Pakistan Army's first warlord who led its longest war - General Douglas Gracey and the Kashmir War of 1947-48

The 14 Month Battles for Kashmir: The longest and least read and known Indo Pak War fought over a vast area, 1999

The 14 Month Battles for Kashmir: The longest and least read and known Indo Pak War fought over a vast area

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Pakistan's Wars, 2022

This book is about all the wars of Pakistan. The chapters required are the ones which deal with war and gender. These are the last four chapters. There is one on females and one on males. Both are based in interviews and written testimonials including memoirs and biographies. The plight of women displaced, killed, raped and assaulted in all the wars from the Kashmir one (1947-48) till the present ongoing suicide and other attacks by radical Islamists is the focus of the chapter. The stories of women in 1971 in Bangladesh get prominent coverage. In the chapter on males and war, I have included the stories of the prisoners of war, mostly Pakistani ones, in 1971.

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Pakistan's Wars, 2023

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Pakistan Army from 1965 to 1971, 2000

Pakistan Army from 1965 to 1971 October 2000 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35888.37121 Agha H AminAgha H Amin

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Pakistan Army's first warlord who led its longest war - General Douglas Gracey and the Kashmir War of 1947-48 Paperback – Large Print, January 23, 2023 by Agha H Amin (Author), 2023

by Agha H Amin (Author) https://a.co/d/huoyKlS INITIAL MISERABLE FAILURES OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE LEADERSHIP IN KASHMIR WAR-HOW KASHMIR WAS IRREVOCABLY LOST BY PHENOMENALLY INCOMPETENT MUSLIM LEAGUE LEADERS OF PAKISTAN IN 1947 • January 2023 • DOI: • 10.13140/RG.2.2.27203.82723 • Agha H Amin Liaquat Ali Khan and Malik Ghulam Mohammad’s Kakkezi relative Railway battalion major Khursheed Anwar was the biggest reason for the tribal invasion’s failure on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis. As per Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was closely connected with leading the invasion , the tribal invasion was planned in September 1947 but Khursheed Anwar disappeared to get married to a Muslim League worker. Pakistani state had two excellent choices , as military commanders to lead the main tribal attack on Muzarrafarabad-Srinagar axis . These were Major Taj Khanzada DSO,MC and Gen Zaman Kiani, sword of honour of IMA and ex chief of Indian national army. Such was the criminal parochialism in the newly created Pakistani state that a railway battalion emergency commission was handpicked by PM Liaquat and his finance minister Malik Ghulam Mohammad,on grounds that he was Ghulam Mohammads Kakkezai clanmate and relative from Jullundhur. It was most irrational to pick up a man whose only qualification was petty intrigue , fomenting riots and who had no military knowledge. But that is how the All India Muslim League was run , right from its creation in 1906. Khursheed Anwar further committed a major security breach when against orders given to him , he contacted Brigadier Iftikhar Khan (Minhas)-later chief designate, at that time commanding 103 Brigade (old Nowshera Brigade) , and requested him for machine guns. As per Shaukat Hayats memoirs , Iftikhar reported this matter to the Pakistan Army C in C ( Gracey at that time officiating as acting C in C), who in turn reported the matter to Indian Army’s British chief ,Lockhart , thus first major intelligence breach occurred. As per Dasgupta :-- “ The Defence Committee met at 10 a.m. on 25 October, under Mountbatten's chairmanship. General Lockhart informed the members that he had received a telegram on the previous day from the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Gracey. This conveyed that a force of 5,000 tribesmen had entered Kashmir and seized Muzaffarabad and Domel on 22 October. It warned that the force was about to attack Kohala. The Prime Minister added that he also had information about large-scale raids In the Jammu area, right up to Poonch. He pointed out that the trucks and arms which had been supplied to the raiders could have been provided only with the assistance of the Pakistan authorities. He had received Information that the Invasion had He had received Information that the Invasion had been planned a fortnight earlier at a conference In Rawalpindi.” Mr Jinnah’s handpicked Pakistan Army Chief of Staff ,Gracey , was India’s best intelligence asset in October 1947 . In this regard Mr. Jinnah , unwittingly and without knowing what was happening , was masterly in selecting people who destroyed Pakistan Army’s chances of, any ,strategic success in Kashmir war as well as selecting two notorious bureaucrats, Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali ,who destroyed Pakistan’s political system and paved the way for Ayub Khan’s disastrous military takeover. Later General Musa Khan in his memoirs narrated that the Indian plan to airlift troops to Srinagar was was routed through Lahore in Pakistan , as this was the only available line . Musa tasked Lieutenant Qaiser Baig to decode the Indian cyphers . Once this was done Musa contacted Chaudhry Mohammad Ali whose staff forbade Musa , on grounds that the Chaudhry was sleeping .Musa then sent the Intercepted Indian plan to the Pakistan Army DMI/DMO , Brigadier Sher Khan, MC , who as per Musa’s account did not do anything. One of the two biggest Pakistani failures in addition to general Gracey sabotaging Pakistan Army’s Kashmir war effort at every strategic decision point was in cancelling the Pakistani plan to cut Indian lines of communication at Jammu , proposed by Brigadier Akbar Khan Pareechkhel DSO on 27th October 1947 at a conference presided by Pakistan’s indecisive prime minister at Lahore. As per Akbar Khan the idea was only supported by Mamdot and Qayyum Khan, while the majority participants had cold feet. Brigadier Akbar Khan, D.S.O described this meeting of indecisives as below: -- “In Pakistan, the same evening, the Prime Minister held an unofficial conference at Lahore to consider the situation arising out of Kashmir’s accession and India’s military intervention. At this conference, among others were also present Colonel Iskander Mirza (then Defence Secretary, later to be Governor- General), Chaudhry Mohammad Ali (then Secretary General, later to be Prime Minister), Abdul Qayum Khan, Chief Minister of the Frontier Province and Nawab Mamdot, Chief Minister of the Punjab. Brigadier Sher Khan and I, were also invited. At this conference I proposed that an attempt should be made to liquidate Jammu in order to block the only road along which India could send reinforcements into the valley and the rest of Kashmir. I did not suggest that troops should be used for this purpose or that the Government should get involved in this. I suggested only that tribesmen may be allowed to make the attempt. I thought that three lashkars of a thousand each should be used. The tribesmen were available and I offered to go with them. With Indian military intervention, Jammu had at once become a focal point of the greatest importance. India had no other land route going into the State except that passing through Jammu. All reinforcements, coming by land, would concentrate there. From there they would move north into the valley and thereby prolong operations in that area. From there also, they would move west along the road to Naushehra and thereby seriously threaten the liberation progress in the central areas of Rajauri and Poonch etc., where at present the liberation forces were virtually masters of the situation. Further, if relations between India and Pakistan took a dangerous turn, the base at Jammu, sitting right on top of Sialkot, would become a serious threat to our own security. Blocking Jammu, I felt, would be like nipping an evil in the bud, while leaving it open would be letting the Azad operations become like emptying, with a cup, a tank into which a running stream was pouring. Although there might be no prospect of the tribesmen capturing Jammu, their action might well scare the Maharajah enough to run away from there as he had run from Srinagar. In any case, with him or without, a large number of others would certainly run for the safety across the border and in doing so they would block the route for a while. Or at least, once in the hills to the west of Jammu, the tribesmen would for a time prevent the movement of troops towards the central areas. The proposal was however, with the exception of Abdul Qayum Khan and Nawab Mamdot, opposed by everyone else—and it had to be abandoned. It was felt that this would provoke India to attack Pakistan and such a risk could not be taken. No one of course wanted an Indo-Pakistan war but many reasons did exist in support of the feeling that India was in no position to start such a war. Already the tribesmen had penetrated 80 miles into the State, already they had gone through Pakistan territory, already India believed, though wrongly, that tribesmen had also besieged Mirpur, Poonch, Kotli, Jhangar, Naushehra and Bhimbar —and, therefore, India already had enough excuse for extending the war to Pakistan. That she had not done so was simply because of the fact that she was militarily not strong enough to take such a risk. Her army was undergoing reorganisation, she had enough worries inside the country, and she was particularly apprehensive about provoking the tribal flood into East Punjab where the population was in panic due to such exaggerated reports as those referring to Baramula where out of 14,000 non- Muslims only 3,000 were

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2017

An insight view of Brigadier Mokhtar Karim, who has the honour of working in all three arms of pre-partition Indian Army as an officer. The forefather of Hot-air ballooning in Pakistan and raiser of Pakistan Army Aviation Wing. A first-hand Account of him by his descendent Ayesha Majid Hamid Karim, who has the honour of penning his whole life.

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Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 2022

This article examines the early foundations of the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army. By exploring the impact of the partition of British India in 1947 and the First Kashmir War of 1947–48, the article identifies the pivotal factors in the development of strategic culture of Pakistan. In also examining Pakistani fears of a “vengeful” Hindu India and a persistence in the belief of discredited martial race theories as well as the idea of a Muslim military exceptionalism, the article concludes that the foundation of this culture remains evident while it is also malleable to contemporaneous events.

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Pakistan Military Review, 2009

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.13118.72003 Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary in 1971 Describes Total Perceptual Failure of Pakistani State in East Pakistan Crisis

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