Liminal
Spaces
Liminal Spaces 2006-2009
Reader :
Editors: Eyal Danon, Galit Eilat
Assistant editor: Maya Pasternak
Graphic design: Guy Saggee, Neta Shoshani – Shual.com
Translation and editing: Daria Kassovsky
Printing and binding: A.R. Printing, Tel Aviv
Production: The Center for Digital Art, Holon
Project :
Participants: Sameh Abboushi, Senan Abdelqader, Lida Abdul, Tal
Adler, Azra Aksamija, Ayreen Anastas and Rene Gabri, Yossi Attia
and Itamar Rose, Yochai Avrahami, Brother Banoit, Yael Bartana,
Nabih Bashir, Hans Bernhard, Eva Birkenstock, Rana Bishara,
Michael Blum, Khaldun Bshara, Boris Buden, Sami Bukhari,
Hicham Chabaita, Hillel Cohen, Scandar Copti, Buthayna Dabit,
Ronen Eidelman, Muhamad El Hatib, Jumana Emil Abboud,
Charles Esche, Orhan Esen, Kodwo Eshun, Peter Friedl, David
Garcia, Hagar Goren, Mauricio Guillen, Jeff Halper, Sandi
Hilal and Alessandro Petti, Sabine Horlitz and Oliver Clemens,
Khaled Hourani, Sanja Ivekovic, Yazan Khlili, Wolfgang Knapp,
Erden Kosova, Ligna, Suleiman Mansour, Francis McKee, Anna
Meyer, Salwa Mikdadi, Daniel Monterescu, Nina Möntmann,
Nat Muller, Joanna Mytkowska, Simona Nastac, Olaf Nicolai,
Khalil Nijem, Ilan Pappé, Parhesia Group, Lia Perjovschi, Khalil
Rabah, Anjalika Sagar, Oren Sagiv, Sala-Manca, Miri Segal, Erinc
Seymen, Solmaz Shahbazi, Nurit Sharett, Fadi Shbeita, Erzen
Shkololi, Sean Snyder, Barbara Steiner, Hito Steyerl, Superflex,
Aneta Szylak, Salim Tamari, Simon Wachsmuth, Adel Yahya,
Inass Hamad Yassin, Yossi Yonah, Artur Zmijewski, Manar Zuabi
Curators: Eyal Danon, Galit Eilat, Reem Fadda, Philipp Misselwitz
Advisor: Khaled Hourani
Production team (The Center for Digital Art): Nir Sagiv, Or
Kadar, Dor Guez, Maya Pasternak
Liminal Spaces is a joint initiative of: The Center for Digital
Art, Holon, The Palestinian Association for Contemporary Art
(PACA), and The International Art Academy Palestine
With the following partners: Universitat der Kunst Berlin,
Galerie für Zeitgenössische Kunst Leipzig
© 2009, All rights reserved to the authors, artists, and
contributors
This reader was compiled from lectures, talks, and discussions
held during the Liminal Spaces conferences. All the texts were
kindly donated by the participants.
Contents
7
INTRODUCTION
Galit Eilat
18
ENGAGED AUTONOMY
& OTHER PARADOXES
Charles Esche
ROLE IN POLITICAL
STRUGGLE
–
ON THE NECESSITY TO
GO TO PALESTINE
Ayreen Anastas
and Rene Gabri
106
ISRAEL AS A GATED
SOCIETY, PAST &
PRESENT
Ilan Pappé
117
EXQUISITE CORPSE
Yochai Avrahami
29
DEALING WITH THE
CHANGING NATION
72
SOLDIERS, SOLDIERS,
SOLDIERS…
Nina Möntmann
Roni Lahav and Artur
Žmijewski in Conversation
41
DUCHIFAT
with Diala Shamas
Mauricio Guillén
88
SHOT BY BOTH SIDES
136
BETWIXT AND
BETWEEN: URBAN
LIMINALITY &
THE FUTURE OF
BINATIONALISM IN
JEWISH-ARAB 'MIXED
TOWNS'
43
STITCHING PIECES
OF OUR STORY IN
LIMINAL SPACES
Francis McKee
Daniel Monterescu
100
STUDIES ON NEW
ISRAELI LANDSCAPES
Sala-Manca:
155
CONFRONTING
THE ICONIC MYTH:
REVISITING JAFFA
Lea Mauas & Diego Rotman
Salim Tamari and
Salwa Mikdadi
56
THE LEFT NEEDS
MEDIATORS
–
ON CULTURAL
PRODUCTION & ITS
Rema Hammami
102
CONSTRUCTION
STATUS UNKNOWN
Simon Wachsmuth
182
UNTITLED
Artur Zmijewski
188
MULTICULTURALISM
IN COMMON SPACES
271
PLAYGROUNDS (1995-)
Peter Friedl
CONFERENCE
DOCUMENTATION
Yossi Yonah
200
RADICAL DISCONTENT
Eyal Danon
223
NOT-YET-NESS
Reem Fadda
278
HOW MUCH DID YOU
PAY FOR THIS PLOT
OF LAND? LAND
VALUE IN RAMALLAH
& EAST JERUSALEM
33-34
Sabine Horlitz and Oliver
81-84
51-52
61-64
Clemens
149-152
232
THE ROAD TO GAZA:
UNIVERSAL RITUALS
IN A LOCAL CONTEXT
284
SHUAFAT - PISGAT
ZE'EV PANORAMAS
161-162
Oren Sagiv
179-180
286
LIVE EVIL
205-208
Francis McKee
257-264
Khaled Hourani
244
TOUR OF RAMALLAH
Yael Bartana
248
ASYMMETRIES IN
GLOBALIZED SPACE:
THE ROAD NETWORK
IN PALESTINE-ISRAEL
298
20 YEARS AFTER
THE EXODUS 2048
ODYSSEY: MIRI STERN
INTERVIEWED BY
LOTTE MÜLLER
Alessandro Petti
Michael Blum
7
Introduction
The Liminal Spaces project
began long before its official
launching, in fact long before
it had ever been conceived
or named. Its beginnings
may be traced to early 2004,
to another project – April
1st. Created by the Artists
Without Walls group, the
latter included Palestinian
and Israeli artists who sought
ways in which to voice their
criticism of the construction
of the Separation Wall which
splits and cuts the Palestinian
villages located along the
Green Line.
April 1st was selected as the
project's title and date as
a type of hoax intended to
make the Separation Wall
transparent. To this end, two
video cameras were positioned
on either side, each with its
back to the Wall and its lens
directed at the view facing
it. Each camera was cableconnected to a video projector
located on the other side of
the wall, which projected the
occurrences captured by the
camera on the opposite side
in real time, thus creating a
virtual window in the wall
via closed-circuit video. The
video window was set in the
village of Abu Dis,1 which
is cut in two by the Wall.
For several hours the village
residents could observe the
other side of their village
and its inhabitants through
the window. The event,
declared an art event, was
initiated to raise awareness
of the damage brought about
by the Separation Wall, by
inviting an Israeli public
which, albeit conscious of
the Wall's construction, had
never physically experienced
the presence of this
concrete monument, nor its
detrimental implications.
The joint work on April
1st, as well as the resulting
conversations and friendships,
formed the basis for Liminal
Spaces. One of the major
questions which accompanied
the initial phases of the
project was whether
artistic projects created by
Israeli, Palestinian, and
international artists are
capable of challenging the
separation systems physically
and mentally constructed
by the State of Israel over
many years between Israelis
and Palestinians, both
within Israel and between
Israel and the Palestinian
Authority. Liminal Spaces
aspired primarily to establish
the absent platform everso necessary for joint work
and action and for dialogue
between the Israeli and
Palestinian art communities, a
platform which would be able
to exist despite the growing
difficulties experienced by
Palestinians under Israeli
occupation, such as denial
of freedom of movement and
other basic human rights.
Three three-day seminars were
held as part of Liminal Spaces.
The first took place in March
2006, and was based on hikes
and tours from morning till
midday in the areas adjacent
to the Qalandiya refugee
camp, a visit to El-Bireh and
Ramallah, guided by scholars,
professionals, and activists
from different disciplines
such as architecture and
urban planning. It began
with a tour which departed
from East Jerusalem,
continued through the
matrix of Jewish settlements
around Jerusalem, arriving
// Galit Eilat
at the Atarot (Qalandiya)
checkpoint. We rented a space
located approximately 500
meters from the checkpoint
(previously used as a furniture
shop) for the duration of the
conference, so that every
noon following the morning
tour we could return there
for additional discussions,
lectures, and presentations.
Following the first conference
we offered the participants
to return to the area which
we had surveyed during the
three seminar days (Route
60),2 to conceive of artworks
in collaboration with the
professionals who had joined
us. At that time, we assessed
the project's duration as eight
months, and the ultimate goal
was to stage three exhibitions
in three cities: Ramallah,
Holon, and Leipzig.
We arrived in Leipzig in
October 2006, when most of
the works were in different
stages of production –
"half-baked" was the term
we used. The meeting in
Leipzig likewise included a
seminar. Having departed
from the geographical area
addressed by the project, we
tried to bridge that distance
and discuss a theme which
we deemed relevant to
the project's continuation
as well as to the hosting
institute, GfZK – Museum of
Contemporary Arts Leipzig.
The second conference
thus dealt with the social
and political responsibility
of artistic institutions in
the context of the Middle
East – characterized by
growing violence and the
violation of human and civil
rights, the continuation of
Israeli occupation policies, the
construction of an apartheid
wall, and the total collapse
of the peace process – as well
as in the context of central
Europe in the post-Fordist
era, in which the erosion of
social-democratic principles
challenges artists and
institutions to survive in a
harsh social climate and fight
for greater public involvement.
During the work on the
exhibition and the opening of
the conference, we realized
that the project required no
concluding exhibition, and
that in fact we were only at
the beginning of the process.
We decided to go on with the
project without committing to
another exhibition or any final
project. While conceiving of
the exhibition and conference
in Leipzig, a considerable
gap was created between the
way in which we wanted to
communicate the project and
the way in which the Leipzig
museum wanted to exhibit it.
Although they were partners
to the project, as a German
arts center they could not
promote the marketing of a
project which calls to stop the
Occupation, or to be more
accurate – could not afford
using the word "occupation"
in any marketing material.
Thus we found ourselves,
Israelis and Palestinians,
opening a shared front to call
a spade a spade, maintaining
that this was the only way to
face reality. Beautification,
indirectness, and the use of
political terminology such
as "the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict," only hinder
discussion on the "situation,"
adding layers of ambiguity
where clarity is needed.
The third meeting was held in
October 2007, approximately
9
18 months after the first.
Like the latter, it consisted of
morning bus tours and hikes
accompanied by professionals,
and afternoon sessions.
This time the conference
focused on the cities Lydda,
Ramla, Jaffa (mixed cities
with high percentages of
Muslims, Christians, and
Jews), Bil'in (a village in the
Palestinian Authority whose
land was confiscated due to
the route of the Wall), and
Taibe (a Palestinian village
in Israel's north). Thus the
three-day seminar largely
focused on Israeli territory
and the repercussions of the
occupation within Israel:
the conflicts, tensions, and
violence embedded in the
daily relationship between
the Jewish and Palestinian
communities within Israel.
Each session proposed a
unique glance into the social
reality and the intricate
interrelations between
colonists and colonized,
occupiers and occupied.
In retrospect, one of the most
important aspects of the
project was that it took place,
transformed, and adapted
itself to the dynamic reality
in the region. At the very
outset we postulated that
a network of collaboration
and sharing of knowledge
are crucial to such a project,
yet we could not foresee how
such a platform would evolve
since we had no role models
in the form of previously held
like projects. In collaboration
with the artists, we (the
project curators) sought
methodologies that would
challenge the limits and
limitations, explore their
penetrability, and their ability
to serve as points of contact
and communication. We tried
to push and challenge the
limitations on movement
between Israel and Palestine
anchored in laws and
regulations, and often in
prejudice and ignorance. Along
with the project participants
we sought and examined
different ways to explore the
physical and mental liminal
spaces, ways which either
confront or interact with
them.
1 Abu Dis is an Arab locale east of
Jerusalem, on the outskirts of the
Northern Judean Desert, whose
population stands at approximately
10,000. In the wake of the Six-Day
War, part of it (approximately
10%) was annexed to Jerusalem,
and its inhabitants became Israeli
ID holders. During that period
the Abu Dis population grew as a
result of the move of inhabitants
from Hebron and the settling of
Bedouins who camped in the area of
the Abu Dis permanent settlement.
This may have been due to the
subsistence possibilities in Abu
Dis on account of its proximity
to Jerusalem. Furthermore, Arabs
who lived in the Jewish Quarter
in Jerusalem and were expelled
after the Six Day War also moved
to Abu Dis. On the eve of the alAqsa Intifada Israel was supposed
to change the status of Abu Dis
to Zone A, but the change was
never implemented. As part of the
construction of the Separation
Wall, a tall concrete wall was
erected, cutting Abu Dis from East
Jerusalem. Since its erection, in
order to move between Abu Dis and
Jerusalem, inhabitants are forced to
cross several checkpoints, a harsh
separation for citizens who had
become accustomed to regarding
Abu Dis and its adjacent Jerusalem
neighborhoods as a single urban
fabric.
Alongside the scrutiny of the
mental and physical liminal
spaces and the development
2 Route 60 is the historic traffic
artery and connecting spine
between Jerusalem, Ramallah
and beyond. Its present condition
of new artworks, a curatorial
model for the project began
to take shape, based on
continuity and the creation
of an infrastructure for
work concurrent with the
construction of a body of
knowledge through the shared
effort of artists, curators,
academic scholars, cultural
producers, architects, and
political activists. Most
importantly perhaps, is that
we succeeded in creating
the basis for ongoing work
between the different partners
in the project which has since
served as backing for other
projects and professional
interactions between Israel
and Palestine, links which
also extend into Europe and
the Middle East. The basis for
the project, an objection to
the occupation and separation
policy, has been preserved
throughout its phases, its most
radical manifestation being
our objection to separation
and hatred propaganda.
Still during the preparatory
phases leading up to Liminal
Spaces, we sought the advice
of the Academic Boycott
Committee in Birzeit
University on how a project
involving Palestinian and
Israeli participants might
take place, and what the
conditions are regarding such
a collaborative project. The
committee assisted us in the
use of terminology, as well as
in formulating the project's
goals, thus helping legitimize
it for some of the Palestinian
participants.
Another act was implemented
by Reem Fadda and Khaled
Hourani before our arrival in
Ramallah as a group for the
first time. These were the
days following the elections
to the Palestinian Authority.
The Hamas government had
only just been elected, but
had not yet constructed a
government, and the state of
mind on the Palestinian street,
mainly in the West Bank, was
hard to anticipate. Therefore,
Fadda and Hourani turned
to the Tanzim,3 requesting
that they accompany us on
our tour to the Qalandiya
refugee camp which was
under their supervision. The
collaboration with the Tanzim
led to a traditional Palestinian
lunch held in one of their
meeting centers.
Other actions which
accompanied the project were
negotiated with the Israeli
security forces.4 Palestinians
living in the Palestinian
Authority cannot enter Israel
without entry permits. Each
such request is filed with the
liaison office, which transfers
it to the General Security
Services, where it is examined,
and subsequently approved or
disapproved. During the years
of work on the project we
issued numerous such requests
for the project participants, for
artists, curators, and in fact,
for anyone who turned to the
Center for help, regardless of
the project. We tried to use our
status as an Israeli center and
a public body to pressure the
security forces into granting
entry to all those requesting it,
though not always successfully.
At times we were aided by
Israeli members of the Knesset
(MPs) in applying pressure
on the security forces for this
purpose. Over the years, the
permit situation has worsened,
bogged down by numerous
bureaucratic obstacles. Apart
from the desire to help in the
11
entry procedure into Israel,
the other goal was to examine
how the systems of separation,
power, and control function,
and find loopholes. Although
this was not an original target,
due to everyday constraints we
had to confront yet another
liminal space – that of Israeli
military law.
The struggle for territorial
and demographic control
is deeply inscribed in the
mundane texture of the
intersecting spheres of Israel
and Palestine. Urban liminal
spaces, such as Jerusalem,
have become laboratories for
the urbanism of an especially
radical ethnic segregation.
Since the outbreak of the
al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000,
previously covert obstacles
were replaced by concrete
blocks, walls and fences often
separating Palestinian villages
from their agricultural land or
cutting villages in two, rather
than separating Israeli and
Palestinian lands.
The Palestinians and the
Israelis live in separate worlds
in which the other's space is
absent from the cognitive map
of the everyday. Sets of codes,
largely incomprehensible to
an outsider, demarcate "safe"
territories and "dangerous"
territories. The clear dominant
polarization between Israeli
Jerusalem and Palestinian
Jerusalem, as a quintessential
example, however, fails to
convey the full complexity of
the social transformations. It
blurs and shifts attention from
the internal conflicts faced
by these two cultures, both
tragically forced to define their
identities in relation to a socalled enemy. This polarized
perception overshadows
and erodes the ability to
acknowledge the internal
conflicts which penetrate
the depths of the social and
psychological texture of both
cultures. The walls, blockades,
and barriers, however, are
but a symptom attesting
to a much deeper ailment
between these two nations.
Withdrawal and gathering
against an enemy equally
affect the social relations
and other interactions in
the internal, communal and
domestic context – with
family, neighbors, foreigners,
and the community.
may be deemed prototypical of
the alienation, segregation, and
fragmentation characterizing the
Israeli method of occupation.
3 The Tanzim was established in
1995 by Yasser Arafat as part of the
Fatah. In effect, it functioned as the
latter's military wing, and the two
formed a single body.
4 During the al-Aqsa Intifada a
military law was issued forbidding
Israeli citizens other than IDF
soldiers from entering the
Palestinian Authority. Palestinians
living in the Palestinian Authority
are prevented entry to Israel
without special permit from the
Israeli security services.
Although everyday realities
in Israel and Palestine are
fundamentally asymmetrical,
increased undermining is
discernible in both cultures
due to economic polarization,
militarization of civilian
life, as well as religious and
social tensions. The internal
borders are reinforced as a
result of antithetical processes
of traditionalism versus
Westernization, preservation
of age-old familial traditions
versus a modern lifestyle,
social and gender inequality,
etc.
A large part of the artistic
practice in Palestine and Israel
is essentially dependent on
this gradually radicalizing
reality. Contacts with artistic
communities from other
countries are made quite
easily, whereas artistic activity
in the local sphere barely
exists between these two
groups. The predominant
climate is one of disregard
on the Israeli side and
boycott on the Palestinian,
a boycott of academic and
artistic institutions in
Israel declared by similar
Palestinian institutions
and individuals, which has
garnered support and has
been de facto embraced by
academic scholars, artists,
architects and many other
artistic figures worldwide.
The difficulty in crossing
borders due to the oppressive
closure and movement
restrictions renders casual
random encounters virtually
impossible. Despite these
difficulties (and sometimes in
response to them), a limited
number of artistic endeavors
survey social and political
agendas in the belief that art
is not only a mirror of society,
but also a tool for political
and social change. Such
perception gives rise to works
and projects transpiring on the
line between representation
and action, ones which blur
the boundaries between
disciplines, between artistic
practice and political activism,
and generate various models
and platforms for artistic and
social activity.
A reduction in shared artistic
projects may be traced from
the early 1990s. During the
first Intifada in the 1980s,
Israeli and Palestinian artists
collaborated on artistic
actions and exhibitions which
rejected the activities of the
IDF and Israeli government
in the Occupied Territories.
The Intifada that broke
out in the late 1980s was
named the Stone Intifada or
People's Intifada, forming
a catalyst which stirred
artists to respond and make
their voices heard in public
discourse on either side of
the divide. The Intifada
atmosphere and political
stands were discernible in
the works of many. Israeli
artists co-exhibited with
Palestinians in East Jerusalem
and demonstrated in front
of the political detention
houses such as Ansar 3. It
was the people's Intifada, and
Palestinian and Israeli artists
joined forces in acts of protest.
During the second Intifada a
fundamental change occurred
in the approach of Palestinian
artists to collaborations with
Israeli colleagues. The sense
of personal and professional
betrayal and the failure on
the part of Israeli artists and
curators to fight or at least
voice public or artistic opinion
13
on the Palestinians' condition
under Israeli occupation, put
an end to the vast majority of
artistic collaborations. Today
such endeavors are virtually
nonexistent, and the rare
instances of collaboration are
met with great skepticism
not due to their quality, but
with regard to the motivations
to work together. In this
context, one must differentiate
between collaborative projects
involving Palestinian artists
living in Israel and those
living in the Palestinian
Authority. Exhibitions
featuring Palestinian artists
living within the Green
Line are still held, but they
are accompanied by great
doubts and careful heed to
their context: exhibitions
criticizing the establishment
or conveying explicit political
messages can still find artistic
collaborations, albeit rare.
The main fear with regard to
these exhibitions is that they
might create the illusion of
normalization between the
two nations, and fail to reflect
the reality of separation and
occupation. Another fear is
that such artistic projects
may be used as a fig leaf for
local and foreign politicians
to create an illusion or
obfuscation of reality.
Exhibitions putting forth an
explicit public objection to the
occupation may be considered.
Proposals for collaborative
projects between Israeli and
Palestinian artists today, for
the most part, are brought
to the region by goodintentioned, yet rather naïve
European curators or artists,
who try to bring the neighbors
together. The motivation
behind most of these projects
is that if borders in Europe
have been opened and walls
have fallen, it can happen here
too, and that in art, unlike
in life, everything is possible;
namely, art does not have
to reflect reality; it should
take positive action, possibly
introduce another horizon, in
order to enable change in the
existing reality. But is it really
possible to introduce another
horizon to a reality where
artists are also civilians, and
where the majority of Israeli
civilians, artists included,
object to the occupation
neither actively nor passively
for the most part, and do not
fight for the Palestinians'
rights.
The chance for local or
international projects to
garner support or participation
of local artists is minimal
mainly on the Palestinian side.
Calls for a cultural boycott are
heard from most art centers,
universities, and other cultural
institutions in Europe and the
Middle East. The situation has
deteriorated since 2006, when
the project was launched,
due to the Second Lebanon
War and the attack on Gaza,
which invoked little criticism
or protest on the Israeli side
whether during the fighting
or thereafter. Another equally
important aspect is the
denunciation of Palestinian
artists and curators who
"collaborate" with Israeli
colleagues. Palestinian society
today denounces artists who
co-exhibit with Israelis,
and every shared work or
presentation is considered
an act of collaboration with
Israel. When one collaborates
with a stronger force he is held
a traitor, since the prevalent
definition of a "collaborator"
is a person who helps a
foreign power governing his
country, and collaborators are
considered traitors of their
people and nation.
Going back millennia to the
biblical collaboration between
the Canaanite harlot Rahab
and the spies sent to Canaan
to scout the land after forty
years in the wilderness, Rahab
is mentioned in the book of
Joshua, in the story about the
capture of Jericho, as the one
who made the city's conquest
possible. She hid the spies
sent by Joshua and helped
them escape, thereby making
possible the capture of the first
in a series of cities conquered
by Joshua in Canaan. In
return for her help, she asked
that her family be spared,
and indeed, all the citizens of
Jericho were killed in the city's
conquest, but Rahab and her
family went unharmed (Joshua
VI). Later, after converting
to Judaism, she married
Joshua, and, according to
the biblical story, gave birth
to ten prophets and priests.
The lesson of the story is that
those who collaborate acquire
reward and recognition for
their help. By the same token,
in most cases when territories
or countries were occupied by
another country or empire,
the conquerors have been
aided by local collaborators
to rule over the occupied
population. This was the case
in Nazi-occupied Europe and
elsewhere, and the Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian
people is no exception. Unlike
the biblical story, however, in
most cases the collaborators
are not rewarded nor do they
gain recognition for their
support, mainly where Zionist
operators and Palestinian
collaborators are concerned.
The term collaborator is
synonymous with traitor, one
who betrays his nation, selling
secrets or people for personal
benefit. Today artistic,
academic, or intellectual
collaboration has also become
considered collaboration
with the enemy. While the
international art and culture
communities pursue projects
of collaboration between
conflicted parties such as the
Palestinians and Israelis, and
Israel tries to promote social
projects including Palestinians
and Israelis, Palestinian
society, as well as many
of the Arab countries and
cultural activists from these
countries today, condemn
such endeavors, refusing to
take part in activities in which
Israelis participate. How did
cultural collaboration become
equal with collaboration with
the enemy? The underlying
logic is that anything that
does not explicitly help
promote Palestinian society
or the Palestinian struggle
for independence should
be banned. This boycott
was preceded by ongoing
collaboration between
Palestinian and Israeli
artists, as well as academic
scholars and intellectuals.
According to the Academic
Boycott Committee in Birzeit
University, such projects
were used to legitimize the
Occupation to the world and
to whitewash Israel's crimes
against the Palestinian people.
But what happens when
someone collaborates with a
weaker party? Is he a traitor or
a hero? How is collaboration
between Palestinian and
Israeli artists perceived by
Israeli society? The past
15
two years since the Second
Lebanon War (as it is called in
Israel) and the attacks on Gaza
have hardened the attitude of
the Israeli public toward the
Palestinians, whether those
living inside Israel or those
in the West Bank and Gaza,
with the encouragement of
politicians. Thus even projects
which previously enjoyed
the support of the Israeli
establishment, if only to create
a semblance of normalization,
have been eliminated, and
any support or identification
with the Palestinian people
or position against the
Occupation is now considered
as an objection to the very
existence of the State of Israel.
A Citizenship-Loyalty Law5
and the Nakba Law6 are some
of the newly-drafted bills on
the political and public agenda
in Israel.
In the Israeli art community
it is deemed proper to
express opinions against
the Occupation in the
private sphere, among
colleagues, or to participate
in demonstrations against the
Occupation. But as individuals
working in museums, galleries
or other art centers, the
activity of these people rarely
touches upon the evils of the
Occupation nor does it take
a social or political stand
against it. The field is largely
dedicated to art which avoids
taking an unequivocal stand,
preferring a personal view,
engagement with the state
of the artist or a formalistaesthetic position which is
subordinated to aesthetic or
social personal interpretation.
In the past two years, an overt
position undermining the
consensus of the Zionist left
in Israel is not legitimized.
Questions pertaining to
engaged or political art are
forthwith invoked by a work
that negates the consensus,
which is forthwith labeled
superficial and slogan-like.
Art, it is commonly held,
ought to be detached from
reality, for reality is so ugly,
and art is about beauty.
It is hard to tell whether a
project such as Liminal Spaces
could have been initiated
today, or could have received
international support as it
had in 2006. The project was
never exhibited in Ramallah or
5 In order to receive Israeli
citizenship, the applicant will have
to pledge loyalty to the state and
undertake to serve in the IDF or
volunteer for national service. The
oath of allegiance, according to
the bill, will include the following
sentence: "I pledge to be loyal to the
State of Israel as a Jewish, Zionist
and democratic state, to its symbols
and values, and serve the state, as
required, in military service, or
alternative service, as stated by the
law."
6 According to the proposed Nakba
Law, anyone who commemorates
the Nakba (Palestinian Catastrophe
of 1948) may be subject to three
years' imprisonment.
in Holon as initially planned.
The frequent events, wars,
and internal struggles within
and between Israeli and
Palestinian societies have led
to the decision to continue
investing in the development
of works, rather than in
staging exhibitions. Some of
the knowledge gathered in the
project is presented in this
book, and many resulting art
works have been featured in
various contexts and venues
the world over.
I would like to thank all
those who have taken part,
contributed, and participated
in this extensive project,
thus helping us explore and
object to a reality based on the
oppression of the other.
Participants of Liminal Spaces first conference, Qalandiya, 12.03.2006
17
Engaged Autonomy &
19
y & Other Paradoxes
// Charles Esche
* A presentation given during the
first Liminal Spaces conference,
Qalandiya, 12.03.2006
I have been asked to try to reflect on the last few days in this
talk, but I have to say that I find this extremely difficult. I will try
rather spontaneously to weave together some of my thoughts
with some of the things that happened over the last three days,
and also to speak in terms of four subjects, which I'll try to run
through. The first is the question of art and the political. I call
it political rather than politics because I think it is a process,
a perceptional activity. The second and third terms I want to
introduce are modest proposals and engaged autonomy, both
of which relate to the potential that art has to permit and
indeed generate ways of thinking things otherwise. That would
lead to the idea of possibility, and whether art is a place for
creating possibility. In seeing the conditions here in Palestine,
it remains a question rather than a confident assertion.
Nevertheless, I think it is an important way of understanding
art as the creation of possibility. In the final section of the talk,
I would like to speak briefly about art institutions and their
possible roles as sites where thinking things otherwise can be
privileged.
Now, let me introduce myself: I began working at the Van
Abbemuseum in August 2004. The Vanabbe opened in 1936 and
has maintained itself basically as a "white cube" type of space,
largely reflective of art historical developments in the West
and by the notion of the aesthetic as a separate category for
judgement and justification. One of the questions I had when
starting was how forums such as Liminal Spaces could use the
institutional tool as a mechanism to project what is going on
elsewhere. I think there is always a danger of essentializing the
local, of making the local a unique point, non-translatable, and
I'll try to explain why I think that's important. First, however, let
me go back to art and the political.
21
One of the inspiring moments, or rather, a moment that helped
me understand what this relationship that we are building
between us might allow, happened on the first day, when we
had two speeches, one from Ilan [Pappé] and one from Khaled
[Hourani]. In their contrasting ways, these two exemplified, in
a sense, the impossibility of politics and the possibility of art.
What impressed but also bothered me about Ilan's talk was
its smoothness, its easiness actually, which had the effect for
me of glossing over complexities in its search to apportion
out blame and guilt. In his talk, he drew a relationship or
analogy between Palestine and South Africa. It troubled me
at that moment, and still troubles me now. It troubled me
for what could be called academic reasons, because I think
there are very different economic structures underlying the
two situations, and as an old Marxist I cannot help but see
the South African struggle in terms of class exploitation that
became manifest in race. In Israel, there are other traditions,
of collectivism for instance, and also a complex racial and
linguistic kinship between Israelis and Palestinians that
makes the direct comparison unconvincing. The other thing
that troubled me was that the only people I've heard use this
analogy have been Israelis. It may be coincidental, but I haven't
yet heard Palestinians refer to the justified struggle in South
Africa with quite such readiness. Moreover, such a connection
seems to me a huge challenge to the current, mainstream
Palestinian strategies. Because the ANC and their strategy
for "one man one vote," for instance, is very different from
Palestinian strategies to do with the legalistic drawing of
borders and a desire, in a way, to have their own “Bantustan”
next to Israel rather than to change Israel as a whole. More
importantly, these thoughts showed me that I was trying to
work things out here on the basis of politics rather than the
political, using as criteria the potential delivery of functional
solutions that could be absolutely crucial to improvements
in daily life amongst a severely oppressed and discriminated
population but to which I am unlikely to be able to contribute
much except my own body.
I also believe that art has nothing to do with such solutions
even in its most instrumentalized versions. So my thoughts in
trying to grasp what is it that I am doing here were much more
jumbled and shaken out of their complacency by Khaled's very
intimate description of going through an IDF checkpoint. The
bareness of that description seems to me to be the language of
art, and actually to be in many ways a more powerful language
than the academic. Art's power is something which resides in
the individual and in the impact that it has − not only on the
artist, but also the intimate effect on the listener or viewer.
So the intimacy of that change, perhaps of that change in
consciousness, is a power of art that politics has abandoned, at
least for now. I'm sure politics needs to return, I'm sure politics
is not over, and art can never replace politics in that sense. But
it seems to me that there is a degree of impossibility in politics
now, and that maybe impossibility is not only here with the
extremes of the situation, but also in political discourse more
generally. Politics itself − and not the subject of the political −
has reduced itself to questions of managerial competence
and salesmanship, devoid of any goal other than the exercise
of power for private benefit. It is therefore at this historical
moment that art seems to offer one of the few ways to apply
an imaginative turn to the political that is not constrained by
legalism nor rhetoric, and permits a specific kind of ambiguity.
By so doing, the practice of art may in fact create the
conditions to make imaginative politics possible again; however,
I think that the relationship between art and politics can never
be direct because art addresses the individual, while politics
must always address the masses. However confined it is by the
politics of the white cube, art provides an intimate moment of
reception that we need to cherish still. It is a moment of turning
on the imagination and "thinking things otherwise," not as a
destination but as an act in and for itself, with all the ambiguity
of selfishness and triviality that it implies. I am sure that in
politics this is extremely dangerous. but in art it is permissible,
partly because art is not politics and art doesn’t have the
power of politics. Art is both extremely important, because in
the end, art is what remains as the legacy of our society, and
at the same time, it is completely irrelevant to daily existence.
It is that irrelevance that gives it its freedom of action, an
irrelevance that might also be seen as the irresponsibility of art.
It is something that creates the conditions for free speculation
and this "thinking things otherwise" without an end in sight.
I would like to read a couple of quotes now that might help
to expand on these thoughts. The first is from Benedict de
Spinoza, a Dutch Jewish philosopher who is the ultimate
materialist in many senses, but also talks about the imagination
in these terms: "If the mind, while imagining non-existent
things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they
do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down
23
1 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics,
Prop. 17, http://www.msu.org/e&r/
content_e&r/texts/spinoza/ethics_
part2.html#text18
to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if
this faculty of imagination depends solely on its own nature −
that is if this faculty of imagination be free."1 As I understand
it, Spinoza says here that the imagination is essentially
deliberately self-deceptive. The imagination requires imagining
a condition which you know does not or cannot exist. That
moment of self-deception of imagining what cannot exist or
what does not yet exist, is a cornerstone of the possibility of art
and its relationship to the political, at least for me. Imagination
is here the currency of art; it is the basis of the language, the
mode of exchange and the faculty that art cherishes above all
else. It is not managerial, it is not pragmatic. It is not engaged
with the politics of everyday decisions.
This imagination is of course not only the imagination of the
artist, but the imagination of the viewer and the imaginative
exchange between them. Now while, on one level, this process
might seem very, very far from the idea of politics discussed
by Ilan, on another level and particularly under current
conditions − it is absolutely vital to be understood as part of the
political possibility today, and perhaps nowhere more so than in
the situations we have seen over the last days.
This is a little introduction to my understanding of the
relationship between art and the political, which I think has
been at the heart of the Liminal Spaces' questions. I think
it might help to use a couple of examples, to see how this
imagination can play out. There are two artists here who I've
worked with and who are very important to me, Superflex and
Sean Snyder, who I think actually play with these things on a
very pragmatic level. Erden Kosova already mentioned at one
point in his talk the question of the cultural nation and the
nation state. This has been a kind of challenge to the idea
of sameness, which I'd like to defend a little bit here, in a
situation where we have persistently talked about division of
land, people and ideas of nationhood and entitlement. I would
like to use the example of Sean Snyder to go further. His work
on Iraq or North Korea for instance, seems to me to describe
a relationship of sameness between extreme moments of
resistance to or failure of our global economic exchange system
and the places where his work is shown in the West. Following
Foucault, it is indeed only at the ragged edges − and I don’t
mean the edges in a geographic sense, I'm not talking about
periphery − of capitalism, that we can actually understand
where we are and what we might need to do politically and
culturally. It is effectively impossible the see the urgency of
the need for change in global relationships when looking to
examples or arguments from Northwestern Europe − The EU,
the Netherlands or Eindhoven, where I live. From here, political
impossibility is only too real as our own cotton wool protected
society disables us from “thinking things otherwise.” One might
say of course that it is designed to disable, and I wouldn’t
disagree, but nevertheless, designed or not, it has been one of
the significant impacts of social democracy. We have probably
two options to “undisable” us from this condition. One is
to import the conditions of collapse that we see in Iraq or
Afghanistan to our safe European home. I have to admit that it
is not such an attractive option but it is a real one. The second
maybe, culturally, to see the sameness that extends from
Helmond (a town near Eindhoven) to Helmand (a province of
Afghanistan). By thinking through such equivalences, an artist
like Sean Snyder gives us just such an opportunity.
So this is where an institution like the one we have in
Eindhoven, this museum with its white cubes, might begin
to make sense in the world or in its own city. As the place
where the presentation and perception of the fraying edges
of capitalism and the consequences of those fraying edges,
for the place where you stand as a visitor, the museum may
grant itself a new purpose and mission. That purpose is one
of exercising criticism rather than entertainment and aesthetic
pleasure, though the latter do not have to be absent by
definition; however, I cannot foresee any possibility for a society
where there isn't a language of critique. We need propositional
modes of resistance that not only say what's wrong, but
suggest alternatives and provide tools of this imagination of
non existent things following Spinoza.
What I want to do now is to talk a little bit about two terms
that I have been contemplating in relation to art, and how art
becomes a site for this exposure of the imagination. The two
terms that I've come up with are both paradoxical − one is
engaged autonomy and the other modest proposals. I think
that these two terms provide some way of understanding the
relationship between art and the political in an agonistic way
in which art is deliberately rejecting the political to retain its
autonomy, or art is deliberately rejecting the political in the
name of modesty, and I say modesty in terms of specificness.
I'd like to read just a short bit out: "Engaged autonomy is a
paradoxical term that suggests a creative tension between two
25
traditionally opposed forms of artistic thinking. It suggests that
the post-1945 idea of artistic autonomy is no longer appropriate
to the conditional relations between art and the political in
the early 21st century. Engaged autonomy would not exclude
any particular approaches to making art, but artworks so
defined would be likely to share some aspects, such as close
attention to the time and place of the presentation, attempts
to lay out the conditions of production as determinants of
what is produced and the abandonment of the idea of an
ideal, universal viewer in favour of more specific invitations to
whatever communities might be constructed. It might involve
direct resistance to current economic doctrines, through
channeling resources away from their stated purpose in order
to fulfill singular objectives. Engaged autonomy should also
be read as an antidote to the dangers of the incorporation
of an instrumentalizing critical or curatorial discourse. Such
frameworks can only be valid if artists themselves retain
an agonistic relationship to other cultural actors especially
curators and museum directors, who shape policy and artistic
reception while often insisting on their unaccountability for the
use of public funds on the basis of a simplified notion of artistic
or even institutional autonomy." I think that the agonistic
relationship extends to the institutions, and to me personally,
on a certain level, as curator. Peter Friedel called himself a diehard opponent of curatorial power in his introduction, I think,
and that I should be an opponent; I shouldn’t give way either,
I should fight back, and that agonistic relationship is actually
one that is very healthy in this sense, and it exacts this kind of
engaged autonomy, which means the engagement with each
other, and of course art's engagement with its environment, but
nevertheless the retention of an autonomous critical position.
Such a position touches closely on what Irit Rogoff would call
criticality, this living within the compromise but retaining a
critical position towards it. I think that is our only option, given
global capitalism and a unipolar world with one superpower
imposing its universalist doctrine of freedom and democracy.
Under these conditions, we inevitably affirm things like the free
market, or the deep imbalances of the world directly caused
by our actions. We live that affirmation every day, performing
it when we go shopping, when we eat, when we buy a book.
There's no outside in that pre '89 sense of two competing
systems that each mirrored the problems of the other back
to itself. In such straits, it is engaged autonomy, I would say,
that offers the only possibility to retain an autonomous core
of being able to be critical despite the universalizing force of
globalizing, of behaving agonistically towards consensus, of
being able to respond with ‘yes but’ and not just ‘yes’. The
rebuttal is done, however, without a position of clarity. There
is no new communist manifesto in our pocket. The adoption
of criticality for its own sake in a sense, although necessarily,
the adoption of criticality for its own sake is the thing that
could allow a kind of engaged autonomy to be meaningful. So
such frameworks may be valid only if artists themselves retain
an agonistic relationship to them, struggling to assert their
own contradictory position, while acknowledging and actively
responding to the issues at hand. Those issues might be given
by curators as much as by the economic or social context. The
point is to take them on, and subvert or disassemble.
Now maybe this is a hard thing to say, but it would be
interesting to hear from Palestinian artists, whether a specific
form of engaged autonomy is necessary even from the
extremes of a situation like occupation, in terms of art, not in
terms of politics, again that agonistic relationship. Yet, what
would that mean here? For sure, it doesn’t mean a retreat to
formalism, because that is a 1945-1989 idea of autonomy that
is long past its sell by date... Therefore, it is not an argument
in any sense for a return to an old North American modernist
discourse. But it is nevertheless an argument for a situation of
critical engagement, relying on artists’ own ethical compass
to guide them and defending, in democratic terms, their right
to be awkward. Furthermore, engaged autonomy, as I see it,
invests the quality of autonomy with action, understanding it
at as a state of being or doing rather than something vested in
the objects of production. For example, art can perhaps hide in
the guise of other things or actions. This almost brings us back
to the notion of the "unartist" developed by Allan Kaprow, the
artist who actually disappears into life but retains an idea of the
arts, the possibility of art through the actions that one carries
out, whether he is a butcher, a baker, or a candlestick maker.
But you carry out those actions in the name of being an artist. I
think Kaprow − and also his withdrawal, in a sense, from the art
world − becomes an important moment. I think a new look at
Kaprow becomes a very interesting possibility and connects to
intentionality and to my second term, modest proposals.
Modest proposals are essentially about a speculation that we
imagine things other than they are now through speculative
gestures that intend to be concrete and actual. They avoid the
27
fantastic as well as the hermetic purity of a private symbolism,
in order to deal with real, existing conditions, and what might
be necessary in order to change those conditions. In different
senses according to various artistic approaches, the notion
of modest proposals addresses the problem of necessity in
relation to the free imagination, as a prerequisite for producing
work. Returning to Spinoza, I think necessity is another term
that comes into play... I've been living in the Netherlands for
18 months now, and the necessity of 93% of the art that I see
there is basically absent. Art becomes a professional production
whereby the necessary freedom to speculate and propose
turns into self-indulgence in a society rich enough to be able to
squander its excess in this harmless way. I hope this is where
the modest proposal can have some purchase. In declaring a
reduced or modest scale, albeit with a certain Swiftian irony,
it impels a less grandiose use of resources and with proposal
it demands that something is offered as a proposition for
consideration by others, not something which is internally selfjustifying. Modesty is about its specificness, as much as about
the scale of the issue involved or the absence of grand ambition
for change. In doing so, these modest proposals exploit a space
which is accepted by society as free, as potentially provocative,
in order to take full advantage of imagining things otherwise
(that term again). This also directly concerns the question of
how we reinvent the museum, which I regard as extremely
urgent if it's going to have any reason to survive as a useful
institution in the coming decades. Its reinvention is intimately
concerned with this idea of exploiting its given possibilities, of
creating the conditions in which it can be something else, in
which the museum can think itself otherwise. I often think of
the museum as a living being, rather than a building, because it
has this ideology which is encoded into it as much as it is a set
of rooms and white cubes − so exploiting that possibility of free
transformative imagination related to modest proposals and
engaged autonomy.
I had my artistic education in Glasgow, where a young group
of artists created a sense of possibility in a city, which had
almost no possibilities for artists previously. They did this
through taking charge of an existing artists' organization
called Transmission, which had a committee run by artists, and
generated a community which then went on to be relatively
successful, internationally speaking. It wasn’t something
which came from the top down or something which came
through national cultural policy. It seems to me that those
were the most important places, those are the places where
that relationship between art and politics can be played out,
and where art and the intimacy of art, the intimate exchange
which art allows, the "thinking things otherwise," without
a destination − this is where that can happen. Of course it
happens for a very small audience, I think that's tragic and
it's a shame, but it is probably necessary that it's that small
audience. There will never be a causal relationship between
art and changing the world. In the end, in a kind of spirit of
foolish optimism, I think in order to go on being an artist one
must believe somewhere, deep down in his being, that the
relationship survives, and that art's relations to changing the
world, to political change exists. It is not something which could
ever be traced causally, or drawn on a map, or reduced to
political rhetoric. It's something which simply exists.
29
Dealing with the
Changing Nation // N
The themes of nation,
nationalism and national
identity are inscribed in the
project Liminal Spaces on
a number of levels: in the
configuration of its curators
and their institutions in Israel,
Palestine and Germany as
well as in the international
participants, the venues, and
finally in the topic of the
Israeli occupation of Palestine.
At the same time, the project
perceives this conflict as an
international matter and
calls upon the participating
artists, curators, activists,
academics, architects and
their institutions to develop
new forms of political debate
within the art sector and using
artistic means: “Curators,
cultural figures and artists
developed this project through
a series of meetings and
discussions that sought to
generate active participation
of the art sector in developing
modes of expression against
the political status quo of
occupation, dehumanization
and oppression. The curators
have invited an array of local
and international artists to
participate in this project.
Additionally, it is hoped that
through participation in the
project, new possibilities of
contact and exchange will
emerge on an individual basis
and beyond.”1
Within the destructive
situation of resurgent
nationalist sentiments in
the Middle East conflict, the
project is implicitly based on
the premise that assuming an
anti-nationalistic position is a
necessary precondition for any
fundamental agreement.
Nation
and
Nationalism
In discussions on the conflict
in the Middle East, the crucial
terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’
are often used without clear
differentiation. Only in a
historically ideal form of
political community are the
two concepts coterminous,
whereby the nation is the
narrative component: it
provides the ideological and
symbolic back-up for the
political formation of the state
and its territorial boundaries.
A group of people who are
unlikely ever to meet use
the term ‘nation’ to define
themselves; their notion of
belonging to this group is
based on a common language,
religion, ethnicity or ‘culture’.
A national community thus
evolves not out of actual
relations, but simply out of
perceived common ground.
Since the publication
of Benedict Anderson’s
pioneering work Imagined
Communities, the nation
can no longer be thought of
without taking into account
this fictional and ideological
aspect which underlies its
identity formation.2
The nation state, which
according to Anderson is
the final version of a nation,
is currently undergoing
something of a contradictory
development. While the
decline of the nation state
in many parts of the world is
symptomatic of its reduced
power, one nonetheless has
to acknowledge its continued
existence and identify its new,
post-sovereign functions,
which manifest themselves in
various forms of participation
in supranational contexts as
31
/ Nina Möntmann
well as in an emerging global
society.
Upon closer consideration, the
decline of the nation state can
be described as a dissociation
of the ideological construct of
the nation from the political
and territorial structure of the
state. How does this ‘drifting
apart’ of state and nation
manifest itself, and how are
they both changing as a result?
Let us begin with national
ideology. In attempting to
answer this question I would
like to refer to Boris Buden,
who has drawn attention to
the crucial fact that although
nations still exist, they have
lost their common narrative.
The narrative, for example,
of anti-colonial nationalism,
which united the “Wretched
of the Earth” and aimed at
using a common interest
in liberation to develop a
model of common agency.3
In Europe, on the other hand,
an all-inclusive, popular
nationalism developed, unified
by a common language, while
a metro-political, formally
conservative and reactionary
nationalism of European
origin later also extended to
the colonies.4 This form of
nationalism, which defines
itself through dissociation
from other ethnic, religious or
‘cultural’ communities, today
emanates less from states
and more from regions, as
the recent changes in Eastern
Europe – and above all in the
former Yugoslavia – show.
Significantly, the ultimate goal
of these regions is usually the
formation of an independent
state.
While the common agenda and
hence the narrative of nations
has been lost, new globalized
states have become part of
new communities in the form
of powerful supranational
decision-making structures
that evidently constitute
the new world order, such as
the WTO or SAARC on an
economic level, NATO on a
military one, the EU or UN on
a political one, etc. The state’s
new responsibilities in its
role as a “free-market global
managerial state” within
transnational state collectives
serve the “postnational
character of global capital” in
today’s neo-capitalistic forms
of society.5
1 http://liminalspaces.org/?page_
id=50/
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities (London: Verso, 2006
[1983]), p. 178.
3 Boris Buden, "Why Not: Art
and Contemporary Nationalism?,"
in Minna Henriksson & Sezgin
Boynik (eds.), Contemporary Art
and Nationalism (Kosovo: Prishtina
Institute for Contemporary Art,
2007), pp. 12-17.
4 See Ania Loomba, Colonialism/
Postcolonialism (Abingdon/New
York: Routledge, 2005), p. 157.
5 Both quotations of Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, in Judith
Butler/Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
Who Sings the Nation-State?
(London, New York, Calcutta:
Seagull Books, 2007), p. 76.
How, then, should the
relationship between state
and nation be regarded in the
specific cases of Israel and
Palestine? Both Israel and
Palestine can be described as
a special form of a nation in
a ‘state of exception’. Israel’s
conception and foundation
as a state was based upon a
monoethnic and religious
national ideology. Thus Israel’s
Declaration of Independence
on May 14, 1948 does not,
as Joseph A. Massad writes,
declare a sovereign state,
but one that is based on a
unifying cultural identity:
“the Declaration (of the
Establishment of the State
of Israel) did not proclaim
Israel a sovereign independent
state, rather it proclaimed it a
‘Jewish State’.”6 The historical
aspect of the Jewish Diaspora
with all its cultural, linguistic
dimensions, etc. was thereby
negated. Palestine, on the
other hand, is a nation that
fights for its state and cannot
therefore be called sovereign
either. The dissolution of
the community as a result of
the internal division of the
political camps fighting for
the ‘Palestinian cause’ into
Fatah and Hamas has further
eroded the Palestinians’ hope
of establishing a governable
state. The loss of the classical
parameters of an anti-colonial
struggle for liberation also
means the loss of the basis for
a national community – and
at the same time reflects the
international interests in the
Israeli occupation of Palestine
in a perfidious way.
As a matter of fact, the
situation of Palestine under
Israeli occupation is often
described as colonial, and an
independent nation state for
the Palestinian people is the
longed-for solution. However,
the history of former colonies
reveals that once they have
gained independence, most
have fallen into the hands
of corrupt rulers from their
own ranks. This means a
reversal of parameters in
terms of the fight for their
national liberation, or, as
Massad describes it: “how the
progressive nature of national
liberation becomes regressive
after liberation takes place.”7
The brief promise of the
nation as the identity-forming
community therefore proves
to be illusory. Besides the
many reasons specific to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the history of anti-colonial
nationalism should therefore
also cloud the hope of a
nation state as a solution
for the Palestinians. With
this in mind, Amnon RazKrakotzkin describes the
Palestinian state simply as a
pragmatic intermediate step
on the way to a binational,
one-state solution, one that
undermines the concept of
monocultural and monoreligious nationalism sought
by both Israel and Palestine
and instead proposes an
inclusive state.8 Even though
this idea seems far removed
from the present situation, its
political concept provides a
fundamental argument against
the regional nationalism
that is fuelling the ongoing
conflict.
33
2 6 0 C T 20 0 7
L O D /L YD D A
PHOTO: DOR GUEZ
35
Art
Institutions
and
Nationalism
The cooperation between
institutions in Liminal
Spaces shows how the theme
of nation and nationalism
also and above all affects the
specific tasks and the (limited)
sphere of influence of cultural
institutions. In general, all
public institutions represent
the respective prevailing
system of social values.
Although art institutions,
unlike political parties, civil
services or trade unions, do
not have a direct and socially
accepted mandate for political
action, they are nevertheless
expected to create an image
of the prevailing social value
system.9 They are supposed
to transform social and
subjective realities into a
format in which this image
can be handled and conserved,
but they are not supposed
to intervene or actively
participate in the production
of social and political realities.
The positive effect of this is a
certain degree of freedom in
the creation of an institution’s
profile, however this freedom
is in fact minimal, particularly
as far as larger institutions
are concerned. The clearly
negative effect is the
sanctioning of art institutions
whose work manifests more
critical positions, which is
articulated through limiting
access to financial resources.
But let us first take a look
at the historical role of the
museum in society and
its function as a public
institution. Museums
originated in the 18th century
as a national project and
were expected to play a part –
together with the power of the
state – in shaping the social
order. The first example of its
kind, the British Museum, was
established in 1759. Its task
was to create the narrative of a
representative national history
and heritage. To this end, its
ideal audience consisted of
those who were educated to
be model citizens: patriotic,
conscious and proud of a rich
history superior to that of
other nations.
6 Joseph A. Massad, The
Persistence of the Palestinian
Question: Essays on Zionism and
the Palestinians (Abingdon/New
York: Routledge, 2006), p. 19.
7 Ibid., p. 21.
8 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Exil et
souveraineté: Judaïsme, sionisme
et pensée binationale (Paris: La
Fabrique éditions, 2007).
9 “Whereas other institutions, like
civil services, parties and unions,
have a direct mandate for political
action – which is also socially
accepted as such – an art institution
is expected to deliver and produce
images or rather an ‘image’ of what
is happening outside; to transform
social and subjective realities
into a format in which we can
handle and conserve it, but not to
interfere and take an active part
in the production of social and
political realities. The question
is, how do art institutions deal
with these expectations, how do
they develop room for manoeuvre,
and how do they relate their work
to the political contexts they are
confronted with and thus also to
the activities of other institutions?”
Nina Möntmann, "Art and its
Institutions," in Möntmann (ed.),
Art and its Institutions (London:
Black Dog Publishing, 2006), p. 8.
Anderson also refers to a
“museumizing imagination”
that translates the fictive
and symbolic concept
of nationalism into an
environment of objects
and images.10 A public
institution such as a museum
is constitutionally open
to everybody, but in fact it
provides a limited and encoded
accessibility that confirms the
bourgeois and patriotic subject
as the ideal citizen. Moreover,
it imagines the world order
from the perspective of
the colonizer by showing a
collection of ‘masterpieces’ of
national artefacts along with
acquired trophies from the
cradles of culture and art such
as Egypt or Greece, which
are thus placed in a direct
line with the contemporary
national culture. In contrast
to this we also find an
ethnicizing presentation of
artefacts from the colonies; in
the context of the imperialistic
narrative these appear as folk
art, their practical value in
both spiritual and everyday
contexts even serving to
highlight the achievements of
civilization, which give way to
the autonomous masterpiece.
The initial purpose of the
museum was thus “the
authoritarian legitimation of
the nation state… through the
construction of a history, a
patrimony, … and a canon.”11
If, therefore, in neocapitalism, there is a general
social tendency to superimpose
private interests on the public
interest, then the profiles for
action on the part of public
positions or institutions
must change accordingly; this
also includes the duties of
an institution’s employees.
In today’s neo-capitalist
societies, art institutions are
becoming branded spaces,
an increasing number of
which, such as the Tate or the
Guggenheim, are extending
according to the franchise
principle. Private financiers
are generally less interested
in attending the museum they
support than in using it as
a tool for image production
and ultimately for the profit
of their company. The ideal
audience is represented
accordingly by a mass of
anonymous consumers. This
corporate model of an art
institution – which applies
to all the major museums
such as the Guggenheim (the
clearest example of an art
institution conceived and
operated by politicians and
financiers), the Tate and even
the MoMA, but also and
increasingly to middle-sized
Kunsthallen and even smaller
institutions – consists of a
peer group of speculators who
possibly identify more with
the Guggenheim brand than
with its programme, and a
non-specific audience that is
measured in visitor numbers.
60 Years of
Israel /
60 Years of
Nakba
A large-scale exhibition project
to mark the 60th anniversary
of the foundation of Israel
shows how a state that has
long since become both
economically and militarily
involved in transnational
contexts and has shown great
interest in EU membership,
nevertheless clings on to
a national ideology that
37
is meant to represent its
history and create a coherent
national community. The
exhibition series Six Decades,
Six Museums, which was held
in 2008 on the occasion of
Israel’s 60th anniversary, is a
prime example of the delicate
situation of art institutions
within the missions of nations.
The press release states that
the project Six Decades, Six
Museums is “the result of
cooperation between the 60s
headquarters, the Ministry of
Science, Culture and Sport,
the Culture Administration,
the Department of Museums
and Plastic Art, participating
museums supported by private
and governmental bodies.”
The state’s mission is made
very clear by this planning
constellation. The structure
of the project is simple: each
participating museum adopts
a decade between 1948 and
2008 and shows ‘Israeli art’
from that period.12 The
occasion – the anniversary of
the state’s foundation – allows
for only limited criticism on
the part of the participating
institutions. The press
announcement continues:
“The project will lead to
first-time cooperation among
Israel’s six leading museums:
each and every one of them
shows an exhibition that is
dedicated to another decade in
Israel’s history. The exhibition
will present a comprehensive
report and new insight about
art in Israel during the last
sixty years.” The emphasis on
first-time cooperation between
the museums and the result of
presenting a “comprehensive
report” testify to the intended
unity and cohesion of the
Israeli community, which
in this sense has long since
ceased to exist. Subtle
references to this fact can
be found in some of the
individually staged exhibitions,
for example in the title of
the exhibition curated by
Doron Rabina at the Herzliya
Museum of Contemporary
Art (“Eventually We’ll
Die”), which in its concept
also mentions the “horrors
of the occupation.” The
participation of Arab artists
is, however, ambivalent. It
is intended to open up the
exclusionary concept of the
series and of the art industry
in Israel generally, but for
many Palestinians, boycotting
10 Anderson, op. cit., p. 178.
11 Hito Steyerl, The Institution of
Critique, http://transform.eipcp.net/
transversal/0106/steyerl/en
12 The participating institutions
and their exhibitions were:
The Fifties: The First Decade:
Hegemony and Plurality (curators:
Gideon Ofrat & Galia Bar Or),
Museum of Art, Ein Harod;
The Birth of the ‘Present’: the
Sixties in Israeli Art (curators:
Yona Fischer & Tamar ManorFriedman), Ashdod Art Museum,
Monart Center; My Body, My
Self: The Seventies in Israeli Art
(curator: Mordechai Omer), Tel Aviv
Museum of Art; Check Post: The
Eighties in Israeli art (curator: Ilana
Tenenbaum), Haifa Museum of Art;
The Nineties: Eventually We’ll Die:
Young Israeli Art in the Nineties
(curator: Doron Rabina), Herzliya
Museum of Contemporary Art;
Real Time: Art in Israel 1998–2008
(curators: Amitai Mendelsohn &
Efrat Natan), The Israel Museum,
Jerusalem.
Israeli events is one of the
few remaining possibilities of
political activism they have.
Ilana Tenenbaum, who curated
the exhibition “Check Post” at
Haifa Museum of Art, discerns
post-Zionist and post-colonial
tendencies already forming
within Israel in the art of the
1980s.
The Collapse
of the
National
Community
The collapse of Israel’s
national community, which
the concept of Six Decades,
Six Museums so vehemently
attempts to counter, has
however only become more
apparent in recent years.
This is also evident in the
history of Israeli film. Whereas
earlier works such as Hem
Hayu Assarah (They Were
Ten) by Baruch Dienar were
‘Zionist manifestos’, which
euphorically praised the idea
of the state’s foundation, today
there are a growing number
of critical films such as Dror
Shaul’s Sweet Mud, which
depicts the incapacitated
existence of those who live
in a kibbutz, Ari Folman’s
Waltz with Bashir and
Avi Mograbi’s Z32, two
experimental documentaries
in which soldiers recall
their traumatic experiences
of the war in Lebanon, or
Yoav Shamir’s Flipping Out
about Israeli soldiers who
are psychologically disturbed
after three years of military
service. Then there is Amos
Kollek’s Restless, featuring
an Israeli who has fled to
New York because he can
no longer stand living in a
state of oppressors, or the
open criticism of Zionist
policies in most of Eyal Sivan’s
documentaries.13 The notion
of a national community
is most visibly collapsing
in intellectual circles. But
without such a community
Israel will disintegrate, which
is why the nationalistic
pressure from above is steadily
increasing. More and more
Israelis are criticizing their
country’s military activities
and condemning the violations
of human rights against
Palestinians. The anniversary
of the Nakba (‘catastrophe’)
was marked on May 15,
2008; art institutions in
Palestine also responded
to this anniversary: several
exhibitions were held in
addition to numerous panel
discussions, film screenings
and demonstrations in
Palestine, Jordan, Egypt,
Lebanon as well as supporting
events in Europe, the
USA, and Canada. For
example, the Palestinian Art
Court – Al Hoash Gallery
in East Jerusalem showed
a project by Scottish artist
Jane Frere. Her symbolically
charged work Return of the
Soul – The Nakba Project
consisted of more than 3,000
wax figurines fixed to the
ceiling of the exhibition space.
“This sculpture is representing
people who had to flee their
homes in a state of terror,”
Frere said in relation to
the events of 1948.14 The
institutionalized events in
Palestine also represent a
common cause, albeit under
very different circumstances –
the ‘Palestinian cause’,
and in Palestine, too, the
reality of society no longer
conforms to its image. Since
39
Hamas seized power in the
Gaza Strip and political and
military leadership was split
between Hamas and Fatah,
and in the light of current
(August 2008) escalations in
the Gaza Strip on a par with
civil war, the ‘Palestinian
cause’, the common struggle
for liberation, has been
overshadowed by internal
conflict and Palestine’s
main national narrative has
consequently disintegrated.
The interests of other nations
such as the USA and Iran in
the opposing parties constitute
an additional dimension,
that of war by proxy, which
weakens and abuses the region
even further.
The collapse of the nation
can be observed, albeit under
varying circumstances, in
almost all parts of the world.
In economically stronger
areas, states are forming
alliances, while national
ideologies are increasingly
emerging from specific
regions. Although Israel
attempts to affiliate itself
with western state alliances,
it remains caught up in the
conflict with Palestine; as
a result, the Israeli state
continues to limit and
isolate itself politically
and territorially, while the
national community falls apart
under the constant pressure
of its own government’s
regional policies.
What roles do art institutions
play in the light of this
changed situation? What
is their public mission?
While a corporatization of
institutions can be observed
in fully capitalized countries
as a parallel development to
that of the neo-liberal global
state, Israel’s specific public
mission can be described as
the attempt to re-establish
the image of a functioning
Israeli community that
supports the project of Israel
with unchanged optimism.
Although the situation in
Palestine means that only
emerging tendencies at most
can be discerned, since the
few institutions that exist are
often supported by private
initiatives or international
money, it can also be described
as an attempt to uphold an
image that is no longer valid –
that of a national community
13 I am referring here to Anke
Leweke’s article "Deserteure der
Idee Israel," in die tageszeitung, 31
July 2008, p. 15.
14 Jane Frere, "The Journey of the
Soul," This Week in Palestine 121,
May 2008.
unified by oppression and the
struggle for liberation.
The overall situation
of collapsing national
communities is, of course,
only problematic for states
which are not open to the
adoption of an inclusive
approach, one that goes
beyond national parameters.
Theoretically, this kind
of situation offers the
opportunity to replace the
idea of the nation as the
main defining element and to
oppose all existing or emerging
forms of nationalism.
Against this background,
Liminal Spaces is an
attempt to react to the new
situation by refusing to
simply accomplish implicit
institutional missions and
instead looking for new forms
of institutional action. In the
first instance this involves
establishing a network of
individual protagonists with
a variety of international
perspectives – not in order to
organize some vague kind of
‘peace project’, but instead
to use this transnational
approach to promote
concrete political debate and
develop possible courses of
action in the field of art. In
addition to the direct debate
it encourages between the
participating artists, curators,
architects and activists,
therefore, Liminal Spaces also
intervenes on a subliminal
level in the operating modes of
institutions and their public
mission.
41
Duchifat
Palair
Timetable of
Palestinian Airways
Limited, Jerusalem,
1939
// Mauricio Guillén
Hud-hud, 2008,
photograph of a
vintage school
poster from before
the first war taken
at the Scientific
Library El Bireh,
Ramallah
43
Stitching Pieces of
Our Story in Limin a
1
Begin with art, because art tries
to take us outside ourselves. It
is a matter of trying to create
an atmosphere and context so
conversation can flow back and
forth and we can be influenced by
e a c h o t h e r.
-- W.E.B. DuBois (1868-1963), American
sociologist and civil rights leader
This essay examines the
potential transformative power
of the liminal or in-between
spaces created by artists and
art professionals in the Liminal
Spaces collaborative project.
It explores how negotiating art
within these on-site performative
spaces in Palestine/Israel can
lead to raising consciousness and
to making meaning out of the
chaotic lives of Palestinians under
occupation. My remarks are
based on my personal experience
as a privileged participant in the
project.
Liminal Spaces took place on
March 10-12, 2006; it was
composed of a series of panel
discussions, guided tours of
the Qalandiya refugee camp,
Ramallah, and Jerusalem.
The tours brought the urban
transformation of Palestinian
land into focus, outlining
the impact of the Separation
Wall, the over 75 permanent
checkpoints and over 150
mobile ones set up every week,
the many concrete road blocks,
gates, fences, and the rerouting
of traffic to favor settler-only
highways, the isolation and
collective punishment of Gazans,
the ethnic cleansing via seizure
of land and house demolitions in
Palestinian Authority areas, and
now more frequent land seizures
from Israeli Palestinians.
In 2007, Liminal Spaces
organized trips to Palestinian
towns in Israel and Israeli urban
centers to meet with Palestinian
communities. From Bethany
45
n al Spaces // Salwa Mikdadi
Dabit in Ramla, we heard firsthand accounts of a ghettoized
community's civil resistance and
the threat to the last remains
of Palestinian cultural heritage
sites. In Jaffa, Fadi Shbeita
explained the myriad laws that
Palestinians face in the onslaught
of gentrification and exclusion
by Israeli city planners. In Bil'in,
we heard the stories of the town's
collective resistance and their
triumph against the construction
of the Separation Wall.
In Taibeh, Palestinian architect
Senan Abdelqader discussed loss
of communal domain in urban
centers. According to Jamal
Zahalqa, a Palestinian Member of
Knesset, the Palestinian minority
in Israel has undergone a process
of modernity without urbanism;
he attributes the absence of
Palestinian cities in Israel not to
"faulty planning," but rather to "a
planned fault. It was manifested,
inter alia, in the authorities'
attitude toward the city of
Nazareth, which was besieged
from all around by confiscation
of land and Jewish settlements
constructed in order to prevent
territorial continuity with the
Arab communities around it."1
Without natural expansion and
with increased demographics,
Palestinian towns are looking
more and more like crowded
refugee camps.
Most illuminating was the
meeting with Israeli artists and
activists who believe in a future
of coexistence and with new
historians such as Ilan Pappé,
who challenges the colonialist
version of the Zionist narrative.
These and others strive to
unveil the truth regarding
Israel's violence against the
Palestinians and the methods of
expulsion, usurpation of land,
and destruction of villages. The
accounts of these historians,
however, are never covered by
Israeli and Western media, or
more importantly – included in
Israeli school books or university
courses.
Eyal Danon is an Israeli artist
and one of the curators of Liminal
Spaces. His project [an initiative
of the AYAM Association]
Jaffa – An Autobiography of a
City documents a new narrative
of the Arab and Jewish history of
Jaffa. According to Danon, the
histories are not based on any
hierarchical order, and a website
database allows all residents
of Jaffa to participate in "the
redesigning of the City's Memory
as part of the construction of a
new Urban-Communal identity."
Danon believes that "when the
Palestinian resident population
will be able to make public its
own History, its communal sense
of belonging and identity will be
intensified and the bond with
the Jewish resident population
will be based on a more balanced
structure."2 Danon and other
artists who seek change do so for
both communities. They take
their art to the community and
work outside the white cube
gallery. They interact with their
audiences, empowering them to
question the dominant narrative.
2
Interrupted and
Fr a g m e n t e d N a r r a t i v e s
The unshared memories such
as those collected by Danon, or
others I have heard throughout
my life from my family, friends,
and every Palestinian I meet
on my travels, are all stories of
fragmented lives – interrupted
adolescent years, incomplete
studies, uprooted lives. Life
in Palestine is getting ever
shorter as more emigrate or
are being detained inside
separation walls preventing
them from seeking a full life or
reaching family members, urban
centers with schools, hospitals,
theaters, museums, cultural
institutions, etc.
47
Such discontinuity in life under
an unpredictable and violent
occupation that restricts the
natural flow of people and
goods leads to a fragmented
physical and mental state of
being. Palestinians with Israeli
citizenship fear that Israel
will one day expel them. East
Jerusalem Palestinians with
Israeli residence permits fear
traveling outside Jerusalem as
they may risk losing their right
to return.
Palestinians hold on to these
fragments, and continue hoping
for a magic minjalieh4 stitch to
string our narrative and connect
us together. Liminal Spaces
artists examined this constant
splitting, separation, and shifting
of boundaries in the architectural
and social landscape of Palestine.
According to Edward Said, such
fragmentation, disruption or
interruption is also reflected
in our literature where the
"characteristic mode... is not
a narrative, in which scenes
take place seriatim, but rather
broken narratives, fragmentary
compositions, and selfconsciously staged testimonials,
in which the narrative voice
keeps stumbling over itself, its
obligations, and its limitations."3
Despite such chaotic existence,
Unlike traditional art residencies,
the exhibition was not the end
of the project. Liminal Spaces
went on with a major conference,
including on site meetings with
Palestinian communities and
other professionals. It structured
liminal spaces in many locations
so that all the participants
could share in the experience.
In these spaces one may feel
trapped, transformed, or emerge
whole again. It all depends on
the performer and other actors
3
C o l l a b o r a t i v e Pe r f o r m a n c e
in Liminal Spaces
within the space, in this case the
artists, the art, the community,
and the art professionals. Liminal
Spaces acted as a medium for
these spaces in Palestine/Israel,
and the participants' performance
took place in situ, outside the
white cube galleries of Holon
or Ramallah. In situ refers to
the fact that the Liminal Spaces
trips, conferences, residencies,
and curatorial processes took
place simultaneously as the
Separation Wall continued
to snake around Palestinian
towns, isolating communities
under an occupation that
continues its restrictive and
dehumanizing practices.
"Liminality" is a term generally
associated with ritual. Liminal
Spaces cannot be described
as such or be associated with
liminality's equalizing attribute
between occupiers and occupied.
Art historian Carol Duncan
explored art museums as ritual
sites with a performative element
within liminality which she
describes as a "'liminal' zone of
time and space in which visitors,
removed from the concerns of
their daily, practical lives, open
themselves to a different quality
of experience."5 Such an approach
is dependent on the viewer
and his/her solitary experience
with the art object inside the
museum. In Liminal Spaces,
the interaction between the
participants and the communities
was a performative process. For
the artists and the audience
outside the museum, creating a
larger art project as a result of the
exhibition was one component.
Many Liminal Spaces
participants shared temporary
in-between spaces with
the communities or their
representatives. The process –
with all its manifestations, tours,
discussions, the art exhibition,
and the participation of the
community – was one. All
participants were predisposed
49
mentally and politically to enter
such a space. Therefore the
experience had a transformative
potential that raised
consciousness and created the
conditions necessary for change.
Several of the artists worked
directly with the community.
Their intervention, whether with
Israelis or Palestinians, created
a performative space mirroring
the larger Liminal Spaces project
prior to exhibiting the final art
work in the gallery. Their art
work coalesced stories, unpacked
complex issues, and gave us a
new perspective. What Everybody
Knows, Ayreen Anastas and Rene
Gabri's project, was informed
by direct conversations with a
diverse group of people over a
twenty-day period in order to
gain insight into their daily lives.
Their art project underscores
the regularity in which profound
changes occur in the daily life of
Palestinians under occupation
so that it becomes humanly
impossible to learn first-hand
how the occupation is affecting
everyone's lives. These conditions
also inform the work of Sandi
Hilal and Alessandro Petti who
looked at how Palestinians
living in Jerusalem respond to
current practices of exclusion and
inclusion.
Israeli laws regarding residence
as well as boundaries are in
constant flux so that real-estate
prices may change overnight
depending on where the new
Separation Wall will create an
excluded or exclusive community.
Artists Sabine Horlitz and Oliver
Clemens explore this further in
their art piece How much did
you pay for this plot of land?
(Land Value in Ramallah and East
Jerusalem). They gathered reams
of information that examine how
the politics of ethnic cleansing
and the master plan for Jerusalem
affect the social architecture of
the excluded areas.
4
Spaces of Consciousness
The liminality of art museums,
theaters, and other sites of
aesthetic experience has long
been recognized by curators, art
historians, and others. Cultural
anthropologist Victor Turner
described liminality as a state
of consciousness "betwixt-andbetween the normal, day-today cultural and social states
and processes of getting and
spending."6 (The Arabic term for
liminality translates as "being at
the threshold of consciousness" –
ala atabat al shu'ur).7 Liminal
Spaces had several manifestations
that together contributed to its
transformative potential for the
audience, the artists, and the
community.
Art projects and artists-activists
invited the audience to step over
the 'threshold' and take time to
reflect. Ronen Eidelman's art
project created such a space on
a promenade and soccer park
where the Arab Jaffa district
of Manshiya once stood. In
The Ghost of Manshiya (2007),
Eidelman, an Israeli artist living
in Tel Aviv, used white chalk to
mark out the grid of streets and
houses of the Manshiya quarter
with the help of soccer field
marking equipment and simple
paint rollers. The artist engaged
pedestrians in conversations
on the vanishing Arab district,
outlined in ghostly white
with Arabic street names. The
pedestrians' comments contrast
sharply with the simplicity of the
project's execution.
Liminal Spaces opened several
liminal spaces in each of the
walks, talks or encounters. The
activists we met in Lydda and
Ramla spoke of the challenges
and threats of Israel's colonial
expansionist policies and the
erasure of their history and
heritage. It seemed as though we
51
25 0 C T 20 0 7
B I L 'I N
PHOTO: DOR GUEZ
53
were on borrowed time, and this
may be our last encounter before
economic and political forces
conspire to drive the residents
out to make room for high-rise
condominiums, settlements, or
high-end boutiques. On the tour
of Ramla and Lydda my 'memory
performance' in these liminal
spaces was personal. I admit that
I missed most of the statistics on
lost lands and homes. I did not
use my camera that day. I wanted
to absorb it all for my school
friend in London whose ancestral
home, the Khairy mansion, still
stands in Ramla; for the owner of
the San Jose falafel drive-in from
Ramla whose falafel surpasses the
one we had in his home town;
in the memory of my father
whose long walks in Palestine are
legendary.
Every Palestinian town we visited
sparked a memory 'chip' in my
reservoir of stories. As I was
born after the Nakba, the stories
I know of historic Palestine are
bits and pieces shared with me
over the years, or perhaps those I
read about in the autobiographies
edited by our fellow participant,
Palestinian sociologist Prof.
Salim Tamari who works
tirelessly to gather Palestinian
autobiographies and is a great
storyteller.
5
On the Brink of the Liminal
Random House dictionary defines
liminal as "pertaining to or
situated at the line (threshold),"
the latter is defined as a "doorsill,
entry, verge, brink, edge." Life
for most Palestinians is not
just fragmented but also inlimbo, always on the brink inbetween entry and exit. This
very description of the state of
being came to mind as I listened
to Buthayna Dabit's father in
Ramla. We met Mr. Dabit at
dusk; we were all standing around
him, surrounded by a mix of old
Palestinian homes and several
post-1948 buildings crowding the
small neighborhood (al-Hara). He
pointed to a remnant of this or
that house, the closed mosque,
the car park; he knew every stone
in al-Hara. He reminded me of
the protagonist in Emile Habiby's
novel The Secret Life of Saeed:
The Pessoptimist (al-Mutasha'il).
Mr. Dabit's reality was neither
part of nor separate from Israeli
life. His status is precarious; for
Palestinians nothing is certain in
Ramla. He was neither happy nor
sad; he was almost an optimist,
but not quite. His demeanor
said a great deal more than his
words. He was proud of Ramla,
of his daughter's activism. He
had a great deal to tell but hardly
enough time. In the end I was
grateful for the new fragments of
memories he graciously shared.
6
Conclusion
For me, Liminal Spaces was more
than just another curatorial
project, it offered me the
opportunity to share discoveries
with artists and to look forward
to their art work from within
these common experiences. In
their statement, Liminal Spaces
curators stress that the project
was not a dialogue or another
peace project, but rather a
cooperative art project that looks
for strategies for a socially and
politically engaged art. They
nurtured this project for over
two years to allow the artists to
work 'in situ' in order to create
alternative strategies to expose
the consequences of the colonial
project on the daily life of
Palestinians.
Liminal Spaces introduced new
ways in which an art institution
can commit to the understanding
55
of artistic practices. The artists
worked directly with the public;
they were both witnesses and
participants in a transformative
performance. The fact that the
art exhibition was presented
on another continent gave the
project a new dimension. It
allowed the artists and other
participants to focus on the
artistic strategies for change
and on reaching out to the
communities, rather than on the
curatorial production.
Liminal Spaces opened new
possibilities for art presentation
that allows viewers and artists
to see the work on equal terms
outside the institutional setting,
to show art for what it is and not
what we imagine it to be, and to
give new meaning to political art
and inclusion.
1 Jamal Zahalqa, "In the Absence of a City," in Senan
Abdelqader (ed.), Senan Abdelqader: Architecture of
Dependency, The Israeli Presentation for the 7th São
Paulo International Biennial of Architecture, Brazil (Tel
Aviv, 2007), p. X.
2 http://www.digitalartlab.org.il/jaffa/jaffa_web_detailed.
htm, accessed July 30, 2008.
3 Edward W. Said, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 38.
4 Minjalieh is the decorative stitch used to join together
separate sections of Palestinian traditional dress.
5 Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art
Museums (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), p .20.
6 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors:
Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
UP, 1974), pp. 13-15.
7 Munir Baa'lbaki, al-Mawrid: A Modern English-Arabic
Dictionary (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm li-al-Malayin, 1981).
Note
The condition of Palestinian daily life is so critical
and abysmal at this time that it almost seems unreal
and not humanly possible to survive. Therefore I never
cease to be amazed at the warm reception we received
in all the towns and cities we visited. I also thank the
organizers Eyal Danon, Galit Eilat, Reem Fadda, and
Philipp Misselwitz for their hard work and commitment
to change.
© S. Mikdadi
Ayreen An a
57
n astas & Rene Gabri
:1
The Left Needs Mediators
For Gilles Deleuze, a political distinction between right and left pertains
to movements. The right is about blocking, the left is about embracing
movements – two completely different methods of negotiation. Whereas
the state works to capture or channel movement and to partition space,
the left wishes to avoid capture, either inventing new channels or reinventing the meaning of existing ones.
The left must re-create the meaning of mediators – those who help us
express ourselves in relation to a problem, but would never express
themselves without us; to make visible what otherwise may remain
invisible. This begins with the awareness that one is always operating in
a group, even if one works alone. One works in a group since one works
in a series, a relay. The mediators that we form are always in a series. If
we’re not in a series, we’re lost.
The right does not face this problem since it has its mediators working
directly for it, in situ, on the field. The left needs freer mediators. A
mediator for a philosopher can be an artist or a scientist; for an artist, it
may be a geographer or an anthropologist. Mediators can even be objects.
Without them nothing happens. They are fundamental.
For our collection of videos from Palestine we chose the title "What
Everybody Knows" precisely in relation to that question. We experiment
with the notion of mediators and how one can be effective in a specific,
targeted way. In that sense, we may serve as mediators for our writerfriends, and our protagonists may form yet another set of mediators for
us: the geographer, the activist, the father of the family, the Bedouin,
the falafel store owner, and so on. One may purport to know all about
Palestine, to take the right side, and so on, but is that enough? No.
To explore all the possibilities of movement under a military rule which
restricts and constrains. To talk to people, and not assume that we know.
We need to create our truth on the ground, in lived experiences, not just
our own, but also the experiences of those who struggle beside us, with
59
us. This implies that the production or fidelity to this truth involves
working on this material. This type of work is a small fragment of what
needs to be done and is being done by other colleagues.
If the right is about opposing movement, it also knows well how to keep
us busy with the wrong arguments. This has been the history of recent
Palestine, bargaining and hard negotiation for well-known facts. We have
to go ahead and do the work that is truly needed, instead of lingering on
the wrong arguments.
:2
On Cultural Production and its Role
in Political Struggle
It might be helpful to begin by asserting that there is no exclusive
response to this question. The solutions may remain forever contingent
or provisional, given the variety of complex situations we are called
upon to consider and address in the world today. Clearly, remaining on
the sideline, detached and aloof, is not the position we are advocate. At
the same time, the role of culture and cultural production clearly has the
potential of being more than a mere instrument in the name of a broader
political program, a mere means toward a hoped for or desired end.
The forms of life historically engendered by artists over centuries of
struggle have certainly helped create many of the spaces of dissent which
we occupy and make use of today. And if these spaces remain freer
and less determinate than other spaces in our contemporary societies,
it is in no small part due to an attitude that would not simply relegate
our means to ends, but would see the means themselves as an essential
element of the coming community we struggle for. In this sense, it should
be clear that the languages we use or employ are not taken for granted,
but rather interrogated. Even if we believe that a certain militancy and
urgency are required on the part of cultural practitioners today, it is not
at the expense of simplifications, platitudes, or avoiding complexity; not
by abandoning poetry or forgetting that our battles need to be waged
concurrently – both on the more explicit terrain of politics, and on the
political terrain of language, images, and the other forms we use.
Having said this, we do perceive today the need to question practices
which retain a fidelity to one pole of the political while losing their
relation to the others. We were faced explicitly with this question in our
most recent work together in relation to Palestine. For instance, overfocus on analyzing an image as a filmmaker might seem appropriate
at times, as it relates to the politics of form and language, but at other
times may distract from the larger context of the political.
61
2 5 O CT 2 0 07
M O D I 'I N I L L I T /B I L 'I N
PHOTO: DOR GUEZ
63
25 O C T 20 0 7
B I L 'I N
PHOTO: DOR GUEZ
25 OC T 2 0 0 7
BI L 'I N
P H O T O : D O R G UE Z
65
How to untangle ourselves from a political narrative that is governed by
disinformation and confusion? There is a fine line between an analysis
that enters the nuances and complexities of a situation and one that
gets lost in them, finds dead ends, road blocks; stuck looking for a way
out, for an elegant solution, a nice transition, and losing sight of the
untenable situation with which Palestinians are confronted under Israeli
Occupation. For the majority of the Palestinians living on the wrong side
of the Wall, the wall is a wall, devastatingly fixed, violent, restricting
movement, cutting off relations with friends, with family members, and
oppressive. No theoretical maneuvers or wizardry should mitigate such a
reality or desensitize a public to it.
In such a context, one inevitably has to negotiate and make choices which
profoundly affect the value a work can have to a political struggle. In
the case of this most recent work in Palestine, we have attempted to err
on the side of clarity on the more explicit political terrain even if this
sometimes meant working against a style of experimental film practice
which may have refused to provide "information" in the ordinary sense,
or denied the viewer a sense of gaining a perspective on a situation. This
tactic has a lot to do with where we believe the situation is today.
Although there is probably no "situation" or area in the world today
which has been the "beneficiary" of such consistent media coverage in
the last thirty years, anyone with even the remotest notion as to what is
unfolding there can tell you that most people have little clue as to what is
really going on; or if they have an idea, it is a confused one.
One should note here, that this confusion and disorientation (by way
of misinformation, disinformation, partial information, and overinformation) is a consistent tactic of not only the Israeli military, but also
our contemporary media.
As a result, even someone committed to a politicized relation to images
would have to re-orient to what in fact an experimental or politicized
relation to images could be or become in such a context.
In this case, to work politically with images we would have to slow
things down to a steady pace, a rhythm parallel to a machine that
has been slowly devouring resistance for the last forty years, slowly,
steadily – to dilate time, allow individuals to speak at their own
speed, give the viewer time to see the physical manifestations of these
techniques of dispossession practiced by the state.
Our goal was not to simplify the analysis of the situation. The
mechanisms employed are diverse and yes – sometimes lawless,
sometimes using the law; sometimes through planning, sometimes
through the lack thereof. It was necessary to allow for a visual and
analytical entry into the political and lived-in landscape in all its
complexity. Something that can resemble a documentary or journalism,
but in moving towards them, hacking away at them, altering them,
demanding more from them.
It is within this process, which is not devoid of ambivalence and
scrutiny, that we say that there is no single response and each solution is
provisional.
67
:3
On the Necessity to Go to Palestine
C o n t i n e n t a l d r i f t c a r r i e s y o u f a r t h e r a w a y e a c h d a y.
- Guy Debord, Hurlements en faveur de Sade (1952)
When Continental Drift was initiated, we felt that there was a necessity
to appraise and analyze exactly where we were. "We" here means those
of us who had followed with interest and/or been involved with various
social/political movements throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. As a
part of that reappraisal and in light of what has taken place in the first
eight years of this century, we want to offer the following assessment.
It is evident that we have upon us a multiplication of various mechanisms
of control and surveillance which are being aggressively redistributed in
all areas of society. More importantly, a great deal is being invested in
entrenching and expanding what appears to be an unending and selfperpetuating war against the specter of terrorism, waged, of course, in
the name of an even more elusive "security."
Many questions remain about how these regimes of security-oriented
control and surveillance integrate with the smooth space posited
by neoliberal economic policies. Or how the emerging bodies of
regional governance, alliances, and economic powers will attempt to
instrumentalize the discourse on security in the foreseeable future of
further attacks (staged or perpetrated).
A more important and immediate question remains for us in our
discussions: How should this growing multitude of non-aligned and
informal political actors around the globe respond to these developments?
If we lack perspective as to the long term ramifications and "success" of
the military-security enterprise, one need not look too far into history.
"Today Israel is conducting an experiment. It has invented a model of
repression that, once adapted, will profit other countries." Although the
statement is absolutely valid today, Gilles Deleuze wrote these lines
nearly thirty years ago in his piece entitled "Spoilers of Peace" published
in Le Monde on April 7, 1978.
We can safely say that the Israeli experiment has multiplied, expanded,
and has begun to reap the profits Deleuze predicted. Of course, the much
sought after peace and security, in whose name the worst injustices are
perpetrated, is nowhere in sight. But strategically and militarily, Israel
controls every resource it needs to secure its long term survival in the
region, and for this reason, it increasingly serves as a model for the
current American-British-? experiment.
We believe that Israel, with its occupation of Palestine, serves as a
kind of nodal point in what appears to be this century’s Cold War. Not
only are its mechanisms and discourses of security, surveillance, and
warfare actively being exported globally, but its continued crimes against
Palestinians on a daily basis also agitate and prevent any possibility for
a plausible peace in the region.
Following this logic, we propose that without clear and explicit
opposition to Israeli policies in Occupied Palestine, there is no short-term
hope for ending the stranglehold on our collective futures by the most
regressive and conservative elements in our contemporary societies.
Of course, Palestine is not the only issue in need of our attention, and
clearly, even a just settlement in Palestine does not guarantee an end to
the current wars. Moreover, a well articulated position against the Israeli
occupation may not address or change the numerous structural dynamics
that have allowed this emergence of the security state to take hold. By
these "structural dynamics" we allude to Giorgio Agamben’s implicit
critique of liberal democracy and his introduction of the camp as the
paradigm of modern governance. We also mention the various forms of
racism that have plagued and continue to plague the internal politics of
so many countries (and the Left in general) in the overdeveloped world
(as evidenced by the revolts in the Parisian suburbs, the [ir]response to
Katrina, and LA uprisings, …) and beyond.
69
One can only hope that it may be through Palestine, that we can continue
a process of education, which may overcome or at least contribute to
addressing both these aforementioned structural dimensions and others.
Our colleagues in the European Left, particularly those who live in
countries which have some history associated with the Holocaust or the
collaboration with the Nazis, have been handed a gag order. To speak
against what Israel is doing today, one could see, is intrinsically related
to this history. But not in the way the Zionists would have us believe.
Yet, equating a criticism of Zionism or Israel with anti-Semitism has
unfortunately been a very successful campaign. And this campaign of
silence has clearly worked in the countries which do not even share this
history of guilt or "culpability."
But it is precisely by speaking out today, against Israeli policies of
segregation, enclosure, siege, apartheid, and state terror that one can
connect responsibly to this history – not by remaining silent. It asserts
"never again, we will not be silent and stand by while such horrors
take place in the name of the security of a people." Unfortunately,
people’s knowledge of the situation is so obscure or the pressure against
speaking out so taboo, that the strategy of avoidance or silence has
been too readily practiced – especially judging by how many respected
intellectuals, journalists, and activists assume this position today.
We support our colleagues who protest against the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan as wars of greed and profit. We support our colleagues
who protest against the G8 and attack the economic mechanisms which
support the wholesale dispossession taking place around the world.
We support the no-border coalitions and networks, which address the
question of racism and the implicit hypocrisy of the neoliberal rhetoric of
a borderless world.
In fact, we believe that it is not a great stretch to connect this structural
racism to the very dynamics that allowed something like the Holocaust
to take place. For example, the same logic (relegating some individuals a
right to bare life, while accepting that only others may enjoy the fruits of
a political life) which was used by the Gestapo to strip the Jews of their
citizenship (thus their political rights) before sending them to the camps,
lets the American government allow the Red Cross to monitor the physical
health of detainees in Guantánamo, while depriving them of the basic
rights which would be bestowed upon any prisoner of war or imprisoned
citizen of another country.
Today, in Palestine, a similar logic is unfolding. Israel continues to
practice a policy of racial engineering among its own citizens, while at
the same time the state actively attempts to foreclose any possibility
of a normal existence or emergent society for Palestinians living in the
Occupied Territories. And the “international community” seems to accept
that an entire people might have the right to bare life, but not necessarily
a political existence.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice in the Hague (the same
one that is given authority to try war criminals like Miloševic) explicitly
calls on the same “international community” and Israel to bring down
the illegal wall separating Palestinians from Palestinians, and on the
latter – to stop confiscating their lands. What exists of any recent vibrant
contemporary social movement remains largely silent. Why is there no
outrage and immediate outcry?
If this mandate does not come from the major powers, it may be
understandable given their longstanding complicity. If this mandate
does not come from those who receive their news from mainstream
media machines, one can also understand. But how could those who
purport to construct their own relationship to the world through an
active engagement with it, through a pursuit of other sources of news,
information, communication, ideas, how could this most promising of all
"communities" remain silent?
As long as the silence remains, as long as we equivocate and lay
blame on "both sides," we remain susceptible to this logic. All the
71
governing elite need is additional "acts of terror" to embolden them to
further attacks against more countries, and more limitations against
personal freedoms and civil liberties. No security is won by targeted
assassinations, or punishing civilians in symbolic retribution, as long as
the conditions that produce the resentment or disagreement persist.
It should also be noted that Palestine has been used by many regimes in
the Arab world to maintain the status quo in their countries, as in Syria
("we have a bigger enemy"). And Lebanon, the unfortunate neighbor of
Israel, will remain an open football field for all the military forces in the
area, as long as Israel does not change fundamentally.
What visible or viable movement in the world today offers an
infrastructure of political, economic, and moral support for ending this
injustice for Palestinians? Are we to expect the Bushes or Blairs of the
world to engender real change there, when within their own countries (US
and UK) these individuals lack such a mandate?
Of course, if the path of peace comes through a process that is not from
international solidarity – not from a social movement that resembles
the global solidarity that helped the ANC end Apartheid – we relegate
ourselves to a "solution" or "road map" that will at best delay and defer
a just resolution or produce catastrophic and unworkable solutions as
were the result of the Oslo Accords.
For these reasons, we believe that any reconsideration of these social
movements for the purposes of investing them with new force and a
capacity to respond to contemporary challenges will need to take this
position into account.
THE END, for now
Soldiers, S
73
, Soldiers, Soldiers...
// Roni Lahav & Artur Zmijewski in
What does it matter who you are?
Where do you come from? How long have you been
working at B’Tselem?1
Diala Shamas: I was born in Jerusalem and grew
up in Beit Hanina, south of Ramallah and east of
Jerusalem. My father is an American of Lebanese
origin and my mother is a Palestinian from Beit
Jala. I studied in the US, and have been working
at B’Tselem for over a year now.
You have moved here from East Jerusalem. Can you
tell us about the difference between the city’s two
parts – West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem?
Jerusalem is a divided city. The eastern part was
annexed by Israel following the Six-Day War of
1967. Some 215,000 Palestinians still live here,
with a so-called "Jerusalem resident" status. It
is like living in a state of limbo, where we don’t
have full rights; we have the right to live here, but
we are not Israeli citizens. We cannot vote. We
can go to the West Bank, which Israelis cannot.
My ID looks like the Israeli one, but it states my
ethnicity as "Arab." They no longer issue these,
because it is discrimination and racism. In the
new ID the information is still contained, but in
digital form. Who I am can be deduced anyway
from my permanent residence address. Mine is
Beit Hanina where my parents live, which is in
East Jerusalem.
In Israel it is a reason for discrimination. The
system categorizes me at every step. Soldiers,
officials, etc. have to know who I am to interact
properly. Israelis always try to learn my ethnicity.
I usually try to avoid answering, speak Hebrew.
When they ask me where I am from, I don’t say
Beit Hanina, I say Jerusalem. Arabs are the object
of some very strong stereotypes, expectations,
which are simply colonial in nature. I don’t look
like a typical Palestinian. In Ramallah or East
Jerusalem I don’t stand out, but in Hebron, for
instance, everyone wonders who I am. I’m not
conservative, I don’t wear the hijab, I don’t cover
my hair. I speak openly with men. It is like trying
to tell whether someone is Polish or German by
the way he looks and behaves.
It is interesting, because whenever I am here I always
have these conversations about looks; about whether
someone looks like a Jew, an Arab, a Russian, a Pole,
an Israeli… I know this from Poland, the so-called
"good looks" and "bad looks," which once determined
whether you could survive or not. Here everyone has a
kind of inner detector, an ethnicity scanner, discerning
between people of different origins.
In Jerusalem we get really good at this, because
there are so many of them on both sides. You
have to look closely and adapt yourself all the
time. There are, for instance, illegal Palestinian
workers from the West Bank. They very much
want to look like Israelis, choosing the right
haircuts, jeans, shoes…
C
n
75
Conversation with Diala Shamas
Tell us more about yourself. How old are you?
I am 23. When they built the Wall, those who
were left behind it tried to remain connected
to their community and started moving. These
weren’t wealthy people, so their houses looked
like slums, overcrowded, without privacy; people
become noisy and rude, very conservative. So I
moved to West Jerusalem. I live in an old Arab
house, right on the Green Line.2 My grandparents
lived somewhere in this neighborhood until the
1948 war.
Let’s talk about B’Tselem. When did you start working
for them?
I started as a volunteer a year and half ago. It
was then that I met Israelis who weren’t soldiers
or settlers for the first time in my life. The
Shooting Back project, which I now coordinate,
was just being launched. We give video cameras
to Palestinians living in dangerous places, near
Israeli settlements or military bases. This is
where acts of violence committed by soldiers or
settlers are most often perpetrated. The guiding
idea is to give them protection and enable them
to gather evidence. A video recording can be used
as evidence or a testimony.3 Three years ago
we presented the first camera to the Abu Ayash
family members from Hebron. They filmed the
incident where an Israeli settler woman screams
and shakes her fist at a Palestinian woman. She
calls her sharmuta, a whore,4 and is extremely
aggressive. Today we have eighty cameras out
there.
How many Palestinians work at B’Tselem?
All field activists are Palestinian. But B’Tselem is
an Israeli, Jewish organization. This is important,
because B’Tselem intends its information for
Jews. It is important that the Israelis criticize
themselves. For this reason, other Israelis can
hardly ignore it.
What exactly do you do at B’Tselem?
I coordinate Shooting Back. I know who has a
camera. Every week I get in touch with these
people to know what has happened in their area.
I visit them. I know Arabic and I can cross the
border between Jerusalem and the West Bank.
If an incident had taken place, I have to know
whether it was filmed. If, for instance, the settlers
destroy olive trees, it is good if we have a tape to
prove that. I make sure we are in constant touch
with the media and the police. I work a bit like a
psychologist and a bit like an ethnographer. I am
the only Palestinian at the B’Tselem office.
Do any other women work for B’Tselem in the field?
One in Nablus and one in Bethlehem. It is difficult
for women to work in the field.
Why?
Women are not treated seriously here. The people
submitting the recordings to B’Tselem are usually
men. This doesn't mean that women do not suffer
from the occupation. It is simply that women are
in the background here, hidden from view. When
I walk into a home in South Hebron and say, “I’d
like to hand this camera over to someone here," I
know it will most likely be the man, the father. Of
course, I try to change this, I do everything to get
through to women too, but the status quo makes
it difficult. Still, more and more women have been
involved in Shooting Back.
Do these people accept you? In conservative religious
communities women are almost hidden from view,
Why did they treat you like this?
You have to understand that in that place men
simply don’t talk to women with whom they are
not related. Women there cover their faces and
never wear trousers like I do. Suddenly I turn up
and talk to them. They don’t get such experiences
there.
while you don’t cover your head and talk to men.
You’ve been to South Hebron, which is most
conservative and religious. Girls approach me
and say, "Are you sure you’re an Arab? How is it
possible that your parents let you come here with
these boys?" There is a family in South Hebron.
We met officially to hand them the camera. I was
the only woman in the tent. The boys looked at me
and laughed. They couldn't believe I was an Arab.
They spoke in Arabic about me. I never felt so bad
in my life. I never went back there; I broke contact
with them. I have to be assertive. It was tough in
the beginning, but now I know how to behave so
that they listen to me and agree to participate in
the project.
Exactly; your behavior, your work style, are in stark
contrast to the culture of conservative Arab villages.
That’s right, but the response is usually positive.
When I meet women there, it usually gives me a
lot of pleasure. They are so curious about who I
am and what I do. They tell me what they would
like to study, what they would like to do in life. I
am the one who can help them somehow, because
my male colleagues have no access to these
women, they can't even introduce themselves. To
satisfy their curiosity, to talk to me, these women
have to change the way they usually behave. None
of us knows where to draw the new line in this
situation.
77
The city of Hebron is very much controlled by the
Israeli army, protecting the 600 Jewish settlers living
there. The life of 160,000 Palestinians is disrupted
because of a couple of Jewish settlements in the city
center. The downtown, where a large open-air market
You are something of a stranger to them, a visitor from
used to be, is deserted these days.5
a distant, unreal world.
It is funny; I’m a foreign citizen, but I also have
Sometimes I really feel like an alien. But
their curiosity about me, my behavior…. their
encounter with me opens their eyes. I really feel
people here are changing because of their contact
with me and people like me.
problems with your border police. We used to joke
Probably not only women. Those men who listen to
that Ben Gurion Airport should be called Ben Gurion
Checkpoint.
Yes, they are very suspicious there now of every
foreigner because of the activity of organizations
such as Anarchists Against the Wall,6 which is
supported by overseas volunteers.
what you have to say, they may not shake hands with
you, but they will do the mental work necessary to
What is Israel for you? An enemy, an occupier?
process your suggestions or instructions. Do you call
Because the Israelis at B’Tselem support the
your work at B’Tselem political activism?
Palestinians...
Of course it is political activism. I couldn't
involve myself in something that I did not regard
as important. This work has the potential to
change things. I can also travel, meet people, visit
places in Palestine that I’d never have visited
otherwise. It is a paradox that due to my work for
an Israeli organization I started travelling around
my own country. My ambiguous ID, the fact that
I am not an Israeli citizen despite being resident
here, enables me to travel to the West Bank to
Zone A, which is Palestinian-controlled. It is
chiefly the cities – Hebron, Ramallah, Jenin. If an
Israeli tries to get there, he has trouble with the
Israeli police.
Until only recently I thought of Israel as an
enemy. It is easy to adopt the position of hatred.
After all, I am a demographic threat, so my
existence is constantly negated, my identity is
negated. I am refused the right to my history.
But I am able to see from a different perspective.
This ability makes me a partner for the Israelis.
B’Tselem is what I regard as the best in Israeli
society. It is a manifestation of their selfcriticism; they know the political situation can
be different. B’Tselem’s activities have caused
many Israeli Jews to start criticizing their own
state. Still, we differ, because I look at it from a
Palestinian perspective.
Can you do it? Israel has crossed every border and
violated almost every democratic principle there is.
The state builds walls on its borders, gives its citizens
a "license to kill," places checkpoints and blockades
on the roads, builds settlements on someone else’s
You work with Shooting Back. Do you think the project
territory. People are talking about apartheid.
can make a change? Do you believe in it?
What do we do in such a situation? In a situation
that is obviously horrible? Bring shame upon
oneself by entering into a relationship with such
a state?
We ask people to film settlers throwing stones
at them so that they can make an official,
evidence-supported complaint. A complaint
made by a Palestinian means nothing. We know
perfectly well that the testimonies of even ten
thousand Palestinians mean nothing, but we
still hope that this or that film will eventually
change the situation. This project is a cynical
acknowledgment of the Israeli legal system,
despite its absurdity. One thing I like about this
project is that it sustains a much needed spirit
of resistance. The Palestinian communities
experiencing occupation are filled with a sense
of hopelessness and passivity. Giving them the
video cameras, asking them to film things gives
them a sense of being in control and a sense of
self-confidence. It turns out the first thing they do
when the settlers appear is turn on the cameras.
This is an immense achievement. But how many
more cameras can we give them? Several hundred?
Will this turn into a social movement? I am aware
that we can only go so far with this strategy. I
want to study law to be able to act in a different
way.
Do you want to become a politician?
No, politics here is a very dirty game – on both
sides, the Israeli as well as the Palestinian. But
I also know that everything is political here. I
would like to write a new Israeli constitution. I
am serious.
Have you ever thought about living elsewhere?
I couldn’t. I am connected to this place. I tried
to fight it, went to Rwanda, thinking the country
is in an even worse situation than mine. But
I couldn’t pull myself together there, find the
passion in myself. It's nationalism. I feel that
I belong to the place where I grew up, whose
language I know, I understand these people, feel
the same as they do. I couldn’t be happy ignoring
this.
What is Palestine’s future? Did anyone envisage the
Wall ten years ago?
No one expected something like that. I think the
Israelis simply wanted to get rid of a problem,
wanted to place us behind the wall and thus give
us a state. If they only left us alone, let us live!
But the Palestinians need something real, not just
the chaos of small villages or towns intersected
by the roads leading to Israeli settlements. This
chaos is tying to call itself Palestine. What
I would see as a long-term solution is a kind
of multinational confederation. The nation
state is passé today. The idea now is to create
communities not based on ethnic origin. The
Israelis must understand that they cannot go on
forever using power to sustain their way of life.
79
We visited a settler family. They are religious people,
observe shabbat. They live in the Shilo settlement,
near Ariel. We talked to them and they told us that
Palestine didn’t exist, the Green Line was a joke, and
the West Bank was part of Greater Israel.7 These
people accept no political change. This is how they
speak about Arabs: "People in Arab villages live like
pigs; when they want water, they dig a hole in the
The settler population keeps growing. Apartments in
ground. We build roads and power lines and sewage
the settlements are cheap, rent is low.
systems for them." How do you feel knowing that such
Yes. And children are born there are then raised in
a situation where violence against the other side
is accepted. It is precisely these kids from Hebron
who throw stones at their Arab peers. They have a
license for violence. They are actually encouraged
by their parents to use violence. I don’t know how
to undo this. My parents’ values are still deeply
rooted in me. The same applies to those kids.
a language exists?
It sounds like what the Europeans said about the
Africans in the mid-19th century; pure colonial
language. Well, I don’t want to entreat these
people to acknowledge that I am a human being.
Many settlers employ Palestinian workers, trust
them. They let them into their homes. Then they
say "They live like pigs."
What should be done?
Do you think the Israeli majority accepts this
situation, this kind of language, and the West Bank
colonization policy?
I think it does. There is some sense of shame
in that, but it is the biblical Israel after all. The
settlers play on this sentiment all the time. They
say Hebron is the city of their fathers and greatgrandfathers, so how can they desert it?8 They
use this trick to show that every Jew has the duty
to protect, finance, and support them. If Israelis
were really against the settlements, the civic
movement against them would have been more
significant. Yet the settlements are commonly
accepted. People turn a blind eye to what the
settlers do.
A mass evacuation of the settlements. The
government mustn’t keep repeating that the right
time has not come yet. The illegal settlements are
being built on land belonging to the Palestinians.
The settlements are a means of controlling and
stealing Palestinian territory. The government
must take them away. It won’t cause a civil war
in Israel.
What do you feel when foreign people come here and
try to understand the situation, when they present
their views?
They usually tell us about nonviolent resistance.
But this is what every Palestinian does every day.
What else can you ask people to do?
What do you think about suicide attacks in Israel?
It occurred to me once or twice that I could do
it. I also had moments when I thought, "I know
why so many have decided to do it." Many people
I know have joined groups organizing armed
attacks. I understand them completely. I don’t
support their choice, but I understand it: men your
age, humiliated, with a sense of hopelessness,
who know nothing other than occupation. They
cannot work, cannot earn money, and cannot leave
the country. Whenever they go outside, they get
shouted at by someone holding a gun. They saw
their fathers and grandfathers being humiliated.
This humiliation is something that most
Palestinians identify with. It is a sense of total
failure, humiliation on a daily basis. Passing the
checkpoint every day, you beg the soldiers to let
you cross. There is no point in arguing with them,
presenting logical arguments or appealing to their
sense of decency. They look at us as if we were
animals. A couple of weeks ago in Ramallah I left
a party at two in the morning, I was with a group
of friends. We had been drinking and having a lot
of fun. We were going to a friend to continue the
drinking, but around the corner stood an army
jeep with its lights turned off and someone was
shouting at us through the loudspeaker, "Get out!
Hands over your head! On the ground! Show your
IDs!". You have fun, people feel great, and then a
moment later some guy you don’t even see gives
you orders. It’s inhuman. And they know that.
Israeli society is militaristic, insensitive. It is a
systematic policy of humiliating and dividing the
Palestinians.
Let’s return to Shooting Back. One of the project’s aims
is to do something about the constant threat under
which Palestinians live.
Yes. Many activists confirm that the cameras
protect them. The settlers withdraw when they see
a camera. So it helps, if only on a small scale.
And, perhaps involuntarily, we are causing the
occupation to become a bit more humanitarian,
tenable. The settlers still live there, only they are
less brutal. The settlers know that their media
image is bad. Especially after the Sharmuta clip
with the famous abuse-hurling settler woman. But
they don’t have a sense that what they do is bad.
Still, they have to be careful. So now the stones
are being thrown by their children. Why? Because
criminal law doesn’t apply to children under 13.
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85
Are you a feminist?
Men pay dearly for the occupation, I mean the
Palestinians, but it seems to me women pay doubly so.
Yes. It’s a direct effect of the occupation, tough
economic conditions, domestic violence; all that
accumulates, women suffer. It is the effect of
massive male acting out. Frustrated in public,
men vent their frustrations on their wives and
daughters. People have a sense that their culture
and identity are under threat, so they want to
protect them. That breeds conservatism. More
women wear the hijab today than a couple of
years ago. In some towns you won’t see a woman
unveiled. People no longer trust each other, the
social fabric is disintegrating; the mosque is
gaining power. All this is affecting women’s lives
and liberties. There has been a return to the
traditional social hierarchy, which marginalizes
women, because this is Islam. Women are not
perceived as actors on the political scene. In
Jerusalem, you cannot raise a flag on the street,
make a speech, establish an organization or
join an existing one – all that carries a prison
sentence. It is a military regime. You can only
gather in the mosque, and if you have no influence
over the political sphere, you strive to have
influence over people’s private lives. Traditionally,
the Palestinians have never been a conservative
society. We were probably the best educated and
most diverse society in the Arab world. Today we
are heading towards religious orthodoxy.
Definitely so. Palestinian liberation means
women’s liberation. Women remain a vital part
of the Palestinian liberation movement. Many
men are in prison. This forces women to work
and earn money to provide for their families.
Many women’s groups and committees are
active. I believe that if the Palestinian state is
created, women’s rights will be guaranteed in
its constitution. Equal treatment is the most
important thing. That’s what I expect from men.
I expect to be looked on and spoken to like an
ordinary human being. Being a feminist means
treating other women with respect, not letting
the stereotypes get in your way. Here it means
choosing the shortest way to the generallyneglected woman in the room.
Tell me about the feminist movement in Palestine.
We have secular feminists and a women’s
religious movement. The latter accepts Islamic
law, which is generally unfair towards women.
All political parties have women’s committees
intended to make women more socially active.
The feminist movement is not as strong today
as during the First Intifada, but we have many
women who write, many women activists,
professors, local community facilitators. Among
the religious parties, Hamas9 has a women’s
league. Women work for Hamas in the interest
of women. Islamic feminists respect Koranic law.
This is a noteworthy position, different from
mine. I studied abroad and I am perceived as
an imported, Western feminist. I have a lot of
respect for women who decide to become feminists
within their language, accepting the Koran.
Unfortunately, organizations such as Hamas or
Islamic Jihad,10 which have women’s committees,
in fact ignore women’s rights. I fear the day
Hamas takes over and we become an Islamic
state. This would mean women becoming inferior
to men. Hamas is very strong today, but in a
situation as difficult as this people don’t think
about the consequences of their eventual rise to
power.
What are the stereotypes about Arab women and Arabs
in general?
The stereotype of the Arab? We are brutal, poor,
uneducated, extremely religious, primitive, and
uncivilized. We are bad, emotional, chaotic,
unruly. We are terrorists and we don’t know about
democracy. Arab women are submissive, meek,
abused, and very conservative; they don’t talk to
men and don’t date them.
And what is the stereotype of the Jew?
Jews are aggressive, impolite, noisy. Above all,
they are all soldiers, soldiers, soldiers. This is
what the Israeli is for the Palestinian.
What now?
Sometimes we win small victories. But even a
victory can paradoxically have a harmful effect.
If we win a case in court, the press writes about
it and people in the US sigh with relief, "See,
the Israeli Supreme Court revoked a racist
government ordinance. So the Israeli democracy is
alive!" By the way, George W. Bush arrives here
in two days.
Yes, with his hand stretched towards the Palestinians.
As he said, "We will strive to achieve peace, but we
cannot accept the existence of a terrorist state on
Israel’s borders." Did he mean Iran or Palestine?
The dynamics of power in the US is completely
against the Palestinians.
When do you plan to change your operating method?
After completing my studies I may join Adalla.
It is a civil rights organization in Israel created
by Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. They
recently issued a statement: "Israel cannot define
itself as a Jewish state, because in such a context
it is impossible to guarantee equal rights for all
its citizens."
Jerusalem, January 2008
1 B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories, see http://www.
btselem.org/english
2 The Green Line, Israel’s border prior to the 1967
Six-Day War. During the war, Israel "seized territories
inhabited by Palestinians. Jewish troops seized,
inter alia, previously Jordan-controlled areas in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the previously
Egypt-administered Gaza Strip"; Izrael i Autonomia
Palestynska: Wybrane aspekty polityczne i prawne
(Wrocław, 2007), p. 147.
3 The archive of video recordings made by Palestinians
for B’Tselem now contains over 2,000 tapes. The footage
is transferred to DVDs and made available free of charge
to the media, members of the press, and filmmakers.
4 Sharmuta (whore in Arabic), the clip is available at:
http://youtube.com/watch?v=KUXSFsJV084&feature=
related
5 In Hebron, where the tombs of the Hebrew
patriarchs, including Abraham, are located, the
situation in very tense. In 1994, Jewish settler Baruch
Goldstein opened fire at Palestinian worshippers
praying in a Hebron mosque, killing many. Today the
city is divided, and its center, in the vicinity of the
Jewish settlement, is almost entirely closed to traffic.
Palestinians are not allowed to ride their cars there; they
must move alongside marked-off walking paths, with
Israeli checkpoints positioned every 100 meters. There
is a lot of anti-Palestinian violence in Hebron. When
Israeli settler children throw stones at Palestinian kids
leaving school, the soldiers avoid intervening because
their job is to protect the Israelis, not the Palestinians.
Trips to Hebron to experience the situation in person
are organized by Children of Abraham, an organization
of orthodox Jews opposed to the West Bank occupation,
and Breaking the Silence, which encourages former
Israeli soldiers to give testimonies about the atrocities
of the occupation.
87
6 Anarchists against the Wall, an Israeli organization
founded in 2003 in response to the plans for building
a wall separating the West Bank and Gaza Strip from
the territory of Israel. See http://awalls.org/about_aatw;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchists_Against_the_
Wall. The wall was not really intended to protect Israel
against Palestinian attacks, as much as it was another
act of revenge against them – a punishment for the
Second Intifada, in keeping with the logic of collective
responsibility. AATW remains active, organizing protests
on access roads to Israeli settlements in the West Bank,
e.g. Road 443, called the "Apartheid Road," and in
Palestinian territory, in places where the "protective
barrier" is being built. Demonstrations are organized
every Friday in Bil’in, Ni’ilin, Um Salmuna (exit from
the Tel Aviv bus station, gathering point near the 4/5
taxi stand). Every month a cycling "critical mass against
occupation" is also organized, in which AATW members
participate.
7 Biblical Israel, the Land of Israel, Eretz-Yisrael,
the land given to the Jews by God. The idea of EretzYisrael has its roots in the Bible (see en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Land_of_Israel). According to its logic, the West
Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights are not other
countries’ territories, but are Jewish property, and
their annexation means continuing the Jews’ covenant
with God. Israeli state structures are deeply imbued
with religious ideology, which affects its political and
military decisions (Uri Huppert, for instance, discusses
this in his book Izrael w cieniu fundamentalizmów
[Poland: Stefan Bratowski, 2007]). The religion-rooted
view about the need for a rebuilt Greater Israel has an
ally in the Israeli military doctrine, whose objective is to
maintain a buffer zone between Israel and its neighbors,
especially Syria and Jordan. The West Bank is exactly
this buffer zone. An exception to this logic, and at the
same time its confirmation, is the Sinai Peninsula,
returned by Israel to Egypt. The 500-km expanse of
desert is a sufficient buffer zone, irrespective of its
owner. This was confirmed by the 1973 (Yom Kippur)
War, when the Israeli Air Force had enough time to
destroy Egyptian tanks negotiating the desert.
8 The tombs of patriarchs important to Jews and
Muslims, including Abraham, are located in Hebron.
The Jews are the descendants of Abraham's son Isaac,
and the Arabs are descendents of Abraham's son
Ismail (Ishmael). This is why, according to rabbinic
interpretation, Judaism is inherited from one’s mother.
Isaac’s mother was Sarah, and Ismail’s mother was her
maid, Hagar. The Arabs’ problems today have their roots
in biblical times. It was precisely his son Ismail that
Abraham supposedly sacrificed on Mount Moriah.
9 Hamas, Islamic resistance movement, an
"organization combining Palestinian nationalism
with an ideology of radical Islam, promotes the model
of a religious Islamic state in the whole territory of
historical Palestine. It does not recognize the State
of Israel, opposes the peace process and the Oslo
agreement" (Izrael i autonomia…, op. cit., p. 280). It s
"recognized as a terrorist organization by the majority
of Western countries, including the EU and the USA"
(http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas).
10 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an organization "whose
main goal is to free Palestine and subsequently promote
Islamic values in Palestinian society. Firmly opposed to
the peace process, bent on armed struggle for Palestine’s
liberation" (Izrael i autonomia…, op. cit., p. 280).
Shot By B
y Both Sides
89
// Francis McKee
* A presentation given during the
first Liminal Spaces conference,
Qalandiya, 11.03.2006
I'm really out of my depth coming here, totally, and even more
so, what with the last few days... I come from Northern Ireland,
so it'll be based on personal stuff more than anything else.
Also, I come from a liminal zone, if there is such a thing. I come
from an unapproved road which doesn’t exist North or South;
it is cut off from both sides, a kind of free space, and the army
can't actually go into it. In my area the army can't actually
travel on the ground. It's not possible because they'll get killed
immediately, so they can only fly. But it's also the area where
they dump all the dead bodies. It's very savage, so they began
dumping corpses there, but things got more and more savage in
the killings. They would mine the bodies afterwards, booby trap
them, do everything possible to kill more people. It's a strange
area. It's all common knowledge, that's what I thought before I
came. I never thought about what I would show; I wasn’t sure.
Then fortunately this very old Scottish man died during the
week, and I figured, well I can show you something from him,
because he's quite nice, but totally irrelevant. So first I'm going
to show you something totally irrelevant.
video segment:
Ivor Cutler singing Shoplifters
That was an illegal download from the web. It seemed to be
totally irrelevant, and therefore relevant, because having looked
at it, I thought I might talk about Northern Ireland and what
happened with visual arts in Northern Ireland during the
troubles, but I couldn’t find very much, and what I found was
less material and more imaginative, more immaterial really. The
most obvious thing I could find in terms of what happened in
the visual arts was the murals and the mural history in Northern
Ireland, and it began with a mural in Derry. London Derry is
what the Protestants call it; the Catholics call it Derry. The point
91
that might interest you in terms of the history of Northern
Ireland, the troubles developed there because of the
Protestants who live in Northern Ireland. The Protestants were
settled by the English. I don’t want to depress Palestinians, but
the Protestants were brought 400 years ago, and they are still
1
there. They were settled there because the Anglican English
had come to settle, but then they would marry Irish people and
within a generation they were gone, they just vanished. So the
Protestants were brought in, only ultra-orthodox,
fundamentalist Protestants. They didn't mix with anybody, they
just kept to themselves. They held onto the territory and spoke
to nobody else. For 400 years they have practiced this; their
motto today is "No Surrender," and they mean it. They do it,
and they haven’t surrendered. People keep shooting at them
and they keep on going. Totally true. Sad but true. There was a
2
mural project and this is the mural... So this is the first mural,
1969, the army came in, the Catholics welcomed them, a few
months later they'd shot enough Catholics for people to stop
welcoming them. They realized things weren’t going well, so
they set up a free zone in Derry, then occupied by the IRA, and
this mural went up, fig 1 and the mural had a huge impact
because of the sheer shock it elicited, saying you're entering
free Derry. The fact that it could be free and that the army
couldn’t enter just created this area that lasted for about a year
before the army bulldozed its way in and seized control. The
3
sheer shock of its being free and unassailable, for Catholics
was a major shock, and the impact never completely
disappeared. I think it was the beginning of the realization that
something could happen. This image – ‘sniper cross’ fig 2 – is
very famous, and it's been there years and no one can remove
it because everyone's afraid to do so. It's true. It's not that
there's a sniper near by, it's just that they say you'll die if you
remove it, so it remains. As the troubles progressed they got
more excited about this, and they had more to celebrate. I
remember seeing the helicopter because it went right across
4
the field. There was this huge gouge across the field, and then
a burnt out helicopter and people were so excited, so this was a
kind of celebration in a funny way. fig 3 But it also was a kind of
a newspaper for people, this one's from Mad Dog Adair and one
of his friends, somebody White, and it was a good message to
them. fig 4 The follow through was very quick, and Mad Dog
Adair is no longer dogging us, he is now dead. He was a very
vicious Protestant paramilitary, and this was a quick sign and
then he was assassinated. The Protestants immediately got in
on this, they were quite jealous I think, and so they started their
own tradition, but their tradition was fascinating because it was
a Protestant tradition, and they are anti-iconic, really. If there
was a Taliban in Scotland and Northern Ireland it was the
Protestants; they destroyed all statues, and they were named
The Mainstream, no one ever got rid of them, you know, George
Bush wasn’t around. George Bush actually probably comes
from them. That's what happened, they created this tradition,
but it's far more emblematic. It doesn’t have the narrative
tradition that the Catholic mural has; it's based on this kind of
abstract mural of the eagle, slightly American, kind of free
missionary Rus-Prussian emblematic structures that were very
Latin. This is funny when you consider the people: you can see
the continuation of this template, of the emblem. The red hand
of Ulster is very interesting, because the red hand comes from
a Celtic myth about a hand covered in blood, which the
Catholics had actually assumed for themselves, and the only bit
the Protestants got was the hand. As the troubles went on, they
began to assume the myth as well, so both sides began to claim
the myth, and began to see themselves as various descendants
of Celtic tribes, with this kind of unifying myth. fig 5 This is
another emblematic image – perhaps more like The Who’s logo,
kind of mod, it’s protesting sectarian marches every 12th of
July. Protestants march, and Catholics throw stones and shoot
them, and this happens regularly. They march to annoy the
Catholics, and the Catholics shoot them to annoy them back,
and that's how it works, it gets more and more savage. This
image is a typical Catholic one, I guess that's what I was talking
about yesterday – in Northern Ireland there's a real
identification with the Palestinian cause and they see a general
link between the Catholic and the Palestinian causes. So these
kinds of things appear. fig 6 What also appears is that the
Catholics make as many connections as they can
internationally, and they connect. They invited the Zapatistas to
come and make a mural which was disastrous, because they
hoped the Zapatistas would make a hip hop mural being
Mexicans. "You're a Mexican; you'll want to make a kind of little
hip hop mural," they were deeply offended. So they keep
making connections. Here's another example, and this one
relates to Catalonia as well, anywhere there's a similar kind of
cause they try to make a connection. The Protestants don’t
bother because they were trained not to talk to anybody.
Seriously, they've made no connections, so they have become
isolated, and this becomes more and more of a tragic situation
as we go on. This is again more of what they do, King Rat, a
classic Protestant from Portadown. Again a very savage man
93
who, I think, was killed in 1997. His lieutenant is now in Scotland
on the run. They began to celebrate more of these murals;
there are hundreds of them, there's a great web site with a
mural directory, with something like 82 files full of a hundred
each of these things, and many of them still exist, again,
because nobody can take them down. Here we have an image
5
that celebrates women fighting for the Protestants, fig 7 but
there are also many celebrating women fighting for the
Catholics, because during the troubles a desire emerged
among women who said: "It's not just men that are being
heroic, it's women as well," and this became quite a strong
movement. Some were terrible, they should treat everybody
connected with this mural. There's a real sentimentality and
this is one of the worst I could find, but there's a sentimentality
running its way through all of the murals. And here we have a
more serious one but equally sentimental. fig 8 It's about the
6
hunger strikers in the 1980s where I think about ten or eleven
Catholic hunger strikers died in prison after dirty protests, etc.,
and Thatcher let them die, because they wanted to be
recognized as political prisoners, not as criminals. This image
is very sentimental, it connects first with Christian mythology,
and secondly it connects with Celtic mythology, an iconography
of Celtic warriors. I actually got very depressed collecting these
things. They are very impressive and very sentimental, and
really when they surround you they become incredibly
7
impressive. Things like this, the Catholic, or a Protestant one,
again very sentimental, a huge Lambeg drum is in the back.
The only thing the Protestants really have is this very large
drum which they beat very loudly with whips. It's incredible, I
have a video of it but it's boring. There are certain cartoon
characters in there as well, and they are drawn from popular
culture. These are all trained artists who have taken on the
mantle of doing these things. Here, they draw comics, they
draw in movies; and this is a Catholic one, but fascinating
because it also refers back to the Kubrick movie (A Clockwork
8
Orange). fig 9 In the Kubrick movie in that scene, the tramp that
gets kicked to pieces is an Irish tramp, and that's very resonant
to the Irish because in England most of their people ended up
as tramps and got a good kicking every three or four days by
the English. It has greater resonance beyond Ireland as well, it
brings it back to show that there is power beyond the
Protestants controlling them, setting them off to do this. This is
Eddie from Iron Maiden who's a strong loyalist, and again,
loyalists are much cruder I think. Again something like this
which is based on newspaper cartoons. And that is all of the
9
murals I’m going to show. They have a kind of humor and a real
folk life to them. They can be incredible when you show them in
a forum like this, they're really exciting. They remind me of
Mexican murals for instance. Living among them is actually
terrifying, because each one is a signal: if you come across the
wrong one it means you're in the wrong area and you'll be lucky
to get out alive. So they can also be oppressing. If you live in
that area, they're a warning, the mural is a warning to the
people in the same area, that you had better support the IRA.
Any deviation from that and you will die. This feeds into how the
area is controlled and what happens to artists in the area. I
think there is very little real art apart from this kind of
propagandistic work, because artists were considered too
dangerous. To make art seemed wrong in the first place; you
shouldn’t waste your time doing that. You should go out and get
a gun and join up. You shouldn’t make art, but if you do, you
better make art that really supports your side and tells the story
from that side only. If you don’t, they'll come around and
kneecap you or they'll beat you into a pulp with baseball bats or
they'll shoot you. That was a regular occurrence, I saw it many
times, that's what happened to artists there. These are signs of
a very conservative culture. If you take drugs the same thing
will happen. Both sides evolved paramilitary gangs or militaries,
and they became real armies, but we always went way beyond
any kind of notion of justice, defense, attack. They found that
these are impoverished areas of poor people; if you wanted
something done but you couldn’t do it yourself, you had a whole
unit behind you – if your wife was unfaithful, well you got your
unit, you went and shot the guy. It began to become personal, it
was something you used. If you didn’t have enough money you
went to a bank and you robbed the bank. If you didn’t have
enough beer, you stopped a lorry and you stole the beer. This is
how it began to evolve, and increasingly, as peace has
emerged, this is what's left. Because it is a poor area, it has
become unfashionable. Because it's unfashionable, nobody
cares. Thus you're left in a poor area, the cameras have gone
away; what can you do except go back to receiving
unemployment? If you've got your unit, you've got a huge army
behind you – you're not going to go on to unemployment. You
start stealing, you set up fences for stolen goods, you deal
drugs yourself. There's a whole system for doing that,
smuggling goods. You get into crime, and that begins to take
over the country. That's what they're doing, because people
who had huge armaments in their lives are not suddenly going
back to living on 20 pounds a week; they're just going to refuse
95
to do that. They haven’t dispersed, they haven’t changed, they
just no longer have a political struggle in the same way, but
they now have an illegal struggle. Within this I could find very
little visual art, but I did find some very interesting aspects of
other kinds of art. One was a group called Field Day Theatre
Company which was a combination of artists, writers, poets,
dramatists, and intellectuals who all got together and began to
work out how they could actually create art in this kind of
environment. What they came up with was the notion that they
would create an extra state, that there already were four
provinces in Ireland, so they posited the creation of a fifth
province, and this was a province of the imagination, and in that
province you can do anything you want and you can enact
anything you want. You could try out different solutions and
nobody would shoot you, which almost worked, except they
could. That's what they tried to do. They began to write plays,
poetry, they began to re-imagine what could happen in the
environment in the fifth province, and it became a very powerful
imaginative force for people in a powerful mental space.
Actually most of the liminal spaces I've come across have all
been psychological here; they haven’t really been physical in
any way. That became a place where you could actually try out
different things. There's a beautiful Protestant poet who went
back and started looking at the sources of Protestantism and
realized that it was Protestants who invented Republicanism,
not Catholics, so all the Catholic Republicans were equally
horrified to find that Protestants had invented Republicanism,
but it gave Protestants a completely different origin and a
completely different political structure to consider as their root,
rather than just being settlers there for the English and their
colonial lackeys. They were able to begin to see themselves
within a very different libertarian tradition and that became
quite exciting for them. This had a real impact in terms of
Protestant prisoners of war, for want of a better word, who
began to learn Irish and then began to write really interesting
tracts, discussing the possibility of speaking to Catholics and to
the IRA and coming up with a different political structure. The
best of these people were then quickly shot by the Protestant
community, but for a moment there was a really exciting point
where they were beginning to create a completely different
sense of what Protestantism could be and to break away from
what it had been. Catholics also began to consider different
kinds of notions of what they could be, and how they could
change their history and get away from their history, because
the greatest burden there is is history. Beyond that, many of
these people then found themselves intimidated on the Catholic
side as well. Protestants were shot by Protestants for daring to
assume there could be an alternative Protestantism. Catholics
were shot by Catholics for assuming they could be something
other than what they were meant to be. A few escaped, such as
Seamus Heaney. He escaped by actually positing the fact that
we are all the evil enemy and there must be a kind of blood lust
in all of us, and something that I think is true, that we are
actually in love with the violence in Northern Ireland. We love
the attention and we love, to be honest (I think someone
mentioned it last night), the sheer bloodiness of it all. There is
a sense that everyone is somehow complacent. Heaney had to
leave the country and only goes there partially but can't
properly go back. Seamus Deane, who was one of the prime
intellectuals and friend of Edward Said, was finally confronted
at gun point for what he was doing, and escaped, but now lives
in America. Horn lives in England and is now a media celebrity.
The whole thing was dispersed through pressure, as it was
considered too dangerous.
Male Speaker:
Francis McKee:
What was the name of the group?
Field Day. They published a lot. There's a nice piece called
"Civilians and Barbarians" about how the English adopted the
notion of civilians and put the notion of barbarians on the Irish,
which is a great essay. What Khaled [Hourani] said yesterday,
just the way he spoke was very important, I think Reem [Fadda]
pointed it out afterwards. I think that was very important, that
it was a completely different way to approach speaking from
the first two speakers, and I think the way he approached it
was radically interesting, as opposed to the first two speakers
[Khalil Nijem, Ilan Pappé], both of whom I enjoyed. What he
offered was more of a narrative approach, and in that kind of
narrative I hope for some storytelling and a way to actually
present a different vision of things. If you get caught up in the
language of what we saw yesterday, the planning, the legal,
the pirating, you're immediately complacent in that language
97
and all you can do is struggle in that language with people
who are deeply legalistic. You might score a point here and
there, but you are caught up in the argument itself. I guess
what Khaled offers is a different way of saying that there's a
completely different vision to be obtained, and it changes the
discourse entirely. Once you change the discourse, you can
offer something more radical as a different vision of what you
can be. I think that's important. It offers a different notion of
identity. A lot of the work came out of Northern Ireland, but the
best work was really about asserting a different kind of identity,
asserting your own identity and creating a voice for yourself
that you could recognize and think "Well, this is what it means
to be a Catholic in Northern Ireland and this is what it means to
be a Protestant in Northern Ireland," and to provide something
to hold onto culturally. I think that was the deep importance
or one of the things that survived. One of the most important
areas that this worked in is music; it might be invisible to
people outside, but someone like Van Morrison, who is wellknown everywhere, and appears to be completely apolitical, just
interested in singing the blues – is a well-known Protestant,
but he joined The Chieftains who are well-known Catholics,
and they produced an album together of Irish music, traditional
Irish music, which to the Protestants really was seen as a
radical betrayal, his doing this. Through this act he was offering
some kind of notion of an alternative again for Protestantism.
Those kinds of notions where you had to extend the identity,
the possibility of what you can be culturally, are very important,
even if you are not looking at something very politically or if you
are not representing the political world or representing what is
out there in terms of tanks and guns and buildings etc. You can
do it without ever referring to any of that. So that's why the first
irrelevant thing I think is relevant. One need not refer to what is
out there in the street; there can be other approaches.
The last thing I'll talk about, the thing that inspired it all; when
Galit [Eilat] asked me to talk about it, I thought well this is
historical. When I went back to the hotel room that night, the
BBC announced that Protestant playwright Gary Mitchell has
just gone into hiding because they firebombed his car, then
they petrol bombed the house of his wife and child, so they're
all in hiding now. It's basically a product of peace, since with
the peace, as I said, the Protestants don't communicate with
anybody. The British have abandoned them. They are seen
now as an embarrassment, these settlers, we don’t want them,
embarrassed they settled, wish they would go somewhere
else, they're stuck there because there is nowhere else to go.
They've been abandoned by everybody. So they still say no
surrender, but there's no one to defend and there's nothing
to defend, and they've been abandoned by everything that
they've ever believed in. Their community is collapsing, it's
imploding. As it implodes, Gary Mitchell, the playwright, is
actually describing that implosion and how it's happening, and
the betrayals that happen in a community when peace comes.
Because when peace comes, you've finally got a paramilitary
community, you've got politicians. The politicians move on
to try for greater glory. Other people set up businesses, and
the people who actually worked the guns become a deep
embarrassment and they all begin to betray each other,
and eventually the community really turns on itself. That's
happening in the Catholic community as well. Gary Mitchell
is in hiding at the moment because he actually portrayed it
exactly as it is and that was unpopular. His problem is that
they are Protestant, nobody wants to know him. If he were
Salman Rushdie everybody would be writing about him in The
Guardian, but because he's a Protestant from Northern Ireland
he's got no publicity, nobody cares. So he's in hiding, his family
is in hiding; he can't come out, but nobody cares. It is a really
peculiar situation, but it's one of those situations which happen
when you're no longer fashionable in a sense, and when peace
arrives, peace is a very peculiar notion in Northern Ireland.
Moderator:
(Salwa Mikdadi)
I just want to mention the title of the session again:
"Occupation, Segregation, Ethnicity, Places, Cultural Territories
in Relation to Other Geographies." ... Francis, you mentioned
being fashionable. I was wondering if you could elaborate
99
a little about that, seeing that Palestinian art is now quite
fashionable.
Francis McKee:
I have been thinking about it a lot because we discussed it this
morning. I've been asked to do an exhibition with Palestinian
and Israeli art, as part of a season in Glasgow of projects about
sectarianism, and it's stepping on a land mine. There are lots
of problems with it, and I know that it would be the same if it
were Irish, Catholic; would be the same if it were Catholic and
Protestant. It's the sort of work that deals with the conflict or
the war or the troubles. It is so specific that for people who
actually live there it's a misreading of the situation. I know,
Northern Ireland is a very boring place, incredibly boring place,
and the troubles will happen, occasionally a bomb will go off,
someone will die, and you'll turn on the TV and watch it; you
don’t go out and get involved all the time. Most of the troubles
you don’t necessarily see, and actually 99% of your life is
incredibly boring and domestic, just ordinary life. Once you
reduce it to "here is the checkpoint, here is the problem, here is
the petrol bomb" you stereotype both countries or both peoples
such that it becomes meaningless. Actually, if the work is that
direct, it's also meaningless. I'm approaching it to try to find
work that isn’t direct and actually might be irrelevant in a sense
that broadens the context. Maybe the direct work has brought
a new context to it. People are beginning to see that there's
something else there, this fits into a broader light that disrupts
or changes. I worry about it being so direct, I have concerns.
Two questions that might come up as a result, there are so
Photos:
A Directory of Murals in
Northern Ireland by Dr
Jonathan McCormick
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
mccormick/index.htm
many material things that you may see that can be dealt with,
but how do you deal with the psychological things; they are
so complex, such as we saw yesterday. You couldn’t see what
the problem was, you couldn’t see anything. It's a completely
invisible problem.
Studies on New Israeli L a
Photo: Hagar Goren
*Sala-Manca are Lea Mauas & Diego Rotman
101
L andscapes // Sala-Manca
From the beginning of the 20th century,
Zionism visually represented an ideologicallycharged Eretz-Israel (Palestine), showing the
local landscape as an idealized continuation
of the biblical landscape. Until around 1970,
Jewish Israeli art constructed an ideological
representation of "the own territory," "the own
landscape" where the Palestinian population was
not represented at all, or became literally a part
of the landscape. Since 2002, with the beginning
of the construction of the Separation Wall by the
Israeli government, a new border is being defined
and a new landscape is being created.
The construction of a new form of landscape,
which has the aim of hiding the view of the
Separation Wall, is being tested in the so-called
Olive Terminal, situated near Al-'Azaria, east
of Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. A pastoral and
"natural" name is intended to conceal the fact
that an unusual terminal serves as a checkpoint.
In this part of the Wall the construction of a
façade, of a Potemkin Village, is being tested
along the "border" in order to prevent Israeli
citizens from seeing the Wall. But the use of
landscape construction, through painting and
reliefs, is not only intended to create the idea
of a peaceful wall in this case, but to make it
disappear. You see mountains, flowers, pastoral
images, and also the façades of Jerusalemstone houses with windows which do not
overlook anything.
In this project, Sala-Manca deals with the use
of politically created landscapes, with these
new forms of art-ificial or art-official and
naïve landscapes, created in a very non-naïve
platform. The platform is the message, and the
naïve landscapes – the decadence of an official
aesthetics of colonialism. These are the first
steps of a new, fake way of life as proposed by the
Israeli state to its citizens.
Prof. G. Vakulinchuk
Constru c
103
u ction Status Unknown
// Simon Wachsmuth
105
Simon Wachsmuth opts for a location-specific
and at the same time structure-creating moment
of publicity for the conditions of participation in
public communication. Struck by the ubiquitous
plastering of the Ramallah townscape with longfaded but also newly stuck-over election posters,
all competing over the project for a future
‘Palestinian state’, communication by means
of posters emerged as a specific phenomena, to
which Wachsmuth reacted by preparing 2000
posters, which could be distributed on the streets
by local youth, and which were distinguished
from the existing posters by their motif and by
their bold, contrasty black-and-whites. Just as
the practice of institutional criticism of the early
1970s is powerfully present in the displacement
of views of concrete places to new surroundings,
so can the coupling of these two pictorial worlds
only be understood against the background of a
functional concept of place. With the coupling
of two picture-realities, discursive relations
are introduced into the viewers’ field of vision,
which determine the paradox of their own public
nature – one whose right to exist is disputed.
Franziska Uhlig
Israel a
107
l as a Gated Society,
Past & Present // Ilan Pappé
* A presentation given during the
first Liminal Spaces conference,
Qalandiya, 10.03.2006
There used to be a house in Tel Aviv called the Red House.
Today it is a parking lot, as are quite a few of the historical
houses in Tel Aviv. The Red House used to be the pride of the
Tel Aviv workers. They built it in the 1920s, reconstructed it
in the early 1930s, and turned it into the headquarters of the
Jewish labor movement inside Palestine. It was not actually red;
it was a white house, very typical of houses built by Jews on the
Mediterranean coast in those years, a fusion of early Bauhaus
motifs with local Palestinian architecture. From photographs
it looks like a very beautiful house; it had three floors, and
until the end of World War II it served mainly as headquarters
for the local Zionist labor movement. In 1945 it was turned
into the headquarters of the main Jewish underground – the
Hagana. In 1947 it actually became the seat of most of the
secret meetings of the Jewish leadership, that dealt directly
with the question of what the fate of the Palestinian population
should be in any future Jewish state. After the British decided
in the very beginning of February 1947 to leave Palestine,
the group of people who met there started to meet more
intensively and to work more attentively on a plan to cleanse
Palestine of its original population. It took them a year and a
month, from February 1947 until the beginning of March 1948,
to come to the conclusion, to two conclusions actually: one
was that they would like to have a Jewish state over much of
what used to be mandatory Palestine, which is present-day
Israel with the occupied territories. They hoped to have at
least 90% of the land, but dreamt of having the whole country.
The second decision was to oust the Palestinian population
from those areas. On March 10, 1948, on the third floor of the
Red House, they adopted a famous or infamous plan called
Plan D. They already had Plans A, B, and C; there were also
Plan D1 and Plan D2, but I won't go into them. In any case,
on March 10, eleven men decided that more than a million
109
Palestinians had to go. Most of these men are quite familiar,
definitely to the Israeli public, and I think some of them are
quite familiar names outside Israel as well. First and foremost
was David Ben Gurion, the founding father of the State and
Israel's first prime minister. Legendary figures usually found
in the Israeli pantheon of heroism, such as Yigal Alon, Moshe
Dayan, and others, were also part of the group, as well as
some less known figures, whom today I think we would call
Orientalists. They were the top advisors to Ben Gurion on Arab
affairs, and played a very important role in finalizing the plan
for absolutely cleansing Palestine. What these people did, in
the 1990s had already been considered quite clearly a crime
against humanity. Anyone who goes into the United Nations or
the State Department website, and anyone who reads scholarly
work on definitions of ethnic cleansing would agree that people
who decide to cleanse systematically and comprehensively
one group of people for the sake of another, are very clearly
a group of ethnic cleansers. Ethnic cleansing is a crime. It
is an incomprehensible story, which is beyond the scope of
this talk, how an ethnic cleansing of half of the country's
population, or destruction of half of the country's villages,
urban neighborhoods for the most part – went unnoticed.
Nothing in the second half of the 20th century comes close to
that kind of elimination of a crime, such a huge crime, from
public attention and public consciousness. It is also beyond
comprehension because there were many journalists on the
ground, there were many United Nations emissaries roaming
the country, and there were Red Cross representatives who
were there also from the very beginning. In fact, all these
people wrote reports, very detailed reports on the ethnic
cleansing. Obviously, they didn’t use the term ethnic cleansing;
the only people who used the term 'cleansing' all the time were
the Israeli commanders themselves. All the direct operations
that came from the headquarters in the Red House to the
units on the ground were to cleanse, they used several Hebrew
words: le'va'er (to uproot), le'taher (to purify, cleanse), and
quite often, le'hashmid (to destroy), the following villages, and
then came the names. But the foreign witnesses, so to speak,
were just describing each locality in detail, and of course it's
neither the function nor the obligation of the representatives
of big bodies, whether foreign press or the United Nations or
the Red Cross, it's not the function of the representatives on
the ground to sum up what they see, they just have to report
what they see in each locality, it's up to the newspaper editors
and headquarters of the Red Cross in Geneva and the UN
Secretariat to write reports, and it's very clear today that in
all these cases – whether it's the important newspapers of
Britain and United States or the headquarters of the Red Cross,
or the UN General Secretariat – there was a clear decision
not to publish a full report of what was going on, each with
its own arguments. The most sinister probably of all was the
Red Cross' behavior, because the organization decided not to
publish a general report due to the way in which it behaved
during World War II, with its unwillingness to commit itself to
exposing the concentration camps in Nazi Germany of which it
was fully aware. So three years later the Red Cross had no wish
to blame the Jewish national movement for ethnically cleansing
Palestine, although its representatives on the ground knew
exactly what was going on.
In terms of how orders were sent to units – Palestine was
divided into twelve regions, each was given to an Israeli
brigade; in haste the Israelis created new brigades to adapt
themselves to the plan that they made, and each brigade had a
very clear list of villages that it had to destroy and cleanse, and
there was a very clear methodology; if you compare the
methodology of expulsion in '48 to the methodology of
expulsion defined in general literature on ethnic cleansing,
there is a perfect match: both in the abstract description and in
the Israeli implementation of the idea on the ground, the
following measures were taken: a village was encircled and the
army went in to locate men of military age – for the Israeli army,
anybody above the age of ten was of military age. These people
were then interrogated, some were executed on the spot,
thousands were sent into prisoner-of-war camps. Only recently
the Israeli army released documents that tell us in full the story
of these camps, most of them were enforced labor camps and
there were five of them in Israel. The rest were expelled, their
houses were demolished, and mines were planted in the debris
so that people could not come back. This was a master order,
this was not a specific order for each village, this was a master
order to all the twelve brigade commanders in the '48 operation
to exercise on the ground. Seven months after this master
order was given, 531 villages had been destroyed, 11 urban
neighborhoods had been demolished, and 750 thousand people
had become refugees. Three quarters of a million people. I
mention these details of the past because I think without
understanding what Israel did in 1948, without understanding
the ideology and master plans of the Israelis in '48 – one
cannot understand what Israel is doing today. What we are
seeing is only the tip of the iceberg of what Israel is doing, but I
111
think it would be wrong to think that this is a policy that
emanated from the '67 war or as a result of the last five years,
as a kind of Israeli retaliation to the outbreak of the second
Intifada, or that any policies which seem to be very extreme –
such as expulsion, ethnic cleansing, and executions – are only
in the margins of Israeli policy and thought. In fact they are very
much rooted at the heart of Zionist thought and ideology. It is
no coincidence that the 1948 ethnic cleansing operation was
masterminded by the Zionist labor movement, and not by the
right wing organizations. And it is not surprising that today the
people who embody the center of Israeli politics – the leaders
of the Kadima party – egard Ben Gurion as their father, their
role model, as the kind of leader they want to be. What it really
shows is that the idea that you should try to have as much of
the place as you can, with as few Palestinians in it, is an agreed
upon objective to mainstream Zionist thinkers from as early as
the late 19th century. It's still very much at the heart of Israeli
policy, strategy, and planning. What changes with time are the
tactics, and what fluctuates, comes in cycles, is the very
interesting interaction between language and realities on the
ground. There are times when Israelis feel that they can openly
use, as Jeff Halper told us today, words such as separation,
segregation, and there are times when they feel that such
words undermine their external image or their domestic image,
or internal image. Basically this interplay is being judged at
every juncture for domestic consumption, and whenever there
is a sense among the policy makers that the image outside is a
crucial factor in the overall policy. Outside usually means
American public opinion, and American public opinion usually
means the two houses of the Congress, and anybody who
knows the basic feelings and emotions and perceptions in the
two houses of the American Congress knows that the Israelis
don’t have to work very hard on language and on policies in
order to receive the support of this component of the American
policy making. Ever since 1948 the ethnic cleansing continues,
but in different phases, at different paces, and in different
forms. Between 1948 and 1956 there was a feeling among the
Israeli authorities that a great opportunity was missed in the
1948 war, and the reason was that there were two areas which
had not been cleansed. If you look at the map of Palestine,
there were two areas which were not totally cleansed, and
these areas are the two concentrations today of the Palestinian
citizens of Israel: One area is called Wadi 'Ara, which is a valley
that connects Hadera on the coast today to the city of Afula and
to a plain called in Arabic Marj Ibn 'Amer and in Hebrew Emeq
Izrael (Valley of Jezreel). Along this road there were more than
a dozen Palestinian villages, which were targeted by the Israelis
in the '48 war and were supposed to be expelled and cleansed
as well. Interestingly enough, during the 1948 War the Israelis
tried six or seven times to occupy these villages and expel them
but failed due to local military resistance. This is a chapter that
even Palestinian historians do not recount for some obscure
reason, a chapter of heroism of Palestinian volunteers who,
together with Iraqi volunteers, protected these villages from
one attack after the other. For some reason the Israelis did not
succeed in occupying these villages from the very start of the
war, whereas they found it quite easy to take over hundreds of
Palestinian villages before and after May 1948. So the only
reason that area became part of Israel is because under an
armistice agreement with Jordan it was annexed to Israel with
its population. A second area where the Israeli ethnic cleansing
operation did not go too well was the upper Galilee and other
parts of the Galilee, and the reason is that the Israelis left that
area for the end of their military operation and I think much of
their energy ran out, and since these were the last Palestinian
villages to be cleansed, the Palestinian villages there already
knew what to expect and put up a much stronger resistance
against the expeller than the early Palestinian villages that had
been expelled along the coast or in the inner plains. Some of
the villages succeeded in remaining because of such
steadfastness, and that's how we ended with what is called in
Israel today the "Israeli Arabs," namely the Palestinian
population of Israel. Most of the Israeli leaders who had already
decided on the ethnic cleansing in '48 regretted that they
allowed the Palestinians to stay in the Galilee, particularly in
the Galilee. Somehow they thought that the people in Wadi 'Ara
would eventually be given back to the Jordanians in some sort
of an exchange. Several villages were expelled after '48 and
until '56 as part of an attempt to reduce the number of
Palestinians in the Galilee. The Israeli ethnic cleansing
tendencies subsided somewhat between 1956 and 1967,
probably the only decade in Israel's history that one cannot
report any significant policies of expulsion, although there were
of course expulsions of individuals who were suspected of
political activity and so on. Then came the '67 war, and the
annexation of additional parts of mandatory Palestine brought
with them, quite naturally from a Zionist point of view, a wish to
reduce the number of Palestinians in the area occupied after
'67. Between 250 and 300 thousand Palestinians were expelled
from their houses and locations in the West Bank and the Gaza
113
Strip after the 1967 war, and very few were allowed to come
back. Ever since 1967, as many of you are aware, there is a kind
of a creeping ethnic cleansing of people, Jeff Halper gave us a
bit of information about how it is done in the Greater Jerusalem
area, but these tactics are not just confined to the Greater
Jerusalem area, they are exercised elsewhere in the occupied
territories. Now I think that the fact that these tendencies are
still there, very much rooted at the heart of the political center
in Israel, and a part of policies of various Israeli governments,
and are still, to my mind, part of future strategies and policies
of the Israelis – go back to a concept that I suggested in the
title, and that is making Israel a gated society. There is a
striking parallel between the way that the early Zionists built
their colonies in the late 19th century and early 20th century,
especially in the 1920s and the 1930s, when they had a clear
concept of what they wanted to see in a Jewish settlement at
the heart of the Palestinian territory or homeland, and the
overall picture or perception of the state in the eyes of both its
leaders and many of its citizens. The early Israeli settlements
were built more like fortresses than rural habitations. The wish
was indeed not to allow too many Jews to settle in the towns,
the wish was to push them into rural areas in order to create
the new Jew, who was supposed to be an agricultural person, a
peasant, something the Jews didn’t do in Europe, and there
was a feeling that Palestine served not only as a coveted
homeland for return from the so called Jewish exile, but also an
empty fertile rural area in which the Jews could be reinvented
as peasants and people who work the land, compared to the
jobs and functions which they had been holding in what the
Zionists used to call the Exile Period, which in many ways was
explained by most Zionist thinkers as one of the main reasons
for the animosity towards the Jews – the kind of jobs that they
had, and so on. There was a lot of talk about the healthy Jew,
not just the new Jew, but the healthier Jew. Their settlements
were built as fortresses to begin with. They were built as
military installations, and they had all the makings of military
bases, and there couldn’t be a greater contrast between the
Palestinian villages with their open access to the hinterland,
hardly any fences, and the very secluded look of the Jewish
Zionist settlements during the early years of the 20th century
and throughout the British mandatory period. The thing that
really made Ben Gurion such a great leader was his ability to
take these separate locations in the rural areas, especially after
he found out that most of the immigrants did not like life in
rural Palestine, most of them prepared to live in the cities. In
1937 he prepared a plan with many of the people who would
eventually sit in that room in the Red House on March 10, the
same people, and they looked at the map and saw all these
isolated Jewish settlements in the Palestinian rural areas,
which was most of Palestine, and they said: if we connect all
these areas, and we regard all the area between the isolated
Jewish settlements as a Jewish space – we have a state, even
if most of the land between the isolated spaces is not inhabited
by Jews. It's amazing because this is the same strategy that
Jeff Halper described to us today in the way that, not just what
he called the Greater Jerusalem, but if you remember he had
three Greater Jerusalems: the biggest Greater Jerusalem that
he described for us is not yet Judaized. It's still Palestinian
area, but he claims, and I think he's right, that if you connect
lines between the various isolated settlements that we have
now in the Greater Jerusalem area, you can see a future map in
the eyes and maybe even in the drawing tables already of
Israeli architects, which is totally Jewish despite the fact that
there are large areas of Palestinian communities inside. The
idea that you have a small gated community which is protected
by a space that should be de-Arabized is, I think, something
that is still in the planning in Israel. The gated communities in
the Galilee are still isolated, from a Zionist point of view. I don’t
think they're isolated; they live very nicely with their Arab
neighbors in a beautiful part of Palestine. From a Zionist point
of view, however, they are isolated. They are becoming more
and more gated physically, by the way. The fences are higher,
they have private militias now, private policemen who protect
them, especially after the spilling over of the October Intifada in
2000. They will never feel secure as long as there are
Palestinian areas between the small gated communities. In
other words, for the small gated communities to feel secure, a
big gated community is needed; a big fortress that will be safe.
It is safer to have the spaces de-Arabized, than just enclosing
the Jewish areas. Much of this gated mentality is reflected not
only in the architecture, and not only in the spatial planning for
the year 2020, which is a famous Israeli plan. It's part of the
raison d'etre behind the official educational system; it has to be
a segregated educational system. It's part of the raison d'etre
behind the welfare policy; that has to be segregated too. You
have to have segregation as a point of departure for any state
policy, because there is a dynamic of building a state that has
not ended yet. The building of the state as a gated community
is finding a way, eventually maybe even to open the small gated
communities, by allowing them to live in a very wide and open
115
"safe space." This was discussed very openly in 1948: the need
to have space which is safe, namely clean of Arabs, between
the isolated Jewish settlements. This is not mentioned openly
today, history changes, historical sensitivity changes, this is not
a way to talk about it, but I don’t think that, apart from change
in language, anything changed in the strategy or the intention.
It also has implications for Israeli immigration policy. As you
know Israel has exhausted its Jewish resources around the
world. There are hardly any more targeted Jewish communities
in the world where the Israelis really hope the Jews will come
over. When I say "Israelis" of course I'm talking of the Israeli
government policy makers. They are very worried about the
demographic balance. Rightly or wrongly it doesn’t matter; I
think that their statistics are all wrong but that doesn’t matter.
What interests me here is the phobia, which is what they call
natural Palestinian growth and natural Jewish growth. Taken
into account, I return to Jeff Halper's remarks on Greater
Jerusalem as a microcosm for Israel as a whole, we're here
about a situation where the Israelis want to annex large parts
of Palestine for a final agreement, which will in a way increase
the number of Palestinians in the state, so it is not just a matter
of a balance of power that changes due to lack of Jewish
immigration and differences in the rate of natural growth, but
also because of the appetite for more territory, and each
territory coveted nowadays by Israel, or the consensual Israel
as we may call it, in the big settlement blocks – in each such
area there is a Palestinian population. You can't get a square
mile without a certain number of Palestinians in it. When you
take into account all these problems of exhausting Jewish
immigration, you can see how the immigration policy of Israel
has changed. Instead of bringing over Jewish populations, the
major target is to bring anyone who is not an Arab. This is why
so much has been done in the case of the former Soviet Bloc to
bring over Christians and Jews alike, as long as they are not
Arabs. And I think much of it is now a part of the immigration
policy of Israel for the next few years. To sum up, I would say
the following: the plan of March 10, 1948, which was adopted at
the Red House near the Tel Aviv coast – the plan has not been
totally implemented. It originally meant a total de-Arabization
of Palestine. I don’t think that the major forces in the Israeli
political system have ever given up on their idea to complete
the plan. Nothing in their ideological outlook, their phobias,
their fears, their perception of reality has changed, and
therefore nothing has changed in their master plan of how to
solve the question. It is true that they are pragmatic people,
they know how to take ad hoc decisions, they know how to take
tactical decisions and wait for opportune moments for taking
more major decisions, but I think one of the things we cannot
allow ourselves, and with this I will end, is to look at anything
that we see around us – the wall, the settlements, the
bypasses – as something which we can confine to the area of
Jerusalem, that we can confine to a problem between Israel
and the Palestinian authorities, that we can talk about problems
that really are only on the seam between Israel and the
occupied territories. The focus on a certain geographical area
is accidental, it is not by choice or decision. The Palestinians in
the Galilee, like the Palestinian in Ramallah, are still part of the
gated communities problem, not part of the gated communities
solution. This makes for a lot of work inside Israel in changing
people's perceptions, ideology, indoctrination in a similar way.
It was a formidable task, but people eventually succeeded in
changing public opinion in places such as South Africa. Here
the task is far more formidable, the balance between majority
and minority is different as we know, the historical cases are
different, but the fixation of the ethnic cleansing of '48 is as
strong as the fixation of those people who built the apartheid
system in South Africa.
117
Exquisite Corpse
// Yochai Avrahami
I
woke up in the dark on
brown Formica tables, in
a room the size of which I was
unable to determine at that
moment. It was difficult to
identify the blinking images
on the computer screens
cast about, pointed upwards.
Flickering lights were reflected
on the ceiling amidst unlit
fluorescent bulbs. Scores of
photographs were scattered in
between the screens. I got used
to the dark, and tried to assess
the room which was lined with
glass cases filled with books
all around, from the floor to
the high ceiling. I didn't know
where I was. The windows
looked Templer in style, but
also Mediterranean. It could
be eclectic architecture. I
must improve my position
to know more, I thought to
myself, and fell asleep again.
The fluorescent starters'
attack woke me up once
more. A series of noisy red
sparks within small plastic
units dragged in its wake a
set of flashes. It culminated
with a fluorescent rectangular
row flooding the room with
cold, bright light. Daylight in
the windows exposed green
branches and creeping ivies
1
The
Collection
Houses, Jaffa
T
which could be seen through
the granular-textured glass
interwoven with a mesh of
ultra-thin wires. More details
were gradually revealed: a
magnifying glass and a video
camera were placed on the
table next to me. I lifted up
my body to see better what
was happening on the tables.
Countless images switched in
varying speeds on the screens:
elderly people, sculptures,
gardens, paths, landscapes,
weapons, and works of art.
The photographs scattered in
piles amidst the screens are
aerial photos. fig 1
he Collection Houses
(IDF History) Museum
exhibits weaponry and spoils
from Israel's various military
operations. Matti Hemed
is the curator of the Small
Arms Wing – a giant hangar
presenting the evolution
of hundreds of weapons
inside glass display cases,
reminiscent of the Marine
Animal wing in a natural
history museum.
We enter a small lecture hall.
Matti gives in to the camera
and begins to talk.
- My connection with the Uzi
is this: In 1950 I moved to
the Quartermaster-General
Corps GHQ. During that time,
Uzi was referred to us at the
Arms Equipment Wing, and we
referred him to Israel Military
Industries (IMI), where
his submachine gun could
be developed according to
specifications determined by
119
2
i
the Chief of Staff. Uzi himself
participated in the Infantry
Platoon Command course in
1949 with Lieutenant Colonel
Meir Zorea; he reported with
a submachine gun which he
had made in Yagur, which
resembled an MG34.
- The Czech…
- It's not Czech, it's
German! Because an MG34
is a Maschinengewehr
vierunddreißig. The Germans
name a weapon by its year
of production – 1934. Later
on they issued the MG42 in
1942, which everyone calls
the Spandau, I don't know
why. It looks very similar to
the MG34, but its rate of fire
is much greater. While the
rate of the MG34 is 600-800
rounds per minute (RPM),
and when you fire a burst, you
hear taktaktaktaktaktak, the
42 can fire 1200, and you hear
a simultaneous rrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
sound. But let me get back to
Uzi. Lieutenant Colonel Zorea
liked the submachine gun Uzi
built on the kibbutz. When he
came to us, he realized that
his submachine gun, which
was similar to the MG34,
must be reworked to meet IDF
needs; and then he was given
a place to work in, a corner of
his own, in IMI.
- A workshop.
- A workshop. He was
assigned a tool operator who
helped him physically, also
in terms of contact with
other departments, when he
had to bend or twist steel,
etc., and there he also built
the prototypes. Two units:
one with a hoe's stock, and
the other with an ordinary
triangular wooden stock of a
standard gun. Later there was
a competition, and the IDF
decreed that Uzi's submachine
gun was preferable. That Uzi
is still in use.
We enter the Small Arms Hall.
The large hall is empty of
people, save a maintenance
man who opens the showcases
one by one, oils the guns, and
returns them to the display.
We naturally approach the
showcases containing the
first Uzis, and those of his
competitor – Kara.
- Can you zoom in without
getting the lamps? [He points
out the reflections of the
lighting in the glass vitrine].
- I get a bit of lamps, but it
doesn't bother me.
- This is the K12 which
competed with the Uzi. They
chose the Uzi. Period. You
see. After the prototypes, five
models were manufactured
initially.
- In the prototype, the sights
hadn't been rounded yet.
- Here it's still straight, and
here, and here. Only later they
began to round them, to make
it stronger. This is my bullet
collection. You have every
bullet, from this caliber to the
small Russian caliber, 5.45
of Kalashnikov. The previous
one is 7.62, very similar to our
5.56.
- It's like a stamp collection.
- True. Here you have all sorts
of things, dozens, countless,
all sorts of calibers, the
Kalashnikovs of North Korea,
of Romania, everything is
loot taken from the Syrians,
partly from the Egyptians. You
see, Iran; an Uzi with Arabic
inscription… It's hard to see
without opening. It's from the
Shah's regime.
- I can see.
- Did you manage? Look, a
rifle was already manufactured
back in 1943. A popular one.
It was called Volksgewehr.
Look at the bolt, look at the
simple barrel. This one was
made by Speer!! That one…
Look at him, look at the way
he puts the oil!... How much
oil?!... That's terrible!!! Why
does he put so much oil?!?!?
- Like models!
- Terrible. fig 2
T
he pair of heavy wooden
doors painted in glossy
white oil paint knocked
noisily. I turned my eyes, but
could see nothing, apart from
the motion of an opening door.
I raised my eyes and saw a
strange fairy: a short, plump,
smiling lady with wideopen, curious, great big eyes,
equipped with dragonfly wings.
A video camera was attached
to her head, like a miners'
lantern. She circled above me,
gliding horizontally over the
tables like a hawk, and then
vertically, up the display cases,
like a honey sucker.
- What are you looking for?
Can I be of any help?
- Yes please! But could you
remind me what I am doing
here?
- We must go on a mission!
She continued flying; the
flap of her wings casting
transparent shadows on the
tables. Her words reinforced
my feeling – I was in a military
facility. There was a smell
of machinery and gun-oil
and plastic and metal there.
Cleanliness for the purpose of
lubrication.
- What's this smell of oil?
- Things must be ready for
receipt of command.
- And what then?
The questions led to riddles
rather than answers. I let it
go. I stretched my awakening
slowly, and enjoyed my semidreamy state. Reality was not
necessarily the one thing I
needed at that moment.
3
4
I
n the summer of 2007,
while staying in Weimar,
I learned that Uziel Gal,
the inventor of the famous
submachine gun Uzi, was
born in that town. During
that week I participated in
a course on the origins of
the Bauhaus. I first became
acquainted with the evolution
of the school's building, which
began operations in an art
deco structure in Weimar
and evolved into the famous
Bauhaus edifice with the
clean lines in Dessau. During
the war, the Nazis wanted
to demolish the building
in Dessau, but ultimately
changed their decision, and
instead opened a school for the
SS command in situ. During
the war Dessau was bombed
due to its famous airplane
factory, but also because of the
sugar processing plant, one of
whose products was Zyklon-B.
The ruins of that factory are
located some 700 meters from
the renowned school, whose
white walls were painted in
camouflage colors in fear of
bombings. fig 3,4
I
contacted Iddo Gal, the
son of Uzi (born Gotthard
Glas) to locate the house in
which the famous weapon
inventor grew up. Iddo gave
me the address; 45-47 Am
Horn street. He told me that
Uzi's father, Erich, was an
aerial photographer in the
German air force during World
War I, and that after he was
injured, he studied in the
Bauhaus during the school's
first years in Weimar. I didn't
succeed in finding the house
that summer. Since my return
to Israel, I have been meeting
with Iddo and others. We
have been sifting through vast
amounts of archival material,
gliding at random over piles of
aerial photographs, motivated
by the intuition that this
piece of weaponry inherited
the Bauhaus genes. The gun's
design, the materials, as well
as the scarcity and simplicity
of the constituent elements
and operation, are a fractal in
the aforementioned chain, in
the symbiosis between selfdefense and creativity.
121
7
5
E
6
The Gal
Family Home
in Haifa
W
e open a wooden box
containing etchings
created by Erich as a student
in the Bauhaus. Then I start
wandering with my camera
over contact-sheet albums
from the years in which Glas
lived in Acre after 1956.
Iddo shows me sights from
which Eri drew inspiration
for his later Orientalist
paintings. We move back to
photographs taken during the
journey to Palestine. One
album after another, scores of
contact sheets. The Munich
beer cellars; a photograph of
fishermen in Trieste, from
where they left by sea to
Palestine; aerial photographs
from the Jordan Valley
fig 5; a photograph of beehives;
Kibbutz Yagur appearing like a
cemetery or a deserted village
against the backdrop of Mount
Carmel; a photograph of a
seaside village, taken from the
sea. The word "Nachsholim"
(Heb. large waves) is inscribed
on its rear, and it is hard
to tell whether it refers to
the waves at the foreground
or predicts the building of
Kibbutz Nachsholim on the
ruins of the Palestinian village
Tantura. fig 6
rich Glas was born in
Germany in 1897. He
never met his father. When
his mother, an actress, was
hospitalized, he moved in with
his uncle and aunt, who were
also in the theater. During
World War I he participated
in one of the first flights to
engage in aerial intelligence
gathering photography. After
sustaining an injury, he
began painting the atrocities
of war, was discharged, and
began studies at the Bauhaus
in Weimar. fig 7 As a young
artist he aspired to reach the
high technical proficiency
of the German Old Masters,
and therefore focused on
etching, lithography, woodcuts
and linocuts – areas which
required an exceptional level
of precision. He married
Maria, a Christian hailing
from a family with a Jewish
background, and their son,
Gotthard, was born. The
family lived on Am Horn
Street. Several years later they
divorced, and Erich moved
to Berlin. Gotthard stayed
Kiryat
Ono
B
in Weimar with Maria and
her partner, Etta, who had
a collection of old weapons
from the days of the Prussian
army. When the Nazis rose
to power, Gotthard was
transferred to boarding school
in England. In the meantime,
Erich studied under Hermann
Struck and Max Liebermann
in Berlin; he was influenced
by his Surrealist-Expressionist
friend, Alfred Kubin, and
taught at the academy. In
1933 he fled with his new
family to Palestine and settled
in Kibbutz Yagur, where he
changed his name to Eri. The
young Gotthard continued his
studies in boarding school,
until one weekend in 1936,
during a home visit in Weimar.
Etta's brother, who was an
SS officer, recommended
that Maria send him out of
Germany as soon as possible,
and he was sent to Palestine,
to his father in Yagur.
erlin-born Ruth Rapaport
lived in Yagur during the
1930s, and knew Glas. Today
she is 97, living in a modest
house in Kiryat Ono. She looks
very old, is hard of hearing and
has difficulty walking.
- He was given a fine welcome.
They gave him a studio in
the center of the kibbutz,
where he worked. What did
he do? He taught art and
painted… One of the things I
think he did in terms of work
was take pictures. Very few
people owned a camera in
those days, and the members
were given credits for having
their pictures taken by Erich.
In 1933-34 we came from
Germany, we were a group
of people, and he invited the
'yekkes'1 for tea. He was a very
nice man. He could tell stories
and engage in conversations….
As far as I remember, his color
paintings weren't his strong
point... His graphic works
were very good, weren't they?
- With regard to the color, I
agree with you, I didn't think
this was his forte.
- Let me tell you one more
thing. Since he came from
Germany, and he was there,
in the army, during World
War I, the old guard in Yagur
accepted him to the Hagana2;
he must have known more
than they did about war. There
was some quantity of bullets
that got wet, and it was a
shame to let them go to waste;
there was a bakery in Yagur,
and he thought he would dry
them… He put the bullets
there after they finished
baking, and they started firing
from the heat… (She laughs).
- Where did you work in the
first years?
- At first I washed dishes
in the kitchen. One of the
worst jobs was to go to the
henhouse, take a live chicken
and look for someone to
slaughter it. The best one was
a Druze from Usfiya. There is
a wadi there that goes all the
way down to Yagur. He had
a good knife, and I told him,
'Kill it'. Then they discovered
I was good at weaving, and
this was where I stayed, in the
factory.
- Do you remember anything
about him? How he behaved,
how he fit in?
- He assimilated very well,
because everyone wanted
their pictures taken. Also, the
guys from the Hagana were
with him, he was considered
someone who knows things…
- Eri studied at the Bauhaus.
Did you know anything about
the Bauhaus?
- Oh, the Bauhaus. It's the
first time I hear that Erich
studied at the Bauhaus. We
had two women-immigrants
who studied there. One was
123
9
8
called Bella, and the other –
Ruth. They helped us create
beautiful weaving patterns
that they learned there.
Bauhaus is a concept, not just
a word. It was a style... you
know, when you entered a flat
in Berlin, you had some piece
sticking up, you know… all
kinds of… and the Bauhaus
put an end to that, and made
everything straight and logical.
Look. I'm 97 now, and I have
the loom by my bed, and I'm
really sorry that I don’t have
the strength to use it anymore.
Recently I worked alone
making so-called art… scarves
and other articles of clothing…
tablecloths… In the good
times I had three workers.
It gradually diminished….
Now I'm like that, all alone.
Everyone has already passed
away. fig 8
D
uring World War II he
knew what was going on
in Europe. His correspondence
with Maria bypassed the
censor. In 1942 he published
a book of linocuts entitled
Nights: 28 prints depicting
a young artist waking into a
nightmare with surrealistic
scenes of the angel of death,
bats and ravens. The sights
are replaced by real images
of rioting, destruction, and
fire, culminating in acts of
violence, punishment, barbedwire fences and watchtowers
in concentration camps.
The book was published
during the war (although it
is customarily believed that
the Jews in Palestine were
unaware of what was going
on). It ends with a prophecy:
the prisoners collect the arms,
rebel, and leave the camp with
the sun beaming behind them.
fig 9,10,11,12
The knowledge he gained in
aerial photography was later
utilized, when he was drafted
to take aerial photographs for
Hagana intelligence as part of
the so-called "Village Files."3
The aerial photographs which
remained in the possession
of the family portray mainly
Jewish settlements and "Tower
and Stockade" groundbreaking
acts.4
Early military aerial
photography by Jews in
Palestine was a by-product
of Glas's art classes at the
kibbutz. Moshe Goren, who
10
11
was his pupil, remembers that
Glas talked about his past as
an aerial photographer during
World War I in class. Goren
later joined the Hagana, and
became Chief Scouting Officer.
He realized the strategic
need in aerial photography,
and harnessed Glas. His
subordinate, Itzhak Eran,
wrote about it in his book
HaSayarim (The Scouting
Patrol). Eran describes the first
test flight, the type of camera
which Glas chose, and the
people on the plane: his wife
as a "decoy" in an ostensible
pleasure flight, which covered
up the military aim, and Yigael
Yadin. 5
T
he fairy continued flying
in the room, fetching
literature about weaponry,
military tactics and strategies,
and mainly information about
analysis of aerial photographs.
I realized we must prepare for
an operation involving flight
overseas. She seemed to have
substantial information, yet
surrendered very little detail,
and things unfolded as in a
psychoanalytic process: she
was high above, and I was
below, barely able to see her. I
mainly hear her voice and the
flapping of her wings behind
me. At some point she ordered
me to get up. I slid off the
messy table, and could finally
see her clearly. She was dressed
in khaki uniform.
- Time to leave.
- Where to?
- Follow me.
She opened the door, and
the smell of lubricant grew
stronger.
125
12
Ramat
Gan
I
received the transcript of
Moshe Goren's testimony,
where he maintained that Glas
already flew over the Middle
East during World War I.
Goren's house is located in the
Paratroopers Neighborhood.
An Asian man opens the door,
leading me to a living room
with a wooden ceiling, leather
sofas, and a state-of-the-art
sound system playing Mahler.
An old man is seated on the
sofa. Piles of remote controls
and medication lie on the
table.
- How did you begin thinking
about the aerial photographs?
- Let me take you to the
beginning. I was Chief
Scouting Officer in the
Hagana, and during that time
we set up an entire system
of aerial photography which
was nonexistent theretofore;
I introduced the change. We
had this basic problem, and
decided to introduce aerial
photography in order to obtain
better information on the
targets themselves, and not
just how to access them. The
Palmach6 was only interested
in access routes; they patrolled
nearby, but what was in the
aerial photograph solved the
problem for us. And then I
remembered Eri. How he told
us that in Germany he was…
- How old were you?
- I was 13. It's been 70 years
since then… Yes. And he…
Every Friday we had an hour
with Eri. We learned to read
paintings: to view a painting
and analyze it, and he also
told us that story… For some
reason, I don't know why, it
remained stuck in my head
on the way back from school.
I finished the regional school
in Yagur, and worked my way
up the Hagana ranks to Chief
Scouting Officer.
- Before we return to the
aerial photographs, can you
remember what he was like as
a teacher?
- Every week we had painting
and music lessons. The
school wanted to broaden our
horizons… to bring us closer
to culture. He used to tell a lot
of stories. He said he knew the
terrain, etc., etc., and that he
toured the area where Jordan
is now located back then. I
don't remember much apart
from that story.
- He said that during World
War I he toured present-day
Jordan?
- Who?
- Eri.
- The territory was Jordan;
the British were there, but the
territory he talked about was
there.
- During World War I?
- World War I, that's what we
are talking about!
- Because I asked the family
about this, and they know
nothing about him flying over
the Middle East.
- That's what he told me!
I didn't make it up. Also…
we were very interested in
painting. He was just a very
gentle man and a good teacher.
- In the family archive I found
many photographs he took,
in your time obviously, but
it's the first I hear about him
coming to the Middle East
during World War I.
- It's a fact! Now, regarding
the aerial photographs—here
we had a problem; because
of the British we couldn’t get
vertical shots. Every shot was
diagonal, and each part of the
photograph had a different
scale. We managed to find a
solution; it wasn't ideal, but it
worked.
- Stories have it that Eri Glas
taught about camouflage
techniques, things he had
learned in Germany, and that
he painted guarding posts in
the kibbutz.
- I don’t know about that.
At any event, he emphasized
visual art because he was an
artist.
- How many flights did you
have with Glas?
- I don’t think I ever flew with
him, not with him… I flew
with Yigal Alon.7
- I know there was one flight
with Glas.
- I don’t know. It wasn't with
me.
- You never flew with Glas?
You mean, you only made the
contact with him and other
people flew with him?
- 'With him' is two different
things, I am trying to
differentiate...
127
13
14
- So please explain again…
- I wanted to tell you what I
know about Glas; so, among
other things, he told us that
he photographed from the air
in the territory that was then
Jordan, the British. I don’t
know more than that.
- But didn't you later invite
him to take photographs for
the Hagana?
- No!
- But in the book it says that
the first photography flight
was with Glas.
- I don’t remember, perhaps it
wasn't in my time… it wasn't
in my time, surely…
- Eran writes: "The initiator
was Moshe Goren, who was
Chief Scouting Officer since
1945. Goren sought an aerial
photographer, and he found Eri
Glas from Kibbutz Yagur"...
- It's all imaginary. fig 13
S
he opened the large
door, and we went to
the entrance of an endless
hall with a row of houses
at its center. They differed
slightly from one another, but
all had clean lines, mainly
horizontal, and protruding
balconies, rounded in part.
Some were reminiscent of
submarines, due to the round
windows in their stairwells.
The design was simple, aside
from the green camouflage
colors that covered them.
As we progressed, the smell
of lubricant grew stronger.
At the end of the avenue
stood an impressive building,
similar to the other houses,
yet much bigger. The rounded
balconies were located on the
roof, on either side, casting
a silhouette of two arches.
A small barrel-like structure
that looked like a water tank
was also located on the roof,
closer to the left-hand balcony.
The building with the metallic
façade seemed to hover on two
columns: one, plastic-coated,
was where the entrance
was; the other was metallicconstructivist, and supported
the building on the right. A
long, large pipe emerged from
the left side of the building,
like a launching apparatus
leading outdoors from the
vast hall. There were fences
all around and heavy security.
fig 14
15
Kibbutz
Kfar Giladi
I
n the foyer of the Museum
of Hashomer (The Jewish
defense organization 'The
Guard')8 we meet Batia Guy,
the Museum's director, who
had studied with Glas as a
young girl. We walk amidst
Batia Lishansky's9 sculptures,
and climb the stairs to the
roof. On the way we see
broken glass – a reminder
of the recent war fought in
the summer. Batia tells us
about the location of the
museum which functioned
as a watchtower. We enter
a large room, which served
as the office of the Shochats
who were among the leaders
of Hashomer. The walls are
lined with pictures from the
Shomer days, paintings by
Israeli artists, and Joseph
Trumpeldor's10 rifle proudly
installed in an elegant wooden
frame adorned with green
velvet. fig 15
- In the kibbutz, everyone
always knew he was a pilot
and that he had studied in an
art academy in Germany. No
one knew about that specific
school or about the Bauhaus
style at the time. He was
very impressive with his high
stature, his dignified gait. He
was considered an authority,
a very pedagogical figure.
There was also something
mysterious about that studio
above the children's house.
After you called me, I began
to think about the affinity
between a military museum
and art. It is a field that I
have been studying ever since
I started engaging in art.
Throughout my career I have
linked history and art. I tried
to think of what I learned
from my art teacher. Creativity
and curiosity. Even if you
create a weapon, it's an artistic
act. The function it serves,
that's another matter. It's
very present in art. As I said,
you have a blank page, and
something emerges from it.
I can say about the problems
of artists on the kibbutz, that
they were considered idlers.
- Parasites.
- Yes, parasites, I didn't want
to use such a word, but it's…
until the Kibbutz Movement
set up a committee whose
function was to evaluate the
quality of their work, and
allot certain "art days" to the
kibbutz. An artist could get an
art day on his work schedule,
because he was given a permit
to make art. In support of
Yagur I can say that they
always treated art as a cultural
asset, and therefore I began by
saying that he was a teacher
like any other.
129
17
O
nce we passed by the
guard, we entered a
tall and narrow metal shaft.
Entry was through a strange
elevator, where instead of
standing up, you had to lie
down across the compartment
and ascend horizontally, one
atop the other in zigzag. I
lay down as well, while the
fairy-soldier hovered on the
outside, accompanying my
ascent which was made in
jolts, like bullets climbing
up a magazine. I was led to
an elongated, rectangular
conference room with massive
walls. To the right of the
façade was a wide window
with rounded corners, and
the ceiling descended from its
highest part to the rear wall
on a slant. On the right was a
round door, and inside – the
elongated table. Left of the
façade was a small round shut
window with a round latch
and a slit which looked like
an emergency exit. On either
elongated side, at the bottom,
E
16
was a rim on which soldiers
sat, speaking enthusiastically
about rabbits that must
be rescued. Several letters
were engraved on the wall
on which they leaned. We
entered the room and heard
a lecture delivered by a short,
chubby man with a beard,
a moustache, and a peaked
cap, who spoke about the
importance of national art and
design for defense purposes.
fig 16
ast of Goethe Park, at the
end of Am Horn Street,
is the first Bauhaus house
worldwide, built as part of the
school's exhibition in 1923.
North of it, between the third
and fourth houses, a small
path climbs uphill, winding
left and then right, embracing
a cultivated plot on the slope
with vegetable crops such as
lattice, carrots, and kohlrabi.
Further along there are several
huts, a wooden greenhouse
with a smoking chimney,
and the family home at the
far end. I visited the place in
summer 2008 and met the
owner, Mr. Tipelt, a nice dwarf
with a small moustache. He
recalled Maria, from whom
his father had purchased
the house in 1973, with
enthusiasm. Mr. Tipelt was
proud of his father, who until
a year before continued to
raise vegetables and sell them
in the City Square, as Maria
had since the 1920s. fig 17
21
I
18
Sadness spread over his face,
but it was soon replaced by
proud gaiety. He said that he
himself grows rabbits for food,
and boasted his major client,
Prof. Dr. Volkhard Knigge,
Director of the Buchenwald
Memorial, who is renowned
for his gourmet cooking. I
recalled that the previous
year, before leaving Weimar in
the summer, we were invited
by Dr. Knigge for a farewell
dinner. I was promised
rabbit, and anticipated the
dinner with mixed feelings of
excitement and fear, but it was
cancelled. fig 18
n one of our conversations
Dr. Knigge recommended
that I visit the Jewish
Cemetery in Erfurt, and on
the morning after my meeting
with Mr. Tipelt, I went there.
At first it gave the impression
of a typical Jewish cemetery,
with gravestones bearing Starsof-David and inscriptions in
Hebrew. I was afraid to be
disappointed and feared the
imminent rain. I climbed
uphill to the funeral home,
which had a portico in front,
with two locked heavy doors
at the center. The doors were
flanked by two large marble
plates bearing the names of
local Jewish soldiers who died
in World War I, decorated with
helmet reliefs and gallantry
medals. I hastened my steps
downward, and then, as in
a German Expressionist
science fiction movie, oblique
gravestones, with odd angles,
prisms and cuttings emerged,
calling to mind diamonds or
pine cones. The more I studied
this section, the more daring
the style turned. These were
gravestones from the 1930s
of a specific bourgeois class
within the Erfurt Jewish
community, whose rest was
penetrated by design extracted
from cinema and art. Some
looked like spaceships, others
like the logos of industrial
20
19
plants fig 19 or parts of
machines and décor. I was
especially impressed by one
large angry-looking gravestone
made green by moss, with a
spiky central part protruding
upwards, and another part
sticking out like a nose. I
felt as if I were in a fictive
air force base dominated by
the souls of this middle class,
which has covered itself with
spikes, prepared fortifications
for wartime, as if fear had
given rise to a belief that art
can offer protection. fig 20, 21
131
O
kay. Now. Do you have
information about that
German rifle?
- What German rifle?
- The German rifle from
1934…
- From 1934?
- Yes, what you told me, the
one like the first submachine
gun Uzi made at Yagur…
- Oh, the machine gun!
- The machine gun, yes,
my mistake. MG34 was a
machine gun first produced
in 1934. It was air-cooled,
like other machine guns,
but it was lightweight. Its
initial design was conceived
by Heinrich Vollmer, during
the time he worked at the
Maschinenfabrik Geipel plant
in Erfurt, which no longer
exists.
- And that weapon which
inspired Uzi, does it exist?
- It doesn’t exist at all, and
I have never seen it, but
from the data I gathered in
my research I reached its
size, magazine capacity, feed
system; and when I saw the
picture, I knew this was it,
because it fit the data.
- You say there was an IDF
specification according to
which Uzi developed the
weapon… What did that
specification contain? What
were the criteria?
- The size, that it wouldn't
exceed 3.5 kilos in weight,
I think, that its rate of fire
wouldn't exceed 400 RPM, its
general length…
- Is the rate of fire an
economic consideration?
- Some developers want to
have as small as possible a
rate of fire to obtain better
accuracy so that the weapon
won't run wild... but the
Germans even produced one
with 1200 RPM.
- You say that he created the
prototype in the kibbutz metal
shop. Did he have knowledge
in welding?
- He graduated from a
vocational school, and he
always fixed spare parts for the
Hagana. He had a knack for
such things. From childhood,
I guess.
- Did he tell you about his
childhood, or…
- Look, Uzi was a very reserved
man. He never initiated talks
about his developments. Since
he was both a technical man
and a soldier, he always knew
what to do in terms of human
engineering, what kind of a
trigger mechanism, which
blowback apparatus, how to
fix jams… Now I am ready
to show it to you. You need a
permit from the Manager in
order to take pictures. They
are all in a showcase, and
there is glass. This one you
may shoot, but if you are using
a flash…
- No. no. I need the flash.
Can't you take the Uzi out and
disassemble it, say….
- Here on the table?
- Yes.
- I can. Let me bring it here.
- So perhaps we should start
with that.
- I'll bring it… You can sit and
wait.
Matti left the room and went
to get the Uzi. I waited,
excited, and after several
minutes he returned, holding
a plain wooden box. He placed
it on the table and opened it.
Inside was an Uzi submachine
gun which looked brand new.
- Do you want it on a bright or
a dark background?
- It doesn't matter.
- What do you want to do?
- I want you to explain about
the various parts.
- I will explain, look. The
weapon is based on the
blowback principle. It has
a heavy bolt, and when you
pull the trigger, the bolt
runs forward, issues a bullet
by turn, feeding it into the
barrel. Here is the return
or recoil spring, which
means that when I want to
cock the weapon, the bolt
is pushed here. Here is the
safety-selector, it's hard to
see: automatic, semi, and
locked. In locked position
I can do nothing. In semi
I take it foreword, and it is
now cocked. Imagine there
are bullets inside; I pull the
trigger, and it fires. The finger
is still pressed, and the bolt
moves backward by itself. It
pushes the bullet forward,
and the bolt backward. Is that
clear?
- Clear.
- Now, in automatic, which is
like that – I'll demonstrate as
if there are bullets, OK? I cock
the weapon and it's ready to
fire. When I pull the trigger,
the bolt runs, the trigger is
pressed, but it doesn't stop, it
runs forward, fires the second
bullet, and the third, and it
does the movement. The bolt
itself moves, but the cockling
handle remains in place.
It doesn't move. That's the
underlying principle. Now it's
me, firing from the hip, but if
I want to aim, I can aim. This
is the front sight and this is
the aperture-type rear sight.
Come see.
- And what is the front sight,
this is just the pointer?
22
- A pointer! I can see it inside.
I bring the end to the center,
and if I lift higher, I lift the
entire machine gun to fire
there (Matti demonstrates: he
makes a circle with the fingers
of one hand and a pointer with
the other, and threads one into
the other). fig 22 Can you see
what they have done here?
They put this weapon out of
service. If I had real bullets…
It is neutered! That means I
cannot take the barrel off. Can
you see that the firing pin is
fixed, but what did they do?
They ground it down so as to
disable this weapon. Now let's
put it together….
- Wait a minute. I would like
to dwell a little longer on this
story. What is this?
- It's an arrangement that
when it gets here, this hits
that and not the metal.
- And what is this material?
- It's a type of plastic,
something very durable. It
is intended to cushion the
impact, it takes all the recoil.
- It feels like cardboard.
23
- Yes, and this one feels
like Bakelite or cardboard.
Not fragile. It is a fact that
it endures. Look at the
mechanism, you can’t see
anything here… You see… It
was in semi-automatic mode,
clear?
Matti fires multiple shots, and
I photograph the movements
in the chamber.
- So this is the weapon. Only
five parts: the body, the return
spring, the barrel, the bolt,
and the cover. Look how
easily it closes: boom, and it's
already down.
- And the box…
- They did it for the present.
He received it from IMI. It's
not from us. fig 23
133
24
The Hagana
Museum
Archives,
Rothschild
Blvd.,
Tel Aviv
A
bronze relief by Batia
Lishansky is installed
in the entrance, depicting
a group of young men and
women in work clothes,
possibly armed, on the move,
looking straight ahead.
The archive contains six
brown Formica tables with
computer terminals. The
archivist sits at the entrance.
A smiling woman with
the energetic gestures of a
librarian, she happily answers
any question and climbs the
ladders to fetch books from
the higher shelves lining the
room. She has been working
in the archives for over twenty
years now, since she was a
young soldier. The noise of a
gardener's saw is heard from
outside. I am handed a pile
of original aerial photographs
from 1921-1948. I have
filed a request to video the
photographs from either side,
because they bear handwritten
inscriptions on the back,
which may help me prove
that these are photographs
taken by Glas. Following my
meeting with Moshe Goren,
who refuted the argument that
Glas took photographs for the
Hagana, I did not invest much
effort to prove otherwise. I
mainly enjoyed toying with the
photographs before the lens:
small and glossy manually
printed black-and-white
images, threaded on light blue
Bristol paper squares pierced
at their corners, much like an
old photo album.
A
photograph of largely
unpopulated terrain,
partly cultivated, with
rural houses on the right.
The cardboard bearing
the photograph reads "a
photograph of enemy
territory, July 1948." I turn
the photograph around,
and on the verso it says in
English "original" with a
double underline. Terraced
olive groves. I zoom in
further, trying to capture
the houses. The reflections
of fluorescent lights in the
room interfere. The next
photograph is very beautiful,
fig 24 almost abstract: an
agricultural territory divided
into squares, occasionally
crossed by dirt roads which
interrupt the geometry. Each
plot has a different texture,
attesting to different crops in
different phases of cultivation.
I detach the photograph
from the cardboard and
zoom in. At the center of the
field there is a house with
an inner yard which could
have been a strategic target.
This photograph was taken
from the airplane's belly, a
vertical rather than a diagonal
photograph. It could have been
taken during 1948, without
British supervision.
T
he archive manager,
whom I asked for
permission to take pictures,
enters the room. She sends
threatening looks, talks about
me with the archivist, making
sure I am aware of the rules.
She briefly looks at the lens. At
the bottom part of the frame
there is a glossy aerial photo,
and it appears immersed in a
grayish puddle. I sense danger,
lift the camera, and go on with
my work.
25
26
T
he lens cap swings,
revealing the inscription
"Tel Aviv – Reading." From
amidst the sands, the airport's
landing strip bursts forth, the
Dov Hoz Airport built by the
Aviron Company, where Glas
flew. Next to it is the famous
Israel Electric Company
building, which has recently
hosted contemporary art
events, running for the title of
the Israeli "Tate Modern."
The camera lands on the table.
The Formica ridges lead from
it in perspective onto the
horizon. fig 25
A vertical photograph of a
village in very high resolution.
A magnifying glass makes
the details clearer; and then
comes a three-dimensional
surprise. Some of the houses
are inclined in relation to
the lens. On the one hand, it
is a two-dimensional image
featuring a sequence of roofs,
roads, and courtyard sections;
on the other hand, it is
three-dimensional, featuring
façades with arched doors
Notes
1 A term denoting Jews hailing
from Germany.
and windows. The organic
subconscious erupts through
the slits of the geometrical at
the village center. In the rural
areas, the opposite happens:
crowding of organic, round
and oval forms – grain barns.
fig 26 The geometric bursts
forth from amidst the barns
in the form of small booths,
tin huts. The camera hovers
hypnotized, and then tires and
once again lands between the
brown Formica clods.
I
arrange the photographs
in a pile with a
strange feeling of research
disappointment. I leave
the building on Rothschild
Boulevard, and head north,
towards the ruins of Tel Aviv's
"culture plaza."
2 An armed Jewish militia
active in Palestine during the
British mandate period until the
establishment of the State of Israel
in 1948. One of its strongholds was
in Kibbutz Yagur.
3 A vast intelligence project of the
Hagana, as part of which extensive
material was gathered about the
largely rural Palestinian population.
4 A unique settling method of
pre-1948 Jews in Palestine. A set
of poles and a folding watchtower
made of wood were driven to a
given location by night, and within
several hours a small settlement
was erected, delimited by wooden
fences, with a watchtower at its
heart, thus introducing a new
reality in situ, despite the objection
of the British mandate and the Arab
neighbors.
5 Head of Operations during
Israel's War of Independence;
second Chief of Staff of the IDF; an
archeologist and a politician.
135
12 Erich Glas, Get Up and Fight!;
To the Weapon!, from Nights, 1942,
linocut print book
figures:
1 Yochai Avrahami, Orly in the
Archive, 2008, linocut
2 Yochai Avrahami, Mati Hemed
holding a copy of Uziel Gal's first
submachine gun, 2008, video still
3,4 Unknown photographer,
Bauhaus campus in Dessau: painted
camouflage in the 1940s, the
Bauhaus Foundation, Dessau
5 Erich Glas, Aerial photographs
from Israel's north region, 1940s,
black & white photographs
6 A scouting unit which evolved
from the Hagana in the early 1940s.
6 Erich Glas, Tantura village (today
Kibbutz Nachsholim), 1940s, black
& white photograph
7 Commander of the Palmach,
minister in the Israeli government,
and acting Prime Minister of Israel.
7 Unknown photographer, Erich
Glas wounded and adorned by the
Iron Cross during WWI, sitting and
drawing, 1920s
8 The first armed Jewish militia in
Palestine.
8 Yochai Avrahami, Ruth with Her
Cat and Loom, 2008, linocut
9 Recipient of the Israeli Prize for
Sculpture. Created busts of leaders
and memorials embracing a wide
spectrum of feelings ranging from
oppression to revolt, defense, and
creation, in social realist style.
9 Erich Glas, Retreat; The Death
Say, 1942, from Nights, linocut
print book
10 A renowned Jewish fighter killed
in the battle of Tel Hai. Attributed
the maxim: "It is good to die for our
country."
10 Erich Glas, Flames; Pogroms,
from Nights, 1942, linocut print
book
11 Erich Glas, Concentration
Camp; The Race of Lords, from
Nights, 1942, linolcut print book
13 Yochai Avrahami, Moshe Goren
in his living room, 2008, video still
14 Yochai Avrahami, BauGun,
2009, linocut
15 Yochai Avrahami, Trumpeldor's
rifle in Hashomer Museum, 2007,
digital photograph
16 Yochai Avrahami, Outside the
Conference Room, 2009, linolcut
17 Unknown photographer, Maria
Zacarias in the Weimar Market,
1925, black & white photograph
18 Yochai Avrahami, Vegetated
Bunnies, 2008, linocut
19,20,21 Yochai Avrahami,
Gravestone in the Jewish Cemetery
of Erfurt, 2007, digital photograph
22 Yochai Avrahami, Mati Hemed
demonstrates the Uzi sights, 2008,
video still
23 Yochai Avrahami, Mati Hemed
demonstrates the Uzi disassembly,
2008, video still
24 Yochai Avrahami, Neon
Reflection over Village, 2008, video
still
25 Yochai Avrahami, Furrows of
Formica, 2008, video still
26 Yochai Avrahami, Threshingfloors, 2008, video still
Betwixt a
t and Between:
137
Urban Liminality & the Future of
Binationalism in Jewish-Arab 'Mixed T
This essay analyzes how
urban space, Jewish-Arab
sociality, and local/national
identities have been both
represented and produced in
ethnically mixed towns in
Israel/Palestine. A binational
borderland in which Arabs
and Jews live together, cities
such as Jaffa, Haifa, Acre,
Ramla, and Lydda bring to
the fore, on the one hand,
the paradox of Palestinian
citizens in a fundamentally
Jewish state, while suggesting,
by the very spatial and social
realization of urban liminality
or "mixed-ness," the potential
imaginary of its solution.
Through ethnographic and
historical research centered
in Jaffa, this article posits
mixed towns as a political and
theoretical challenge to the
hegemonic ethnonationalist
guiding principles of the
Israeli state, which fails to
maintain homogeneous,
segregated, and ethnicallystable spaces. This failure, I
argue, results in the parallel
existence of heteronomous
spaces in these towns, which
operate through multiple and
often contradictory logics
of space, class, and nation.
Analyzed relationally, these
spaces produce peculiar forms
of quotidian social relations
between Palestinians and
Israelis, enacting counterhegemonic local identities that
challenge both Palestinian and
Jewish nationalisms.
'Me or him' –
T h u s b e g i n s t h e w a r.
But it
Ends with an
awkward encounter:
'Me and him'
Mahmoud Darwish, State of Siege1
Awkward
Encounters?
Forced
Coexistence
in an
Enabling
Environment
Now more than ever,
Palestinian-Israeli relations
seem like a zero sum game.
Indeed, for more than a
century Jewish and Palestinian
national movements have
been struggling to establish
their collective identities
as separate autochthonous
"nations" with respective
distinct cultural histories
and so were they analyzed by
sociologists, anthropologists,
and historians. Thus, these
projects of nation-building
were conceptualized as
antagonistic processes defined
only by the negation and
exclusion of the other.
Implicated in this struggle
for recognition and
exceptionalism, however,
under Ottoman, British, and
later Israeli rule, Zionist
settlers and Arab inhabitants
interacted in a complex, multivaried web of relations. This
included, on the one hand,
land purchase, dispossession
and territorial feuds, and
on the other, commercial
partnerships, class-based
coalitions, residential mix
and municipal cooperation.
Rather than a unidimensional
conflict between primordial,
self-contained, and largely
monolithic entities, the two
groups and their identities
ipso facto constituted each
other in a relational dialectic
of negation and recognition,
139
d Towns' // Daniel Monterescu
authenticity and mimicry,
segregation and mix.
Historically and analytically,
therefore, the PalestinianArab and the Jewish-Zionist
political collectivities and
cultural projects not only
opposed each other, but at
the same time created each
other, albeit in obvious
asymmetrical positions
of power. The relations of
mutual determination and
the history of contact between
these communities have often
been rendered invisible in
Palestinian-Israeli studies.2
The mutually constitutive
relations and cultural
encounter between the
rival ethnonational groups
and individual actors have
been most acutely marked
in ethnically mixed urban
centers, such as Haifa, Jaffa,
Lydda, Ramla, and Acre, where
both Jews and PalestinianArabs have been sharing one
living space and competing
over limited resources.3 In
these cities, from a condition
of forced coexistence, a
border-zone thus emerged
which brought to the fore the
paradox of Palestinian citizens
in a fundamentally Jewish
state, while simultaneously
suggesting, by the very spatial
and social realization of urban
liminality or "mixed-ness,"
the potential imaginary of its
solution. This twilight area
and intercultural "contact
zone" is the theoretical and
analytical territory explored in
this article.
The highly politicized
encounter between Jewish and
Palestinian individuals and
social worlds – which Darwish
qualifies as "awkward" – can
be literally read from various
public representations that
cover Jaffa's city walls. The
three graffiti I photographed
in 2003 and 2007, three to
seven years after the eruption
of the al-Aqsa Intifada,
point to the persistence of
a deeply rooted structure of
ambivalence. fig. 1 On the
one hand, a series of five
misguided swastikas on a side
street in one of Jaffa's mixed
neighborhoods expresses clear
frustration and anger, but in
a pattern of graphic mimesis
which lacks the cultural and
ideological knowledge required
to draw the historical sign
accurately and thus to convey
the message effectively. The
1 Mahmoud Darwish, "State of
Siege," in Halat Hissar (Beirut:
Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-alNashr, 2002), p. 62.
2 The terms 'Israeli' and
'Palestinian' refer here, respectively,
to Jews who are citizens of Israel
and to Arab-Palestinians, who
are also Israeli citizens, and who
are usually referred to, in Israeli
research and media, as "Israeli
Arabs" (Rabinowitz and Abu Baker
2005). Arabs who remained in Israel
following the establishment of the
state constituted 13% of the total
Israeli population, and now make
up about 17% of the entire Israeli
population. Today, 10% of the entire
Palestinian population in Israel
(approx. 100,000) reside in mixed
towns. In Jaffa, for instance, the
Palestinian population constitutes
24% of the city's total population.
Despite of their population size,
however, mixed towns occupy a
disproportionately important place
in Israeli and Palestinian public
discourse and national imagination.
3 The term 'mixed towns' refers to
the pre-1948 Palestinian leading
and "modern" urban centers that
were officially transformed from
Arab into Jewish cities during the
first years of Israeli statehood.
The majority of the Palestinian
population (95%) in Jaffa, Haifa,
Acre and Ramla, including most of
the local elite strata, were forced to
leave during the hostilities of 1948.
At the same time, Jewish mass
immigration from Europe and the
Fig. 1 Public signs of impossible love and hate: failed attempts to draw a
swastika (above) and a declaration of love – "Fuad Love OSNAT" (below)
result is an indeterminate
signifier which exposes
the drawer's confusion
as much as it attempts
to relay an ideologically
coherent statement. Rather
than an icon of nationalist
enmity, which invokes an
internationally identified
symbolic code, the swastikas
indexically point to the
problematic political context
of urban mix and social
disadvantage from which
they sprang. On the other
hand, a graffiti which reads in
English "Fuad Love OSNAT"
(sic) celebrates a romantic
relationship between a
Palestinian man and a Jewish
woman on the walls of a
mosque, newly renovated by
the Islamic Movement. Here
too, however, the explicit
choice to express their love in
English, namely in a foreign
and "neutral" language, while
insisting on exposing it to
the public in what might be
perceived as a controversial
and even subversive location,
reveals a similar position of
incongruity. These public
expressions of love and hate
are culturally inarticulate
and attest to the political,
social, and cultural difficulty
of enacting coherent subject
positions in Jaffa. The third
graffiti, fig. 2 located in the
same mixed neighborhood
as the first one, seems to
correspond with the figure
of the swastika. Stating,
in English, that "Jaffo [sic.
misspelled Hebrew for Jaffa]
141
is the Jewish City Too,"
the graffiti invokes the
Star of David to make an
ethnonational claim on the
city. This claim over space
and entitlement, however, is
qualified ("Jewish City Too"),
and refrains from making
an exclusionary territorial
statement. Again, here, more
than it calls for a Jewish
takeover of Jaffa, the writing
on the wall reflects a culturally
and politically indeterminate
position vis-à-vis the city's
identity.
While these graffiti
representations express
opposing emotions and
diverging political ideologies,
they all share a semiotic
failure in conveying a clear
message and thus problematize
exclusivist narratives of
identity and place in the
context of the mixed city. This
inconsistency within the two
ethnonational factions that
define difference and identity
in the Palestinian-Israeli city
disrupts a unified vision of
the city as either exclusively
Jewish or Palestinian. Such
examples, I argue, are
representative of more general
practices and interpretations,
which exemplify the
problematic and paradoxical
nature of the cultural regime
that I term spatial heteronomy
in Jaffa.4
How should these paradoxical
representations and the social
world that enabled them be
understood? Addressing a
similar problem in a different
context, Ann Stoler analyzes
conflicting reports by colonial
officials in Sumatra and calls
to "recoup the inconsistencies
of these narratives." For Stoler,
such an endeavor must address
the following questions:
"how do we ethnographically
read these stories and write
a history that retains the
allusive, incomplete nature of
colonial knowledge? How do
we represent the incoherence
rather than write over it with
a neater story we wish to
tell?"5 The methodological
task that Jewish-Arab sociality
and urban mix challenge
us to undertake calls for
making sense of such political
inconsistencies and cultural
reciprocities, without losing
sight of the constant unequal
power relations between these
collectivities.
In line with Stoler's call
Middle East poured into Israel and
settled in the emptied cities (see
Morris 1987; Falah 1996).
4 I define heteronomy as a
paradoxical spatial terrain whereby
constituent parts follow divergent,
sometimes mutually contradictory
logics of class, ethnicity and
social or physical proximity.
Etymologically, heteronomy
goes back to the Greek words for
"other" and "law." Focusing on the
problem of social and spatial order,
I maintain that heteronomy should
be distinguished theoretically from
Foucault's concept of heterotopia,
"of effectively realized utopia …
a sort of place that lies outside
all places and yet is actually
localizable" (1986), such as
cemeteries, fairgrounds, gardens,
and ships.
5 Ann Stoler, "In Cold Blood:
Hierarchies of Credibilities and the
Politics of Colonial Narratives,"
Representations 37:151-185, 1992,
p. 154.
to retain incoherence and
represent ambivalence,
I argue that we should
recognize (politically and
analytically) that Jewish-Arab
mixed towns have long been
sites of opposing as well as
complementary cultural and
social processes. To decipher
these processes one needs
to focus on interactions and
Within this theoretical
context I would like to suggest
a third alternative that
perceives Jaffa as a relational
field in which nationalism
and urbanism, identity and
place are simultaneously
contested and confirmed in
everyday interactions. I offer
a dialectical reading of the
urban, national, and class
Fig. 2 Faint Jewish attempts to reclaim the mixed city
relationships which have
not been over-determined by
national identities and state
ideologies. The argument I
put forth is thus not a liberal
argument of multicultural
peaceful co-existence, nor
is it an argument of urban
ethnocracy as total exclusion.
scales of position and action
that produce Jewish spaces
within Arab spaces and Arab
spaces within Jewish ones,
rather than one ethnicallyhomogenous urban space (as
in Tel Aviv) or two divided
parts (as in Jerusalem).
Such a perspective allows a
critique of the "dual society"
paradigm in Palestinian-Israeli
studies, which posited the
existence of two essentially
separate societies with distinct
and disconnected historical
trajectories. As an instance
of the broader analytic bias
which Ulrich Beck termed
"methodological nationalism,"
I argue that this paradigm had
chained sociological analysis of
ethnically mixed towns to the
category of the nation-state
and thus concealed much of
their interstitial complexities.
The theoretical perspective
of relationalism is proposed
to address the deficiencies
of current approaches to
Palestinian-Israeli relations
and thus change the focus
of analysis from a-priori
relations of exclusion between
reified "communities" to a
space of social transaction,
failed mediation and
binational liminality. In
light of this interpretive
paradigm, a revisionary
conceptualization of the
colonial encounter makes
visible, as Albert Memmi
has noted, the dialectic
"enchaînement" between the
colonizer and the colonized
143
that produces in the process
multiple intentionalities,
identifications, and
alienations.
The notion of liminality –
one of anthropology's gatekeeping concepts – is a state
of mediation as well as a state
of rupture.6 It describes an
existential condition, socially
and culturally defined, which
centers on the threshold
(limen). It is a state of
limbo, "betwixt and between"
normative structures of power.
Marking prevailing structures
of power, it also engenders an
"anti-structure" which often
involves the suspension of
historical time and a break
from "normal" routine.
Liminality, however, is often a
moment of failed mediation.
Mixed towns may thus be
seen as the most powerful
example of political-cumcultural liminality and its
simultaneous failure. Their
Palestinian citizens form a
"trapped minority" crucified
between (the Israeli) state
and (the Palestinian) nation.
Within Israel they are
excluded twice over: they are
denied equal resources and
political recognition from the
municipal authorities as they
are excluded from political
representation on the national
level (in the Supreme Arab
Monitoring Committee, for
instance). Those who inhabit
these cities are in a permanent
state of exception.
As such, urban liminality
has two contradictory
effects, which may be labeled
"disabling" and "enabling"
respectively. It is disabling
for it reproduces a place
where Palestinians cannot
express and perform their
legitimate national identity.
Moreover, it is seen, both
by insiders and outsiders,
as a place of social anomie,
political fragmentation, and
moral crisis. In addition to
the prevailing social problems
(such as crime and a lagging
educational system), mixed
towns lack mechanisms of
social control, partly caused
by the disintegration of the
centralized family structure,
which fails to serve as a
mediator, and to protect its
members. The result, however,
is not the emancipatory
dissolution of patriarchy
and male domination, but
rather the emergence of a
6 In anthropology, liminality refers
to the quality of the second stage
of a ritual in the theories of Arnold
van Gennep, Victor Turner, and
others. In these theories, a rite of
passage involves some change to
the participants, especially their
social status. It is thus a moment of
transition and transformation.
dissociative neo-patriarchal
mode of domination, which is
predicated on violent virility
and territorial masculinity.
In sum, mixed towns suffer
from the disadvantages of
modern urbanism without any
of its benefits – fragmentation
devoid of anonymity's freedom.
Conversely, Jaffa's contact
zone also facilitates binational
social encounters and JewishArab coalitions. Paradoxically
since the October 2000 events,
it functions as an "enabling
environment" for new
claims of equal citizenship,
binational cooperation and
Palestinian presence. While
obviously unable to stand
up to state-led attempts to
Judaize the city and to market
forces of gentrification,
Jewish-Arab initiatives such as
Café Yafa, Autobiography of a
City, Re'ut-Sadaqa and others
nevertheless produce powerful
discourses of resistance and a
symbolic re-Palestinization of
the city from below.
Urban
Colonialism
from a
Relational
Approach
From a broader historical
and comparative perspective,
ethnonational mixed towns
underwent several major
transformations.7 Under
Ottoman, British, and Israeli
rule, they gradually emerged
as a distinct city form. Bound
by demography, discourse,
and history, this socio-spatial
configuration simultaneously
symbolizes and reproduces
dialectic urban encounters and
conflicts.
The history of ethnically
mixed towns in Israel/
Palestine since the 16th
century is an obvious
manifestation of the power
of urban colonialism and its
vicissitudes in the Levant. In
the wake of Ottoman rule and
throughout the 20th century,
the powerful intervention of
European planning ideologies
and Zionist projects of
territorial expansion resulted
in an urban regime that
geographers have recently
termed "urban ethnocracy."
This regime of governmental
power and ethnic control is
notably predicated on the
radical division of urban space
between the affluent and
politically dominant Jewish
settlers and the weakened
Palestinian community,
which is systematically barred
from access to land reserves,
economic resources, and
policymaking circles.
A critical anthropological and
historical outlook, however,
seeks to problematize
such linear geographical
trajectories. Diachronically,
I argue, mixed towns evolved
from millet-based ethnoconfessional structures
to modern nation-based
configurations largely
determined by the logic of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
This notwithstanding,
ethnographic sensibilities
and ethnohistorical inquiry
should make us wary of
treating mixed towns as one
monolithic unit. In the case
of contemporary Israel, for
example, spatial segregation,
145
ethnocratic control, capital
accumulation, and political
alliances vary considerably
between Lydda/Lod, where
indexes of segregation and
poverty are the highest,
and Jaffa and Haifa, which
display more varied sociospatial patterns, with
Haifa especially offering
pockets of more equitable
distribution of wealth and
access to property, amenities,
and political influence.8
Geographers have usefully
devised means of classifying
different modalities of the
"urban ethnic spectrum,"
from assimilation through
pluralism, segmentation, and
polarization, all the way to
cleansing.9 To address this
diachronic and synchronic
variability, the perspective of
relationality is proposed.
As relational historian Zachary
Lockman convincingly shows,
in the historiography of
Israel/Palestine, ideologically
motivated scholarship has laid
the basis for the model of the
"dual society." Institutional
sociologists such as S.N.
Eisenstadt have posited the
existence of two essentially
separate societies with distinct
and disconnected historical
trajectories:
The Arab and Jewish
communities in Palestine are
represented as primordial,
self-contained, and largely
monolithic entities. By
extension, communal identities
are regarded as natural rather
than as constructed within
a larger fields of relations
and forces that differentially
affected (and even constituted)
subgroups among both Arabs
and Jews… This approach
has rendered their mutually
constitutive impact virtually
invisible, tended to downplay
intracommunal divisions, and
focused attention on episodes
of violent conflict, implicitly
assumed to be the sole normal
or even possible form of
interaction.
Equating societies in general
with nation-state societies,
and seeing states and their
national ideologies as the
cornerstones of socialscientific analysis, the "dual
society" approach has been the
main interpretive framework
characterizing research
on Israel/Palestine. This
7 Taking the Ottoman conquest
of 1517 as a point of departure,
we can identify six chronological
urban configurations, each
of which evolved within the
context of specific sociohistoric circumstances. The six
configurations are as follows: The
Prenational, Precapitalist Ottoman
Sectarian Town (1517-1858);
The Protonational, Mercantile
Mixed Town (1830-1921); The
Bifurcated Nationalizing Mixed
Town (1917-1948); The Truncated
Town as War Zone (1947-1950);
The Depopulated Colonized Mixed
Town (1948 to date); The Newly
Mixed Town (1980s to date).
8 The main case study for Yiftachel
and Yacobi's analysis, Lydda/Lod
is the paradigmatic case of urban
ethnocracy with high segregation
rates and a radically disempowered
Palestinian community subject to
concerted attempts at Judaization.
Jaffa, however, has only one third of
its 20,000 strong Arab population
living in a predominantly
Palestinian quarter (Ajami), while
another third lives in the mixed
area of Jerusalem Blvd. The rest
is scattered in the eastern part of
the city (Tel Aviv Municipality
Statistical Bureau, 2006). Haifa,
which entertains a predominantly
well-off Christian population,
has become the home for an
emerging urban middle class of
liberal Palestinians who settled
in previously Jewish-dominated
neighborhoods and thus display a
third residential pattern.
"methodological nationalist"
stance is a deep-rooted
paradigmatic epistemological
position that cuts across the
spectrum of both Palestinian
and Israeli political viewpoints
and operates by fixating
social agents as independent
oppositional actors (settlers
vs. natives, colonizers vs.
colonized). The relational
analysis of Jewish-Arab
mixed towns I put forth,
while not disregarding the
internal processes inherent
to each community, avoids
the blind spot of the dualsociety paradigm and takes
the relationship between the
Jewish and the Palestinian
population as its central
object of study. Moreover,
in this view, the Palestinian
"minority" becomes not merely
a passive ethnonational group
marginalized by the state, but
a key and active agent in the
historical making of Israeli
society and the PalestinianIsraeli conflict at large.
An important clarification
is in line here. While this
paper proposes a relational
and postcolonial reading
of ethnically mixed towns
in Palestine and later
Israel, such a reading by no
means intends to overwrite
Palestine's colonial history. In
fact it proposes precisely the
opposite: while drawing on
urban colonialism as its point
of departure, it reveals "the
fissures and contradictions"
of such projects. Mixed towns
are exemplary sites where
colonial regimes played
their most radical role. This
notwithstanding, it is also
there that they (fortunately)
failed in their attempt to
instigate and to sustain a
stable regime of complete
ethnic separation. While
such attempts at ethnic
dichotomization were effective
in terms of residential
segregation in some cities,
when it came to other aspects
of urban synergy, they were
often subverted by external
resistance and internal failure.
The relational reframing
of Jewish-Arab mixed
towns should be viewed in
contradistinction to three
different images of the city
prevalent in Middle Eastern
studies: the classical colonial
city, the divided city, and the
dual city. These tropes are not
only popular and politically
efficacious metaphors of
racial segregation, ethnic
violence, nationalist struggle,
and class division, but also
serve as sociological ideal
types and geographical models
underwriting urban analysis.10
The classical model of the
colonial city has been a major
gate-keeping concept in such
analyses. Following Fanon's
foundational work on Algiers,
urban colonialism has since
been viewed through the
Manichean divide between
citizens and subjects,
Europeans and natives,
colonizers and colonized.11
Much scholarly attention, for
example, has been drawn to
the role of urban planning and
architecture in visualizing the
rational power and civilizing
mission of colonial regimes
in the Middle East. Colonial
demarcations between the
(Arab) native town and the
(European) ville nouvelle
signified the superiority of
Western modernity and,
concomitantly, the absence –
perhaps even improbability –
of non-European modernities.
The colonial city was thus
only nominally one city, while
in fact it constituted two
147
radically different life worlds
and social temporalities.
The violent climate
surrounding Arab-Jewish
urban relations since the
advent of Zionism may induce
observer and participant
alike to subscribe to a
classical colonial paradigm à
la Fanon. While this may be
an appropriate description
of the situation in the West
Bank and Gaza, citizenship
configurations in mixed
towns inside Israel, and in
particular the presence of
Palestinian citizens within
them, problematize this
political and theoretical
perspective. Urban mix in
Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Lydda, and
Ramla presents a historical
and sociological context that
complicates a space which
no longer corresponds to
Fanon's "world cut in two." By
posing a theoretical challenge
to this idealized polarized
dichotomy whereby divisions
and frontiers are "shown by
barracks and police stations,"
ethnically mixed towns of
the type we have historicized
call for refinements of these
analytical tools.
An interesting case in point
is historian Mark LeVine's
characterization of Tel Aviv
as a colonial city, which
appropriated and dispossessed
Arab Jaffa of its land,
culture, and history. While
this was certainly the case
in the first half of the 20th
century, the classic colonial
city subsequently ceased to
provide a nuanced analytical
framework. The victory of
the Zionist forces and the
ensuing Palestinian tragedy
of the Nakba rocked the
foundations of the social and
political system in Palestine
and gave rise to a new political
subject – the Palestinian
citizens of Israel. Henceforth,
despite state-funded projects
of Judaization, unbreakable
glass ceilings, and limited
mobility, Palestinians in
mixed towns nevertheless
chose to participate in the
politics of citizenship. Thus,
while Palestinian towns in the
occupied territories, such as
Ramallah, Nablus, or Hebron,
remain sharply colonized
and cordoned-off by powerful
external forces, Palestinian
residents of mixed towns
within Israel find themselves
in a different predicament
9 Geographer Fred Boal devised
a classification system for the
study of ethnically mixed cites
which he designated the "Scenarios
Approach," where a scenario is
defined as an imagined set of ethnic
circumstances in a particular city.
A quick indicative categorization
would subsume U.S. cities of the
early twentieth century under the
label of Assimilation category; late
twentieth century Toronto under
Pluralism; contemporary U.S.
Black ghetto under segmentation,
places like Jerusalem and Belfast
under Polarization; and Sarajevo in
the early 1990s under Cleansing.
Within this simplified classification,
Palestinian-Israeli mixed towns
would probably range between
polarization (Lydda, Ramla),
segmentation (Jaffa, Acre) and
pluralism (Haifa).
10 I follow Bodnár's excellent
analysis of the theoretical relations
between these key metaphors here.
See, Judit Bodnár, "Metaphors
We Live In: Dual Cities, Uneven
Development and the Splitting of
Unitary Frames."
11 This is best exemplified in
Fanon's own words: "The settlers'
town is strongly built, all made
of stone and steel. It is a brightlylit town; the streets are covered
with asphalt, and the garbage-cans
swallow all the leavings, unseen,
unknown and hardly thought
about… The town belonging to the
colonized people, or at least the
native town, the Negro village, the
vis-à-vis the state. Making
claims of entitlement in
mixed towns, Palestinian
citizens of Israel tend to
channel their resistance to
party politics, civil society,
and local-level (municipal)
spheres, rather than to the
politics of decolonization.
While many of them invoke
narratives and images of
colonization, these are better
seen as mayday calls of
disenfranchised citizens rather
than collectively organized
calls of a national liberation
movement. A recent example
is the eruption in 2000 of the
second Palestinian uprising
in Jerusalem, the Galilee,
and the occupied territories.
Triggering Pan-Palestinian
solidarity and frustration, it
bred a momentary surge of
heated demonstrations on the
part of Palestinian residents
in mixed towns and amplified
those voices that called for
redefining Israeli citizenship
to include its Palestinian
citizens more fully. Even these
events, however, failed to
mobilize urban Palestinians
within Israel as long-term
active participants in the
national struggle. In terms of
patterns of political awareness
and mobilization, then, mixed
towns once again emerge
as markedly distinct from
colonial cities.
To recapitulate the discussion
on the classical colonial city:
urban colonialism in mixed
towns has worked in different
ways from Ottoman rule
through British administration
and ending with the Israeli
state. Except for moments of
radical confrontation (e.g. in
1936 or 1948), these cities, by
virtue of economic exchange,
commercial collaboration,
and demographic interpermeation, posed a serious
challenge to the logic of
colonial segregation. For
cities like Haifa (where joint
Jewish-Arab mayoralty and
administration persisted
until 1948) and Jaffa (whose
relations with Tel-Aviv, as
LeVine shows, were nothing
but intertwined), the history of
colonialism points also to its
own political and conceptual
limitations.
The divided city is the second
powerful trope and urban
archetype, one which conjures
up slightly different images
of separation walls, barbed
wire, and police patrols.
They evoke barriers of race,
religion, and nationality,
encoded in dualistic
metaphors of East and West,
uptown and downtown,
north side and south side.
Represented by archetypes
such as Jerusalem, Nicosia,
Berlin, or Belfast, these towns
predominantly reproduce
formal discrimination
through differential
entitlement to citizenship
and planning rights. The
status of East Jerusalem is
perhaps the strongest case
for distinguishing the divided
city from the ethnically
mixed town. In addition
to the explicit project of
Judaization, which is more
implicit in mixed towns,
post-1967 Jerusalemites are
not Israeli citizens but merely
permanent residents.12 The
unabashed state violence that
Palestinians encounter on
a daily basis dissuades even
the most optimistic activists
and analysts from wishful
thinking of equal footing and
interaction.
The third image I write
against is the dual-city
model. While the metaphor
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153
of duality has been applied
to colonial and divided cities
alike, it became associated
within urban studies with
economic restructuring
and the vicissitudes of late
capitalism. In an age of
globalization and increasing
disparities between global
North and South, the notion
of "duality," which theorizes
the contemporary city as a
site of unequal production of
space, successfully captures
the uneven nature of social
and urban change. Even in the
context of advanced capitalism
where this concept emerged,
however, Mollenkopf and
Castells – editors of the Dual
City book – conclude that the
dual city idiom is imperfect.
As Bodnár aptly argues, "while
there are powerful polarizing
tendencies, dichotomies will
not suffice: the intersections
of class, race and gender
inequalities are more
complex."
The concept of urban duality
is predicated on the primacy
of capital-based dynamics
and class structure, often
at the expense of ethnic
dynamics, cultural factors,
and communal relations. Thus
the dual city paradigm often
reduces multi-varied urban
differentiation to the duality
of formal and informal labor,
increased professionalization
and capital flow. This analytic
weakness notwithstanding,
in treating the period of
decolonization in the Middle
East, the dual city approach
has greatly contributed to the
understanding of the agonistic
transition from colonial
occupation to postcolonial
self-governance. In her
Urban Apartheid in Morocco,
Abu-Lughod argues that the
"caste cleavages" of social and
spatial segregation instituted
by the French in 1912 were
progressively transformed by
the late 1940s into a "complex
but rigid system of class
stratification along ethnic
lines." This, however, was
replaced in turn by systemic
class-based residential
separation, which emerged in
the 1970s.
In the context of ethnically
mixed towns in Palestine/
Israel, the continual presence
of ethnonational conflict does
not allow class to overwhelm
or supersede ethnicity. The
creeping neoliberalization
medina, the reservation, is a place
of ill-fame, peopled by men of evil
repute. They are born there, it
matters little where and how they
die there; it matters not where,
nor how. It is a world without
spaciousness; men there live on top
of each other… The native town
is a crouching village, a town on
its knees, a town wallowing in the
mire. It is a town of niggers and
dirty Arabs."
12 See, Human Rights
Organization B'Tselem's definition
of permanent residency vs.
citizenship. "Permanent residency
differs substantially from
citizenship. The primary right
granted to permanent residents is
to live and work in Israel without
the necessity of special permits.
Permanent residents are also
entitled to social benefits provided
by the National Insurance Institute
and to health insurance. Permanent
residents have the right to vote in
local elections, but not in elections
to Knesset [Parliament]. Unlike
citizenship, permanent residency
is only passed on to the holder's
children where the holder meets
certain conditions. A permanent
resident with a non-resident
spouse must submit, on behalf of
the spouse, a request for family
unification. Only citizens are
granted the right to return to Israel
at any time" (www.btselem.org/
English/Jerusalem/Legal_Status.asp).
Con f
of the Israeli economy and
real estate in the last two
decades, the recent emergence
of a new Palestinian middle
class, and consequentially
the growing number of young
Palestinian professionals
who choose to live in mixed
towns have introduced class
into an already complicated
urban matrix, which has
become more fragmented and
diversified rather than dual.
Thus the model of the dual
city, as well as of the divided
city or the colonial city, does
little to provide an adequate
framework for explaining
and interpreting residential
choices, urban planning
dynamics, electoral coalitions,
and urban violence in these
towns.
To conclude, I argue that
research on this issue can
greatly benefit from a new
comparative conceptualization
of mixed towns as a
historically specific sociospatial configuration. Insisting
on the importance of a joint
analytic framework, it is
important to bear in mind
that these towns emerged de
facto – that is to say, not as
a theoretical, ideological, or
deterministic model but in
practice – as a new type of
city that resulted from the
historical hybrid superposition
of old and new urban forms.
Out of the collusion of
the old Ottoman sectarian
urban regime and the new
national, modernizing,
and capitalist order (both
Palestinian and Zionist) –
there emerged in the first
half of the 20th century and,
more dramatically, since
1948, a new heteronomous
urban form. Bearing traces
of the old one, it was in fact
a fragmented amalgam of
various city forms.
If the story of mixed towns
has a moral to it, it is perhaps
that nationalistic attempts
at effacing and rewriting
history as part of an effort to
create a country (or at least a
cityscape) which is ethnically
cleansed are bound to fail.
This could perhaps provide a
"mixed" space of hope.
155
n fronting the Iconic
Myth : Revisiting Jaffa // Salim
Virtual Return
Fifteen Years Later
[Salim Tamari]
My reflections on the "virtual return" to Jaffa
were written over a decade ago in an antinostalgic mode. These remarks, which included
a dialogue with Rema Hammami, were meant
to mock (or rather humor) the obsessions of
Palestinian returnees, particularly after the
Oslo agreement of 1993-94, with their past, and
with the iconic status that the historical city of
Jaffa acquired in their imagination as a Paradise
Lost. Certainly the present marginalized status
of the city, as a slum extension of Tel Aviv, and
the squalor in which the Arab inhabitants live,
created an understandable contrast with this
past.
Since these lines were written, the situation
has deteriorated considerably. Many of those
"returnees" have either given up their hope to
settle in Palestine, many of them returning with
despair to their adopted cities and countries.
Those of us who live in the Occupied Territories
also began to experience the blockade in a
very personal way. Jaffa, Jerusalem, as well as
all of the Israeli territories were now banned
destinations. Permits to enter these areas were
scarcely given. Even though I was born in Jaffa,
and part of my family still lives there, it is no
longer possible for me to get there, except by
infiltration.
One of those few occasions took place last
winter (2007) when the group Liminal Space in
collaboration with the Palestinian Association
for Contemporary Art (PACA) organized a field
trip to Jaffa, Ramla, and Lydda (Lod). The
highlight of the event was a walk into the gray
zone (liminal indeed) of Manshiya, located on
the borderline between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, now
reconstituted by the municipality of Tel Aviv
as a high rise tourist area. Only the resilient
and stubborn mosque of Hassan Bek (the
ruthless Ottoman governor) is still standing
as a marker of a bygone era. The trip ended
in a visit to the gentrification schemes of old
Jaffa. The old port, Ajami, and Jabaliyyeh are
now being relentlessly pursued by developers
and contractors, hounding the remnants of the
pauperized Palestinian community in order to
build expensive mansions for the Tel Aviv and
international jet set, seeking an exotic taste of
the Orient, without experiencing the danger
of living in the Third World. This 2007 visit
to Jaffa reinforced earlier impressions, but
also created new ones that challenged earlier
perceptions. At the heart of the new situation
is the manner in which the current changes
drastically limit the housing options open to
the poorer population (mostly Arab) of the city.
One also witnesses a sense of encirclement and
community disintegration in Ramla and Lydda –
both of which were included in this visit. The
highlight of the visit was a night tour of Ramla
led by the city’s young urban planner, Buthaina
Dabit, who has been leading a campaign against
the city’s marginalization by the municipal
T
m
157
Tamari & Rema Hammami
authorities. This year I also became aware of
the triangle that these three cities constitute
for the Palestinian Arab community. There is a
great deal of mobility between them, as there
was over sixty years ago. But in Jaffa there is
constant pressure, by the municipality and
planners, to push the remnants of the Arab
community from the marina, as well as from
Ajami and Jaballiyeh to other points inland –
into the housing projects near Abu Kebir, and
further east, towards Lydda and Ramla. In
Ramla, the Arabs tend to concentrate into
the area of the Ghetto, as their zone is semiofficially known (it is thus designated on official
municipal maps). Both cities have also become
dumping grounds for collaborators, who have
needed Israeli protection since the first Intifada
(1987-92). This explains, to a large extent, why
drug lords and the Arab criminal underworld is
concentrated in Ramla and Lydda.
One feels, however, that people are fighting
back. The gentrification schemes, with their
urban renewal and transplantation schemes
of poor communities, have been resisted on
a daily basis, sometimes with success. Youth
clubs in the three cities have been fighting drug
pushers and apathy. The spirit of the people,
however, seems to be broken, as the community
itself has become helpless and lethargic. The
main hope of young people is to get out. This
malaise is beautifully exemplified in a film
by Kamal Ja’afari, al Sateh (The Roof, 2007),
an intimate portrait of daily life in Ramla,
Jafari’s hometown. The film is a double take
on the author’s own double exile: his life
in Germany as a professional filmmaker, and
his own internal exile in Ramla’s squalid
existence. Jafari also makes the important
observation of the triangular relationship that
existed historically between Ramla, Jaffa, and
Lydda. Historical because these comprised
the urban network that connected the central
coast of Palestine in a matrix of commerce,
transport, and social bonding, creating an
unparalleled modernity that was disrupted by
war. Contemporary because the remnants of the
Arab community after the 1948 war continued
to seek strategies of survival in a much
narrower corridor that linked the three cities.
You can read volumes about it in monographs
on urban (mis)planning, and urban degradation,
but seeing the film allows you to capture the
scene in one glance. Once again, the literary
(and cinematic) imagination proves superior to
social science.
A
H I S TO RY L E S S O N
(SALIM)
The city of Jaffa was the most
important commercial and cultural
center of Arab Palestine before the
1948 war. At the end of April of
that year, the city was captured by
the combined Jewish forces of the
Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi. Except for
several thousand people, its 70,000
inhabitants fled during the fighting
or were expelled, and were never
allowed to return to their homes.
The following pieces were selected
from a series of electronic memoirs/
reflections initiated by Salim Tamari
in 1995 and exchanged by a group of
twelve Jaffa exiles living across the
globe. The correspondence was later
taken over by two young academics
living in Jaffa, Andre Mazawi and
Haytham Sawalhi, and transformed
into a Web page on the city of Jaffa
(www.yafa.org).
Today we went again to visit Old Jaffa.
My companions had less emotional
baggage in that they were already
veterans of this Via Dolorosa and the
objective this time was much more
clearly defined – to eat fish at the
Rauf and Athena restaurant in the
Jabaliyya quarter. Since it was the first
day of the new year according to the
Julian Calendar, we stopped at the
approaches of the city by the Russian
church where my uncle Fayeq got
married more than half a century ago.
The doors were bolted and the nuns
refused to open the place for us, so
we climbed the fence and stole some
bergamot from a leaning tree.
This time we approached the city
from the lower rim by the harbor. I
noticed that the old Hanna Dumiani
soap factory had been renovated and
sandblasted. They not only removed
the Arabic inscription of the owner's
name but added Hebrew motifs to
the eastern entrance of the building,
surmounting it with the Star of David.
Even with the dilapidated state
of the buildings, the view looking up
from the harbor is spectacular and
159
still recalls the nineteenth-century
woodcuts of David Roberts taken from
the sea. The best way to capture this
panorama is to stand between the
Armenian convent and St. Michael's
church with your back to the sea.
There we met eight Russian nuns
gathering pebbles from the seashore.
One of them was angelically beautiful.
It must have been the Day of the
Russians, because soon afterward we
entered the Catholic church when the
evening mass was about to begin, and
it was packed with Soviet immigrants.
At the top of the hill stands the wide
open space that was the dense heart of
Old Jaffa before it was dynamited and
bulldozed by the British at the start
of the Palestine Rebellion in 1936
to clear it of underground resisters.
Now named Kedumim Square by
the Israelis, the plaza is lined by
old Arab buildings converted into
cafés, art boutiques, and restaurants
offering overpriced food. All over the
place young Russian couples were
promenading and taking photos of the
sea and of themselves.
Below the plaza lies a small but
attractive archeological museum
displaying mainly Hellenic and
Roman artifacts. Placards narrating
the history of Jaffa decorate the walls.
In the manner of Ruth Kark in her
book on Jaffa, the Israelis in this
museum have managed to expunge
virtually all traces of Arabs from
the history of the city. Here are the
relevant dates of modern Jaffa as
outlined in the museum brochure1:
1750:
ESTABLISHMENT OF
JAFFA'S FIRST JEWISH
HOSTEL
1799:
CONQUEST OF JAFFA BY
NAPOLEON'S FORCES,
OUTBREAK OF THE
BUBONIC PLAGUE
1820:
REVIVAL OF
JAFFA'S JEWISH
COMMUNITY WITH
THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A HOSTEL AND
SYNAGOGUE BY
ISAIAH AJIMAN
1832:
CONQUEST OF JAFFA BY
THE EGYPTIAN FORCES
1881:
FIRST GROUP OF
JEWISH PIONEERS,
BELONGING TO THE BILU
ORGANIZATION ARRIVES
IN JAFFA
1903+1905:
JAFFA SUFFERS A
CRIPPLING CHOLERA
EPIDEMIC
1917:
EXPULSION OF THE
JEWISH COMMUNITIES
OF JAFFA AND TEL
AVIV BY THE TURKISH
ADMINISTRATION
16 NOVEMBER 1917:
CONQUEST OF JAFFA BY
ALLENBY
1936+1939:
ANTI-JEWISH
DISTURBANCES
THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY [THIS IS HOW
THE GREAT PALESTINE
REBELLION AGAINST THE
BRITISH IS DESCRIBED]
14 MAY 1948:
JAFFA IS LIBERATED
DURING THE PASSOVER
FESTIVAL BY THE JEWISH
UNDERGROUND
24 APRIL 1950:
TEL AVIV AND JAFFA
BECOME UNIFIED.
Despite the museum's silence about
Arabs as past or present inhabitants
of the city, it seems that the tourist
board is expecting large numbers
of them this summer: a special
brochure has been printed in Arabic
and thousands of copies are stacked
at the museum's entrance. Unlike
the chronology above, the Arabs are
mentioned here, and in no uncertain
terms.
161
2 5 OCT 2 0 0 7
B I L 'I N
1[a]
P H O T O : M AU R I C I O G U I L LÉN
2 5 0C T 2 007
1 6 : 38
B IL ' IN
27 O C T 2 0 0 7
JAFFA
P H OT O : M A Y A P A S T ER N AK
163
TOWARD THE END
OF WWI THE CITY
WAS CONQUERED BY
GENERAL ALLENBY,
USHERING IN THE
PERIOD OF THE BRITISH
MANDATE. THE PORT OF
JAFFA (THE SOLE PORT
AT THE TIME) SERVED AS
THE POINT OF ENTRY FOR
THE INCREASED JEWISH
IMMIGRATION WHICH
CAME TO THE LAND.
THE JEWS SUFFERED
FROM POGROMS AND
PERSECUTION AT THE
HAND OF THE ARABS.
THE ATTACKS REACHED
A PEAK SHORTLY BEFORE
THE DECLARATION OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN
MAY 1948.
JEWISH DEFENSIVE
ACTION LED TO THE
FLIGHT OF MOST OF
THE CITY'S ARABS,
AND SHORTLY AFTER
THAT PART OF THE
CITY WAS SETTLED BY
THE IMPOVERISHED
JEWISH FAMILIES WHOM
THE WAR HAD LEFT
HOMELESS.
At this stage we decided we had had
enough history and proceeded to the
fish restaurant. This, incidentally,
is a ritual shared by all Palestinian
"returnees" to Jaffa. After being
slapped by the gentrified and
de-Arabized city and treated to a
laundered version of their history,
they treat themselves to a sumptuous
meal by the sea in order to forget.
In our case we were lucky to find
the Rauf and Athena empty except
for the Gazan illegal waiters eager
to exchange views on the coming
Palestinian elections. Our waiter
was from the Khan Yunis camp and
a distant relative of Hasan Asfour – a
former communist running on the
Fatah list. He was trying to find a way
to sneak back into the Strip to vote for
his cousin.
R E M A’ S
J A F FA
I always go to Jaffa with a sense of emotional
trepidation and leave with diffuse anger and
resignation. My final feeling on the way home to
Jerusalem is generally that I don't want to go back.
Going to Jaffa for someone who grew up with it as
an iconic myth, a place that no other place can ever
measure up to, is bound to bring disappointment.
My feeling of being burdened by Jaffa, this place
that exists only in the world of lost paradises,
is no different from that of any other child of a
Jaffaite. For there are no "former" Jaffaites – they
never really left in 1948 but still carry it around
with them everywhere and always. I would love
to be able to walk through the city without being
weighed down by its past and my duty to that
past – just to be able to be fascinated by the
architecture and the people who live there now, to
be able to call them "Yaffawiin" in some meaningful
way, instead of referring to them as "the present
inhabitants." Alas, to do so would mean being
burned at the stake for collaborating with a reality
built on the demolition of dreams.
My first trip to Jaffa was in the spring of 1989.
My aunt who lives in Jerusalem had wanted to
take me earlier, but because it was intifada time,
any movement beyond the perimeter of Shuafat
and Salahiddin street was seen as a move into
uncharted and potentially dangerous territory. My
aunt had left Jaffa when she was eleven and had
spent her teen years in Beirut, a far more open
environment than she ever could have experienced
in Jaffa – witness the tissue-wrapped photos she
keeps of herself and her Brazilian girlfriend in
1950s movie-queen bathing suits at the plage in
Beirut. In Jaffa, she was never even taught to swim
like her brothers because she was a girl.
I don't remember much about the city from that
first trip. Mostly it was the problematic quest for
the family house in Jabaliyya, what had been the
new southern suburb of the city. (Not long before
my visit, my younger sister had tried to find the
house as well, and a cousin mistakenly took her to
the house of my father's cousin where the nervous
Arab occupant let them in, but then proceeded to
show them his revolver.) We drove past my great
uncle's house, now the residence of the French
consul. Built in the 1940s, it was and is a grand
modernist Bauhaus mansion, all straight lines and
cream-colored stream-lined volumes. My aunt said
it had been her uncle's dream house and one of the
most modern in all Palestine. She also said that
he was from the most conservative branch of the
family and that his wife and daughters rarely went
out. So much for architectural determinism.
"From Bauhaus to our house." My family's house
was lost or, even worse, destroyed. We kept
circling and turning back down the same narrow
residential road, while my aunt pointed out Said
Hammami's house, the Kanafani family's pink
stone house on the adjacent corner, and so on.
Then she would recalculate, confused: "Our house
should be here. . . ." Suddenly it struck her: the
grotesquely ugly two-story pebble-brown Israeli
building was actually our house, now concealed
under a hideous facade of pebbled-concrete. We
got out of the car and she started crying, "They've
buried it! Our house is in a tomb!!" Some Arab
workmen were digging up the pavement and came
165
over to see what was the matter. I explained, and
perhaps to make us feel better one of them said,
"Yes, yes. We know the Hammami family. All of
these are Hammami houses, and we still call this
Hammami street."
My aunt was too upset to go inside and got
back into the car. Across the house's upper floor,
emblazoned in Hebrew and English, were letters
spelling out its new identity, Beit Nurit – "House of
Light." I went ahead to the large electric gate which
was now the front entrance, though originally
it had been backside of the house. Because the
entrances had been switched and additions made,
and because the original character of the place was
hidden under the concrete shell, it was difficult to
tell what was where. What did show through was
the original three-arched veranda and entrance,
though most of it was now enclosed. When I saw
the arches I had a sudden shock of recognition
based on an old family photograph taken in front
of this veranda, which back then had a huge
asparagus fern growing up one side. The photo
had that slightly out-of-focus, dream-like quality
peculiar to old photos. It showed a large family,
with young girls in white frocks and bows in their
hair lined up in the front row. I always noticed
how innocent they looked, but perhaps that was
something I read into their expressions, knowing
what was going to happen to them a year later.
The gate was open so I walked in. I found myself in
the large liwan, the womb of the house, which still
had its columns and original italianate tile floor. It
was full of people who somehow didn't enter my
field of vision: I was remapping the liwan's former
reality, a process that excluded objects and people
not part of that earlier moment. Then someone
spoke to me in Hebrew, and I was brought out of
my dream. A woman in a white medical coat was
asking me things I didn't understand. I looked
around and realized that the liwan was full of
retarded children. When I answered in English, the
woman walked off and returned with a large blonde
Germanic looking matron, also in a white coat.
She looked like the female jailer in Seven Beauties
or a heftier nurse Ratched from One Flew Over the
Cuckoo's Nest. She asked me what I wanted, and
I replied that this was my grandfather's house and
I just wanted to look at it. For some reason I was
surprised at her reaction, which was nervousness
and agitation.
She became very flustered and said, variously,
that I must be mistaken, that it couldn't be
true, and besides, how could I know it was my
grandfather's house? I replied that my aunt who
grew up in the house was sitting right outside in
the car. The woman told me that before I looked
further she had to get the director. After a bit I was
ushered upstairs to the director, ensconced in his
desk and emitting an aura of deep and expansive
self-confidence. "Sit, sit, come in come in. Yes yes,
do come in," he said in that pushy way that Israelis
seem to understand as warmth. "Here, I want
to show you something." I followed him to the
landing where he indicated an odd colored frieze
on the wall. He asked me to look closely, and then
proceeded to explain with what seemed to be glee
that the frieze depicted the return of the Jewish
people to the Land of Israel and the creation of the
Jewish state. He ended with a kind of hymn to the
success of the Zionist dream. I was speechless at
what I could only take as a form of sadism, and
mumbled something like: "Look, I just want to
look around the house." Without waiting for an
answer, I proceeded to do so.
On subsequent visits, the occupants changed from
retarded children to incapacitated old people. This
made the visits even more painful, since when
you stopped visually excavating the place in search
of the original structure you looked up to find
yourself surrounded by hunched up and drooling
old men and women with unkempt hair lolling in
plastic chairs as if sedated. You walked past them
as if they didn't see you, like walking through a
gallery of macabre statuary. Our house had become
a dumping ground for unwanted people – God's
waiting room. It occurred to me that in their earlier
lives these pathetic souls may have played their
part in making the Victory Frieze on the second
floor possible.
There were many things about Jaffa that my aunt
was unable to explain to me – nor did she really
know even the Jabaliyya neighborhood where
she had grown up. At first I attributed this to her
youthfulness in 1948, to the fact that she had
only a child's-eye memory of her environment.
Though this was partly the case, it was also due to
the fact that she had been a girl in a conservative
community and could not roam about freely
like my father who was about the same age. She
told me how her movements had been further
circumscribed: Once, playing with neighborhood
children in the street outside her house, they had
spotted an older man in a tall tarbush and a suit
riding by on a bicycle at the end of the street.
They all began jeering and making catcalls at him.
As he turned his head to look at them, my aunt
realized in horror that the comic figure they'd been
mocking was my grandfather. He saw her as well
but with his usual self-control kept pedaling away
while she died a thousand deaths knowing what
she would face when he came home. After this
incident she was no longer allowed to play outside
and thus stopped being able to see her playmate
Ghassan Kanafani2, who she says used to be the
instigator of games of make-believe.
Although all of my aunts went to school, the
main function of schooling of young girls seemed
to be the "finishing" necessary for young ladies.
Thus needlepoint and music figure strongly in
my aunt's depiction of her early education. I gave
my sister in Boston the only thing we inherited
from our grandmother: a garishly colored petitpoint embroidery of an eighteenth-century French
lady in a pastoral scene. The piece was such a
dilemma – ugly and kitschy yet simultaneously
something to be cherished as having belonged to
my grandmother.
Although the family had a dining table, my aunt
told me that they preferred to eat sitting on
mats around a short-legged round table in the
kitchen. The image intrigued me. The Bauhaus
architecture, the needlepoint, the missionary
school education and all the while there was this
(secret?) preference to eat sitting on the floor. I
could picture the empty dining table standing
proud but forlorn at the end of the liwan, while
happy voices emanated from the cramped kitchen.
167
A D AT E
WITH MURJANA
(SALIM)
Yesterday I went to Jaffa for my first
(probably also my last) rendezvous
arranged on the Internet. It all began
four months ago when a young woman
introduced herself on my screen
as wanting to talk with somebody
in Ramallah. She is a computer
technician from Tel Aviv, born and
raised in Jaffa. When I suggested that
I might come to Jaffa on a Friday
afternoon, she said she would show
me around.
We decided to meet by the clock tower
at 2:30 p.m. I told her to look for a
man with gray hair. She described
herself as blond and wearing high
heals. Liza Bouri, who is visiting us
this winter, was dying to go to Jaffa,
her birth place, so I took her along,
and Rema and Alex came as well. Liza
cried all the way in anticipation of the
encounter with her lost city. Later, she
told me that she was crying because
her father died without having the
chance to revisit Jaffa.
We arrived fifteen minutes late.
Murjana was waiting next to a bakery.
She was indeed blond. Actually, her
hair was platinum silver with streaks
of gold. She suggested that we meet
her family. We all went to a new
working-class neighborhood that
Russian Yuppies have been moving
into and where her family lives.
The mother is a social worker with
a fighting spirit. She belonged to a
community group that was trying
to get Arab representation on the
city council. The father, a mechanic,
had just awakened and greeted us in
Hebrew – to Liza's great discomfort.
Language actually was a problem in
this household. Murjana spoke Arabic
with strong Hebrew inflections, and
the elder brother cannot read or write
in his native tongue. Only the mother
knew proper Arabic. They all mixed
their talk with a liberal sprinkling of
Hebrew.
The family – four sisters and
two brothers – was close, but the
daughters, at least according to
Murjana, spoke of their family's
oppressive protectiveness. The
younger sister had gone to study in
Marseilles and married a French
student, but because he was a
Christian the daughters did not dare
tell the family.
When we finally went on the tour we
found that Murjana, our tour guide,
hardly knew what was where. She
could not identify any landmarks
except for the French Hospital
(where I was born) and the church of
al-Khader. At al-Khader, we saw young
Jaffaite boys and girls playing in the
yard, and Liza started crying again.
She was taking pictures of everything
that moved. We passed Yafet Street
and my maternal grandfather's
house. Fakhri Jdaii, my mother's
distant cousin, still has his pharmacy
there and pays rent to Amidar – the
Custodian of Absentee Property. We
did not stop; it was late and Fakhri
would have felt obliged to invite this
large crowd for dinner.
One of the most memorable aspects
of the outing was seeing the way
Murjana related to Jaffa. She had
absolutely no feeling for the place.
Freedom to her meant Haifa, where
she had an occasional job, and a
place away from family oppression.
To her, growing up in Jaffa meant
growing up in squalor. The remnants
of the community were the poorer
Arab villagers who had been forced
to relocate to the city when their
homes were destroyed in 1948.
Today, of Jaffa's total population
of 70,000, Arabs constitute about
20,000. Less than a quarter of these
are original Jaffaites, the rest being
refugees from Salama, Rubeen, Shaykh
Muwwanis, Manshiya, and so on,
as well as workers from the Galilee
employed in Tel Aviv. Unlike the
situation in Haifa, the communal
bond uniting the Arabs of Jaffa is
very weak. There is also a strong
feeling of confessionalism and worse –
atomization. Prostitution and drug
gangsterism are rampant, and the
few pockets of nationalist groups are
completely isolated.
To us, Jaffa cast a very long shadow.
A city abandoned and now in the
process of being rejuvenated or
gentrified by Jews seeking abandoned
Arab houses – or pushing for Arab
houses to be abandoned.
One of the most moving moments
was our visit to the harbor where
Rema narrated how her father, Hasan
Hammami, as a teenage boy embarked
upon a boat with his family – along
169
with hundreds of other families – on
10 May 1948, leaving Jaffa for the last
time in the direction of the ship that
took them to Beirut and permanent
exile. As they embarked, gun shells
were exploding all around them,
spreading panic and mayhem.
Last year, Hasan came on a visit as an
American tourist. He went straight
to his house in Jabaliyya, next to the
Christian cemetery. The house was
abandoned. Then he saw a light next
door were the Andrawus family used
to live. He vividly remembered the
Andrawus girls he used to lust for
as a growing boy. It was 9:30 in the
evening and despite protests from his
wife and daughter, he knocked at the
door. To their utter astonishment,
they found the four Andrawus girls,
now matronly ladies in their sixties,
facing them at the door. After a tearful
scene of embracing and hugging, and
many lemonades later, they told him
that none of them had married, since
"all the men of stature" had gone.
That says a lot of what happened to
the city. Murjana was completely
oblivious to this. Her main interest
was in taking us to the Hinnawi
Brothers' ice cream shop were they
had twenty-two flavors.
After leaving the harbor, we went
through the main thoroughfare of
Ajami, now called Yafet Street, past
the French Hospital, past Terra
Sancta, past the Ottoman fountain,
Sabil Abu Nabbout, and finally past
Kemal Pharmacy, on top of which
stands the house of my grandfather,
Salim Jabagi, where my mother and
her twelve siblings were born. Now it
is occupied by two Moroccan Jewish
families who, ten years ago when I
went to visit with Suad, denied us
entry. Diagonally across the street is
the decaying house of Elias Tamari,
where my father and my uncles Fayeq,
Abdallah, and Emile, and my two
aunts were born.
Ajami today is a divided quarter.
Only the disintegrating old mansions
of the patrician Jaffan merchants
bespeak its former glory. Beyond Yafet,
going west toward the sea, one faces
squalor everywhere. Arab and Jewish
prostitutes mingle and fraternize,
and drug dealers are everywhere. By
the seashore, Arabs are encouraged
to relocate south (to housing estates
near Bat Yam) and a new marina is
being built for rich condo invaders.
Gentrified single-story houses are
sprouting up everywhere. For the
last decade, Ajami has become the
real estate destination of hip Jewish
artists, gallery owners, professionals,
and foreign embassy staff. There
is an easy coexistence between the
newcomers and the destitute Arab
community. In the middle have
remained few established families of
Jaffa and another dozen nouveau riche
Jaffaites who made their fortunes from
building contracting and drug dealing.
By the old water reservoir (Hawuuz),
Murjana pointed out a vacant lot
confiscated from her grandfather.
In 1949, Amidar took his two-anda-half dunams away and offered
him compensation. He refused the
money and contested the confiscation
in court. Since he had not left the
city, he had a good case. But he
lost, and the money was deposited
in his name in Bank Leumi. He
refused to touch it. When he died
fifteen years later, the family could
not trace the money. But they still
hold fast to the land deed, their family
patrimony.
Now we moved on to the Old City. It
was here that the Great Palestinian
Rebellion began in 1936. And it was
here that the British, in an operation
reenacted by Arik Sharon in Gaza
forty years later, moved in with a huge
force and blasted a Y-shaped passage
linking the harbor to an opening
toward Clock Square, bulldozing
the rubble to make swift passage for
armored cars.3
The Old City today encapsulates
the magnificence and tragedy of
historic Jaffa. The Israelis – meaning
the greater Tel Aviv-Jaffa Council –
have completely renovated the area
as a major tourist attraction and
an "artists' colony," an operation
later replicated in Old Safed and in
Ayn Hawd.4 Outwardly the place is
attractive if you are ignorant of its
historical context, full of restaurants,
cafés, galleries, promenades, and
so on. It is a favorite vista for Arab
and Sephardic newlyweds who come
here with video teams for photo
opportunities. Several signposts
171
and coin-operated machines
narrate the history of Jaffa in four
languages (not Arabic). Just as in
the archeological museum, nowhere
is there an indication that this was
once a thriving Arab city – the biggest
and richest in Palestine. The taped
narrative mentions Philistines,
Phoenicians, Mamluks, Turks, and
British who, we learn, all had their
share in plundering the city until it
was delivered by the combined Jewish
forces of the Haganah and Lehi in
May of 1948. A ragged sculpture of
Napoleon Bonaparte, who seized the
city in the year 1800, points his finger
to a restaurant overlooking the harbor.
The cafés and restaurants were
blaring music and full of mixed Tel
Avian and tourist clienteles. Rema
pointed out a remarkable absence.
There were no young people around
except for the two wedding parties
being photographed. Even the noisy
café bar with disco music by the
harbor landing was full of couples over
fifty. We differed on how to explain
this. Rema and Alex thought it was
the antiseptic atmosphere of the
neighborhood, self-consciously quaint
but intimidating. Murjana thought it
was the prices, the fact - intentional that no young couple could afford a
cup of cappuccino in Old Jaffa.
On the way to the harbor, I met
an old student of mine showing an
Egyptian friend of hers the town. This
strange encounter brought me back
to reality. Jaffa is really a figment
of the imagination. There is no
connection between the city of our
parents and this bleached ghost town.
But Arab visitors construct the past
from their memory (or their parents'
and grandparents' memory) using the
rubble as their nodes.
Only in one short lane the great city
has retained its past – that is, the
stretch between the old mosque, past
St. Michael's Orthodox monastery and
the attached church, down the stairs
to the old harbor. Here the walls, the
staircase, and even the engraved Greek
and Arabic signs have been retained.
The feeling is eerie and haunting, and
here there is complete silence. Thanks
to the Greeks, the Arabness of the city
has been preserved.
R E M A’ S
VERSION
Between my first and my last trip to Jaffa there
have been others, the most painful perhaps being
when I accompanied my father on his first visit
"home" since he left as a boy in 1948. The most
recent was with Salim, Liza, and Alex. I wanted
to meet Murjana because I so rarely get to meet
contemporary Jaffaites – people many of the
originals do not even consider as being really of
Jaffa but as latecomers who are just posing as
Yaffawiin while the authentic ones are in exile.
I also like visiting Jaffa with Salim because he
harbors many of the same resentments about
the oppressive reverence with which children of
Jaffaites are supposed to react to the place, as well
as the desire to resist the overwhelming bitterness
one feels about the subversion of Jaffa's history.
As we headed toward Jaffa on the Tel Aviv
highway – as opposed to the "Beit Dajan/Yazur"
route I am usually forced to take on family
pilgrimages) I realized it was going to be an
emotionally charged visit because of Liza's return
for the first time. I had obliquely thought of the
trip as a visit to the Jaffa of today through the
person of Murjana. However, it turned into the
colliding of the two Jaffas – the one of loss and
dreams and the one of everyday lived-in places.
Jaffa is not marked as an exit on the main
highway – you have to know to get off at the exit
marked "Kibbutz Galuyot." One wonders why, but
most likely rather than being a conspiracy Kibbutz
Galuyot is for some reason a more important
marker on the Israeli map of geographic meaning
than Jaffa. The main road into the city begins with
1950s housing projects and then dissipates into
an industrial area; you only start picking out that
you are near Jaffa when you see dilapidated old
buildings with orange-tiled roofs dotted in between
what seem to be grimy mechanic shops and
crossroads attempting to lure you in more hopeful
directions. One has to be totally committed to
visiting Jaffa in order to make it through this maze
of unmarked directions and one-way streets.
Finally, we reached Clock Square. By now we
know that it is best to park on the right side of the
prison-fortress in the sandy parking lot overlooking
the sea. It is at this point that one always feels
pulled in two directions: whether to walk up to
the Old City or around the square and old market
area. That day it was decided for us by Murjana,
who had arranged with Salim to be waiting
near the clock tower. So we filed down the main
square, attempting to piece together various bits of
information that could serve as Liza's introduction.
Past the mosque and the lurid tropical juice cafés
we crossed the street to the clock, and on the
opposite side was a "blonde" leaning against a
doorway – Murjana. What struck me was not the
blonde streaks in her hair (I was once teased by
Gaza women that I couldn't be from Jaffa because
I didn't have "frosted" hair), but the fact that she
was wearing a blouse and jeans too tight to put
things in the pockets, but was not carrying a bag –
women always seem to have a need to carry things.
The group was, I think, a bit surprised by this tall
attractive woman who was also clearly quite shy
and not sure about what to do with us.
Murjana insisted that before anything we must
go home to meet her family, who were waiting for
173
us. This immediately raised the problem of oldversus-new Jaffa. If we were to get caught at her
house, we probably would not be able to do what
Liza had been waiting for all her life – visit the
lost Jaffa of her father. In this one brief moment
all the contending needs of the array of Jaffaites
came up against each other. The Jaffaites of the
here-and-now wanting to welcome us into their
homes and learn about us as "real" Palestinians
living in the West Bank or the diaspora; and us,
who saw ourselves and wanted to be seen as
Jaffaites, wanting to celebrate our "Jaffaishness"
with Murjana and walk around uncovering the
"real" Jaffa from underneath the Israeli signs and
landscapes imposed on "our" city.
Of course we made the courtesy call to Murjana's
family, who lived not far from "my house" though
on the other side of the main road. In asking
Murjana what this neighborhood was called, she
looked confused and shrugged: "shu barifni?" –
"who knows?"
Her neighborhood had all the marks of the
failed housing rehabilitation projects that stand
dejectedly around Ajami. A few years ago the New
Israel Fund had decided to start doing projects in
the Arab sector. Jaffa, as the metaphor for Arab
communities in need of rehabilitation (Read:
drug addicts, thieves, and prostitutes), was taken
on as the showcase project. Money provided
largely by the Los Angeles Jewish community
went into "urban renewal," especially in Ajami
where the exteriors of houses were returned to
their original Venetian-style splendor, while a
pedestrian walkway and small children's park
were added. But the people living in the houses
selected for rehabilitation were the poor remnants
of a community that had been literally destroyed,
and all of their attempts at civic control over their
own lives had been quickly and systematically
neutralized. So it was not long before the pink
stucco was either soiled or splashed with graffiti,
the houses and park now standing as eloquent
reminders of the futility of prettifying the
environments of fundamentally marginalized and
oppressed peoples – at least when the prettifying
is undertaken by the same forces that marginalize
and oppress them.
Murjana's family lived in a relatively new onestory house that had not been rehabilitated and
that could not have figured in our Jaffa dreams.
We were led into the liwan where we were met
by Murjana's mother – the best Arabic speaker
of the family as well as the strongest personality.
We were introduced to the family in dribs and
drabs. Murjana's father, who had just woken up,
shuffled in; the beautiful red-headed sister came
and sat with us; two very uninterested brothers
who had just awakened filed by at various intervals
with hastily mumbled greetings and even hastier
departures. The father was very quiet. It seems that
whenever he tried to speak Arabic, Hebrew words
came out. This linguistic unease perhaps explained
why the brothers, who we were told spoke no
Arabic, seemed to avoid us. The beautiful redhead
had diligently majored in Arabic, but she too was
shy to speak. This meant that the matriarch was
our main point of contact. She taught in the public
school system and was actively involved in the
community and municipal politics, explaining
A VISIT
TO T H E D E A D
(SALIM)
how Jaffa's managing to get one Palestinian
representative in the Tel Aviv municipality (into
which the Jaffa municipality has been dissolved)
after forty-five years was a great achievement for a
community so divided among and against itself.
Murjana's mother was very good at the
contemporary political and social situation, but of
no use in satisfying Liza's need for confirmation
of her family's link to Jaffa. In fact, Murjana's
family recognized none of the original Jaffa family
names we lobbed at them, or simply acknowledged
that they'd heard the names but were not able to
provide any of the hoped for genealogical itineraries
or their connection to contemporary sites which
Jaffan exiles so deeply need. I was beginning to get
frustrated – we were being corralled into a very
unnecessary lunch made by Murjana, which would
prevent us from seeing the city in daylight and
leave no room for the fish dinner at the end of the
day, always the needed transition from the pain of
lost Jaffa and back into the world of the living.
I thought that my frustration was on Liza's behalf,
since it seemed so unjust for her to be cooped
up in someone's living room in Jaffa while the
sun was going down on the city she had so long
longed to explore. In retrospect, however, it seems
clear that I am also not ready or able to visit Jaffa
as the contemporary place it is. I am still too
overwhelmed by the desire to uncover that past, to
find the Jaffa hidden under the new signs and to
make it live again through the stories of my father
and other exiles, then connect them back to a
pavement I walk on, a storefront now boarded up,
a clump of old cypress trees in a front garden.
Last Sunday Suad, Beshara, and I went
to visit the Jaffa cemetery in Jabaliyya.
We were looking for the remnants of
my family. My mother had mentioned
that some time in the late thirties,
when she was in her teens, the Jaffa
cemetery near the city center in Ajami
had to be moved since the dead were
crowding the living. An outlying plot
in Jabaliyya was chosen since at the
time it was at the southern edge of
the town. The dead were dug up and
heaped in collective family plots. Rich
people built family crypts known as
Fustuqiyyat laced with marble and
embellished with highly stylized
verses celebrating their occupants.
The poor were dumped in holes
marked by concrete blocks. All this
seems inconsequential today since all
three Arab cemeteries have become
squalid heaps. All that remains of
their beauty is their location – a
magnificent hilly plot overlooking the
Mediterranean.
From the western edge of the Greek
Orthodox cemetery, you can see Ajami
to the north and the beginnings of
Bat Yam to the south. Soon the Israeli
plans for Jaffa's gentrification will
175
extend the marina project to this
point, and both the dead and (some of)
the living will be enjoying the view.
My two companions were not
interested in my quest and had to be
dragged in. Suad's father was born
in Manshiya, died in Prague, and
was buried in Amman. She went
to visit his grave twenty years ago
accompanied by her mother, who
slipped near the grave and broke her
pelvis. They never went back. Beshara
was still shaken from the morning
boat tour of the Jaffa harbor and the
unbearable kitsch of the renovated
lofts surrounding the old town. He
was particularly annoyed when the
Arab waiter in the restaurant – also
called Beshara – addressed him in
Hebrew. Of the three, only I have a
fetishism for the dead.
The three Arab cemeteries, where
there is a progression of decay, are
separated by walls. First the Muslim
cemetery, a sloping field of thorns
and brush dotted with uniformly
melting white marble. Rema had
earlier claimed to have located the
grave of her grandfather, Shaykh Ali
al-Hammami, among the thorny
shrubs, but I do not see how. Next, the
Greek Orthodox cemetery is similarly
disintegrating, but with a few family
crypts valiantly withstanding time and
the sea breeze's devastation. Finally,
the Catholic cemetery, with an air
of a fading beauty queen, some new
marble here and there but not enough
to mask the cruelty of years.
This time we entered the Orthodox
cemetery and asked the caretaker, a
gaunt and shabby man in his sixties,
if he knew of any Tamari graves. At
first he suggested that we go to Yazur
(only God knows why), but then
suggested we look in the northwest
corner where the pre-1948 graves
were. It was a hopeless quest. Very few
of the older graves were left intact,
and among those only an archeologist
could decipher the script. Eventually
I could make out some older names:
Qahush, Musa, Khoury, Burtqush.
Then I came across a grave with a
name I recognized, Nicola Dabbas –
Aunt Margo's father, the father-in-law
of my uncle Fayeq. But mostly the old
graves were covered over by new ones.
Since the cemetery was too small to
accommodate the new dead and very
few of original pre-1948 Jaffa families
were left to maintain their family
plots, the newcomers (from Ramla,
Lydda, and the Galilee) had begun to
displace them.
What astonished us, however, was
the Russian invasion. All over the
place the old Arabic grave slabs
(shawahid) were being replaced with
Russian ones. In Jaffa there was a
small Russian Orthodox community,
attached to the Russian convent – so
obviously some of these were the nuns
and monks. But that does not explain
the sudden flood of Russian-inscribed
graves in the 1980s and 1990s. The
most logical explanation is that many
of these are Soviet immigrants who
came to Israel disguised as Jews,
or as Christian spouses of Jewish
immigrants. Many of them had
occupied portions of Arab graves and
carved their niches on top of the
marble slabs. You could still see many
of the Arabic inscriptions underneath
the Russian ones. Nearer to the
entrance – among the more recent
burials – we also saw Hebrew graves
carved on top of the Arab graves.
Invariably they would have a small
cross on top and a Slavic name in
Hebrew script, Ruth Davidovich, for
example, who died 14 February 1989.
Beshara – already in a bad mood
from the boat trip – was foaming by
now. "First they take the 'abandoned'
houses in Jaffa, then they displace
Arab workers from their jobs, and now
they have occupied our cemeteries!"
he fumed.
It wasn't clear who "they" were. The
main diplacers of Arab abandoned
houses in Jaffa were Bulgarian Jews
who came in the 1950s. But in the
1980s and 1990s, it was the Russians
and Ukrainians who began to
invade Jaffa and Tel Aviv, with heavy
connections with the Russian mafia
in Israel.
We sought enlightenment to all these
mysteries from the caretaker, but he
was more interested in confusing
us. He led us by the hand to the
newly-built Orthodox chapel, still
fresh with new paint and not even
consecrated yet, near the cemetery's
entrance. The Orthodox community,
177
he told us, had tried to get a plot for
the chapel outside the cemetery, but
the municipality would not grant
one. But we were curious about other
issues: "What happened to the older
dead? Why so many Russian names
on the graves? Who are those Hebrew
Christians?" The man's lips were
sealed. Either he didn't know, or he
didn't want us to know. Suad decided
he was subcontracting the older graves
for the newly dead.
On the way back to Jerusalem, with
Beshara driving and Suad directing,
we got completely lost.
1 "Old Jaffa" leaflet distributed by the Old Jaffa
Development Corporation.
2 Palestinian writer, poet, and activist, assassinated by
the Israelis in Beirut in 1973.
3 This surgical act of urban cleansing was captured
in its razor sharpness in three photographs shot from
the air that can be seen in Sarah Graham-Brown's
Palestinians and Their Society, 1880+1946: A
Photographic Essay (London: Quartet Books, 1980).
4 A picturesque village in the Haifa district whose
population was expelled during the 1948 fighting but
which was not destroyed. It was transformed into an
artists' colony in 1954 and has been designated as a
tourist site.
* Salim Tamari is director of IPS's Jerusalem affiliate,
the Institute for Jerusalem Studies, and an associate
professor of sociology at Birzeit University.
* Rema Hammami is assistant professor of
anthropology at Birzeit University and the coordinator
of research at Birzeit's Women's Study Center.
" TA B A D U L "
(SALIM)
Every new visit to Jaffa dulls the
novelty of the encounter. The
dramatic fades away, and the mundane
prevails. But the excitement is always
there, in part because there is an
element of trespassing. We go there
without a permit, and therefore our
presence is "illegal." But we also
trespass on people's existing reality
by invoking a past which they, the
Jewish majority of present-day Jaffa,
do not recognize or choose to suppress
or – most likely – are completely
oblivious to.
Recently we began making greater
efforts to observe the existing
realities of Jaffa and suppressing the
(nostalgic?) past. Which basically
means that you skip the sea, the
restaurants, the artists' quarter, the
churches, and the mosques. You must
also skip the cemeteries. Especially
the cemeteries. (Rania, Brigitte, and
I were expelled from the Jabaliyya
cemetery last month by two Jaffa
thugs wearing swimming shorts for
showing disrespect for the dead.)
So now we meander around the
streets and let our feet guide us. We
let the faces and the dialects and the
smells leave their traces on us. Last
week we began by buying manaqish
from Abul 'Afyeh's pastry shop and
set out on a mission of discovery.
Rema insisted on visiting the music
shop across from the police station.
The man was a Moroccan who lives
in Holon and has been in Jaffa for a
long time. He was very eager to show
us his collection of predominantly
Arabic music. Um Kalthum, Abdel
Wahhab, and Layla Murad were
dominant. (No sign of Fairuz, who
does not seem to have much appeal
to the Sephardic community.) He was
impressed to see that we were familiar
with Andalusian Muwashahat, which
seemed to be his favorite, and he
ended up by selling us some Ladino
CDs – mostly lamentations over lost
love in Andalusia – and some tapes of
Moroccan singers.
He was curious to know where we
came from, since we conversed with
him in Arabic and broken Hebrew. I
showed him my Palestinian passport
with the birth entry: Jaffa 1945.
179
2 9 O CT 2 0 07
L E I P ZI G
P H O T O : P H I L I P P M I SSE L W I T Z
D OC U M EN T ATI O N :
FRONTIER VEST
A Z R A AK SAM I J A
181
Shlomo:
"And where in Jaffa were
you born?"
Me:
"Ajami."
Shlomo:
"That's very curious,
because I came to
Ajami in 1948! I was a
teenager then. Isn't that
a coincidence! You left
exactly when I arrived!
We could have met then."
Me:
“I don’t think so.”
Rema:
“It was what you
might call a ‘tabadul’
[exchange].”
[ironically]
Shlomo kept repeating the word,
“Tabadul . . . tabadul”
as if in a trance. Then all of
sudden it dawned on him, and
he said loudly: "Aah . . .
TABADUL!"
Then he smiled and nodded sadly
in recognition.
He asked if I still knew
anybody in Jaffa. I mentioned
the pharmacist Fakhri Jdaii,
a distant cousin of mine. He
said that Fakhri is the best
"doktoor" in Jaffa. He has
been going to him for years,
and Fakhri always prescribes
treatments that work. "You
see, we are Arabs like
you, and here is the
proof," he said, pointing to the
cassettes.
Untitled // Artur Zmije w
183
e wski
Photo:
Roni Lahav
Photographs taken
in Lydda (close to
the Wall) during the
meeting between
members of the local
Arab community
(many) and members of
the Jewish community
from Nir Zvi (two
people).
The aim of the meeting
was to discuss 'why the
Wall was built.'
185
Photo:
Roni Lahav
187
Photo:
Roni Lahav
Multiculturalism i
189
m in Common Spaces
// Yossi Yonah
* A presentation given during the
third Liminal Spaces conference,
Holon, 27.10.2007
What I'm going to speak about is related to my book about
multiculturalism in Israel. I will not, however, discuss the
book. I would like to talk about something related to the MIT
project pertaining to urban planning and development, which I
was asked to join. I was invited to participate in a conference
about Jerusalem in the year 2050. Truth be told, I didn’t know
much about Jerusalem – I don’t like the city, and I didn’t know
anything about urban planning either, so I was quite surprised
and even voiced some reservation, but in the end I went there
and gave a talk about Jerusalem as a multicultural city of
mixed neighborhoods. In fact, we were asked, Palestinians
and Israelis, how we would like to see Jerusalem in 2050. We
were told to disregard the current reality, and envision our
own imaginary grounds. I wasn't quite sure what they meant;
whether they wanted our forecast on how the city of Jerusalem
would eventually be, or whether they wanted us to write
about our ideals, our aspirations, of how the city should be.
Eventually I wrote an article which combined both elements:
partly forecast, partly aspirations; possibly more aspirations
than a forecast, because, as I told you, I don’t know much about
Jerusalem. So I was thinking about a multicultural city of mixed
neighborhoods, and thereby I was able to connect issues of
urban planning with one of many interests of my research –
multiculturalism. It was a very interesting challenge for me to
combine these two fields – multiculturalism and urban planning.
The first distinctions that came to mind were between two kinds
of multiculturalism with respect to urban planning. I called
them "segregationist multiculturalism" and "integrationist
multiculturalism." When we think about segregationist
multiculturalism, we have in mind distinct neighborhoods with
distinct cultures, community centers, schools, and so on. It
ought to be stressed that when we talk about multiculturalism,
we are not just talking about heterogeneity; we are talking
191
about multiculturalism as an ideal, as a moral ideal, whereby
the different communities are allowed, granted the rights
to Jerusalem, and of course, preferring this ideal, this
interpretation of multiculturalism whereby we maintain mixed
neighborhoods, people living in the same neighborhoods
though having different cultures. In this context I would like
to say something in parentheses: I don't deny the legitimacy
of segregationist multiculturalism, but what I suggest is this –
supposing that people want another option, that option should
be granted to them. And indeed, some people want this option.
We have to recognize, on the other hand, the right of other
people to have segregated neighborhoods, for instance ultraOrthodox Jews in Jerusalem, or if we have ultra-devout Muslims
in Jerusalem who would like to have their own segregated
neighborhoods. But my idea is that what is currently missing
in the city, that might be very interesting to envision for the
future, is the other option, of people living side by side in the
same neighborhood. As I said, in order to envision the future
I went back to the past. And when I went back to the past, my
parents' experience naturally sprang to mind. So I did a little
research with my parents, mainly with my mother, because they
came from Iraq and lived in the city of Ramadi, which is in the
Suna triangle. So I interviewed my mother. I said: Mom, tell me
about how you lived there, in Ramadi with the Arabs. Was there
a Jewish quarter (Harat el'yahood), a segregated neighborhood
for the Jews, as in Alexandria and other places? She said, no,
there was no Harat el'yahood, there was something totally
different. We had real mixed neighborhoods. Just to illustrate
to you how she described it in her own words: "Muslims and
Jews were scattered randomly across the city, separated only
by small distances of 10 to 15 yards. Next to our house lived
the Hussein family. Next to them, the Jewish family of Saleh
Elmualem. Across the street there was the house of a Muslim
family, Diab Elrahmu, and next to them, the house of the Jewish
Habush family, and then the Muslim family Ismail Elbana, and
then the house of the Jewish family of Saleh Elbasa, and so
on." From this I got a picture. This is what I want for the future,
even though it was in the past. The city of Ramadi is not that
distinct or special. Under the Ottoman Empire this was a very
ordinary state of affairs in Palestine. I read a little on the
subject, and came across a book by Abraham Marcus who wrote
similarly about Aleppo: "The confessional boundaries were
so clearly drawn and religious beliefs so little open to debate
that people could associate freely in various spheres without
compromise. Sharing a common cultural heritage, Muslims,
1 Abraham Marcus, The Middle
East on the Eve of Modernity:
Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century
(New York: Columbia UP, 1992),
p. 43.
Christians, and Jews were hardly strangers to each other."1
So it seems that this was actually a very common experience
for Christians, Jews, and Muslims under the Ottoman
Empire and probably elsewhere, though I did not research
that. We must realize something very interesting. Jews,
Christians and Muslims lived side by side and shared many
things… The interesting thing about it, what allowed it, is
that religion provided very strict and distinct boundaries.
Everyone knew his place. There was no romance across
religions. Intermarriage was very rare, if at all. The fact that
religion was so well ingrained in the people, allowed them this
very close proximity, because there was no danger of really
intermarrying, of creating a hybrid of homogeneous community.
It was homogeneous culturally speaking, but people remained
separate by religion. Something happened since then;
what happened, concentrating mainly on the case of IsraelPalestine, is that nationalism came to the fore, and it brought
secularization with it. The secularization is very interesting
in this respect. Once people become secular, there are no
longer boundaries preventing their mixing with each other.
This was not the liking of nationalism. So its way to create
clear distinction between "us" and "them" was by physical
segregation, segregation of neighborhoods. The role of religion
as a demarcating mechanism has declined, and nationalism by
itself did not provide an adequate substitute – an alternative
symbolic mechanism ensuring rigid social distinctions. Hence,
segregated neighborhoods, segregated cities, was the answer
successfully provided by nationalism. This is the answer
embraced by Zionism. Lev Grinberg wrote about that: that the
national project was threatened by the city, by the possibility
that citizens might develop a society where people of different
religions collaborate on certain kinds of activities, such as
labor unions, that was very successful in Jerusalem in the
1930s. Later, the Zionist movement refused to go on with these
kinds of activities because it felt that they would undermine its
national aspirations. This is the situation we have to this day in
Jerusalem, and throughout Israel.
There are, however, some other things happening. Unintended
consequences of nationalism I call them, and here I would
like to make a distinction regarding the possibilities of
mixed neighborhoods. As I said before, if we had a vision
of fully planned, top-down, mixed neighborhoods, the
government would encourage the creation of heterogeneous
neighborhoods – not heterogeneous cities, but heterogeneous
neighborhoods within the cities. The government in Israel
193
would not do that. At least for the time being, such projects
are not in the offing because the government is still very much
interested in the segregationist project of nationalism. This is
what I call the unintended consequences of nationalism; what
Israel has been doing in Jerusalem and in other places within
the 1967 borders, practically suffocating Arab neighborhoods,
disallowing urban development. Let me just mention a very
dramatic fact: since the creation of Israel no new Arab
neighborhood or new Arab city has been established, except
sixteen settlements for the Bedouins in the Negev, and even
then not because the Israeli government was interested in
their welfare, but for other national reasons. This fact creates
a real problem for Arabs, because they need some space (for
expanding families, etc.). What does one do when there is no
opportunity to create one's own neighborhood or city or village?
This gave rise to a very interesting phenomenon of Arabs
sporadically moving into Jewish neighborhoods. One example
is, of course, Nazareth. You have Arab Nazareth and the city of
Upper Nazareth, where I think by now there are 5,000 or more
Arabs moving into Jewish neighborhoods, thereby creating
types of mixed neighborhoods not designed top-down, but
rather ones that emerge from the bottom up. Obviously there
are problems in this respect. Last night we discussed some
of the problems or shortcomings from the point of view of the
Palestinians, because if you move into a Jewish neighborhood,
you are forced to give up, to some extent, your culture, your
way of life, because you are integrating into a very hegemonic
Jewish neighborhood; you have to send your children to a
Jewish school, you might forget the Arabic language, have no
place for religious worship, and so on. So we have this kind
of mixed neighborhood that works from the bottom up, but of
course, it is not accompanied by the very ideal of multicultural
mixed neighborhoods that I am talking about. I see it as kind
of a train: the more the Israeli government suffocates the
development of Arab neighborhoods, the more Arabs will have
to move into Jewish neighborhoods. It happens in Beer Sheva
too – Bedouins who move into Beer Sheva, or, obviously, in
Ramla-Lod, Jaffa, Nazareth, and Jerusalem, where you see
Arabs moving into the French Hill and other neighborhoods.
What we have here, I would say, is a crippled kind of mixed
neighborhoods. If I think about my idea of mixed neighborhoods
designed top-down, providing the opportunity to develop for
people of different cultures, to preserve the culture, we don’t
have that here. Now, of course, when I envision Jerusalem or
other cities in Israel, I envision it top-down, hoping that one day
it will happen. It is not forthcoming, but I still hope that maybe
these unintended consequences of nationalism will bring back
what used to be in the past, which also wasn't top-down – what
happened in Ramadi or Aleppo was not developed from this
point of view, it was not taken by governments; it happened
naturally. The question is, whether things that now happen
naturally will allow real multiculturalism. As I said before, in the
past religion took care of that. Usually, when people move into
mixed neighborhoods, Jewish neighborhoods, this would be one
of their distinguishing features – those Palestinians would not
hold on to observance or to religion very tenaciously. Whether
they do or not, they think this is a big compromise in terms of
their culture. Who knows, something might happen in the future
that would compensate for that. Again, I cannot see anything
in the offing in terms of government initiatives, in terms of
developing civil society, in terms of developing movements
or parties in Israel that would push for it; not even in Tel Aviv,
which is considered an enlightened and tolerant city. One
ought to bear in mind that this is an Arab-free city. So there is
this paradox, in many ways it is considered a very tolerant and
cosmopolitan city in terms of sexual norms, and it is a home (a
shaky one, to be sure) to migrant workers from many countries
the world over, but, as one of my colleagues put it, perhaps it
can be so enlightened and tolerant because it has managed to
throw all the Arabs out. So the real challenge is to find a sizable
sector in Israel that would wish for mixed multicultural cities of
mixed neighborhoods. I'm not all that optimistic in this regard.
But I am nonetheless hoping that the unintended consequences
of nationalism would inevitably lead to this end, even if the
overwhelming majority of Jews are not willing to embrace the
ideal of multicultural cities with mixed neighborhoods.
Female Speaker:
My question is about the terminological use of multiculturalism.
How do you relate to the very critical international debate on
the question of multiculturalism? Because you take it as a
positive model, while in both England and France it is virtually a
taboo term. So I was somehow impressed by that very positive
use you made.
Male Speaker:
I was trying to put myself in your mother's vision, and I have a
question: do you think that people who move outside and live
in these so-called mixed quarters do not maintain a strong
relation with their center?
Yossi Yonah:
What is the center?
195
Male Speaker:
With the center, which means with their village, with Arab
culture, religion; sometimes they might become even more
fundamentalist, because they want to protect their children…
Yossi Yonah:
Well, I'm shifting from advancing a vision to describing an
unplanned social process, thinking that these processes
would lead eventually to the implementation of the vision. It
is the bottom up process that might lead to a desirable state
of affairs. Let's consider again what is happening today on
the ground. Arabs, due to limited housing possibilities in their
villages, wish to move to Jewish neighborhoods. This would be
the beginning, so it is a minimal demand. Let me give you an
example. Since the late 1970s or 1980s, about 450 communities,
communal villages, have been built in Israel. The interesting
thing about these villages is that they are fashioned after the
white flight in America following the integration program. It is
often the case that those who move there are Ashkenazi Jews
who don’t want to live with the Mizrahi Jews. They flee the
urban centers and build their own community villages. It reflects
a segregationist tendency within Jewish society itself, but one
of the consequences was that Arabs were not allowed in, to
any of them. This was brought before the Supreme Court, and
there was the famous Katzir case, and this also has to do with
the previous comment about multiculturalism. It was actually
an abuse of multiculturalism by the people who live in the
community villages, saying: don’t we have a right to preserve
our culture? The Supreme Court, however, decided that in these
cases there is no distinct culture to be preserved, because
there is no ideological or cultural uniqueness characterizing
these villages, and it ordered the State of Israel, the Jewish
Agency, and other institutions involved in the establishment
of these communities to allow the Qa'adan family from Baqa
el-Gharbiyyah to buy the house. The funny thing about it is
that it took about five-six years to implement the court's ruling
in this case, because they found a hundred ways to delay the
court's decision; in fact, they simply ignored the decision. Then
the court had to intervene over and over again, and only two
months ago, I think, they were allowed to move in. In a sense,
this is the problem, so at least lift the restrictions. But if we
have already mentioned this case, I would like to make one
related comment: it was an interesting case because Adalah
(The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) came up
and said we don’t want to represent the Qa'adan family. Who
represented them? The Association for Civil Rights in Israel.
So why did Adalah refuse? They said, what's going to happen?
The Qa'adan family will buy a house in a Jewish village, they're
going to give up their culture. What we want is to have our
own villages, so that we can preserve our culture. We don’t
want that, we don’t want to merge, integrate in small numbers
within a Jewish neighborhood, because then it means that
we are relinquishing our unique culture. So you have this very
interesting interplay here of philosophies, of visions, interests,
etc. The purpose of the example was to demonstrate the kind
of restrictions put on the movement of Arabs within Israel, not
allowing them to go into Jewish neighborhoods, which means
either you have to lift restrictions or you have to do something
top-down, there's no other way around I think, but going top
to bottom without detailed visions of the city, but enabling a
situation whereby Arabs and Jews, those who want to do so,
mix, because as I said before, segregationist multiculturalisms
are also legitimate, if you don’t want to mix. It's also a right
not to mix. At least allow for this option, for integrationist
multiculturalism.
Now, as to the comment about religion: My parents were never
fundamentally religious. This is what is interesting about
religion in the Arab world. Religious fundamentalism among
Mizrahi Jews, Middle Eastern Jews, actually has increased
in Israel. This is the interesting thing. It means that in many
quarters, Jewish quarters, cities where Jews live, especially in
Iraq, they were going through some kind of secularization there,
and you see this intensification of religious tenacity in Israel,
where you already have the separate neighborhoods. So this is
both very interesting and contradictory. So yes, I admit that we
have given their religions a definite and major role; you might
not be very happy about that, and I'm not even suggesting
that we now have mixed neighborhoods, and intensify religious
tenacity of people, no. So we have to be futuristic in a sense
of trying to see what new venues may be entertained so that
mixed neighborhoods will not have to replicate what happened
in the past. We do not want to give up nationality and embrace
religious ways of life tenaciously. I am not suggesting that.
Regarding the comment about the international critique
of multiculturalism. Yes, I am aware of that, I am aware
that multiculturalism now is not very popular in many
European countries, having all these bad experiences with
multiculturalism. I don't buy it though. I have to say it very
definitely, I don't buy that, because I think that France, Britain,
and other nations don’t play it right, or don’t play it honestly
when they voice this criticism of multiculturalism, calling
197
multiculturalism the source of the problem. No, the source of
the problem is that France, Britain, Belgium, Germany, have not
opened their gates well enough to integrate those peoples. The
fact that they were forced to stress their culture was actually a
part of the exclusion-inclusion dynamics. If Germany or France
were more inclusive, there probably would be less need for
segregationist multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is sometimes
a reaction to the practices of exclusion and marginalization
that the nation-state exercises. To blame multiculturalism for
the exclusionary practices of the nation-state, as far as I'm
concerned, is a bit dishonest, unwilling to identify the real
problems.
Female Speaker:
France is very different...
Yossi Yonah:
I'm aware of this difference, of course. The French model is a
very strict, rigid republican model, and the British model is less
strict and republican. You can generalize a bit, and a lot has
been written about that recently, for instance Rogers Brubaker,
an expert on European nationalism, in a very interesting article
published in 2000, entitled "The Return of Assimilation,"
analyzes these tendencies to retreat from multiculturalism in
Germany, France, and Britain. So I'm aware of the subtleties,
or rather – the major differences between different societies,
but again, I think that on the level of our present discussion,
it is okay to generalize and say that what is common to these
societies is the so-called disillusionment with multiculturalism,
and as I said I'm putting it in quotation marks, because I still
think that the problem should be located within the exclusionary
practices of the nation-state, and not in multiculturalism per se.
That is my opinion.
Male Speaker:
I just want to go back again to Jerusalem. Looking at
this situation, united Jerusalem is a modern form of
multiculturalism. I'm not just talking historically, of course, in
the sense of realizing the policy of the State of Israel. I would
like to know how you think we can look at it in the sense of replanning.
Yossi Yonah:
I'll tell you what happened.
Female Speaker:
I think there's a very successful model in London. Of people
living together… I live in a neighborhood full of Hasidic Jews,
Muslims, there's even a street called the West Bank right near
my house. Turks, Vietnamese, West Africans, and they're all
there together, and everyone is happily practicing his religion.
There isn’t this sense that people are losing themselves
within that. So I'd like to know what you mean when you say
disillusionment in multiculturalism.
Male Speaker:
Where is that?
Female Speaker:
In Putney, London.
Male Speaker:
You made this suggestion, if you draw the practical implication
of what you were saying, you were saying, well for God's sake
lift these restrictions for Palestinians moving into Jewish
neighborhoods. Isn’t it also important to emphasize that a great
part of the problem is giving them the choice to develop their
own communities?
Yossi Yonah:
That's what I said.
Male Speaker:
So in addition to lifting these restrictions, it's like lifting the
restrictions or actually keeping that segregationist model of
multiculturalism which is, I think, the biggest problem actually,
that Palestinians within Israel aren’t really being allowed to
develop their own towns or villages.
Yossi Yonah:
That's what I said. When I talk about segregationist
multiculturalism and integrationist multiculturalism I don’t
mean that we've got to look at them as mutually exclusive.
They've got to live side by side. All I was saying is that people
who want to preserve their cultures and live in segregated
areas, have every right to do that and we have to allow them
to do so under certain conditions, never mind encourage, but
we've got to allow them of course. On the other hand I'm saying
you've got to promote integrationist multiculturalism whereby
people who want to live in mixed neighborhoods are able to do
so, and that means to lift restrictions or to build new cities and
towns that would allow Arabs and Jews to co-mingle if you wish.
So this is my answer to you, and I think that we see eye-to-eye
on that.
As for your question, I am not much of an expert on what
happens in Jerusalem, so I'll speak in general. What does it
mean, for instance, that the mayor of Jerusalem, the Israeli
government, are terrified by the growing number of Arabs
within the metropolitan area of Jerusalem? What do they do?
They either build walls to stop them from moving in, or continue
to build segregated Jewish neighborhoods in order to assert
199
Jewish dominance in the city of Jerusalem. What can be done?
I don’t know what can be done to undermine, collaborate,
mitigate this sort of top-down harsh urban planning jointly
done by the Israeli government and the city of Jerusalem. I
wish I had an answer. With respect to disillusionment, what I
mean is manifested, for instance, by these states upholding
these ideas of putting restrictions on immigration, having
selected immigration policies, putting obstacles in the way of
naturalization, saying that if you want to become a citizen of
the state, you have to know the language or the constitution,
in America they talk about social studies whereby you've got
to learn the American heritage, and then you go to Germany
and you've got maybe to learn more, with emphasis on German
heritage or French heritage, you cannot wear a Hijab – this is
what I meant by the disillusionment with multiculturalism.
Radical D
l Discontent
201
// Eyal Danon
Nowadays for a smaller and
smaller proportion of Israelis,
the land in which we live was
once a non-Jewish space; it
was an Arab realm, foreign
and threatening or familiar
and intriguing, but real. For
most of us, the land has never
been a non-Jewish territory.
The natural way in which the
land's Jewishness is accepted
may imply that individuals
and societies develop an
intimate relationship with the
surroundings and landscape
in which they are born; an
intimacy which renders
natural something which is,
in fact, an artificial product,
something which only slightly
more than sixty years ago was
a wholly different landscape.
The successful Judaization
of the landscape of Palestine
reinforces the recognition that
myths and stories are powerful
tools in the shaping of subjects
and landscapes. Zionism's
success is possibly the most
radical example in this respect.
The story of the Jewish
people's affinity with the Land
of Israel, and the introduction
of Zionist settlement in
it as the continuation of a
historical sequence of Jewish
national presence may be
deemed the most conspicuous
Zionist creation. In this sense,
Zionism's most significant
product and its most effective
tool is the narrative. Zionism
succeeded in reshaping
the Jewish subject and the
territory it allotted him by
virtue of the narrative it
created.
The success of the Judaization
of the land, of the landscape,
is absolute. For us, Jewish
Israelis, there should be
only one Israel, a direct
continuation of an ancient
national Jewish entity. This
is the most perfect expression
indicating the success of the
Zionist Movement's takeover
of the territory, as well as the
success in shaping the new
Jewish subject, the one who
believes the story. This short
essay was written from the
perspective of a product of this
enterprise. It sets out to trace
the two elements at the core of
Zionism – the human element
and the land – as well as the
impact of the Zionist shaping
enterprise on the everyday life
of Israel's Jewish citizens.
Zionism's two foci – the
renewal of the individual and
the shaping and takeover of
the land – were based on the
notion of the "negation of
exile," namely the negation
of Jewish existence and the
characteristics of the exilic
Jew, alongside negation of the
country's years of existence
without Jews, namely –
negation of the Palestinian
existence in it. In both
cases, one is concerned with
radical discontent regarding
the reality of the two major
objects of Zionism – the
Jewish individual and the
Land of Israel. Zionism
will radically change both,
while erasing 2,000 years of
history, and skipping back
in time to the biblical past
where it found the historical
justification for the entire
process.
Zionism, as a European
national movement,
endeavored to recreate the
Jewish subject as an antithesis
of the European Jew, the
product of years of exile. Even
though its target audience
was composed of subjects
who lived in Europe in the
203
mid-19th century, in presentday Israel the major political
forces still regard Zionism
as a revolution that has not
ended. We, Israelis, are still
regarded as requiring a process
of shaping and education in
order to strengthen our hold
on the land and our bond with
it. This pedagogical move
is manifested throughout
the education process of
the Israeli child – from
kindergarten, through school,
to military service, continuing
even into his adult life.
Zionism still tries to produce
"new Jews"; this holds true
of my generation and that of
my children – we are all still
subjected to an educational
process intended to shape us
as Jews who are confident
of their right over the land
in which they live, and who
regard their very life in it as a
realization of a historical right
granted to our patriarchs who
dwelled in this land in biblical
times.
I came across an example of
the association made during
the socialization of the Israeli
citizen during Israel's war in
Gaza last December (2008).
My ten-year old son came back
with Bible class homework
from the Book of Joshua
and with questions from
his tutor about "Operation
Cast Lead," the name given
to the Israeli attack on
Gaza. The connection made
between the story of Canaan's
conquest by Joshua in his
war against the Canaanites,
and Israel's present-day war
in Gaza generated a type of
disturbance, making the raw
materials comprising Israeli
identity and the tools shaping
it appear less transparent and
self-evident. For a split second
a door had opened, granting
a peek into out operation
mechanism.
The homework in Bible
included questions about
the conquest of the land, the
annihilation of its inhabitants,
the nation's right over the
land, and other questions
about the stories of the land's
conquest as recounted in the
Book of Joshua. Nowhere were
my son and his classmates
asked to pose questions or
be critical of the story told.
The land's conquest and the
expulsion of its inhabitants
were introduced as resulting
from a just move which is
not supposed to invoke moral
dilemmas. Nowhere was the
question asked, whether it is
just to conquer and expel, by
what right, or what the Divine
Promise is on whose behalf
this was done.
Even if this were a mere
curricular coincidence, such
a link between the recent
Israeli war in Gaza and the
biblical past can be seen as the
core of the Israeli educational
system. It generates a national
identity and identification
with the ancient Israelites
whose chronicles the Bible
recounts, and is intended to
make us and them a part of a
continuous national entity. My
ability as a parent to offer an
alternative for that narrative
is very limited, since it is
reinforced and supported by so
many interactions experienced
by the Israeli child – in school,
on television, in literature,
and also since his exposure
to another narrative or other
possibilities of reading the
biblical stories, necessarily
differentiates him from his
classmates.1
The Bible, which is presented
in Israeli schools as a
history book, is taught as
a basic textbook providing
justification to the goals
of Zionism and proof of
its rightness. The Israeli
educational system cannot
promote critical reading of the
Bible and the undermining
of its status since this would
cut the ground from under
its feet. Thus it is interesting
that precisely the approach
regarding the bible as history,
one that seeks proofs of its
rightness, is not originally
Jewish, but rather Christian.
The ideas of Jewish Zionism,
as they crystallized in the
second half of the 19th
century, may be read as a later
reincarnation of Christian
ideas that may be dubbed
Christian Zionism.2 The
great interest in the Holy
Land was a Christian practice
for centuries, while the Jews
maintained a spiritual affinity
with the land and did not
regard pilgrimage as a goal of
Jewish religious life.
Like Christian theology,
Zionism, too, was based on
the permanent discontent
with reality and the present,
and outlined a radical ideology
intended to bring about a
change in order to reconstruct
a glorious past. This denial
of the present and preference
for the imagined over the real
is an element which exists
in both Christianity and
Zionism, forming a major
motivation for these ideologies
as they approach the focus of
their interest: the individual
and the land.
The roots of Christian
Zionism lie in the theological
struggles which led to
the establishment of the
Protestant Church. The
struggle between Catholicism
and Protestantism led to
an important turning point
with regard to Christianity's
relation to the Holy Land.
The advent of the Protestant
Church and with it, additional
currents in Christian faith,
such as Puritanism in the
16th and 17th centuries,
and Evangelism in the
18th century, represented
discontent with the old
ecclesiastical establishment
and its tradition of exegesis
and precepts, preaching
a return to the original
scriptures. Through its
influence, the status of the
Holy Land began to change,
from a site of a punishment
and strengthening of faith,
as it was for the pilgrims,
into a site of learning.
Perception of the land as a
site which enables human
transformation, already
held by the pilgrims,
was maintained, but the
Protestants introduced
preference for learning via
experience, rather than by
interpretation of texts, hence
the voyage to the Holy Land
became central to the study
of the Bible and a part of
the reshaping of the devout
believer via learning. Christian
theology drew a link between
the land and the text, between
a site in the Holy Land and
a biblical story. The land
was perceived as a dormant
text that must be revealed in
order to approach sanctity.
The obsession for reading the
land will pass on to Jewish
Zionism, and form a milestone
in the construction of a new
Jew, confident of his right to
the land, knowing through his
intimate acquaintance with it,
that by his very return to the
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T E L AV I V
PHOTO: DOR GUEZ
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2 5 O C T 20 0 7
AB U G H O SH
P H O T O : T AL AD L E R
10 M AR 2 0 0 6
JERUSALEM
P H O T O : G A L I T E I L AT
209
land he is renewing an ancient
national Jewish presence.
In his book Land/Text: The
Christian Roots of Zionism,
Yoad Eliaz discusses the
centrality of vision in relation
to the bond with the Holy
Land. The association between
the text and the land requires
vision, observation of the
land, which makes possible
the shaping of the Christian
or Zionist subject. In both
Christian and Jewish travel
literature, the journey to the
Holy Land begins by turning
one's eyes away from the
starting port, from reality.
Eliaz cites two examples from
Christian and Jewish travel
literature. At the beginning
of Joseph Klausner's journey
to Eretz-Israel, he describes
how the ship draws away from
Odessa: "My eyes looked at the
shore, but I could see nothing,
as if my eyes were covered by
'cataracts'."3 Another example
cited by Eliaz involves the
journey of pilgrim Paula,
who is described standing
on the deck, looking away so
as not to see her children as
they part.4 Despite the great
difference between them,
both these examples preserve
the principle of turning the
gaze or looking away, and the
inability to observe reality.
One may construe this
gesture as symbolizing the
true essence of the journey
to the Holy Land. It requires
dissociation from the present
and reality, and a connection
to the sacred past. As a
journey of self-rectification
or reshaping, the moment
at which the gaze is turned
is fundamental, and has a
double meaning: the turning
of the gaze from the concrete
reality of Christian or Jewish
existence will lead to turning
away from the concrete reality
of the land itself and its
indigenous inhabitants once
the traveler arrives there. The
appropriation of the Holy
Land is made possible by
turning away from reality, and
observing it exclusively from
the perspective of its sacred
past.
Vision is given precedence
since it creates a physical link
between the subject and the
Biblical story. Only someone
who has seen the sacred sites
first hand, the light that shone
1 In the 1960s Dr. George Tamarin
conducted a study among Israeli
children about the influence of
ethnic and religious prejudice on
moral judgment. First published in
Tel Aviv in 1963, and subsequently
in New Outlook in 1966, the
study explored the influence
of nationalism on their moral
judgment in terms of the presence
of prejudice in the ideology held by
school children, and the influence
of uncritical study of the Bible
in state schools in Israel on the
inclination for the emergence
of prejudice (especially the idea
of "the chosen people," and the
acts of genocide carried out by
biblical heroes). I first heard of Dr.
Tamarin's study in Galia Zalmanson
Levi's essay, "Teaching the Book of
Joshua and the Conquest," see:
http://readingmachine.co.il/home/
books/1130066483/1130068804
http://www.geocities.com/
abumidian/josua.htm
2 For elaboration on the Christian
roots of Zionism, see: Regina Sharif,
"Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots and
Origins in England in Relation to
British Imperialism, 1600-1919,"
http://www.al-moharer.net/
falasteen_docs/regina_sharif.htm;
Hilton Obenzinger, "American
Palestine: Herman Melville,
Mark Twain, and the Holy
Land in the 19th Century
American Imagination,"
http://209.85.129.132/
search?q=cache:_N2e6tbtdIJ:wwwlb.aub.edu.
lb/~webcasar/Activities/PastEvents/
on the Biblical heroes and on
Christ, is capable of believing.
We are concerned, however,
with vision which prefers the
imagination to reality, the past
to the present, since reality is
no more than a guise hiding
the sacred essence of the land.
It is a vision at work in both
present and real time and
space, yet focused on neither;
it enables one to detach
oneself from them. Vision is a
way to connect to the past, to
skip the present and eliminate
the temporal dimension
via spatial presence. The
subject, whether a devout
Christian or a Zionist Jew,
may thus prefer the sacred
past over the real present,
the sacred space over the real
one, thereby reaffirming and
strengthening his faith. This is
the desired change caused by
on site presence, making for
introspection which cancels
reality, creating before the
viewer's eyes a reconstruction
of the sacred Biblical past.
Of all the Christian traditions
that have entered Jewish
Zionism, the tradition of
turning the gaze away from
reality and opting for fiction
may be considered the most
significant. Despite the
many metamorphoses of
various Zionist traditions
prevalent in the pre-state
and early state years, and
what nowadays appears as
Israeli society's eschewal of
grand ideologies and myths
and its transformation into a
cynical consumerist society,
this dimension has remained
extremely central, and its
impact on contemporary
Israeli society is immense.
Most of us, the Jewish citizens
of Israel, regard the society
in which we live as a part of
the realization of a Divine
Promise. The justification for
the existence of the State of
Israel is found in the stories
of the Bible. The reality
which includes a Palestinian
presence, occupation of
Palestinian land, an oppressive
regime, and denial of human
and civil rights – all these are
met by near-total oversight,
a turning of the gaze by
large parts of our society.
The roots of this oversight
may be traced to this ability
and need to ignore reality, of
turning the gaze away from
reality, intended to enable the
story to exist without it being
undermined by reality – an
approach already prevalent
among Christian pilgrims.
The interpretation of the
space by either Christian or
Jewish Zionism corresponded
with the reshaping of subjects
in the service of ideology. It
was suited to populations of
immigrants or travelers, but
not the indigenous population.
It may be argued that only
one who is foreign to the land
can ignore its real essence
and regard its landscapes as
symbolizing another existence,
a radical view of reality which,
in fact, eliminates it. The
influence of this discipline
on the indigenous people
of the land is weakened,
and therefore the practices
of pre-state and early state
Zionism lose much of their
appeal to native born Israelis.
This may account for the
fact that pivotal political and
ideological powers now exist in
Israel which regard the Zionist
mission as an unfinished
process: whether in terms of
the shaping of the ZionistIsraeli subject who does not
meet the criteria of faith in
211
the ideology and story of the
land, or in terms of shaping
the space, parts of which
are not yet "Judaized." Thus,
initiatives for pedagogical
programs for reinforcement
of Zionism and the Jewish
heritage among the children of
Israel are frequently presented,
in amendments to the State
Education Law defining its
goals, as in the 2000 and 2003
amendments where the Israeli
Parliament (Knesset) stated
these goals:
1. To educate a humanist
individual, who loves his
people and his country, a loyal
citizen of the State of Israel,
who respects his parents
and family, his heritage, his
cultural identity, and his
language;
2. To bequeath the principles
listed in the Declaration of
the Establishment of the State
of Israel and the basic values
of the State of Israel as a
democratic, Jewish state, and
to engender respect for human
rights, for basic liberties,
for democratic values, for
obedience to the law, for
respect of the other's culture
and views, and to educate and
strive for peace and tolerance
between peoples and nations;
3. To teach the history of the
Land of Israel and the State of
Israel;
4. To teach the Holy Scriptures
(the 'Torah of Israel'), the
history of the Jewish people,
Jewish heritage and Jewish
tradition; to bequeath the
awareness of the memory of
the Holocaust, heroism and
martyrdom, and to teach to
respect them.
- The goals of State Education in
Israel as detailed in the Dovrat
Report
Later on in his report, Dovrat,
who headed a committee
appointed to examine
the condition of the state
education system, notes that:
The State of Israel is a Jewish
and democratic state. As such,
its educational system must
strive to strengthen the Jewish
identity of its pupils, to shape
the conceptual core which
forms the foundation for the
existence of the nation in its
land, the national home of the
Jewish people, which, as such,
serves as a Jewish center and a
Lecture%2520texts/Fall0607/
HiltonObenzinger'spaper.doc+lands
cape+bible+israel+palestine&hl=e
n&ct=clnk&cd=33;
Keith W. Whitelam, The Invention
of Ancient Israel (London:
Routledge, 1996).
3 Yoad Eliaz, Land/Text: The
Christian Roots of Zionism (Tel
Aviv: Resling, 2008), p. 186.
4 Ibid., p. 73.
focal point of identification for
every Jew the world over.
In recent years additional
programs have been
and Shomron: Every Jew's
Story" fig. 1 – which indicates
the continued view of the
territories as connected to
the Bible, and of Jewish
Tel Shiloh is located
in southern Samaria,
approximately 30 km north of
Jerusalem, halfway between
Ramallah and Nablus. The
1 Jewish kids dressed in "Biblical" costumes, image from the website of the campaign "Judea and Samaria: The story
of every Jew," http://www.jstory.co.il/
introduced aimed at
strengthening Jewish identity
and heritage, among them
"One Hundred Basic Concepts
in Heritage, Zionism, and
Democracy," and the core
program intended to create
uniformity between the various
educational streams, offering
bonuses to schools teaching
extra lessons in heritage.5
Another fascinating example
of the link between the land
and the book (the Bible) is
evident in the campaign of
the Yesha6 Council – "Yehuda
settlement in the West
Bank as a continuation of
the same ancient national
Jewish existence. The website
launched especially for the
campaign,7 presented a map
of the Occupied Territories,
Judea and Samaria as the
settlers call them, with
reference points of sites in
which the Biblical stories took
place. The association between
story and geography generates
the proof for the rightness of
Jewish settlement there today.
The story of Tel Shiloh may
serve as an example:
site has been populated since
the Middle Bronze Age (ca.
1750 BCE). It is a high hill,
easily accessible by climbing,
but only from the north. At its
peak the settlement extended
over some 7.45 acres.
The word Shiloh is first
mentioned in the Bible in the
Book of Genesis (in Jacob's
blessing his son Judah). As
a specific place, however,
it appears only in the Book
of Joshua: "And the whole
congregation of the children
of Israel assembled together
at Shiloh, and set up the
213
tabernacle of the congregation
there. And the land was
subdued before them" (Joshua
18:1). The Holy Ark was kept
in Shiloh; later on in the book
of Joshua it is hinted that
Shiloh was also the de facto
capital of the twelve tribes.
In Shiloh, Hannah prays for a
son. In her despair, she makes
a vow to dedicate her future
son's life to the service of the
Lord. Hearing her prayer, the
priest Eli promises, in the
name of the Lord, that she will
be granted a son. Her son will
be Samuel, one of the most
influential figures in the nation
at the time, and the one who
transformed it from a cluster
of tribes into a kingdom.
The Ark was taken from Shilo
for spiritual reinforcement
during the war against the
Philistines; the Israelites,
however, were defeated, and
the philistines took the Ark
as a plunder. Subsequently,
Shiloh itself was destroyed,
probably by the Philistines. It
took nearly 21 years before the
Ark was returned to Jerusalem
by King David. Despite its
destruction, however, it
appears that Jews remained
in Shiloh until 722 BCE – the
year in which the Kingdom
of Israel was destroyed by
Assyria.
5 For information about the
“One Hundred Basic Concepts in
Heritage, Zionism, and Democracy"
see: http://www.education.gov.il/
moe/klali/mea_musagim.htm.
Shiloh was a center
of pilgrimage and the
construction of houses of
prayer by worshipers of all
three monotheistic religions.
Its ruins include mosaic floors
and diverse archaeological
finds. Its significance and the
archaeological wealth in it
have attracted various research
expeditions, among them the
Danish expedition (1926-31)
and the group headed by
Dr. Finkelstein of Bar Ilan
University (1981).
6 Yesha is an acronym for the
Hebrew names of Judea, Samaria
and Gaza (Yehuda, Shomron, Aza)
used by parts of the Israeli political
right and the settlers to designate
the Occupied West Bank.
It is easy for us, as secular
Israelis, to dismiss the settlers'
campaign as detached from the
mainstream of Israeli society,
regarding them as a group of
messianic extremists who have
taken the Zionist enterprise
one step too far, endangering
themselves and society as a
whole. The settlements in
the territories occupied in
1967, however, cannot be
dissociated from the Zionist
enterprise as a whole. They are
based on the same ideology,
7 http://www.jstory.co.il/
The site presents its goal as follows:
"Judea and Samaria – Information
Administration" is an a-political
Zionist body striving to reinforce
the affinity of the Jewish people
to two of the major provinces in
its homeland where the dramatic
events that constituted our nation,
as we know it today, took place.
The places where God was revealed
to our patriarchs, where David
led his father's flock, where the
Hasmoneans fought the Hellenists –
are all in Judea and Samaria.
The bitter debate between Israelis
from different ends of the political
spectrum is well known. We have no
intention of adding fuel to this fire.
Our goal is very different. We would
like to enable Israelis to experience
Judea and Samaria in a profound
and fundamental manner. It is our
view that Judea and Samaria are not
the core of the Palestinian problem,
but rather the focal point of Israeli
existence. It is a perceptual change
ultimately capable of influencing
the political decision which we will
all have to take, as one nation.
supported by the same
systems of government, and
mainly – they are underlain
by the same narrative. The
settlement enterprise in the
Occupied Territories is indeed
associated with the religious
right wing, but in effect – and
this is congruent with the
settlers' position – it is a direct
and natural continuation
of the secular Zionist
enterprise. It is a continuation
thereof without the secular
guise which characterized
Zionism in its beginnings.
The power of the narrative
as the "operating system" of
Israeli society greatly deviates
from the settlers' circles.
It has always had immense
influence, certainly after the
establishment of the State
of Israel, when it had at its
disposal the powers of the
establishment and the state,
hence it was very difficult to
oppose to it. In this context
I review the history of parts
of my family, Jews who
have lived here for several
generations, long before
Zionist settlement. It is very
likely that they were Arabspeaking Jews who perceived
themselves as part of the Arab
community, and yet adopted
the Jewish national narrative.
I wonder whether such things
can evolve differently. Could
there have been a PalestinianJewish identity which would
have symbolized a type
of intercultural link and
introduced an opposition to
the national narrative that
has taken over not only the
Zionist subjects who have
come here on its account, but
over the local Jewish identity
as well?
As aforesaid, Zionism focused
not only on the creation of a
new subject, but also on the
creation of a new territory for
that subject. The Christians
deemed physical settlement
of the land significant; there
were Christian colonies which
incorporated theological
thought and science, and
regarded the study of the
land on the spot as a type
of religious practice. Only
Zionism, however, succeeded
in shaping the land itself, its
landscapes, and population
makeup according to the story,
in the sense that if proof for
the justness of the story in the
landscape is insufficient, we
shall shape the landscape so as
to make the proof correspond
with the story.
The most significant and
revolutionary element in the
takeover and Hebraization
of the land was the
Hebraization of the map.
Two committees were set
up for that purpose: the
Committee for Determining
Hebrew Names in the
Negev and the Government
Names Committee.8 The
Hebraization of the map was
an act of reversal, reversal
of Arab names into Hebrew,
as well as reversal of the
ordinary relationship within
the practice of cartography:
instead of a map which is a
representation of the territory,
it introduced a map which is
a model by which the territory
may be shaped.9
Until the establishment of
the State of Israel one may
describe Zionist cartography
not as an act of taking over
the space, but as a gradual
takeover – of time, of
history.10 It was a graphic
expression of the Zionist
narrative, of the continuity
215
between biblical times and
contemporary reality. The
elimination of the temporal
dimension acquired a spatial
manifestation here, on paper,
on the map, and only later
would it be given a spatial
expression in the territory
itself. This will happen after
the establishment of the
State, when the powers of the
state and the army were at
the disposal of cartography
and the state was able to
implement its model without
the indigenous population
being there to present any
opposition. This is a radical
example of the link between
cartography and the military.
Mapping is a known tool in
the service of the army. Here,
however, the army works in
the service of cartography by
making possible the shaping
of the landscape according
to its model, creating a
territory where there is no
longer a temporal or spatial
gap between the story and
the land. Theretofore, the
Arab landscape was perceived
as a foreign, threatening
territory. On the map there
were enclaves of known Jewish
areas, but it was mainly
The names we found not only
rang foreign to our ears; they
were also inaccurate. Their
meaning was unclear, and
many of them were no more
than random names of people
or derogatory designations.
Many of them were offensive
due to their somber meaning
which reflects the nomads'
frailty vis-à-vis the difficulties
posed by nature.12
The Judea and Samaria –
Information Administration regards
settlement in Judea and Samaria as
the implementation of the affinity
between the Jewish people and its
land. Nevertheless and despite the
link and support on the part of the
Yesha Council, the Administration
does not represent the Judea and
Samaria settlement movement,
which has its own agenda and
speakers. Furthermore, the
Administration does not promote
an essentially religious message.
Mostly secular, its team promotes
this concern out of a broad culturalhistorical-national view, rather than
religious belief.
The Administration will engage
in several fields, among them:
advertising campaigns; website
content; encouragement of
participation in trips and events;
audience-targeted propaganda, and
participation in panel discussions.
Interestingly, even though
the map of Palestine before
1948 appeared as foreign,
threatening territory due
to the "blanket" of Arab
names which covered it, this
multiplicity of foreign names
could not undermine the myth
of "a people without a land
returning to a land without
a people." This continuous
view of the land from the
perspective of its sacred
past, while disregarding its
8 The Committee for Determining
Hebrew Names in the Negev was
established by David Ben-Gurion.
Its main role was to determine
Hebrew names for "geographical
objects." The Committee held 29
sessions over ten months, during
which 561 Hebrew names were
affixed to sites south of the line
between Ashkelon and the Kidron
Brook; only 29 of them names
of settlements. The result was
published in 1950. It was the only
map of the Government Survey
Department where the Arabic
name of the place appeared next
to its new Hebrew name. The map
foreign land. In the wake
of the 1948 War, when the
Names Committee was set
up to Hebraicize the map of
the Negev, the names it heard
from the Arabs who remained
there, sounded foreign to its
members.11
demographic and political
reality – a principle which was
a part of Zionism from the
very outset and continues to
this day – is given a significant
boost here when a link is
drawn not only between the
story and the power of the
state, but also between the
story and science. This link
furnishes scientific validity
to the ownership claim and
the appropriation of the land
by Zionism. It also anchors
it in a Western tradition of
knowledge, thus reinforcing
its truth, furnishing it with
an aura of objectivity vis-àvis the Palestinian claims of
ownership which are perceived
as uttered from the perspective
of the underprivileged East.13
The Jewish establishment has
attempted and still attempts
to create an intimate link
with the territory by scouting,
hikes, and "knowledge of
the land." It is an ongoing
endeavor boosted by the
educational system. Scouting
traditions that existed before
the establishment of the
State, exploring the land in
the footsteps of the Bible,
still continue within certain
2 A list of Arab names of sites in the Negev and the proposed Hebrew alternatives.
Israel State Archives
segments of Israeli society.
Walking tours of the land
are widespread in leisure
culture. These activities are
perceived as acts of learning
and appropriation, adapting
themselves to the changing
Israeli society. Among
Fr
es.
217
was published after the cease-fire
agreement with Jordan on April
3, 1949. Ben-Gurion instructed
to ignore the Green Line. Under
his encouragement and approval
Hebrew names were given to
settlements, ruins and geographical
features within the boundaries of
the Jordan-held West Bank, beyond
the Green Line in that area.
The Government Names
Committee is a public committee
appointed by the Israeli
Government, engaged in naming
settlements and other features
and spots on the map of Israel and
changing pre-1948 Arab names
with Hebrew names. All State
institutions must abide by the
Committee decisions. The first
Names Committee was established,
on the order of the High
Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel,
by the Jewish National Fund (JNF/
KKL) in 1922, and was called "The
Settlement Names Committee
under the auspices of the JNF." It
operated in this format until 1950,
subsequently given official status
and subordinated as a unit in the
Prime Minister's Office.
From the protocols of the Committee for Determining Hebrew Names in the Negev,
ideological circles such as
the settlers in the Occupied
Territories, such tours are
held in the context of study
of local geography and the
bible, whereas among secular
audiences they are held in the
context of leisure culture.
9 One may see how the Christian
and Zionist characteristics of
preference of the imagined over the
real and the past over the present
apply here as well. The map is being
shaped according to the biblical
story, rather than the actual reality
of the land.
10 Meron Benvenisti, Sacred
Landscape: The Buried History of
3 The ruins of the Abu Sneina family house in the village of Ijlil (today in the municipal territory of the cities of
Herzliya and Ramat HaSharon)
Even though the Hebraicized
map is an artificial tool,
the fact that the power
mechanisms serve it lends
it validity and a hold. The
educational system, road
signs, the postal service, the
transportation system, and the
press – all use the Hebraicized
map, relating to the landscape
as a Hebrew landscape;
therefore, the Palestinian
citizens of Israel, the ones who
remained here, are also forced
to adopt the new map, and
with it – the new landscape,
in all its interactions with
the government. The result of
these systems of socialization
operated by the State in the
service of the narrative is
that an entire stratum of
Israelis born here accepts
the Hebraicized landscape as
219
totally natural. We succeed
in creating intimacy with
the landscape, therefore the
grand narrative has lesser sway
over us. Reality is perceived
as the natural thing. The
fact that the reality of the
space in which we live is a
structured reality, the result
of a violent process of shaping
that has unrecognizably
changed the territory, remains
unknown. The implication
of this ignorance is crucial to
every aspect of our everyday
life as Israelis. Ignorance
of the basic facts regarding
the country in which we
live, the inaccessibility of
the information, and the
reluctance to search for it
enable the State of Israel to
continue sustaining a regime
of occupation and oppression
without having large parts of
the Jewish population in Israel
challenge the justness of the
causes and means.
The concluding report of the
Names Committee states
that "nine years ago, the map
of our country was poor in
names."14 To the committee
members, an Arab map is
an empty map indicating an
empty land. A Hebrew map is
a full map, hence the country
is now full. In other words,
the process of takeover and
reshaping is complete. It is
interesting to review it from
a Christian perspective –
rejection of the local reality
of the land, view of only that
which enables rejuvenation of
the past, scientific research,
mapping, and finally takeover.
From an empty land to a
full land which fulfills its
destiny as an expression and
a proof of the biblical story.
This story once served the
Christian establishment,
and once again – the Zionist
establishment. fig. 2
The result of the
Hebraization process was
de-synchronization of the
landscape, so to speak. This is
best manifested by the updated
Mandatory Map which
fleetingly offers an opportunity
to observe both landscapes and
both times together, before the
Palestinian map was erased,
and with it the landscape.
(fig. 3,4)
Zionism and Christianity
imagined the Holy Land
in the same manner. The
the Holy Land Since 1948 (Berkeley:
University of California Press,
2000).
11 In the Names Committee
work, precedence was given to the
biblical story over scientific proof.
In Zionism as in Christianity, the
bible holds precedence, forming
a proof even when the goal of the
search for proof is to prove its
truth. The Committee has always
preferred to give a biblical name to
a given site even when there was no
sufficient proof as to its location.
The Negev, and subsequently the
entire country, became a space
where a biblical landscape may be
created by imagination, without
need of scientific proof. The story
overpowers everything, arranging
the power systems to serve its
purpose.
12 Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape,
op. cit., [Central Zionist Archive
KKL/5/17204].
13 Perusing the Arab map of the
land, one finds the map of the
Jewish Diaspora in Europe. These
are two sides of the same coin. The
two maps represent liminal time
and space in which the nation and
land are presented according to
Zionism, until it eliminated the
liminal loss in which they were
trapped. It ultimately led to the
end of time in an act imitating
Messianic realization, and revived
the Jewish ownership of the land.
14 Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape,
op. cit., p. 38.
4 British map of Palestine from 1946 with added layers of Hebrew names from 1949 and 1951. One of the last cartographic
evi
hic
221
evidences for the process of Hebraization of the landscape.
Christian pilgrims, travelers,
and scholars depicted it and
settled in it. The Zionists
shaped it practically and
directly, to make it conform
with the imagination. The
imagined community15
used the imagined narrative
in order to shape the
territory – landscape, people,
etc. – in congruence with its
imagination. The modeling
was so effective that only at
certain places, where signs
were left, where there are
loopholes and gaps between
the landscape and the cloak
of names covering it, in the
space between signifier and
signified, one may pinpoint
hints of another story; signs
of another existence, another
narrative insisting on leaving
its imprint on the landscape,
refusing to be erased. Everyday
anew, we, the Jewish citizens
of Israel, seem to choose to
cling to the story told us,
instead of confronting the
reality of our life in this
region. It is precisely the
adherence to the Zionist
narrative that leaves all of
us in a state of concurrent
presence in a liminal space
and time, between past and
future, between East and
West. In this respect one may
say that Zionism extracted
the Jewish people from its
history in contrast with its
professed goal. The adherence
to the past and disregard for
the present, while relying
exclusively on power to enable
such existence, render Israel
a society with not only an
imagined past, but also an
imagined present reality; a
society which still regards
itself as a type of re-realization
of a grand existence, and not
a society whose objective is
to ensure real, secure, and
egalitarian life to anyone
living under its auspices. The
question arises: when will we
take the pill that will make
us tear down the curtain of
illusion and see the desert of
the real in which we really
live?
15 Benedict Anderson's notion of
the 'imagined community' is highly
relevant here since it takes into
consideration the significance of the
imagined narrative. See: Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (London and
New York: Verso, 1983).
223
Not-Yet-Ness
// Reem Fadda
1
Introduction
In a recent visit to the
Palestinian Territories by
performance artist and curator
Coco Fusco, I asked her what she
thought was the reason for the
influx of professionals, especially
art-related practitioners, to this
troubled area. These people, she
suggested, feel that they are in
a place where history "is being
made." History-in-the-making
is an interesting concept in this
regard. People realize that time
in this place is of consequence,
an insight which they witness
in 'real' time. The present tense
seems to contribute towards
futurity or time continuum. In
the concept of 'our' time and
space, I think it is important to
capitalize on how 'our' aspect
of understanding may become
a platform for others as well,
not as a way to essentialize or
hegemonize, but to provide
an opportunity for communal
practices and adoptions. Cultures
are founded on cohabitation and
shared-ness. The limits of the
context's specificity ought to be
broken up in order to facilitate
broader understanding, possibly
even a solution.
The Palestinian issue has
currently entered an interesting
phase. With the collapse of
functional politics and a spatial
metamorphosis or disfiguration,
we have come to face a new
set of questions regarding its
'nationalistic' project. In what
seems to be a time of stagnation,
I see a time where existentialistic
formulas need to be challenged
and reconsidered within
parameters of the known. What
happens spatially when hysteria
leads to physical disintegration of
applicable spatial logic, and ideas
of what constitutes the norm are
being derived from political and
social practices that are clearly
reformulated and reexamined
225
organically yet impulsively? This
is a place where nationalism
comes into question, along with
belonging, patriotism, identity,
and the jumble of adherents of
nationalism. I find that it has
entered the 'not' zone where
everything becomes possible. I
would even go as far as to vouch
that this state of stagnation
and digression can become a
place of surrender for claims
of universality. It is an open
space for contemplation about
existential dilemmas that pertain
not only to the Palestinians
or the Israelis, but to time in
general. Imagination becomes
necessary for provisions and
scenarios of possible futures,
together and with others. Maybe
this is all mere day-dreaming or
wishful thinking.
I recently attended a conference
organized in New York City by
CUNY and Columbia University
entitled "Crisis States: The
Uncertain Future of Israel/
Palestine." It was reassuring
to find that not only me and
the many artists I know obsess
about this question of futurity,
but the academics as well.
Voices were raised asking direct
questions related to its past and
future. Questions of temporality,
spatial rationale, and existential
continuum are essential here,
in Palestine as well as in Israel.
We must find formulas as to how
and in what shape the foreseeable
future could persist. Maybe these
formulas need to be created from
a blend of elements brought on
by reality, theory and aesthetic
interpretation, yet mixed in with
a huge dollop of openness and a
drive stemming from reclaiming
agency through decolonization,
towards the future.
I find it most interesting that a
place such as this nevertheless
serves as a quintessential case of
modernity. In this context, the
actual severance from history –
from the 1948 War (Al-Nakba)
and the many unfolding realities
that have ruptured geographies,
to Bantustans and other presentday enclaves – has compromised
this sense of continuity in
our comprehension of time.
Furthermore, this continuous
radical, forced rupture with
our past transforms it into an
obsession with our timelessness;
our contemporaniety is
heightened as is our futurity.
Duly and obsessively, we never
forsake the past. Hence a new
vocabulary is created for the
interpretation of our modernity,
distinctly characterized by a
forceful relationship with our
time. The violence of these
ruptures recalls the need for
stratagems of dealing with an
exceptional temporal reality. For
me, this interest in time makes
it all the more a political act. We
find that many attempts fall short
from the messianic, and in their
simplest form – are attempts at
liberatory politics.
2
Not-yet-ness
I would like to highlight
a temporal term which I
encountered in reference to the
Palestinian question in an article
by Prof. Grant Farred, "Disorderly
Democracy: An Axiomatic
Politics," a term which, I find,
adds to the notion of history-inthe-making. The term is "not-yetness." Farred used it to reflect on
the current state of affairs of the
nationalistic project taking place
in Palestine; I find the term very
appealing context-wise as well as
in its temporal "potentialities"
a-la Agamben. Needless to say
that the term 'not-yet', in its
literal sense, is not new in its
philosophical expansions. In the
following paragraphs I will trace
it back to Heidegger, Benjamin,
and Iqbal.
First, in the crude political
interpretation of the Palestinian
227
context, not-yet-ness refers to
the state of not being a state, or
a sovereignty in the traditional
sense that is not fully reinstated
or wants to create its own
permutations and understandings
of what constitutes a sovereign
project. According to Farred,
"The Palestinian's is a struggle
for and against a sovereignty
whose not-yet-ness, whose
persistent incipience, constitutes
the very spectral substance
that undermines all those
other adjoining, contiguous
sovereignties…"1 In this sense,
the Palestinians have the
agency to claim, interpret, and
create viable understandings of
sovereignty away from didactics
of enforced power relations.
Here one begins to see the hints
alluding to self-proclamation and
calls of decolonization.
Unpacking the term "not-yetness" within that context from a
more theoretical point of view,
one finds that it unfolds multiple
meanings; that which is, and
which is not. Or that with the
potential to be, but is not. My
major attempt in understanding
the temporal aspect within
this sense is by conflating it
with human agency. So in this
permutation, it is interesting
to see that this term conflates
with the Agambenian notion
of "potentialities" in that it
always retains the negative or a
state of lackness; the same state
of lackness or "not-ness" that
invokes restlessness or need for
change brought about by the
subject's ability and knowledge
to realize one's lackness.
According to Alam Khundmiri's
interpretation of poet Iqbal, "to
be potential means: to be one's
own lack, to be in relation to
one's own incapacity."2 Potential,
according to this understanding,
holds the possibility of becoming
an actuality, very similar to that
of the not-yet; at the same time,
it also holds the potential not to
be or not to do.
The major claim that I find so
evident in this concept is that
of agency and 'action.' The 'to
do' is the real source of energy
that also finds itself attached to
a temporal reality, and always
somehow seems to be neglected
or undermined. The spirit of
'to do,' 'to make,' 'to build,' 'to
create,' and many other verbs
that denote action becomes
highlighted within this context,
once again illustrating how
action becomes enjoined with
the temporal. Furthermore, the
highlighted rigor in this concept
is its inexplicable cycle of selfregeneration. Agamben insists
on highlighting words of action
such as 'having.' He is primarily
concerned with how potentiality
retains 'knowledge and ability.'3
To be capable of harnessing
one's own 'absence' or 'privation,'
means that one has 'faculty' and
'power.' In this instance one
asserts his capacity of garnering
free will and agency. "To be free
is… to be capable of one's own
impotentiality, to be in relation
to one's own privation."4
The term's temporality, that
which evokes a strong reference
to futurity while still anchored
in the present and past, is
fascinating. Iqbal established
modernity as that which is
projected towards a future, while
always being driven by a past. The
'not-yet' is a constant caller in his
poems.5 This refers to Heidegger's
Dasein, that which sees its Beingin-the-world as a perpetual,
hermeneutic continuum,
empowered by a sense of agency,
free will, and awareness.6 Iqbal
realized the importance in
assuming a non-fatalistic attitude
towards the world, one where
agency and transformation
again unfold. "Iqbal is in full
agreement with the humanists
that man makes his own
history… Iqbal would have agreed
with Heidegger that destiny is a
mode of authentic existence and
that everything does not have a
229
destiny. If a man becomes a thing
he loses his destiny, he acquires
it by becoming free. To act freely
is to act historically, and to act
historically is to defy death."7 So
in acting within the parameters
of the not-yet, one claims agency
and free will, in order to act on
his potential and with knowledge
that he is doing so in a historical
framework, owning his history
and thwarting, towards a future.
3
Agency & the Messianic Drive
Not-yet, in its capacity to
incorporate all tenses leading to
futurity, is still a phrase with a
negation. This status of negation
or not, however, somehow
manages to introduce an
assertion, alluding to a somewhat
prophetic force or voice of that
which is about to happen. Free
will and agency are conjured to
assert the future implicit in the
not-yet. In this prophetic drive
we are brought to messianic
interpretations that seem to
have also been quite natural to
this place. The agency we have
spoken so vigorously about is
now capped in individuals who
seek change. Once again, time
here conflates with the subject.
Messianic time renders prophets
of "radical change," as Iqbal
refers to them. According to the
intellectual Alam Khundmiri,
Iqbal's understanding of the role
of prophets was that
a prophet becomes a destroyer, a
creator and an agent of change.
Iqbal's strong passion for the
prophetic example does not betray
his revivalistic attitude; on the
contrary, it indicates a passion
for time as against the static
eternity of the mystic, a search for
reality in the process of becoming
rather than a changeless being,
a passion for striving against
the traditional quietist attitude,
and, above all, a desire to plunge
into the process of history for the
creation of novelty.8
The need becomes
insurmountable in the state of
the not-yet to produce those
agents of change. Active ruptures,
implemented with agency and
a revolutionary drive, counter
violent ruptures in time aimed
at severing the past from the
present, as in the case of the
colonial occupation of Palestine.
The aim is to stride away from
our timelessness and recapture
our past with messianic force.
This, of course, is very much
an understanding inspired by
Walter Benjamin's position on
history and the need for change.
The messianic or revolutionary
moment is to be conceived as
a rupture or an interruption of
the current situation. This is
an important transformation
in the idea of what constitutes
revolution, since it has long
been regarded as the end-point
of progress and of historical
development. Revolution is,
therefore, theorized as an
element in the norm of progress,
whereas disaster and crisis are
intrusions. Benjamin turns the
tables, with revolution becoming
the interruption of progress,
conceived as a cumulative
development of the logic inherent
in disaster, which is immanent in
the present.9
The messianic translatability
from Iqbal and Benjamin
meets at a reclaiming of the
past through adopting change
as a catalyst. This brings the
revolutionary mode into a new
set of variables and a new role in
relation to our history and time.
In the not-yet of our times and
within the Palestinian situation,
an insurmountable desire comes
about to recapture our sense of
time by evoking our agency and
provoking change, real change.
231
1 G. Farred, "Disorderly Democracy: An Axiomatic
Politics," CR: The New Centennial Review (Michigan
State University) 8(2), Fall 2008, p. 59.
2 M.T. Ansari (ed.), Secularism, Islam and Modernity:
Selected Essays of Alam Khundmiri (New Delhi/London:
Sage Publications, 2001), p. 189.
3 G. Agamben, "On Potentiality," Potentialities:
Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel HellerRoazen (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP, 1999), p. 179.
4 Ibid., p. 183.
5 Ansari, op. cit., p. 214.
6 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans.: John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper &
Row, 1962).
7 Ibid., p. 186.
8 Ibid., p. 181.
9 W. Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflection,
ed. Hannah Arendt, trans.: Harry Zohn (New York:
Schocken, 2007).
The Road to Gaza :
233
a : Universal Rituals
in a Local Context
The local matters of the place, the changes occurring in it and the
ones forced upon it, as well as its observation from the perspectives
of a passerby and a resident – all of these necessarily generate
changing and new relationships which call for special analysis… In
order to have something to say, one must pose the question, whose
answer does not necessarily constitute a solution to the problems.
...
The place speaks out, as if it had a tongue; it recounts the story
of its people: their history, culture, cruelty… their struggle, their
sources of pride and their misery, despite the people's attempts
to deny or affirm this or that interpretation. After all, logic is a
reflection of the world.
...
Urban planning of cities, their architecture, symbols, and
landscapes are all political. This is sevenfold true under the
circumstances of an illegal Israeli occupation, which tries to take
control of land, destroys thousands of houses, isolates the towns
and villages, builds settlements and paves roads in the service of
the military machine and the occupying settlers. Art and science
set out to research, observe, and change not only the landscape and
scenery, but also the meaning, without withholding it completely.
...
To draw nearer – this is what a man can do in order to discover
life in the place or the place in life. Ironically, even though the
individual's life is shorter than the life of the place, the fast changes
and revolutionary metamorphoses of places elicit the feeling that
he lives more than one lifetime, and stands on multiple ruins. In
this there is an evocation of the experience of the ancient Arabs
who cried over a withering fire or a tent carried away by the
//
t
235
// Khaled Hourani, Ramallah 2006
desert wind.
...
In Palestine, the occupation makes both man and the place lose
their way, their compass. A fifty year old person undergoes a
hundred years' worth of experiences. A place of a mere 2.5 acres
undergoes the transformations of an entire universe. Let us take
Kalandia as an example, and follow the life of one individual,
Nabil, our artist friend, who is 55. Already in mid-life, the place,
for him, had more than a single meaning; meaning here is not
merely revolutionary, but also cumulating, urgent and constant;
almost denying what had been retained by memory.
...
From Kalandia Nabil flew to Egypt on his first trip to Alexandria.
The place represented the airport, which duly is the gateway to the
world, with all the connotations embedded in the words airport and
airplane, launch, movement, freedom, hope, and the anticipation of
the development of aeronautics…
The window to the world. The other places have become closed out.
The airport was officially closed at the outbreak of the war. The last
international flight took off in 1967.
...
Kalandia is also home to a refugee camp that symbolizes the
Nakba; the Palestinian Catastrophe of 1948. Half of its inhabitants
carry Jerusalem IDs, and the other half carry West Bank IDs,
aptly representing the 1967 War and its repercussions... and
the Separation Wall and the checkpoint… a continuation of the
occupation and its policies.
...
Within these connotations, the area of Kalandia, with the airport,
checkpoint, camp and wall, are an exemplary record of the social
and political transformations, at least since 1967.
...
From the Palestinian and global perspectives, the Kalandia
checkpoint is the most conspicuous among the hundreds scattered
throughout the West Bank, while Erez (or Beit Hanoun) is the most
prominent in Gaza Strip. It is worthy to note here that checkpoints
have various names and designations. Qalandiya checkpoint is
referred to by the Israelis as "Qalandiya crossing" – the opposite
of a checkpoint. This is also the name they use for the “Erez”,
"Karni", and "Philadelphia" crossings on the Gaza-Egypt border.
King Hussein Bridge is also known as Allenby Bridge or al-Karama
crossing.
...
The differences in names and designations are determined
according to the position and side from which you stand. The
permits issued by the occupation for some Palestinians, for
example, are not called "exit permits from Gaza," but rather "entry
permits to Israel." In a clear reference, meanings are switched –
exiting a room within the house, rather than entering a house
through a room within it, as if Gaza and the West Bank were
external places from which you enter into Israel, while Israelis are
totally forbidden to exit into the West Bank.
...
We will soon go to Gaza, having received the permit, the magnetic
card and the ID card… and given the rare situation – no closure on
the Occupied Territories…
...
Exiting from the Kalandia checkpoint, you go through gates which
237
remind you of house, hotel or shopping center entrances, and
certainly not of entry gates into a new country... The Kalandia
checkpoint is gradually coming to resemble Erez more, due to the
multiple doors and control towers. The main difference is that in
order to cross Erez one needs a user's manual in multiple languages
to teach him the art of crossing.
...
Market-like stalls are scattered everywhere, and cars crowd in
an act of defiance of life, competing with the Occupation on the
ownership of roads and pavements. The taxi driver tells me “I
must pick a driver who knows the roads well,” adding that "It's
not easy at all. The roads, my brother, have changed and there
are no signposts." I decide to go with him, if only to continue
the conversation. More than once he proves to me – I being the
only passenger in his taxi – that he was right, and that indeed I
no longer know the way. And indeed, you cannot trust the road
signs, which totally ignore Gaza's existence. A small hill with a few
houses on it on the other hand, is gives large conspicuous signs
plus entry and exit arrows. All of a sudden, while driving on an
international highway, the driver signals right, as though he wished
to enter a farm or a side road, but this is the road to Gaza.
...
Alterations to the map, the planning of routes, and the road signs
are all but innocent. The only remaining clue is a small road
sign in Hebrew bearing the word "Gaza." The road continues,
widening slightly only to narrow again, reaching a checkpoint in
an atmosphere of isolation. A tourist's foot will not tread here
place. There is no attraction to lure you. Here a world ends, and
a hidden, forlorn world begins behind a checkpoint which is more
reminiscent of the entrance to an army base or a nuclear space
station.
...
The horizon is blocked and nothing remotely resembles what the
entrance to Gaza used to be like years ago; a two- or three-story
building, barbed-wire fences, control towers, and body search
points are located outside the mute building. Strict security
inspections welcome you upon entry. The soldiers sit in a room
behind thick glass, facing state-of-the-art computers. The room
looks like a space station. Your picture appears on the screen as
soon as you start waving your permit behind the glass, beginning
with the process of entering alone. The cameras follow you, and the
loudspeakers give instructions in a jumble of languages; they order
you to stop and perform a self-search, turn around, take off your
coat in the middle of this long tunnel leading to and from the Gaza
Strip. The building and gates are intelligently built to keep you
away from the soldiers, and you must obey the instructions whose
exact source you cannot tell.
...
The decisive tone infuses you with a sense of emptiness and
solitude. You are carefully watched. You don't know whether you
should hasten your step or rather walk slowly. Whether you should
put your hands in yours pockets or not. The instructions of a poor
director in an irony-filled play. You are controlled by the voice. All
you have to do is obey the orders and keep silent. There is no one to
hear you, and you cannot say or explain or inquire about anything.
Once you enter the tunnel, the doors around you open and close
automatically as in science-fiction movies. You become a receiver
and an examinee, you cannot transmit; you cannot examine or
239
speak to anyone. You are the one being addressed; a one-way
contact. You are an object, not a subject, an a-priori suspect,
surrounded.
...
What is important to you is to pass this examination successfully,
and with minimal damage. One of the most perplexing moments
is when the voice stops. Suddenly you are overcome by the feeling
that your performance loses its meaning… What would have
happened if someone were to photograph the entire process and
erase the soundtrack? It would probably have turned into a first
rate tragicomic scene. Comic because of the casual gestures and
gyrating in the empty space, taking off your coat, and then putting
it on again, then moving forward and back, waiting with no definite
goal. It is especially funny for the first-timers, and bitterly sad due
to the general context in which it all takes place.
...
Exiting from Gaza is more exhausting than entering. The process
is more complicated and the wait is longer. There are inspection
machines and x-rays and magnetic scanners and more, which could
be much harder and even catastrophic for the deaf and mute.
...
The Erez crossing filters those entering Gaza, but it also hides
that which lies beyond it. Once you have passed from Beit Hanoun
into Gaza City, an exhausted, bombed country is revealed, full of
pits and craters left by the tanks. And the congestion is stifling.
Your hosts do not need to hear your experiences and tribulations,
nothing’s new and you have not come from the moon. There's
nothing to say. You can only keep silent in the clamorous Gaza.
One question hangs in the air: Is it worth living a life where
people are treated like animals or marionettes? Is it a life worth
recounting?
...
The dominant culture now in this life of solitude and oppression
has pushed towards the inward, and the self by force, and it has
reduced the space of natural human contact and the ordinary
grappling in the complexities of life. It has created totalitarian
images and thoughts, and increased the sense of despair that
hope of salvation will come. It has reinforced the conditions of
isolation and racial segregation, and created an overwhelming
sense of despair. The other – any other – is viewed as an enemy.
The possibility of heterogeneity is omitted from consciousness
altogether. Inner diversification of the self is likewise erased.
...
The war waged by the occupying country is total and directed at
all citizens. It is not only aimed at military targets as the Occupier
claims. The policy of collective punishment and invasion of
the cities would not have been performed without a culture of
exclusion and negation of the other and the treatment of every
Palestinian as enemy. Suffice it to mention here the horrible sonic
raids carried out by low-flying Israeli aircrafts on Gaza after the
evacuation of the settlements. Children, women, men, and elders
are deprived of sleep and live in a constant state of terror due to the
formidable air explosions that occur in the Gazan sky.
...
It has also become manifest in the responses of Palestinians;
martyr attacks prove that the other has become the ultimate enemy
indiscriminately, while the self has been defined as a collective
victim struggling on behalf of others, all others.
241
...
The conflict and re-Occupation brought about new elements and
means unknown before the second Intifada, which have had greater
devastative impact than all the Occupation years. The hopes of
the Palestinian people for freedom, peace, security, and economic
development have been diminished following the construction
of the Separation Wall and installation of hundreds checkpoints
in situ. The Occupation continues the policy of isolation, land
expropriation, settlement building, and transformation of the
Palestinian cities and villages into dissociated cantons. Further on,
the Occupation declares its intention to plan an extensive road
matrix; it intends to deepen Jerusalem's Judaization, cut off the
Jordan Valley, and declare the Wall as Israel's permanent border.
...
Alongside all these, the obscure Palestinian national entity,
founded on the basis of agreements which have been torn apart,
has become paralyzed as a national authority, unable to stop the
deterioration and to provide protection to land and citizens. The
entire region suffers from deterioration and regression, of which
the American occupation in Iraq is a quintessential manifestation.
...
Obviously one cannot examine the road to Gaza separately from
international and regional influences, and Samuel Huntington's
theory about "the clash of civilizations," and what has been dubbed
the war against terror after September 11, 2001.
...
Israel has regarded the conflict with the Palestinians as a
matter underlain by the terror issue. Doing so, it fully exploits
unprecedented international circumstances, ignoring the very
heart of the problem – the illegitimate occupation it imposes
on Palestinian land. What Palestinians are doing is resisting
this occupation, while Israel calls its military operations,
the erection of the Wall and policy of isolation a response to
Palestinian violence… Therefore, it carries out acts of oppression,
bombardment, expulsion, targeted killings, house and farm
demolitions, road blocking and diverting – all as a form of racial
discrimination under the pretext of self-defense... Such operations
motivate some Palestinian factions to adopt violence; it creates
a fertile ground for the emergence of a violent and oppositional
culture, spawning a new generation of "martyrs" (istishahdiyyin).
...
The transformation of the Palestinians' cry, which is their natural
claim for justice, into a mere issue of political violence, along
with the conspiring international community, is what isolates
Palestinians… It places them in a context they do not want,
a context that deems them terrorist groups, asked to stop the
violence. This situation negates historical logic; it is an attempt to
de-legitimize the struggle against occupation, even its non-violent
manifestations.
...
Then, surveillance towers and military checkpoints are placed.
Roads are transformed. The landscape of the country is changed.
The building of the Wall persists. The transformation of cities,
villages, and refugee camps into enclosures, lacking architecturally,
roofs, since walls and gates are provided. All this occurs under
definitions that distort reality, and a culture that attempts to
strangle history.
...
243
As far as the Palestinians are concerned, such pressure and the
attempt to force them to accept the unacceptable are useless, and
will not help them adopt a culture of acceptance and peace. For the
Israelis, the political culture perceiving the Occupation as a natural
right, and the belief that land may be confiscated and people
isolated, are a sure recipe for deterioration. This will only reinforce
the conflict and crisis, and thus more suffering and torture will be
inflicted on the Israelis and the Palestinians alike…
... Working paper, submitted to the conference Liminal Spaces, Qalandiya, Palestine
2006
Tour of Ramallah // Yae l
245
e l Bartana
May 19, 2006
PSS headquarters, Ramallah
The uniformed men work in the service of the
PSS (Palestinian Security Services).
The Israelis, pretending to be Dutch artists, are
suspected of being Jewish settlers, interested in
buying Palestinian land.
The PSS arrest them in order to protect them
from Palestinian kidnappers.
With the help of a local culture institution, they
are released (not before they are served a cup of
tasty "black coffee").
247
Two Israeli citizens on a research trip to
Ramallah (zone A*, forbidden for Israeli citizens),
escorted by a local Palestinian.
They take photographs of a construction site.
10 minutes later they are arrested by people in
uniforms carrying guns.
The Israelis try lying to the soldiers, explaining
that they are not carrying identity cards, and that
they are from The Netherlands.
Later they are taken for interrogation by car
following a jeep to an unknown location.
* Since the Madrid Conference in 1991, there has been
a succession of international agreements on which some
areas of the Occupied Territories have been transferred
to the Palestinian National Authority. The territory
has been divided into three kinds of administrative
areas: Zone A, where the Palestinian Authority carries
full responsibility for civil administration and security
affairs; Zone B, where the authorities care only for the
civil responsibilities and the Israeli Army still holds
control over the area; and Zone C, where the Palestinian
Authority has not got any kind of authority.
Asymmetries i
249
s in Globalized Space
// Alessandro Petti
The Road
Network in
PalestineIsrael
—
Prologue
O n the b ord er between
J ordan and Pal esti neI srael , August 2002
We wake up early in the
morning. A hard day of
waiting and sun lies before
us. In order to come to
Palestine with my wife Sandi
and her parents, Anwar
and Monira (all three with
Palestinian passports), instead
of taking the easy route via
Tel Aviv, which is barred to
Palestinians, I decided to
cross the border with them
over what Jordanians call the
King Hussein Bridge and the
Israelis, the Allenby Bridge.
There are three border
crossings between Jordan and
Palestine: the Allenby/King
Hussein Bridge is the closest
to Jerusalem. It was built on
the lowest ground in the area,
at the same level as the Dead
Sea. During the trip, the heat
rises and the air pressure
drops; ears pop and sweat runs
down as our bodies attempt to
compensate. The taxi that has
ventured into this inhospitable
land is an old Mercedes with
a dozen seats, dilapidated on
any terrain.
Here we are now, on the
Jordanian side of the border.
In silence, we get out of the
vehicle. Sandi and her parents
walk off a few yards toward
the entry point reserved for
Palestinians.
Left on my own, my defenses
naturally go up and my
attention is more on the
alert. A young man takes
the luggage from me and I
automatically follow him. I
wouldn't know where else to
go and there aren't any signs
with information written in
a language I can decipher.
The boy, about eighteen years
old, takes me to the front of
a baggage track and sets the
suitcases down on the rollers.
He turns around, looks at me,
and then leaves. It doesn't take
a genius to understand that my
next stop is some seats set in
the shade, out of the merciless
August sun. A few minutes
later I hear a voice behind me.
I follow it and find myself at
passport control. Everything's
in order.
After five minutes, I'm already
in the no-man's land. A ribbon
of asphalt, fenced along the
edges, with signs warning of
landmine fields. Up ahead,
there is the Israeli checkpoint.
Two young men with rifles
dressed in camouflage make us
get out of the bus to inspect
it from top to bottom. A short
time later they make us get
on the bus again, but we drive
only a few yards. Another
checkpoint.
The Israeli flag flutters on
top of the only hill rising
out of the dry plateau. We
are stopped for another half
hour. I don't know why or
what we're waiting for. All of
a sudden, a barrier lifts up
and we are free to pass over
the Israeli border. A surreal
expanse of green spreads out
in front of our eyes: palm trees
and flower beds. Welcome to
Israel.
251
The border is not a line. It is
a space with depth to it. The
materials of which it is made
are the same as the ones in
cities, but used differently.
Here, for example, a retaining
wall made out of reinforced
concrete serves as a barricade.
Inside the border, the rules
are few but essential. All flow
is strictly monitored and
controlled. The border is a
machine which tears apart
everything that crosses it into
separate, classifiable elements,
only to put them together
again one way or another
when they exit. This applies to
people, too, not just objects.
I going to? When will I be
coming back? Where is my
luggage? The same questions
are asked in different ways for
half an hour.
When the interrogation ends,
another soldier shows me
into a dressing room. Very
courteously, he asks me to
undress. He checks every
single piece of my clothing,
then goes out, taking my
shoes with him. I find myself
back where I started from,
only shoeless. Two hours have
already gone by since we got to
the border and I wonder just
how long we are going to have
to stay here.
When I get off the bus, I am
greeted by some young soldiers
who look like American
teenagers, with low-hung
pants and baggy T-shirts. A
female soldier comes up to
me and asks me where I am
heading. "To Bethlehem," I
answer. "Follow me, please,"
she says.
They take me out of the
"normal" line. I sit down and
wait for the security staff.
Another female soldier starts
questioning me: Where am
I headed? Whose house am
They take me into another
room and ask me to open up
the suitcases that are arranged
on stainless steel tables, like
meat in a butcher shop, easy
to clean. Seated, I wait for
every single thing I own to be
inspected.
Truth be told, I was prepared
for this treatment so I take it
calmly, even when they tell me
that my personal belongings
may now be repacked after
their vivisection: it's the same
feeling you get when you
come home to find a burglar
has dropped in during your
absence. You feel violated:
your dirty laundry, your
agenda lying open, everything
that's been touched by other
hands, the hands of complete
strangers. I try not to lose my
humanity, and with great calm
and dignity I fold everything
as if I am about to take my
leave from a Grand Hotel. I
will my gestures into slow
motion, trying to be as refined
as possible in spite of the
vivisection lab I've wandered
into.
This particular procedure is
reserved for Palestinians and
anyone who has contact with
them.
My clothes are now back in
my suitcase. I think I've finally
finished, but where is my
passport? They tell me I have
to pick it up in an office near
the exit: this is where I'm told
to fill in yet another form, and
asked the same questions.
Four hours to cross the border.
The border is not a line: you
cannot cross it by stepping
over it.
Once I'm over the border, the
heat clutches at my throat
and the light is blinding. We
bargain with a taxi driver
over the fare for the trip. The
discussion goes on longer than
expected because there are
problems reaching Bethlehem.
To get there, you first have
to pass through Jerusalem.
In theory, that would be the
easiest route, but Palestinians
are not authorized to go
there. The taxi driver doesn't
want to risk any of the rural
routes because there might be
roadblocks on them. We agree
on a relay arrangement: the
first taxi will take us as far as
the outskirts of Jerusalem, and
from there we'll have to get
ourselves another ride.
Along the road, we come
across colony settlements and
Bedouin tents. Two opposite
ways of using the territory:
one sedentary, one nomadic.
The settlements are fenced in
by walls whose foundations
are dug into the ground, while
the Bedouin tents are perched
on the surface of the land.
Immobility versus motion.
Controlled borders versus
freedom of movement.
At 2:30 p.m. we're on the
outskirts of Jerusalem. At 3
p.m., curfew starts. We have to
hurry. Yet another checkpoint.
We get out of the taxi in the
middle of a line of vehicles
packed tightly together. We
jump into a new taxi that
turns around and goes back for
a bit over the same road we’ve
just taken.
I'm starting to give up on the
idea of ever making it there,
when the genius of selforganization suddenly comes
into play. Whenever a new
checkpoint is set up by the
Israelis, the Palestinian taxi
drivers respond by planning
a new road to get around it.
They take up a collection to
lease a tractor and clear a few
hundred yards with it: voilà, a
new passage that circumvents
the checkpoint. The soldiers
know about it, but these are
the crazed rules of the game
and the Palestinians are forced
to abide by them.
and turns, we finally make
it to the gates of Bethlehem.
We get out of the car to find
the entire family there to
greet us. Our marriage, which
took place a few weeks earlier
in Rome, is celebrated in
the family courtyard with
singing and dancing. My
thoughts turn for a second to
the courtyards of Italy, lit by
the blue glow of televisions,
and to the same TV news
story broadcast every year,
about the mid-August exodus
and counter-exodus and the
bad weather that’s ruining
everybody’s summer holidays.
The taxi driver who's taking
us on this part of the drive is
a refugee; he risks receiving a
fine that he won't be able to
pay and being arrested, but
what can he do about it? It's
the only way he has to get by.
After a long series of twists
Tala, my daughter, was born
in Bethlehem on a beautiful
spring morning in the month
of February. She was birthed in
a clinic built with funds from
the Japanese government and
tended by a Palestinian nurse
who spoke perfect Neapolitan,
Four years
later…
On the border between
Pales tine-Is rael and
Jordan, Augus t 2006
253
learned during a long stay in
Naples where he had studied.
After the first few days spent
rejoicing in her arrival, we
find ourselves faced with a
dilemma: how is Tala going
to be able to cross the border
and get out of the Occupied
Territories? How will the
border machine work on her,
with a Palestinian mother and
an Italian father? If Tala leaves
Bethlehem as an “Italian”
she'll only be able to come
back as a tourist; if she leaves
Bethlehem as a “Palestinian”
she'll be treated as such by
the Israeli army, meaning
she won't be able to move
freely around the Occupied
Territories and Israel.
mediates between birth and
nationhood.
By being half-Italian and
half-Palestinian, Tala puts
the pre-established spatial
and political order into
crisis, revealing the fiction
of national belonging and all
the politics that stem from it.
The mere thought of having to
face the device with her that
awaits us on the Jordanian
border, the only entry and exit
point for Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories, is deeply
disturbing to me. The idea of
being forced to be stripped
bare by the border machine
makes almost any certainty
you have about your rights and
existence falter.
The border machine is
interactive architecture. It
changes depending on the
citizenship of the person who
crosses over it. As a prototype
of biopolitical architecture,
maybe in its purest form, it
becomes more or less porous
depending on the nation it
belongs to: it constructs and
deconstructs itself depending
on the relationship that
each individual has with the
state, a regulating device that
We hire the usual group taxi, a
dilapidated yellow Mercedes.
Concerns about the trip are
magnified by the sense of
uncertainty. How many times
have I heard it said that the
real problem is not knowing
what the rules are? At the
beginning, I always used to
say, "There must be someone
who decides what you can and
can't do!" Then I discovered
that this void is a form of
government.
Take the roads, for example.
The Israeli army can decide for
security reasons to blockade
a given part of a road used on
a daily basis by thousands of
Palestinians. The blockade is
enforced by deploying patrols,
roadblocks and barriers. After
a few months, even though the
roadblocks have been removed,
the Palestinians – fearful of
running up against soldiers
and being arrested – choose
not to use the road anymore,
thus leaving it to the exclusive
use of the colonists.
This is what differentiates
the rule of Israel in the
Occupied Territories from
South African apartheid. The
separation here is not crudely
imposed by Only White signs,
but rather by a much more
sophisticated system ensuring
that the prohibitions will be
internalized. You will never
find signs saying “Forbidden
to Palestinians – Reserved to
Tourists and Colonists” along
the roads used exclusively
by colonists. The regime of
prohibitions is implemented
by verbal orders given by
Israeli military officers who
control a given area of the
territory. Palestinians found
on a road prohibited to them
or for which they lack the
required permit risk being
put into jail or having their
vehicle confiscated. This is
why Palestinians are forced
to use group transportation
vehicles that shuttle between
one checkpoint and another.
The border machine is not
located on state lines; rather,
it acts on the boundaries of
Palestinian cities and villages.
To ensure ourselves some
likelihood of crossing the
border into Jordan, which is
only open a few hours a day,
we set out from Bethlehem at
4:30 in the morning. Luckily,
Tala is sleeping. We get
through the first checkpoint,
called the container, without
any particular problems.
I'm the only Westerner in the
bus, one of the few Westerners
to take the roads reserved to
Palestinians. The soldiers at
the checkpoints have often
asked me, “What the fuck
are you doing here?” And I've
always answered, “It’s a long
story, actually,…”. To save
themselves the boredom, they
almost always let me through.
Having arrived as far as Abu
Dis, I'm beginning to think
that this is a charmed trip,
with a remarkable lack of
snags, when we suddenly
come up against a mobile
checkpoint. They stop us and
tell us that we can't pass this
way. The passengers start to
get upset. They start shouting,
waving airplane tickets
departing from the Amman
airport. The soldiers pretend
they don't hear. There's no
point in arguing.
Tense and irritated, the taxi
driver turns the car around
and after a few yards sets off
down a back road through the
countryside. Tala wakes up:
the car is rocking a little too
violently to be mistaken for
a cradle. I hold her baby seat
against my chest as tightly as I
can. We cut across a beautiful
field of ancient olive trees.
After a short while, we're once
again on the main road, with
the soldiers behind us grinning
from the checkpoint.
The road starts to go downhill
and we gaze out the windows
onto the extraordinary
landscape of the hills of the
Dead Sea, dotted by colonies
and Bedouin camps. My
thoughts turn toward the
nomadic city designed by
Constant. I tell myself that
its tragic dimension, rarely
discussed, takes on concrete
form in this place. I have
always thought of Constant's
New Babylon as a dystopia: the
vision of a world in collapse,
in constant conflict, not so
much between nomads and
sedentary peoples as between
different conceptions of
nomadism.
As I look out the car
window, I recognize the
encampments and the new
colony expansions. Lost in my
thoughts, I fail to notice that,
instead of driving straight
toward the Jordanian border,
the taxi has detoured and is
entering into Jericho. And I
suddenly find myself in front
of the mutated form of the
border that I had crossed four
years previously.
The first time I arrived here
from Jordan, I first met up
with the Jordanian police and
then with the Israeli forces,
assisted by a Palestinian police
unit. Now the Palestinians
have been moved away from
the border and have set up a
sham border of a non-existent
255
state on a piece of land
measuring 150 by 500 feet.
A barrier appears in front of
our vehicle. We get out of the
taxi and climb onto a bus that
stops again after a few yards.
Some Palestinian policemen
climb on to check documents
and luggage. The bus starts
again, and stops a few yards
later. They make us get off.
We pick up our suitcases from
practically the same spot
where we made our entry.
The Palestinian border is
like a service station that
leads nowhere. I'm flooded
by a sense of overwhelming
sadness. The idea of
Palestinian sovereignty
appears to have achieved its
final form in this place: a
sovereignty exercised over a
miniscule plot of land inside
of which all procedures are
complied with for a border
crossing into... nowhere. The
real border is five miles away.
I'm flabbergasted: the police
and the people in transit
diligently recite their parts in
this puppet theater. Everybody
knows that it's make-believe,
but no one objects to it.
Back in the bus, we leave for
the real border, presided over
this time solely by Israelis.
As an Italian citizen in a
taxi, I could have reached the
border directly. Sandi and
Tala, as Palestinians, had no
way of avoiding this sham
performance.
The trip from Bethlehem
to Amman – less than 125
miles – normally takes more
than eight hours. The puppettheater border crossing has
radically disheartened me. The
day will come, I say to myself,
when the Palestinians will
climb out of their rundown
buses, their overcrowded,
stuffy group vans, and with
a resigned but peaceful
expression, say to the Israelis:
“Fine, you win. This cannot
be the dream of a Palestinian
state that we nurtured for so
many years. We don't want a
fake state, a sham border. We
simply want to live and move
around freely like you. We give
up on our state. We just want
our rights.”
We continue our journey,
this time in the direction of
the real border. After hours
of waiting to be able to
enter the border zone, the
moment comes to show our
documents. Many Westerners
with privileged passports do
not understand the anxiety
of people who are faced with
the potential of being sent
back. The Palestinian travel
document is once again the
paroxysmal expression of this
control device. It's a travel
document, not a passport,
and it doesn't even specify
a nationality. I've seen
policemen at the airport stare
at it with puzzled expressions
and ask, "What the heck is
this?" Whoever thought up
this document didn't have
the courage to write the word
"Palestinian" in the box for
"Nationality". The adjective
"Palestinian" is becoming like
the adjective "Jewish": a lot of
people are too scared to even
pronounce it. Bad consciences.
Even though Tala is registered
on my passport, for the
Israelis and Palestinians
she's Palestinian, so she has
to follow the same route as
Sandi, a different one from
mine. I don't object to this, I
just ask the Israeli soldier to
allow me to go with them, to
let me follow the procedure
reserved to Palestinians. I
want to give up my Westerner
privileges, air conditioning,
cleanliness and cold drinks, in
order to accompany my family
into the crowded buildings
and hallways reserved to
Palestinians.
The soldier informs me that
this will not be possible and
that I have to stick to the
procedures for tourists. A
confused jumble of questions
comes to my mind. By
accepting this treatment,
to what extent do I make
myself an accomplice to this
madness? Why do all the
things I've read not come to
my aid, preventing me from
going crazy with rage? To stop
myself from dehumanizing the
soldiers standing before me,
I imagine that Nadav, Eyal,
Ravit, Ronit and many other
Israeli friends of mine might
very well be disguised behind
their uniforms and rifles. All
I know is that I give in and,
dazed, I watch Sandi and Tala
walk away from me.
I enter into the area for nonPalestinians. Air conditioning
and men in Bermuda shorts.
I feel ashamed of myself for
giving up and accepting this
privileged treatment. Me,
here, with the tourists, and
them, over there, hoping not
to be sent home. Stunned, I
obey the orders issued to me:
pay here, open there, get up
here, go there, step down, step
up, sit down....
After a few hours, I cross
the bridge. I'm in Jordan. I
immediately start looking for
the Palestinian exit, but it's
not easy to find. The building
is built in such a way as to
prevent human traffic flows
from ever meeting up, like
in hospitals, where areas and
routes for healthy people and
patients are kept rigorously
separated. Breathlessly, I
search among lazy Jordanian
policemen and sweaty tourists
for the door connecting the
area reserved to Palestinians
with the area for everyone else.
I finally find the door, and
before opening it, I feel like
Jim Carrey in The Truman
Show when he discovers the
hidden door in the painted
blue skyscape that may
possibly eject him into the
real world.
The
Diffusion of
the Model
The flow control and
surveillance practices are not
specific to the Palestinian
Occupied Territories. They
appear in other geographical
contexts – from Australia to
East Asia to North America –
and they take form in various
ways: in the functioning of the
toll-road bypass freeways in
the large urban agglomerations
of Los Angeles, Toronto, and
Melbourne; in the use of
highways as "sanitary cordons"
to divide new settlements for
the emerging classes from
the informal settlements of
Istanbul, Jakarta, and Manila;
in the use of pedestrian
bypasses in office center
complexes.
Alongside the privatization
that has taken place in many
sectors during recent years,
the system of private toll
highways, ensuring speedier
and more efficient travel, has
taken on a rapidly growing
role.
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265
In many cities, private
highways have been
superimposed directly on top
of the old congested public
transport network. The
Riverside SR 91 Freeway in
Los Angeles, Highway 407 in
Toronto, and the CityLink
Project in Melbourne are
highway routes built as
networks for bypassing
crowded public streets.
New major roadways in
Istanbul, Jakarta, and
Manila are used as genuine
sanitary cordons that divide
residential neighborhoods
from the slums. This new
generation of highways is
used to bypass urban areas
that are considered unsafe,
and to restrict the growth of
undesirable populations.
The new toll systems that
are built into the highway
routes function as devices for
control, for cataloging, and for
automatic surveillance. Today,
high technology has enabled
control and surveillance
to reach unprecedented
levels of invasiveness and
pervasiveness.
SR 91 Freeway, Route 407,
and Transurban CityLink are
the names of the new bypass
road networks built in three
major cities: Los Angeles,
Toronto, and Melbourne. Toll
highways built to bypass the
overcrowded public roadways,
they use electronic control
systems for entry and exit
points so that drivers are
freed from having to stop at
toll booths. Some have toll
fares that vary depending on
the time of travel and the
traffic flow. The construction
companies that built them
offer reserved spaces for paying
customers who want to get
across the city quickly.
The Transurban CityLink
in Melbourne, inaugurated
in 1999, is 14 miles long
and links the most affluent
neighborhoods with the
downtown area and the
airport. Offering faster
travel times, toll highways
are capable of determining
the lines along which future
expansion of the settlements
will develop. Given their
size, this type of privatized
space, which increasingly
occupies the land of the large
conurbations, puts the very
notion of public space into
discussion.
Projects like the CityLink can
become pivotal in determining
the evolution of a city's form
because of the fact that they
are structural and tend to set
the agenda of what sort of
urban space is being created
for future generations. At issue
is the future of public space
itself, in its social, technical
and aesthetic forms. This is
true from the point of view
of by-passing of traditional
agora like markets and the
parking-based streetscapes,
to the further privileging of
the super-regulated private
spaces of shopping complexes,
another cocoon for which
the freeways is the link.1
The creation of toll road
spaces to travel from
one area of the city to
another contributes to
the fragmentation of the
territory: financial centers,
luxury residences, shopping
centers, and theme parks
are the islands connected
by toll networks that bypass
spaces and populations in the
archipelago of colonies found
in major conurbations.
As we know, highway routes
are not exclusively spaces
for flows. They can also be
sanitary cordons that separate
affluent neighborhoods from
the growth of slums.
In Istanbul, in the wake
of a period of economic
and political renewal, new
settlements for the emerging
class have sprung up. They
offer "Western lifestyles,"
social uniformity, comfort
and security from crime, and
refuge from the multiethnic,
chaotic, polluted city.
Esenkent and Bogazkoy
are two postmodern-style
settlements built west of
the city, composed of luxury
apartments furnished
with swimming pools and
gardens. They are separated
by informal villages with
houses constructed willynilly along the highway
routes that mark out the new
class and identity confines
inside the metropolis.2
The same highways that were
considered instruments of
progress and modernization
in the modernist ideology
have become obstructions
and barriers in Istanbul,
blocking the growth of
informal settlements. For
Caldeira, the instruments
of modernist planning have
ironically been used opposite
to how they were conceived.3
The separation between
pedestrian and vehicular
traffic, which for modernism
represented a victory for
human health, is seen in
Istanbul to be a strategy for
prohibiting improper use
of the major roadways. The
roads are actually sterilized
of activities and people who
are considered incompatible
with the smooth space of
flows. Individual private
transport has been privileged,
excluding the people who use
public transport. Similarly,
empty urban spaces, which
in modernist planning were
conceived as "the right
distance between buildings"
or "green belts," have been
transformed into areas where
sculpture-like, fortified
"designer" buildings are
located.
The use of the highway as a
sanitary cordon may also be
found in some Asian cities.
In the endless suburbs of
Jakarta, gated communities,
shopping centers, and office
areas are linked by public or
private toll highways. The
privileged social classes have
moved to the safest and least
polluted places in the vast
outskirts, abandoning the old,
unhealthy city, considered to
be dangerous, with its poor
infrastructures. The major
roadways that link the islands
of the wealthy bypass the old
city center by soaring over it.4
In Manila, to build the new
toll-road bypass network,
called the Metro Manila
Skyway, various informal
neighborhoods were
demolished, forcing the
inhabitants to evacuate. To
reinforce exclusive use of
the highway network that
connects the residential
islands, access is forbidden to
traditional vehicles. Jeepneys,
buses, and motorcycles are
thus forced to use the old
streets.
The creation of privatized
spaces for flows has even
invaded the spaces designed
for pedestrians. Raised or
underground pedestrian routes
267
have emerged in financial
centers and for offices,
connecting one building to
another by bypassing the city
streets. Because of this, the
streets and squares that for
years symbolized public life
have slowly and inexorably
been replaced by tunnels
and skyway bridges. Access
to offices by workers and
executives is through tunnels
and skywalks, without ever
having to step out of their cars
other than inside a private
parking garage. Building
entrances are monitored by
video cameras and security
staff.
The use of tunnels
and pedestrian bridges
has compromised the
indiscriminate life and
use of the public streets.
In some business centers,
simply going somewhere on
foot automatically makes
one suspect. The street, a
place of human activity and
chance encounter, has been
transformed into a realm of
fear and surveillance.
The
Society of
Control
During the course he gave at
the Collège de France between
1977 and 1978,5 Foucault
investigated the passage of
a disciplinary society into a
society of security, by which he
means a society with a general
economy of power which
has the form of, or which is
dominated by, the technology
of security. Foucault pays
particular attention to the
distinction between discipline
and security in their respective
ways of dealing with the
organization of spatial
distributions. He provides
three examples from history.
The first is the project by
Alexandre Le Maître, in which
the city is defined in terms of
sovereignty; a distinguishing
feature of this spatial project
is the capital and its role in
relation to the rest of the
territory. Indeed, the relation
between sovereignty and
the spatial arrangement is
fundamental, since the city
1 David Holmes, "Cybercommuting
on an Information Superhighway:
the Case of Melbourne’s CityLink,"
in Stephen Graham (ed.), The
Cybercities Reader, (London:
Routledge, 2004), p. 177.
2 Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins,
"Modernism and the Millennium:
Trial by Space in Istanbul," in City
8, 1997, pp. 21-36.
3 Teresa Caldeira, "Fortified
Enclaves: The New Urban
Segregation," in Public Culture 8,
1996, pp. 303-328.
4 Abidin Kusno, City, Space +
Globalization: An International
Perspective – Proceedings of an
International Symposium (Collage
of Architecture and Urban
Planning, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor MI, 1999), p. 163.
5 Michel Foucault, Security,
Territory, Population: Lectures at
the Collège de France, 1977-78,
trans. Graham Burchell (New York:
Pelgrave Macmillan, 2007).
is essentially conceived in
relation to the more global
dimension of the territory,
while the State itself is
seen as an edifice. Foucault
associates this spatial project
with the age of law, in which
the security mechanism is
both a legal and a juridical
mechanism. To explain how
this mechanism of security
functions, he provides the
example of the treatment of
lepers, who were excluded
from the city by laws and
regulations.
His second example is the
town of Richelieu, based on
17th century political thought.
The town was built using the
form of the Roman camp,
with the grid embodying the
instrument of discipline:
hierarchies and relations of
power are established through
the structural formation of
the space. Discipline forms
an empty, closed space;
discipline belongs to the order
of construction. Foucault
associates this spatial project
with the disciplinary age, the
institution of the modern legal
system. In order to explain
how this security mechanism
functions, he provides the
example of how the plague
was treated between the 16th
and 17th centuries, when
the territory was subject to
regulations specifying when
people could go out and how
they should behave at home,
prohibiting contact, and
requiring them to present
themselves to inspectors, and
so on.
The third example is Nantes,
where the space was organized
to give structure to the
problem of hygiene, trade, and
other types of networks.
An important problem for
towns in the 18th century
was allowing for surveillance,
since the suppression of city
walls made necessary by
economic development meant
that one could no longer
close towns in the evening
or closely supervise daily
comings and goings, so that
the insecurity of the towns
was increased by the influx
of the floating population of
beggars, vagrants, delinquents,
criminals, thieves, murderers,
and so on, who might come,
as everyone knows, from the
country. In other words, it
was a matter of organizing
circulation, eliminating its
dangerous elements, making a
division between good and bad
circulation, and maximizing
the good circulation by
diminishing the bad.6
Foucault associates this
spatial project with the age of
security. To explain how this
mechanism works, he provides
the example of smallpox
and inoculation practices
beginning in the 18th century.
The fundamental problem
will not be the imposition of
discipline... so much as the
problem of knowing how
many people are infected
with smallpox... the statistical
effects on the population
in general. In short, it will
no longer be the problem of
exclusion, as with leprosy,
or of quarantine, as with the
plague, but of epidemics and
the medical campaigns that try
to halt epidemic or endemic
phenomena.7
Nevertheless, Foucault
cautions that these three
mechanisms can be found in
269
different historical periods and
that one influences the other.
Hence, a complex apparatus of
discipline is required to make
the security mechanisms work.
They do not follow each other
in succession and the forms
that emerge do not cause
the earlier ones to disappear.
There is not the legal age, the
disciplinary age, and then the
age of security. Apparatuses
of security do not replace
disciplinary mechanisms;
when a technology of
security is put into action,
for example, it may use or, at
times, multiply juridical and
disciplinary elements.
one which acquires force
only by virtue of the security
mechanism of the road system.
Indeed, if discipline acts in an
empty space through isolation,
hierarchy, and repression,
security, on the other hand,
allows for a certain amount
of circulation, making a
division between good and bad
circulation, since its objective
is not to block flows, but to
monitor them. Security, unlike
discipline, does not tend to
resolve the problem, but,
rather, to manage probable
events that are only partially
controllable while attempting
to minimize the risks.
In other words, in a period
of the deployment of
mechanisms of security, it is
the disciplinary that sparked
off, not the explosion, for there
has not been an explosion, but
at least the most evident and
visible conflicts.8
Discipline gives architectural
form to a space and considers
the hierarchical and functional
distribution of the elements
as an essential problem: I
think of how the Israeli guard
towers and military camps
are organized in the layout
of a prison plan, to allow
for surveillance even when
there is no one observing and
guarding from the towers,
because all that is needed to
influence people's behavior
is the very existence of the
mechanism.
Foucault's schema helps
us to arrive at a better
understanding of how
the wall built by Israel to
encircle Palestinian towns,
for example, is indeed a
disciplinary mechanism, but
6 Ibid., p. 18.
7 Ibid., p. 10.
8 Ibid., p. 9.
Security seeks, rather, to
structure an environment
based on a series of possible
events or elements that must
be regulated within a multifunctional and transformable
framework: I think about how
the permanent and mobile
checkpoints work, not by
attempting to resolve the
problem of armed attacks
once and for all, but, rather,
by reducing their probability,
in the same way that taking
digital fingerprints for the
identity cards issued to
Palestinians by the Israelis
marks the passage toward
a bio-political power that
invades the very nature
of humanity, our DNA,
transforming a people into a
population, into statistical
data.
For security, control of the
road circulation is equally
important as the juridical-legal
apparatus and the disciplinary
apparatus. The problem is not
one of delimiting the territory,
as it is for the disciplinary
mechanism, or at least not
exclusively so. It is a question
of allowing circulation,
controlling it, distinguishing
between good and bad
circulation, and assisting
movements, but in such a way
as to eliminate the dangers
inherent to this circulation.
I began this piece with
a story, attempting to
describe the asymmetrical
functioning of the roads,
for which there are no road
maps prohibiting access or
even written regulations.
What we are dealing with
here is not exclusion, a crude
but blatant separation like
South African apartheid.
What we have here is a much
more sophisticated regime.
The problem is not about
imposing a law that says no (if
such a law exists) but about
keeping certain phenomena
at bay, within acceptable
limits, by encouraging their
progressive self-annihilation.
The mechanisms in this type
of control become increasingly
"democratic." It is for this
reason that the socio-political
future of Palestine-Israel is
so relevant to countries that
consider themselves to be
liberal democracies. It is here
that forms of government
will come into being which
will juxtapose freedom and
domination, access and
separation, liberalism and
occupation.
271
Playgrounds (1995-)
// Peter Friedl
273
Ramallah, Nadi Islami
Ramallah, 2007
275
Qalqiliyah, Mala'ab
Baladiyet Qalqiliyah,
2006
277
El-Bireh,
Isa'ad Al-Toufuleh,
2006
How much did you pay f
279
y for this plot of land?
The maps are based on
talks and interviews
with inhabitants,
architects, researchers,
municipal employees,
project developers and
real-estate agencies,
as well as on related
studies and texts.
Land Value in Ramalla h
a h and East Jerusalem
281
// Sabine Horlitz & Oliv e
v er Clemens
283
Shuafat-Pisgat Ze'ev Pa n
285
a noramas // Oren Sagiv
Live Evil
Francis McKee
Kodwo touched one of the throbbing blisters and it burst over his
shirt. Thick red syrup spread like a slow blossom across his chest.
From the corner of his eye he could see shadows flicker and advance.
Blood bubbled across his body and the shadows hissed his name,
"Kodwo!" Kodwo!"
The sun hit his eyes and he finally woke up. Majd was jabbing him in
the side with his elbow and a soldier was standing impatiently at the
window of the minibus holding out his hand expectantly.
"Show him your ID," said Majd.
Kodwo dug into the bag at his feet, retrieved his passport, and
handed it to the soldier. They were at a checkpoint, a gray concrete
tower looming in front of them. Burn marks scorched the huge wall
and the road itself. Now that he was awake he could see all of the
soldiers properly. They were tense and restless, milling around the
stationary cars. And still in the corners of his eyes, the shadows
flickered. What was it, some optical trick of the light? Reflections,
maybe, of the corrugated roof that spanned the giant holding shed
they'd built for pedestrians. His passport was returned. Still the car
sat in the queue.
Rima turned in her seat and passed something back to Majd. "What
is it?" asked Kodwo.
"Ouija board," replied Rima. "Can't use mobiles here. See if
287
289
you can get through."
Majd grinned and placed the board between them. Kodwo shrugged.
It was worth a go to pass the time. Maybe he could contact Sun Ra.
He placed his hand on the board and Majd gently guided it around
the board. Probably because he was sitting at the wrong angle in the
cramped seat of the bus, Kodwo found it hard to reach the letters he
hoped for on the matrix. "What's it spell, then?" he asked Majd.
"Harry," he replied, mystified. "Who's Harry?"
"God knows. Wrong number I expect." Kodwo sighed.
"Could have at least found Miles – he must be somewhere
in the underworld."
There was nothing more to keep him awake and so he dozed uneasily
for another half an hour before the queue started to move.
By the time Kodwo was dropped off at the hotel it was beginning
to rain. Having picked up his key, he stopped to check the small set
of bookshelves near the lifts, a library for guests made up almost
entirely of books on the conflict in the West Bank. Said's On Late
Style looked tempting and Kodwo was about to take it off the shelf
when a strange guest tramped across the foyer to the reception desk.
He was soaked and bedraggled, wearing an old blue pinstripe suit.
His bony face was harsh but outdone by an electric shock of hair,
stiffened with dried mud. He stood at the desk, unable to do more
than utter inarticulate grunts and cries, his bony hands rapping the
desktop urgently, as if in some version of Morse code rather than an
attempt to gain attention from the frightened receptionist. Then, just
as quickly, he walked out of the hotel.
From his bedroom window high above, Kodwo watched the man
tramp back down the street, oblivious to the rain, apparently
oblivious to everything around him.
It was still raining when Kodwo next emerged from the hotel. He
wanted to photograph Arafat's tomb. The last time he'd tried, a
Norwegian diplomatic mission had descended on the scene and it
became impossible to get a clear shot. Late afternoon on a rainy
day should have ensured a solitary experience but when he reached
the Muqata he saw something had changed. The tomb glowed in
the fading light. The rain was turning to sleet, even snow. But
the normally low-key military guard had been reinforced. Inside
the marble vault, there was still just one soldier in dress uniform.
Outside, however, there were armed men stationed at every possible
vantage point.
Kodwo took a few desultory snaps, feeling pressured by the soldiers
to move on as quickly as possible. He walked away, heading back
towards the high tower block that loomed over the Muqata. They said
the building was where the Israeli army had been based during the
siege. A long, desolate wasteland separated it from the compound.
The rubble of demolished buildings, littered with rubbish, was
dotted with crows scavenging in the rain. To one side stood a tiny,
makeshift stall made from white canvas, decorated with graffiti and
telephone numbers. Inside, one old man sat beside a table of books
and photographs covered in plastic – everything was in Arabic, but
Kodwo guessed it was a kind of witnessing, remembering the siege
of the compound. The man gestured for him to sit and offered him
coffee, pointing grimly to the snow-dark sky. They sat in silence,
inhaling the aroma, looking out across the wasteland.
Kodwo was tired and reckoned that was why the shadows kept
bothering his eyes. Amidst the rubble, the crows seemed to flit
into shadows as the twilight deepened. The birds were pecking at
something viciously but in that light it was impossible to see what
291
they were attacking with such fury. In fact, in that light, with the
snow falling heavier now, it might not have been crows. There was
no perspective. They might have been dogs, even humans, on all
fours, feeding crazily on some ungodly lump of meat.
Suddenly, a gaunt figure was striding swiftly across the empty waste
ground towards the feeding frenzy. It was the mud man from the
hotel foyer. He had a hammer in one hand and a clutch of sticks in
the other. When he reached the animals, there was a painful scream
as he leaned down and beat a stake into the largest of the beasts. The
others tried to escape but two more were caught and dispatched,
squealing and howling in the darkness.
The rest flew off. The muddy stranger stood up and strode across to
the stall. The old man offered him coffee and he accepted, speaking
fluent Arabic. Then he turned to Kodwo.
"Well, you called me… and your wish is our command.
What next?"
"I called you?"
"Yes. 'Harry.' Remember?"
"Harry?"
"Houdini. Pleasure to meet you. Repeat another word
though, and I'll stake you."
"What was that about?" asked Kodwo, nodding towards the
waste ground.
"Vampires," Harry looked back at the troops circling the Muqata.
"They know, but they can't say it out loud."
"You said your wish is 'our' command. Are there more of
you?" asked Kodwo, wondering what exactly was Harry anyway?
"Mmm. There are a few of us. We share an interest in
the place. For me, it was professional." Harry smiled. "The
largest open prison in the world – escapology and all
that. Fascinating."
Harry raised a bony, bloodied finger to his chapped lips before
Kodwo could say more. "No
time. We need to stop them from
breeding."
He thanked the old man and tugged at Kodwo's jacket, pointing
"There's a quarry beyond the Qalandiya
refugee camp. That's where we're going."
across the city.
It was a long slog. The snow turned to heavy, freezing rain and
Harry kept up a demonic pace. Kodwo trailed behind miserably in
the dark. Finally Harry stopped and waited for him to catch up. "It's
here. The queen is roosting in a high crevice. I'll flush
her out and you will finish her off."
Harry handed Kodwo the longest, thinnest stake he had. "You
want the hammer?" he asked. Kodwo nodded dumbly, looking
at the stake.
They passed through a broken fence and headed down a steep incline
until they were at the bottom of what appeared to be a vast arena.
The quarry cliffs towered above them. Kodwo thought: this must be
what it was like on the sea floor in the Atlantic, in the middle of a
tempest.
Harry began to scale one side of the quarry. He moved with speed,
uncanny in his ability to find a foothold on the sheer surface. Now he
was barely visible, but Kodwo thought he had stopped. Suddenly, he
could see a flame ignite and watched it fly through the air into the
darkness of the cliff face. There was a horrible, piercing shriek and a
large dark mass – half ablaze – was falling towards him.
293
It hit the ground with a hard thump but within seconds started
writhing, extinguishing the flames around it. Kodwo could make
out a female face but the creature it belonged too was that of an
immense, pulsing cockroach, its legs twitching furiously as it tried
to gain purchase on the ground. Its large belly quivered in spasms,
the young inside squealing and pushing against the belly lining.
The creature looked about it and found Kodwo. It launched itself
immediately in his direction and instinctively, his heart pumping, he
gripped the stake in his right hand and plunged it into the advancing
beast. It collapsed but its stomach exploded immediately. Screaming
young flailed across the quarry floor. Kodwo blindly beat them back
with the hammer, shouting uncontrollably. Then Harry was there,
slicing each one like an eel and staking them.
Kodwo was badly shaken and couldn't remember how they had
reached the main road again. Two jeeps hurtled by, their headlights
blinding him. He grabbed Harry's arm.
"What happened?" he shouted. "Did I just kill a woman?"
"No," shouted Harry in reply. "When vampires take their
prey, they can adapt their physiology. What you just
encountered may have included a human several
generations back but now that creature is a hybrid –
insect, human, supernatural. A whole new species." He
looked Kodwo in the eye. "A monster," he shouted.
They came to an apartment block and Harry led the way up the
stairs, out of the rain to a red door. He rang the bell and Kodwo was
shocked to see Suleiman Mansour let them in.
Suleiman laughed and held out his hand in greeting.
"Kodwo! I'd embrace you but you seem to have been
swimming!"
Kodwo just shook his head and followed Harry into the apartment.
Suleiman beckoned them over to a table that was already heaped
with food.
"Help yourself, Kodwo. Harry, I think, is beyond things
like eating."
Harry laughed and just then the door to what must have been the
kitchen opened, and a small woman appeared, carrying a pot of
strong smelling coffee.
Kodwo thought she looked familiar. While she poured the hot, thick
liquid he studied her face. She caught his eye and smiled, knowing
he was trying to remember. There was something regal about the
way she stood there. She radiated an elegant authority that defied
the chaos of the present. It was only when she automatically reached
to her lips with a handkerchief and dabbed her lips that it came to
him.
"Oum Kalthoum…?"
She nodded modestly and made a little bow, before joining Harry at
a small table at the far end of the room.
Kodwo looked to Suleiman for help.
"Did I call her too?"
"It appears so. Or at least Harry put together a team for
this job," replied Suleiman.
"You're saying there are more of them…?" asked Kodwo.
"One more. In the Negev. He's 'slouching towards
Dimona,' you might say."
There was a sudden clatter from across the room. Oum and Harry
were spilling dominoes onto their table and shuffling them for a
game.
As they began to play they seemed to fall into a trance, moving the
dominos automatically while repeatedly nodding their heads and
295
clucking quietly.
Kodwo and Suleiman settled down with their coffee and Kodwo
recounted what had happened at the quarry.
"Harry described the creature as a monster," he explained,
"but I still feel as if I killed something human."
Suleiman nodded towards a stack of DVD cases in a bookcase against
the wall.
"Recently I've been watching a lot of films. You know I'm
working with video now and so I'm watching old movies
again in a different light." He went over and sorted through the
DVDs, picking out one which he then handed to Kodwo.
"This one – The Pervert's Guide to Cinema by Slavoj
Žižek – it's got some beautiful clips. He analyzes the
scene in Alien where the baby monster bursts out of
the crewman's chest. You remember the scene." Suleiman
"Anyway, Žižek says something like "humanity means
the aliens are controlling our animal bodies. Our ego is
an alien force, distorting, controlling our body." Suleiman
imitated the creature emerging from his chest with his hands.
mimicked a lisping, heavy East European accent and stared
dramatically into Kodwo's eyes,
"We ourselves are the aliens
controlling our bodies."
As if in response, Harry and Oum stopped clucking and looked over,
fully awake again.
"Can we watch television?" asked Harry.
Suleiman nodded and picked up a remote from the table.
They all sat on the sofa and watched the screen warm to life. Suleiman
flicked through various soap operas until he found a news bulletin.
Helicopter gunships were swooping across a desert landscape, a
scared-looking reporter was pointing to a giant tower in the distance
and in the background it was possible to hear the shocked gasp of the
cameraman. The tower came into focus. It had enormous teeth and
angry, bulbous eyes. Its skin was scaly, dripping with slime, and it
stood tall on its massive, muscular haunches.
"It's Godzilla!!" shouted Kodwo.
Harry and Oum cheered and waved their arms in celebration.
Suleiman laughed and patted Kodwo comfortingly on the shoulder.
Kodwo watched in a daze as the monster raced across a perimeter
fence into a vast industrial installation. There it promptly began to
demolish everything in its path. Reaching the centre of the building
complex, Godzilla batted away the onrushing gunships, ignoring
them as they spun off crazily in billows of black smoke. Finally, the
monster leaned into a smokestack closing its vast jaws on something
out of sight.
"Eating the core," murmured Oum with some satisfaction. Harry
grunted happily.
Sated, the monster lifted its head, climbed onto the rubble of the
surrounding buildings and roared.
Outside the apartment, there was the rattle of gunfire. Suleiman got
up to look.
"Someone celebrating?" asked Harry.
"No," replied Suleiman, peering into the darkness. "They've set
up checkpoints on every road. I think they're getting
ready to search door to door."
"Resist," murmured Oum.
Suleiman returned to the table and spread out a map. Harry, Oum,
and Kodwo gathered round him.
"Bi'lin is where we fight." He jabbed his finger at the map.
"There is a legion of vampires buried in the fields there
but we also have allies in the same place." Shifting his finger
slightly, he pointed again. "Just here, on the edge of the fields
there is a congregation of beehives. The insects have
297
agreed to help us and they will attack while we prepare
our weapons."
"Is it sticks again?" asked Kodwo.
"You mean stakes," said Harry. "No. This time we are the
weapons."
He grabbed a sheet of drawing paper and began to sketch.
"Oum will create a sonic wave – it will rouse them and
they will be profoundly disturbed by its beauty."
Harry hastily drew a series of boxes on the paper.
"Suleiman has devised a series of projections – images of
daylight – and they'll be projected around the field while
I – ," here he paused and drew a circle in the centre of the field, "– I
will create a diversion, worthy of Houdini."
"This is going to work…?" asked Kodwo hesitantly.
"It's not real daylight, I know," said Suleiman, "but the
image is real and it is made of light, and Harry's skill
lies in making you accept the impossible."
"And we don't have time to debate it either," said Harry,
folding up the map. "They're going to be here in minutes."
They left the lights on and the food was still sitting on the table.
Grabbing coats they rushed downstairs into the uneasy night.
"We'll split up – Harry and Oum, you have your own
ways to get there," said Suleiman.
"Can we do this?" asked Kodwo plaintively.
"Godspeed", murmured Oum as they set out.
Israeli Goverment
Relocated
Associated Press [staff writer]. 26 DEC 2047.
Following the overthrow of Israeli cities by
Palestinian forces last week, the Israeli
government has been evacuating the country
and temporarily relocating in Brooklyn, New
York.
Avi Azoulay, spokesman of the Israeli
government, declared this morning at an
overcrowded press conference at Ben Gurion
Airport: "You shouldn't consider our escape
as treason or cowardice, but as a strategic
retreat while preparing for the next battle."
299
Palestinian Tel Aviv
Reuters [staff writer]. 09 JAN 2048.
The Israeli population seems stunned by
its own defeat, according to foreign press
correspondents and UN envoys.
Scenes of looting and squatting have been
witnessed throughout the country, but
only sporadic fire was reported. Tel Aviv’s
townhall fell yesterday, and the city was
immediately renamed Jaffa.
According to a Jerusalem Media &
Communication Center poll, 87% of Israel's
population is ready to leave the country if
Palestinian domination lasts.
North Sea Refugees
European Press Feed [M.Br.]. 23 MAR 2048.
The “Exodus 2048,” a Maltese ferry carrying
4,500 Israeli refugees, is roaming the North
Sea again, after British authorities denied
docking in Kingston-upon-Hull. According to
the UNHCR, the sanitary situation aboard
is alarming. Outbreaks of scurvy and
tuberculosis have been reported.
An extraordinary meeting of EU's
Immigration Ministers is scheduled tomorrow
in Istanbul.
301
"Exodus 2048"
Allowed To Dock
Associated Press [staff writer]. 11 APR 2048.
After a heated debate, the Dutch Tweede
Kamer (Second Chamber) allowed the
“Exodus 2048” to dock in Rotterdam at the
Quarantine Pier. Piet Verwoerd, the Dutch
Minister of Crime and Immigration, tempered
that this emergency measure was temporary
and that the refugees would not be allowed
to disembark.
Refugees End Hunger
Strike
ANP [MvW/eng]. 05 MAY 2048.
The “Exodus 2048” refugees agreed to
interrupt their hunger strike yesterday,
after Queen Amalia demanded that the
government provide the boatpeople with
proper accomodation.
The decree, which will determine refugee
quotas for each region, and the list of
buildings to be requisitioned, will be passed
shortly.
r
303
Refugee Camp at
Van Abbemuseum
Nederlands Persbureau [stff wrtr/eng]. 17 MAY 2048.
The Van Abbemuseum in Eindhoven has
been chosen as one of the five buildings
requisitioned in Noord-Brabant to
accomodate Israeli refugees.
A group of 120 refugees has been staying on
museum premises since last Tuesday. They
hope to have land granted, and to establish
a kibbutz in the Eindhoven area. Nurit
Ashkelon, spokesperson of the refugees,
declared yesterday after a meeting
with Fatima van Rijn, Mayor of Eindhoven:
"Our fate is terrible, but the odds will revive
the pioneering spirit of our forerunners. The
“Eretz Hoven” kibbutz will constitute the
first step towards a future, peaceful, and
democratic Israel."
20 Years after the E
305
e Exodus 2048 Odyssey
// Miri Stern Interviewed by Lotte
Published in Voice of the Buuret,
Can you tell me under what circumstances you left
Israel?
By the last days of 2048, most Israeli
citizens had left their country in one of the
most massive transfers of population in the
21st century. The relocation of the Israeli
government in Brooklyn, as well as the
creation of the New State of Israel (Israel
Hakhadasha) in Uganda have remained little
known. Miri Stern, a scientist and founder of
Kibbutz Eretz Hoven, spoke to journalist Lotte
Müller about the ordeal of Exodus 2048 and
her own experience on board.
The situation had been very explosive beginning
in September with the onset of the Grand Jihad.
In November came the takeover of the Sinai and
the bombings of Haifa and Tel Aviv. But most
Israelis continued as before, oblivious to what
was happening. A few weeks later rumors began,
that the Arabs were about to take over all of
Israel. At one point, they seized all of Jerusalem’s
neighborhoods, returned to the Green Line, and
then proceeded westward. They were getting closer
to Tel Aviv, and we had to go, quickly. It was like
a steam-roller that couldn’t be stopped. We didn’t
have much time to think about what we should do.
Lotte Müller: 20 years after the incidents of December
What eventually convinced you to leave?
2047, I would like to recall the chain of events. You
Fear. The rumors were getting more persistent and
we grew really scared. As informed and liberal as
we were, there was a level of fear that could not be
withstood. When you hear stories of Arabs taking
over Jewish houses and entire neighborhoods over
and over again, you start believing them; they
gain currency.
were among the active witnesses of the time…
Miri Stern: That’s true. Those months seem very
close and very far at the same time. In retrospect,
it is hard to believe that I had to leave my country
forever. We always take countries for granted,
hence the shock when one ceases to exist.
M
R
e
t,
307
Müller
Rotterdam (EU), 20.03.2068
You followed a basic instinct for survival.
In hindsight, I know that the whole country was
deserted upon a mere rumor. We had the news, but
never saw actual fighting. It was ridiculous, yet
very powerful. Nothing spreads faster than fear.
We were all scared, and one man's fear fed the
other's fear. The whole country sensed a danger
and was frantically running away. Everyone was
thinking that only the fastest would be able to
leave… I was no different, I admit. Above all, I
wanted to save my children. I didn’t think much
about the rest. We all thought we’d be back
shortly.
So you didn’t witness fighting in Tel Aviv?
No, I didn’t. I know it sounds crazy today, that
we left without fighting, just by hearsay. But
that's how it happened. I could hear remote
gunshot exchange but it was relatively light, and
never too close to the city center – we lived on
Allenby, at the corner of Lilienblum.
When you read the accounts in the press of that time,
it is hard to form an opinion, to understand what was
And bombings?
really going on.
Aside from the Haifa bombing in September, we
took Iranian threats very seriously. They had
hundreds of missiles aimed at us and no one was
protecting us anymore. Remember that the US
had entirely given up any form of support after
the Dubai treaty. But the fact is that Iran never
launched the missiles and I was never sure, for a
couple of years, whether they were bluffing or not.
As in any war, the media become a mere vector
of propaganda. They use the situation for other
purposes. They don’t really report. It has always
been the case, but in the last decade, with the
help of technology, it had become ever more
sophisticated. At the same time, war had become
more and more brutal and sophisticated.
Do you remember the exact circumstances of your
departure?
It was December 15 I think, a Tuesday.
This I remember because I had had a dentist
appointment for a long time; it’s one of those
insignificant facts that stay in your memory for no
reason. The Friday before, I thought that I should
cancel it. Eventually I decided to go, but the office
was closed and the building apparently empty.
The area [the corner of Allenby and Bialik],
normally very lively, was even calmer than on
Saturdays. It was surreal. That’s what scared
me. I called my children – David was 13 and
Leah 15 at the time – and summoned them home.
In school, the teachers were calling parents to
come and pick up their children, they didn’t want
to let them go by themselves, as usual. At this
point, there was no longer a sense of normalcy.
Everywhere you could see people loading cars. I
didn’t fully understand what was going on; events
were sliding on the surface of my conscience. We
packed just a bag each and left – I had always
heard from my parents that life was more precious
than commodities. We closed the door as if we’d
return the day after. That was the last time I was
there.
What were your thoughts then?
I can only remember that I was thinking of my
dentist appointment and that it was a shame I
missed it.
Didn’t you think of fighting back instead of leaving?
No one was fighting… Of course, there was a
military solution and Israel had a good record
in trying to solve political problems by force.
But what was failing us was a moral drive. We
had basically oppressed Arabs for a century, and
there’s no way you can negate that. The whole
country was oblivious to the facts, but deep down,
you knew that what you’d done, or what had been
done in your name, was not in line with the moral
standards you would have liked in your country.
From South Africa to Israel, a regime that has
no moral legitimacy can not last forever. We had
fought the Arabs for a hundred years, but we
knew that one day we’d have to account for the
hardships inflicted upon them. So yes, we simply
left, we all deserted …
309
Can you describe what happened after you left your
house, how you managed to get out of the country?
It was a huge mess, and I must have forgotten
most details. I had heard that Lod (Lydda) had
already fallen, so I thought that trying to reach
the airport would be suicidal. I knew that the UN
was negotiating a humanitarian corridor, but in
Israel we had grown skeptical of UN initiatives.
So instead, my children and I attempted to reach
the harbor in Jaffa, which was walking distance
from the apartment. We were a bit anxious
because of the Arab population there, but there
was no safe, ideal situation anywhere. Buses were
not running and taxis were all packed with people
and luggage, so walking was best. On the way
to Jaffa, we discovered that many others had the
same idea – the harbor was crowded and in total
chaos.
How was the situation in the city of Jaffa, outside the
harbor?
Very confusing. The news was contradictory.
For people with twin-identities, and double to a
point of total schizophrenia like in the case of
most Israeli Arabs, it must have been a terrible
moment – to choose one side at the expense of the
other. Some of them were parading and chanting
victory, but on our way to the harbor, we also saw
many families preparing to leave, as anxious as
everyone else.
What happened once you reached the harbor?
It was packed with tens of thousands of people,
unbelievable! The Jewish Agency and JNF were
there with volunteers, trying to organize. People
were assigned numbers and places on ships that
were supposed to come. But there were few docks
and the harbor was not equipped for docking large
ships, which slowed down the whole evacuation
process and led to a major chaos. Since nothing
was happening, we tried to find an alternative.
Leah spoke to people who were in touch with a
fisherman. We ended up paying GBL$ 4,000 per
person and embarked on a fishing trawler, bound
for Cyprus. The trip was horrendous. I really
thought we would die at sea. The weather was bad
and the boat loaded way beyond capacity. But we
landed the next day, exhausted but alive.
Why Cyprus?
I suppose it was the only destination possible
with a small ship. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria were
ruled out, and friendly countries were too far.
Cyprus had always been special for Israelis – as
the closest part of the ‘Free World,’ as they used
to say – and then turned into the major hub for
Israeli refugees.
Did you then embark on the Exodus 2048 right away?
Not right away, but it didn’t take too long. The
UNHCR and a variety of NGOs were there, trying
to organize chaos, apparently more efficiently than
the Jewish Agency and JNF in Jaffa. In Larnaca,
the dramatic chaos of Jaffa turned into a refugee
machine. It was a huge camp organized like a
little army and guarded like a prison. Refugees
were pouring in continuously, day and night. I’ve
read that 80% of Israel’s population transited
in Larnaca within a couple of weeks. Apparently
there had been a deal made with Cyprus, that no
refugee would exit the harbor area. Most of the
refugees quickly embarked on cargo ships, ferries,
and requisitioned cruise ships headed towards
Libya, where a humanitarian corridor to Uganda
had been negotiated.
Did you know at the time that Israel Hakhadasha
had been inaugurated in Uganda, after Herzl’s plan of
1903?
That was the main discussion topic among
refugees and there were very heated debates!
311
That’s why you were allowed to board the Exodus
2048, which was reserved for dual EU-Israeli citizens
What was your position on that?
and visa holders?
You can’t just relocate like that, establishing a
state is more complex than writing the myth of
its creation. And the official government, at the
time, had just relocated to Brooklyn, so there was
real confusion about authority and legitimacy. I
personally believe that the split between Uganda
and Brooklyn was the very end of Israel, not
the Palestinian takeover. You cannot physically
save a country which has already vanished in its
essence. And everyone was responsible for that –
the Ashkenazim with their class racism, and the
Mizrahi themselves, who were happy to be rid of
the Ashkenazim. It’s the old story, you know…
I suppose. What we didn’t know though, was that
EU authorities would consider us only as Israeli
citizens and deny us any EU citizens' rights!
Despite all that, were you tempted by Uganda?
I was, but I thought that Europe would offer my
children a better future. There was nothing in
Uganda. The Jewish Agency purchased the land
in part with government funds, but everything
had to be done, from scratch. I felt I was too old
for a new Utopia. I needed safety more than the
prospect of a new society in which I didn’t really
believe. Since my children and I had EU passports
as well, there was no visa issue – at least we
thought so.
On what grounds? That must have been illegal.
It was indeed illegal. But the EU and local
governments quickly tailored laws that legalized
our treatment.
Was the Exodus 2048 initially bound to a EU city?
Yes, to Bari. But we didn’t even approach the
harbor. Police speedboats surrounded us and
prevented the ship from docking. We were forced
to drop anchor a good distance from the shore.
Our morale started to decline. The next day, we
saw demonstrators chanting "Italians in Italia,
Jews in Uganda" on TV. We realized we were
pariahs, no one wanted to see us, have us. That
evening I had a long argument with Leah. She
was very upset at inheriting our mess, and she
blamed the entire situation on my generation. We
had been incapable of remembering our ideals and
had, with the previous generations, produced a
great country which had gone badly astray. That
was her point, and she was not entirely wrong…
313
Maybe these arguments simply revealed the level of
tension?… How long were you stuck in Bari?
It seemed very long. Two weeks, perhaps.
There were negotiations going on, but no good
negotiator who could impose a compromise. Every
party was, as ever, protecting its self interests
with no understanding or compassion whatsoever.
How was life onboard?
The ship was decent when we embarked in
Larnaca; it was originally a cruise ship. But it
loaded 4,500 people with capacity for 1,400.
Hygiene and living conditions deteriorated
quickly. Food was sparse and of deteriorating
quality, the water got contaminated, there were
not enough toilets… We were in a cabin for 6,
with 6 other people in the beginning, and then
more and more came. Life in the cabin itself was
hellish, but outside it was even worse. People
were lying across the corridors everywhere, it was
difficult to move to or from the cabin; the smell
was horrendous… Leah was very combative and
optimistic; she was probably the strongest of us
three. David became depressed; he would just lie
anywhere and do nothing. That really worried me.
Everyone hoped to disembark quickly, because we
all knew that the situation would only get worse,
but we couldn’t do much about it.
So you weren’t allowed to disembark in Bari, right?
Right, neither in Bari nor elsewhere. No country
was willing to make an effort. European leaders
and public opinion thought that we had somehow
deserved our fate, that we had planted the seed,
the product of which we were now harvesting. We
could sense a great deal of Schadenfreude. Then
there was a final round of negotiations and France
agreed to accept the ship in Marseilles.
How was the news received onboard?
The main thing was to dock, where was
secondary. I think the French government did
that to lift the first round of negotiations, but had
no intention of letting us in. So when we arrived
in Marseilles, it was the same old song again.
This time we docked, but we were not allowed to
disembark. The French government had passed a
law while we were en route, preventing any people
carrying diseases to enter the country. Only a few
people in poor health and with good connections
were taken to hospitals, in spite of the new law.
As for the dead, they were kept in the ship’s
freezers.
But everyone knew that the sanitary situation would
only get worse…
Absolutely. But that’s how people in charge think;
they want to get rid of the problem at the expense
of a weaker party. It doesn’t matter if it gets
worse, as long as someone else ends up taking
care of it. But to us, it was devastating. Living
conditions were deteriorating every day; it was
now a matter of survival. In Marseilles, there were
already breakouts of scurvy and tuberculosis.
The toilets were in such a state that we couldn’t
use them anymore. And most of us were very
depressed.
What happened next?
We were re-routed towards Valletta, Malta. But
when we reached Malta, the ship went back right
away. Malta was threatening to sue the EU if the
ship approached its coast. That’s what all EU
countries wanted to do, but it was not acceptable
to say it bluntly. So we came back to Marseilles,
as if we hadn’t left.
315
Is that when the uprising took place?
Yes, it was. Refugees had elected a board to
represent them, and the board decided that we
should seize the ship, which we did, quite easily.
The crew members were upset with the situation
and somehow happy to be forced off.
Was it the board who took the decision to head to
Kingston-upon-Hull?
The board put the question to the vote and won
with an overwhelming majority. There was a
rumor onboard, that only the UK could take us,
that they had a better record with immigration –
which was a hoax! I remember the Exodus leaving
Marseilles escorted by hundreds of police
speedboats. They left only once we had reached
international waters. But in Hull, guess what:
the same thing happened again. We were used
to it at this point. We were pariahs everywhere,
carrying diseases and with little hope. But, at
the same time, we were also becoming a source
for EU embarrassment, they needed to solve the
issue and have us disappear from the headlines.
We had been on the Exodus 2048 for almost three
months…
Is that why the Istanbul meeting was called?
The Turkish government took the measure of
the disaster, both morally and politically, and
decided to call an extraordinary meeting of EU’s
Crime and Immigration Ministers. In her opening
speech, Gülsün Dink, Turkey’s Prime Minister,
said that no one would leave the premises before
an agreement was reached. A motion was later put
to the vote, forcing the Netherlands to let the ship
dock and take care of the refugees.
Why the Netherlands?
Apparently because they had the biggest debt in
the EU budget, and other countries were annoyed
with their constant vetoes of many issues. In
addition, it was close to Hull, and Rotterdam was
equipped with quarantine piers and quarters.
So you docked in Rotterdam?
Yes, and in the beginning, the same thing
happened. This time, we would be allowed to
disembark, but only after a quarantine period.
There were obviously very heated debates within
Dutch society and Parliament, and a group of
opposition representatives managed to freeze the
Istanbul process. But we were at our wits end
and had to take a ground-breaking initiative to
force our entry into the country. That’s when most
of us went on hunger strike. The general feeling
onboard was that we had to pressure the EU with
guilt, our only weapon… After three weeks or so,
the Queen decided to end the nightmare and treat
us like they used to treat refugees in the 20th
century. We called off the hunger strike then, and
that was the end of almost four months onboard
the Exodus 2048. It was an odd impression to
walk on firm ground again.
317
What were your thoughts then? Did you see it as a
victory?
We were all too wrecked to think of a victory,
it was rather a relief; also because upon
disembarking, we were in the care of a medical
team. After a week, we started feeling much better,
even though I had no idea what would happen
to us in a world that had no place for us. Yet the
exhausting journey was over, and we were very
happy. Hope was possible again.
Lotte Müller is a writer and a journalist. She recently
published Rise and Fall of the Jewish Utopia: A Critical
Reader (New York & Shanghai: MacMillan, 2067).
Miri Stern was born in Tel Aviv, 2007. After
studies at the Universities of Haifa and Oxford,
UK, she devoted her time to research and
teaching, in Israel and overseas. She was the
founder of the Department of Particle Physics at
Tel Aviv University, and the author of numerous
articles. Since the collapse of the State of Israel,
Stern has been associated with institutions in
both Europe and North America. She was also one
of the founders of Kibbutz Eretz Hoven, the first
kibbutz on European soil. She lives in Eindhoven
and New York.
The interview was conducted in English and
published in Dutch translation. The above was
excerpted from the original transcript.
Originally published in the framework of
Michael Blum's project 'Exodus 2048' at Van
Abbemuseum, Eindhoven, 2008, and New
Museum, New York, 2009.
© Voice of the Buurt, 2068
Images from pages 308-315 are taken from the work:
Michael Blum, Exodus 2048, 2008, mixed media
installation, "Be(com)ing Dutch," Van Abbemuseum,
Eindhoven
Photos: Peter Cox
International Academy of Art Palestine
This project is
funded by The
European Union
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Wachsmuth's project: