How Philosophy Can Change the World — Radically and for the Better Robert Hanna Karl Marx (1818-1883) In the 11th and most famous of his Theses on Feuerbach, Karl Marx wrote that “philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1964: p. 69). But what did Marx mean, precisely? In an interesting interview published in The New York Times eight months after Donald Trump’s election as US President in November 2016, my favorite contemporary public intellectual — “favorite” because he’s an autonomous, critical, radical thinker who’s refused to accommodate himself to the academic, cultural, or political conventional wisdom or status quo, and has spoken truth to power for 50+ years — Noam Chomsky, said this: N.C.: I am not sure just what Marx had in mind when he wrote that “philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” Did he mean that philosophy could change the world, or that philosophers should turn to the higher priority of changing the world? If the former, then he presumably meant 1 philosophy in a broad sense of the term, including analysis of the social order and ideas about why it should be changed, and how. In that broad sense, philosophy can play a role, indeed an essential role, in changing the world, and philosophers, including in the analytic tradition, have undertaken that effort, in their philosophical work as well as in their activist lives — Bertrand Russell, to mention a prominent example. (Yancy and Chomskt, 2017) In other words, as per Chomsky, the ambiguity in Marx’s remark is between whether he meant (i) that the enterprise of philosophy, which previously to Marx was over-narrowly taken to be merely the interpretation of the world, is now revolutionized so that the new enterprise of philosophy aims at radically changing the world instead, or instead meant (ii) that philosophers, who, as philosophers, can only ever interpret the world, should stop doing philosophy, and try to change the world instead. Actually, however, with all due respect to Chomsky, I think that this is what logicians call a “false dilemma” — i.e., the false appearance of an “A or B but not both” inconsistency — and that Marx in fact consistently meant both of those things. As to (i), Marx was a “Left Hegelian,” aka “Young Hegelian,” who held that the activity of critically and reflectively tracking the dynamic development of human social and political history and the activity of authentic, serious philosophy are one and the same. And as to (ii), like virtually all Left Hegelians, Marx was an angry, unemployed academic who was passionately looking for some way to go beyond professional academic philosophy and become a real-world social and political radical activist. So Marx meant that changing the world is the essential aim of authentic, serious philosophy and also that in order to do authentic, serious philosophy, one has to stop doing academic philosophy and become instead a real-world social and political radical activist, thereby realizing the activity of authentic, serious philosophy in one’s own life. In this connection, as Chomsky indicated, Bertrand Russell is indeed an illuminating case-in-point, because when he became a radical social and political activist and, among other things, challenged England’s involvement in World War I, he was put in prison, removed from his fellowship and lectureship at Cambridge, then briefly reinstated, and then finally quit professional academic philosophy altogether. But there is a fundamental problem with Marx’s view about philosophy and radically changing the world, which is that not every radical social and political change is for the better. Indeed, radical social and political change, as such, can all-too-easily lead to change for the worse, and even to the catastrophically worse. Thus, for example, Marx’s own imperative recommendation, perhaps best expressed in The Communist Manifesto, that workers take control of the means of economic production in order to liberate 2 themselves from capitalist oppression and alienation from the products of their own labor, eventually turned, under Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, into the dictatorship of the proletariat and then into the dictatorship of the vanguard (i.e., elite leaders) of the proletariat, and thus finally into a brutal, coercive, authoritarian, totalitarian version of (in effect) state capitalism. Therefore, in order to be able to change the world radically and for the better, it is necessary, first of all, to change one’s own life radically and for the better, because then and only then will one be able to act upon the world in the right way, and change it radically and for the better. This leads me to a general definition of authentic, serious philosophy, which I think is synoptic, systematic reflection on the human condition in a thoroughly non-ideal world, both natural and social, with the ultimate aim of radically changing one’s own life and others’ lives, and then the larger social and political world, for the better. Now, you might ask yourself: “How could I ever become an authentic, serious philosopher and radically change my own life and other people’s lives, and then the larger social and political world, for the better? I don’t have any sort of academic degree in philosophy; and I hardly have enough time and energy to hold my everyday life together, much less just sit around, mentally twiddling my thumbs!” The answer is already contained in what we’ve seen above when we interpreted what Marx was saying about philosophy and changing the world. In order to become an authentic, serious philosopher you don’t need professional academic philosophy; indeed, professional academic philosophy, which only ever “interprets the world” — in effect, just mentally twiddling its thumbs — is only going to impede your progress towards authentic, serious philosophy. For authentic, serious philosophy isn’t just sitting around mentally twiddling your thumbs, like a professional academic philosopher: it’s actively engaging your critical intellect, and thinking long and hard about the things that matter most to you and other people, with the ultimate aim of radically changing your own life and their lives, and then the larger social and political world, for the better. So what you could do right now, as a beginning authentic, serious philosopher, is to take, say, one hour a day, and read some Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Russell, or Chomsky— and then start thinking critically, reflectively, synoptically, and systematically for yourself about the things that matter most to you and other people, here and now, with the ultimate aim of radically changing your own life and their lives, and then the larger social and political world, for the better. 3 What might such thinking lead you to? In a nutshell, what I’m going to argue now is (i) that only what Michelle Maiese and I call the mind-body politic (Maiese and Hanna, 2019) provides for a philosophical activism that’s at once non-coercive, non-authoritarian, and dignitarian in the Kantian sense, in that it sufficiently respects the absolute, intrinsic, non-denumerably infinite, objective value or worth of all rational human animals, agents, or persons, (ii) that insofar as it’s dignitarian, only the mind-body politic provides for a philosophical activism that creates and sustains all and only social institutions that are grounded on the essentially embodied innate human capacity for rationality, and therefore (iii) that only the mind-body politic provides for a philosophical activism that makes authentic, serious philosophy possible, especially by virtue of its ability to resist and defend itself and innocent others against all forms of coercive authoritarianism, in a fully non-coercive and non-violent way. In The Mind-Body Politic, Maiese and I start with the following basic thesis, drawn from our earlier work—1. Human minds are necessarily and completely embodied (the essential embodiment thesis) (Hanna and Maiese, 2009), Then we proceed from there to argue for three new basic theses: 2. Essentially embodied minds are neither merely brains nor over-extended “extended minds,” yet all social institutions saliently constrain, frame, and partially determine the social-dynamic patterns of our essentially embodied consciousness, self-consciousness, affect, (including feelings, desires, and emotions), cognition, and agency—that is, they literally shape our essentially embodied minds, and thereby fundamentally affect our lives, for worse or better, mostly without our selfconscious awareness (the mind-shaping thesis). 3. Many or even most social institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states literally shape our essentially embodied minds, and thereby our lives, in such a way as to alienate us, mentally enslave us, or even undermine our mental health, to a greater or lesser degree (the destructive Gemeinschaft/collective sociopathy thesis). 4. Nevertheless, some social institutions, working against the grain of standard, dystopian social institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states, can make it really possible for us to self-realize, connect with others in a mutually aiding way, liberate ourselves, and be mentally healthy, authentic, and deeply happy (the constructive Gemeinschaft/collective wisdom thesis). It should be noticed that the kind of destructive, deforming mind-shaping described in thesis 3 inherently admits of degrees—greater or lesser—whereas, by sharp contrast, the kind of constructive, enabling mind-shaping described in thesis 4 is categorically different from the kind of literal mind-shaping that occurs in standard, dystopian neoliberal social institutions. Hence the existence, creation, and development of constructive, enabling social institutions represents an absolute, radical break with the social-institutional status quo in contemporary neoliberal societies. So understood, the 4 conjunction of our four basic theses yields what we call the enactive-transformative principle: Enacting salient or even radical changes in the structure and complex dynamics of a social institution produces corresponding salient or even radical changes in the structure and complex dynamics of the essentially embodied minds of the people belonging to, participating in, or falling under the jurisdiction of, that institution, thereby fundamentally affecting their lives, for worse or better. In short, we can significantly change our own and other people’s essentially embodied minds, and in turn, their lives, whether for worse or better, by means of changing the social institutions we and they inhabit. The enactive-transformative principle, in turn, motivates a philosophico-political clarion call whose simple, yet world-transforming message is that we can freely, systematically, and even radically change existing destructive, deforming social institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states into new constructive, enabling social institutions; and this, as a consequence, enables us to transform our own and other people’s essentially embodied minds and lives significantly or even radically for the better. More generally, The Mind-Body Politic is not only a study in the philosophy of mind, but also a study in radical, emancipatory political theory, drawing on Kant’s theory of radical enlightenment, Schiller’s aesthetic extension of Kant’s radical enlightenment theory, Kierkegaard’s existentialism, early Marx’s existential humanism, Foucault’s insights about governmentality, Frankfurt School Critical theory, and my Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism (Hanna, 2018). For our purposes in that book, here’s what Maiese and I understood by those doctrines. Kant’s theory of radical enlightenment says that in order to liberate ourselves from our own self-imposed rational, moral, and political immaturity, we must dare to think and act autonomously, both as individuals and also publicly or relationally, under the guidance of individually and multiply self-legislated universal ethical principles that require sufficient respect for human dignity. Such respect entails never treating anyone, including ourselves, either as mere instrumental means to self-interested ends or collective happiness or as mere things, hence as non-persons. Schiller’s aesthetic extension of Kant’s radical enlightenment theory says that the life-process of liberating ourselves from our own self-imposed rational, moral, and political immaturity, and daring to think and act autonomously, is neither merely an intellectual process (which Schiller dubs the “formal drive” or Formtrieb), nor merely a sensory process (which he dubs the “sensible drive” or Sinnestrieb). Instead, by way of reconciling, harmonizing, and transcending the other two processes, the emergence of human autonomy is 5 fundamentally a creative, playful process (which Schiller dubs the “play drive” or Spieltrieb) of developing one’s capacities for meaningful self-expression, the appreciation of beauty and other aesthetic qualities, artistic production, feeling, and emotion. Kierkegaard’s existentialism says that our recognition of universal ethical principles must be combined with fundamental spiritual values in the radical absence of certainty about God’s existence or non-existence, and freely worked out by the individual herself over the course of her entire life. All the while, the individual must be guided by the ideal of authenticity, according to which “purity of heart is to will one thing.” Early Marx’s existential humanism says that the alienating “commodification” (instrumentalization and mechanization) of all aspects of human life under the system of large-scale capitalism can be overcome only by self-liberating, self-realizing activity in which all laborers or workers freely create and control both the means of production and its products. Foucault’s work on “governmentality” says that any government’s techniques for coercing and controlling individuals are tied to the ways those individuals monitor and control themselves, aka “subjectivation.” More specifically, self-shaping practices of subjectivation consist of “processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (Foucault, 1993: pp. 203-204), precisely so as to sustain particular behaviors, namely, those coercively compelled or “nudged” within specific power structures and social institutions. Frankfurt School Critical theory says that an essential preliminary to the full recovery of our seriously-diminished capacities for autonomous rational agency in the modern world, including the liberation of our aesthetic and affective (that is, sensible, desiring, and emotional) selves, is our self-conscious, reflective awareness of the pathological impact of the multifarious systems of ideology and thought-control in advanced capitalist States. These toxic arrangements include totalitarian fascist statecapitalist systems, totalitarian communist State-capitalist systems, and all neoliberal nation-States, whether democratic or non-democratic. So The Mind-Body Politic is an explicit, detailed attempt to renew and extend radically enlightened, existentiallyinformed, emancipatory philosophical projects in the tradition of Kant, Schiller, Kierkegaard, early Marx, Kropotkin, Foucault, and the Frankfurt School, in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. Correspondingly, in Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism (Hanna, 2018), I use Kant’s eighteenth century philosophical ideas, together with nineteenth and twentieth century social anarchist (aka anarcho-socialist) doctrines, especially those developed by Peter Kropotkin, in order to develop a contemporary Kantian radically agnostic doctrine in the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and real-world spirituality, and also a cosmopolitan dignitarian emancipatory political theory. By cosmopolitan dignitarian emancipatory political theory, Maiese and I mean any political theory that creates, promotes, and sustains (i) a borderless and global, universal dignitarian moral and political theory (see, e.g., Hanna, 2023a, 2023b), (ii) a critical consciousness about ourselves and our basic 6 relationships to social institutions, (iii) a cognitive and practical resistance to destructive, deforming institutions, and (iv) a radically enlightened self-education that is at once intellectual, moral, aesthetic, affective, religious/spiritual, and existential, via our collective creation of, and individual engagement with, constructive, enabling institutions. More specifically, we believe that the enactive-transformative principle should be directly deployed in service of our critical consciousness, cognitive and practical resistance, and radically enlightened self-education. And that’s how philosophy can change the world—radically and for the better. 7 REFERENCES (Foucault, 1993). Foucault, M. “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth.” Political Theory 21: 198–227. (Hanna, 2018). Hanna, R., Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise. THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 4. New York: Nova Science. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/36359665/The_Rational_Human_Condition_4_Kant_Agnos ticism_and_Anarchism_A_Theological_Political_Treatise_Nova_Science_2018_>. (Hanna, 2023a). Hanna, R. “In Defence of Dignity.” Borderless Philosophy 6: 77-98. Available online at URL = <https://www.cckp.space/single-post/bp6-2023-robert-hannain-defence-of-dignity-77-98>. (Hanna, 2023b). “Dignitarian Post-Capitalism.” Borderless Philosophy 6: 99-129. Available online at URL = <https://www.cckp.space/single-post/bp6-2023-robert-hannadignitarian-post-capitalism-99-129>. (Hanna and Maiese, 2009). Hanna, R. and Maiese, M., Embodied Minds in Action. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/21620839/Embodied_Minds_in_Action>. (Maiese and Hanna, 2019). Maiese, M. and Hanna, R. The Mind-Body Politic. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/38764188/The_Mind-Body_Politic_Preview_Coauthored_with_Michelle_Maiese_forthcoming_from_Palgrave_Macmillan_in_July_2019 _>. (Marx, 1964). Marx, K. Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social Philosophy. Trans. T.B. Bottomore. New York: McGraw-Hill. (Yancy and Chomsky, 2017). Yancy, G. and Chomsky, N. “Noam Chomsky: On Trump and the State of the Union.” The New York Times. 5 July. Available online at URL = <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/opinion/noam-chomsky-on-trump-and-thestate-of-the-union.html?>. 8