for Sartre in defending existentialism against claims that it is a philosophy of despair. Sartre affirms that “existentialism is optimistic; it is a doctrine of action…” 24 Our concern is with establishing an ethics of freedom, and not with the defence of any particular doctrine of existentialism. Except for the recognition of mental acts (perhaps as brain states), choice cannot be equated to action. For example, I may be at the counter of an ice cream shop, and I proceed to choose the Belgian chocolate ice cream in my mind, and a split second before opening my mouth to place my order, I change my choice to the salted caramel ice cream, and I order that instead. Have I taken two actions in this instance or just one? Perhaps in some metaphysical sense, I have taken two actions – made two choices one after the other, but in a practical sense, I have only taken one action, and the world reflects this one action – I hold in my hand one salted caramel ice cream; I pay for the one salted caramel ice cream; and I consume the one salted caramel ice cream. Any action that counts insofar as it affects the world takes place only within the realm of the practical, not the ontological. The concept of freedom adopted for the purposes of this thesis then, on which an ethics of freedom is established, is one where action takes place within the realm of the practical, but any such action must first be conceived in consciousness (the realm of the ontological). While ontological freedom of choice is not equated to action, it is necessary for it. Whether the slave chooses to wander beyond the master’s confines, dreams of it or wishes it were possible is not important, but before taking any practical action to do so, it is necessary that he exercise his ontological freedom to choose to do so first. 23 24 (EH, 27) (EH, 54) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 14 To bring the discussion of freedom to a close, let us address the objection to the view that ontological freedom requires our protection. Sartre’s view is that ontological freedom is inviolable. There is certainly a way in which this is true, but in other ways it is patently false. The way in which the inviolability of ontological freedom is true is in the sense that one has ontological freedom. The way in which it is false is in what one has as ontological freedom. It is straightforward to show that the property of inviolability is lost when one considers the “what” instead of the “that”. That every person is free to choose is a given, but what one is free to choose is not. Powers of reason, interpretation, consideration, imagination, intuition, etc. are not evenly distributed among us, and they are certainly not equally developed by us in our lifetimes. In many ways we require exposure to and awareness of different possibilities before being able to consider and choose such possibilities. That a person is free to choose does not vary as a fact from one person to the next. It is the invariability of this fact upon which the claim that ontological freedom is inviolable is premised. What a person is free to choose varies significantly from one person to the next, depending on how one has developed one’s faculties of contemplation and what one has been exposed to. Consequently, we must conclude that ontological freedom is not inviolable. One’s ontological freedom can be coerced in ways that serve as means to another’s ends, and it can go underdeveloped as a result of neglect. The reasons for protecting against the coercion and underdevelopment of freedom as a foundation of ethics are discussed in Part 3. Before engaging in that discussion, it is necessary to explore how it is that freedom is a value, and why it is the ultimate value to be protected, over and above other values such as happiness or non-harm. These questions are discussed in Part 2, along with criticisms of the subjectivity of value judgments that arise out of freedom and responses to these criticisms. An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 15 Part 2 – Freedom and Subjectivity §2.1 – The subjectiveness of value judgments While it is true that most humans experience similar emotions in relation to many of life’s events, it is also true that no event gives rise to the same emotion in all humans. This is a consequence of the subjectiveness of value judgments. How one emotionally responds to an event is not predetermined, because each conscious self is free to interpret the facts of its situation in its own way. And for the same reason, the events that one seeks out in attempt to bring about an emotion are not predetermined. What makes me happy does not necessarily make you happy or happy to the same extent or in the same way, and what causes me harm does not necessarily cause you harm or harm you to the same extent or in the same way, because our respective conscious selves are free to interpret the facts in different ways. Therefore, it cannot be up to anyone else to decide what is good for one other than oneself. Others may offer advice and even evidence for what will do one good or harm, and recommend how one ought to live to experience the good and minimise harm to oneself, but ultimately, it is up to one to choose for oneself. It is a commonly held view that happiness is the greatest good, and that harm is the greatest obstruction to the good, and while we can attest to these statements being true from experience, we must acknowledge that good or harm depend on the free interpretation of facts by consciousness before even being able to register as good or harm to one’s consciousness. Freedom of consciousness (i.e. ontological freedom) is what gives rise to good or non-harm as positive values. Therefore, the ultimate value is that of ontological freedom that brings about good or non-harm through the interpretation of facts. The ultimate value is not good or non-harm in itself. An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 16 There is no problem with this view when the ramifications are not particularly serious, for example when two people must decide on what to have for dinner, but it is highly problematic when the ramifications are serious, such as when an entire global community of human beings must decide on how they are to treat each other. It is for the serious cases that we look to ethics for assistance. But can ethics provide objective prescriptions for how we ought to act even though what is good or harmful to each individual is entirely subject to his or her own interpretations? There are two kinds of knowledge, a priori and a posteriori. An example of a priori knowledge is the statement “2 + 2 = 4.” An example of a posteriori knowledge is the statement “The earth revolves around the sun.” Both of these types of knowledge are knowledge of objective facts. If a moral prescription were an objective fact, we could come to know it in one of these two ways. Let us consider the statement “It is wrong to kill babies for pleasure”, and ask whether we can have a posteriori knowledge of it. Killing babies is certainly harmful to babies. It is harmful to the parents of babies. It is reprehensible to the community. But it is pleasurable for the killer. It is wrong because it is harmful to babies and their parents. It is wrong because it is reprehensible to the community. But it is not wrong because it is pleasurable for the killer. Whose values are to be more highly considered – the babies’, the parents’, the community’s or the killer’s? While we can expect there to be a majority who would denounce the practice of killing babies for pleasure and declare that it is wrong, a majority opinion does not establish a fact. The earth’s orbit around the sun is not established by popular opinion; it is established by countless observations that do not falsify the theory of heliocentricity. Might we come to know that “it is wrong to kill babies for pleasure” a priori? To know something a priori, the objects to which the statement refers must not be An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 17 objects in the ‘real world’, examples being numbers and geometrical figures. We arrive at a priori knowledge by setting out proofs using logic alone, without having to resort to experience.25 “Killing”, “babies” and “pleasure” are all things of the real world that do not exist beyond the real world. Plato would have argued that all real world objects are instances of their abstract Forms, and so a statement like “It is wrong to kill babies for pleasure” could be considered a priori by referring to the abstract Forms of “killing”, “babies” and “pleasure”, but there is still no logical entailment between the Forms and the assertion that killing babies for pleasure is wrong. Mackie asserts, “The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?” 26 That there is no ‘because’ is the metaphysical argument for there not being moral facts. There are also epistemological problems concerning being able to know moral facts were they to exist. Kristana Arp captures the essence of the epistemological problems in this argument against moral objectivism: What I want to ask is whether a moral objectivist, someone who strenuously asserts that values and standards have force independently of human awareness of them, is entitled to claim that he or she can know for sure in all cases – or even any case – that his or her moral judgments are correct. According to an objectivist point of view, there is a standard “out there” that one can use to match one’s actual moral judgments up to. But what guarantees that any particular person has access to this realm and can perceive this standard? Certainly the ethical objectivist, like the adherent of existentialist ethics, like us all, thinks that many people’s moral judgments 25 26 (Baggini and Fosl 2010, 141) (Mackie 1977, 41) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 18 are not correct. He or she thinks that many people think that something is morally right when it is actually morally wrong and vice versa. Indeed since people hold conflicting moral views, some of them must be incorrect. But what guarantees for the ethical objectivist that one’s own moral judgments fall into the category of correct moral judgments and not the other category?27 If moral statements do not objectively exist, or if it cannot be established how moral statements that may exist can be epistemologically accessed, what is one to do concerning morality? Accepting that morality (for all practical purposes) is a subjective enterprise is the first step. Upon accepting this, we can ask: Whose morality is to be observed? Can a shared morality be developed for humankind? While Mackie does assert that there is no objective morality, he does recognise there being value in moral institutions, an institution being a collection of moral prescriptions that are assented to and observed by its adherents.28 For example, if a moral institution were happiness maximising, such an institution may prescribe that “It is wrong to cause the unhappiness of others”, and hold such a statement to be true internally while recognising there is no truth to the statement objectively. The following sections present a series of problems we face when we commit to moral subjectivism without assenting to any moral institution. §2.2 – The problem of moral equivalence of all free actions The moral equivalence criticism against moral subjectivism is aptly captured by this assertion from Warnock: “If choosing freely for oneself is the highest value, 27 28 (Arp 2001, 101-102) (Mackie 1977, 80-82) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 19 the free choice to wear red socks is as valuable as the free choice to murder one’s farther or sacrifice oneself for one’s friend. Such a belief is ridiculous.”29 This claim vividly captures the danger that is our situation of moral subjectivism. However, before getting swept up by the rhetoric, it is important to discern what the statement suggests. There is a sense in which a fallacy of equivocation has taken place between ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘what one chooses’. In each of the three choices depicted, one exercises freedom of choice. The value of this freedom is the same in each instance, irrespective of the choice. However, it does not follow from this that the choices themselves have equal value. Warnock is correct to assert that it is ridiculous to assign equal value to wearing red socks, murdering one’s father and sacrificing oneself for one’s friend, but she is mistaken to suggest that because equal value is assigned to ‘freedom of choice’ that any choice that ensues from freedom of choice is to be equally valued. Moral nihilism is the view that nothing is morally abject30, but moral subjectivism is not necessarily moral nihilism: All moral nihilism is moral subjectivism, but not all moral subjectivism is moral nihilism. That choosing freely for oneself is the highest value is required for the conclusion that the best version of the world is one where we protect and develop ontological freedom and sustain practical freedom for all, so it is crucial to defend against this claim of Warnock’s by distinguishing between freedom of choice and choices themselves. §2.3 – The authentic torturer problem Existentialist ethicists who are not prepared to declare that not all choices have equal value seek to address the issue of ‘immoral’ choices by attaching to them an 29 (Warnock 1967, 54) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 20 authenticity condition. This approach to existentialist ethics persists to the present day, as expressed by Heter who states, “Authenticity is the chief moral virtue of existential ethics, just as bad faith is the chief vice of existential ethics.”31 One acts in bad faith when one lies to oneself in an attempt to hide the unbearable truth that one is absolutely free and that one bears the responsibility of this freedom.32 So, one is authentic when one acts out of absolute freedom while bearing the responsibility of this freedom. Sartre himself went so far as to suggest that even though we are not compelled to make any particular choice, that when one makes a choice, one must choose for all humanity.33 At first brush it may seem that subjecting choices to an authenticity condition may produce a sensible system of ethics, but authenticity as a condition for ethical actions does not do enough, and bad faith as a condition for unethical actions does too much. Detmer presents a case that undermines authenticity as an adequate condition for ethics. Consider the ethical torturer who states: “I have freely chosen to kidnap and torture you, and I take full responsibility for my choice.”34 In this case, the torturer is authentic in that he is not deceiving himself and is prepared to take full responsibility for the actions he has freely undertaken. Adhering to authenticity has not resulted in an action that we would be prepared to label ‘ethical’. Conversely, bad faith over-determines unethical actions. Consider the dedicated employee who works from early morning late into the night to sustain the image of herself as a dedicated employee. She acts in bad faith because she deceives herself into thinking she is intrinsically a dedicated employee, and takes actions to sustain her self-deception. Yet 30 (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011) (Heter 2006, 75) 32 (BN, 71) 33 (EH, 24-25) 31 An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 21 this employee’s being in bad faith does not result in actions we would be prepared to label ‘unethical’. It would seem that an ethics of authenticity has serious problems. It is not sensible to take some reprehensible act, attach to it the property of authenticity, and obtain an ethical act. Conversely, it is not sensible to take some innocuous act, attach to it the property of bad faith, and obtain an unethical act. §2.4 – Subjectivity and consistency There is a sense in which moral subjectivism leads to nihilism, and authenticity as a condition for morality is unable to resolve this issue. This is certainly a concern for moral subjectivism, but there is more to subjectivism than nihilism. Not all situations are equally valued; some are better than others, even if what is considered better varies from one person to the next. It was argued in §2.1 that the ultimate value is that of ontological freedom that brings about good or non-harm through the interpretation of facts. The ultimate value is not good or non-harm in itself. And it was discussed how moral institutions embody moral statements that can be true internally while having no truth-value objectively. For a system of ethics to be useful, it makes sense for it to be consistent. Yet, when left to our subjectivity alone, our views can often be inconsistent. By having our moral institution oriented around a single point of reference ensures that the statements contained in our moral institution remain consistent. And by making that single point of reference the protection and development of ontological freedom ensures the moral institution is centred on the thing of ultimate value. This now simply leaves the question of whether it is best for one to assent to such a moral institution and aim to observe its prescriptions. Providing an argument for doing so is the purpose of Part 3. 34 (Detmer 1986, 165) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 22 Part 3 – Freedom and Ethics §3.1 – Setting the stage While we have been able to defend moral subjectivism against moral objectivism by showing that we have no greater moral certitude under the latter, this does not resolve the issue of moral uncertainty itself. The appeal of moral objectivism is that it at least provides the possibility that true moral judgments exist “out there”, and that even if we do not know what they are, we may someday come to know them. Moral subjectivism offers no such hope. Sartre himself acknowledges: Value derives its being from its exigency and not its exigency from its being … it can be revealed only to an active freedom which makes it exist as value by the sole fact of recognizing it as such. It follows that my freedom is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable.35 Beauvoir is also of this view. She asserts, “Freedom is the source from which all values spring. It is the original condition of all justification of existence.”36 How then are we to live our lives in relation to others? Beauvoir proposes that one continually agonise over one’s moral judgments. She states that “morality resides in the painfulness of indefinite questioning … what distinguishes the tyrant from the man of good will is that the first rests in the certainty of his aims, whereas the second keeps asking himself, ‘Am I really working for the liberation of men?’”37 35 (BN, 62) (EA, 24) 37 (EA, 133) 36 An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 23 While this is certainly a conscientious approach when relating to others, it is likely that such an approach may prove too much for some to bear, and as a result, people are likely to default to a traditional version of morality without giving it due consideration or abandon their moral responsibilities altogether. Sartre highlights that humans are condemned to be free and so carry the weight of the world on their shoulders; they are responsible for the world and for themselves as a way of being.38 Can a system of ethics be developed for the person who simply wants to know what a sensible course of moral action is without having to agonise over morality? Given our commitment to moral subjectivism, such a system cannot appeal to objective moral truths. Daigle aptly describes the problem when she states that it is one of “how we come to ethical rules and principles to serve as a code for a group, given that our set of rules and principles has to fit into each of our individual projects. This issue is all the more difficult for existentialist thinkers … who claim that the individual has to choose his or her own values. How does one reconcile the individual’s having a choice of values with the existence of a collectively agreed on (if not an absolute) set of rules and principles?”39 That ontological freedom is the ultimate value is good reason to establish a system of ethics that regards the protection and development of ontological freedom as its central point of reference. However, it is entirely plausible that one may be concerned with the protection and development of one’s own freedom without a care in the world for the rest of humankind. That would be a perfectly acceptable subjectivist position. A system of ethics, whatever its prescriptions, requires that it 38 39 (BN, 574) (Daigle 2006, 13) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 24 appeal to the compassionate and the selfish alike. What argument can be offered for an ethics of freedom that would appeal to persons of both persuasions? §3.2 – Relations with others A most beneficial version of the world for the extremely selfish person is a world where no one has any ontological freedom to exercise, and where all other persons are nothing but objects whose only purpose is to assist in bringing about the selfish person’s desires. While this would be a supremely beneficial world in terms of maximising practical freedom, it would also be an extremely lonely world. A world where others have no ontological freedom is a world where others cannot extend recognition or acknowledgement – they are, for all intents and purposes, without consciousness. It is not much good for our selfish antagonist to have the whole world under his control without anyone to recognise his power and acknowledge him. This idea can be found in Hegel who suggests, “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”40 This sets up the limits of selfishness. The selfish person does not want others to be without ontological freedom, because he requires that others have ontological freedom to bestow recognition and acknowledgement upon him. Rather, the selfish person wishes that every other person’s wishes be prioritised secondary to his own. For the purposes of developing an ethics of freedom, there is no need to conceptualise a world where others do not possess ontological freedom. The most extreme version of a selfish world is one where every person has ontological freedom, but where the priority of protection and development of ontological freedom is 40 (Hegel 1977, 111) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 25 extended only to a minority to the detriment of the majority. To make this discussion meaningful, it is necessary to outline the ways in which ontological freedom and practical freedom can be rendered sub-optimal. In §1.5 an argument was presented for how it is that ontological freedom can be coerced and underdeveloped. A deeper discussion of the coercion and underdevelopment of ontological freedom is now necessary for our purposes. To coerce another’s ontological freedom is to manipulate another to believe they want something where that something primarily serves the ends of the manipulator. To cause the underdevelopment of another’s ontological freedom is to limit another’s exposure to the world through manipulation so that the possibilities they are able to entertain are in turn limited, and these limits primarily serve the ends of the manipulator. An example of the first kind: A father heavily influences his daughter to take up the study and practice of law, because it would make him proud to have his daughter become a partner in the family’s legal practice. An example of the second kind: A husband forbids his young wife to read books on philosophy so that she remains ignorant of certain ideologies that may bring his treatment of her into question. Why is the selfish person concerned with the coercion and underdevelopment of ontological freedom? The motivation is because these are ways to control others toward the fulfilment of one’s own desires. However, it is a far from perfect method. The only perfect method would be one where another’s ontological freedom was eradicated completely, but we have discussed why this is not ideal for our selfish antagonist. The coercion and underdevelopment of the ontological freedom of others is not perfect due to the risks, which if realised, stand to undermine the fulfilment of An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 26 our antagonist’s desires and is likely to result in other losses being sustained in the process. Let us consider more examples to illustrate the point. Continuation of the first example: The daughter who has gone on to study and practice law under the firm hand of her father realises that she has done this against her own wishes to study and practice fine art. Years go by, and her resentment turns to anger. One day, while discussing the details of a particular legal case with her father, something sets her off and her anger is unleashed. She resigns from the practice, and worse, she withdraws her love from her father and vows never to speak to him again. Continuation of the second example: The subservient wife encounters a copy of Simone de Beauvoir’s book, The Second Sex, at a second hand book fair. She is curious about it, and purchases the item without her husband knowing. When he is at work and the children are at school, she devours the text, and grows increasingly sad then furious at the oppression she and women like her are made to suffer. When her husband returns home one evening, she exclaims in a fit of passion that she is leaving him and is taking the girls. Enraged at her perceived insolence, he strangles her, and kills her. He has now lost the love he tried so hard to control, and the children have lost their mother. A combined example: In an all too common narrative, a dictator coerces the populace with cleverly crafted propaganda, and forces the underdevelopment of their ontological freedom by imposing extensive censorship laws, for which harsh penalties are exacted for non-compliance. The dictator rules with an iron fist, and the people starve and grow weary. In a moment of weakness, a rebel army seizes the houses of parliament, captures the dictator and publicly executes him. The leader of the rebel army establishes himself as ruler, and the cycle repeats itself. An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 27 I do not use such examples to be gratuitously gruesome; I do so to draw the reader’s attention to the types of acts that people do in fact commit in our very own world with the intention to draw out the challenges that any system of ethics must necessarily overcome. It is clear from these examples that there are serious risks associated with undertaking acts that result in the coercion and underdevelopment of the ontological freedom of others. The examples highlight how such oppressive behaviours do not benefit anyone over time. Detmer aptly captures what is at issue when he paraphrases Sartre’s view that, “in my relations with others I stand always in danger of having the tables turned on me; rather than having the ability myself to interpret and to assign meanings to that which is external to me, I am vulnerable to the ability of those external entities called people to interpret and assign meanings to me.”41 The risk one faces when oppressing the freedom of others is that the oppressed may take responsive action. The response may be in the form of a withdrawal, where the oppressed finds a way to simply reclaim their freedom, or it may escalate into retaliation. These are unfavourable responses for the one who is faced with them. The situation lends itself to what can appropriately be called a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. The four possible scenarios of a prisoner’s dilemma with respect to freedom are depicted in the table below: Person A acts selfishly or retaliates Person A does not act selfishly or retaliate 41 Person B acts selfishly or retaliates Scenario 1 Sub-optimal for both Person A & Person B Person B does not act selfishly or retaliate Scenario 3 Optimal for Person A; suboptimal for Person B Scenario 2 Optimal for Person B; suboptimal for Person A Scenario 4 Best situation for Person A & Person B combined (Detmer 1986, 54) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 28 What we observe is that it is best for each person to act selfishly and have the other person not retaliate, as specified by Scenario 2 for Person B and Scenario 3 for Person A. However, it is unlikely that another will suffer oppression indefinitely without retaliating, which inevitably leads to Scenario 1, where either Person A has oppressed Person B and Person B has retaliated, or vice versa. Scenario 4, even though not optimal for either Person A or Person B, is the one that is best for both of them combined. The only way to bring about this scenario is for neither to oppress the other. Here we have logical proof that to act selfishly ultimately leads to a situation where all involved suffer worse than had no one acted selfishly in the first instance. The subjectivity of moral judgments allows that a person may ignore this result and continue to act selfishly (albeit irrationally), but where one is rational and wants to promote one’s own interests, it is required that one observe the prescription of not oppressing the freedom of others.42 One may argue that it is best to act first and be the oppressor than to stand idly by and await oppression. Taking such a course of action will certainly give the oppressor the advantage at the outset, but the eventual result is a sub-optimal situation where both parties end up worse off. Our interactions with others are rarely single instances; others usually respond in time to how we have treated them. Derek Parfit, in his seminal work on ethics, Reasons and Persons, highlights that when a set of circumstances is self-defeating, as is the case with the prisoner’s dilemma, we should all ideally do what will cause the given aims of each to be better achieved.43 This is highly compatible with and justifies Beauvoir’s position that “to will oneself free is also to will others free”. 42 43 (Axelrod 1981) (Parfit 1986, 100) An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 29 The advocate of selfishness may press the point by saying that if only the other can be prevented from knowing that her freedom is being compromised, that he would continue to have the advantage and would not prompt retaliation on her part. This would be the case where deception has been so effective so as to avoid detection. The straightforward response to this argument is that deception, like oppression, is not without risk. No deception is immune from being discovered, and once discovered, the risk of retaliation is likely to follow. For these reasons it is sensible not to oppress the ontological freedom of others. Observing this prescription produces the best long-term results for the compassionate person and the selfish person alike. It draws out the central unethical act of the theory and gives reason for why it is sensible to avoid it. There is still work to be done to arrive at the final conclusion: that the best version of the world is one where we protect and develop ontological freedom and sustain practical freedom for all. To arrive at this conclusion, it is necessary to discuss the interplay between ontological and practical freedom. §3.3 – The interplay between ontological and practical freedom What is the relationship between ontological freedom and practical freedom? As discussed in §1.4, ontological freedom is freedom of choice, and practical freedom is the freedom of obtaining. Ontological freedom precedes practical freedom, because one must first choose something before determining whether one is free or not to obtain it. The previous section discussed why it is sensible to not oppress the ontological freedom of others, but said nothing concerning practical freedom. Yet it is practical freedom that we are ultimately concerned with – the freedom to do what we have freely conceived. Take for example a master that promotes the cultivation of ontological freedom by providing for his slave lectures in philosophy and culture An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 30 from the world’s preeminent scholars in these disciplines. This master could not be charged with coercing the ontological freedom of his slave, because he allows for the slave to be exposed to a world of diverse artefacts and ideas. For the same reason, he cannot be charged with causing the underdevelopment of the slave’s ontological freedom. Yet the master does not allow the slave to leave his confines and forces hard labour upon him. The master in this case meets the criteria for protecting and developing ontological freedom, but there is something awry with this scenario. In some respects, life may be worse for a slave whose ontological freedom is so richly promoted while his practical freedom remains constrained. The disparity between the two freedoms is likely to cause him all sorts of mental anguish and harm that may not be experienced by the slave whose ontological freedom is constrained along with practical freedom. These are purely conjectures without evidence or argument, but it is not difficult to imagine a person whose mind soars so freely becoming dejected by the limitations of not being able to obtain what he might choose. The limits of practical freedom relative to ontological freedom exist regardless of whether one is a slave or not. I can dream of visiting every city in the world and taking in all the art and culture present there, but I am largely unfree in a practical sense to undertake such a project. This unfreedom causes me some disappointment, and I must learn to adjust my mind to the practical realities. The questions this raises are: Would it be more sensible for me to under-cultivate my ontological freedom, so that the disparity between my ontological and practical freedoms would be lessened? Is it sensible to continually seek out greater practical freedom, while knowing full well that it will never match what I can contemplate by virtue of my ontological freedom? Is the ultimate freedom one of accepting the limits of my practical freedom? An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 31 The argument for not oppressing the practical freedom of others is the same as the one put forward for not oppressing the ontological freedom of others. Take the example of the slave who is allowed extensive ontological freedom and relatively little practical freedom. Unless this slave accepts for himself some version of stoicism that results in him freely and willingly enduring the condition of his practical unfreedom, there is a good chance he would seek to escape his situation and may very well do harm to the master in the process. For this reason, it is sensible not to oppress the practical freedom of others, because to do so results in a suboptimal world where selfish acts are repaid by acts of retaliation. This is likely to be even more pronounced than when ontological freedom is oppressed – Deny a man his thoughts and he may be remain unaware of it; deny him bread and water, and he is sure to revolt. Protecting practical freedom is then a necessary element of an ethics of freedom. The question then is how much of each type would qualify as optimal. Given practical limitations, such as scarcity (i.e. that there are only so many resources available to us) and mutual exclusivity (i.e. that one’s use of a resource prevents another’s use of the same), practical freedom cannot be maximised for all. As such, the practical freedom one has will generally fall short of one’s ontological freedom. This disparity can at times lead to great disappointment and anguish, and underscores the importance of arriving at a harmony between ontological freedom and practical freedom. Such harmony cannot be achieved by placing limits on the development of ontological freedom, because this is in and of itself a restriction on freedom. Instead, it is the responsibility of each of us to develop an attitude of acceptance (and even stoicism) in times of lack to relieve the tension between the expansiveness of ontological freedom and the limits of practical freedom. An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 32 For these reasons it is thought that the most sensible ethics for humankind is to protect and develop ontological freedom and sustain practical freedom for all. The first requisite is implementable by ensuring all persons are exposed to a sufficient diversity of ideas that aim to prevent the calcification of one’s thoughts into dogma, and facilitate the development of one’s own ideas by way of an active imagination. The second requisite is implementable by ensuring all persons have sufficient nourishment, shelter, safety and community to serve as the foundation for the development of their ontological freedom, and make possible the pursuit of greater practical freedom, such as wealth and prosperity, so long as these pursuits contribute to the protection and development of ontological freedom and help sustain practical freedom for all of humankind. §3.4 – Conclusion The main conclusion of this thesis is that freedom is the first and foremost value to be considered, protected, developed and sustained, above all other values, including happiness and non-harm, when producing a system of ethics. Freedom as a value is superior to all other values because it is by exercising (ontological) freedom that one determines for oneself what one values. This subjectivity of value determination requires that one choose one’s values for oneself and that values not be prescribed external to oneself. Subjectiveness extends to moral judgments of right and wrong, in that it is up to each person to decide for him or herself what is moral or immoral. The subjectiveness of moral judgments presents the risk of falling into moral nihilism, the view that no act, no matter how reprehensible, is morally abject. This is certainly one possibility for moral subjectivism, but it is by no means the version of moral subjectivism that produces the best outcomes. The best version of the world is one where we protect and develop ontological freedom and sustain An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 33 practical freedom for all. Even though holding freedom to be the central value of ethics cannot be established as a moral fact (because there are no moral facts), to do so is rationally justifiable: Whenever one oppresses the freedoms of another, one runs the risk of being met with retaliation. The cycle of oppression and retaliation is a suboptimal version of the world when compared to a version of the world where people do not oppress the freedoms of others. Consequently, it is judicious that freedom be considered central to ethics, because it is the value necessary for each one of us to imagine and live a life of one’s own choosing. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ An Ethics of Freedom Alain Guillemain © 2015 34 Works Cited Abbreviations BN: Being and nothingness EA: The ethics of ambiguity EH: Existentialism is a humanism Anderson,! Thomas! C.! 1993.! Sartre's( two( ethics:( from( authenticity( to( integral( humanity.!Chicago:!Open!Court.! Arp,! Kristana.! 2001.! The( bonds( of( freedom:( Simone( de( Beauvoir's( existentialist( ethics.!Chicago:!Open!Court.! Axelrod,! Robert.! 1981.! "The! Emergence! of! cooperation! among! egoists."! The( American( Political( Science( Review! no.! 75! (2):306K318.! doi:! 10.2307/1961366.! 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